



# **VISIONS CANNOT BE NEGLECTED – COMPILATION OF GENERAL PĒTERIS RADZIŅŠ WRITINGS**



**Compiled and Edited by Art Johanson**

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**Foreword by Major General Andis Dilāns  
Editor: Art Johanson**

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# EDITOR'S NOTE

There are many publications available on military leadership and history and therefore we always have a justified question: how the field is covered and researched? The availability of publications covering Baltic region military history and leadership in English is of great significance for the Baltic Defence College because all the studies and research are done in the English language. Therefore, it is clearly visible which parts of the histories of the three Baltic nations are more complete and which parts are lacking sufficient coverage in English. This book tries to fill this gap from the perspective of Latvian military leadership during the World War I and the 1920's.

General Pēteris Radziņš was a fruitful thinker and writer during his active service. He managed to cover the most important aspects of military affairs in writings during his considerably short lifetime. Those writings give a splendid overview about the events and notions during his active service; and to some extent, the leadership lessons are valid even today. I encourage anyone interested in military history to read it, and certainly military leaders who can draw empirical knowledge from the book.

This book was possible thanks to all those who supported the translation and publication of works on military history at the Baltic Defence College in English. I hope that this project will provide sustainable continued translation of Baltic military history literature into English.

**Art Johanson**

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# ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The Editor would like to express sincere gratitude to all the contributors who helped with the contents and the illustrations for the book.

The idea to publish different military history and leadership related books into English owes a lot to the Baltic Defence College management who helped start this significant project. Especially it is important to mention Major General Andis Dilāns, Colonel (ret) Dr Zdzisław Śliwa, Capt. N (ret.) Juris Roze and Dr Asta Maskaliunaite, who provided precious insights and proposed solutions. Book illustrations and General Radziņš biography were generously provided by Major Agris Purviņš from the General Pēteris Radziņš Association.

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*"But to exercise the intellect the prince should read histories, and study there the actions of illustrious men, to see how they have borne themselves in war, to examine the causes of their victories and defeat, so as to avoid the latter and imitate the former; and above all do as illustrious man did, who took as an exemplar one who had been praised and famous before him, and whose achievements and deeds he always kept in his mind, as it is said Alexander the Great imitated Achilles, Caesar Alexander, Scipio Cyrus."*<sup>1</sup>

In the quote above, Niccolò Machiavelli clearly states that to study one's politics, one should study their history and examples from the past in order to learn from their success and avoid their failures.

## FOREWORD - DO WE KNOW OUR HEROES?

A cliché exists in our minds telling that we cannot influence or change things that have happened in the past, and that it is history. It is partly true - even if we cannot change the past, it may influence the future. In other words, to develop further and to move forward, at first one must look ahead and have the aim and clear vision of what has to be achieved. At the same time, one also needs to study and know the history; as this knowledge strengthens awareness and allows drawing required conclusions in order not to repeat the same or similar mistakes. Oscar Wilde has said, "Experience is simply the name we give our mistakes" and experience is the key to accomplishments.

In order to succeed, the Baltic Defence College has since its establishment in 1999 put a huge emphasis on studies of military history and military and political leadership at the operational and strategic level. It was especially important at the creation of the College since the intention was to form a Western-type General Staff officers' educational institution to assist the three Baltic countries to transform and develop our officership and defence systems in accordance with the best standards

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<sup>1</sup> Niccolò Machiavelli, *The Prince*, written c. 1505, published 1515, translated by W. K. Marriott 1908; *The Constitution Society* San Antonio 10 July 1997, Chapter XIV. That Which Concerns a Prince on the Subject of the Art of War, p. 69-70, available online: <https://www.constitution.org/mac/prince.pdf> (accessed 26 February 2020).



of Western states armies and based on democratic values, ethical principles and mission-oriented leadership.

Therefore, the College went on and included in its studies the great and decisive battles that have shaped history, like Tannenberg 1410, Austerlitz 1805, Waterloo 1815, the Somme 1916, Normandy 1944, as well as those more closely connected to the Baltic Sea region, like Operation Albion 1917, the Winter War 1939-1940, the Battle of Tannenberg Line 1944 (or the Battle of the Blue Hills), the Battle of Memel 1944, the Battle of More 1944, Battle for Kurland 1944-1945 and others. Undoubtedly, the great battles were led by great generals, and to understand their success and historical significance, we urge our students and officers to study these great personalities, read their memoirs, read their publications, and research other relevant materials as part of leadership studies. As the College command language is English, there was no problem to find sources about such great leaders as Alexander the Great, Hannibal, Caesar, Frederick, Napoleon, Wellington, Foch, Eisenhower, Patton, Montgomery, Ludendorff, Rommel, Guderian, MacArthur, Mannerheim and others, whose works have been published and translated into English.

In the case of our own military leaders from Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, who received enormous merits for building our states, who have led and won the liberation and independence wars, as well as defended our freedom and Western values 100 years ago, we still have limited sources in English for studying their accomplishments, analysing them as leaders or reading their thoughts and insights.

I must say that after 50 years of Soviet occupation, there are not so many sources available or left by those individuals whose works can be translated and which would have an added value for professional education purposes. But at least there are some in all three Baltic countries, which deserve special attention for us to get to know these individuals better and to get to understand the historical events more precisely for embracing and creating a better future.

Recognizing the importance of history, the College already in 2009 initiated a workshop on Baltic Region military history, which evolved into the Annual Baltic Military History Conference, and now has become an established academic event. The topics related to regional aspects are discussed by military and civilian experts allowing us to learn from the past. Acknowledging its importance, starting from 2017 the College has made the conference an integral part of curricula of courses. Similarly, in 2017 the College also enhanced the importance of Baltic military leadership and named the syndicate rooms (small group of 10 up to 12-person interaction study rooms) after historical figures who have made a meaningful

contribution in military records of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. It allows us to show respect to those individuals, like Generals Laidoner, Põdder and Larka from Estonia, Generals Radziņš, Rozenšteins and Hartmanis from Latvia, Grand Duke Gediminas, the Supreme Commander Žukauskas, and the leader of armed resistance to Soviet occupation Žemaitis from Lithuania. It also provides the connection of present times and current officers with the particular individuals and specific epoch encouraging detailed analyses and enriching knowledge within the syndicates.

Now we are moving further. As mentioned earlier, due to the scarcity of English-language sources regarding Baltic military figures and historical events, the Baltic Defence College would like to broaden the audience and give its contribution to the publicity of the great military leaders of our states by launching this very first book, thus starting the project of translation of essential records about Baltic military history and its leadership into English. Doing so gives us a chance to introduce our military leaders and our nations' histories outside of our own languages' space, thus providing benefit for expanded studies and research.

This is a Centennial year of concluding the War of Independence in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. On the 11th of August 1920 after the liberation of the Latgale region, the peace treaty between Latvia and Soviet Russia was signed, ending two long years of struggle with multiple adversaries for the newly built nation. We decided to commission this translation and publish this book devoted to the author of the operational plan for the liberation of Latgale, the legendary personality, genius warrior, military strategist, and Latvian Clausewitz, General Pēteris Voldemārs Radziņš (1880-1930). On the 2nd of May 2020, we will celebrate his 140th birthday, and we will recognize his personal dedication and contribution for the victory over the Bermont-Avalov troops in late 1919, as well as for the liberation of Latgale from the Soviet Russia Bolsheviks.

### **What Makes General Radziņš Great?**

General Radziņš acquired professional knowledge and experience, leadership skills and abilities to be a great planner who exercised his intelligence and talent at the tactical, operational and strategic level. He had a clear vision of what his nation (Latvia) needed and had a clear goal of what an army's (Armed Forces) role was (and still is) within the state-building process, which made him a truly strategic military leader.

His personal network and links with the leaders from the allies (especially with Poland and particularly with Marshal Józef Piłsudski and his officers) facilitated building of a strategic alliance, which led to the victory in the War of Independence. When publishing in the Polish military quarterly “Armed Poland” (*Polska Zbrojna*), General Radziņš highlighted that: *“The political situation, political views and direction may change, but friendship once entered between armies on the battlefield and sprinkled with blood, can never expire or change”*<sup>2</sup>; presenting that values are more than just words.

A creative and innovative approach during his second appointment as Commander of the Army (1924-1928) helped to build modern aviation and naval forces of that time. Already in those days, he recognized the power of air combat, as he said that: *“air superiority will lead to the victory on the ground”*. Manoeuvrability and difficulty in detecting submarines, as well as mine-laying capability to deny the enemy approach by the sea, were his choice versus static and expensive coastal defence system.

General Radziņš always tried to be up to date, and he read widely in the field of military theory, strategy, arts and science, as well as in the subjects of history, technology, philosophy and politics. He always focused on academic work. He was a good writer himself, and he was a lecturer at the War School. He very quickly, already during the War of Independence, realised the importance of documenting and noting events and things around him, as truth tends to change while time passes by.

Therefore, he wrote and published his fundamental work “Latvian War of Liberation” which is used nowadays as the primary source for studying the war. He also wrote both about history and theories of war, and about political and social sciences. Undoubtedly, this makes him one of the most competent author from the ranks of Latvian military.

He was a frequent publisher of short articles expressing advanced thoughts and unbiased and realistic opinion in the Latvian military magazine “*Latvijas kareivis*” (*Latvian Soldier*). He often gave interviews to different media commenting on any subject that he was asked in a competent and convincing manner. It was his way of communication to reach every soldier within the military as well as to express his ideas to a broader public. He was not hesitant to tell and provide different opinions

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<sup>2</sup> Tomasz Otwocki, *Generał Pēteris Radziņš. Przyjaciół Polski i Ukrainy, sympatyk Międzymorza*, Przegląd Bałtycki 24 November 2017, <https://przegladbaltycki.pl/6387,general-peteris-radzins-przyjaciol-polski-ukrainy-sympatyk-miedzymorza.html> (accessed 26 February 2020).

than those that some politicians in the government had. To some extent, he was an uncomfortable man for politicians as he was an erudite and charismatic leader very liked by his colleagues, subordinates and contemporaries. It must be admitted *"He was a peculiar man. As an eager Latvian patriot, he harshly criticized the works of politicians"*<sup>3</sup> This approach led to his dismissal (self-resignation, forced by political leadership) from the Commander of the Army position twice. He "paid the bill" for his intellectual capacity, straight-forwardness, constructiveness, openness, and the courage to speak and do things, what he felt was right, something that current military leaders should build more upon and should exercise in practice.

In fact, General Radziņš was the leader who set the scene for political impartiality of officers in the armed forces of Latvia. Realizing that belonging to a political party may cause unnecessary implications and consequences for the armed forces, he resigned from the political party he belonged to. General Radziņš was also a remarkable thinker and geopolitician of his time. Therefore, I strongly recommend the reader to pay attention to the chapter related to geopolitics, where you may clearly identify the linkage of the past and current events in and around Ukraine.

He advocated for a Baltic Alliance in the field of defence and was in favour of more extensive cooperation among friendly nations like Estonia, Finland, Lithuania, Poland and Ukraine, those who were bordering with red Russia. He promoted the idea for the same condition that NATO Article 5 stands for today, *"an attack on one member should be considered as attack on them all."*<sup>4</sup> Unfortunately, neither a Baltic nor broader alliance was reached, and all of these countries suffered from their larger and more powerful neighbour.

In hindsight, we can see that he was very visionary as he predicted clouds darkening in the East (Soviet Russia) and the West (Nazi Germany) that resulted in the close cooperation between Nazis and Soviets<sup>5</sup>. Now we know that the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact with its secret annex was signed nine years after General Radziņš's death that led to the division of Europe, to World War II and to the occupation of the three Baltic states by Soviets. Someone might say that if General Radziņš were still alive in 1940 we would not have been occupied. Of course, that is speculation, but there is no doubt that he would have had a different opinion

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<sup>3</sup> Agris Purviņš, Ēriks Jēkabsons, Ģenerāļa Pētera Voldemāra Rakstu krājums, Society of General Peteris Radzins, Riga 2016, p. 122.

<sup>4</sup> *The North Atlantic Treaty*, NATO Website, Washington D.C. 4 April 1949, Last updated: 10 Apr. 2019 [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official\\_texts\\_17120.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm)

<sup>5</sup> „Latvijas Kareivis” No 160, Riga 2 September 1920, <http://data.lnb.lv/nba01/LatvijasKareivis/1920/LatvijasKareivis1920-160.pdf> (accessed 26 February 2020).

than the self-appointed President of State and Prime Minister of the authoritarian regime Kārlis Ulmanis who did not allow our militaries to fight invaders. That lesson from history should not be repeated.

The military genius, according to Carl von Clausewitz, is: *“first, an intellect that, even in the darkest hours, retains some glimmering of inner light which leads to truth, and second, the courage to follow this faint light wherever it may lead.”*<sup>6</sup> General Radziņš possessed these qualities. We have to know and study our heroes, thereby becoming stronger, more capable, more aware, more united, more patient, more vigorous, more intelligent, and more resilient to sustain and maintain the values, gains and sacrifices of our ancestors.

While there are few informative chapters within describing the astonishing service of General Pēteris Radziņš prior to Latvia's Independence in 1918 and prior to his return to Latvia in October 1919 (when he was immediately appointed as Chief of Staff of Supreme Headquarters with the task to plan and execute the liberation of Riga, that was achieved on the 11<sup>th</sup> of November 1919, nowadays known as the Day of Lāčplēsis), still this book is not a biography of General Radziņš.

Most importantly, this book is a compilation of articles written by the General and gathers some interviews published throughout the twenties of the twentieth century. This permits readers to acknowledge and find for themselves the sharpness and clarity of the thoughts laid by the wise statesman, whose many ideas have not lost relevance, topicality or significance at present times and in modern warfare.

He was an active military professional, and he had time to gather his thoughts throughout his military duty. Thus, we possess reflections of one successful leader in many wars and his view towards the military theory and leadership what we can apply to education in the Baltic Defence College. Knowledge and power are closely linked. You need awareness and cognizance prior to placing trust in your weapons. Similarly, Sun Tzu wrote: *“The art of war is of vital importance to the State. It is a matter of life and death, a road either to safety or to ruin. Hence it is a subject of inquiry which can on no account be neglected.”*<sup>7</sup>

Taking into account the fact that we are going to celebrate the thirtieth anniversary since we have regained independence, I have to admit that there are very few memoirs, which have been written by current active duty or retired

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<sup>6</sup> Carl Von Clausewitz, On War: Volume 1, Createspace Independent Publishing Platform, Scotts Valley 19 December 2013. Translation by James John Graham.

<sup>7</sup> Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, British Museum, Department of Oriental Printed Books and Manuscripts, London 1910, Chapter 1. Laying Plans, para 1 and 2. Translation by Lionel Giles.

generals and officers; definitely, there are almost none in English. We can do whatever we do, but we cannot stop time. Therefore, I would like to use this opportunity to welcome and encourage the Baltic countries' military leaders to take some time and reflect on things as you saw them while we were rebuilding our armed forces and integrated into NATO. That will ease, or maybe will make more difficult, the life of our historians who will study recent history; but at least there will be some primary sources.

I would like to finish my foreword with a quote of Winston Churchill: *"Now this is not the end. It is not even the beginning of the end. But it is, perhaps, the end of the beginning."* This publication is the start of a broader project, where the Baltic Defence College is professionally and significantly contributing to the enhancement of defence policy-related research and academic endeavours. This translation of General Radziņš publications, interviews and thoughts begins a series of releasing insights in military strategy, history and leadership by printing valuable sources written by prominent military leaders and strategists of the three Baltic states who have profound significance for our security and defence studies. By these written works we will recognize and familiarize ourselves more with our own heroes and acknowledge their merits for the security of our region.

**Major General Andis Dilāns**

Commandant,

Baltic Defence College

# BIOGRAPHY

by Major Agris Purviņš

Pēteris Voldemārs Radziņš was born on May 2, 1880 in the “Jaunvīdedži” homestead in Lugazhi parish in Valka district. The Radziņš family was very religious and raised their children in kind — two sons and a daughter.

His mother taught Pēteris to read. Having learned to read, he began his school days at Lugazhi Parish School. As was the case with many young people at the time, the road to higher education went through czarist Russia’s junker schools where tuition was free. The future Latvian Army general also chose this route.

Radziņš attempted to join the army for the first time at the age of seventeen, but was not accepted because he was too young. Two years later Radziņš and a school mate went to Pleskava and took the volunteer (so called “savvaļnieki” in Latvian or вольноопределяющийся in Russian) test at the cadet corps.

In August 1898 he joined the 112th Ural Infantry regiment stationed at Kalvarija (Suwalki province). In September the regiment returned from summer camps to the city of Kalvarija. On August 12, 1899 Radziņš was assigned to the 27th infantry division headquarters, he passed the Vilnius infantry junker school entrance exam, and on September 1 he commenced studies. That same year he was promoted to junker — youngest officer.

On August 1, 1901 he graduated with distinction and in July was assigned to the 113th Staraya Rusa infantry regiment. On August 5 he was promoted to “podporuchik” and assigned to the 24th Simbirsk infantry regiment in Ostrow Mazowiecka, Lomza province, in Poland for the remainder of his service.

In June 1903 he underwent a one month training session at the 4th Field Engineer brigade.

At the end of 1904, as the Russo-Japanese War broke out, Pēteris Radziņš volunteered for frontline duty and in January 1905 became a member of the 10th Eastern Siberian rifle regiment. Having the rank of “podporuchik”, he was assigned the position of acting company commander. His first battle, a baptism by fire, was the defensive fight in the Siping positions. On October 18 he was promoted to “poruchik”. On October 27, by orders to the 1st Manchurian Army, “poruchik” Radziņš received his first medal — a 3rd Class of St. Stanislaus order (for “excellence in service during the war with Japan”).



Initially, the regiment in which Radziņš was serving returned to Omsk. In May 1906 he left Omsk and returned to his regiment in Ostrow Mazowiecka, Poland, where he was appointed commander of the “podpraporschnik” school.

The companies of Radziņš’ regiment were positioned at Sosnovic at the German border. He took advantage of the situation to learn more about Germany. He actively used the regiment library privileges and subscribed to newspapers and magazines, including the German publication “Die Moderne Kunst”, for the amount of 150 rubles, and planned to subscribe to additional publications for another 250 rubles. The annual budget for the regiment library was 450 rubles.

On August 20, 1907 he was assigned to take entrance exams to the prestigious Nicholas General Staff academy in St Petersburg, where the competition was so severe that on average only one in every thirty candidates was accepted. Radziņš brilliantly passed both parts of the exam (first at his own local army headquarters, then at the academy itself) and on October 15 was accepted to enrol in the newest class.

On August 21, 1909 Radziņš graduated the second class of the academy with a level I and was enrolled in the academy continuing course. On May 26, 1910 he successfully graduated the continuing course as well defending his dissertation “The role of the reserves in the hands of the high command” and was promoted to captain. In June he was added to the General Staff as an officer of the Warsaw military district headquarters. His dissertation was considered brilliant and was published not only in the General Staff academic monthly “Akademicheskii Vestnik” but also in book format, and was acknowledged as a part of high commander training.

Upon graduation of the General Staff Academy, Radziņš was assigned to Warsaw where he spent several months at the 6th infantry division headquarters. Following that he was assigned to the 32nd Kremenchug regiment as company commander.

In November 1912 Radziņš was enlisted as General Staff officer and appointed aide—de—camp at the 38th infantry division headquarters in Brest-Litovsk.

At the end of April 1913 Radziņš filled the position of division Chief of Staff for several months, due to the promotion of the current officer.

Prior to World War I in Warsaw, Radziņš expressed an interest in aviation — the new technical form of military transport. He joined the aviation company as a volunteer and learned the technical and tactical basics of aviation. During flight training Radziņš had an accident, but in spite of the fact that the plane was badly damaged, Radziņš and his companion were unhurt.



At the end of July 1914 World War I began. General Pēteris Radziņš participated in the following battles:

Komarow	August 13—18
Andreevsk	August 18—27
Rawa	October 11—14
Lodz	November 5—22
Valbork	December 1—4
Rawa	December 5—24

In 1915:

Rawa until	February 2
Plonsk	February 6—11
Przasnysz	February 11—14
Mlawa	February 18—28
Dnovedec	March 5—18
Jelgava—Shiaulai	April 25—May 15

The defence of Novogeorgievsk Fortress from July 15—August 5

In 1916 he was appointed Chief of Staff of the 61st division. From October to June the units under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Radziņš fought a positions war in Byelorussia. Later the 61st division was transferred to Romania where they took part in battles against the Austro-Hungarian Army in Dobrudzha from August to September. Then the 61st division was merged with the 1st Serbian volunteer division as well as four other divisions. Radziņš was responsible for the leadership and planning of the operations of these united divisions. The commander of this joint division was General Simanski, professor at the Russian General Staff Academy. From 1917, the 61st division was involved in a positions war at Siret.

In February 1917 the czar was overthrown in Russia and an interim government was formed. Radziņš was promoted to Colonel, but the collapse of the Russian Army was imminent. Following the communist October revolution Radziņš continued to fill his duties as Chief of Staff of his joint divisions. The general chaos in Russia and the army notwithstanding, a certain order and discipline were maintained on the Romanian front. Only when the Red Army led the attack from Odessa on Bessarabia at the end of February 1918 did Radziņš dissolve the units under his command and leave for Ukraine (under Romanian rule at the time).

At the beginning of 1918, when the Ukraine hetman Skoropadskyi nation was established, Radziņš, like many of the Latvian officers living in Ukraine at the time, also joined the Ukraine Army. He was appointed commander of the General Staff organizational and training department. Hetman Skoropadskyi's army was weak because of a reliance on Germany's protection. When the revolution broke out in Germany and it capitulated to the Antante, the German Army no longer guaranteed Hetman Skoropadskyi's protection, and as a result inner turmoil flared in Ukraine. Ataman Petliura came to power and proclaimed the national republic of Ukraine. In response to the invitation of his former study mate at the Russian General Staff Academy even before World War I — Major General Vsevolod Petriv, on December 27, 1918 Pēteris Radziņš joined the UNR Army as assistant to Chief of Staff Mikola Yunakiv (this officer was one of Radziņš' and Petriv's instructors at the academy). Later he recalled that the General Staff Central Administration commander Vyacheslav Bronski — "an avid patriot, especially honest, intelligent and energetic person" — said as he persuaded him to serve in the UNR Army: "Help us now, perhaps we will someday help you Latvians!"

After the defeat of the UNR Army in the battles with A. Denikin's White Forces and the Red Army, Radziņš headed to Poland in September 1919 and settled in Warsaw. In October he met Latvian Minister of Foreign Affairs Z. A. Meierovics who had arrived on October 15 to seek help from Polish Marshall Pilsudski. The military situation in Latvia was very complicated at the time. The Russian volunteer army, consisting mainly of German mercenaries, under the leadership of Count Bermond-Avalov and the supervision of German General von der Goltz, began to attack the Latvian Army on October 10, they had pushed the Latvians to Riga and were holding onto the left bank of the Daugava. At the same time Latvia had to maintain armed forces in the east against the Red Army which controlled a significant part of Latvian territory.

Minister of Foreign Affairs Meierovics met with Radziņš and invited him to return to Latvia and join the Latvian Army. Radziņš accepted and returned to Latvia immediately. On October 26 he introduced himself to Army Commander Colonel Balodis, and on October 27 he began work as commander of the Chief of Staff. In his new position he worked out a plan of attack which was ready on November 2 and the Latvian Army began its attack on November 3. Colonel Radziņš was the actual leader of the army and under his leadership Bermond's German Army was driven out of Latvia within a month.

In 1920 our Army just as successfully implemented Colonel Radziņš' formulated Latgale liberation operation. The successes of the Latvian Army secured Colonel

Radziņš' reputation as an eminent strategist and tactician. He became the greatest military authority for Latvians. It is worth noting that General Radziņš' militarily tactical, operative and strategically political talent came to light particularly in the fight for Latgale, where the Latvian Army faced the Red Army, with neighbouring Lithuanian and Polish Armies and the controversial status of Daugavpils. Colonel Aleksandrs Plensners in his memoirs talks about how and under what circumstances Colonel Radziņš planned and led the liberation of Latgale:

"The size of the Soviet Army initially was smaller in numbers, but much greater in terms of military arms and equipment. Upon hearing concern at Headquarters about our chances against the Bolsheviks, Radziņš just smiled his Mephistophelian smile. It is vital to ensure success from the very beginning, then further success will follow. Soon we started to sense how he planned to ensure these early successes. In December, especially in the second half of the month, he was frequently visited by Polish military representative Major Myszkowski. He had ever longer discussions with him locked in the so called map room. After these discussions Myszkowski reported to his leadership in Poland and upon returning, another top secret discussion with Chief of Staff Colonel Radziņš ensued. Radziņš never invited a third person to join them and he never produced any notes that needed to be recopied.

Only at the very end of December did we sense that Colonel Radziņš had concluded an agreement about collaboration in the liberation of Latgale. This collaboration was especially necessary because without it the Bolsheviks could quickly and easily increase their numbers. The Bolsheviks had defeated the Russian white armies: Kolchak in Siberia, Denikin in Ukraine, and Yudenich at the Narva. Besides, Estonia had signed a cease fire with Soviet Russia on December 31. Hitherto Estonian forces thus became available on our right wing where we were comparatively weaker.

Due to the large number of spies, our High Command put off all deployment of forces to the east up to the last minute and with as great a secrecy as possible. Leftists also tried to deter army deployment to Latgale, unsuccessfully inviting the railroaders to strike. The leadership of our army believed that the sceptics would become believers if we would have visible successes on the Latgale front from the very beginning."<sup>8</sup>

The Latvian Army together with the allied Polish Army successfully attacked, and essentially within a month defeated the Red Army on the Latgale front. On

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<sup>8</sup> Aleksandrs Plensners. *Pret Vētrām un Negaisiem*. Brooklyn: Grāmatu Draugs, 1982. p. 156–157.

February 1, 1920 Latvian government representatives signed a secret cease fire with Soviet Russia. In his book "The Latvian War of Independence" General Radziņš writes: "So, starting on February 1, on the one hand the war was supposedly over, but on the other hand, the war had to be continued legally and officially. At first the cease fire was secret and had to be kept in complete secrecy. So the war continued openly and officially, and the forces could not be informed of the cease fire, because that could be perceived as breaking the cease fire. If the forces do not know about a cease fire, they have to continue the war."<sup>9</sup> The cease fire did not stop war activities and as late as March bitter battles ensued and it was only by force that we could get the Russian Army to respect the lines of demarcation set forth in the cease fire. Although General Radziņš complied with the national political leadership, he strongly criticizes their short sightedness in his book. This outlines the General's conflict with political parties, especially the left wing parties, which he, not without reason, did not trust. He writes: "at the onset of the cease fire we had grown a lot – almost twice as large. Besides the prevalence of numbers, we had grown even more in moral strength. Our forces were everywhere and had always been victorious, not having been defeated even once. We had not suffered really major losses either. By contrast the Soviet Russian forces had suffered only defeats, many units were annihilated and the remaining ones largely demoralized.

At the same time, on our right, the Polish forces had crushed parts of the Russian Army they faced. The Poles had already taken the Drysa and from there threatened to go on to Polotsk. The Soviet Russian front was completely severed and they had no means of holding us and the Poles back in case of further attacks, if they would have occurred."<sup>10</sup>

Thanks to the courage, knowledge and experience of General Radziņš and the heroism of the soldiers in the Latvian Army, we Latvians can be proud that we are a nation that, while simultaneously fighting on two fronts against groups of the German and Russian Army, won on both, and not only won, but soundly defeated them in a short time (four months!!!) with relatively few losses on the Latvian side. These victories were an unequivocal prerequisite for the birth of a new nation and country on the shores of the Baltic Sea – LATVIA.

In January 1920 Colonel Radziņš participated in the first Baltic Country conference in Helsinki. In August the conference continued in Latvia – in Bulduri, and in October a meeting of Latvian, Polish, Estonian, Finnish, and Ukrainian army

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<sup>9</sup> Pēteris Radziņš. *The Latvian War of Independence*. Part 1 and 2. 2005, electronic version, p. 115.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.* p. 120.

representatives took place in Riga to draft a military convention project. Latvia was represented by General Radziņš. He was deeply convinced that the Latvian Army would be able to ensure peace only as part of a military union with our neighbours. The General wrote: "Independence of the Baltic States is founded only in the closest union between the Baltic States, it must become necessary for all the political groups and nationalities that stand for Latvian independence. (...) Every nationalistic thinking Baltic citizen must be convinced that the interests of their countries are mutually closely connected, that an enemy that threatens one of the three countries is a threat to all three. If one of them should lose their independence, the others will also lose theirs. (...) Only if all of the Baltic States are irreversibly convinced of the need of this close union, that is, regarding the need to act jointly against external enemies, only then, if one is threatened, will we all act as one country and one nation; only then will our enemy not dare to threaten our independence."<sup>11</sup>

After the liberation of Latgale and two days following the peace treaty with Russia on August 13, 1920, Pēteris Radziņš was promoted from Colonel to General and relieved of active duty. Even at this time, the plots and schemes of ill-wishers were surfacing against General Radziņš. On August 13, 1920, as ruled by the Cabinet, Pēteris Radziņš became the first Latvian Army soldier to receive a 3rd Class Military Order of Lāčplēsis, and was appointed the first member of the Military Order of Lāčplēsis board.

Peace had come to Latvia. The country was now ours, and we had to start shaping it. Discussion resounded in society about the nature of our country's defence and army. The social democrats and other leftist parties did not feel that Latvia needed an army; they believed this would mean additional expenditure, and friendly peace loving Soviet Russia was no threat to Latvia. Others felt that following World War I an "eternal peace" had settled over Europe, and all future conflicts would be resolved by the newly formed National Alliance. Radziņš actively protested both of these viewpoints. He was convinced that a future war was unavoidable, and it was necessary to prepare seriously and in a timely manner. An army can be demolished in a day, but it takes tens of years to establish an army.

On October 29, 1920 General Radziņš was, of "his own free will", retired from the Army. Dr. Hist. Ēriks Jēkabsons discusses the reasons for this retirement: "The true reason for the retirement was the so-called Vranghel affair. Members of the Russian White Guard who were in Latvia had illegally organized themselves so as to end up under Vranghel in South Korea or under Savinkov in Poland. There were

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<sup>11</sup> Pēteris Radziņš. *Independence and Union*. Latvijas Kareivis, 1920. No. 244.

no particular consequences to these activities, the government of Latvia did not know anything about the situation, but the Social Democrats managed to engineer the retirement of Radziņš. The General had been informed about the recruitment activities, but had paid no attention. His actions were largely dictated by Polish military attaché Myszkowski. There is evidence in Polish archives that in June 1920 the two had already met to discuss the possibility of organizing Russian partisans in Latvia and their use against the Red Army in the regions of Drysa and Polotsk."<sup>12</sup>

After the success of the War of Independence, General Radziņš settled in to a more modest life, earning a living by giving military lectures at the military school and by publishing articles about issues important to the military and civil society. General Pēteris Radziņš can be considered the most influential godfather of the military newspaper "Latvijas kareivis". Later came his most significant work *The Latvian War of Independence (Latvijas atbrīvošanas karš)*, in which he describes Latvian Army operations against Bermont (Part I) and against the Red Army (Part II). This book is an expression of his great talent as a strategist and tactician. He is able to simultaneously provide an in depth look at details, while at the same time providing a view of the entire operation, supplementing everything with political aspects.

One of the best descriptions of military leadership is his work *The Military Commander (Kara vadonis)*. Making use of his extensive knowledge of war history along with his personal experience, he describes the objectives, responsibilities and character traits necessary for victory on the battle field. It is interesting reading not only for army commanders and officers, but politicians will also find some valuable advice in this book. Other works of note by General Radziņš include *Strategic Problems Following the World War (Stratēģiskās problēmas pēc pasaules kara piedzīvojumiem)*, *Tactics, The Size and Structure of the Artillery (Artilērijas daudzums un sastāvs)*, *Memories of the World War (Atmiņās no pasaules kara)* et al.

In 1921 the position of Army Commander in Chief was abolished and General Jānis Balodis retired from the military. The new position of Army Inspector was established, General Mārtiņš Peniķis, who led the Vidzeme division during the War of Independence, was appointed to this post. The experiment with the Army Inspector position was not really successful and politicians decided to reorganize the Army, and as part of the reorganization establish the position of Army Commander. On February 24, 1924, the president's order by which the Army Commander position was established was published and General Radziņš was named Army Commander. Historian Edgars Andersons has this to say about

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<sup>12</sup> Ē. Jēkabsons. Ģenerālis Pēteris Radziņš. Tēvijas Sargs, Nr. 5 (May, 2005), p. 28-30.

Radziņš as Commander: "...since 1924 Radziņš was Army Commander — the first real commander in Latvian history. Radziņš was a powerful personality and a genial military commander, and he was envied by many."<sup>13</sup>

In spite of General Radziņš tremendous authority among soldiers and his contribution to the formation of the country of Latvia, leftist socialists could not accept a general who was negatively disposed toward the Internationale and communist ideas, who staunchly stood for a nationalistic country and centuries old national values. Many of the highest ranking officers of the time claimed that it was precisely under the leadership of General Radziņš that the fighting ability of the Latvian Army developed most quickly. In spite of these accolades, the leftists managed, thanks to various schemes, to get General Radziņš sent to Poland to improve his health. Following this he was relieved of the position of Commander. Among officers, Radziņš was a great authority and his demotion was met with bitterness and incomprehension.

Colonel G. Grinbergs aptly describes the effect of Radziņš demotion on the future of our country, and especially the effect on the soldiers: "...and where are our soldiers now? They have been slaughtered or are suffering miserable slavery in Siberia or in the polar north. But things could have been completely different. We would not have experienced the last year of Bolshevik torment if we had listened to General Radziņš. Following his farsighted advice we would have retained our excellent army staff, and as the war started we would have been 200,000 strong and could have made our own evergreen crowns of victory..."<sup>14</sup>

Upon his return home, General Radziņš accepted the position of director of the academic officers' course, and continued in this position until the end. In autumn 1929 he also became Inspector of Army military schools. He continued to lecture at various Army schools and courses.

The last years of his life were hard. He received a lot of criticism for his excellent contributions to the formation of the country of Latvia as well as its army. He clearly saw the development of threatening political activities that caused our country and our army serious challenges and difficulty. Due to the near sightedness and personal selfishness of our politicians we might not have succeeded since the army was not adequately prepared. This caused General Radziņš great despondency and depression. He gained strength from visits to his family home "Jaunvīdēži". During this period he became very attached to his

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<sup>13</sup> Rislaki. *At the End of the Rainbow*. Kur beidzas varavīksne. Rīga: Jumava, 2004. p. 170

<sup>14</sup> G. Grinbergs. *If We had listened to General Radziņš*. Ja būtu klausījuši ģenerāli Radziņu. Tukuma ziņotājs, 1942, No. 13.



brother's daughter Nellija. The feeling was mutual. Despite the years of Soviet occupation, Nellija held on to her memories of her uncle and passed them on to her daughters Dzintra and Teiksmā, who tirelessly tried to draw the attention of society, generals and politicians to the fact that the contributions by General Pēteris Radziņš have not been aptly appreciated and recognized. In his memoirs of the general's last years Andrejs Radziņš writes:

“The last time I saw General Pēteris Radziņš was on a beautiful summer evening in his garden several months before his death. I noticed a certain change in his personality, the tone of his voice, his way of talking. I sensed a deep inner peace that cannot be shaken by personal disappointments. He left the impression of a person who no longer lived for himself alone, but whose concern had grown to encompass all of humanity. That evening we talked for a long time, I had a lot of questions that I wanted to get clearer answers to.”<sup>15</sup>

Pēteris Radziņš died of a heart attack on October 7, 1930 in his apartment in Riga in Valdemāra Street. After the funeral on October 11 the general was buried in the Riga Brethren Cemetery. About 10.000 people attended the funeral. Among the attendees were President A. Kviesis, Speaker of the Saeima P. Kalniņš, Prime Minister H. Celmiņš, ministers, Saeima deputies, the Estonian Army delegation headed by Major General A. Tõnisson. The chairman of the Estonian “Central alliance of brethren of the Cross of Freedom” Lieutenant General Johan Laidoner, on behalf of his organization, sent his condolences to the Military Order of Lāčplēsis Board.

The life of an undoubtedly eminent military man. His military experience and talent was put to full use against the forces of Bermondts and the Red Army in 1919–1920. One can only agree with the words of War Minister General R. Bangskis in his 1925 report about Army Commander Pēteris Radziņš: “He would be an excellent Chief of Staff of a larger army unit. Very good. Should be left in his present position during peace time, in war time he should be nominated as Commander in Chief or Chief of Staff.” His contemporaries, including a fair number of foreigners, unanimously emphasize the General's military talent, honesty, rectitude, candour and deep patriotism.

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<sup>15</sup> Andrejs Radziņš. *My Memories of General P. Radziņš*. Manas atmiņas par ģenerāli P. Radziņu. LVVA 5434.f.2.apr. case 60 p. 325.



# THE MILITARY COMMANDER

A serious leader is necessary when embarking on any important project. If a country decides to build railroads or a factory during peace time, they select the best engineers and then choose one, the best of the best, and make him the leader. Similarly, if a society or a business man begins a serious, expensive and responsible project, then the leader of this project is selected with the utmost care and consideration. Both in the life of a nation or an individual: the more serious and expensive or the more responsible a project is, the more serious attention and consideration is paid to the selection of the person in charge of the project. In addition, the leader of such a project is sought among specialists in the field, that is, among people who have both the practical and theoretical knowledge required, as well as work experience in the particular area. Despite the importance of all peace time duties, their importance pales compared to war time activities. The future of countries for tens and even hundreds of years is directly dependent on the results of war; in addition, the destiny determined by decisions made on the battlefield for the most part is irreversible. Activities on the battlefield are all connected with the lives of people: thousands and tens of thousands of human lives are laid on the line. Nothing done in any other aspect of national activity is comparable. The battlefield is a field of activity wherein during a very short period of time the lives of tens of thousands of people and the future of a nation are decided. Thus, the selection of a military commander is one that requires the utmost gravity and seriousness.

## **The Military Commander and the Masses**

World history provides a wealth of material regarding the activities of the great wars commanders, the results of these activities and their significance throughout history. Alexander of Macedonia, Hannibal, Julius Caesar, Gustav Adolph, Peter the Great, Frederick the Great, Suvorov, Napoleon, Moltke — all of these commanders completely changed the history of their time, giving new direction to the life of their world. Most historians also turn to evaluating the activities of famous commanders in their research, viewing the military commander as the centre where all events originated. There are, however, some historians who claim that it is not the military commander who propelled events, but rather historical events produced a leader,

the commander. The masses have always pulled along their leader. This idea gained tremendous momentum thanks to L. Tolstoy's historical novel "War and Peace". In this novel, Tolstoy, with his characteristic depth of thought, depicts an unusually clear, understandable and picturesque image of Western European nations coming to the east — to Russia — in 1812. A human wave of people swept in from west to east propelling Napoleon as their leader. In 1813 and 1814 this same human wave turned in the opposite direction — it swept back from east to west, and atop this wave again was Napoleon. It was not Napoleon who led the people to Moscow, rather people headed to the east leaving behind a Western Europe ravaged by revolution. Tolstoy's perception has many supporters still today, especially regarding military commanders of the world. Leaders do not produce historical events, but rather these events impel people — bright, shining leaders — forward. The following are the main arguments for this position: as historical events settled to a certain degree, the shining leader disappeared. When western European nations wanted to head east, they needed a leader at the helm; when the wave of masses started flowing back from east to west, Napoleon's genius could not hold them back, quite the opposite occurred — this same mass wave of humanity overthrew and buried Napoleon. The same can be said of Alexander of Macedonia's war marches on Persia and India, Hannibal's struggle with Rome, Gustav Adolph, Karl XII and Moltke; the explanation of the significance of world commanders of the military is similar. A casual observation of events can result in an irrefutable truth. If, however, we take a more in depth look at the reasons behind historical events, this argument automatically falls away. First of all, considering Napoleon's march to Russia, it must be said that although Napoleon was a genius, he was nevertheless only human with all the resultant human traits: 1) as are the abilities of all people, those of a genius are limited, 2) from time to time a genius can also be mistaken and 3) a genius is also subject to some human weaknesses.

The march to Moscow must be seen as terribly, even unnaturally, difficult. Napoleon's troops had to march on foot from France to Moscow — about 3000 versts (1 verst = 3500 feet). A part of Napoleon's army was grouped around Warsaw, but some regiments came from Spain and Italy. At the time there were no automobiles, railroads, there was no telegraph nor telephone service. Enemy territory had to be crossed for half the distance, the other half being subversively enemy territory, since Prussia and Austria were just waiting for an opportune moment to commence war with Napoleon. To ensure rear support for a distance of 3000 versts — army provisions, reserves, communication — average military commanders would not dare to do this even with today's technical advantages. The war march had

been ingeniously planned, but very risky nevertheless, as Napoleon himself has admitted. It turned out that a successful end to this march was beyond Napoleon's abilities.

The genius, on his way to Moscow, had been mistaken, although not as seriously as some might think. Napoleon had very precisely calculated and planned the march. Until 1812 Napoleon had always been successful in reaching his political goal capturing an enemy capital. Thus, he also believed that once he had taken Moscow, a peace agreement would be reached with Russia. Napoleon took Moscow as he had planned, but Russia did not go for a peace agreement. One reason for Napoleon's failure was the unexpectedly early winter, with the additional factor that such an early and severe freeze tends to occur only once in about 10 years in this area.

As instigator of war, Napoleon had always been victorious since 1796. He himself realized that he was a genius in the art of war. His fame and brilliance gradually began to expose his weaker qualities. Napoleon began to enjoy being flattered, ingratiated and worshipped. He soon lost the ability to appraise some of his activities self-critically, because everyone flattered him and said that everything he said or did was always right. He did not tolerate objections from a subordinate. As early as 1809, as Marshall Lannes lay critically wounded and dying, he warned Napoleon. Lannes said that Napoleon did not like objections and therefore, only surrounded himself with people who flatter him and ingratiate themselves to him. However, serious and capable people do not stand a chance of succeeding. If this continues, then he (Napoleon) will soon not have any able generals. In 1813 and 1814 Napoleon himself often said that he no longer had any capable generals.

If we payed attention to Napoleon's human weaknesses and considered them in evaluating his results, it would not, on the one hand, enter our mind to ask the impossible of a genius and, on the other hand, we would still see and appreciate his geniality. If there had been no Napoleon, the French would not have reached Moscow, they probably would not have even reached the Russian border. In 1805, thanks only to his artfulness, Napoleon defeated the joint Austrian Russian Army at Austerlitz. Even more artfulness was required to be victorious over the Russian Prussian Army at Eylau (Prussia) in 1807. It was only thanks to his genius that Napoleon was victorious at Wagram in 1809. If the French Army had been under the command of a mediocre commander, it would have been totally defeated. Thus, there could not even be any discussion of a mass wave of humanity flowing from west to east and back again. It must be noted that prior to 1812 almost none of these western European nations had the least inclination to head toward Russia.

Therefore, we must assume that in 1812 the genius Napoleon inspired the masses and led them 3000 versts to Russia. If we delve deeper into the annals of history, we will see that other great military commanders have also led armies and nations to victory, but these great military commanders were never led by the masses.

In order for the genial military commander to reach the heights of his genius it is undoubtedly necessary that circumstances are favourable. At the least, a period of war is needed. If a bright military commander would have come along during the long years of peace, he would not have been able to show his prowess and talent. However, since not every war, not even a long one, always spawns a bright military commander, it is clear that circumstances and the masses alone are not enough to put forth a great military commander. He can appear only if he has inherent talents at birth, grows up and matures among his people. Circumstances and the masses alone are not enough to call forth neither genius nor talent. We have witnessed that in many wars in which not even a marginally notorious leader has appeared. The Russian Turkish War, the English Boer War, the Russo Japanese War — there were almost no outstanding leaders. Thus, circumstances alone are not enough to spawn the personality of a brilliant war leader.

It is often said that the masses carry and support their leader, but that is only true of a mass leader. A mass leader is something completely different from a military commander. Mass leaders who call themselves military commanders always come to light in situations where the masses have gone astray — revolutions, riots, unrest always make people find their leaders and call them generals, marshals, atamans, etc. Tolstoy's theory that under certain circumstances the masses produce their leaders and as soon as the circumstances change, the leader disappears, applies to these leaders completely. These mass leaders are people who know how to assess and take advantage of existing circumstances and feel the efforts of the masses; they lead the masses but only in the way the masses want to be led; these leaders are not capable of giving the masses new direction. We all remember such mass leaders from the recent past: "headataman" Petliura, ataman "batko" Mahno, "general" Bulak-Balahovics and others. At certain times in certain circumstances they were great men, but as soon as the circumstances changed they completely lost all of their significance and influence on the masses. Under certain circumstances the masses needed them. When the circumstances change, the masses will no longer need them. We now see that no attention is paid to these former leaders, even their former enemies do not fear that they would ever come to power again and lead the masses. As a contrast, if we look at two distinguished military commanders of the world — Hindenburg and Ludendorff — the French pay the utmost attention

to them. The present French general headquarters commander Buat in his book "Hindenburg" says the following about Ludendorff: "Whether he (Ludendorff) will remain backstage in the future or come out onto the stage is hard to say, but it is undoubtable that he would ever abandon his dream goals. We will meet him again, if not openly under his name then in a leading role nevertheless..." Thus, Ludendorff is not a leader produced by certain war circumstances, but he is a military commander by nature and training and as such can be a leader under any circumstances. Even after Napoleon had been dethroned and banished from France, he was still powerful and strong as proven by his return to France in 1815. When he was arrested again in 1815, England took him to Helena Island where he was held isolated so as to prevent even the least communication with France.

### **The Military Commander and Politics**

"War is not a simple political act, but rather an important political instrument; it is a continuation of political relations and their carrying out by alternate means. Political intentions set a goal, war is a means (to reach goals) and means can not be imagined without a goal"  
(Clausewitz).

Thus, waging war is most closely connected with politics: war is a continuation of politics. War is summoned by politics. But who is to prepare the waging of war? First of all, the military commander appears here because of political leaders. During peace time the only basis of politics is real power (either its own or that of the entire society, or that of a large neighbour — protector): the political leader must precisely know his own strengths and those of the potential enemy (obviously, not only in numbers but also based on expert evaluation), as well as the growth or depletion of these strengths. The military commander must prepare military forces based on the way the politician is waging politics, and, on the other hand, the politician can only go as far as guaranteed by support of the military commander. That is the first rule of collaboration.

The second rule of collaboration has to do with the onset of war. If war is inevitable, it must be started at a moment advantageous for us; otherwise the enemy will start the war when it is advantageous for them and unfavourable for us. Here, too, very close collaboration is necessary.

The third rule of collaboration has to do with the length of war. Politics must support waging war by gaining allies or a benign neutrality, splitting apart the enemy's allies, etc. the military commander for his part, must wage the war in a way so as not to impede the attainment of these political goals.

The fourth rule of collaboration: the ending of war and achieving a peace agreement. The military commander and the politician must completely coordinate the time and rules as well as the format of the peace offer.

All of the above pertains to foreign policy, but there must be every bit as close a collaboration in domestic politics, because this is where the military commander gains his war waging forces; the state domestically maintains and supplements the army with both forces as well as war materiel; the strength of the army depends on the actions of the state. The effect of domestic policy on war activity in previous wars was never as noticeable as it was during the last war.

Given that the military commander must be in the closest possible collaboration with domestic and foreign policy, and given that war time war activity plays a dominant role in the life of the entire nation, we must conclude that the best system would be one in which the military commander is also the leader of domestic and foreign politics. For this reason it is said that the best system for waging war is a monarchy: the monarch — military commander and at the same time the head of state. That is so theoretically, however, history has shown that monarchies do not always wage war successfully. A monarchy has an advantage in waging war only if the monarch is a truly great military commander, like Napoleon, Frederick the Great, or Peter the Great. During the World War, however, there was poorer war waging and politics in the monarchies — Russia, Germany and Austria — than there was in republican France and England.

I would briefly like to touch upon the difficulties that deter collaboration of a military commander and a politician during peace time. First of all, during peace time a war commander has not always been appointed, and even if one exists based on mobilization rosters, he very often is not the main army representative responsible for preparation for war. This happens for the following reasons: war does not occur every year or even every ten years. If peace exists and there is no direct threat of war, we are left with the impression that war is very distant and perhaps completely impossible. Then why is there need of a military commander? One will be appointed in case it becomes necessary — there is time enough. After a certain time political leaders get used to the fact that conflicts can be resolved peacefully, one need only be a quick, clever, resourceful and skilful politician, in which case the army has no role to play during peace time. A military commander

becomes not so useful to such a skilful political leader. That is the reason why so often the person appointed as head of the army during peace time is someone who gets along well with all politicians, but is not an appropriate military commander. This is what happened after the Russo Japanese War in Germany and Austria. Both of these countries had spent 40 years free of war. Politicians did not think about war and they were convinced that they would continue to wage successful foreign policy, avoiding war and gaining benefits for their nations thanks to their talent. Germany had gained its shining position thanks to victories in 1870–1871, and Austria — thanks to being allied with a powerful Germany. Making use of frequent and speedy political memoranda, politicians were successful and completely forgot that the successes ensued because in 1870–1871 Germany had shown tremendous strength and its neighbours were still afraid. These neighbours, however, also began taking steps so as not to succumb in the face of German and Austrian memoranda. German and Austrian army leaders carefully watched and calculated the growth of their neighbours' (France, Russia and England) military strength, and as early as 1906 began warning political leaders that the sharpness of diplomatic memoranda was no longer comparable to the sharpness of the sword; the neighbours' forces grew quicker than German and Austrian forces. The politicians did not like this. In 1908 Austria annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina, occupied since 1878, a European scandal resulted and was "successfully" ended in 1909 by Austrian foreign affairs minister Aehrenthal. Aehrenthal was hailed as an illustrious diplomat — by his friends due to their near sightedness, and by his enemies — to lull Austria to sleep. This diplomatic victory was the road to catastrophe: Austria had managed to get recognition of the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Austria and Germany also managed to get 1) Italy's withdrawal from the triple alliance, 2) a closer alliance between Russia and France, 3) England getting closer to France and Russia, 4) a more intense preparation for war by Russia (start of army reorganization) and 5) a decision on the part of Russia and France to commence war with Austria and Germany in the near future. The politicians did not want to see this reverse side of their medal of victory. The army commander and the Chief of General Staff had, however, also noted this other side of the medal and sharply insisted on enlarging the army, proving with numbers and dates the military predominance of their next enemy. Funding was not allotted for army enlargement and as a result the Chief of General Staff at the time Conrad Graf von Hötzendorf sent an acrid letter to Aehrenthal warning of Austria being on the brink of catastrophe unless the army is enlarged or foreign policy is amended. Hötzendorf was removed from leadership of the army. Austria continued its politics and did not enlarge their army. Three years



later, when war clouds could be seen on the horizon, Hötzenndorf was reinstated as the Chief of General Staff, and army enlargement was allotted minimum funding.

In 1912, after all the previous political conflicts (the Moroccan issue in 1906, the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908—1909, the Moroccan issue part II in 1911 and 1912) between Germany and Austria on the one side and France, Russia and England on the other side, German diplomats had gained, if not huge, then certainly notable gains and did not pay any attention to the General Headquarters Commander's admonitions. The German General Staff had done everything in their power to make their army as exemplary as possible given the available funding. General Staff, following the armament of possible enemies (Russia and France) clearly believed that France and Russia were preparing for immediate war and they would become notably more powerful in a shorter time than Germany and Austria. The German General Staff had clearly observed the following: 1) German politicians were annoying Russia and England with their activities, thus aligning them with a France that was seeking revenge, 2) French and Russian forces were gaining predominance over those of Germany and Austria and 3) Germany and Austria were playing hard politics, but they did not enlarge their armed forces. What consequences could be expected? In 1912, General Staff Section I Commander Ludendorff presented this situation to the government complete with numbers and statistics and his conclusion: Germany must change its politics or enlarge their peace time army by at least two corps; if that is not done, the German Army will be incapable of protecting existing policy — armies do not guarantee a fatherland — the German government simply demoted Ludendorff and assigned him a less responsible position (brigade commander), so he would not be in a position to show the government, with his sharp and clear proof, the bitter truth about the impending disaster.

Since 1910 the German and Austrian General Staffs had pointed out that in the event of war the enemy would have a military predominance. After 1912 this predominance became tangible (France went from a 2 year service to a 3 year military service and Russia waged extensive war preparations). The governments, the political leaders, chose not to believe this tangible proof and paid no attention to the impending disaster. Even in 1914, as they resolved the issue of starting war, political leaders in Germany and Austria did not believe their Chiefs of General Staff who said the enemy had a military predominance. When the government of Austria had prepared the ultimatum for Serbia (July 25, 1914), General Headquarters Commander Conrad Graf von Hötzenndorf was invited to a cabinet meeting and asked the following: "Does Austria have a chance of waging a successful war?"



Conrad Graf von Hötendorf answered: "Austria does not have a chance of waging a successful war." Even at this moment the government did not believe the head of the Army, and 5 days later that same government ordered that same person to wage war. Is that not a tragedy in the heart and mind of a military commander? They did not believe his calculations and conclusions enough to allot a few millions for the benefit of their country, but when war broke out he was entrusted with the destiny of the entire nation. I have commented on the relationship of German and Austrian politicians and military commanders, but this is by no means an exception; the same has happened and continues to happen in many other countries. The relationship between the Bismarck and Moltke before the French German War in 1870 could be considered an exception. In some countries (Russia) there was the case of one person leading the army during peace time, and when war broke out another person was appointed to lead the entire armed forces as well as individual units. (Commander in Chief Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, the army commander and the commander at the front were assigned armies they had not led during peace time — ergo, they were unfamiliar with these forces).

The other issue concerning peace time preparations: gaining favourable neutrality from allies and neighbours. Gaining friends and enemies is a part of politics, but politicians do not know how nor are they able to weigh and calculate the potential power of potential allies. General Staff, however, always keep a systematic and precise accounting and evaluation of military force. This systematic observation of a neighbours' military preparations results in another important factor: who the neighbour is fortifying against (this becomes clear from mobilization plans, peace time troop distribution, fortification work, road construction, armed forces supplies and technical equipment, training and war literature). A politician makes his decision based on another politician's words and writings, while General Staff decides based on facts and deeds. We see this in reference to preparing for the World War: until 1909 Austrian and German diplomats considered Italy an ally, after 1909 they believed that in case of war, Italy, if not an ally of Germany and Austria, would maintain a favourable neutrality. By contrast, German and Austrian General Staffs had not considered Italy an ally since 1906 and after 1908 viewed Italy as a possible enemy, who would take advantage of any opportunity to invade Austria. Similarly, the German General Staff knew that in case of war with France, Belgium would not, nor would it be able, to remain neutral, but would take the side of France. If a country entrusts its destiny to a military commander during a critical period — during war — then during peace time this military commander must be entrusted with preparations and evaluation for the overcoming of danger.

“If war is inevitable it should be started at a time that is advantageous for us, and not wait for the enemy to do so at a time that is disadvantageous for us.” This is true both of a greater pre-war period as well the day and hour of declaring war. In these circumstances a competent head of the army always has surer and more correct news than politicians do, both about the unavoidability of war as well as an opportune or inopportune time to declare war.

Japan declared war on Russia the same day that the Japanese ambassador stopped diplomatic communication. At the very moment that a telegram was sent to the Japanese reprimanding their arrogance, the Japanese fleet was mobilized and heading for Port Arthur. If this had not been done, the Japanese would possibly never have gained the upper hand over Russia’s Far Eastern fleet, and — if they had not gained the advantage at sea, it would have been impossible to put their army ashore in Korea. German and Austrian politicians, dazed by cheap accolades, never paid attention to the words of the military commander. War with France was inevitable — this was clear from the first years of the century. A very sharp conflict broke out between Germany and France in 1906. General Staff Commander Schlieffen announced that the army is ready and able to start war with France, a moment so opportune is not likely anytime in the future. At the time Russia was embroiled in revolution and England had not yet befriended France, so war would have broken out between France alone and Germany. The politicians wanted to gain diplomatic stars — prevent war. In 1909 the Austrian Chief of General Staff had suggested starting war with Italy and defeating Italy (at the time there was a sharp conflict between Italy and Austria), since the circumstances were such that war would have taken place between only Italy and Austria.

In 1912 another bitter conflict occurred between France and Germany. The Chief of General Staff had noted that this was the final more or less opportune moment, since every subsequent year promised circumstantial change detrimental to Germany. At that time Russia’s army was not yet ready, France had just introduced a 3 year military service with no results available yet, England had not yet formed a close relationship with Russia and France. Diplomats again prevented war, but accepted it in 1914 when war commanders considered war disadvantageous.

The entire war waging system in Germany was based on speed: Germany’s enemies had a great military predominance, so Germany had only one factor in its favour — to gain victory by speed, that is begin mobilization earlier and attack while the enemy was still getting ready as Japan did in the war with Russia. German diplomats put off the discussion for so long that Germany announced

mobilization later than Russia and France, thus taking away this weapon from the war commander. French politicians did the complete opposite: while General Staff said that the chances of success were small, the politicians gave in and prevented conflicts. When General Staff said that the French had gained a comfortable predominance, they joined in the war.

When war is underway politicians can either support their war commander or create new difficulties for him. We clearly see that in the World War, although shining examples are available in the history of earlier wars. From the side of the Allies, the war was commenced by France, Russia, Serbia, England, Belgium and Japan — by the end of the war more than 20 countries had joined the Allies. German and Austrian diplomats, on the other hand, just managed to attract Turkey and Bulgaria; they had been part of the Germany Austria group earlier. Was this not a new tragedy for the war commander — to be continually accosted by new enemies? Undoubtedly, the Allied politicians found themselves in a more advantageous position: the Allied fleet ruled the world's waters and threats from the sea could force neutral players to join. Nevertheless, there were plenty of opportunities for Austrian and German politicians as well, had they been more compliant. On the other hand, if the politicians were unable to do anything, then the military commander should have been given greater discretionary power in certain situations. Threats or invasion made it possible to force Romania to join Austria; a minimum of casualties made it possible to keep Italy from joining the Allies.

A second point of collaboration between politicians and military commanders during war time was to regulate the relationship between Allies. Until 1916 Germany and Austria did not have joint war leadership — each country fought on its own.

The military commander is extremely interested in domestic politics; domestic policy can strengthen the army and can completely demoralize it as well. We saw the former in Germany up until 1918, and the latter in Russia and Germany after the revolution. The military commander needs to have a say in domestic politics, because now wars are waged by nations, not by armies.

The collaboration between military commanders and politicians must be as close when ending a war than it was at the onset of war.

If the military commander says there is no chance of victory, the politician must help. The beginning of peace talks is just as important as the beginning of war and only the military commander can deem the time right. Peace talks at an inopportune time will raise enemy forces, reveal our shortcomings and lower the desire to win among our troops. In the event of failure, peace talks begun at the

wrong time can completely drown a military commander, as happened in Germany, but in case of success, peace talks begun at the wrong time can completely obliterate the results of victory.

Bad politics binds the military commander's arms and legs and sends him into battle bound; good politics sends a free military commander into war and supports his every move. Every educated military commander must study both the history of war and political history, because this fills him with knowledge in his specialty, which is his peace time preparation. By contrast, politicians' knowledge of history is often limited to a secondary school history course, which tends to be forgotten as the years go by. That is the reason that politics often is the first stumbling block in a military commander's battle field.

### **The Military Commander and the Army**

In the first volume of *A Collection of Military Writings* (*Militāro rakstu krājums*) I already discussed the relationship between the military commander and the masses. In a certain, but strictly defined way, the army too is a mass of armed people. The army, however, is a different kind of armed mass of people, it is not the so called psychological crowd. The first and perhaps most important difference between a military commander and a crowd leader — the crowd moves forward its leader either on its own initiative or the potential crowd leader manipulates the crowd in such a way as to move him forward. The military commander, on the other hand, receives the army in his command and transforms it into a compliant weapon. The military commander always leads and exerts influence on his army, but never allows himself to be led or in the least influenced by that army. The leader of a psychological crowd often is led by the crowd, and if not led, is always influenced by the crowd. The crowd leader always has to take into account the disposition of the crowd; if he refuses to do so, he can lose his power over the crowd. The crowd leader is the emotional centre of his crowd; the military commander is the head of the war body in the full meaning of the word: he too is the emotional centre, but an emotional centre subject to the brain, thus ruling his entire army's emotions and mind with his mind. Since the military commander is the head of the war body, he does not have to deal with the army's irresponsible emotions and instincts as does the crowd leader; the military commander deals with the responsible emotions of the army — emotions and feelings recognized and confirmed by the brain. Thanks to revolution, the military commander does not always get distinguished from

a crowd leader. Revolutionary periods most clearly demonstrate the differences between a military commander and a crowd leader and this is most appreciated by serious people. Kerensky was a typical crowd leader: he enraptured the crowd and intended to send this enraptured crowd into battle, but what was the result? The enraptured crowd lost its enthusiasm on the way to the front, and not having reached the front lines return back to the rear. During the destruction of the Russian Army, officers with no military commander talent rose to high positions. They satisfied their desire for honour and popularity by transforming into a crowd leader (Bonch—Bruevich, Radus—Senkovics, Verhovskis, Muravyov, Vācietis and others, not to mention the likes of Krilenko, Kerenski, and revolutionary gang leaders like Mahno, Bułak-Bałachowicz and the Ukrainian atamans). Because officers turned into crowd leaders, a casual observer might well confuse the concepts of military commander and crowd leader. No real military commander has ever tried to rule his army using the methods of a crowd leader. During the revolution and peace negotiations the officers and generals remained in their military commander role never turning into crowd leaders, resulting in an obedient front line army; that is also why only German armies carried out an impressive retreat after signing the cease fire; a retreat defined by very difficult rules. At the same time there was complete revolution inside Germany with all the power resting in the hands of soldier and worker councils.

In our age, the concept of democracy has become a bit of a fad item. People freely define the idea of democracy to suit their purpose and often force their idea of democracy where it would not naturally fit. These creators of the “democratic idea” are the ones who tend to compare a military commander with a simple state official, when in fact there is a huge difference between a state official and a military commander. A state official does only that which is proscribed by law or instructions or fills the requests of his superiors. If the official has done everything based on law — has not broken the law — he is not responsible for the results of his work. An official can always hide behind the law or the instructions. If the official has done everything based on law, but his subordinates have not carried out his orders in real life, the official is not responsible; officials are always and everywhere covered and protected by the law. Besides, officials do not risk their lives. The military commander can at no time during war operations hide behind legal verbiage. Who gets blamed for every failure? The leader. The leader is always responsible for anything and everything that goes wrong. The leader is also responsible for the mistakes and negligence of his soldiers (a military commander

does not lay the blame on his subordinates). A leader always, and everywhere, covers for his subordinates. The leader risks his life just as the rest of the army does.

We often hear claims that in today's "democratic" age an armed nation makes up the national army, and the national armed forces will perform heroic deeds never fearing danger, driven by love for the fatherland, enraptured by a national consciousness and united by responsible discipline which has risen from their sense of justice and patriotism. Without a doubt, love for the fatherland, a national awareness and discipline are very important, but they are not the main factors. A general military service was introduced in all countries a hundred years ago. After the World War, countries did not become more nationalistic than they had been before the war, except for those that were not victorious: Germany, Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria, which became completely nation states. Thus, a national consciousness will not play a larger role than before. If a love of fatherland and a national awareness have always existed, how do we explain the fact that one country's army wages war much better than another's? How do we explain the fact that one and the same country's army has been very strong in certain circumstances and much weaker in some periods? The brightest evidence is offered by the revolutionary wars in France and Russia. At the beginning of the French revolution from 1789–1796 the revolutionary nationalistic French Army was unable to achieve even a single victory. Only after 1796 the French Italian Army commanded by Napoleon achieved brilliant victories. Is the present Russian National Army stronger than it was at the beginning of the war when the Russian Army was less nationalistic? Did the foreigners, including Latvians, in the Russian Army fight worse than the Russians during the World War? During the World War the Austrian Army was the only one in which some foreigners did not fight, but gave themselves up as prisoners of war, but Austria was not one nation. Nevertheless, some of the nations that have established independent countries or united with brethren countries — former enemies of Austria — in the Austrian Army were courageous warriors: the Hungarians, Croatians, Bosnians and in part the Galicians and Poles. The Austrian Army was the best example of the significance of a military commander: the parts of the Austrian Army under the command of German generals waged war much more successfully than those under Austrian generals. In 1916 in the Balkans, where German, Austrian, Bulgarian and Turkish army units fought, the Bulgarians and Turks insisted most adamantly (even refusing to continue fighting) that general leadership in the Balkans be assigned to German generals, not Austrians, Bulgarians or Turks.

Patriotism and nationalism are characteristics that only make an army a more powerful and sharper weapon in the hands of the leader, a weapon that the leader no longer needs to waste time honing or strengthening.

A nation raised on discipline and justice will undoubtedly produce a more powerful army. But discipline is not only based on laws and rules of discipline: discipline is instilled by the leader. If discipline did not depend entirely on leaders, all army units would be equally disciplined, but that never happens — not in peace time and especially not in war time. We know that during war, one army will go through fire and water on their leader's command while another will not. We know that one and the same army under one commander has performed heroic feats while under another commander this same army has been cowardly and fainthearted. No wonder the ancient Romans said that a herd of sheep led by a lion is better than a pride of lions led by a sheep.

What means does a military commander have at his disposal to lead his army, to strengthen it? He has his own personality, his personal qualities. The military commander gains the hearts and soul of his army with his personality. The army is proud of its commander. The army willingly suffers the greatest hardships, dangers, and walks into sure death, the army is proud of having overcome these dangers and hardships. The army loves their leader, they give him their heart and soul and obey his every command in spite of danger and death, because the leader leads his army to victory — honour and glory — the greater the hardship, the greater the honour and glory: easily gained cheap successes do not bring honour and glory, and do not raise the leader in the eyes of his army; the army knows that it was possible to achieve much more if only some energy would have been exerted to do so.

Let me discuss several examples of the activities of great leaders. First, the greatest Russian leader Suvorov. He was still regiment commander in the autumn of 1768 when Suvorov received orders to take his regiment and march from Ladoga to Smolensk.

The distance of 850 versts took 30 days in November; during the march 6 men dropped back because of illness and one disappeared. In spring 1769 Suvorov was ordered to move his regiment from Minsk to Warsaw. Horses were used during this march, but it led through an area of local uprisings, so they had to proceed ready for battle. Suvorov managed the 560 verst distance from Minsk to Warsaw in 12 days. These marches were his main instrument of surprising the enemy. These quick marches gave Suvorov a great advantage in the war against the French in 1799. The battle at the Trebbia River on June 7 and 8 was predestined to a certain



degree because on June 6 Suvorov, having marched 80 versts in 30 hours (in the heat of June in Italy), attacked Macdonald's advanced guard completely unexpectedly. Suvorov's Russian-Austrian army was 22,000 strong, Macdonald's — 33,000); on June 7 they fought to a draw, on June 8 Suvorov continued to attack. The French started to gain the advantage; General Bagration, commander of a Russian column, reported that he cannot move forward because of extensive losses and his army's exhaustion; Suvorov ordered his army to attack immediately. General Rozenberg, commander of the second Russian column reported that he could no longer stand the attacks and suggested a retreat. Suvorov, standing next to a big rock at the time, said to Rozenberg: "Try to move this rock, — you cannot? Well, then our army cannot move either. General Melass, commander of the Austrian Army, sent his aide de camp to Suvorov with this question: "Where will you order us to retreat to?" because the Austrians had started to suffer total failure. Suvorov ordered him to tell General Melass: "To Piasenc!" (Piasenc was located to the rear of the enemy attacking Melass). The fighting continued until evening with no gains by either side. That evening Suvorov thanked his commanders for the victory and ordered pursuit to begin in the morning. Macdonald started his retreat during the night, but the Russians really did engage in hot pursuit which demoralized Macdonald's troops to the point they couldn't do anything but scatter beyond the Apennines, where they joined Moro's army. This battle was won purely because of the personality of the leader. Similarly, a second victory over the French near Novi was also the result of Suvorov's personal character. Following that he led the famous retreat through the Alps, which German military author and world war participant Freytag von Loringhoven commented, comparing Hannibal's and Suvorov's crossing the Alps: "The more a military commander is used to demand of his army, the more sure he can be that the army will execute these demands. A soldier is just as proud of overcoming hardship as he is of overcoming danger. This pride grew even more in Hannibal's army because several times Hannibal had presented his failures, which were connected with extreme hardship and danger, as successes, which is what Suvorov did during his march across the Alps."

In the autumn of 1799, Suvorov with an army of 20,000 and one Austrian brigade went from Upper Italy to Switzerland to reconnoitre with an allied army of 40,000 men scattered throughout the Upper Rhine, Linta and Limmata area, facing a French army of 50,000 commanded by Massena. After a fierce battle in the mountains, Suvorov took St. Gothard's Pass, which was protected from the French division, and then went to Altdorf. Contrary to the news he had gathered, the road from Firvaldsteter did not go any further and Suvorov turned to take the



mountain trails to Kincigkult. Here he received news that during this time the Allied army in Switzerland had scattered following a complete defeat. Overcoming extreme hardships he turned and went through Prigel and Glarus while his rear guard successfully drove back the French attack at the Mota River; then through the Sarnfta river valley he reached the Upper Rhein valley. This march through the high Alps took 3 weeks from September 21 to October 10, wrought with continuous battles, hardships and shortages; it cost the lives of about one third of the men, most of the horses and all of the cannon they had brought from Varese. These losses were similar to war losses but the moral effect was completely the opposite. If Suvorov and his men had looked back on this march through a region they had previously known little about, the impression should have been that they had broken through like an unstoppable stream breaking all barriers the enemy had put in their way. If we see that Suvorov presented this march, critical for him, as a victory, we cannot say he was bragging in an attempt to cover up his failure. Materialistically Suvorov's march was more a failure than a success but morally it was a victory rather than a defeat.

Bonaparte began playing his role as military commander in 1796; on March 2 he married Josephine, on March 11 he headed for the front, and on March 27 — accepted command of the army with his famous address to the army:

“G.N., Nice, 7th germinal IV.

Soldiers! You are naked, poorly kept, the government owes you a lot, but they can give you nothing. The stamina and bravery you have shown here between these cliffs is amazing, but you have gained no glory; no bright light shines over you. I want to lead you into the richest flatlands on Earth. Wealthy provinces and big cities will be yours to command. There you will receive honour, glory and riches. Soldiers of Italy! You will not lose your heroism and stamina.”

*Signed by Bonaparte*

This order is fully the appeal of a revolutionary general — a proclamation — these are the dues paid for the circumstances of that time. It should be noted that the government commissioner was there with Bonaparte. Upon winding up in the army, Bonaparte's behaviour changed completely; he started to take control of the army starting at the top — with the division commanders. Among his subordinates were many older revolution generals, who had been fighting on front lines for a long time, but Bonaparte arrived completely unknown with almost nothing of

note to his credit. Two of the oldest division commanders, Massena and Anzero, were especially displeased with Napoleon's appointment. Bonaparte had ordered a meeting with the division commanders. They gathered in one of Bonaparte's two rooms. Bonaparte made them wait for a certain while before he came in to see them. While they were waiting, Massena and Anzero discussed the situation: "I want to see who will lead this army. Will we do so or will this young man!" When Bonaparte entered, he greeted the generals and proceeded to explain his demands regarding the operations ahead, discipline and order. He ended by saying that the generals can immediately return to their divisions. As they left the room, Anzero said to Massena: "I do not understand how it happened, but in front of this young man I felt like a student in front of his teacher." On April 11 Napoleon began his first attack which ended in a brilliant victory. After this first victory Napoleon began to introduce discipline and order in the army. He had given the army a victory — honour and glory — and now he had every right to demand a lot in return from his army. The more victories and glory he gave his army, the more he asked from his army in return. Napoleon was a war genius, with very few equals in the history of the world. Napoleon can be compared only to Hannibal among ancient military commanders, there is no one comparable among modern history military commanders. Napoleon was a genius, and he put his genius to good use, but the genius also had negative qualities. He knew absolutely no boundaries in anything nor anywhere. Other art forms are not harmed by the destruction of boundaries, but in the practical art of war not recognizing boundaries leaves the genius, and along with him, the nation, open for catastrophe.

Regarding Napoleon's relationship with his army, we can say that only Hannibal was like him (perhaps a bit better). Only these two military commanders succeeded in achieving that their armies never under any circumstances complained about their military commander, hardships notwithstanding. These two military commanders possessed a "demonic" ability to lead people to death. Napoleon never pitied his men and his army was glad to die for the honour of their commander.

It should be added that the national consciousness and spirit didn't play even the slightest part in this. Half of Napoleon's Great Army of 1812 were foreigners, and also these foreigners were happy to die under Napoleon's watchful eyes. The Polish cavalry, crossing the Neman River, intentionally rode over the river's deepest parts to show Napoleon that they weren't afraid to die, and actually many were happy to drown in front of Napoleon's eyes. Germans, Italians, and Spaniards idolized Napoleon during the war march of 1812 to Moscow just as much as the

French did. Such difficulties, which overtook Napoleon's army in the year of 1812 never emerged even during the world's war. Going to Moscow during the sizzling weather of August, the Davon corps had to march very quickly in the province of Minsk; soldiers were losing blood from their armpits instead of sweat. Returning from Moscow, death from famine and cold awaited every step and still not a single grumble was made toward Napoleon. Marshal Ney earned such praise among the troops for the retreat, praise such that nobody had ever received even in victory. During the retreat, the corps of Marshal Ney established the rear guard and arriving in the village of Smorgon there were only a few hundred soldiers remaining. In the year of 1812, almost all of the Great Army had been killed, but still in 1813 and 1814 from those remaining and the newly recruited, it was possible to form a new army, which, although it was terribly trained and led, still worshipped its leader Napoleon. Even during the last battle of 1815, when the victor was already known and the remaining men of Napoleon's army had been scattered, a handful of the old guards, completing the given assignment, led the battle to the Belalliananna Inn. When the English made this handful of guards who were surrounded and shot at by all sides stop the unnecessary bloodletting and let themselves be taken captive, the injured corporal stood, and raising the flag answered, "The old guard is dying but not giving up." That situation, when the leader of the war and his soldiers have become one organism and he gives the final word, completely exemplifies the expression: you cannot give away your head while at least one muscle is still able to work.

The troops were submissive to Napoleon without restriction: Napoleon had absolute power over his troops for whom there was almost no distinction between French nationality or some other; whether the troops were from a conquered or allied country, all equally idolized their leader. The history of war shows us that such enormous obedience by troops, as was enjoyed by Napoleon, has been enjoyed only extremely rarely by other military leaders. Definitely, from ancient times Hannibal can be mentioned and from modern times the American Civil War's Confederate General Lee.

Among the enemies of Napoleon were also a few very brilliant military leaders: Russia's General Barclay de Tolly, Austria's General First Count of Schwarzenberg, and the Prussian General Blücher. Blücher with his characteristics and talents was very similar to Suvorov. Just like Suvorov, he amazingly impressed his troops and the last one was still obedient to him, if not equally as Napoleon's troops were. Blücher often experienced defeat, receiving blows from Napoleon. However, after 3—4 days, Blücher was able to lead that same beaten army to a new battle and this

army fought just as heroically as in the preceding battle. In 1914, Napoleon on the island of Elba (after his first descent from the tower) said about Blücher, "This old Satan attacked me always with the same swiftness. Just beaten, he immediately became ready for war." A beaten army can only be transformed to battle-ready if the troops trust their leader without any reservation.

Suvorov, Napoleon, and Blücher are prime examples in regards to troop submissiveness to their leader: Napoleon's troops idolised him, and both Suvorov's and Blücher's troops displayed such loyalty that only can be shown to a dying person. Leaders who have experienced troop obedience and have received acknowledgement of complete trust are quite many. Each distinguished leader has troops that trusts in and is obedient to him to a large degree. Gaining trust and loyalty from troops is one characteristic of a great leader because without the trust of the troops, the leader cannot get any monumental victory. If the troops have complete lack of faith in and aren't loyal to their leader, then those troops will never lead a ferocious critical battle in order to complete a given assignment. A leader who never gains the full trust of his troops will only be able to gain a victory if he has a dominant force in numbers or owing to his opponent's lesser tactical force or morale.

With which resources have these distinguished leaders and art-of-war geniuses gained such unlimited obedience and trust from their troops? Firstly, they've gained it from the direct impression they make: an excellent leader's personal dominance lets you sense it even at the first encounter, as it is obvious from the previously given example about Napoleon's first encounter with his division commanders. Also, overall in life, everyone has noticed that when meeting unfamiliar people, during the first encounter one person makes a more notable impression, while the other, in contrast, affects us in the opposite way. After a long cooperative effort, and especially in the service of war, especially on the battlefields, the subordinates always very keenly and accurately assess their superiors. A superior's short-sightedness or character flaws won't be hidden to the subordinates by a post of high duty or by a bright outfit and assorted marks of honour. With a good nature, attempts to please, speeches and other cheap means of attracting popularity, it is possible only to earn a servile bootlicker and the agreement of a lesser hero, but not the true trust of troops.

Subordinates give respect, trust, and obedience to their leader if they feel that the leader is much more powerful, and if they can sense the dominance of positive characteristics of the leader. These characteristics are made up of physical, moral and intellectual power. A lesser superior will have enough if he shows

greater endurance and bravery. The higher post a superior occupies, the greater expectations there will be in regards to his morality and intellect. However, courage must be much greater. A leading commander has enough with personal courage. A military leader also cannot have a lack of personal courage. A military leader won't have to display an example of courage, going into a regiment or division battle, but still in one case or the other it will be seen if a leader is missing personal courage, especially now, when battles will also be coming from the sky; a deficit of personal courage can become visible to subordinates. A military leader's courage isn't just about personal fitness but also about courage in relation to his troops. A military leader cannot be afraid to let his troops go into a battle or ask for them to make great sacrifices. Without heavy losses, there cannot be bright victories. That will not be a military leader who during a battle will say, "The troops are tired and have suffered losses; we must let them rest and wait." Troops will never grumble about a leader who asks them to conquer their challenges and tolerate their losses, but troops will lose respect for a leader who, sparing his troops listens to a morally weak chief's objections, won't have attained his goal and utilized an opportune moment: "We should have just pushed more, attacked more and the enemy would have been totally beaten." Troops will never forgive leaders for letting victories slide by. Leading a battle, a military leader is not allowed to show the smallest fear of loss or defeat. If a military leader has actually suffered defeat — been beaten in battle, then he cannot lose his head; this would indicate the leader's lack of courage. A courageous leader must accept defeat as if it had never been. He, with his personality and with his further actions must impress the troops as if the troops hadn't been beaten, but only manoeuvring he must retreat and act as if the entire previous battle had no special significance. A prime example in this respect can be seen by Blücher and his Chief of Staff, Gneisenau. During the month of February in 1814, when the Allied Army was moving towards Paris, Blücher's army, going forward towards the wide front, received a powerful hit from Napoleon. On February 10, Olsufiev was defeated; on February 11, the Sacken Corps were defeated near Château—Thierry. On February 12, Yorck was defeated near Château—Thierry, and on February 14, Blücher's main forces were defeated near Étoges, for whom the retreat was especially challenging because Napoleon's cavalry was located within Blücher's flank and also behind it. On the night from February 14 to 15, Blücher with his Chief of Staff discussed their condition, during which Gneisenau said, "Let's proceed as if we hadn't been defeated, and on the fifth day let's attack again," In reality, that also occurred.

The more significant the leader, the broader must be vision in order to make correct assumptions based on the correct assessment of the conditions. If his vision will be narrow, then the condition and circumstances won't be accurately assessed, and accordingly, courage and heroism won't yield positive results. A chief's inability to think becomes quickly visible and apparent to subordinates. There cannot be complete trust and obedience to a military leader if the accuracy of his intellectual conclusions are in doubt. A military leader must correctly understand not only the situation and the condition, but also his own military forces. Understanding military forces is a twofold consideration: its tactical ability and its endurance. A tactical understanding (brand of weaponry, knowing the characteristics and utilization) isn't included in this topic. A military leader must always understand and know well the strength of his military forces: what more can be asked from the military forces, what more they able to do are, and what is asking too much of them. One cannot give a command which demands more than can be delivered by the military forces: the command will remain unrealized and the leader's authority will be lost. Most importantly, one must know what the hands and the feet are capable of. This knowledge is based on mutual trust. If military forces trust their leader, then he will accurately assess their conditions. If a military leader has the benefit of earning the trust of his military forces, then he will also be able to completely rely on them and make calculations in harmony with the subordinates' input.

A military leader must always care for his military forces. If the military forces sense that the military leader is concerned about his subordinates like a head thinking about its hands and feet, then the military forces will feel that the leader is their head and will conduct itself as if it is their own head.

In previous times, when the military forces were active in small districts, a leader could more easily impress the entire military forces. During battles, the entire army often saw its military leader. The entire army saw its leader's courage, artistry, character, and his qualities. In critical moments, the military leader arrived in a critical place and personally affected the military forces. Napoleon, leading a battle, was atop some platform from where he could oversee almost the entire battlefield. When the battle had reached its culmination, then Napoleon would sit upon his horse and arrive in exactly the crucial place so that with the strike of his personal influence, he could uplift the force of the group's morale.

These days, battles do not occur as they did in Napoleon's era. Similarly, also the current (and emerging) way of leading battles must happen very differently. Distinguished researchers can definitely state, based on the latest wars and battles,

how the future of leading battles will occur. Former Chief of the Imperial German General Staff Count Schlieffen, not long after the Russo-Japanese War, said the following: "In the future, the realization of the major battle chief's duty will lie in predicting the possibility of meeting the enemy and hence will prematurely indicate to his armies and corps the potential attack paths, precincts, and directions, and approximately indicate each day's assignment. There will no longer be a Napoleon who is standing on a hill in the middle of a flamboyant accompaniment. Even with the most precise telescope, he would now see very little. If he were on a horse, then he would be the easiest target for much of the enemy's artillery batteries. A military leader will be found far in the background, in some shelter with wide rooms and a telegraph, a wireless telegraph, telephones and a signal device, uncountable automobiles and motorcycles, ready to travel the farthest distances. There, in a comfortable chair by a table, the modern military leader sees the entire battle field on a map in front of him; from there he expresses fiery words and there he receives reports from army and corps commanders and aerial scouts." That's how the genius German military leader predicted the future of leading war based on Russo-Japanese experiences and advancements in technological means. The experience of world war and current technological advancements show us that this prediction was slightly exaggerated. The battlefields of current times in comparison with Napoleon's battlefields are immeasurably wider. Even Napoleon already near Bautzen couldn't predict the battlefield (15 versts frontline). However, modern day technological apparatus gives us the opportunity to drive a long distance in a short while. In the time of Napoleon, a full hour (on a good horse) was needed in order to traverse 15 versts; now in an hour's time 200-300 versts can be traversed by airplane, 50-60 versts by automobile. In modern day war, not paying attention to great distances, notifications and orders reach their destination much quicker than in Napoleon's time, when battlefields were much smaller. That's why also a modern day military leader can arrive at a necessary moment in a critical location, where he can see much himself, utter admonishments, and with his persona influence the military force. It is known that a leader cannot march in front his regiment when striking, pulling his soldiers along with his heroism, because he would be seen by and affect at most only a few hundred soldiers, while the overall front for a period of time would remain without leadership. Nevertheless, a modern military leader can very quickly keep everyone informed about his location on the battlefield by telegraph, and the same it is with the assistance of electrical currents; his words can very quickly be announced to all the subordinates. A modern day military leader certainly doesn't have the opportunity to personally appear in front of his



military forces, circumvent the army's front by horse, and with fiery words elevate the morale of the troops, as was always done by medieval military leaders. But even in the time of Napoleon, it already wasn't possible for the leader to appear in front of all of his military force. Napoleon constantly saw only his guard and one or another corps while a large part of the military forces got to see their leader no more than once a year.

Without a doubt, the modern day battle administration must happen from a command point, combat headquarters, found far behind in comfortable quarters by maps with technological instruments. A military leader's mental characteristics become known much quicker than in Napoleon's time. With a telegraph and telephone (wire and wireless) it is possible to communicate long distances at every moment; in addition, communicating by phone, one can discern the intonation of the voice. Subordinates can receive a leader's directives more often than in previous times, and that's why it is easier even for subordinates to judge their commander's abilities, because subordinates constantly and without interruption sense the administration's reins and feel that they are always under the watchful eye of the leader. The modern day military force, even more than in earlier times, waits to be led and to be looked after. Now, greater artistry must be shown in this concern for the troops. Huge armies must be supplied with food, clothing, and war materials, and it is much more difficult to station them in comparison to the smaller medieval armies. Perhaps some will find it odd, but it is a fact that a military force very accurately assesses how it is led and how it is cared for. If leadership occurs expediently and accurately, then there won't be complaints among the troops about the difficulties, the shortages, but if a leadership won't be effective, then disturbances among the troops will occur even over insignificant difficulties and minimal shortages. In 1914, when on September 10th the Russian 5th Army's front began persecuting the Austrian troops, at first everything went accordingly and the troops very accurately fulfilled their duties. Nearing the San River, the 5th Army's frontline was already squeezed tightly; crossing the river and moving further, the army's frontline became even narrower; as a result, it would actually be easier to execute each battle assignment, but the reality turned out to be different. Already on the San River, the Russian attacks were carried out quite slowly and lethargically, but later, wherever the Austrian's showed opposition, it took a long time to push them back; segments of the troops had become indolent. These same segments of the 5th Army in October were flung over to Warsaw in very quick marches. In these marches the troops had to make due with just stale bread for many days in a row (5-6 days); however, they completed their movements

absolutely without delay. Also, in the battles by Warsaw, segments of the army displayed significant if not valour then at least energy against a much stronger enemy— against the Germans.

It is known that soldiers and the lowest ranking officers couldn't see or know that during September the leadership wasn't efficiently working for everyone, but the troops instinctively felt this from having overheard the statements of the highest officers from place to place and having noticed a few other indirect indications.

Leading manoeuvre warfare in modern time (wide districts with huge military automobiles) without a doubt requires a wide ranging knowledge of war and a large amount of instruments of war for leadership. The results of the war between nations in this time has a greater meaning than in previous wars: in earlier wars a small army could be beaten and part of a province lost, but in modern day war, whole nations can be beaten and an entire country can lose its independence. Therefore, accepting the plans of war and directing that same war requires a hearty morale— great mental courage to accept a definite resolution and without the smallest doubt or hesitancy carry this out in real life. If the decisions aren't definite, if hesitant orders and directions are given, then the troops will sense this, and they will lose trust in their leader. A great deal of mental courage is required to throw thousands of the best sons of nations into the fire, but if in a time when needed that won't have been done, then those same sons won't trust their leader.

From the beginning of time until the World War (and without a doubt in all the future wars) one of the most supreme instruments for a leader to gain the respect and the idolization from his troops is a victory. The troops always want to win regardless of the price it pays. If a leader gives a victory, then the hearts and souls of the troops will attach to the leader.

In the experiences of the World War, we seemingly see very little respect for the great military commanders, few instances when the troops with their hearts and souls would have attached themselves to their leader and idolized him. We can provide a few reasons for why that is. Here in this role play there are current military leadership conditions: the leader far behind, the troops rarely look upon their leader; the leader doesn't provide an example of personal courage and doesn't share the challenges of war with his troops. Secondly, the World War hasn't put forth first class war geniuses. Thirdly, because of various political conditions, war commanders were called off and substituted numerous times. The various political circumstances sometimes were even the reason why the military leader's authority was minimalised. Not taking all of that into account, we still see a fairly great and high respect towards certain leaders. If we reminisce about the military leaders of

the Russian army, then everyone will immediately think of Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolayevich, although he was only commander in chief during the first year of the war, didn't earn any special victories, and during his time of high command, the Russian army incurred the most substantial losses, deaths, and injuries than in all the rest of the years of that war. The troops, however, felt the sizable energy, strong desire, and also quickness of the leadership, which is why they readily endured hardships and huge losses. That's why, to this day the former Russian soldiers and former Russian allies and enemies admiringly remember the military commander Nikolai Nikolayevich. In the beginning of the World War, a military leader needed to have a distinguished title in order to earn boundless authority among the company of other higher officers and government officials. However, on the second side of the World War, when propaganda started to be utilized, having a distinguished title played a negative role; it was easy to convince people that the Grand Duke actually understood little of the science of war and only shoved people into death.

The commander-in-chief of the Allied Forces (Marshall Joffre) also had earned a vast amount of trust and respect among the troops, if not as a war artist, then as a soldier with great energy, unbreakable desire, and vast amounts of optimism. However, he didn't display quick movements in military leadership during the World War. In the war's beginning, the French army's offensive ended with utter failure, but just like Joffre, the followers never lost their desire and hope to gain victory.

We saw the greatest art of war during the World War on the side of Germany. Without a doubt, Hindenburg and Ludendorff earned the greatest respect in the World War. They have received honour and praise as commanders-in-chief. It is hard to say who was greater: Hindenburg or Ludendorff. Some German writers compare Hindenburg's relationship with Ludendorff to Blücher's relationship with his Chief of Staff, Gneisenau: Gneisenau did the thinking while Blücher did the acting. On the first side of the World War, among the soldiers only Hindenburg's name was heard; in contrast, on the latter side of the World War and especially towards the end, Ludendorff's name was heard more. Despite that being so, the legal commander-in-chief was Hindenburg. He had appeared before the troops and in his name everything was done. That's why, without a doubt, this honour belongs to him. Praise and trust was shared among Hindenburg and Ludendorff.

In August of 2014, Hindenburg and Ludendorff were accepted into the 8th Army, which had suffered defeat and was in the process of retreating. The retreating army received new telegraphic orders from the leaders, who hadn't until this time

yet been seen: Hindenburg was retired from service, and Ludendorff was a staff worker who before the war had commanded only a brigade. The commands given by the unseen leadership were fulfilled with complete energy and the army after such brutal battles earned a victory, which was incomparable to any victory earned in modern or medieval war history. The victory motivated trust in the leaders. Hindenburg-Ludendorff used this trust, assigning the troops more challenging assignments. On August 30, the Russian Samsonov army was destroyed on the border of Poland, and already on September 12, this same Germany army had driven out the Rennenkampf army from Eastern Prussia and was located on the border of Lithuania. On September 28, this same German corps had already made its way to Upper Silesia and from there began attacking in southern Poland, and from there to Warsaw, where they attacked the first 3 days until there was an encounter with the only the Russian cavalry. The corps moved at about the rate of 40 kilometres per day. On October 9, the Germany troops already stretched the battle to Warsaw and along the Vistula River to the north of Warsaw. If at the Battle of Tannenberg the German troops began trusting the new commanders, the content of their orders, their directness and other signs, which alluded to the sense of the leaders' power, then at the battle near Warsaw the troops from the gained experience knew their leaders well and so gifted them unbounded trust. In the Battle of Tannenberg, Ludendorff still didn't completely trust the troops or rather wasn't yet able to definitely state its military ability, couldn't calculate exactly how strong of a weapon their troops were. At the battle by Warsaw, Ludendorff could already very accurately calculate what was possible, what the troops were capable of fulfilling and what they weren't. On October 16, by Warsaw, Ludendorff finds that the condition of the German troops is being threatened by the Russian forces, who, coming from Novogeorgievsk, has started to create a flank along the left side of the Germans. Ludendorff makes the choice to retreat from Warsaw. Since on all the German frontlines the Russians have very strong dominance, then the retreating isn't so easily done. In order to retreat freely, the order is given to the troops located in Warsaw to push the Russians back a few points. On October 17 and 18 all the left (threatened) flank moves into battle and actually in more than a few places pushes back the Russians. Then on the night from October 18 to 19 they begin to retreat, which they also complete without fault.

Trust and loyalty from the side of the troops and accurately managing the force of the troops by the side of the leader gives a final opportunity to take action following exact calculations. If these elements are missing, then a leader cannot

create a definite action plan. Also, if a leader creates a most brilliant plan, then it would still only be a theoretical idea because it could not be realized in real life.

In this respect, I can provide an opposite example by mentioning the Austrian military leader Hetzendorf. Hetzendorf must be viewed as a distinguished military leader; in regards to talent, he had no less than Ludendorff, with the same enthusiasm and disposition, but between him and his troops there wasn't a strong internal connection as there was with Hindenburg-Ludendorff and the German troops. Hetzendorf's plans and manoeuvring is admirable, but all these beautiful manoeuvres ended either in catastrophe or defeat or just small gains. The first crucial battle in August and September of 1914, the Austrian military forces get thrown into an attack for so long until they are totally beaten and in the end the attack concluded with a disorderly retreat. That's why also not one of the brilliantly devised plans yielded brilliant victories.

I don't want to say that Hetzendorf as a leader didn't benefit from the trust of his troops and wouldn't have known the abilities of his troops, but I only want to emphasize that between Hetzendorf and his troops, there wasn't a strong internal connection, and that's why Hetzendorf continually erred in his calculations. The reasons for this lack of internal connection were many and diverse, and for the most part they were not the fault of Hetzendorf.

When in 1916, all of Germany's military forces were put into the hands of Hindenburg and Ludendorff, then Hindenburg with Ludendorff had already earned such widespread, broad praise with their brilliant victories, and that's why naturally all the troops looked to them with complete trust and loyalty. Already the first directives, which were given by Hindenburg-Ludendorff (instructions about leading a battle and training for battle) resulted in even greater confidence in these leaders. Later, the war activities from the autumn of 1916 through the summer of 1918 strengthened this more and more. In the fall of 1918, during the time of Ludendorff's withdrawal, even for him there was no loss of trust by the troops: the enemy propaganda against Ludendorff had gained advancements in the background between politicians and those who had avoided war, but not from the troops on the frontline; if the healthy German elements still believed in something, then it was only in Hindenburg and Ludendorff. Otherwise, that which is also proved by current German circumstances couldn't be. The influence of Hindenburg-Ludendorff on the troops has also been argued against. It tends to be said that the Germans with their nationalistic qualities are much disciplined and that's why they fulfilled the desires of their leadership. To me it seems this isn't the case, but that the main role played the personalities of Hindenburg-Ludendorff.

Those German soldiers who were captured during the battles of 1914 often didn't know the names of their corps or division commanders, but each one knew Hindenburg, and beginning with the latter part of the 1915, each soldier also knew Ludendorff. It was known that Hindenburg and Ludendorff became popularized in a large way through newspapers and speeches and various recognitions. On each page of German newspapers, songs of praise were sung to Hindenburg and Ludendorff. The songs of praise in newspapers, various recognitions and the praises of government officials can never have been considered a measurement in regards to a general's influence on the troops and the troops' attitude toward the leader. The troops themselves, independent of external influences gives the greatest or smallest trust and subordination to the leader due to the leader's own work, from his leading. Until the end, the German army also remained faithful to their leadership. Also, in that era, when the Kaiser had been toppled, when the new government and government officials began to attack the old leadership (the government itself started to direct propaganda against its leadership, piling on it all of Germany's and the German nation's failures and suffering), also then the army in spite of this believed and trusted only their generals, and from the perspective of the troops on the frontline there came not one rebuke of Hindenburg and Ludendorff. That circumstance, with the troops remaining faithful to their leadership even during the greatest moment of disaster, is the most significant evidence of the enormous trust and loyalty that Hindenburg and Ludendorff had gained in the military.

The trust and obedience of a military force is one of the most significant factors of success: if a soldier completely trusts, only then will he fulfil a command— the demand of the general— and only then will it be possible to realize the designed plans; if there isn't absolute trust and obedience by troops, then their complete effort won't be put into an assignment, the command won't be completely fulfilled and often even the most genius of plans won't yield brilliant results. Therefore, trust and obedience give victory, and from the opposite perspective, victory gains trust and obedience.

One of the greater known military authors formulated in a rather banal way the relationship between leadership and troops, and I haven't been able to find a more precise definition. He said that a true leader must gain such trust and loyalty from troops "so that the troops devote themselves to their leader, much like a loving woman gives devotion".

# A MILITARY LEADER IN WAR

Clausewitz says that war is the continuation of politics but only through different means. It seems to me that this definition needs to be expanded. If war is the continuation of politics, but only through different means, then it also yields different results. The effects of war are much more different than the effects of politics; the results of war are especially determinant. Politics doesn't force anything. Political contracts express the wishes of both parties: agree to and accept that which is favourable or seems at least favourable for both parties entering into the contract. In contrast, in war one of the warring sides (the victor) forces the other side (the defeated) to fulfil that, which for the latter isn't favourable but is often catastrophic. Each political (international) contract remains in effect only while the contract remains advantageous for both parties. As soon as it becomes disadvantageous for one of the contract's parties, the contract can be terminated. On the other hand, through war the victor forces the defeated to fulfil that which for the latter is totally disadvantageous and for whom this can be forced upon for as long as the victor has been determined to have the dominant force. No one can force a diplomat to sign one or another contract. A diplomat has the time to consider. A diplomat knows the terms and the circumstances when and for which he must accept the contract. A military leader never knows the time and circumstances when an enemy plans to attack. A military leader never has advanced knowledge about when and where a decisive battle will happen. A military leader can never decline to respond to an enemy's actions. He cannot ignore an enemy's provocation; he can only alter an enemy's provocation with force. If a diplomat will have done something inconvenient— signed a disadvantageous contract, the nation and country won't admit it and the contract will be annulled; the results of a diplomat's mistake will be that the diplomat will be recalled— the diplomat will lose his career, but the country won't suffer. If a military leader makes a mistake, then the results will be a catastrophe for the country; the recalling of the military leader and the disapproval won't save the country. A lost battle cannot be improved. The mistakes made leading war cannot be edited; the actions of war which have already begun can no longer be halted and started over.

It is possible to direct politics such that for both sides it is favourable: the politicians from two countries can sign a contract which is advantageous for both countries. Therefore, the results of success for the politicians are without boundary.



In contrast, from two warring sides only one side can win; thus, the military leader has only a 50% chance of possible success. From two military leaders one will be the victor and the other will be the defeated. The results of the work done by politicians aren't always immediately visible; often they can only be felt after a longer period. A politician can always convince his country and nation that he has achieved the greatest results. Only now is history carrying out judgment about Russia's, Austria's, and Germany's diplomacy— the deeds of the ministers of foreign affairs from 1906-1914, because only now have the results become visible from the politics of Izvolsky, Sazonov, Aehrenthal, Bethmann—Hollweg. On the other hand, in that time, when they were actively working, they were praised, honoured, and lauded in front of the nation. The results from the actions of military leaders are seen on the spot, as victory or failure. It is known, that even in this circumstance, the magnitude of the approval for the military leader will become visible only later, but the results from his work will always immediately be felt by the nation and country.

Who carries the responsibility for the political mistakes? No one. Diplomats cover themselves with their government, the government with their political parties. Moreover, the parties don't have to answer to anyone regarding their activities. In stark contrast, the military leader is always responsible for the results of directing the war. For the failures of the war Russia blames Samsonov, Zhilinsky, Rennenkampf and others; Germany— Moltke, Falkenhayn, Kluck, Bülow, etc. For starting the war, Germany's, Austria's, and Russia's chiefs of staff are blamed; military leaders and superiors are blamed for the catastrophes which Russia, Germany, and Austria suffer. However, it is the diplomats who proclaimed the war, and it was the politicians who gave the resources in order to prepare the army for war. Still, not one politician is burdened with the responsibility for the country's catastrophe.

If a military leader is given tremendous responsibility, responsibility for a country's entire future existence, then the military leader must be given a tremendous amount of freedom. The exceptional Russian leader Suvorov expressed it so: "Absolute power to the appointed leader". The military leader is the only person responsible for the entire war; consequently, he must have the benefit of the complete and unrestricted rights throughout the entire leading of the war. The country must choose a military leader and must give him absolute rights; the country must choose a person to whom to entrust the fate of the country in a critical moment. The future of the country will be reliant upon the determined actions of the military leader. The chosen military leader will only be able to use

all his power and resources to save the country if he benefits from unrestricted freedom of action, and if his decisions are made only to uphold the rules of victory and nothing else.

For this reason, he must be chosen and given rights, but that isn't something done easily.

Who, then, to elect as a military leader? If, as already mentioned, one must build a very important factory, bridge, and other similar devices, then the best specialist in that field can be found and given this job. This specialist will devise a project, based on this project, he will ask for the needed materials and resources and will complete this job. A military leader's work must happen much differently. First of all, the military leader will only be able to use those resources that are already available; the military leader cannot ask for any more resources; he must fight with the army as it is. Once war has been proclaimed, there is no more devising a plan or project; he must use the already established project and resources as his foundation. Once the war has been announced, then the military leader won't have any opportunity to become acquainted with his war leading apparatus: his army, or with other resources; the enemy's activities won't allow him any more time to prepare or become familiar; each idle hour is a loss — each unused or wasted day can bring about catastrophe. The activities of war don't get directed by mechanisms: machines, whose work power and resilience can be definitely calculated following formulae: such and such horse power, such and such kilowatts, etc. War activities are led by a military— and organism, whose capabilities can't be calculated by mathematical formulas, but one that is subjected to the greatest of alterations. In order to most usefully utilize capabilities of the military, then this military must not only be known, it must be felt. Only feeling his military, the leader will be capable of expanding his power and vice versa; if a military does not have a good leader, then their power will be greatly minimized.

The power of a military in the most significant way is dependent upon its readiness. A military will gift its absolute trust, allow its power to be completely utilized only by him, who has prepared them. Only he who has trained the military will have a good knowledge of the military's power. Therefore, only that person, who in the time of peace trained the military is the one capable of leading them into battle, the only one who can most suitably utilize and sustain their power, not allowing it to diminish. He can only lead a military in war that in the time of peace he himself has trained them for, prepared himself and readied his military. It is a mistaken opinion, believing that only a popular personality and healthy mind is necessary for leading a war. In a country's and nation's life, the activity

of war is the most critical and complicated, and that's why a person who has most seriously trained his weapon, his military and himself, is necessary to lead to lead it. When, after Napoleon's brilliant successes in 1796 and 1797, news about his victories spread over all of Europe, then many turned to the greying genius Russian general Suvorov with a question: how can Napoleon's brilliant victories be explained? Suvorov answered: "Read Alexander of Macedonia, Julius Caesar, Turenne, Gustav Adolf, and Frederick the Great, read them, get immersed in them and then read them again." Hence Suvorov explained the victories of Napoleon not as an occurrence, luck, or as something new, as something previously unimagined, but as art, founded on a deep knowledge of war.

Preparing the military must be completely in tandem with the plan to begin the war: our instruments of work must match our intent. Therefore, the incoming military leader must devise a war plan and dependent upon this must prepare the military. When the war has already been proclaimed, then there's no more thinking about the war's plan; the war plan must have been complete already long ago. Along with the mobilization begins the actualization of the war plan. A military leader cannot begin to fulfil a foreign, unfamiliar war plan. A victory in war is a work of art justified by knowledge. The author of the project and the exporter in life can only be one and the same person. In this regard, Napoleon can be an example for his actions in the year 1800. In the year 1800, Napoleon became the true ruler. Peace talks with the French enemy at that time didn't yield positive results, and so it was decided to initiate war. The situation was like this: on the Italian front—from the French side Masséna with 50,000 men, opposite him approximately 80,000 Austrians; on the German front—120,000 French led by Moreau, opposite him were just as large an Allied military force led by General Kray. Moreau had already earned rather large praise during the revolutionary war and was considered to be a distinguished general: Napoleon's companion. Assessing the situation, Napoleon had come to the conclusion that the most important theatre of war should be the German frontline, but the Italian frontline should be the side theatre: wonderful successes on the German front promised to completely break the force of the enemy. Deciding on this war plan, Napoleon also established an operation plan on the German front, an operational plan, which required an attack against the enemy's left flank, then circumvent this flank and then throw back the enemy's forces to the northeast—to throw them back off the base and off of Austria. Napoleon sent his operational plan to General Moreau. The latter didn't agree with Napoleon's strategic plan; Moreau put forth his own plan. Moreau's plan could give success, but couldn't ensure a complete victory—destroying the enemy's force. Moreau

definitely supported his own plan. Napoleon didn't find it possible to impose his brilliant plan. Napoleon preferred to sacrifice the entire notion of the main theatre or war. He decided it was better to earn brilliant successes in the side theatre instead of imposing his plan on a general who disagreed with him. Napoleon didn't dare to recall General Moreau because he had earned rather widespread acclaim and popularity.

Thus war and strategic planning are not devised by only the one person who will realize the plan in life. Consequently, in peacetime, a plan can only be devised by that person who will have to lead the military. In this regard, especially appropriate examples are given by the last world war. The war plans for the Russian army, in general and for individual armies, were devised by the Chief of Staff: the main heads of the administration for the Chief of Staff and the heads of the regional mobilization for war and operations. The plans were devised very extensively, deeply considered and based on wide data, facts, and calculations. Along with devising the plans, they took into consideration all the resources and well-tested information about their own and their enemy's military forces. It was factored in that the Russian army is less mobile, not as quick, weaker leadership, etc., and that the German army was able to fight more battles; the magnitude of the enemy's force and their operational methods were factored in. Their plans made certain that there would be no surprises, no accidents, no defeats in the beginning. If these plans had been carried out in life, then, without any doubt, if the Russians also wouldn't have had brilliant results, then at least there wouldn't have been the greatest defeats, not to event mention the catastrophes, like the ones that befell Samsonov's army by Soldov-Tannenberg. But the misfortune existed in that these plans were devised by one party, but carrying out the war was given to other people— individuals who, if they even became carelessly acquainted with these plans, then they hadn't at least thoroughly examined them or understood their foundation on which the plans were based. Commander-in-Chief Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolayevich didn't deeply understand the foundation on which the war's beginning depended and that's why he easily gave in to France's confidence and admonishments, and for this reason during the time of mobilization and ordering of military force, already the war plan was being changed. In the war plan, it was foreseen that each army against Germany would be much stronger in number than all the German forces left on the Russian front. Thus if the German's attacked one of these two armies with all its might, it could experience a failure, but wouldn't get completely obliterated, as actually occurred. According to the war plan, both armies working against Germany had to begin the attack in careful coordination,

cautiously keeping a tight connection, and resisting even the smallest amount of rush. With the alteration of the war plan the armies focused against Germany were minimized and began to rush their activities without maintaining connection and not in any coordinated way. That all happened not only because Nikolai Nikolayevich wasn't the author of the plan, but also because he hadn't taken any active participation in devising the plan. The Russian II Army Commander General Samsonov along with announcing the mobilization arrived in Poland from distant Turkestan and took under his leadership the corps, who had in peacetime been led and trained by others. Of course, General Samsonov also didn't know well all the details of the operational plan, which the headquarters of the Warsaw war region had devised. The result was that the Samsonov army in its first battle was completely destroyed, despite that this army was comprised of the best Russian corps: The Germans remembered these army corps (XV, XIII, and XXIII) with the greatest praise.

With the alterations in the war plan and rushing, the Russian army would also suffer defeat on the eastern front. There wasn't a catastrophe just because the Austrian military showed that they were less prepared than the Russian military. In addition, a large portion of the Austrian military had been pulled to the Serbian front. If Russia's general would have carried out the Chief of Staff's devised plan, cooperating with the Chief of Staff, utilizing all the available data and calculations, without a doubt the Russian army wouldn't have suffered any large defeat, at least not at the beginning of the war, even if all the Austrian forces were working against Russia.

After the war ended, the German war literature very widely analysed Germany's war plan. From these articles, it is now possible to draw known conclusions about the devising of the war plan and realizing it in real life from German military leaders. When circumstances change, also the war plan changes. Germany's war plan, it is known, also changed. Speaking about the World War, the German literature never discusses the so-called Count Schlieffen operational plan. Count Schlieffen, having for a long time been Germany's director of the Chief of General Staff had devised a genius war plan. Even his successors stuck to this plan, but they did make some rather important amendments to the plan. Also, the final Chief of General Staff and the army's actual commander-in-chief in 1914 at the beginning of the war, Helmuth von Moltke, had made some changes to Count Schlieffen's plan, alterations, which the new circumstances had called for. It is hard to say whether Count Schlieffen also would have made these changes. It's hard to say if these changes were absolutely called for due to the changes in circumstances,

so it isn't possible to say if in meeting the circumstances of 1914 it would have been possible to leave the plan devised by Count Schlieffen in 1905. However, it is possible to state that in the World War, the plan ideated by Count Schlieffen was possible to carry out in life. Nowadays critics have determined that it could very well be that if in 1914, Count Schlieffen's idea would have been realized in real life, the German's would have occupied Paris. The author of the war plan didn't get to realize his brilliant plan. Another leader, following this wonderful plan, altered it and didn't get any victories, suffered defeat, and perhaps this is so because he was acting from his own will and not from the soul of Count Schlieffen. However, Moltke wasn't Schlieffen. Perhaps, if Moltke himself had devised his own plan, one suitable to himself from the beginning to the end, then he wouldn't have had bad results. The Schlieffen plan by idea would have been carried out in life by a leader with the same spirit and insight as Schlieffen.

Ludendorff is seen as Schlieffen's apprentice. Ludendorff worked for a rather long time under Schlieffen's guidance. Until 1912, Ludendorff took a position that allowed him to become most intimately familiar with Schlieffen's ideas, his decisions, his conclusions and the bases for those conclusions. Ludendorff was actually the one to continue with Schlieffen's ideas and to carry them out in real life because through 1912, Ludendorff held the position of Chief of General Staff of the I section—devising the plan for war and mobilization. When in 1914, Ludendorff was promoted to the position of director of the German 8th Army's Chief of General Staff (since only the 8th Army was located on Russia's front, then Ludendorff was the Chief of General Staff for the entire front), Ludendorff had devised, considered and more than once deliberated about taking action against Russia.

When in 1914 he had to carry out this plan in real life, then we see the most brilliant results. Previously, Ludendorff's 8th Army had been commanded by General Prittwitz, who, without a doubt, had been introduced to the methods of the action plan, but between being introduced and being immersed in them there is a huge difference—just as big a difference was between knowledge and ability. That's precisely why there is such a large difference between a general leader and a military leader. Prittwitz suffered defeat, and Ludendorff with that same army earned the most brilliant victory. In those circumstances, in which Ludendorff earned laurels from Tannenberg, it is possible to earn a victory but only for that type of leader, who throughout the entire action has already in advance carefully studied and considered the situation. The example of Ludendorff preparing in advance is just as brilliant an example as is Ludendorff's first step into the World's War—attacking the citadel of the Liège fortress and occupying Meuse (Maas) River

Bridge. Near Germany, fulfilling the war plan meant for a large part just going through Belgium as quickly as possible. If an attack through Belgium didn't happen very quickly, then the French would be given the opportunity to either defeat the German forces located in Lorraine, or to pull together a stronger counterforce against the attacking German forces. If the attack wouldn't happen very quickly, then also the Belgians would be capable of showing a much stronger resistance and bring together its own army and fortifications to be in total battle-ready condition.

Each lost day was a huge failure. That's why the attack in Belgium was devised down to the smallest detail, everything with which it would be possible to quicken the attack was reconsidered and carefully weighed. The Liège fortress was located only 20 kilometres from Germany's border and together with the Namur fortress they covered the remainder of the Meuse River. It was decided that overtaking this fortress should be done with a swift attack, but even if the fortress could be overtaken rather quickly, the Belgians would still defend, and if they saw that they weren't able to resist for much longer, they would blow up the bridge over the Meuse River. Building a new bridge would require a rather long time. Therefore, a decision was made to make a very bold manoeuvre: during the night break through the fortress line, overtake the citadel and occupy and safeguard the bridges until other military forces from outside with artillery assistance move into the fortresses. This breaking through plan was devised by the Chief of General Staff; perhaps Ludendorff was the author of this overconfident attack. This plan was overconfident because the fortress was a recently constructed building, and it consisted of 12 fortresses and citadels, the fortresses were located  $2\frac{1}{2}$  to  $3\frac{1}{2}$  kilometres distance from one another. Six brigades that hadn't completed mobilization were designated for the attack. On August 4, these brigades crossed the border and on the night of August 5 to 6, they broke into the fortress. Ludendorff by announcing mobilization had been designated to the II army headquarters. Since these headquarters hadn't yet had work (during the period of mobilization and transportation), so Ludendorff arrived at the Liège fortress. From there, Ludendorff's voluntary arrival and breaking into the fortress, it is apparent that this operation to a large extent had been very close to him. On the night from August 5 to 6, he went together with the 14th Brigade. When the commander of the brigade fell, Ludendorff took over leading the brigade and entered the citadel with the brigade, and in this way secured the bridges over the Meuse River. The only brigade that in that first night broke through the line of the fortress is this 14th Brigade led by Ludendorff. Only the next night did auxiliary forces arrive. The fortresses of the fortification for a few days following this resisted and the final fort was overtaken August 16.



From the German military force attack in Belgium, it is easy to see how detailed the German operational plan had been devised. If these details hadn't been devised in peacetime, then it wouldn't have been possible during the war's beginning to figure them out and to explain them to the plan executors. The latter also wouldn't have been able to so smoothly and in such a coordinated way carry out the plan in real life.

The military leader must absolutely and in a complete way know his weapon—the army—which he will need to work with in war. Even a chauffeur won't want to set off on a distant, risky trip in a car that he hasn't driven first; if a chauffeur also drives with a foreign car, then he will break it much quicker than a chauffeur who has previously driven this car, controlled it, kept it in a good condition and knows well all of its intricacies. A military leader will only know his army well if in peacetime he will have been able to prepare it, teach it, nurture it, and overall lead it. The preparation of an army happens entirely dependent on what kind of assignments it will need to carry out. These assignments are devised by the general, devising the war plan. Therefore, it is only natural that the only person who can correctly and expediently train is the person who devises the war plan and who will lead the army. The designated military leader must stand in front of the army during peacetime, if not as the commander during peacetime, then at least as a war plan deviser and battle drilling leader of the military force. In the German army, already beginning in Napoleon's time, this order was accepted: in the case of war, the Kaiser (Prussian king) became the commander-in-chief (it was known that he wasn't the actual one) and the chief of the Kaiser's headquarters, that is, the actual commander-in-chief, became the general Chief of Staff. Thus the person who in peacetime took the position of general Chief of Staff became the commander-in-chief in the case of war. The general Chief of Staff led the military training—preparation for war; similarly, he prepared all the highest ranking superiors; he devised war and operational plans and, departing from them, set up expectations in regards to the organization of the army, its arming and maintenance; he was the one to prepare the military forces for war.

France's general Chief of Staff in peacetime assumed a similar responsibility as Germany's general Chief of Staff. In war, France's general Chief of Staff turned into the head of the commander of the Chief of Staff. Distinguished military leaders were designated commanders and army commanders, who in peacetime had held the positions of inspector and other high-ranking positions with rather small workloads so that they could immerse themselves in the war activities looming ahead; it was known, that they needed to participate actively in devising the war

plan and prepare the army and the territory for war. France's final commander of the general Chief of Staff during the World War, who gained victory and the greatest glory and honour, Marshall Foch, in peacetime had held the command position at the war academy; therefore, if he wasn't the one to directly train the military force, then still through his hands had gone France's chiefs of staff, who had trained chiefs of staffs and officers—military leaders, through which his perspective, his thoughts, his doctrine governed France's army. Consequently, he benefited from great trust and everyone knew well and understood his expectations.

There is still one more quite odd resource for military leaders in leading war—headquarters with the main person—the general Chief of Staff. History shows us examples of very diverse relationships between military leaders and their general chiefs of staff. There are examples, when a military leader himself makes all the decisions, commanding and doing, but the Chief of Staff is just an administrative director. There are examples of the military leader making decisions and the general Chief of Staff carrying out those decisions in real life. There are examples, when the general Chief of Staff is the military leader's council—together they make decisions and the general Chief of Staff carries them out in real life, and there are occasions, when the military leader is only a symbol for his general Chief of Staff; the general Chief of Staff makes all the decisions, puts together directives, informs the general of those and finally without objections and without the slightest contemplation signs. This text assignment does not include any analysis of such a relationship or assess this kind of relationship. Writing about military leaders, I am considering actual leaders, regardless if the actual leader is himself a military leader or his general Chief of Staff.

Let's examine an especially advantageous occasion: a military leader already during peacetime has been the one to prepare the military for war; he himself devised the war and operational plans, the government with the proclamation of war has given him complete and unrestricted power in leading the war. In one word, the military leader enters the war in complete armour. Nevertheless, his work will be very difficult: we mustn't forget that there is only a 50 percent chance of victory. While everything is proceeding well and successfully, it isn't hard for the military leader. However, in war things tend to go smoothly and easily only at that time when the enemy isn't working hard or when we ourselves are working slowly without energy, or again when the enemy in comparison to us is very weak. As soon as energetic work begins, then the military leader is required to ask from his military forces a tremendous amount of energy and immediately the troops will show resistance. Within that resistance there doesn't have to be contradiction,

refusal to fulfil commands and similar disorderly conduct, although often also that is something that comes forward; continual resistance will remain in the troops expressing their exhaustion over huge losses, over lack of material resources, and they will beg for some rest, to not continue attacks, and sometimes still they will even say that they don't even hope for success and may remark that they don't guarantee a possible catastrophe. Resistance will often create an impression that the war general himself will have gotten up close on the battlefield, seeing the large number of sacrifices. Therefore, the military leader must first conquer his own resistance and the resistance within the entire troops. When the troops start to lose their mental energy, then the only reserve from which it is possible to replenish this loss is the military leader; hence the military leader must have such a high morale that he has enough for himself and can give some to his subordinates. As the army's morale starts to fall, the heavier all the work presses on the shoulders of the leader. When in the hearts of the subordinates the flame of victory's hope starts to grow dim and their minds start to darken, then the leader with his heart fire must light his subordinates' hope for victory anew and with his mind he must illuminate his subordinates' outlook. If he is capable, if he becomes the unbendable commander, then he will become a military leader. If he will allow himself to be convinced by the troops, then the masses of troops will pull him to the ground and he will be level with them, then he will not be a military leader and won't lead the troops, but he himself will be led by the troops.

Each war plan devised during peacetime can experience all the operations only to the first battle. Thus, when the first battle has just begun or the first battle has given known results, the war general must immediately consider the next action. If the first battle will have occurred favourably, then, it is known, that the next action can follow the idea base that was established in peacetime, but still new decisions will need to be made, because the war circumstances can't be prematurely predicted. The circumstances of war always are very unclear, and there's no time to wait for clarity, because the circumstances won't ever become clear but only become more complicated; after each larger or smaller interval, completely new and unforeseen news about the enemy and their activities will be received. The mind of the military leader must be so bright that it clearly could see and understand by the small light, which gives not much broken information about the conditions. In this weak little light, he must be able to identify the correct situation. The moral force of the war general must be so strong that it would give direction from the observed truth within this small light and definitively direct without hesitancy in order to make definite decisions and strong realization in real

life. Making definite decisions and strictly carrying out plans in life under these circumstances requires a very bright mind and strong character. For this reason, we often meet leaders who cannot make decisions, who fluctuate, who alter accepted decisions, confer with subordinates so that they can shuck their responsibility, etc. About making decisions, Napoleon said the following: "When I have to make a decision in war, then I suffer like a woman giving birth, but when I have made the decision, then I immediately feel happy and free." I will present an example in regards to a decision made in Napoleon's first war expedition under especially difficult circumstances. In his first military expedition in 1796, Napoleon had successfully broken through the enemy's front and attacked Northern Italy. The Piedmont military forces had retreated to the north and the Austrian troops to the west and northwest beyond the Alps, keeping in its grasp the way out from the Alps. In Italy, the Austrian's had left a rather strong garrison at the Mantua fortress of that time. Napoleon encircled this fortress, but couldn't overtake it due to a lack of artillery. The government of France did not send Napoleon any additional forces or resources. As a result, Napoleon did the only thing he could; he controlled the overtaken district, forced order there, used the local means to build his army and tried to force the garrison in the fortress to give up by forcing them to suffer famine. For the fortress to not give in, then the Austrians' tried to attack and unite with the garrison of the fortress. The Austrian's always began their attacks emerging from the Alps in many columns with intention; if Napoleon were to block the way for one of the columns, then another column could go around Napoleon's back. Napoleon took advantage of the Austrian attacks in numerous columns: acting swiftly and definitively, he always was able to delay a few of the Austrian columns with only a little manpower, and at that exact time, he would attack one column with the all the rest of his power, defeat that and then with all of his troops return to fight the next column. In this way, Napoleon was able to successfully hit back already against two attacks. At the end of September 1797, the Austrians began to assemble a new army at the Mantua fortress to reinvigorate under the leadership of General Alvinczi. On October 22, Alvinczi began his movement to attack.

# A MILITARY LEADER IN BATTLE

“A battle is the main type of action in directing the war; everything else is only an auxiliary action for this most significant method. A battle is combat with the goal of destroying the enemy.”

If devising a battle plan isn't a mathematical assignment involving calculation, but instead is very challenging work involving the brain and spirit, then directing that battle requires even greater intellectual and spiritual energy from the military leader.

First, work of preparation must be directed in order to successfully realize the plan in real life. The preparation can be shorter or longer in duration, depending on how much time is left between accepting the plan and the beginning of the battle. Meeting in battle, agreeing to the plan, and carrying out the preparation of the plan happen almost simultaneously; on the other hand, in an attack in battle, when the enemy has taken its position, the preparation can drag on for weeks and even months. Agreeing on a battle plan is to a large extent connected to the length of the time needed for preparation: a battle plan cannot be accepted if there isn't enough time for preparation or even necessary resources. That needs to be known and calculated by the military leader himself. On the other hand, devising a detailed operation requires the agreement of all a military leader's headquarters. The military leader must follow and with the capability of his desire and character must avert any obstacles that would arise, as those obstacles usually occur due to various objections from the side of the subordinates: difficult movements, excuses about the impossibility of realizing a few of the preparation tasks, etc. In previous times, the preparation for battle was much easier and simpler: easier because the battles were led on a much more restricted battlefield and also with smaller armies; simpler because all the preparation for the most part consisted of grouping the unit of troops in accordance with the battle plan. Now the grouping of a unit of troops must be done in a very wide district and preparation of huge technical resources must also be carried out. All of this is the work of the headquarters. If the headquarters is correctly organized and comprised of capable workers, then the preparation is carried out easily, correctly and such that the troops aren't unnecessarily made tired. The headquarters must be a capable entity such that the military leader is completely relieved of all these details.

As soon as carrying out the plan has begun— the battle begins— then the military leader's work begins again, and also it is the most challenging work. There is a rather large difference between the war general's work in previous times and his work in this era. In earlier times, the war general either from one place personally oversaw the battlefield or he could at least circumvent all the battlefield on horse in a short period of time and get a real impression and assurance about the unfolding events. The previous military leader had to make very quick decisions and had to very hurriedly give directions because battles occurred much quicker than now: one hour was already a long time period, especially at the period of a battle's culmination, delaying by one hour could mean losing the entire battle. That's why Russia's military leader Suvorov characterizes a leader's ability in three words: "vision, quickness, and instinct", which would be correct— without lengthy consideration assessing the situation, quickly making a decision and just as quickly and definitively carrying out this decision in real life. Since these characteristics in the largest way were already practised by the cavalry from the establishment of the office, then we also see that the military leaders of previous times and highest officials emerged from the cavalymen.

In modern time, the situation for military leaders is different. He cannot overlook the battlefield because the field has now spread in length and depth: beginning with the era of Napoleon, the battle fronts continually grew longer and longer, but beginning with the first year of the World's War, the battlefield began to widen also in depth. A military leader nowadays, as well as the leader of every larger unit, is located far from the front parts of the battle: he doesn't have the possibility to personally make sure about the battle's steps and personally cannot affect the battle leading elements. However, these days' battles occur over a longer period of time than in earlier battles, which is why now one hour's time is no longer as decisive as it used to be, because now battles drag on for many days and even weeks. Consequently, the current-day military leader doesn't need to make decisions as momentarily as previously needed to be done. Now there is the opportunity to consider and reconsider. However, greater endurance is required from a current-day military leader. A previous military leader needed to spend one, at the most two or three, days in the state of highest anxiety. The current-day military leader personally doesn't see the battlefield— this circumstance has also its advantage: a military leader doesn't become affected by the horror of various battle sights and various localized failures. The current day military leader leads the war from afar; the richest and most diverse technical resources provide him a complete opportunity to quickly receive all notifications from his subjugated leaders and

in just as quick time transmit the last directives— expressing his desire to set new goals.

Therefore, it happens to be that the current day leadership is easier than in previous times: sitting peacefully in an office and giving well considered directives. Maybe that's how it could certainly be, but only with the rule that a military leader's subjugated leaders would be just like the same kind of people as their leader; that is, they would all identically understand and consider each event and also identically understand every word of each notification or directive. Every person thinks, understands, and senses more or less differently than another person. If from the same position on a battlefield two soldiers will have come and each individually one after the other will tell his impressions, it will turn out that their battle descriptions will differ in the most significant way. Thus if they had written notifications about one and the same even, then it would appear that the notifications aren't identical: both soldiers would definitely have seen the same thing, but they would have experienced it and talked about it differently. If two soldiers were given one and the same tactical assignment under the same circumstances, then again we would see that each of them would fulfil this assignment differently.

The better prepared are leaders, have collaborated well, know each other very well, the less differences there will be between them. That is the question that is called the joint doctrine in the army. There needs to be one shared school, longer shared work, mutual understanding and recognition, then about one and the same event there will be identical understanding and assignments will be completed almost identically. In such a case, the leader, having received notification, will set forth the steps for fulfilling the command. It is not of such importance that this doctrine be perfectly correct and the absolute best, but it is important for there to be this one doctrine.

However, a high morale is required of the most prepared troops and of the best authority from the military leader in the time of battle: the military leader's morale is all of the army's morale reserve.

“In the beginning, while the troops with absolute courage, heartily and quickly leads the battle, the military leader doesn't have enough opportunities to show his strong passion for achieving his goal, yet as soon as the conditions become more challenging— and that is something that cannot be avoided— there where there must be an enormous work, then also everything won't be working on its own like a well-greased machine, but more like this machine will itself start to show



resistance. In overcoming this resistance, the greatest capacity of passion from a military leader is necessary. Underneath this resistance direct disobedience or objections don't need to be understood, although such events from individual subordinates does rather often come forth, but actually this resistance exists as a general impression due to the loss of all the physical and moral energy, an impression, that rises from the bloody battle sacrifices and which every leader must first battle within himself as well as in the other battle participants. When progressively the energy of individual soldiers runs dry and these soldiers don't any longer control their own ability to feel desire, then progressively all the troops collective inertia lies solely upon the desire of the military leader. The fire that burns in his heart and the light that shines in his soul must reignite the glow of commitment within the hearts of the subordinates and must rekindle new rays of hope for all the rest. Just as long as he is able to do this, just as long as he commands the masses, he remains their leader. However, as soon as he no longer can do that, as soon as his personal masculinity isn't any longer that strong to revive his subordinates— in the masses, then immediately the mass will him down to the them— to the lower level of animal nature, where they run from danger and don't know shame. This is the weight of resistance, which the military leader with his personal masculinity and moral energy much overcome if he wants to achieve something excellent. This weight of resistance grows with the size of the masses and for this reason, with every occupancy of a highest supervisor placement, this magnification of energy is necessary if a leader wants to be suitable for his position."

Clausewitz

The affirmation of Clausewitz's judgment was brilliantly seen in the last world war, when battles and marches greatly exhausted both physical and moral energy. At the battle's beginning and especially in the first battles, the troops, pulled themselves in front of themselves, so to speak. However, after long battles, sleepless nights, losses, continual peril and the tremendous effect of the current technical machinery, a physical and more important spiritual exhaustion, that each person who is without feelings of strong masculine heroism begins to avoid; the larger the exhaustion, the less the troops do of their own accord— more and more necessary are commands, that is, the leader must begin to utilize his capacity for desire, his moral energy reserve. Later— at each battle's exhaustion,

each perilous situation begins to seem greater than it is in reality: the dominant power of the enemy, the enemy has received its reserves, the fire of the enemy is especially strong. The despondent often intentionally exaggerate in order to avoid doing more work, but also people with strong, masculine heroism, often after a strong battle's fatigue or overly strong blows, have a totally incorrect assessment of the condition and it seems even worse and more sizable than it actually is. If a leader, receives such nervous, exaggerated notifications, he will begin to look at the situation with the same sight as those informants, and then the battle will be lost. As per Clausewitz's expression: the leader has surely allowed the masses to pull him down to a lower level of animalistic nature. To a lesser extent, I came to see this situation on September 9, 1914. After the Battles of Komarów and after some smaller battles, the 18th division beginning with September 7 started a movement. On September 9 at around 12 noon the division's advanced guard, going through the village of Andrzejówka, ran into the enemy, who also came to battle. Towards evening the battle came to a critical condition. The conditions for the 38th division were very unfavourable. From the beginning two regiments of the II brigade came to turn very rapidly and being that they were in a deep valley, the surrounding elevations were occupied by the enemy. In addition, the battery departing from the II artillery division to their position very rapidly came under the fire from the enemy's artillery. The division's I brigade and 1st artillery battalion couldn't come onto the battlefield because the region was mountainous and the artillery couldn't be taken off the road, and for this reason it didn't get out of forest behind them, and from which the only way out was being fired upon by the enemy's battery. Similarly, the ammunition and cartridge wagon also couldn't get out. Close to dusk, the II brigade was located near the village of Andrzejówka; the enemy on the surrounding elevations, enveloping the brigade from three sides; the ammunition had all been shot; in the dusk, the enemy was still leading strong attacks, during which the II division shot its final round of ammunition hitting them back. The division commander and headquarters were located right there in Andrzejówka, where with darkness setting in, the brigade commander, the artillery brigade commander, both regiment commanders, and the division commander arrived with notifications and directives. All the superiors had arrived with terrible news: the ammunition was gone, the losses were tremendous, the enemy envelops from both flanks; reinforcements have been spotted arriving close to the enemy— a noise is heard, it is believed that a new battery is being set up against the Russian flanks; with the morning sun beginning, the enemy will start from the mountains to shoot and we will be sitting as if in a pot. As a conclusion, which also was expressed: the

brigade will retreat during the night. Only the division commander, who on this day was injured in his chest, held an opposing perspective and ordered everyone to stay in their places. To that the commander of the brigade posed a question: "And what then to do in the morning?" "Continue the battle!"—commanded the division commander. "But with what if we don't have ammunition?" asked the commander of the brigade. "With bayonets!"—answered the division commander. The brigade stayed in their positions and the reality showed that the enemy hadn't been as strong as they had imagined. In a battle it is important to remember the words of Suvorov: "If things are challenging for you, then take into account, that the enemy is having a tougher time."

I have seen numerous times when very courageous and heroic battalion and regiment commanders, when they already have been leading exhausting battles for a long time and after that, come upon a less exciting battle episode, for a determined time lose their masculinity and exaggerate to the greatest extent their condition and the actual circumstances. In battle, more than anywhere else, the feeling comes from above—from a superior and very quickly spreads through the subordinates: how a superior feels, so feels the vast majority of the subordinates. As soon as the superior begins to doubt the potential of a victory, then that victory is already lost. That's why, if a leader gives in to the impression given by notification of particular episodes, episodes, where the greatest failures occurred, even a catastrophe, then this impression will overtake the rest of the sections of the troops, who perhaps in that same moment had actually achieved some successes. A fire begins from one thing burning in one place; the same it is in battle. If in one, even miniscule front segment a hard-hitting defeat occurs and if the next-in-command doesn't eliminate that failure but gives in to the impression left by it, then the defeat will spread further: the superior will inform the next-in-command about the defeat, and if he gives in to that impression and also informs those above in command, then it will appear that the defeat has happened on a wider front. A leader must overcome the local defeats. In each significant battle, a few segments of troops will suffer defeat and perhaps even very significant defeat: without loss a serious battle cannot be won. One or some other subordinate's defeat and staggering report mustn't keep a leader from attaining his intended goal. The character of a leader must be strong so that individual events don't scare him away from achieving his plan.

However, from the opposite perspective, you can't misjudge stubbornness for a strong character. Also stubborn leaders sometimes can attain brilliant results, but such a victory will show the character of the event, and just as often through stubbornness a catastrophic defeat can occur.

A stubborn leader doesn't divert from a plan that has begun, regardless of circumstances. In contrast, a military leader with a strong character sets the fulfilment of his plan as being dependent upon the circumstances: as soon as the circumstances have changed in such a great way that they no longer resemble those that were in the conception of the plan, then the plan must be altered. The strength of character exists in the military leader not allowing himself to be influenced by various disturbing and exaggerated reports. A military leader must be able to discern and correctly assess if a report is accurate or exaggerated, if the conditions are really as they are reported to be or is exhaustion, anxiety, weak nerves and perhaps the reporters lack of masculinity playing a role. A military leader must be able to accurately orientate oneself and assess the circumstances from very diverse and oppositional reports: in this is where the art of the military leader is found: in dim light to see the truth. A military leader must be able to accurately see the enemy, as well as his own troops. If a military leader, inaccurately assessing, admits the enemy is weaker than he actually is, and his troops stronger than they actually are, then the battle will end with a catastrophic defeat. That's what happened at the end of August and beginning of September in 1914 with Austria's army: The Austrians at first made gains from beginning successes, and leading attacks, although they couldn't gain any more successes and after a brief time the Austrian army wasn't capable anymore of leading defensive battles or covering its own retreat. The highest leadership of the Austrians had an overly high assessment of its own military capabilities. If incorrectly assessing, a military leader will assume his enemy to be stronger than he actually is and his own troops to be weaker than they actually are, then catastrophic defeats won't be suffered, but there also won't be any brilliant victories; for the most part such a circumstance with an energetic opponent in battle will end with a retreat. This incorrect assessment of power we see in almost all the battles of the Russo-Japanese war from the side of the Russians. The Japanese powers were always counted as much larger than they actually were; for this reason, all the battles ended with retreat. That same overassessment of an enemy's power we also see rather often in the World's War from a few of the highest positions of Russian leadership. Absolute accurate assessment of the power of one's own as well as one's enemy we see in the World's War from the German military leaders' side as well as from France's, especially on Russia's front in almost all the significant battles. However, where the earlier accepted plan didn't get altered in enough time, despite the circumstances having greatly shifted, was on the Eastern front during the first days of September 1914, the result of that was the disadvantageous Battle of Marne. Touching upon this question overall about

the history of war, it is important to always keep in mind that after the war, sitting peacefully in a room reading about the events of war, it is very easy to judge that which should have occurred in those times. Reading the history of war, we see that one side's condition is just like the other side's, we know the powers of both sides and those powers' physical, material, and moral condition; we even know what each side's leader and subordinates have already determined to do. In war, however, the enemy's actual condition isn't known and often enough the condition of one's troops isn't accurately known, not to mention even the enemy's intentions or plans. Despite all of that, it is on the leader that the tremendous weight and feeling of responsibility is laid. Disregarding that, when studying the historical examples of war, it seems to us, that we can rather easily judge the accuracy or inaccuracy of activities. It must be expressed that this is the way it only seems: theoretically and especially if we function with data on paper, it seems that it is so easy and comprehensible, but in war there is work with living people with their physical and moral unique traits, which do not give in to any mathematical calculations; that's why in war, life's truth often shows itself to be something different than mathematical calculations. Exactly in this respect is interesting to observe a few examples from the German side leaders' actions and the results of those actions in the Battle of Marne, what those results were and what they could have been.

During the first days of September the German right flank had already attacked deep into France, but now the incoming reports show that the French army still isn't beaten and has only suffered a defeat. The German army's right—hitting flank— has become much weaker: after battles, exceptionally long marches and especially having left sizable forces behind to secure. As a result, Germany's high command doesn't find it a possibility to go around Paris from the eastern side because through that the right flank would be stretched out, causing it to become even weaker. On September 2, the high command gives the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Army the furthest distance directly to the south. The furthest goal— steadily chase the French powers so that through that consistency not affording France the chance to regroup, and for this reason, the other armies were given the directives to continue the attacks. On September 2 and 3, the Germans start receiving reports that the French on a large scale were shifting their powers from the right flank to the left flank. Thus a threat to the German front was established along the right flank from the side of Paris. The German high command on the night of September 4 made a decision: assign the 1st and 2nd army to establish a defensive front against Paris and to the east from the last point and from that distance; in order to not lose their manoeuvring ability, the 3rd, 4th, and 5th armies would continue to attack

from previous positions. This decision was already sent to the armies by telegraph on the night of September 4.

On September 5, the army fulfilled the given assignments. On September 5, good news arrived: In Paris, a large quantity of the enemy's troops were assembled, who were preparing to attack the German's right flank from behind; from Antwerp, the Belgians were preparing to attack; in Northern France, behind the Germans, the British were putting aside new troops and the French were organizing new units. The German supreme command on September 6 decided they were ready to meet the anticipated French attack actively with a counter attack. Hence the Germans agreed to battle with the only goal of hitting back the French offensive. With the German 1st Army's energetic activities, the French 6th Army's attack from Paris, an attack which was aimed at the rear of the German's, transformed into a simple frontal battle during which by the end of the battle the German army had managed to envelop France's left (supreme) flank; through that all the 6th Army's attack lost its meaning (the 6th Army almost on all fronts were forced back). During that time there emerged a large rift between the German 1st and 2nd Armies, which could become catastrophic if that were used against them, but the enemy (the British army) didn't use it. On September 8, the German's 2nd Army commander, fearing not his own but the 1st Army's condition (considering that the 1st Army had to retreat) suggests the situation to be critical and so he receives permission to pull back his right flank, through this, then, the actual condition of the 1st Army becomes critical and it is forced to retreat with great difficulty. A criticism of the conditions before the Battle of Marne are seen as such: firstly, the right German flank from the beginning was too weak; already at the end of August the troops needed to be regrouped, strengthening the right flank; at the beginning of September, any further ideas about an attack needed to be discarded. V. Festers writes: "Exceptionally huge, uninterrupted procession required an extensive amount of energy from the troops; battles, which had to be led almost every day, created huge losses, in numbers the composition of the troops continually shrunk, there was no reason to hope for reinforcements to arrive soon, the provisions organs weren't able to keep up quickly with the existing troops. Only an uplifted spirit, which exceeded every praise and confidence in a victory inspired all the troops in a way that he had until then overcome every obstacle. The psychological factors could also still endure what was to come, but by those, who had still been spared by the enemy's fire and the difficult processions, even the number of this remaining quickly melted. The condition of the troops demandingly commanded at least for the time being, for a time, prudence, rest." "If the supreme command until now, not considering any

difficulties, remained steadfast in holding on to the most important thing— the highest goal in war— destroying the enemy even after it had been convinced that the first impression of brilliant victories hadn't been accurate, and still now on the night of September 4, it was the final psychological moment when, considering the overall condition and all the actual factors, a conclusion needed to be made: this path can be followed no longer. Clear and still not too late to acknowledge and refuse to encircle the enemy's flank further should have consequently followed the signal: 'stop on all fronts': but not only to take a breath, but so that immediately on all fronts, where at all possible, to extract the reserves. With these reserves, then, after a known period of time and dependent upon the actions and counteractions of the enemy, a new offensive could begin in the spirit of Schlieffen."

I don't want to say that this criticism would be incorrect, but this criticism is written after the war when the circumstances were known and more importantly when the decision made and their results were also known, yet when the military leader had made the decision, then he wasn't privy to knowing the results that were to occur following completion of the actions.

Not justifying the German high command (the actual Chief of the General Staff Moltke in this time period was already sick) in regards to their decision making, still actual events must be paid attention to: after all of the current data being made known, how the German right flank and especially the right flank army— the 1st Army— had numerically shrunk, extremely tired and without proper provisions,— therefore, there couldn't be hope that this flank would achieve success, especially because against this flank an important French striking army was positioned. The supreme command had commanded the 1st Army to progressively remain behind the flank so that this army would secure itself and all the rest of the front. The 1st Army commander General Kluck, considering the condition came to the conclusion that if something more can still be achieved, then only by means of persistent quick movement forward because on September 6, the German 1st Army wasn't located entirely progressively behind the flank but progressively in front of the entire German front. Thus this army had positioned itself even more unfavourably against the French striking army, whose attack direction is behind the German 1st Army. Looking at the map and theoretically calculating, the conclusion must be drawn that the condition of the German right flank is catastrophic. In spite of all this, the results of the actions of the 1st Army from September 6—9 is such that the French striking army is pushed back and their flank enveloped by the German 1st Army. If the German high command and 2nd Army commander would have only



been completely oriented toward the condition of the 1st Army, then the Battle of Marne would have been a decisive win for the Germans.

In that case, the critics would praise the German high command for its unrelenting adherence to the accepted plan. When we look, then the battle was a decisive win for the French only because the 2nd Army's commander believed that the condition of the 1st Army was much direr than it actually was. Therefore, we can see that also by the given circumstances there could have been successes. Results of battle actions often tend to be different than one can theoretically predict. It is hard to find borders until which the military leader can risk: if the German high command and army's commander would have been just as confident about success in the Battle of Marne as the 1st Army's commander, then also they would have had victory.

"A lost battle often enough is such a battle that one side considers a defeat and so the next day retreats, while the military leader of the other side with stronger nerves and stronger troops doesn't step back and doesn't admit defeat, but instead proclaims victory and then also history is forced to admit him to be the victor."

(Prince Friedrich Karl, opponent of Napoleon)

This saying completely justifies the Battle of Marne in the World War and the Battle of Liaoyang in the Russo-Japanese war. Following the war experiences of the Russo-Japanese war and then reinforced in the World War, an expression was established stating that often enough the victor is he who has missed the retreat by one hour. This expression based on the experiences of war is accurate, but correct only as it relates to military leaders—craftsmen. One of France's writers, Colonel Rousseau, places military leaders into three categories: geniuses, artists, and craftsmen; therefore, this expression can be concerned with the latter, the lowest category. In the history of war, there have been very few geniuses: Macedonian Alexander, Hannibal, Napoleon— they are definitely geniuses, perhaps 2-3 more military leaders can be added to this list. Military leaders—artists, have been rather numerous: Julius Caesar, Gustav Adolf, Frederick the Great, Suvorov, and many others. However, the history of war in the greatest capacity shows—craftsmen. Preparing for war, no one can hope and make calculations about a military leader being a genius or artist, but calculations made must predict a craftsman. That's why also establishing a doctrine and other related ideas, one must always expect only that the military leaders— the highest of an army's command— will not be

geniuses, not artists, but only craftsmen good at their craft. If there will happen to be a genius or artist, then that will be an unforeseen benefit, which won't damage anything, but will improve upon it, but if all hope is placed on a genius or artist and someone like that won't appear, then all calculations will be damaged and catastrophic failures will commence.

A beautiful spectacle in this regard is provided by the Russian-German front in the World War in 1914. The German Chief of Staff already long before in peacetime proposed an idea that the war plan can be created for a mediocre (artisanal-technical) leadership; that's why it was decided to defend on the Russian front, but attack France. Defence on the Russian front was considered to be so passive that even retreating to the Vistula was predicted. For this reason, also on Russia's front the fortifications were only along the Vistula River— Torun, Grudziadz, and Vistula River were fortified, while the remaining border was open, except for one lake fort— Boyen (Lötzen) and Königsberg— a sea fortification.

Of course, it wasn't expected that they would leave East Prussia without any battles; however, they also weren't expecting to donate their army or even risk it for the defence of East Prussia. Due to this, the 8th Army Commander General Prittwitz following the Battle of Gumbinnen had decided to step back from the Vistula River. The victor of the Battle of Gumbinnen was undecided: both sides had suffered losses and failures. Now long after the battle, when we examine the condition of both sides, we must conclude that the Germans would have won if they had continued with the battle. However, according the reports, which had come in to the 8th Army headquarters on the battle's first night, the condition on the side of the Germans was rather critical, so Prittwitz commanded the retreat and *Rennenkampf* trumpeted the victory.

The German commander-in-chief, inspired by the successes along France's front, was unsettled by Prittwitz's actions and the decision to retreat back to the Vistula. Prittwitz was operating as a common craftsman, more accurately— a specialist. The German commander-in-chief recalled Prittwitz and replaced him with Hindenburg and Ludendorff. It is hard to say, who deserves the accolades: Hindenburg or Ludendorff. Perhaps, it would be more accurate to say Hindenburg-Ludendorff. It seems to me that they together devised their system of war art, which each of them individually wouldn't have been capable of showing. However, the fact remains that after the appointment of Hindenburg-Ludendorff, it seems that the German-Russian front no longer had a mediocre military leadership, instead if not geniuses, then in the least they were artists. The result from their actions was that Germany's eastern border's defence didn't get pulled back behind the Vistula

at all, but instead all of East Prussia remained unharmed from the enemy and even more— Austria received assistance. The actual war steps were such: Germany's 8th Army at the end of the August 1914 destroyed Russia's 2nd (Samsonov's) Army; in the beginning of September, the Russian 1st (Rennenkampf's) Army was completely expelled from Prussia and at the end of October and beginning of November, those same German corps, helping to save the defeated Austrian army in the early days of August and September, arrive in Warsaw and totally disarrange all of the operational plans of Russia's high command: when a simple craftsman (specialist) is replaced by artists; then defence is replaced by the rare and brilliant successes of victory.

Also, the mediocre military leader (war craftsman-specialist) can know well, learn war and battle theories, can theoretically accurately assess, read reports and very completely know all the mathematical and material aspects of leading war and battles. Mathematical material calculations establish only a small part of the sum of a battle's factors of force. In war and in battle the main factors are the forces—one's own and the enemy's, composed not of mathematical material but of plain psychological data. Once again one's own and one's enemy's forces individually aren't the only factor, but in turn they are composed of the leadership—the highest and middle ranks of command— and the same forces— soldiers and the lowest ranked leadership. These most important factors aren't possible to calculate with mathematical formulas; a real leader needs to feel the characteristics and power of these factors. This feeling a leader can get from the finest and deepest examinations of the history of war and by getting to know the military through practical means.

Hindenburg-Ludendorff, making the decision, to give a decisive battle to the Samsonov army, at that time when the German military had made the decision to retreat to the Vistula based on the results from the Battle of Gumbinnen, can in no way be explained by the principles of mathematical materials. The Russian forces attacked from the east and the south. Russia's eastern group— Rennenkampf's army was given a battle; the results of this battle was such that the German forces were forced to retreat, losing a few batteries; hence the Russian forces here were stronger than the German forces. At the same time, reports were received that from the south a second Russian military group was attacking, which, according to the reports from the German general headquarters, wasn't smaller than the entire Germany army. Therefore, the decision had to be made to attack one Russian army, which wasn't smaller but rather was much larger than all the German forces at that time, when the other Russian army had already in the previous (Gumbinnen) battle shown themselves to be victors. Here there wasn't any mathematical or

material advantage; here was just art, established on deeply feeling one's own and one's enemy's forces (leadership and troops). This feeling isn't simple, and it always comes with the greatest risk. Accurately assessing the enemy's leadership and troops and just as accurately assessing one's own leadership and troops isn't mathematics, but is art in its absolute definition. This assessment is psychological not mathematical. One person—a leader—by the current rather wide circumstances of war isn't capable of doing that. It is necessary for the leader to have been given organs, who are identical in their thinking and their attitude as the leader is himself. Here begins a question about the military leader's conducting organs—in other words, the general headquarters. It is not coincidence that in the Peace Treaty of Versailles there was introduced a law that the German General Staff must be liquidated. The General Staff is the organ through which the leader thinks, makes decision and carries those out in real life. The brain without eyes, ears without hands cannot give anything productive. The leading of war in this time, these eyes, ears, nose and hands are the General Staff. The duty of the General Staff isn't as simple as other office duties. The right impression can be gotten only from the work of a Staff which is appropriately subordinate. A correct decision can be made only then if there is an accurate impression about one's own and one's enemy's condition—that is given by the General Staff. A correct decision can be realized in real life only through accurate directives: directives are created by the General Staff.

I remember life in the fall of 1915: from mid-August after flying out of the fortress of Novogeorgievsk; I was positioned in the headquarters of the Eastern front and had fulfilled a few important assignments. Towards the end of August, I was commanded to assess the suitability of rear position constructions. The Russian army was in the circumstance of retreating. My academic peers in the headquarters of the Eastern front were a part of the reconnaissance, which is why every night when I was at the headquarters, I went to them to learn about the condition and any possible changes. Visiting one of my peers, on a desk in the headquarters I spotted the portraits of Hindenburg and Ludendorff. I asked why these portraits were on the headquarters' table; he answered, that each time when reports come in from the front, he looks at these portraits for a long time and then thinks what these men, looking at the impressions of their facial features, could be thinking about the current circumstances. That was original, weird, but very true; he needed to understand the opponent's psychology, guess the opponent's thoughts in order to guess the further goals from the actions of the current moment.

The work of leadership isn't all just thinking, but it is equally the work of the mind and the soul. A military leader's work in this day and age isn't just a leadership position, but it is the collaboration between him and the Staff. For his collaborative work to give the best results, it is necessary that the leader's Staff be totally in the mindset of the leader, grown together in mind, thoughts, and the soul. It is not for nothing that the Germans write that over the battlefield at Tannenberg (victory) flew the ghost of Count Schlieffen; the school of Schlieffen, his mind, his thoughts and feelings.

# MEMORIES OF THE WORLD WAR

Ten years have passed from that time when the fate of European countries and nations started to take a totally new direction, when there began to be the breaking of that condition which had been established before 100 years and in the last 100 years had only been subordinate to small changes.

In 1914, I was captain of the Russian army's General Staff and in the month of May of this year by my own desire I had been commanded to the aviation company to learn the aviation work and duty. At that time, aviation hadn't developed very much and that's why practical flights occurred early in the morning and at night. My work was that at a good time in the morning and night I was to be found in the aerodrome or in workshops. While the rest of the time I was reading all the available literature from that time related to aviation and combustion engines. I had quite a lot of free time, which is why I had absolutely enough time to follow the political events in newspapers. That the political atmosphere had thickened was known to every serious-minded person and especially so the Head of the General Staff, beginning in 1912 resources were very quickly accepted for battle preparation, which until that time hadn't yet been experienced. At the end of 1913 and the beginning of 1914, there was brief silence, but just from an external formal position, covert internal work continued especially intensively. After the command to join aviation, I no longer had to participate in that work because I only worked with aviation matters and because the political situation was already known to me from newspapers, then in the months of May and June, to me it seemed as if everything was peaceful and moving at a normal speed.

When on June 29 (or June 15, following the old style) a telegram was received that on June 28 in the Bosnian city of Sarajevo, Austro-Hungary's heir presumptive to the throne, Archduke Franz Ferdinand, had been assassinated, the greatest overall concern was summoned. Conversations were heard about war, if it will or won't be. Russia's ultra-patriotic newspapers beat the drums of war. However, slowly this noise became quieter. When peace has been maintained for a longer period, then nobody believes in war: a person considers that which he is accustomed to normal, and believes that this state of normalcy is unmovable. The Russo-Japanese war didn't have the characteristic of a war between nations, but more like a colonial war because Russia's core didn't even feel this war; that's why the Russian folk considered the condition of peacetime to be unchangeable,

and so they didn't pay appropriate attention to political events. Austro-Hungary's government had instigated an investigation into the assassination of the archduke. This investigation was drawn out over four weeks and during this time everyone progressively accepted an absolute peaceful condition— it seemed as if all the horrors of war had gone by. However, there was a feeling as if there was an oppressed mental condition, like the quiet before a storm. This mental condition was slightly created by the newspapers and from the other side, perhaps also an instinctive feeling.

On July 24, new and anxious reports came in about Austro-Hungary's ultimatum to Serbia. This ultimatum didn't get newspaper coverage, but definitely a few pieces of this ultimatum were printed and from these few paragraphs the entire ultimatum was discussed. All the newspapers just wrote about war: Austro-Hungary's attitude was described as disdainful and provocative, Austro-Hungary's ultimatum— as an invitation to war and how such an ultimatum Serbia can ever accept. But I can't say that Russia's leadership would also be thrilled about war from these newspaper battle cries. I remember well the beginning of the Russo-Japanese War: at that time the excitement among the superiors was much greater; one reason for this was that the superiors, especially the older ones knew that the results of the European war will be much more terrible than the results of the Japanese war. In addition, the Japanese war had already demonstrated that war isn't an easy task. It also wasn't entirely clear to the Russian superiors why Russia had to war against Austria and Germany, when even since ancient times there had never been any disputes over boundaries or interests. Only the ultra-patriotic superiors were for the war— those same ones who already at the beginning of war were looking to move into some warm position behind others.

On July 25, the newspaper continued its war propaganda, but since there were no new facts, then many had already started saying that the trumpets of this newspaper will grow quiet and the diplomats will be able to reconcile that which isn't on the path to peace.

July 26 was a Sunday— the last Sunday of peacetime before the World War. In the morning I went to the aerodrome, but due to the thundering atmosphere, no flights took place; having read in the newspaper about how Serbia in place of an answer to Austro-Hungary's ultimatum had proclaimed mobilization efforts, I went home. In all the city there was a very strongly felt feeling of an oppressed spiritual condition. Around 7 o'clock at night I had decided to visit one of my acquaintances. When I had come to the corner of Brother Street and Jerusalem Alley, a hard thundering rain began; in order to hide from the rain, I went into



a café on Jerusalem Alley. Sitting there, I started to hear a manoeuvring sound familiar to me— artillery driving down the street. When the rain stopped, I went out to look: the 3rd guard division's artillery was driving on New Holy Street, coming from the region of the Kraków suburbs towards Mokotów. Until then, the artillery had been returning from the marshal's to the winter camp— that is the first step in mobilization. That indicates that movement is happening beyond articles and words. I decided to return home.

Arriving home around 8-9 o'clock, I found a telegram on the table: "without hesitation return to your regular place of duty". Now it was totally clear to me that the mobilization had begun. The thunderstorm outside began again, but suddenly a stronger thunder echoed— an explosion— one, then another, a third, etc. I was looking out the windows; between the houses nothing could be seen, but the bangs continued one after another, some seemingly very close and strong, some further away and not so strong. There was an impression as if artilleries were being shot or bombs exploding. I tried to remember what it was that was actually occurring; it couldn't be the fire of artillery because no one could accidentally invade Warsaw, a Zeppelin attack? I looked out the window, saw a strong thunderstorm and everything was dark— therefore, also that couldn't be it. Then I started calling on the phone, but that was Sunday afternoon and so it wasn't simple to find a person who could explain. Finally, however, the aviation duty officer could tell me that one of the artillery ammunition depositories had exploded; this depository was located in the old fort by the Warsaw-Kovel railway station. Approximately after one hour, the explosions happened less often and quieter and then were completely silent. All the experiences of this night gave me a feeling that the peacetime had ended. In the same building, one floor higher lived the German consul (Yasnaya Street No. 11); I could hear well that also for him there was no longer any peace. Much later than 12 o'clock rushing steps were heard, movement of various objects, etc. Impatiently I awaited the morning in order to gain clarity about all the events.

On the morning of July 27, Warsaw was totally quiet— drivers and pedestrians on the street were few, but also the proclamation of mobilization that I had been waiting for never came. During the day, I took care of—finished all my debts with the aviation and at night drove to my regular post of duty Brest-Litovsk, the 38th division headquarters, where I arrived on the morning of July 28. The division staff was feverishly working: preparation for the beginning of the mobilization had been commanded (premobilization period). The 38th division's marshal was located close to the city (approximately 3 versts), which is why segments of the formation were still at the marshal's, only the financial management offices had moved over

to the winter station, but the decision was made that over the course of the coming days everyone would move over to the winter station, which also happened on July 29 and 30. During the course of these days, much was said and discussed about the war, about expectations and consequences and potential setbacks. By the way, I tried to find out the cause for the explosion at the Warsaw ammunition depot. It was explained that lightning had struck the depository; that was very possible because there actually was a very strong thunderstorm. Now, long after the war I came to hear also another version which possibly is more correct: that it was actually the first assignment for the liberation of Poland, organized by Piłsudski's organization.

When on July 28 and 29, no new directives had arrived, then again a little hope sprouted that war would be averted, although the newspapers spoke only of war. Also on the morning of July 30, everything still seemed peaceful because even the newspapers had nothing new, or exciting, to write. After lunch on July 30, I was called to the telephone by the corps Chief of Staff General Major Asmus who told me that today, after lunch, either the head of division Staff or I, the General Staff adjutant, should remain uninterrupted at the division headquarters because tonight mobilization would be proclaimed. This news squashed all final hope for averting the war. Between 8 and 9 o'clock at night I actually was again called to the phone and the corps Chief of Staff informed me that the general mobilization had been announced. This notification by telephone must be understood to be official and I must take action and that the written notification will also immediately be sent out (XIX Corps headquarters were also located there in Brest-Litovsk). I informed the division Chief of Staff, who was also at headquarters, about this directive and also the division commander and other workers at the headquarters. After that, I immediately began doing an already well-known task, well-known because the previous winter very many mobilization tests had occurred in our headquarters, where I had to play the role of executor of the order, and at other divisions, where I had to play the role of inspector.

The mobilization of the 38th Division into parts happened smoothly without obstacles. With the announcement of mobilization, the 38th Division had to mobilize themselves and also form a second division: the 75th. The duration of the 38th Division's mobilization, as with all active divisions, was 6 days; the duration of mobilization for secondary divisions, like the 75th, was 12 days.

Until the announcement of mobilization, the information from newspaper articles had been very much discussed, considered, and given the most attention. With the announcement of mobilization, everything became much quieter and also

no one even wanted to ingest information from newspapers. Until the mobilization sloppy emotions functioned: hatred, Slavic patriotism— all that which sometimes had been desired or found too convenient to pull out of oneself, to gain popularity and goodwill, but with the announcement of mobilization, reality emerged with all of its seriousness, and for this reason, only a few hurrah patriots still boasted. Serious people reconsidered and only in very few words discussed that which in peacetime much had been spoken and written about.

I most often conversed with my direct superior— the division Chief of Staff Colonel Agapeev, a very energetic, serious and capable officer. He had accepted the division headquarters position one year prior. Before that, he had served on the board of the Central Chief of General Staff in Saint Petersburg. Our exchange of ideas always revolved around two main points: Russian together with its allies will win; Germany and Austria will be defeated. Already long before the war— in the year of 1913— we often argued about the possible results of war if Russia and France would be on one side and Germany and Austria on the other; Italy was never taken into account, firstly, because its forces in comparison were weak, and secondly, after that time it was clear that if Italy would also participate in war, then it would do so only because of appearances, as it really couldn't help one side or the other. About the combinations, if the war were carried out by Russia and France on one side and Germany and Austria on the other, Agapeev believed that Russia and France would nevertheless win, but I was of the opposite opinion. Agapeev, similar overall to quite a large portion of Russia's General Staff, rather highly assessed France's military forces: Russia had the inspiring perspective that France in regards to the military is just as strong as Germany, because it was known that in the occurrence of mobilization France can create an army no smaller than German army (France— 2,032,820; Germany—2,019,470). That was a fact that the war also verified, but a number still doesn't prove force: in broad circles in Russia, it was believed that France's army, in regards to their training and morale, stood not equal to but even higher than the German army— that was a rather widespread perspective. Therefore, France is in equal proportion to Germany; on the other hand, Russia is stronger than Austria: if Germany throws all of its forces against France, then France won't be defeated, but during that time, Russia will defeat Austria, then invade Germany. If Germany leaves a portion of its forces against Russia and that way together with Austria hold Russia in balance, then France will be able to invade Germany. This opinion about German leadership was not shared in all circles; German Chief of General Staff stands much higher than France's Chief of General Staff and German soldiers' morale and methods of training are

much stronger than the French, not to even mention Russian. In regards to our own Russian army, the Chief of General Staff governed the perspective: soldiers are very good—better than German soldiers, the newest heads through and including the company commander aren't worse than German soldiers and heads, but beginning with the regiment commander and the higher Russian leadership do not stand at their elevation—no less than 5 years are needed so that the leadership, beginning with the regiment commander and upward would be at the necessary condition of elevation. There wasn't General Staff as such in the Russian army yet, because that began to be organized only after the Japanese war; until that time there were only Chiefs of Staffs. There was a General Staff administration, but that only consisted of graduation from the academy, an outline and a title, but no work. The reforms introduced after the Japanese war hadn't yet been given the opportunity to give results because the organization of the General Staff required so much time. Due to this, I also agreed with the segments of the General Staff who believed that Germany is much stronger than France. About this question, I very often argued with Colonel Agapeev. Now with the proclamations of mobilization and war, the political and militaristic conjuncture had become totally different: on the side of the Allies were Russia, France, Belgium, Serbia, and England, but on Germany's side was only Austria. Under these circumstance, Russia's side had a rather large dominance of forces. Therefore, there also couldn't be any doubt that Germany will lose the war and will definitely lose it quickly. Although quite a large segment of Russia's General Staff assessed Germany's military forces to be very high, still as high as they were proven to be by the World War, nobody had assessed. Personally, I often ask myself why Germany had accepted an invitation to a war, in which there isn't even any minimal expectation for victory? Wasn't there some diplomatic path, in spite of the loss of territories and prestige, because Germany could have no hope of victory? From this question, I was able to answer a second question: for what reason and who started the war? Measuring power, there couldn't be the smallest doubt about Germany wanting or searching for war; there could be only one possibility: Germany had been pulled into an unnecessary war. Germany hadn't wanted to refuse the war because that would have been connected to the loss of Germany's prestige and perhaps to the loss of other rights. I cannot accept that Germany's Chief of General Staff, who had been recognized overall as exemplary, would have participated in an unintentional war. As current facts and data indicate, everything that occurred had happened differently than I had imagined at that time. Until the proclamation of war, Austria's diplomacy hadn't paid the slightest attention to the admonishments given by the Chief of

Staff, and when the state of politics became so jagged that war was inevitable, then it had simply proclaimed war, ignoring the fact that the Chief of General Staff had informed us that due to the current state of politics, Austria didn't even have the slightest chance for a successful war; Germany's Kaiser again simply united with Austria on the basis of the existing Triple Alliance, disregarding instructions from its own Staff, which was the best in the world.

At the time, that all seemed odd and incomprehensible. Equally odd and incomprehensible seemed Russia's overly sharp behaviour and invitations of war, especially when it became clear to all that Russia wasn't yet ready for war, materially or by its training: many improvements had certainly been made since the Japanese war, but a few more years were needed in order to prepare the army to such a standing that it would be deemed normal.

As I've already mentioned, the mobilization of troops occurred according to plan, and on August 5 (following the new calendar) mobilization of the 38th division was complete, and from August 6th it was time to begin completing war assignments. The assignment for the XIX army corps was included in this, and after mobilization was finished, it had to protect the 5th Army's (which included the XIX corps) organizing area. Since the chief of the General Staff had created this plan for the beginning of the war so that every failure at the war's beginning could be avoided (Nikolay Nikolayevich altered this plan), then the assignment for the 38th division was a part of that: to occupy the passes to the north of the Kovel-Włodowo railroad line with one brigade and artillery, while the other brigade would be left at the Brest-Litovsk fortress until the completion of the mobilization of the 75th division. The corps and Brest-Litovsk fortress battle assignments were tested in manoeuvres and field exercises, accepting the most disadvantageous Russian army conditions. For this reason, also, the realization of the battle assignments happened absolutely orderly and safely.

The part of the first brigade, which had to spread out over the passes by August 5, went marching there, the artillery also marching. Division offices: 2 mobile hospitals, the division lazaret, the division's transport vehicles, and the division headquarters were transported by train to the Malaryta station and from there on foot. On the night of August 5th, after mobilization the division's administration and division commander had their last dinner under peaceful conditions in Brest-Litovsk.

On the morning of August 6th, the division commander and the Chief of Staff drove by car to the location of the first battle, while I had to travel with the final echelon by rail to the Malaryta station and from there join the division by foot.

The last echelon consisted of the division Chief of Staff and one field hospital. The loading of the final echelon began at 9 o'clock in the morning; the echelon left at around one o'clock in the afternoon. The travel distance was about 60 versts. The first incident occurred here. I knew well the surrounding area. I was sitting peacefully in the railway wagon and riding. The train halted accordingly at the previous station, then continued, nearing the Maralyta station. It started to rain hard; I was looking out the window and was observing the area, waiting for the train to soon stop. The train passed several buildings and because of the rain I didn't have the opportunity to see the station and the station name. The train continued forward without stopping. I assumed that the area for unloading was probably on the other side of the station, but soon enough all the buildings disappeared and instead there was the beginning of a marshy area I was too familiar with which stretched to the Pripyat River. Seeing that we had already passed the station and the train was again picking up speed, I exited to the door of wagon with the help of a rod, which connected the wagons, stopped the train and commanded the train drive back to the station. Later I didn't have the time to clarify if this had merely been a mistake or intentional malice. I believe it was malice because the train had stopped at each of the previous stations. Driving beyond the station couldn't produce any exceptional catastrophe; our echelon would move forward to the Kovel railway hub, where there was disembarkation for another corps, but it was a rather unfortunate disturbance and the tardiness would interfere in our work and in the work of our neighbour corps.

At the Malaryta station we unloaded, fed people, and then near evening we began our march to the division's base, which was about 24 versts. Around 5 o'clock on the morning of August 7, my echelon and I arrived at the division's base, informed the Chief of Staff; I situated the echelon at camp and after that, I was able to rest myself. Hence on August 7, I had arrived at my division's operational base for war.

The division's Chief of Staff, artillery and division offices were located in the village of Pishcha. One of the infantry reserve brigades was located on the banks of the Pishcha Lake, another occupied the isthmus between the Pulmo and Svitiáz lakes and the highway to the east of Lake Svitiáz (the Pulmo lake—5 versts, the Svitiáz lake— 8 versts wide). Before lunch the Chief of Staff and I inspected the arrangement of the base and the condition of the troops.

Orders for the corps arrived, instructing that the division needed to move to the region of the town of Liuboml in order to shut off the Kovel—Włodowo railway and to await the assembling of all divisions in this region (as I previously stated, the



division's II Brigade had been left at the Brest-Litovsk fortress until the completion of the 75th Division's mobilization). After receiving these orders, commands were given for the march forward. The distance from Pishcha to Liuboml was 50 versts, so the march was calculated to be a two-day march. On August 7 the division headquarters and main forces moved to Zhorany, the leading regiment moved 5 versts in front into the forest, field camps. On August 8, the division headquarters moved to the Liuboml train station, the division offices— to the village, regiments and artillery— to the station's south: the villages of Kotsyury, Vyshniv, and Mashiv.

As I previously had already mentioned, following the XIX Corps battle assignment created during peacetime, the 38th Division's brigade had to cover the Brest-Litovsk fortress, pushing out further to the south. The second division of the XIX Corps, which had already been situated close to the Austrian border in peacetime, together with the cavalry belonging to the division (the 8th cavalry and the 7<sup>th</sup> Cossack Division) had to cover the border itself. In addition, the cavalry had been given the assignment to cover the borders of both shores of the Bug River, while the infantry's assignment was to complete mobilization in its regions, if possible, and then retreating, joining the corps, but if the enemy were to attack sooner, then orders were to retreat to the line drawn by the 38th division and to finish its mobilization efforts there. At that moment, Russia had begun general mobilization sooner than Austria, and for this reason, there was security knowing that Austria would not be able to attack Russia before its mobilization were completed. Emerging from this, also, came the orders for the 38th division to push out 50 versts forward from the lake straits, which was predicted to be accomplished by the peacetime battle plan. It was clear that Austria wouldn't be able to complete mobilization efforts enough to make an attack on the region of Russia's earlier mobilization. Therefore, the XIX corps could push forward, occupying the Kovel-Wlodowo train station and through this transport all the 5th Army coordination point on a two day march even further forward than was expected by previous calculations. This rush forward wasn't understandable to me at first because I was leading from a Russian perspective: begin war such that there wouldn't be failures in the first battles. From a strategic viewpoint, there was no sense in starting a decisive or even serious battle earlier, while they hadn't coordinated all available forces. From a moralistic viewpoint, which was emphasized in all Russian military literature, Russia shouldn't have accepted any serious battle prior to having achieved a definitive predominant force on Russia's side. All of that was easy for Russia to obtain: Russia's territory was huge, compared with Austria's and Germany's territories. Moreover, there weren't just Russians in the region of



military action, but there were foreigners: Poles, which is why the loss of parts of known territory for a time couldn't be considered a failure. The quantity of Russia's military force was huge, compared with Austria's and Germany's forces, but the bringing together of these forces required a long time. From all of this, it was clear that if Russia wanted to win, it shouldn't rush. That was the theory of Russian strategists that no one could disagree with. Hence the circumstance of being commanded to hurry forward seemed odd to me. At that time, it hadn't occurred to me that Russia's supreme command (Nikolay Nikolayevich) could be so short sighted that he would donate Russia's strategic upper hand to France's selfish aspirations, and France's strategic ineptitude. Russia's orders "onward" I could not fathom: from that, what I had learned at the academy and later during the entire time leading up to the war, occupying myself with the knowledge of war, theoretically and practically, it was clear to me that Russia foremost cannot hurry. With hurrying, Russia would not be able to utilize anything proactively for itself. Russia could gain definite incontestable victory only if it calmly assembled its forces and only after that, when all its forces were assembled, began combat action. Maybe the Russian military would have to go back to the Bug River, to the banks of the Vistula River and the Narew River (those also had been predicted after the mobilization by the war orders), but there wouldn't have been any failures. Consequently, had Russia's army begun an attack after being completely assembled, then every somewhat unsuccessful attempt wouldn't occur. Thinking like this, it hadn't occurred to me, that Russia's diplomacy and supreme command was under the influence of France's diplomacy and France's selfish strategy.

In the region of Liuboml we waited for our second brigade, which after the completion of the 75th division's mobilization (August 11) had been brought to the Liuboml station to join us. During this immobile time in the region of Liuboml, we didn't have any particular work or assignments. The troops were inspected, and they were tested, to ensure that everything was fine so that they would be completely prepared to march further.

The corps Chief of Staff had still remained at the Brest-Litovsk fortress. Around midday August 15 the division commander, being at the station, had received a telegram, which informed that the Austrian cavalry was attacking the city of Vlodymyr-Volynskiy. During peacetime the 68th Borodino regiment was located at Vlodymyr-Volynskiy; right there it mobilized and remained also for the time being as a support for the cavalry divisions and as border patrols while the Austrian infantry hadn't yet arrived and only the cavalry could attack. This regiment didn't have artillery, but the attacking Austrian cavalry did have

artillery. The division's commander, having received information about this attack, on the basis of the principle of mutual assistance, immediately decided to go with the entire division to Vlodymyr-Volynskyi to rescue the neighbour's division regiment. No objections from the Chief of Staff mattered: that the division was not allowed to act autocratically moving such a long distance away, that it was the army's time for assembling, that the cavalry's attack wasn't that dangerous, etc. The division's commander was not deterred and soon thereafter began the march. The division's commander himself gave the command; the commander-in-chief refused to give his co-signature. The division commander dismissed the Chief of Staff from his duties. I was promoted as a temporary replacement. As this argument was occurring the division commander had already announced his command to march. I, being completely in agreement with the Chief of Staff, also avoided signing and following the command. However, I had to move along with the division. The commander-in-chief stayed at the Liuboml station, from where he sent a telegram to the headquarters of the corps informing them of what had occurred. Knowing that giving assistance to the Borodino Regiment could in no way be justified: from our area to Vlodymyr-Volynskyi it was over 50 versts; therefore, we could only actually help the next morning, and in that long time the Borodino Regiment's fate certainly had to already have been sealed before our arrival. The Austrian cavalry which had been pushed far ahead couldn't lead a lengthy battle: one way or another, it might have occupied Vlodymyr-Volynskyi or the Borodino regiment would have driven back the attack. The Austrian cavalry had to be afraid of the masses of Russian artillery, which at that time were on Austrian territory. Truthfully, it happened just like that: the cavalry's division, assisting with its artillery, led the attack, and when it wasn't successful, at nightfall it left. Having walked at least 10 versts— a two hour procession, we received the command from the commander of the corps to return to our previous locations.

The division commander, Lieutenant General Prasalov, was an aging general. After graduating from the academy in the beginning he was interested in things related to war, but later he had dedicated himself in a large way to revelry, which is why literature related to war didn't follow him: he remembered only that which he had learned at the academy, and everything that had changed after that was unfamiliar to him: war he understood by the Russian-Turkish war descriptions. Due to his drinking, he had been threatened with retirement from his duty. He had given an oath that he would limit himself. During peacetime he formally limited himself, but with the advent of war, he fulfilled his oath most completely to the fullest extent following his conscience: at no time and nowhere did he drink more

than one small liquor in a 24 hour period. Overall, general Prasalov was a person with a very strong character and very high feeling of honour. That's why, in fact, he believed the dispute with his Chief of Staff was a known event that could not affect his onward service or personal relationships. The next day the commander of the corps arrived at Liuboml and was able to help reconcile the division commander and the Chief of Staff, leaving the latter in his post, and after that, their interpersonal relationship remained just as it had been prior to the dispute.

The XIX corps was commanded by Lieutenant-General Gorbatovsky. During the Russo-Japanese war, he had been battalion commander and had received the honour of the St George cross for the Battle of Kindjau. He maybe was a distinguished battalion commander, but he lacked the knowledge and character to command corps. Not taking that into account, he didn't know how to lead a corps, or how to lead a battle in this age with the cooperation of different kinds of arms in such a far-stretching region, as the corps needed to do.

The Chief of Staff of the XIX corps, General Major Asmus, was rather old and experienced, and he understood his role very well. As a person, he was very sympathetic and pleasant, but he hadn't been able to position himself in the necessary order against the commander of the corps. The commander of the corps often established himself not through the Chief of Staff, but through newer officers, which resulted in various unwanted occurrences.

After arriving at the headquarters of the corps, we were briefed on the latest information about the situation: the assembly of the 5th Army and its composition, as well as news about the activities of the army's cavalry. News about the cavalry's activities didn't justify the hopes that had been placed on the cavalry during the peacetime.

After the arrival of the commander of the corps at the village of Liuboml, we regularly began receiving news about the situation and our division's coming assignments. The 5th Army (which we were a part of) finalized its assembly. It had to establish communications and begin moving forward. The 38th division had to establish connections to the right— with the Grenadier corps and to the left with the 5th army's corps. Later establishing communications to the right was an assignment given to the 17th division. An officer was sent to the Grenadier corps in order to maintain relations. On August 19, we received orders from the corps to begin our movement that same day; the goal was unknown. At that time, I believed, that a movement towards attack had begun, but in reality, that was just straightening the front line of the army.

On August 20, the division's headquarters were stationed in the village of Bendyuha, with the troops in the surrounding area. Here we received the first news from the officers in charge of establishing connections. Everything was completely peaceful; we were just getting ready.

On August 20, we received the order about our further march, which the division commander had devised for the troops to fulfil. The division had to cross over to the left shore of the Bug River. The march overall was very long and hard.

On August 21, this march occurred without interference. It was quite a hot and sunny day. Our long break was around 3 o'clock in the afternoon. During that time, we received news that one of the 152nd Vladikavkaz regiment's battalion commanders had tried to commit suicide. This lieutenant colonel appeared mentally ill and he was sent to the hospital. This was the first sombre impression of the war because until this, everything had happened just as smoothly as it did in the manoeuvres during peacetime. As I already mentioned, the march was extremely difficult. We made it to our lodging in complete darkness. During peacetime manoeuvres, Chiefs of Staff hadn't known any hardships because they were heartily welcomed by local noblemen, preachers, teachers, etc. That's why during peacetime there was never any mention or emphasis given towards possible challenges of stationing headquarters. Now, in time of war, everything immediately happened differently: citizens didn't think about and didn't care about military authorities. In peacetime, citizens did care but only for selfish reasons. As a result, the commanding officers were in a tough situation. The commander of the division arrived to his location, but there were no available places for him to rest or to work because the division commander wasn't expected to have any field kitchen or corresponding tents. In addition, the division commander wasn't used to the field work of that time. The Chief of Staff and I stayed together while the division commander travelled separately. After searching for a long time in complete darkness, the Chief of Staff and I found lodging in the rooms of a Jewish miller's and went to sleep. At around 10 o'clock at night, the division commander arrived; he wanted to get a good place to sleep, perhaps one of ours, but we had just lay down to rest and didn't offer him our beds. The division commander had to spend the night in not entirely favourable conditions. I slept on the Jewish man's bed, soft and warm. Early in the morning we had to wake in order to continue the movement. We hadn't eaten at all the entire previous day. In the morning we joined the troops, where we drank tea and had breakfast, as well as formulated a command for continuing the movement, which needed to be fulfilled as soon as breakfast was eaten. This was the first difficult time of wartime life: all the

previous day without eating, at night just a few hours of sleep. In the morning, we had to quickly write a command for moving forward and then immediately leave. However, August 22 promised some slight comfort and rest: the movement wasn't long—to the small city of Hrubieszow. On August 22, the division entered Hrubieszow, where it stayed until August 23. Here the 5th Army became aligned and the last preparations were made for an attack. Hrubieszow was a district city of the Lublin province and similar to Valmiera. All the government offices had already been evacuated; the city was quiet and lifeless. With the entering of the division and a few rear sections a more jovial living ensued. The soldiers, sensing that in the coming days a few good men will have to leave these earthly joys and sorrows, tried for perhaps the last time to enjoy all that is possible to enjoy in life. For this reason, Bacchus and Eros lorded over Hrubieszow in the simplest and overt ways, as during the peacetime they had never been allowed to appear. Later during the war, I often came to see the most open expressions on ways of Eros, but the experiences in, where I first collided with these, stayed deep in my memory.

In Hrubieszow, the 38th division got its cavalry: two cavalry units of mounted border troops and one unit of unmounted infantry. We were very happy to get our horsemen with whom we could conduct area reconnaissance and maintain communication. In Russia during peacetime, an opinion which governed held that border troops were a powerful force, whose original task would be to secure borders and after that, they would execute area reconnaissance with invincible skill and accordingly during peacetime they were prepared for just these tasks. They needed to have good knowledge about borders and they needed to know how to orientate in each location, in the day, at night and in fog. In other words, border troops were seen as an invincible cavalry division. That's why we were thrilled receiving word that we would be given two mounted and one unmounted infantry units. However, when the commander from these units arrived, we received the opposite impression. The commander of the unit asked to be granted a week of rest because they hadn't been entirely able to do anything. They weren't granted rest, but we also didn't get any decent work from them. The mounted units, however, had to conduct the area reconnaissance for the division, although the military officers complained that their people hadn't ever been trained in this position, and as a result, from their reconnaissance we weren't able to gain any positive results. The mounted patrols were sent out, but either no information came, or it came much too late. In contrast the unmounted unit turned out to be totally unable to be used for battle assignments. The only assignment that could be given them was guarding the military train. On August 24, the division commander entered

Mirca, but the regiment were stationed in close proximity. In the town of Mirca, a nobleman welcomed the division chief of the staff just like in peacetime and the Chief of Staff was stationed in the nobleman's castle. The nobleman invited us to a lunch, which was very prosperous; we weren't even at a loss for champagne. The castle was large, and so we were stationed very comfortably. After so long a period I finally had my own room again, and I hoped to get a good night's rest, but the opposite happened. After lunch came the command to leave with the other side of the Austrian border being our final destination. That created a certain excitement. I organized a reconnaissance. At dusk, the order for the next march was formulated and sent, almost all the day's work was complete, only mere details remained and also verification that all had received the command and that it was correctly understood. It was a quiet, warm night; when complete darkness had almost set in we heard the noise of distant artillery gunfire: that was the first artillery boom of the big war. All my exhaustion immediately disappeared, interest, energy, and life emerged—the instinct of war was awoken. Also, later manoeuvres in the war with the greatest difficulties, sleepless nights, bitter cold, hunger, and the first gunshots always forced the forgetting of exhaustion and summoned the greatest flood of energy. The gunshots from the artillery were heard coming from the south. We assumed that the cavalry sent ahead was occupied there, and this assumption turned out to be correct. An hour later the firing fell silent. After dinner, when we were readying for rest, a new order came in: the order called for tomorrow's march to be carried out westward instead of to the south as had previously been ordered. The march was expected to be long. We had to quickly revoke the order we had already issued, create a new order and organize a new reconnaissance, and take the necessary steps for the scouts already sent ahead to catch up with the division. The formulation of the new order and its issuing lasted all night; I didn't get to rest for even one hour.

The corps headquarters didn't inform the division about the overall situation: the division didn't understand why the order was changed and it also didn't know what is happening in other corps and with neighbouring armies. Information from our heads of communication arrived late (they needed to send the report directly to the corps headquarters: to the division they sent transcript copies, which were late). On August 24, as it is known, the Austrian 1st Army began an attack on the Russian 4th Army and had gained victory by Kraśnik. Because of this, all the Russian 5th Army was rotated towards the southeast from its previous direction.

On August 25, the march began in the early morning along a difficult sandy road. A big rest was taken in the city of Tvsovcı. After the rest, myself, with the

Chief of Staff rode past the column of troops to the division headquarters night time location in the village of Czartowczyk. We spent the night in the manor house; the manor's owner received us in an especially unfriendly manner, even hatefully. This hateful treatment seemed odd: utilizing the circumstances of war, we could have taken punitive measures. Thankfully, this Polish country nobleman, as a supporter of Austria, already that same day, or the previous day, had seen at his manor Austrian mounted patrols. Now we arrived; in addition, we were few: 3 officers and 4 soldiers. It could happen that after a brief time the Austrian's would arrive again and drive us off or capture us. Since at that time we weren't aware of the circumstances, then it didn't occur to us that we were located in the area of the Austrian mounted reconnaissance.

Regiments arrived only toward dusk; at the same the division commander arrived along with the headquarters wagons. In total darkness I was assigned to oversee the stationing of the regiments. During the night, the division was stationed in brigades: I Brigade in Zubowice, II Brigade in the vicinity of Czartowczyk; each brigade dispatched its defence outposts. XIX Corps other division— 17th Division— was located in the region of Komarów. During the night we didn't receive directives from the corps headquarters, nor did we receive news about the situation. Greatly exhausted, we went to bed. At around 2 o'clock in the morning on August 26, we received the corps order for the next day's task.

According to the order given by the corps commander, the situation for August 26 was as follows: On August 25, the corps cavalry scouts had come upon the enemy's squadron of cavalry 10 versts to the south of our location and in another place, approximately 15 versts from us, they came upon the enemy's unmounted company, who were digging trenches— that was the most recent news about the enemy from yesterday. Therefore, we weren't expecting to meet much stronger enemy forces. One mounted squadron doesn't mean a lot; one unmounted company gave the impression, as if the enemy had pushed out a small segment of its cavalry for support. I thought that we can easily defeat this one company, even if behind it were 2-3 squadrons, and the victory would give us prisoners and trophies. I was also thinking about how ineffective it is to push forward individual parts of squadrons or battalions, when the situation isn't known and these small units can be easily destroyed by the enemy. My opinion was based on the fact that I was convinced about the number of the Russian cavalry and that the cavalry scouts could provide well-founded reports about the enemy, at least as much to make me certain how large the area was that was still free from the enemy. From the corps order, I got the impression that in the entire area of tomorrow's



movement there would be no enemy, but that there would be only one company and one squadron— that's such a weak force, that an unmounted division needn't even be concerned about. Further in the corps order it was indicated that the corps cavalry— one Cossack squadron on the night from August 25 to the 26 was located 5 versts in front of the 38th Divisions defence details. Since the next day we needed to go forward, if we meet the enemy somewhere along the way, then first the Cossack squadron will meet with it and we will receive information about the enemy in time, in other words, there could be no accident. The situation of the XIX infantry corps on the night from August 25 to 6 was such: the right flank— 17th Division in the region of the village Komarów, the 38th Division— I Brigade in the region of Zubowice, IIInd Brigade with the division headquarters— in the region of Czartowczyk with the defence line along Mikalów—Wozuczyn. In accordance with the corps order on August 26, the 17th Division had to move to the west and southwest from Komarów, then to Krynica, Majdan and Wielkie; the 38th Division with Ist Brigade to the south— southwest— Tarnawatka and Tomaszów, IIInd Brigade — to the southwest— Rachanie, Tomaszów. The 38th Division IIInd Brigade direction crossed 4 brooklets, which flowed from the east; the brooklets flowed through a meadow-like, boggy valley approximately  $\frac{1}{2}$  of a verst wide; between these streams was rather hilly terrain, covered with fields and forests. Our defence line was at the first brooklet, the Mikalów-Wozuczyn line.

On August 26 at 5 o'clock the division order for a further march was sent: Ist Brigade under the leadership of the brigade's commander, General Major Bem, had to go from Zubowice through Tarnawatka to the city of Tomaszów; the IIInd Brigade, where the division commander and division headquarters were located, had to go by horse through Kochany, Podhorce, Gorny, Majdan, Tomaszów, the march needed to start at 8 o'clock in the morning.

At 4 o'clock in the morning I woke up very exhausted, and not having slept much, because I did not sleep at all last night, and on this night I only slept for a half an hour. I arranged my maps for the next movements. Only a few of the headquarters' wagons had arrived and those same ones were left unpacked, which is why I couldn't assign the task of gluing together the pages of the map to the secretary. I myself tried to glue together the other pages, but since there wasn't glue, then the gluing together I did with the help of edges of postage stamps; of course, the map pages held together very weakly. The commander of the division noticed this— my work— and thinking about his own maps unstuck pages, asked, "Did you prepare these maps for me?" I pretended that I didn't understand and indifferently answered, "No, these maps I prepared for myself." The division

commander mumbled under his nose and went away. I found that this had been rude of me, but still my maps were more necessary for me than for him, and also, there were more resources available to him than to me; it wouldn't have been worthwhile to occupy the Chief of Staff with such a task that any secretary could fulfil. I checked the orders sent and received, then we ate a very poor breakfast and began our movement. The division commander and Chief of Staff were the first to go; I stayed and took care of notifications and communications. The staff captain, Ivashchenko (Ivashchenko had graduated from the academy with II grade one year earlier than me) who had been attached to the headquarters stayed with me; with the proclamation of mobilization he was given the title for our other— the 60th Division's headquarters staff adjutant, but then in this division someone else was named the staff adjutant, which is why Ivashchenko returned to his regiment. Ivashchenko's regiment was located much further ahead and so he was temporarily left in our division headquarters.

This day's movement seemed to me to be just as calm as the previous day's because we could only come into contact with a squadron or a company, whose resistance we were capable of breaking. The staff captain, Ivashchenko, and I went out when the brigade was already on their way, and we rode by horse very quickly in order to catch up to the Chief of Staff. In order to get by the column, we had to ride next to the road by the untilled and the tilled fields. On one boundary, my horse's foot got stuck, it fell and I fell over the front and besides the horse. When I had fallen, I noticed that Ivashchenko continued to trot ahead. I got back on the horse and rode up to Ivashchenko and asked why he hadn't stopped, seeing that the horse and I tumbled. He calmly answered me, "I, of course, looked and saw that the horse fell and that you didn't fall under the horse but over the side of the horse, so there was no way for there to be an injury." Here for the first time I met with the Ukrainian phlegmatic cold-bloodedness, which is described by Gogol in his "Taras Bulba". In 1918, I met Ivashchenko in the Ukrainian army and after this experience, many of the Ukrainian events became very understandable to me. Still, this fall with the horse seemed like a bad omen to me.

Arriving in the village of Wożuczyn we caught up to the Chief of Staff; we had a rest and from here we ordered to establish telephone communications with our I Brigade and corps headquarters. Although we organized this in the early morning, still the telephone communication was not established. We continued with the movement. Close to Wożuczyn, we needed to cross the first brooklet's valley— in a narrow column. Here already at night had stood our corps cavalry— the Cossack regiment. We moved further ahead and came to the valley of the second brooklet,

the village of Kochany. As soon as we crossed to the other side (south) half of this valley reverberated in gunshots— in front and to the right— the enemy is met. The fight of the first battle had started.

In the Russo-Japanese war I came to the front already after the Battle of Mukden, and that's why I came under the fire only while in a defensive position (Hspingai position): I hadn't taken part in the attack or encounter battle. The first shots fired, while in a movement, gave a stronger impression. The division commander had taken part in battles only in the 1880's in Turkestan and only slightly understood modern warfare. On the other hand, the Chief of Staff Colonel Agapeev had been actively involved in the Russo-Japanese War and knew modern warfare very well.

The firing quickly erupted along the entire front of the column. At around 10 o'clock the gunfire was heard everywhere on the front. The first prisoner was brought— an Austrian mounted cavalryman. The 151st infantry regiment scouts brought the prisoner and explained that they had met the mounted patrol, fired upon it, the cavalryman, whom they caught, had fallen from his horse, and they also captured the horse. I tried to get information from the captive, but he didn't say anything and only asked what would happen with him— if we were going to shoot him. Finally, I looked at his documents and it turned out that he was an Austrian Jew. His fears, his lack of knowledge, and his being captured now became clear to me.

During the firing, the division headquarters had crossed the river valley from Rachanie to Werechanie on the southern bank. The column of troops was crossing the river (boggy meadow) by way of the valley's narrow road. Standing on the southern side, the division commander verbally ordered the crossing companies to continue forward to the right and also to the left, gesturing with his hand in the direction of the attack. The Chief of Staff was shaking his head, and bending towards me quietly said that with such conduct groups will become confused and there won't be a unified commander or unified leadership, and so he ordered me to at least write down which company was sent in which direction. The firing on the front became stronger and stronger. The first battery to arrive was told to position themselves to the south and to support the attack, the mission and situation weren't explained in any more detail. The division commander wants to immediately move forward with headquarters to the frontline of the battle.

The Chief of Staff persisted that they must determine and occupy a command post to where the regiments could send reports and from where it would be possible to give directives, but not along the chain of riflemen. In the end, the

division commander agreed that they must occupy a command post to the south of the Werechanie villages, at the forest on the edge of the mountain, but he himself, taking with him the staff captain Ivashchenko, moved forward towards the line of riflemen, assigning the task of establishing the command post on the previously mentioned mountainside— edge of the forest— to the Chief of Staff and to me. The Chief of Staff, staying with me said, “That same situation of not being led will begin again, just as it happened with Keller in the Russo-Japanese war.” I didn’t completely understand that because to me it still seemed like the personal courage demonstrated by the division commander should be held in a higher regard than choosing the command post, which would be less threatened and more easily accessible.

The Chief of Staff along with me and about 10 dispatchers headed to the designated command post. We went straight over a field; to the left of us stretched a deep ravine. Over our heads bullets started whistling and one bullet or another started to drill into the ground not far from us more often. The Chief of Staff said, “Oi, Piotr Karlovič, it’s not good here anymore; let’s go through the ravine.” At that time and still a few months later, it seemed to me that these words were proof of his fear. At that time, I didn’t understand horror or war. In fact, it was just the opposite; it seemed very pleasant to me, traveling in the place where the bullets were whistling. We came to the designated place; our horses were brought into the woods; we stayed at the edge of the forest. I was jealous of the division commander and the staff captain Ivashchenko, who had gone under the direct fire, while the Chief of Staff and I had hidden from fire in the forest.

It could be heard from the fire that the battle was becoming even hotter and the entire front rattled with strong rifle and machine-gun fire. After a short period, one of our batteries also opened fire. The enemy’s artillery hadn’t yet started working. We didn’t receive any reports and no directives were given to us. The reports didn’t come in because no one knew where the headquarters was located (because the units of brigades were pushed forward without clarification of the situation). We couldn’t give directives because we didn’t know what was happening at the front.

Due to the forested region, we could only see a small part of the front and the rest of the front we could only hear. Around 12 o’clock the division commander with Ivashchenko arrived, the latter told me that it was very hot for them. They had been under direct fire in the role of common riflemen and that’s why they were only able to understand the situation in as much as a common rifleman in his sector. The enemy artillery also had started to work, but it was shooting very terribly, a few highly exploding shells were launched also to our edge of the forest.

We didn't have to worry about those in the forest. However, the captured horse of the Austrian was hit by a shell in his back and the next day it died.

The division commander arrived with a question: what assignment to give his third battery. We decided to set it up as a left flank to the left of the forest where we were located. The terrain was not so well known to us, and so we decided that together with the battery, we would take a look at the left flank, leaving at the command post one officer in order to receive incoming reports. A report came in that our I Brigade was also in the battle and moving successfully forward. After we observed the battery's position, we hurried to our command post. News had arrived that informed us that both our infantry regiments were in the battle and that an especially fierce fight was happening along the entire front. In addition, the enemy was trying to encircle our flanks. The division commander, not receiving any clarity from these reports, ordered me to examine the region of the third battle and to provide information about its condition. I accepted this order with the greatest joy. I understood this to be my actual mission and work. Although, as I already mentioned, our command post was located not only under the shelling but also under the fire of the unmounted cavalry, still I sat on the back of my horse and rode not through the forest, where I could have gotten to the frontline, but through the field next to the forest. The further I rode, the more often and more frequently bullets whistled by me. Finally, the bullets started to hit into the ground between my horse's legs so much that the horse started to get strongly excited and jump. I wasn't even aware of the danger. The direction of my thoughts was such: "A bullet can hit the horse, the horse will fall and break my leg." That's why I got off the horse, gave it to the dispatcher and ordered that he bring it into the woods and to wait for me there. I continued to go by foot on my own further ahead to the infantry line. On my way, I met a few soldiers and in a tired voice, as in manoeuvres, began to question them: what are they doing, where are they going, which regiments, where are their regiments located, etc. However, none of the soldiers knew how to give me clear answers as in manoeuvres. I came to the conclusion that I had met with rather undeveloped soldiers, so I started to look for officers. At the edge of the forest I found the commander of the regiment, who was laying around 10 feet behind the regiment's infantry line. I started to speak with him while around us bullets strongly whistled. The commander of the regiment told me for me to lie down because the shooting here was strong. I complied, not fearing the bullets, but to show the formation officer that the officer of the Chief of Staff understood the manners of battle. Still, I lied down on the ground not as low as where the regiment

commander was but above him. When numerous bullets hit the ground directly beside me, the commander of the regiment pulled me onto the ground by my arms.

Having spoken with the commander of the regiment, I went further to the right of the field, where the right flank of 152nd Regiment was. Between this flank and the 151st Regiment's left flank was an open space. In this open space, beside a small mound, the flank patrol with 6-8 soldiers was located. These soldiers were hidden behind a small elevation. I went down to them and lay down between them, but to the front of the top of the elevation in order to see the battlefield as I had done in the peacetime manoeuvres. However, I didn't see anything except the smoke of gunfire. I started to speak with the soldiers and to question them. Here for the first time I noticed the look of the soldiers: rigidly spread, stoic eyes— eyes like a person strongly intoxicated.

From the right flank of the 152nd Regiment I headed over to the left flank. I went back a little behind the front, then by the valley and continued further through the woods, staying all the while about 100 steps from the front. In the forest, I met numerous soldiers. I tried to question them, but almost no soldier could give me clear answers. I noticed that all the soldiers had very pale faces and indifferent eyes; they were overcome by the horror of battle, but I still didn't understand this horror. Going to the eastern edge of the forest, I was in rather deep valley, and to the east the village of Pawłówka was located. In that village I didn't sense any movement. I no longer saw my own soldiers or the enemy's. After a short while, to the south of the mountain (273) irregular fire began— so there was the enemy. Soon fire also opened in the northern direction of the mountain. From this I concluded that there were my troops: there was the 152nd Regiment in stages behind the flank stationed regiment. Now bullets whistled over my head from both sides; now I started to get a little scared. I imagined that if I am injured while alone here, then no one will find me. I went back into the forest to find my horse. The horse and dispatcher were rather anxious. On the way back I rode through the forest and only emerged onto the field when I was near the command post. My report to the division commander was very inaccurate. I still didn't know how to assess the situation. I informed that the condition was very good; the enemy wasn't closer than 1000 steps from our chains (when in reality it was 400 steps, because a laying down enemy that has adjusted very well to the terrain seems farther); our forces were capable of continuing attacks, the artillery fire from both sides was weak; losses on our side were miniscule, not more than 5-6 people from one regiment. After a short while, we started to receive short but very anxious reports. The 151st Regiment informed us that the enemy was strongly

attacking in the woods, its right flank was threatened, the reserves were already used up and cartridges were few. The headquarters gave the directive to deliver them cartridges. Around our command post shells started to fall more frequently and we headed deeper into the forest. Also the 152nd Regiment reported that the situation was difficult. After a short while, the 5th Battery (in the centre) reported that it was under enemy infantry fire and shooting at the enemy with canister shots. At that moment, I didn't understand how that could have happened. In reality, a few of our regiments were driven back and the enemy was moving forward. The commander of the artillery brigade in great anxiousness begged us to save the battery. Due to sheer luck, the battery itself with its fire resisted the enemy's attack. The Chief of Staff convinced the division commander to relocate the command post back to Werechanie, at a crossroad where the dispatcher could easily find us, and we could again send out notifications as well as rearrange the closest behind point and reassemble the reserves. Arriving in Werechanie, we met already anxious operators and dispatchers. Here there were already many stray and lost (retreating) soldiers. The Chief of Staff started to energetically collect the straying soldiers and send them back to the front.

In the early morning not long before the battle, black smoke columns rose a few versts in front of us. It turns out that piles of grain were on fire. At that time in Poland, already a large amount of the grain had been harvested; the harvested grain that hadn't been thrashed tended to be put into large piles. Ahead of our front these piles of grain had caught fire and even during the battle they started to burn in our flanks. When we arrived back in the village of Werechanie, the piles of grain started to burn in our left flank and smoke clouds progressively rose further and further behind our flank. That wasn't a good sign. We assumed that the forward scout units had set the piles on fire as a signal, to show how far they had gotten. However, that was not the case. Describing these first battles, also the Austrian's mention these smoke signals, but they attribute them to Russia's widely organized web of spies; Russia's spies, by setting fire to the piles, had shown where the Austrian military forces were located. The truth, however, seems to be that the cavalry patrols in the front had given those fire signals because the Russian Cossack's especially loved to set fire to all that burns.

We had to think about retreating because around three o'clock in the afternoon, we could sense that our regiments were being pushed back. After a short while in Werechanie the 5th Battery arrived and informed us that our unmounted cavalry had already retreated so far that the commander of the regiment had ordered the battery to also go. Due to the terrain, retreating was very difficult. Between



Werechanie and Kochany was a soft meadow valley, over which only one good road led approximately  $\frac{3}{4}$  versts long on which only the artillery and wagons could travel. If the enemy continued to steadily attack, then this valley could go below the enemy's artillery and also machine-gun fire. Since from the columns of smoke it could be seen, the enemy threatened not only our flanks but also our rear side because our left flank was totally open. Between the villages of Grodysławice and Mikalów this valley was narrow and near Grodysławice piles of grain had already been burning a long time. If the enemy occupied Mikalów, then all of our retreat would be under direct fire. That's why the battery was given the assignment to take up position to the northeast of Rachanie. The chief of my Staff ordered to gather the retreating soldiers in the valley, form a team from them and to occupy the high ground by Mikalów to cover the left flank and battery. Gathering the individually retreating soldier groups wasn't easy. Those, who had already been first to leave their regiments didn't especially love going into battle. With the help of some dispatchers, I was able to gather around 60 people, ordered them to go and take position, but they answered, "We don't have cartridges." This answer I came to hear even more often later on. I immediately called to the cartridge wagon passing us and ordered they give us cartridges. After receiving the cartridges, I noticed that my "heroes" were taking only one or two cases of cartridges and that they still had many cartridges left in their possession. Leading my team into position, I saw that the enemy's shells were starting to break over Werechanie. To our luck, the enemy shot only 4-5 shells, but that was enough to quicken the crossing over the valley. Arriving at the village of Mikalów, I saw that all the batteries and wagons had crossed the valley. On the other side of the valley, the enemy still wasn't visible, which is why I turned my team in order to join the column. I caught up to the Chief of Staff and to the column in the next valley by Woźuczyn. In the direction of the enemy only a few shots were still heard, but still for the retreating segments, for the most part in wagons and the artillery, the anxiety hadn't yet subsided. On the side of the road on Woźuczyn valley's other bank, even some of the items tossed out the wagons could be seen: like sugar, oats, and stale bread. The retreating unmounted cavalrymen were very happy; they took and immediately shared the leftover sugar. 1½ km beyond Woźuczyn (6-7 km from the battlefield) the artillery was stopped in the valley in order to assemble everyone together, straighten out the units, and give food and rest to the people. Here we also came to understand the losses. The casualties it turned out were large: in the regiments of unmounted cavalry, of the injured and killed around 30% were officers and 25% of soldiers involved in the

battle; the artillery had lost only 2-3 soldiers. The corps commander was informed of all that had happened.

After approximately an hour's rest, we went further through the camp from the previous night, Czartowczyk to Przewale. The last three versts we had to walk in the dark through a forest road. We were feeling extremely exhausted, and we knew that we had suffered defeat, but we were in an especially unhappy mood because during the day the I Brigade had informed us that it had successfully moved forward. It seemed like only we were the unlucky ones, who had already suffered defeat in the first battle and worse yet at the hands of the Austrians. The only thing that we thanked God for was that the Austrian's didn't continue to attack and let us peacefully retreat. The details of the battle and the accurate number of casualties weren't yet known for certain. Later it turned out that the battle had been especially cruel. In the afternoon, both sides had been located in the forest 50 steps from each other. Those regiments, who had covered the retreat, remained in position until nightfall, continuing short fire. The division hospital, which was located near the brigades, hadn't retreated, but remained in place and fell into the hands of the Austrians with all those non-evacuated and injured. It is possible that a few machine guns were also lost, but no one reported anything about that.

We arrived in Przewale in the dark and each person was just looking for a place to lie down. The division commander, Chief of Staff, two more officers and I lay down to sleep in small, small room and immediately fell asleep. A directive was indeed given to station guards around Przewale, but we were absolutely convinced that we wouldn't need any guards; everyone would be sleeping just as deeply, and so also we went peacefully to bed.

Those were my impressions and my emotions at the time because I wasn't well-informed about the neighbouring surroundings, and I knew hardly anything about the enemy. That was the actual condition on that day.

The Russian 5th Army was moving towards the south and southwest. The XXV Corps were moving to the right of the XIX Corps. To the left was the V Corps, which had remained quite a distance behind. The Austrian 4th Army moved against the Russians in the direction of northwest; this army's middle— XI Corps was given the assignment to attack that zone in which the Russian XIX Corps were moving, their centre and right flank. In the left flank of the Austrian VI Corps, the 39th Division came into contact with the left flank of the Russian XIX Corps— the 38th Division's II Brigade near where I was located. The impressions from battle, which I described, were gotten from the 38th Division II Brigade's battle against the entire Austrian 39th Division. The Austrian VI Corps centre was moving on the

27th and in the right flank of the 15th Division, which hadn't yet encountered the enemy because the Russian V Corps had stayed back quite a distance. The previous day (August 25), the Austrian 4th Army's left flank had already gained successes against the Russian XXV Corps. We didn't know anything about that yet. On the morning of August 26, we still didn't know that we could encounter strong enemy forces. This very poor sharing of information continued the entire time while I was serving in the XIX Corps. That was explained by the ill-prepared structure of the General Staff. Following the rules and traditions of the Russian army, Chief of Staff, the lieutenant colonel of the General Staff, and three General Staff captains were located in the corps headquarters. In addition, following seniority, the division Chief of Staff was higher in rank than the lieutenant colonel of the corps staff, and the operative adjutant for the division staff was higher than the staff captains of the corps staff. This fostered competition. From the perspective of usefulness, it was indisputably accurate. The Russian corps commanders usually weren't to the highest of standards but that could especially be said about XIX Corps Commander General Gorbatovsky. He was searching for personally subordinate people. New, recent graduates of the academy who were captains, or General Staff captains, found a convenient foundation for their careers with General Gorbatovsky. These three new officers of the staff came directly from the academy seat without the slightest rank or qualification of service for the headquarters. The commander of the corps often asked them about military situation and its factors because with the Chief of Staff and his assistant colonel of the General Staff who had a large workload it wasn't possible to fulfil the whimsy desires of the corps commander. To gain a better impression, these new officers of the staff tried to please the corps commander and on the other hand, tried to smear the other workers, especially in the division headquarters. Already at that time, there appeared an absolute unconscientious hatred towards the highest Chief of Staff. So on August 26, the corps command assigned the division Chief of Staff to establish telephone communication with the corps Chief of Staff, who was 20 versts away from the corps headquarters. The corps Chief of Staff didn't give us anything, but only asked from us, weakening the division's work capabilities. That was one of the key questions: The Russian field manual required communication from the commander to the subordinates; in this instance, the Chief of Staff for the corps was asking the opposite.

The Austrian 4th Army Commander General Auffenberg described this first day of battle with the Russian XIX Corps approximately as follows.

The 39th Division was heading forward in a left wing formation by way of the Tomaszów—Zamość highway, dividing its side column to the right (under the

leadership of Major General Foglar). This side column on the right was composed of 3 battalions and 3 batteries. It first encountered the enemy and quickly attacking it, drove it back. The driven back enemy assembled in an elevated line by Tarnawatka, a very convenient area where the reserves happened to be located. During peacetime the Russian XIV Corps shooting range with bunkers and trenches was located here. At this line, all further attacks suffered defeat, in which Austria's entire 39th Division participated. The 39th Division suffered heavy losses; General Foglar perished. Consequently, in the evening the commander of the corps ordered the division to go back and occupy the high line to the north of Tomaszów. That's what the Austrian's wrote. Actually, from the Russian perspective, our 38th Division I Brigade under the leadership of Bem participated here and later they were joined by the 17th Division's brigade, so they joined together with the division. The first encounter happened with our brigade's advanced guard, which suffered defeat. After that, they threw back the Austrian side column, but when Austria's entire 39th Division entered into the battle, then at first our brigade and the 17th Division's brigade gained successes in battle and advanced 4 km forward to Wieprzów. In this battle, however, the Russians also suffered such heavy losses that at dusk they retreated back to the elevations by Tarnawatka. Therefore, in the evening, neither side had considered themselves the victor.

About the activities of war, which I had witnessed and described, general Auffenberg writes the following, "The battle was much more successful for the VI Corps middle group— the unmounted cavalry of the 27th Division. This division marched forward in two main columns with many side columns in the direction of Kochany. Not long after the crossing the Tomaszów- (Jarczów) Jaržira's road, this division encountered the enemy, who had occupied one of the mountain lines to the north of this road." As I had already previously mentioned, the 38th Division's II Brigade went on ahead. Therefore, they hadn't occupied any mountain lines, but Austria's 27th Division, while in movement, encountered the 38th Division's II Brigade, which was also in movement and who just like the Austrian division had been given the assignment to march forward to a designated line much farther. Furthermore, General Auffenberg writes, "Going forward, the regiments and battalions transformed into battle mode with the quickness inherent in our military forces, not even waiting for the artillery to arrive that had been delayed due to the boggy and sandy terrain." That account completely matches with the truth but doesn't do the Austrian artillery any favour. The Austrian artillery opened fire much later than the Russian artillery, although the Russian artillery had to traverse the same terrain that the Austrian artillery had to.

General Auffenberg continues to write,

“In this movement forward, which soon enough transformed correctly into an unmounted cavalry attack, with its actions the foot soldiers of the 85th Regiment stood out. The composition of this regiment was very diverse: there were Hungarians, Romanians, Little Russians (Belarusians and Ukrainians) and Slovaks, and that after being assembled for the first time went into the battle and immediately one after the other took over and occupied three enemy positions, immediately attacking with bayonets, gaining 300 prisoners and 4 machine guns as trophies, but this regiment on the battlefield left 450 killed and not less than 1000 were wounded. In this first battle, the regiment lost not less than 50% of its men, but losing its battle capacity, the regiment didn’t lose its morale.

With similar courage, although with much less losses, the division’s remaining two regiments attacked and completed the division’s task. Notwithstanding the division retreating to the left, the 27th Division Regiments occupied the earned battlefield.”

From this Austrian’s article, it is clear that the entire 27th Division had attacked the Russian 38th Division Brigade. Moreover, it had suffered heavy losses; one regiment had left 450 killed on the battle field and had not less than 1000 wounded. The rest of the regiments suffered smaller losses, but still they greatly suffered. Therefore, this battle, which I personally witnessed, had been between the Russian brigade and the Austrian division, in other words, against a force twice as powerful. Auffenberg continues to write, “On the other hand, in the right wing, where the 15th Division was working, it had achieved its directed goal after a long movement without any serious encounters with the enemy.”

From this it can be seen, that on August 26, the 38th Division’s II Brigade had endured battle with the Austrian division; moreover, the 15th Division had moved forward in the battle to the left of the brigade. After a day of battle, the Russian brigade happily left the battle because the Austrians believed that holding the battlefield in its grip was heroic. If there had been Germans in place of the Austrians, then we would have had an especially difficult time. We started to retreat at 4 o’clock in the afternoon; if the Austrians had continued attacking, then taking into consideration that against us were forces twice as strong and to the left of us, there was still an entire enemy division, which hadn’t yet encountered Russian forces, our retreat would have turned into panic. The most important aspect of this encounter was that the Austrian artillery in no way was capable of

competing with the Russian artillery. I as an eye witness need to affirm the honour of the Austrian foot soldiers, who without the support of artillery pushed back the Russian foot soldiers. If the Austrian foot soldiers had received support from artillery equally strong as the Russians had, then the condition of the 38th Division II Brigade would have been catastrophic: Russia's strong artillery saved the foot soldiers from the dominant power of foot soldiers who were twice as many and their artillery. From the accounts of the participants of the melee about the battle on this day, I came to the conclusion that Austrian foot soldiers cannot be assessed as lower than the Russian foot soldiers, but perhaps higher. The bayonet battles about which General Auffenberg wrote, didn't actually occur here, although the appropriate circumstances were at hand, where one opponent was 50 feet from another. On a level or forested area, a firefight with 50 feet of separation is quite similar to a bayonet fight. The Russians had twice as many Austrians against them, but the Russians were supported by modern artillery and had received modern-day training, while, on the other hand, the Austrians had material that was outdated and also in regards to training, they had weaker artillery. The result of the battle: The Russians easily retreated and the Austrians not only didn't utilize their dominating double power, but they also didn't utilize their own division advances going to the right (moving into the Russian left flank). They should have smashed and totally destroyed our brigade, but we peacefully retreated. On the morning of August 27, we received orders to cross to Komarów and to join our entire division. On the morning of August 27 the division headquarters gave an order and the regiment started its movement. At around 10 o'clock, I arrived at the Zubowice manor, where, awaiting the arrival of the column, the division headquarters stopped. Having not eaten anything for 24 hours, we had hoped to get at least some tea for breakfast here. Right at that moment when my dispatcher brought me a cup of tea, a report came in that the enemy was attacking. We had to quickly give an order: the 151st regiment with the battery needed to hold off the enemy, and the 152nd regiment with battery should continue the movement to Komarów. The division headquarters also immediately continued on horseback to Komarów. It was a sunny afternoon in August. We rode by the vehicle for the injured, hearing the groans, curses, and prayers. Around 12 o'clock, we came to the town of Komarów and the division headquarters stopped at the home of the local Roman Catholic priest. The priest didn't give us anything to eat, a friendly way of telling us that all of his things had been stolen. Our dispatcher prepared tea for us with black torte (stale bread). Around 1 o'clock in the afternoon we received our task, to secure with one regiment (Piatigorsky's 151st regiment) flank and with the



152nd Regiment, to launch an offensive attack in the direction of Krynica and to overtake the village.

Around 3 o'clock in the afternoon, the orders had been received and they were starting to be fulfilled. The division headquarters crossed over the hills to the south of the village of Komarów. It was a hot August day, I wanted to eat and drink. Occasional artillery fire could be heard in the south. The movement forward was going slow. The 38th Division I Brigade and the 17th Division regiments were leading a battle in the south and southwest of Komarów. News came in seldom and definite. Around 5 o'clock, I received an assignment—ride over to the 151st Regiment in order to ascertain their situation, and if there aren't dangerous threats against the corps from the eastern side, then to pull the 151st Regiment back into reserve. It was not easy to get to the 151st Regiment because I had to traverse many deep ravines with steep sides. From my perspective, there still wasn't any enemy action coming from the east or the southeast, which is why I instructed the 151st Regiment to cross to the Wolica-Brzozów to form a reserve. I returned to the division headquarters around 6 o'clock and reported my actions in regards to the 151st Regiment. In that time, news arrived that our I Brigade together with the 17th Division brigade had successfully attacked in the south from Dzierżnia. To secure the right flank of the attacker, the 152nd Regiment was ordered to move energetically forward in the direction of Krynica. The division commander together with the Chief of Staff decided to cross over to the region of I Brigade in order to more closely see what was happening there, but I was given orders to go together with the 152nd Regiment and to quicken the movement of this regiment. At the front of the 152nd Regiment, there was only occasional gunfire, but the regiment actually moved very slowly forward because the officers and the soldiers were still under the effect of the previous day's huge losses: the huge losses of the previous day had jolted the regiment, and more importantly the regiments' commander. Only after a few months did I understand that the regiment commander had been jarred the most. Being close to the regiment's commander, I began to give him instructions about moving forward more quickly. The commander of the regiment agreed with me, but didn't give any orders. In that moment I hadn't understood, I thought that everything was moving correctly and regularly, but only later did I understand that the commander of the regiment wasn't doing anything — didn't give any order to the battalions so that the battalion and company commanders did only that which came to their minds. Colonel Ganskau, who had spent his entire previous service as an adjutant close to various high-ranking personnel: shiny in peacetime and a representational commander—strong and beautiful in words, but



in battle, low to mediocre. When the sun started to get closer to the horizon I lost my patience and faith in the regiment's commander; I rode to the front position of the battalion and companies in order to encourage them to keep moving forward; soon enough a quicker pace ensued. The fire at the front had ended: turns out that almost no enemy was coming towards us. To the front left the sound of artillery could be heard; I thought that our Ist brigade was continuing to move successfully forward. In the southwest from Komarów a woody area began. The 152nd Regiment went through this forest and in order to not lose communication, the leading elements pulled together, got out of position and formed a column. In the dusk, the 152nd regiment and battery was in a column march through the woods. The enemy's front wasn't anywhere visible, which is why I made the regiment hurry for it to more quickly achieve the task— reaching the village of Krynica. I told the commander of the 152nd regiment to place guards by the village of Antoniówka, and after that I wrote a notification to the division commander about the 152nd Regiment, with the battery being located in Krynica, and about setting up a guard along the Antoniówka-Budy-Dzerążyńska line. After sending this report, I started to think about how to get tea for dinner, something to eat and then to find some hay for a rest. The water had just boiled and the hay for a rest had been carried in, when I received an answer to my report: "Without halting go to Komarów, because you are right now located in the enemy's region." We had thought that the I Brigade together with the 17th Division brigade at night would retreat and now we found that we were in enemy territory — in a space between the Austrian parts. Very quickly we organized our movement of retreat, going back in the easterly direction lights of the night quarters of the Austrians. It occurred to me to attack these night quarters, but these ideas couldn't be realized: the forces were exhausted, the commander of the regiment wanted to just get away unharmed, and I— strong in theory, but still rather unaccomplished in practise. We went back to Komarów, just thinking about how to get back unharmed and to our own. However, if in this moment we would have taken action, then the Austrians would have had it very bad. Perhaps this sole 152nd Regiment would have been able to ruin all of the Austrian's coming plans. The Austrians on this day had led the battle with three brigades at Komarów, but without gaining a success because these three brigades had encountered two Russian brigades with stronger artillery. On August 27, neither side had earned a success.

Around midnight the 152nd Regiment arrived in the village of Pomarowo from where they had to go to Wolica Brzozowa, where the division headquarters

was located. We arrived to the division headquarters on the eve of August 28 at 2 o'clock at night. I immediately lay on the hay to sleep.

On the morning of August 28 around 6 o'clock I was awoken by the noise of artillery shots, but my exhaustion was so great that I only got up at 7, when others had already awoken. Directives needed to be given and the corps headquarters, which was located in the village of Komarów, needed to be informed. We had been ordered to attack; given the directive to attack in the south from Komarów. We ordered the 151st Regiment to take position to the north of Komarów. This situation, when we had a right flank of defence to the north of Komarów was totally unexpected and we couldn't understand it. The 151st Regiment was sent to the region of Ruszczyzna-Antoniówka. Therefore, the XIX corps 17th Division took the western front from Komarów already beginning on August 28; the 38th Division with the I Brigade occupied the southern front and one of the regiments of the II Brigade to the north of Komarów. We were positioned in a half circle. Tired, having not eaten, I was on telephone duty and around 11 o'clock I was sent to the position of supervising the artillery. In the southwest of Wolica-Brzozowa was a position—a mortar battalion on the Height 276. One battery was facing against the south; the other towards to north; there was the need to orientate ourselves, the need to orientate the mortar battalion. To the battle in general nothing could be given. All this time in my memory one thing has remained: around 12 o'clock the artilleryman-scout said that the military forces to the west from Kol-Sujaticka and to the west of the forest of Kurzyna were moving forward (that is, from the north to the south). I instructed to open fire along that line, and the battalion commander turned to me with a question: am I taking the responsibility upon myself to know that it is the enemy and not the Russian military forces? As far as the circumstances were known to me, that could only be the enemy and that's why I said to open fire because I am taking responsibility myself. The battery opened fire. The battalion commander observed, but this battalion commander, an old man, was a good artilleryman-technician, a very good person, and a pacifist in his heart, and he was looking, looking and then said, that he cannot stand the sight of people being slaughtered. I took the telescope and the sight was truly horrendous: 48 grenades fell among the people; the Austrian battalion was marching in companies, companies in platoons as they are taught on the training field, and between them 48 grenades exploded—truly a horrific view of annihilation, because you could see how hands fly into the sky, feet, pieces of clothing, etc. It seemed that these enemy battalions were completely destroyed, but later it was clarified that these battalions had indeed suffered losses, but they hadn't actually been that heavy. August 28 gave us many

captives and also some cannons. At that time, I thought that the Austrian army was completely destroyed, but reality showed that only the Czechs came willingly into captivity, while the Austrian nationals battled courageously. Already since August 28, the situation of the XIX corps wasn't stellar, the corps being a part of the semi-circle, then, to improve the situation, on August 29, I ordered the cavalry unit (the Swodnaya cavalry division) under the leadership of Abram Dragomirov to attack the Austrian wing in the north from the village of Łaszców. Furthermore, in this battle the greatest participation came from the 7th Division, whose Chief of Staff was Dowbor-Muśnicki, nowadays a Polish general. This news was painful for us: we had already been leading battles for three days and hadn't achieved any noticeable successes, but had suffered very heavy losses. It happened that everyone else was getting victories, but we couldn't achieve anything. We were depressed. Overall, the XIX Corps headquarters didn't even orient us about the situation to the left or the right of us. Perhaps that was good because as I see it now, the condition of the XIX corps was very critical: all the Austrian's 4th Army considered the region of Komarów as the centre of the battle, and against the Russian XIX Corps all of the main forces of the Austrian 4th Army had been focused.

At that time, it only seemed striking that the Austrian reserves were coming from the north, but I didn't pay that much attention. In contrast, now I see that the XIX Corps had already been encircled on August 28. On the night of August 28, a captive Austrian officer was sent to our headquarters (Wolica Brzozowa). I met him by Wolica Brzozowa: he was sitting in a farmer's wagon. I didn't know which Austrian ethnicity he was. I started to speak with him in German. Since on this day we received around 10,000 captives without any serious battle, then I asked this Austrian officer, why the Austrians had heartily given themselves over to be captured. I, as a soldier, considered those who willingly gave themselves up to be traitors and treated them scornfully. Although it is war, there still are ethics, and that's why nobody respects traitors. I was disgusted by those Austrian officers and soldiers (Czechs), who answered willingly and with strongly definite self-assurance when I said, "From my group no one has given themselves up to be captured." And he answered, "I am not captured and can never be captured, but I came voluntarily. After the battles on August 26 and 27, from my battalion, only 15 men were left; everyone else stayed on the battlefield, but weren't captured. Since I no longer had any battalion, then I was sent to the wagons, in order to straighten things out there. Really, there was a lot of work to do there, not just for the whip but also the revolver. In the end, the transportation was gone, all the soldiers were gone; I was left alone. I then went to the closest village and informed them that I am

an officer, who has fallen into captivity.” Only in the continuing conversation did it become clear that he was Hungarian. Hungarians until the very end of the war demonstrated that they were true honourable warriors. This encounter was odd: I wasn’t fighting for Russia and this Hungarian wasn’t fighting for Austria, but both of us understood the honour of a soldier.

In the dusk of night, the division commander and the Chief of Staff and I went to the village of Szynczyce, where the commander of the brigade, one of the regiment commanders, and the commander of the artillery battalion were located. We just wanted to become oriented about the situation of our northern front in order to give appropriate warnings. On the front all was quiet: Austrians always with the onset of nightfall, tended to stop the battle. Our regiments felt extremely exhausted and that’s why they didn’t conduct any night time activities. While we were talking with the brigade and regiment commander, a rushed report came in that the Austrians were attacking at night and had already overtaken our sixth battery. This battery was located in a position to the east of Antoniówka. In the direction of the mentioned batteries, we had a few minutes prior heard a few individual gunshots, but when the report came in, then there was absolute silence. This report made us all very anxious: the enemy has overtaken our battery and what will happen next? The division commander immediately made a quick and definite decision: the two battalions of the 152nd Regiment, who were in reserve in the village of Imatica, should move into a counterattack and he would personally lead this counterattack, going with the division headquarters at the front of the battalions. The decision to launch a counteroffensive was accurate, but the circumstances weren’t clearly explained because nobody knew even approximately where the invading Austrians were. What pertains to the personal leading of the counterattack at night with the division commander in front of two battalions, then it was an anachronism: that’s how the big chiefs of their time operated. The night was very dark, which is why it took approximately a half hour until the battalion in reserve could begin their movement. During this time the Chief of Staff somewhat tried to ascertain the full circumstances. Around 11 o’clock, the battalion started to move, but it hadn’t gotten far when from the sixth battery a dispatcher with a report rode up by horse, informing that the battery is maintaining its position and there hadn’t been any attack. Only the next day was it learned that from this battery the commander of the battery was missing along with a few scouts and the crew of two cannons. The battery commander, with the onset of darkness, had wanted to establish a new point of observations closer to the enemy and in this endeavour moved forward along with soldiers. In this same region, Austrians had

sent out patrols of foot soldiers, who had encountered our artillerymen in the dark, and had captured them. Late at night, we returned to our headquarters in Wolica-Brzozowa.

On the morning of August 29 firing re-commenced at the front. Not taking anything into account, the corps gave the order — attack again. The division headquarters also ordered the regiments to attack, only in a slightly softer tone. The situation was such that we did not hope for success; the regiment commanders reported that they could barely remain in position. Before 10.00 I went to the mortar battalion's observation point to observe how the cavalry division attacked the Austrian flank and rear, and to promptly report the results to the division and corps commanders. I waited until 10.00, then 11.00 came but still no cavalry attack, but I did see that the Austrians were attacking our northern front harder and harder. I received news from headquarters by telephone that for some reason the cavalry attack had been postponed. Shortly thereafter, I received a phone call from corps headquarters ordering the mortar battalion to fire at the enemy as they headed along the Zamość -Tomaszów highway in columns; at present the head of the column had reached Łabunie. The mortar battalion commander took a map and compass to measure the distance — 11 versts. "Does the corps headquarters have any idea of how far our artillery reaches!" shouted the mortar battalion commander. In spite of the fact that I had informed them by telephone that the Tomaszow-Zamość highway is out of range of the mortar battalion, an angry phone call came a half hour later demanding to know why the battalion had not carried out orders to fire at the Austrians as they marched in columns along the road. It turned out that corps commander General Gorbatovskis had climbed up in the steeple of Komorów church; from there he had seen the Austrian column and personally gave orders to the mortar battalion. In spite of a written report that the highway is out of range of the mortar battalion, corps headquarters continued to repeat the order several times to fire at this highway on August 29 and 30. Upon returning to division headquarters, it turned out that the northern front was in trouble and that is why the 152nd regiment was brought into action. The Austrians attacked quite energetically from the north and almost no prisoners of war were taken. Fighting continued along the southern front with various degrees of success, with the end result being that as evening came both sides remained in their original positions. In the evening we received another report that the cavalry division would attack the enemy's flank and rear, but started to lose faith in these announcements.

On the morning of August 30 the corps ordered regrouping of forces at the southern front: the 17th division replaced part of our circuit and we pulled in the

150th regiment as reserves. Besides, after the 152nd regiment was brought into action at the northern front on August 29, the only reserve unit remaining in the division was the field engineer company located in the village of Śniatycze, and on August 30 they were for a short time drawn into the infantry battle. I was at the mortar division observation point again. After 10.00 I could see a cloud of dust rising up from the valley about 2 versts to the north of Śniatycze and moving westward, but only for a short time. The dust cloud soon began heading back to the east. So, the cavalry division had shown up but returned not having attacked. About that same time a report came in from the northern front that the Austrians had started to surround the right flank of the northern front. The 151st and 152nd regiments were positioned on a hill about one half verst to the north of Śniatycze, with their right flank in the forest between Dub and Śniatycze, and the left flank was in Stara Antoniówka. Around 12.00 we received a report that the enemy had attacked the village of Dub. Our situation was critical: the 150th regiment had not yet returned from the southern front; there was nothing left in the division reserves; the only thing left to do was to order the 152nd regiment reserves to counterattack Dub and concentrate artillery fire there. That was done. We managed to take the southern end of the village of Dub, but the north remained in the hands of the Austrians. There was only one rear route to Tyszowce left for the entire XIX corps; moreover the enemy was located about 4 versts north of this road and about just as far to the south. Around 15.00 a report from the corps headquarters informed us that we were to expect the V corps 39th regiment, explain the situation to them, give the orders and bring them to the village of Dub. I rode out and found the regiment, but before I could meet the regiment commander, the aide-de-camp informed me that they had received new orders from their division commander — a different battle assignment in the area of their division. I was forced to return empty handed. The critical situation had not been prevented. As I recall, Dub was protected by two companies quite well supported by our artillery, since Dub's northern part was located on a hillside and was quite easy to spot and observe. Around 18.00 corps headquarters reported that we were to receive the 324th regiment (V corps 2nd rate regiment) from the village of Zubowice and that according to all calculations they should be approaching our headquarters. We immediately sent out riders to find the regiment and show them the way, but the search was unsuccessful — we never found this regiment. It was only late that evening that the regiment was found in the village of Zubowice and their commander announced that they had just arrived and the men were not able to travel any farther that day. August 30 was a very difficult day: it was already the fifth day of battle; both soldiers and officers were



exhausted both physically and emotionally. Angry orders kept coming in from the corps — to attack and drive out the enemy at any cost; why have there been no attacks? Why had this or that place not yet been taken? Threats of discharge and lawsuits were made. The troops had absolutely no strength left, their energy had been totally sapped and no orders helped — they were unable to move forward because the enemy was strong and continually attacked. We were forced to begin lying. During the first days of battle we reported everything as it was and we were scolded, so now we changed our way of reporting. Regarding the troops that had been ordered by the corps to move forward we reported that they were slowly moving forward although we knew these troops had no intention of attacking, but hoped only to maintain their position. Since term reports were required fairly often but the situation remained practically unchanged, we had to enhance our reports. Our infantry as well as that of the Austrians was either entrenched or hidden in various local spots, the men attempted from time to time to open fire and attack, but these attempts were immediately undone by counter-fire. There were alternate successes and failures in only a few spots. In the afternoon of August 30 the situation was truly critical, but because of sheer exhaustion I did not report it. The 150th regiment arrived in the early evening, but they had suffered tremendous losses and were so exhausted that they needed to rest before receiving any further battle assignments.

As it later became clear, in the battle against the Russian XIX corps, consisting of two XIX corps divisions and one V corps regiment, on August 30 a very great number of Austrian troops was involved: part of the Austrian VI corps, the IX corps and part of the II corps — in total no less than 5 Austrian divisions.

The battle continued in the early morning of August 31. The 38th division felt especially strong pressure from the north (two Austrian divisions attacked from the north — the 13th and 26th) against the 151st and 152nd Russian regiments supplemented by the V corps 324th regiment. The 324th regiment received orders in the evening of August 30 to drive the Austrians from the village of Dub. On the morning of August 31 this regiment commenced attack supported by our artillery. The southern exit of Dub was soon taken (it turned out that the southern exit had never been taken by the Austrians). In the village itself and the surrounding area bloody battles took place in a totally open field. The 324th regiment was made up of older soldiers, it had not yet taken part in battle, therefore, it went into battle clumsily, using thick chains not adapted to the terrain. The regiment suffered serious losses. Around 10.00 the regiment received repeated orders to drive the enemy out of Dub, moreover several batteries were ordered to support the



attack. The northern exit to Dub and the surrounding area were clearly visible to the artillery observation points. At the same time the other regiments were also ordered to attack. Cannon fire was evidence that fierce battle was also taking place on the 17th division front line. Corps headquarters reported that the 17th division was successfully attacking, but as it turned out later, the 17th division had been struggling since August 30—it had gradually pressed back. Although our regiments had been ordered to attack, we did not hope for any success; our only hope was the 324th regiment that had joined us at full strength, had not suffered in battle as yet and was not as exhausted as were our regiments. Moreover, it was necessary to take Dub because if Dub remained in enemy hands, our only road to the rear, Zubowice–Tyszowce, would be clearly visible to the enemy and we might be under fire; the road to Tyszowce, however, did not lead directly to the rear but to the left flank, and our rear would be safe only as long as our neighbour to the left, the V corps, was doing well. To better coordinate the 324th regiment attack with the artillery fire I was sent to the artillery observation point from which I could see the entire battle. Our artillery barraged the northern exit from Dub and the surrounding area with fire, but the energy of the 324th regiment attack had already dissipated: in a few spots forward movement could be observed, but an attack in the true sense of the word did not take place anywhere, because the Russian lines never reached the enemy. The Austrians had adapted well to the terrain, they could not be seen from the artillery observation point, but as soon as the Austrians opened fire the smoke gave them away and our artillery opened shrapnel fire on that spot. I wondered how the Austrians could stand that much fire, all the more so because they had no artillery back-up from the Dub village region. It became clear later that there had been three Austrian battalions near Dub: a machine gun battalion, the 25th battalion and one battalion from the 1st machine gun regiment — all really good forces. On our side the 324th regiment (4 battalions) and 2-3 strike force batteries fought against these Austrian troops. Around 12.00 our attack actually ended and following a telephone conversation with the Chief of Staff I returned to division headquarters around 13.00. The situation elsewhere on the front was the same as it had been earlier: the corps gave orders to attack, the regiment filed reports about their losses, exhaustion and Austrian attacks. After I had sent some injunctions and written some reports the Chief of Staff came in and said that he and Rotmistrz (cavalry Captain) Ivaschenko, who had been attached to the division commander, were immediately going to the left flank to inspect the terrain and the situation, and I should stay here and run operations during that time as well as conduct all conversations with the regiments and corps headquarters. I was a bit surprised,

but did not find it difficult. As far as our regiments were concerned, I completely knew and understood their operations, but I did not feel comfortable regarding corps headquarters, because they were always very angry about how weakly we carried out attacks. I feared being rebuked by corps headquarters. Shortly before the division commander returned, we saw enemy shrapnel falling on the village of Komarów. We found that amusing, because corps headquarters was always scolding us — what would they do now, finding themselves under fire? We truly did not receive any further harsh demands from corps headquarters. Term reports needed to be sent every half hour. Since term reports from the regiments did not come at regular intervals, I telephoned the regiments to find out what was going on at the front before filing my report. That is exactly what I did this time as well. Around 15.00 immediately after I had sent the current term report, Lieutenant Colonel Plehanov of corps headquarters telephoned to find out about the situation at the front. I told him the report had just been sent; he said it had not been delivered to corps headquarters yet and asked that I tell him verbally. I remember very well that I told him that the 149th regiment was ready to go on the offensive in the southern front, the 324th regiment was continuing attacks in the village of Dub, and the 151st regiment had just driven back an enemy attack and was receiving ammunition to continue the offensive. I had made up all these attack preparation activities, because as I said earlier, we were forced to lie because the corps asked more of us than we were capable of doing. Lieutenant Colonel Plehanov answered in a very soft and congenial tone: “Very good,” and then asked if our front had retreated anywhere. I responded that the 38th division sections had not retreated anywhere, all the taken locations were in our hands, which was true. Plehanov again said “very good” and ended the conversation. 10 to 15 minutes following this conversation an automobile carrying the corps commander and Chief of Staff drove in from the direction of Komarovo. The car drove past division headquarters in the direction of Zubowice-Tyszowce. A second automobile followed and then a third with other corps headquarters workers. I wondered at this and thought to myself that they were driving to the front. Another half hour or so passed and my phone operator from corps headquarters called and asked: “Will you order me to take down the line?” I wondered even more, but then in conversation with the phone operator I learned that corps headquarters had left and taken down all telephone lines. I had to give permission to take down the line. Only then did I understand that somewhere something bad was happening. Things remained unchanged at the front. I telephoned the regiments and was assured that they remained in their positions. Only the 150th regiment, which was in reserve, asked

where they should go because sectors of the 17th division were leaving Komarovo. I ordered them to stay in position. After a short time (about 16.30) I noticed 17th division infantry lines coming from the southwest and west going in the direction of Wolica-Brzozowa. It was clear that the 17th division was retreating. Since there was no gunfire to be heard in the area of the 17th division, I remained calmly in place waiting to see what would happen next. Here I could relax, whereas if I went to see the division commander, and possibly the corps commander would have joined him, I would only encounter work and trouble.

About an hour later I received a visit from the Rotmistrz assigned to division headquarters. His name was Ivaschenko and he told me the Chief of Staff and the division commander were waiting for me in the village of Zubowice. I answered that everything was quiet here now and we should take advantage of the situation and rest a bit. We arrived at Zubowice at about 19.00; there we met our commander as well as the 17th division commander and Chief of Staff, several regiment commanders, including the commander of the 324th regiment. Elements of the 324th regiment were having lunch in Zubowice. The 38th division commander wanted to know if this regiment's front lines still are in Dub. The regiment commander responded that they had received orders from their corps (V) to join the corps and that is why there were orders for the regiment to gather in Zubowice; he did not know who was in control of Dub. It was clear from this answer that everyone was trying to save their own skin and no one showed any interest in the battle as a whole. I was very tired and hungry, and I imagine the others were as well. Back at Wolica-Brzozowa I had intended to boil some potatoes and have a meal, but Rotmistrz Ivaschenko spoiled my plans. There was absolutely no chance of finding anything to eat in Zubowice. Both division commanders and the majority of the other officers were very concerned and considered the situation to be critical. Even now I cannot explain why I thought the situation was fine — perhaps I had become lethargic due to exhaustion; perhaps because being in Wolica-Brzozowa I saw that the Austrians were not advancing, they were not pursuing us, but perhaps it was because I was never happy about Russian victories, even from the very beginning of the war, with a few possible exceptions. Moreover, I never feared that our troops could end up in a catastrophic situation. Thanks to the fact that I neither cheered Russian victories nor defeats, I had the best opportunity to be totally objective in assessing the situation. During this first battle I instinctively assessed the situation objectively rather than relying on reason. It was only in the later battles, starting in November, that I was able to rationally assess the situation objectively. Although I fully felt the situation instinctively, I was completely calm. That evening Captain

Nikiforov, commander of the 151st regiment company, arrived in Zubowice quite upset and reported that Austrian spies are all around and they were signalling about our whereabouts; the Austrians were sure to surround us from all sides and capture us or totally defeat us since signals were visible everywhere. That seemed silly, even a bit childish, as it turned out to be.

In the evening we remained in Zubowice and awaited orders from the corps commander. Not knowing how to proceed, we did nothing. About 21.00 it became clear that we had taken Wolica-Brzozowa and the 151st regiment company was on the south side of Dub; there was no news of the northern exit.

The 17th division headquarters treated us to tea and dark bread. That was a delicious meal in those conditions, because it was something we did not have.

About 23.00 we received corps orders to retreat to the north. I had no time to waste in preparing division orders since the retreat was to start at 3.00. I do not remember what exactly was assigned to the 17th division; I only know that on their first march the 38th division had to first go to the village of Grabowiec and then to Wojsławice . I prepared and sent the division orders immediately. We began to consider some rest options since we were exhausted. We lay down on the bare floor for 1-2 hours. The march commenced in the dark hours of the morning. As the division Chief of Staff and I reached the southern exit of Dub, the sun was just rising. Morning light was dangerous; we had to remember that the Austrians had not changed position since yesterday evening, because they had not attacked after that. Thus, they could not have been pushed back, but rather could have advanced — thus, our retreat route quite possibly would be under Austrian machine gun fire. Nevertheless, everything was quiet. Based on time calculations, our advance guard should have already passed through the Dub northern exit, thus that area was still enemy free. One of the division's hospital elements, overcrowded with the lightly and seriously wounded, was positioned at the southern exit. Colonel Agapeev, division Chief of Staff, stopped the artillery and ordered the lightly wounded to be moved to the artillery limbers and munitions wagons as well as some of the lighter freight wagons. This way almost all of the lightly wounded were evacuated from Dub leaving only the seriously wounded. As we passed along with the column through Dub going north we were overcome by a frightful feeling. It was fairly light already and we could have expected Austrian machine guns at any moment, or, at the least, artillery fire from the side. If we had in fact been fired on, our entire division would have been overcome by panic — total catastrophe would have set in. However, total silence prevailed. In the early morning light our eyes were searching for the enemy in the woods to the left at Majdan; our artillery had totally

defeated them in the first days of battle. The artillery men said that canons were still there as well, but we had no intention of collecting them. We were happy that the enemy did not bother our column and we had no intention of bothering the enemy. In the centre of the village of Dub and at the northern exit I saw for the first time a battlefield after a fierce battle — a field that literally was covered in casualties. This was the first time I saw something like this, however, later on during the war I saw fields heavily covered in casualties about 2-3 times. Austrian and Russian corpses were intermingled on the field. An especially large number of casualties was from the 324th regiment, they were lying in rows. They had attacked in close clumsy infantry lines and the Austrian machine guns had mowed them down. But the Austrian machine gun points, marked by piles of shells, were also full of huge piles of casualties; they had been felled by our artillery fire. Our orderlies cleared the battlefield: the wounded were taken to the infirmary, the fatalities were buried.

We had gone about 5 versts to the north of Dub and had not heard any shots; only then did we begin to feel safe. Now a question arose — why were we going to retreat if the enemy was not pursuing us?

About 11.00 we reached the village of Grabowiec. It was a hot sunny day and it was especially hot in the village which was located in a deep valley. We took care of the most pressing things and then decided to sleep for a bit, since we could expect orders from the corps toward the end of the day. The moment I had laid down I lost all hope of actually getting some sleep. Already around 14.00 the phone rang with news that the Austrian cavalry was heading to Grabowiec from Gaescina. Great agitation ensued because we knew very well that all the regiments were quietly relaxing after the long days in battle. We issued immediate orders to take up positions. The Russian cavalry appeared after a short time. The opposing cavalries exchanged some gunfire and then disappeared. Our rest had been spoiled. After lunch we began receiving orders and requests from the corps. I had to get back to work. The corps told us that we have to remain in the Grabowiec region for the time being, and I had some hope of getting a good night's sleep. In the evening, however, I received orders from the division commander to inspect the defence sectors. Their right flank had taken Świdnik, their centre had taken the forest to the south of Grabowiec and their left flank had taken the village of Berezka. The division commander ordered me to check on the defence sectors in the forest.

It was already quite dark as I rode out of Grabowiec accompanied by two messengers. When I reached the place in the forest where the defence troops had gone, it was completely dark. I searched all around for a long time, but could not

find any defence troops. I was forced to return to Grabowiec not having carried out my orders; I did so around 2.00.

The next day, September 2, it was cloudy, rather cool and it rained from time to time. The corps orders regarding further retreat to Wojsławice came in early in the morning. The retreat march was to start at 13.00. We calmly wrote down the orders and began the march. Having been on the road for one hour, we received orders from the corps to return to Grabowiec. We turned back. A half hour later I received new orders — for the time being we were to stay put and await further orders. We stood in the forest about an hour, then received orders to return to Grabowiec and remain ready to march. It was not until early evening that we received orders — we were to go to Wojsławice where we would receive orders regarding subsequent activity. We left at dusk. We reached Wojsławice at midnight. From there we needed to proceed to the region of Bończa-Kraśniczyn. Division headquarters was to move to Wólka Kraśniczyńska. We arrived at our positions on September 3 at about 6.00 in the morning having walked more than 30 kilometres during the night.

On September 3 the army rested. Corps headquarters sent news of Russian victories and Austrian defeats. On September 4 we were assigned an attack march to the south to the region of Monastyr - Skierbieszów. There was no news of the enemy, so we could have run into them unexpectedly. We started the march at 9.00 on September 4. The weather was rainy and foggy. We took our positions immediately after midday. Division headquarters remained in the village of Skierbieszów.

During the night we received orders for September 5. We were told that the enemy had taken the villages around the city of Zamość. Corps orders were to take Zamość using the 38th division to attack from the north and the 17th division to attack from the northeast. At 8.00 in the morning on September 5 we commenced the attack march.

Since we received very scant information about the enemy from the corps and we received no news from our division cavalry — border guards — we had to proceed as if we could do battle at any moment. The division marched in two columns — the right column followed the route from Monastyr to Udrycze, Sitaniec Lubelska, Zamość; the left column went from Skierbieszów to Dębowiec, Lapiga Manor, Majdan, Zamość. From the Udrycze - Dębowiec line both columns had to proceed at full battle readiness. The 17th division marched on our left, on the right our right column had to protect our flank since our forces were not nearby. Up to the Udrycze -Dębowiec line the terrain was woody, thus, enemy fire was not to be



expected. Open and clear terrain followed and an attack could be expected at any moment; however, everything was silent. Division headquarters joined the right column and gradually moved to the head of the column. The right column came onto the highway and infantry lines marched along both sides of the highway, division commander General Prasalov was positioned in the front line. Chief of Staff Colonel Agapeev's warnings did not help. The terrain was totally open and flat with a rise toward the enemy side. Had the enemy been in Zamość at the time, an attack on the march would have ended in complete defeat; the first shots from the enemy would have shot down the division commander and the division and headquarters would have been left without a leader. But everything was quiet, very quiet. Upon reaching the village of Lubelska we noticed a local wagon heading toward us. We stopped the wagon to question the driver and noticed an Austrian soldier sitting behind him. The soldier answered our questions calmly, saying he was going to find food in Zamość for their wounded; apparently there was food aplenty there and there was no army presence. As our front troops coming from the north had already passed through the town, the 17th division's front troops were approaching from the east, and these front troops did in fact exchange some fire with the enemy.

Division headquarters took up a position in the hotel, the regiments in the town and nearby villages. Some sectors of the 17th division also remained in the town. An Austrian infirmary remained in the town with about 200 seriously wounded Austrians and Russians. Two doctors and a few helpers remained with the wounded. The wounded had not eaten for two days since the Austrians had started evacuating on August 31. It turned out that the Austrians had left a fair amount of war materiel in Zamość and the surrounding area: two trucks — one broken down, one working, quite a few wagons, guns, clothing, and ammunition. It appears that was all taken from the casualties and the warehouses. But we found even more Russian war materiel which the Austrians had taken from the Russians but had not been able to take with them. We took about 10 cannons, quite a few munitions wagons, machine guns, wagons full of cartridges and a variety of other types of wagons. They had all been taken from the 2nd and 3rd Russian grenadier division. Most of the cannons and munitions wagons had damaged wagon parts, but two cannons were in perfect condition. We took what we needed from these things. I took a grenadier cart to store and transport topographic maps.

We also took the truck, but we had a hard time with it — we did not have a good driver, the truck did not work well and we often had difficulties getting it to our next destination; after 10 days we sent it back to the rear.



The city of Zamość was totally deserted. Only about 200-300 inhabitants remained. For the first time in ages we were able to comfortably settle in — we each had our own room. In the early evening I was at headquarters. The Chief of Staff and Ivaschenko had gone out to look around the city. When the Chief of Staff returned, I noticed he was carrying a large pack of candles under his arm. He had found the candles at one of the shops, but since there were no clerks around he just took the candles and left. We needed candles badly, since the ones we had brought along as we went to war had all been burned and it was impossible to buy any more. Ivaschenko returned after a while. He took me aside and very secretively, with a very happy facial expression, started telling me that he had found a wine cellar full of great things for the taking; if we do not take them, the soldiers would do so during the night. At first Ivaschenko went back by himself and brought back as many bottles as he could carry, but later went back with the dispatch runners and brought back around 100 bottles of various wines, canned goods, cheese and other edibles. This was the beginning of the widespread wartime practice of disclaiming private property. Soon we received news that soldiers were wandering through the city opening up shops: the corps commander issued strict orders to both divisions to take steps to prevent looting and they did so. However, the next morning it turned out that most of the shops had been broken into and the merchandise taken. A women's hat shop was located next to our headquarters — it too had been broken into and hats were strewn everywhere. At the time everyone viewed this with a certain sense of humour but in reality it was the beginning of the birth of Bolshevik instincts.

The next morning one of our regiments reported that their scouts had seen enemy transport driving off 8 versts from Zamość. A border patrol squadron was sent out and ordered to arrest the transport. A few hours later the squadron reported that they had not found the transport. It is quite likely that they did not want to pursue the transport fearing enemy fire. On September 6 and 7 we continued to gather war materiel, putting our equipment in order and relaxing.

Now that 10 years have passed since the Komarovo battle and the retreat afterwards, and thanks to clarification of Austrian forces, their activities and circumstances, it is possible to objectively evaluate the activities of the 38th division, the XIX corps and the 5th Army. Their activities can be divided in the following manner: a) the battle at Komarovo and b) the retreat. During the battle at Komarovo, beginning August 27, we received enemy prisoners of war every day. Division headquarters did not have the time nor the appropriate officers to question the prisoners in detail, or systematise information about enemy units in

order to form a picture of what enemy forces were fighting against the XIX corps. It was not possible to dig for information about Austrian peace time organizations to gather information about what divisions and corps were fighting against us; this job was easily done at corps and army headquarters. However, we did not receive any reports from above regarding the status and position of neighbouring corps during the entire battle of Komarovo; thus, we did not know what the XIX corps had been ordered to do. In the early morning of each day of battle we received the stereotypical corps orders: "The corps objective — to energetically attack and defeat the enemy, ...to attack the 38th division and at any cost, take ..." At first — August 26 and 27 we believed these orders, but as days went by and we did not fully know the situation, but sensing the size of the enemy forces, we no longer believed them. Every day we received the objective — attack and defeat the enemy, but every day we saw that the enemy far outnumbered us, they continued to surround and attack us more and more. Given the situation and the corps order we could reach one of two conclusions: either the enemy is really weaker than we are and nevertheless, we suffer defeat — therefore, our army is a lot weaker than the enemy army, or the corps does not understand the situation and gives orders that are impossible to carry out. This conclusion was, at least for me, supported by two factors: first, the division Chief of Staff — Colonel Agapeev, who had a wealth of experience in the Russo-Japanese War and who I respected since the first days of battle for his ability to correctly assess situations, who used practical war methods, and had a knack for understanding the essence of the battle, this very same Agapeev, upon receiving corps orders, would shake his head and say: "This is impossible, but if it is an order, let us try, maybe something will come of it." Second, I clearly remember my response to one of the corps queries regarding the forces against us; I reported that it was clear that against every regiment of the 38th division, the enemy outnumbered them by 1.5 to two times. Corps headquarters did not overturn this report so it was correct. We did not understand why we should attack if the enemy surrounded us more and more. The only explanation I could find for the corps orders to attack was the fact that, not knowing the true situation, they thought the others were successfully moving forward and only we had been stopped. But that did not correspond with the fact that the enemy was attacking us and surrounding our corps from all sides. In the beginning we wanted to believe that the commanders were right in ordering us, but this faith evaporated as early as August 29, 30, and 31. Now, knowing the Austrian situation, we are forced to conclude that the XIX corps orders were totally ill-considered, inappropriate and unsuitable. Perhaps the XIX corps did in fact receive such orders totally in disagreement with the existing

situation, but even if that were the case, I must admit that the orders from the High Command were not only unsuitable but also demoralizing. After several days of fighting, army and corps headquarters certainly must have received information that the troops attacking the XIX corps outnumber our forces two to one. Moreover, it was known at both headquarters that the XIX corps had advanced. Thus, if army headquarters wanted to gain a victory, they should have done so with other corps, attacking the Austrian forces that were trying to surround the XIX corps from the flank, especially since there was no enemy predominance over the other army corps. About two enemy divisions were fighting the XXV corps (3 divisions) and only 4 – 5 Austrian divisions were fighting against the XVII and V corps (6 divisions). Even if the XIX corps would have had any success, the situation would have become even worse – the corps, all by itself, would have pressed into Austrian territory and would have been completely surrounded. If the XIX corps would have received appropriate orders for the existing situation, such as hold your positions and when possible start activity, the XIX corps divisions would have calmly held their position and they would not have morally defeated in trying to carry out the order.

As we can see, that would have been the only proper objective for the divisions of the XIX corps. That is the way we (Colonel Agapeev and I) understood our mission, but our superiors did not let us carry on that way. An attack was demanded of us, but on August 31 we were ordered to retreat and again we did not understand – why is that necessary? Since the situation of the 38th division was the same on August 31 as it had been on August 28, 29 and 30, in our view it was not necessary to do so, even more so because at 14.00 there came a demand to know why we still had not attacked and had not taken the locations we had been ordered to take. Earlier the divisions had not received information about the overall situation so we perceived the order to retreat quite mechanically: what is ordered must be carried out, especially if it is easy to do so and relieves us of difficulties. As I wrote earlier, I would have gladly remained in the village of Volica-Brzozova longer, because I instinctively felt that there was no reason to fear the enemy. As we learned later, the XIX corps commander was in a total panic on the afternoon of August 31. Until 17.00 this same commander demanded an energetic attack from us, but later when the 17th division had suffered a minor defeat, only morally significant since there were no losses, and Komarovo was under Austrian fire, this same corps commander lost his head. Leaving behind a good part of corps documentation, he fled as quickly as possible. Later it turned out that corps commander General Gorbatovskis had fled by car to Tyszowce where

our artillery park (supply) brigade was located. The park brigade commander had immediately reported to the corps commander that the park brigade, as per orders, was located in Tyszowce. General Gorbатовski demanded to know the brigade's positions. The park brigade commander explained that he had no positions because they were delivering munitions to the fighting troops and they were unable to do anything else. General Gorbатовski ordered: "Occupy any kind of position." That proves that the corps commander was totally overtaken by panic. I learned of this only later, but already on the evening of August 31 I concluded that the high commander had totally lost his head. That is a preposterous situation. I am not certain, but I think that the situation on the evening of August 31 was saved by Colonel Agapeev silently supported by General Prasalov, commander of the 38th division. The support consisted of not interfering with Agapeev. Agapeev did some special scouting in Dub to determine which part of the village was under our control and which part the enemy had taken over. This was necessary in order for us to plan the retreat route and vacate the village by dawn. Then official guard posts were set up and the sections of the 38th division were positioned so they could counter a night attack if it occurred. My exhaustion notwithstanding, I had to write these orders and organize the guard posts. I observed the 17th division's headquarters with envy as the division commander General Baluev and his Chief of Staff Colonel Krugers (from Kurzeme) were sleeping soundly. I tried to find out the location of the various sectors the 17th division as requested by Agapeev, but none of the aides de camp could tell me anything. They responded that one of the regiments was assigned to cover the retreat and the others were to gather in the Zubowice region, but no one knew where the regiments were at present. If the Austrians would have carried out a night attack this evening even with a minimum of soldiers the entire XIX corps would have been scattered in a panic. The most important moment in any battle is the retreat, therefore, it must be well-organized down to the smallest details with precision and exactitude. This evening we knew absolutely nothing about the real situation nor the objectives of the corps. It was only at 24.00 that we received brief orders from corps headquarters to march back to the Vaislavica region in two groups, but these orders contained no information about our neighbouring division nor the enemy. Now, calmly looking back at the situation, I seem to understand the orders. General Gorbатовski as battalion commander was awarded the St. George cross for the battles at Kindzau in the Russo-Japanese War. At that time battalion commanders only commanded, they did not issue orders. Admitting nothing more, Gorbатовski intended to command the corps the same way he had commanded the battalion in the Russo-Japanese

War (10 years earlier). Our 38th division had to retreat going through the village of Dub, the north end of which was in enemy hands until the evening of August 31. Thus, in reality we had to deal with a battle rather than with retreating in order to get through the enemy front lines. The corps orders mentioned nothing of this fact.

As it turned out later, our retreat was successful only thanks to the fact that the Austrian 4th Army had received orders on the evening of August 31 to turn their back on us and go south to attack the Russian 3rd Army that had taken Lvov, leaving only two corps to stand against the entire Russian 5th Army. Thus, on the night of August 31 to September 1 we retreated but so did the Austrians, who actually began to retreat a bit earlier than we did. If the Austrians would have continued to attack on September 1 as they had been doing on August 30 and 31, the Russian 5th Army would have been in a catastrophic condition. The Russian XIX corps — the only corps of the 5th Army that had not suffered any serious losses during the six day battle — was forced to retreat through an area that had been in enemy hands until August 31. If the Austrians would not have given orders to retreat on August 31, the same might have happened as did at Liaoyang in the Russo-Japanese War. If the Austrians had continued to attack on September 1 the Russian 5th Army would have been defeated and the Russian 4th Army would have been forced to retreat along with them: the Austrians would have definitely won in Poland and possibly the Russian 3rd Army victories would not have occurred. In today's war the leader cannot make decisions based on his impressions because he cannot oversee the battle field. The leader must make decisions based on the reports of his subordinates. General Konrad, the Chief of General Staff, made his decision based on the report of his 4th Army's Commander General Aufenberg. Aufenberg had reported that the Russian army had been defeated and was retreating. In fact, nothing like that happened. Although the Russian 5th Army commander had issued the order to retreat on August 30, the corps was not given the order until the evening of August 31. A lack of coordination on behalf of the Russians was obvious. As I read reports of the Russian activities in these battles I must conclude that on August 30 the commander of the Russian 5th Army concluded that the situation on his front lines was critical and thus he made the decision to retreat. Considering the overall situation in the entire Russian front, I must admit this decision was completely correct. Carrying out these orders was extremely difficult for the XIX corps: the retreat route ran through enemy occupied territory (it is thought that the XIX corps had not informed the army of their real situation). That is the reason the XIX corps suggested putting off the retreat until the situation improved. The XIX corps wanted and received support

from the V corps in order to secure their route of retreat. However, the effort to secure the route through the village of Duna was not successful. Sections of the 5th Army maintained their positions on August 31 and continued to do battle until evening. This saved the 5th Army from catastrophe, albeit with no calculation and unconscientiously. Victors are not brought to justice. If the 5th Army had been ordered to retreat on September 1, and to do so through enemy occupied territory (until August 31), and the enemy would not have impeded the retreat with a single shot, then based on reports (such reports were sent by the 38th division, that had to retreat through enemy territory) the only conclusion that could have been made was that the enemy had retreated, or in the worst case, the enemy had suffered seriously since they were no longer pursuing us. Neither the 5th Army nor the XIX corps headquarters had come to such a conclusion. On September 1 it was clear that not only were the Austrians not in pursuit, they had not advanced at all. Both the corps and the army should have had a clear understanding of this issue, because the Russians had a very strong army and corps cavalry. However, on September 2 the Russian 5th Army retreated and lost contact with the Austrians — this was an incontestable mistake on the part of the corps and the army. We also retreated on September 2, but why did we do so if the Austrians were no longer after us? Then we headed for Zamostje, but Zamość could have been taken by the powerful Russian cavalry. We spent three full days in Zamość doing absolutely nothing — why? To clumsily allow the enemy to retreat and clean up? Regarding a unit the size of a division, the situation had not been clarified, but they were ordered to act only based on orders and directives. The consequences — inactivity, hesitation and not taking advantage of opportune circumstances. As we relaxed in the town of Zamość we were completely convinced that war activity had finished. When we received orders to head west of Zamość we understood that to be a march with the purpose of totally annihilating the enemy. Based on the news that we received from the corps at that time, I did not have the slightest doubt that war against Austria was over and now, as victors, we would totally defeat the Austrian forces.

It seemed strange that having received the orders on September 7 we did not start the march until September 8. We received no news from our scouts. The corps orders did not include specific information about the enemy, but during the march we received additional admonition that we need to proceed with the greatest of care since we might run into enemy forces. From Zamość we went west to Zawada, Wielącza and Deszkowice, where the division headquarters remained. The regiments took Kulików, Sułowiec and Żrebce. We arrived at the designated night rest stop at about 15.00 and heard intense artillery fire from the northwest.



Thus, a battle was going on in the northwest, but up until now we had not known that the enemy was this far north; quite the opposite, we constantly received news about great victories and successes from other armies and other corps. Judging by the artillery fire, we were not in a very safe position, so the division commander, the Chief of Staff and I reviewed regiment positioning for a possible battle scenario. As usual the division cavalry — Border Guards — had not advanced beyond the infantry line of defence. Thus, surveying the region we were entering we proceeded to locations that none of the scouts had seen. In later years of the war, cases like this occurred fairly often. In the evening we received orders that the following day, September 9, we were to continue marching west in two columns, through a hilly, forested and rugged terrain to the village of Goraj. We left early in the morning but did not advance very quickly since the roads were very bad — through hilly terrain full of ravines and forests. Around noon both columns were to align in the marshy valley of the Gorajec River. The right column crossed this valley at Latiezira and left column crossed at M. Grigla, the march continued on one road through Andzejewka toward Goraj. The right column was led by the Ist Brigade followed by the IInd Brigade. Around 14.00 the head of the column emerged from the forest and was nearing the village of Andrzejówka. The front defence line had already left Andrzejówka and the advance guard was in the village when sparse infantry fire began. The fire became stronger and stronger. The commander of the regiment at the head of the column (the 150th, I recall) reported that the enemy was attacking from the west. Our situation was bleak: Andrzejówka is located in a deep ravine, we were surrounded by hills; our regiment met the enemy as they left the village. The enemy was in the hills and we were down in the valley. About an hour later the entire first brigade was doing battle; the enemy attacked from the west, the northwest and partly from the southwest. We again found ourselves in a semi-circle surrounded by the enemy. The artillery became active about 14.00. The division commander went forward to our active machine guns.

The Chief of Staff and I remained in the village to observe and evaluate the overall situation and report to the corps. It was difficult to get oriented and evaluate the situation, because we could see very little from the valley. The surrounding hills were occupied by the enemy. We were in a pit and the enemy was on the rim of that pit. Our II brigade still was in the forest east of Andrzejówka and did not take part in the battle. After about an hour, corps Chief of Staff Captain Sizih arrived to help us get oriented and to get information about our situation. We did not like this captain very much from previous experience and watched with glee as he dashed from house to house trying to reach us while evading whistling bullets.



Having discussed everything with him we suggested that he go down to see the division commander and then return and we would give him a written report for headquarters. Going down to the division commander was particularly unpleasant since he was located in an infantry line, and we happily watched as Captain Sizih's face turned different shades of pale. The captain did go, however, but he never returned for the written report. A bit later we received news that our division commander General Prasalov had been wounded. We found him on the east side of the village where he had already been treated by the division doctor. He had received a bullet in the chest, but luckily the bullet hit a button and remained in the chest bone. The general boasted that a shoddy Austrian bullet could never break his powerful Russian chest. Here at the edge of the village we received somewhat better news of the situation. The artillery battalion attached to the first brigade had wanted to help the infantrymen as soon as the shooting started. The first battery positioned themselves at the eastern edge of Andrzejówka and opened fire. After the first shots the battery received enemy artillery fire and was forced to remain quiet. The second battery had gone into position to the right and a bit behind the first battery, but enemy grenades began falling between their cannons as soon as they began shooting. A bit later the third battery took well-chosen positions under cover and it was only the third battery that managed to effectively carry on a serious attack. The first and second battery only managed to fire a round now and then, but then were forced to be silent. The first battery received several enemy grenades aimed directly at their cannons. Our second brigade and second artillery battalion were in the forest east of Andrzejówka and could not get out of there to help us. The road that the column was on was in a ravine that could not be exited to the side, so the column could have either come forward and spread out over the fields or go back several versts and look for a different access route. The enemy did not let them leave the forest either. As soon as anyone appeared at the fringe of the forest, they opened artillery fire along the edge of the forest.

The battle continued until evening with no gains for us; we were happy to maintain our positions. There were several misunderstandings during the battle that in retrospect I have to admit gave me valuable insight into battle psychology. For example, being positioned on the eastern edge of the village near a house, we received shrapnel fire above the roof of the house. Our first conclusion was that shrapnel is falling on us and we need to hide. In a few minutes the artillery brigade aide-de-camp reported that it was not enemy shrapnel but rather premature bursts of our own shrapnel. We immediately felt over-joyed and no longer considered ourselves in danger. In reality enemy shrapnel could not have hit us because we

were protected by the surrounding houses, however, premature bursts of our shrapnel were dangerous to us since we were not protected from them. That is battle psychology: if we know that someone wants to eliminate us, we know we are in danger, but real accidental danger is not really danger because we know there is no evil intention.

In the evening dusk the enemy attacked, but we were able to counter attack. As darkness fell the battle field was completely silent. We sought out a larger house to spend the night. The village was very poor and dirty. Having found shelter, we began to collect information and assess the situation. The infantry and artillery brigade commanders and one of the regiment commanders came to see us. They said the situation was critical: the brigade with one artillery battalion was pushed forward and now they were surrounded by machine gun fire on three sides. The enemy has the other brigade and artillery battalion trapped in the forest. There is no hope of getting closer to the first brigade the next morning because the access road is under enemy fire. During this conversation we received news that on the left flank south of the village the sound of wagons could be heard. Brigade commander Major General Bem commented that most likely the enemy was extending their front line and setting up artillery so they could bombard us with even stronger crossfire (during the day we were shot at only by infantrymen from the south; enemy artillery shots came from the west and northwest). This comment added to the concern and everyone agreed that during the night the brigade should be moved back to the other brigade. Only the injured division commander General Prasalov categorically opposed retreating. To the brigade commander's question — "what are we going to use to continue the battle tomorrow without infantrymen and artillery cartridges?" — the division commander stuck firmly to his decision; short orders followed about defending their present positions. Orders were also given to supply more munitions, etc. When all the orders had been delivered and the report had been sent to the corps commander, we headed for a night's rest. The house where we had settled was small and very dirty (very stuffy), so I decided to sleep outside. There were cut rye stacks about 500 feet from the house. I settled into one of these stacks with the intention of returning to the village before dawn, since these rye stacks came under shrapnel fire. However, I did not wake up that early the next morning. When I did wake up it was already completely light, I don't think the sun had risen yet. Total silence lay over the land, not a single shot could be heard. At division headquarters everyone was up. Corps orders came around 4.00. According to orders, one regiment and battery were to remain in the Andrzejówka region and the entire division was to retreat to the Czarnystok region.

This order did not contain any explanation of the situation nor any admonition about the overall objective of the corps and division. The overall situation was totally incomprehensible to me. When I entered headquarters, the commander had already written down the orders for the division sectors. I was told to remain with the 149th regiment, which had been ordered to remain in hilltop positions northeast of the village of Andrzejówka. We were to remain on this hill until noon and then retreat to Czarnystok. If the enemy were to wage a powerful attack, we had to stick it out until 10.00. The day was beautiful and sunny and silence ruled all around. The regiment calmly stood in position about one kilometre east of yesterday's battle field. Yesterday's enemy had completely disappeared.

The enemy's situation was the following: the Austrian 1st Army had suffered defeat for the last several days and had begun to retreat. The German Woyrsch flank and rear covered the retreat, since sectors of the Woyrsch corps had to retreat through Goraj. Thus parts of this corps, probably one infantry regiment and one battery (this regiment had little artillery), were sent to Andrzejówka to defend the flanks; there they ran into our brigade. The German army activity was purposeful and active and left the impression that they were great in number. Moreover, up until now we had only fought the Austrians. The nature of the September 9 battle was completely different. Although we had not received any report on who we were facing, by evening on September 9 everyone said that these were not Austrians, but most likely Germans. Both infantry and artillery activity differed greatly from what we had experienced from the Austrians. On the night of September 9 to 10 the Woyrsch corps had already retreated and that is why the enemy was no longer near Andrzejówka. From time to time enemy planes appeared above our heads. Somewhere at a great distance Russian infantry shot at these planes as was usual in 1914, because we saw bullets fall around us although we could not hear any shooting. I remained in place until the specified time and then ordered the regiment commander to retreat to Czarnystok, where our division sectors at least managed to rest a bit on the afternoon of September 10. On September 11 the division was ordered to head west to the town of Frampole.

On the morning of September 11 the division headed out in two columns from Gorajec and Czarnystok. About 14.00 the columns reached Vola-Radzienska, where the enemy had demolished the bridges over the Lada River. Although the river was small, it flowed through a marshy valley and without a road and bridge neither horses nor wagons could get across it. The field engineers began to construct a bridge. Scouts were sent out to look for alternate routes and bridges but they did not find any standing bridges in the area. There was nothing we could do

other than wait for the field engineers to finish their work. We reached the town of Frampole in the evening dusk. We did not meet the enemy but did find some war materiel that was not of great value — like wagons taken from the Austrians and Russians (2nd Grenadier division).

We received the next day's orders during the night as usual. I was to go east to the Zvezineca region. On September 12 we left early in the morning and by evening dusk the regiments were in position. The march was lengthy, the regiments had to go about 30 kilometres. It was rainy, the road was bad.

On September 13 we went on to the Juzefova region fairly easily. Headquarters was set up in the manor. We finally had the opportunity to enjoy some of life's comforts after a very long time of having done without any. This was especially enjoyable because it rained all day.

On September 14 we were ordered to go straight south, practically to the Austrian border to the region of Obsza and Wola-Obszanska. In the morning shortly before we were to set off we received a telegram from corps headquarters notifying us about the total defeat of German armies on the western front in the battle at the Marne. We immediately passed this news on to the regiments to lift their spirits. I must add that prior to this day we had received no news of what was going on at the German French front. Likewise, we did not know anything about what was going on at the other Russian fronts. The only news we received about Russian fronts was that of great victories in Galicia (Russian 3rd and 8th armies) and once we received news about the invasion of Prussia by the Russian 1st Army. We did not know that the Russian 2nd Army was annihilated, nor that the 1st army had long since been driven out of Prussia. Maybe that is for the best, we had less to worry about.

After a long arduous march we arrived at our night stop late in the evening. Tomorrow we would continue the march into Austrian territory.

On September 15 our division crossed the line that marked the Russian Austrian border at the time. The border crossing did much to lift our spirits. Up until now the war had taken place in Russian territory, now we had invaded enemy territory. The enemy did not do anything to deter us.

Therefore, the enemy had been so beleaguered that they could no longer defend their territory. Since there was no activity along the border in peace time, there was a 1 verst zone on both sides without a road — we had to cross the fields to get to the nearest road. The fog had been very thick in the morning, but by the time we reached the border the fog cleared and we had a beautiful sunny autumn day. Although we had not seen any Austrians the previous day, we expected that we

would be greeted with gunfire from every house, every wooded spot. That is why we crossed the border in a state of battle readiness. Much to our surprise everything was silent and deserted: the first houses closest to the border had been abandoned. In houses farther from the border we ran into a few very old people who left the impression that they were very afraid. It should be noted that the people living on the Russian side (the southern part of Lublin today) as well as on the Austrian side on the right bank of the San River were of Russian Ukrainian heritage and this area is very poor and underdeveloped. The Austrian cultural situation was striking: the maps showed small roads, in reality they were highways; forests had been planted, the underbrush cleared; the cultural level was higher than that on the Russian side.

The destination of today's march was not far, we reached it at about noon — the village of Dzikow, very dirty and poverty stricken. It was obvious, that the local economy was in the hands of the Jews, and along with that the Jews also set the rules, the farmers would bow to the Jews. Headquarters was set up on the top floor of a shop — one of the best buildings. Corps headquarters was set up at the opposite end of town. One of our regiments was moved forward about 4 versts as a defence precaution, the others remained in the vicinity of Dzików. We knew nothing about the enemy nor about our further orders. The orders to move on could have come at any moment, but we wound up staying there for three days. The next morning it turned out that our soldiers had stolen some items from the shop downstairs — some sugar and a few other things. Our search for the culprit was unsuccessful.

Our advance guard regiment, the 17th division's advance guard unit, supplemented by artillery, was ordered to move more forward and take the crossings over the Lubaczówka River. After noon the regiment reported that the Lubaczówka River had been taken by the enemy. The battle continued until evening, reports came in but they were rather unclear. We received orders for September 17 to take one brigade and artillery battalion and attack and take the crossings on the Lubaczówka River — and cross over to the other side. Brigade commander General Bem was the one who received this order, division headquarters remained in Dzikow. In Dzikow we kept ourselves busy with catching imaginary spies. That is a very common thing during war: there are always hotheads who are convinced that they see spies around every corner.

In Dzikow I received a severe reprimand from corps commander General Gorbatovski due to the fact that the telephone used to communicate with the corps headquarters often does not work because the telephone cables are positioned in such a way that they are easily damaged. At the time I did not pay much attention to

the reprimand, but later I found myself in a very precarious position regarding this same issue. Even back then Russian field regulations stated that communication was to take place from the top down — i.e. from the corps to the division, but corps headquarters demanded that we communicate with them. I was the aide-de-camp of the division headquarters and as such I was the one and only headquarters assistant and operations officer, so putting in telephone lines was not my main concern, since there were always more pressing things that needed attending to: make out orders, organize scouting patrols, discussions with the regiment commanders, reports to the corps headquarters, etc. In addition, I never thought that a good corps commander would even think to worry about how correctly or incorrectly telephone lines were installed and who was guilty in this situation. Division commanders are subordinate to the corps commander but the division headquarters aide-de-camp is not; he has his own superior — the division Chief of Staff. In reality: if the commander is not in his place and does not know how to deal with his direct subordinates, he deals with secondary things, this is called “trinciks” in the Russian army. If a soldier who at one time has been a company or battalion commander, but has not taken the time to educate himself past the company and battalion level, then as commander of a division or a corps, he does only what he has been used to doing as company or battalion commander.

In the afternoon of September 17 we had to leave Dzikow to be closer to the battle zone where the advance brigade was fighting. The battles at the Lubaczówka River proved that the army no longer wanted to wage battle. Reports about enemy fire came in, our artillery was exhibiting slow fire. Although we had hardly any losses, we were proceeding very slowly. We were outside all day, we received reports, heard occasional firing, but actually no one was doing anything serious. In the evening we moved to a small village near the Lubaczówka River, since our regiments had actually driven out the Austrians, or perhaps it is more accurate to say — the Austrians had left. The next morning it became clear that we had captured 6 cannons. Since both the 17th division regiment and our troops had waged the battle, they decided to split the gains in half. These were old style cannons; the Austrians most likely had set them up in position, but since they were not harnessed, they simply abandoned them.

The next day as we examined the Austrian positions, it was concluded that the Austrian army had really been overwhelmed: positions as well-planned as these could not have been taken without severe losses if they had been somewhat seriously defended. Our advance sectors were immediately sent on to the San River, the division headquarters moved to Radawa. We did not run into the enemy

on our way to the San River, but it was slow going nevertheless. It turned out that the left bank of the San had been taken by the enemy. The river had risen considerably following the autumn rain and it was impossible to cross it. We went to the edge of the water and looked across. The field engineer battalion with their small portable bridge could only carry the scouts across. We would have remained sitting on the banks of the San for lord knows how long, if we had not received news that the 3rd army sectors had crossed the San and taken Jaroslaw. The 3rd army got across, but we did not since our field engineers could not build a bridge across the river. We began walking along the San from Radawa to Wiązownica, Nielepkowice and Manasterz, where the battalion was building a bridge across the San because the enemy had left.

On September 19 we moved to a destroyed manor on the bank of the Lubaczówka River not far from the estuary of this river into the San. When we had somewhat settled in and thought to spend the night, we received new orders: we were to group near Manasterz and prepare to cross the San River. We spent the night riding and driving, giving orders and searching for regiments. We only managed to sleep a bit just before dawn. September 20 had been set as the date for crossing the San and positioning in the Przeworsk region. The bridge was not very far away so we could start crossing early in the morning. The entire corps had to cross the river on one pontoon bridge. Thanks to the fact that all of the High Command was present at the bridge and the crossing was very well organized, it proceeded in exemplary fashion. Around 13.00 both divisions had crossed. From here to Przeworsk was about an 18 kilometre march and the road was good. Life was much better here on the left bank of the San — beautiful brick and stone houses, lush fields and gardens, good roads, but we did not meet any of the local inhabitants, just as had been our experience on the right bank. Immediately after crossing the river we once again expressed amazement about the strong Austrian positions that the Russians had managed to take so easily.

Our destination — Przeworsk — a small town on the Mleczna River, the right tributary of the Wisłoka River; inhabitants had abandoned this town as well. There were a couple hundred people left in the town and they joyfully greeted us saying: "Thank God we have finally been sent a regular army to free us from looting and murder." It seemed that prior to our arrival the Cossacks had made themselves at home here and they had stolen valuables and demanded money under the threat of being shot. That most likely went on for only a few hours, because the town did not really leave the impression of having been ransacked. It seemed that the local inhabitants had left the town not more than 24 hours before our arrival. Our



division headquarters settled into one of the best houses — the local prosecutor's apartment with about 8 - 10 rooms. In this apartment everything looked as if the people who lived here had just left: the rooms were neat and tidy, everything was left behind, with the likely exception of valuables. The clock on the wall was still working, the beds were made, the tea service was on the table in the dining room, as if it had just been used to serve tea. It was very, very pleasant to be in a beautiful, clean apartment, to eat dinner and drink tea from nice clean dishes at a table covered with a white tablecloth. We remained in Przeworsk for three days and truly enjoyed the rest and relaxation in favourable circumstances. There was plenty to do during the day, since we had to take care of everything that due to continual marches and battles had been put off to be done later.

We did, however, devote one evening to ourselves — complete relaxation and fun with the help of the local wine and that which we had brought along from Zamość. We spoke candidly and openly about events we had experienced both in the past as well as the current situation, we also talked about our hopes and wishes for the future. All of us were totally convinced that the war was nearly over and that perhaps we would celebrate Christmas in peace this year. This conclusion was logical given the information we had: the Austrian army was totally defeated — there was no doubt about that, just as we had no reason to doubt the official information about the defeat of the German army at the Marne. There was not the least bit of information about any setbacks on the French or Russian front. In general, I was fairly sceptical about the French and Russian victories. My scepticism was based on the fact that I had followed the scientific and practical activities of the German General Staff for many years, and I do not believe they would have been involved in a war that would end with German defeat in such a short time. In the current situation, however, I had no reason to doubt that the Austrians and Germans were utterly defeated and thus, we would soon experience peace. That is why we did a lot during the three days at Przeworsk and began to prepare for a life of peace. We sent the things we did not need to Brestlitovsk, put all our daily journals and other documentation in order, sent off some personal items, but mainly our thoughts were occupied by how to transition to peace time and how to continue life in peace time rather than preparing for the continuation of war.

Our advance guard had not run into the enemy anywhere these entire three days. Nor did we receive news from corps headquarters regarding the enemy or the circumstances of our neighbours.

On September 23 we continued our march west. On the way we stopped at a beautiful town called Łańcut with its beautiful old Polish count's castle, which

the Austrian emperor had visited fairly often. The officers were allowed to tour the castle. At that time the castle, with its library and some ancient monuments, was guarded by the XIX corps security force. I found out later that various rear units had been stationed here and they had fully taken advantage of the castle.

Our destination was the region of Albigowa about 23 km from Przeworsk. Division headquarters was set up in the manor. As we entered Austria we started to experience a shortage of tobacco, because there was no tobacco in Austria nor was there any for sale. I was quite happy that I found cigars and a bit of Russian cigarette tobacco at the manor. Local inhabitants had abandoned Albigowa and only a few elderly men and women stayed behind. Our scouts reported that they had found an automobile in a factory about 10 versts from Albigowa. The Chief of Staff and I took the headquarters car and drove to the specified location and found the automobile with one front wheel missing, which had most likely been hidden. We were not able to find it anywhere and we had to leave the automobile behind and return empty handed. In the evening our security sector sent 10 inhabitants to see us; they had tried to break through security lines and head toward the Austrians. Upon interrogation it turned out these were Austrian National Guardsmen who had recently received mobilization orders, but they were late and thus stopped by our army. At first this was meaningless news, I even thought that we had arrived so quickly that we had disrupted Austrian mobilization. Later that evening, however, giving the incident more thought, I arrived at a different conclusion. A mobilization of the 2nd category National Guard had not been planned in either Russia or Austria along with the first mobilization, therefore, the Austrians had mobilized their 2nd category National Guard just recently, in other words, when they had made the decision to retreat from Galicia. This circumstance points to the fact that the Austrian Chief of Staff had not lost his head and did not accept the fact that the Austrian army was totally defeated; quite the opposite — they were organizing forces for continued war activity. When I shared these views with my direct superior division Chief of Staff Colonel Agapeev, he tried to prove I was wrong, as usual, but it was obvious that this event also caused him second thoughts.

The following day, September 24, we continued marching southwest and stopped in the Blazowa area. Division headquarters was set up in the schoolhouse of the tiny village. That afternoon our advance guard had run into the enemy to the west; the enemy had shown “serious” resistance and according to our advance guard, had counter attacked. Division headquarters did not believe the report. Orders were given to take the abandoned areas and the artillery were ordered to

support the effort. It was clear that our army no longer wanted to be involved in a serious attack. All signs indicated that the Austrians were retreating and were no longer able to stand a battle; if they had to report the serious resistance of the enemy and even a counter attack, it was clear that our heroes no longer want to wage battle. This proved to be right when it became known that only two Austrian divisions had been operative on the right bank of the Dunajec River against the Russians. Therefore, the above mentioned encounters had been with the Austrian cavalry.

By evening it was clear that the enemy had been forced back and the following day we went farther to the southwest to a poverty stricken village the name of which I cannot remember. Again we set up headquarters in the school. To the south we could see the heights of the Carpathian Mountains. We were located in a river valley. There were no more encounters. I glued together a map as far as Kraków, which was the direction we were to continue in. Humans think, but God acts. This was the second time I had prepared maps for one route, but we were ordered to continue the march in a different direction. Late on the evening of September 28 we received orders to continue our march to the north, not to the west which is the direction I had taken into consideration when preparing my maps. The corps orders did not define any circumstances nor further objectives, only roads that we were to take and locations we were to stop at. We had to figure out our existing situation and further objectives ourselves. Being optimistic by nature, and sensing optimism in the others, we decided that too many armies had been brought into the region between the Wisła River and the Carpathian Mountains — the 4th, 5th and 3rd armies; it was necessary to remove some corps from this narrow front line and move them in a different direction. It is with these thoughts that we began our march to the north on September 28, although we had hoped to go west to Krakow. After a long and arduous march it was already dark when the division headquarters reached their location in the village of Kraczkowa. The march had been long and arduous along bad roads, the regiment finally reached their night stop in complete darkness. We continued our march north on September 29 still not knowing anything about circumstances or our objectives. Division headquarters reached their destination — the city of Sokołów — in the dark. As we neared Sokołów, we, inhabitants of flat lands, were pleased that we had left the mountains and were back on level terrain. Accommodations were good and warm in Sokołów, but we had to continue the march north the next day, September 30. The situation seemed suspicious, but due to our exhaustion there was no time to ponder this further. Our only thought and our only task was to carry out the orders given by corps commander to our division correctly and precisely.

In subsequent years and even up to the present, the issue of whether or not corps headquarters acted correctly by not providing division commanders information about the current overall situation is still a controversial issue. I felt corps headquarters was right in doing so. If we had already known on September 27 that the 5th Army was being rerouted to the north because the north flank was in danger, I feel we would not have executed all the difficult marches for the simple reason that we would not have felt like victors. That is why I still agree with General Suvorov when he said that every soldier needs to know his tactical manoeuvres, but only his, not those of his commanding officers.

On September 30 we had to march from Sokółów, north to the San River in the Kopki region. Division headquarters was set up in the village of Kopki, the regiment in the surrounding area. The terrain was beautiful and it was pleasant to stay put even though division headquarters was set up in a totally demolished manor. This was the location of Austrian positions in the beginning of September; some battles had been fought here as well, at least some artillery battles.

On October 1 we continued our march from Kopki through Rudniki to Ulanowa where we had to cross the San to the right bank. The march was not long, only about 16 km and the bridge across the San. October 1 was a beautiful autumn day. I met with the Chief of Staff in the village of Rudniki, where he had arrived by automobile and I on horseback. He had found several telephones which he placed in his car. I protested, but he referred to his experience in the Russo-Japanese War saying that any instrument of communication is useful during wartime and even the old style telephones would come in handy. Even though the old telephones were of no use to us, Colonel Agapeev's principle that everything can be useful in wartime, however, was of great value to us and now I strongly adhere to this principle: every possible means should be used when waging war, if it is not of any use, no harm has been done, but if it is useful, it will be very beneficial — thus no instrument or means should be belittled saying it "might" be useful.

During the march from Kopki to Ulanów, corps headquarters demanded to know, as they had done up until now, how our defence was set up: as in an attack march, a retreat march or a flank march. The commander asked us a question that we needed to pass on to our commander but we felt uneasy doing so. We did not, however, feel uneasy about responding — we reported that we are carrying out the orders given by the corps. We did not know anything about the enemy so initially we marched in rear guard fashion, then as in a flank march and if we are to continue the march until morning, we will do so in attack fashion. We did not receive any response from corps headquarters to our report.

One of the organizational mistakes of the Russian Army was the fact that corps Staff officers were younger and less experienced than the division headquarters aide-de-camp; the corps Staff youngest officers conversed with the corps commander and used his name to cover all his activities. This faulty organization brought a lot of malice into battle activity. It is human nature to fully trust the people with whom there is a lot of contact, not considering how capable these people are. Thus, it should be forbidden to have a system in which the high commander directly converses and discusses issues with officers who are his subordinates, who receive orders from the high commander. The corps commander can hear out only his Chief of Staff, but under no circumstances his aides-de-camp. The respective aides-de-camps (in division headquarters to the division commander, in corps headquarters to the corps commander) can only play the role of intelligent valet to their unit commander, but not the role of advisor. In case the commander is unable, the only advisor can be the Chief of Staff, but under no circumstances the aide-de-camp or another Staff officer.

For the first time in my life my car slid into a ditch as I was driving from Ulanova to Wólka-Tanewska, but thanks to the fact the car bounced off a tree on the side of the road, nothing bad happened and I reached my destination.

On October 2 the division's assignment was to move to Modliborzyce along with Staff and the division sectors were to remain in the vicinity of this village. In the beginning we had to traverse Austrian territory, cross the former Russia Austria border and then traverse former Russian territory. There were no roads on either side of the border zone. The first part of the march in Austrian territory to Domostawa went very well. From Domostawa we had to march about 10 km along the Austria Russia border in order to avoid the marshy region known as "Bagna-Emilino". This part of the march was extremely arduous: we wasted our time searching for border markers, and if we did find any Colonel Agapeev knocked them over, thus making it impossible to find the road. Overcoming extreme difficulties we finally managed to reach the Russian village of Gwizdów and then continued along roads every bit as bad as those we had just travelled and only in the evening dusk did we reach our destination — the village of Modlibozica. This village was located in Russian territory in a marshy and forested roadless region. The streets of the village were covered by no less than a half foot deep layer of mud. At first I set up my position together with the Chief of Staff, but later I needed to do some work at the other end of the village and I did not dare to come back in the dark of night. In the morning the Chief of Staff told me I had missed out on a lot of good stuff last night, there had been so much good stuff that he could not finish

it by himself. Nevertheless, I was sure that it was better to miss out on some fun than to wade through that thick mud.

On October 3 we were to move to the town of Krasnik, a place I knew quite well from peace time horseback riding trips. It rained heavily all day. As long as we were marching over sandy terrain the rain did not bother us but as we neared the Krasnik region with its fertile fields of clay soil, it was difficult to move forward even on horseback. I rode into Krasnik with the mud up to my horse's knees; I was afraid he might trip and I would end up in the mud. In Krasnik on the street in the heavy rain I met the Rotmistrz Ivaschenko of the Kinburg dragoon regiment. He told me everything he could about recent events and that he now was stationed as communications officer at the 9th Army's headquarters (Lechitski). Struggling considerably we managed to settle in. Headquarters did not experience any difficulties, but the Chief of Staff Colonel Agapeev, who was interested in everything, was now concerned about food delivery. The quarter master of our division, compared to others, was exemplary; however, after our division had been marching in the direction of Krakow and now was turned 90 degrees in the opposite direction, the entire rear of the division and corps was in a very precarious position. Our bakehouses were not able to deliver us bread — our bread was given to other sectors. The division had subsisted on dried bread for the last several days, and stomach disorders were starting to surface. Try as hard as he might, the quarter master was powerless to do anything. At the time the 9th army headquarters (Lechitski) and rear authorities were stationed in Krasnik.

As soon as we arrived in Krasnik Colonel Agapeev said to me: "We have no bread, let's go to the 9th army headquarters, perhaps we can wheedle some out of them." I went with him as a witness, not really understanding what I would have to do. Agapeev began at the bottom with the lower ranked officers: "Give us some bread, it has been 10 days since we have had fresh bread," they refused. Thus Colonel Agapeev and I approached increasingly higher ranked officers until we got to the commander of the 9th army General Lechitski. Colonel Agapeev tried to make General Lechitski understand that the 38th division had no bread and it was necessary for the 9th army to provide bread from its bakehouses. General Lechitski responded that his army has not had any bread for five days to which Colonel Agapeev responded that the 38th division had been without fresh bread for 10 days.

While Colonel Agapeev was arguing one of the 9th army quarter masters came in with a report that the 150th regiment of the 5th Army had robbed one of the 9th army's bakehouses, taking most of the bread that had been baked. The 150th

regiment is one of the regiments of our division. Agapeev responded immediately and said: "Is it possible to accuse and punish soldiers who have gone without bread for 10 days after their heavy marches and now, smelling the aroma of freshly baked bread, take their portion; the guilt really lies with those who have been unable to ensure the soldiers on the front lines with their deserved portion of bread." General Lechitski as a practical person without any special knowledge was convinced by these arguments; he not only ordered that the robbing of the bakehouse by the 150th regiment be forgotten, but ordered that the 9th army bakehouses supply the 38th division with fresh bread for three days. This was a very gratifying and flattering turn of events for the 38th division. I felt, however, that the 9th army was having the same sort of problems with bread delivery. In this particular case I only saw that an energetic person with correct and resolute control can achieve anything where there is no system and no set order.

On October 4 we continued the march to Niedrzwica. It was a rainy October day. The road from Krasnik to Lublin had already existed in peace time, it was completely rutted and was to be repaired. Rocks for the repair work had already been delivered, but the road itself was turned into an impassable river in 1912; all movement took place along the edge, not along the road. Therefore, as we started the march from Krasnik to Lublin, I felt we would wind up in insurmountable difficulty. As it turned out, the Austrians had covered the road in thick planks in August 1914. The mud on the road was about one foot deep, but there was a firm foundation underneath. Our wagons took the road and the army moved along the edge of the road, because even the ploughed fields were not as muddy as the road was.

On the way to Lublin we saw battle sites of 1914. We wondered once again how the Austrians had dared to attack such solid and strong positions and why the Russians had let such strong positions slip through their fingers.

## **Strategic Problems After the Experiences of the World War**

Strategy as a concept does not have a universal definition. Clausewitz called his classic strategy "About war", but in this book he defines strategy as "the use of the battle"; some military authorities define strategy as "war activity in the theatre of war". Moltke referred to strategy as "a system of help". Some countries do not use the term "strategy" when describing a subject of study: in France it is called large



group tactics, in Germany it is called waging war and leading war. I will hold with the latter nomenclature and division of the subject.

There are so many different circumstances of war activity that two identical situations do not occur, and even if the situation would for some reason would occur twice, the people involved are different and elements of chance would be different, thus the results of the activity would be different. It is clear that even though waging war occurs on the basis of certain principles, these principles cannot be applied as one would apply a mathematical formula: their application is always directly related to existing conditions. A strategy provides both principles and laws of waging war and war leadership; they are by their nature very simple and easy to understand, but their practical application is very difficult, because there are countless conditions that can be correctly assessed only after the fact — after the war operations. This explains the appearance of numerous critics following a war; after a war, when conditions on both sides are known, the entire operational process on both sides is known, and the results of the activities of both sides are known, critics exhibit a total ignorance of waging war. If the conditions are assessed incorrectly, the theory of waging war is of little use. A very frequent phenomenon is the appearance of gentlemen during peace time who consider themselves to be great war leaders simply because they had experienced some success during a war as commanders of a small unit, after the war they read a few popular and biased articles about the past war, but in reality they have never tried to command larger units during war or peace time; they are convinced, however, that for them waging a war would be child's play.

Some military authorities have expressed the opinion that military academies should not offer a course in the theory of waging war; each individual should arrive at his own basic principles of waging war by studying the history of war and observing military manoeuvres and deeply pondering what has been learned. I cannot agree with this approach: first of all, in order to draw conclusions about the basics of waging war from the history of war and military manoeuvres, it is important that the individual be mature and have an extensive theoretical and applied military education; second, not everyone has the opportunity to study the history of war (lack of time, lack of books, etc.), and third, everyone will read their favourite authors, thus their studies will be biased and each individual will have principles based on those of the authors he has read.

The unity of principles is of utmost importance in waging war. Thus, it is necessary to teach the theory of waging war, albeit in an abbreviated version, as a separate subject.

Following each major war the principles of waging war are re-evaluated: for example, a basic principle — if one column has run into the enemy, neighbouring columns must support this column without orders from the high command; previously this was done by neighbouring columns leaving their route and rushing directly to help the column in danger; nowadays this is done by the neighbouring columns continuing along their route at a greater speed thereby threatening the enemy by deeply enveloping it. The use of each country's theory of waging war depends on the country's army, leaders, the enemy, its own national characteristics, its wealth, industry, geographical position, roads, etc. Thus, the principles of waging war used by another country cannot be implemented in Latvia unchanged. It is not sufficient, however, that we learn the theory of waging war deemed right for Latvia. It is necessary to study the theory of waging war used by neighbouring countries and especially the theories implemented by the super powers, so that by comparing all of these theories we can intelligently assess the correctness and suitability of ours.

It is not necessary for a soldier to delve into the history of war back to its origins in order to learn about the principles of waging war. To do so would mean devoting his entire life to the history of war or basing his opinions on the information given by a single war historian, in which case the soldier's studies would be biased and less than thorough. It is sufficient to begin the study of the history of war with the era of Napoleon I, yet especially close scrutiny should be paid to the World War from 1914-1918 and the Russo-Japanese War from 1904-1905. As a soldier begins his study of the history of war, it is necessary to receive explanations, otherwise his conclusions will be biased and partial, and the army will lose its doctrinal unity. Doctrinal unity must already be taken into consideration in peace time in war games, field trekking and manoeuvres: during war time it is advantageous to have all commanders follow one, albeit imperfect, theory, rather than each commander following his own, possibly excellent, theory. The person who is learning the theory of war but who has not studied the history of war in depth has to accept many principles based on faith, but that is not detrimental and will be helpful in finding the right approach to the study of the history of war.

According to Clausewitz, the greatest problem with the application of war waging principles is the fact that in war circumstances these principles tend to be forgotten: thus, it is vital that they be reviewed every once in a while during peace time.

## War as a Phenomenon of Human Life

All countries have had permanent foreign ministers and ambassadors in other countries for centuries; the objective of foreign ministers and ambassadors is to peacefully regulate mutual relations with countries and mainly, to resolve all disputes peacefully. It was common to convene international court of arbitration conferences. Following the World War the League of Nations was established with the objective of preventing war forever; if they are not successful in doing so peacefully, they can resort to eliminating war by using weapons, that is, war. In spite of the good intentions of this train of thought, but at least today, it is impossible to implement in real life. We also could observe the same problem after the World War and establishment of the League of Nations. It was by war that Ireland got away from England, Turkey drove the Greeks out of Asia Minor and their allies out of Constantinople, Italy took over Greek owned Korfu, the Moroccan rebel's waged war against France and Spain for several years, the Syrians did the same against France. It is precisely at this time that conditions can develop in any country making war inevitable, if only it is possible: there are conditions that can be improved only by war, because the only other alternative is the decline or even death of a nation or country. First of all, nationalistic ideas have developed quite intensely in our era: if a country has been a part of another, it can gain freedom and independence only by means of war. The nations that were newly established after the World War gained their independence thanks to war. Spheres of dominance and competition (Russo-Japanese War) also play an important role. Secondly, war is inevitable when the economic interests of a country have been offended. Europe is so densely populated it cannot rely on the manufacturing of its countries especially food products. In order to be able to purchase other countries' production, one has to sell one's own production: competition for more advantageous markets arises along with colonization and, on the other hand, competition for natural resource sites. Each and every country and its people have the right to exist under the sun — to use the riches and benefits of the earth. If one country has gained a lot or has stopped another country from getting the riches of the earth, it is understandable that the first country will not relinquish its right to what it has gained, but what can the second country do? Let its people famish and perish, or attempt to get the necessary lands when the opportunity to do so arises? In situations like this, when a country's economic interests are at issue, war is always inevitable; the beginning of war is simply a question of the presence of an opportune moment. Neither a court of arbitration nor the League of Nations will be able to prevent war, because

they do not have real power — an army. The League of Nations assumes that they will be successful in convincing all countries to delegate a certain number of armed forces to them. This type of army could prevent war between two small nations, but if there is a threat of war between two super powers, as was the case during the World War, that type of army will not exist because neither of the hostile countries will contribute their soldiers to a League of Nations army, they will keep all of their soldiers to have a better chance of defeating the enemy. War is a continuation of politics, only by different means (Clausewitz).

The best means of keeping peace is to be militarily strong; the strong get attacked less frequently than the weak. The stronger the country the bigger the onus on the attacker making it more difficult to make the decision start a war. Militarily weak countries surrounded by militarily strong countries have always been the reason for any outbreak of war (militarily weak Korea was the reason for the Russo-Japanese War).

The best military organization is one that, in the event of war, turns over all men able to bear arms and all material and intellectual means to the army in the name of national defence. All citizens, including women, able to bear arms must act as if mobilized for action, not as profit oriented traders or manufacturers; all state and municipal institutions must follow the same rules as the army, but not on the basis of a 6 or 8 hour work day. It is completely wrong to think that during war only one group of citizens and one part of material means get used for national defence; during a time when the very issue of a nation's life or death is being decided, everything must be sacrificed for the cause. Neither the socialists nor the communists deny this principle of waging war, but they insist that war should not be waged between countries or nations, but rather between classes of people — between workers and the unemployed on the one hand, and the so called "bourgeois" on the other hand, although socialist and communist leaders are no less wealthy and proud than the "bourgeois". The national military organization is largely dependent on the constitution as well as the social transformation of a nation. Today there exist three main types of war organization. First — the conscription system, which means that one group of soldiers are part of a permanent military service and make up the school that all men capable of bearing arms must go through; these same men make up the skeleton of army organization during war time; the mobilized and the trained supplement this skeleton. This conscription system is the most widespread. Its strength depends on the number of staff and the length of mandatory military service during peace time. Second — a militia army, in which permanent staff is very small and men capable of bearing arms are

called in for several shorter training periods rather than one uninterrupted period of service. This type of military service can be used only by those countries whose geographical position (mountains, the sea) can protect them from quick invasion and guarantees a longer time for carrying out mobilization and organizing army units. Third — recruited armies; recruited armies are appropriate only for those countries that do not need much of a dry land army: England, whose defence is based on a military fleet, the USA, who does not have any militarily strong neighbours; in addition, recruited armies do not allow mobilization to be carried out and they are very expensive.

Conscripted armies and militia armies calls for arming an entire nation (the nation in arms idea). During the second half of the World War (1917-1918) we saw that with today's technical capabilities an armed nation can no longer be applied as proclaimed by von der Goltz at one time. At that time it was thought that victory depends only on the number of soldiers (with the same arms and training). Today's technical equipment requires rigorous training and extreme moral strength. That is why the army was divided after 1917: attack divisions (Germany) and technical arms branches were made up of the best soldiers, who were thoroughly trained, while the position and secondary divisions were made up of older men with less rigorous training. In France the attack divisions and technical arms branches were made up of Frenchmen, while the static and secondary divisions consisted mainly of colonial soldiers. Today's technical weaponry army requires outstanding training and high moral standards.

### **The Special Characteristics of Today's Wars**

If we compare the wars of today with those of the 17th or 18th centuries, there is a considerable difference. First of all, back then wars were waged by rulers, completely ignoring the will of the people and sometimes their own national interests. Now nations wage war, although the opinions of the people often are artificially created by the government and other influential groups: England joined the World War only after receiving approval from parliament, they took advantage of the fact that Germany disregarded the neutrality of Belgium. In the USA the government and the people were affected by financiers. Germany was cut off from the USA and could not buy anything there nor take out loans. Germany and England, however, had incurred a great number of debts in the USA. When Russia began preparing for the revolution it was clear that it would leave the fighting,

and if Russia left the war Germany would win: France would have to pay out its contribution so the USA would not receive any repayment — therefore, the USA had to help France win. Second, today's wars set large and distant goals; goals in former wars were taking a fort or annexing a small province. By contrast today's goals include destruction of another country or incapacitating it so that it cannot continue developing and it has to lag behind its neighbours. The English Boer War ended with the destruction of two existing republics. In the Russo-Japanese War, if Russia would have won, Japan would have had to give up its role as a super power and its size would seriously impede the growth of its population and it could no longer be militarily strong. Since the goals of war today are so enormous, it necessarily takes a longer time to prepare for war — many years both politically (domestic and foreign politics) and militarily. Since the goals of war today are very important, war itself is very serious: victories are gained only in decisive battles, not by manoeuvring to the enemy's rear.

The meaning of today's wars is either a fight of convenience or to the death: the goal of war is to totally erase the enemy from political maps or the enemy's total destruction. It is no longer the Middle Ages when the goal of war was the taking of a province or a fortress. If we look at the Middle Ages from a historical perspective, wars in a truly military political aspect, were a preparation for today's battles among nations. Even in recent wars we see that diplomats view wars differently than military individuals do. If the most outstanding of European diplomats Prince Bismarck would have heeded the demands of military individuals in 1871, the situation with Germany in 1914 would have been considerably different. People in German military circles in 1871 demanded that the Balfour fortress be annexed by Germany: after a bit of haggling Bismarck agreed to let France keep it. If the Balfour fortress would have been in German hands in 1914, the strategic directions taken would have been different as well. If the greatest European diplomat had made such mistakes, it is even more likely that average diplomats would do so: diplomats do not take military individuals into consideration in spite of the fact that diplomats exert pressure on military individuals to wage war.

If a war is lost, however, it is the military war leaders rather than diplomats who are blamed. Considering today's conditions, a war with an insignificant goal is impossible. War can break out based on a reasonable calculation: the enemy's total annihilation or complete suppression so this enemy cannot be the enemy in the future. During the Boer War, England erased two independent republics from the political map; during the World War these republics would have had to send their armies to do the will of England. Following the World War, the victors

created a completely new political map of Europe. This is the best demonstration of what war goals should be. War is no longer an episode of political life as it was in the 18th century; today's war has more far-reaching goals — based on the very existence of a nation or a country. Colonial wars and punitive expeditions are not pertinent here. Pulling everything together, we must conclude that the wars of days gone by did not have such far-reaching goals, but rather were fuelled by narrow political, dynastic or prestigious issues and demands. Beginning in the 19th century, goals became broader — not a ruler's personal goals but the goals dealing with the country's or nation's future. This was evident already in the Boer War, the goal of which was to annex two Boer (Dutch emigrants) republics to England for its commercial needs.

The goal of the Russo-Japanese War: Russian dominance in the Far East on behalf of Russia and on behalf of Japan development of its colonization abilities without which it would never become a super power. As far as the World War is concerned, we can see from the results exactly how far-reaching its goals were. The goals of the World War were not reached in the manner they had been defined by the allies as they were preparing for this war, because the Russian revolution put pressure on Russia to leave the war before it was finished: had there been no Russian revolution, the political map of Europe would look completely different. "War is a continuation of politics only by different means."

If goals as far-reaching as the existence of an entire country are set for wars today, then the entire country's resources must be used to wage war — all of its living and non-living forces; all of the resources of the entire country must be put to use from the very beginning in order to deny the enemy the opportunity to defeat our forces one sector after the other. Even if a large country declares war on a small country, the large country must not begin the war with only a part of its forces; it must mobilize all of its forces in order to gain victory and reach the war goals as quickly and as precisely as possible. The faster and more powerful the blows to the enemy, the quicker the damage to the enemy's morale and they will be willing to accept the victor's peace terms. On the other hand, if the war drags on, the enemy's morale does not suffer and they stand a chance to attract allies — a neighbouring country may join the war. Therefore, small countries, too, must use all of their forces from the very beginning — everything and anything possible must be put to use. If a small country wages war against a large country and has no hope of winning the war, nevertheless, the small country by putting to use all of its possible resources, can possibly drag out the war and try to get additional support from a larger neighbouring country. In 1877 the Russians declared war on Turkey, but did



not mobilize all of their forces: the war dragged on, the Russians incurred severe losses and in the end Russia gained very little from this war; during this time other European super power diplomats had managed to discuss the issue and they did not allow Russia to force Turkey to accept the kind of peace agreement it wanted and could get. Had Russia used all of its resources from the beginning of the war, it would have managed to take Constantinople and dictate the terms of a peace agreement to the Turks.

We see the same action on behalf of Russia during the Russo-Japanese War: Russia did not mobilize its entire army; it participated in battles with small forces, it suffered defeats, the war dragged on so long that unrest broke out in the interior of Russia and in the end the great Russia lost the war.

If we look at the World War, we see that strong frequent blows demoralize enemy forces. In August 1914 when the Germans pummelled the French left flank and the English Army with full force frequent blows; as we now know, the English army commanders wanted to retreat to their base — the port of Calais — rather than go south together with the French Army; it required great effort and pressure to make the English stay together with the French Army. Similarly, the mood of the French 5th Army was totally depressed and discipline suffered as a result (numerous deserters), and it required very severe means to restore the army's discipline.

### **Basic Principles of Warfare Today**

When thinking about waging war, and in practical life getting ready for war, it is necessary to assume that the enemy is acting on the same, if not better, principles than we are; the enemy will try to mobilize a larger force to gain predominance and the first victories, since the greatest result of any victory is the raising of morale in our army, and just as big a fall in morale on the enemy's side.

In today's war the entire length of a country's border turns into a battle field and that is why the army is spread out along the entire border. Nevertheless, neither side in the conflict will spread its forces evenly along the length of the border. They will group more army units in certain key areas with the aim of giving the main blows, and this concentration of forces must be perceived as the main strength of the respective army. At the beginning of war operations it is vital to defeat the main force of the enemy, or at least make sure the battle is not a success for them. Then there is no reason to fear the remainder of the enemy's forces. This is one of

the main principles of today's wars. If a super power wages war against several smaller countries, it will always concentrate its strongest force against the fighting neighbour it perceives as the strongest. However, in relation to the main enemy as well as to other, less important enemies, the super power will never distribute its forces equally: there will be one location for the main goals and greatest strength, and there will be locations for secondary goals and lesser goals. That is why every small country needs to establish its main and secondary goals. Every small country's main goal will be to defeat the enemy's main force grouped against it, or in the worst case, not allow the enemy's main force to gain huge successes. That is the main goal of the initial part of any war.

Practical war experience shows us that secondary operations will have to be carried out to reach secondary goals in order to reach the main goal. As secondary goals are being achieved we must never lose sight of the main goal. At the beginning of the World War Germany's main goal was to attack the left flank of the French army with serious blows, thus driving them to the south and pressing them against the Switzerland-Italy border. In order to reach this goal it was necessary to get through Belgium as quickly as possible: to take Belgian roads and bridges and destroy Belgian resistance. The Germans acted based on the circumstances — they either took Belgian fortresses with a speedy attack (Liege), or if that was not possible, they permanently surrounded the fortresses.

Russia, for its part, had set the crushing of Austria-Hungary as its main goal<sup>16</sup>, but their side goal was to crush the German border, because Russia knew that Germany would send their main forces to the French border. Russia was successful on the Austria-Hungarian front, but in the meantime the side front was not. Russia, fearing that it would lose its prestige, and in order to help France gain success in the west, pulled back their main force from the former main goal and grouped them against a former secondary goal. As a result there were no decisive victories in reaching the first nor the second goal.

If a small country has to wage war against a large country, the small country can set its main goal, at best, to crush the forces left to fight against it (Serbia in 1914 after it had declared war and mobilization, Austria-Hungary had to recall one army from the Serbian front to the Russian front), and at the worst — to hold the enemy at bay without a chance for any great success. In order to gain victory in reaching main goals, a predominance of force is necessary — the same is true tactically — to gain local victory (known as the local victory principle). If we speak

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<sup>16</sup> We will see later how correctly this goal was set.

of predominance, we must be clear about an army's strengths. An army's strength consist of several components: moral strength, discipline, training, education, weapons, amount of war materiel, size in numbers, leadership and others. As war begins, the war commander is not able to quickly alter any one of these components. The army commander can only change the number of soldiers quickly and perhaps enforce some of the other elements of strength. Thus, the only means left for the war commander is to gain numerical predominance in order to reach his main goal: no one can ever really know that his army is the best and that he is a better commander than his counterpart on the enemy's side.

Of course, as we actually prepare for war we will have certain data regarding the enemy's moral strength, training, discipline, armaments, etc. These data must be taken into consideration. These data, however, must not be considered during peace time training (war games, riding expeditions, manoeuvres). During war the war commander can use these data as a last resort. In setting up plans and calculations regarding war activities, we must not base our work on the assumption that our leaders are geniuses; all calculations must be made based on the abilities of an average individual (this is what Moltke said); Napoleon said that there will never be any spare battalion on the battle field. Therefore, in order to crush the enemy the first necessity is numerical predominance. The location where we want and intend to crush the enemy must receive the highest concentration of force. It should be noted that in today's wars the time required to crush the enemy is measured in hours and sometimes even days or weeks. During the preparation for and execution of the main attack, forces must not be assigned to secondary goals. There are two different types of secondary goals: a) those that have or can have an effect on the main attack; b) those that, in the short term, cannot have any effect on the direction of the main attack. In the first case, secondary goals should receive as much attention as necessary to assure that the fight for the main goal is not hindered; in the second case, secondary goals should receive absolutely no attention. After the World War had begun, the German high command had decided to carry out its main attack through Belgium against the French left flank. The secondary goal was the taking of Belgian roads and bridges, which had a tremendous effect on the amount of time it would take to move through Belgium; thus, German forces were used to take the Lutiha fortress and bridges at great risk. By contrast, the German border with East Prussia was considered a secondary goal that did not hinder the defeat of France. When East Prussia was threatened by two Russian armies, however, the German high command took two corps from its right flank (attack flank) and sent them to East Prussia. Had these two corps remained in the German right flank during the

battle at the Marne, the Germans would have without a doubt been victorious, and the fact that the Russian armies had reached the fortified position at the Vistula River would have had no detrimental effect on the German victory.

If we say that in order to reach the main goal, all forces must be concentrated accordingly, that does not mean that these forces need to be grouped in a limited area at a certain time, but rather these forces should receive the appropriate assignment and direction. A basic principle of all wars of today is that grouping of forces in a narrow front line is the exception rather than the rule.

Smaller countries, like ours, with small armies and fairly long borders have to resolve these issues differently than super powers do. The latter manage to group ten times greater forces along their borders. Each reader must consider this issue. We must consider today's communication and traffic capabilities that make it easier to move large military units. In addition, given today's well developed political streams and economic complexities, prolonging war can result in various phenomena in our own as well as the enemy's country. We saw that Russia left the World War not for military reasons, but rather because of internal political factors. Germany, too, was defeated not on the battle field, but in Germany. That is why we must accept the basic principle that today's war is waged not only on the front but also against the entire enemy country; thus, the war results are dependent not only on activities at the front, but also activities within the entire country.

Measures used in today's wars and battles are so powerful that they do not make it possible to gain a quick victory simply because of numerical predominance. If we consider the practice of war, we see that given similar moral, training and material conditions, one unit is capable of doing battle for one whole day with two enemy units. Today's battles take place on broader fronts and require more time than the battles of days gone by. This circumstance allows commanders more time to reach their goals. That does not mean that the war commander and his officers must wait for a certain time, but it does mean that today we cannot expect neither a quick victory nor a quick catastrophe, if only the government is at their best.

In today's wars, even more so than in previous wars, we must in principle accept the fact that each operation reaches its so-called culmination: each operation moves progressively forward successfully for a certain time, then it slows down, and if this downturn is not caught quickly enough, it can just as quickly turn into failure. In Napoleon's march on Moscow in 1812 this culmination point was the battle at Borodino. Napoleon did not notice it coming and continued on to Moscow and as a result, a brilliant victory march turned into an unenviable flight back to France with huge losses having been incurred.

One aspect of today's wars is the effect of the press and propaganda on the activities of war. This is a totally new phenomenon that was not known in the 19th century. We see this phenomenon for the first time during the English Boer War, when William II sent greetings to Boer president Kruger.<sup>17</sup> During the Russo-Japanese War the press was used a lot more widely: the Japanese collected information from the press regarding regrouping of Russian forces and the condition at the front — that is, thanks to the very open Russian press, they received substantial support for their reconnaissance efforts. From the Russian perspective, their stringent censorship did not allow information to be spread about their failures throughout Russia. That was a mistake: the press was censored but letters and personal conversations were not taken into account, so everything always became known but in a more exaggerated fashion. The positions of Russia after the Mukden battles were actually much better than Russians thought.

If the interior of Russia had not been shaken and revolutionized, it would have without a doubt driven the Japanese into the sea, just as they froze the French in 1812. Here the main factors were the press, propaganda and reconnaissance. By the time they were preparing for the World War, all of the super powers were very much aware of what the press was and its significance. That is why we saw that news about war activities and the armies were censored. However, at the beginning of the World War the press was viewed only through a reconnaissance prism: you could collect information about the enemy and with your careless press releases from the front or to the enemy front it was possible to provide important news about the grouping of forces and events at the front. More attention was also paid to personal correspondence to the front and from the front to the interior. Everything was very correct and justified, but it only pertained to reconnaissance. The significance of reconnaissance is great, but during the World War the press played an even greater role in the propaganda aspect.

Prior to the World War, the dominant attitude was that given today's modern transportation, powerful weapons and well-developed international trade and manufacturing relations, war will not last long: if not individual battles, the very continuation of war activity would ruin a country. The World War proved the opposite: not only a state of war, but also continual and intense war activity lasted for almost four years.

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<sup>17</sup> It was only a show of sympathy, but the Boers were elated by this act and their spirits were raised tremendously: the lowly Boers are fighting one of the greatest nations in Europe, but another equally great European super power expresses their greatest acclaim for the Boers.

The reason the war dragged on was the fact that none of the fighting sides gained substantial victories on the battlefield, but the goals of both sides were extremely important for national existence: losing the war meant a country losing its position among other nations and possibly losing its independence. In this situation, of course, the nations involved continued the war until they reached total collapse.

Today war activity can continue intensively or intermittently; that is, after a certain period of intense fighting, a shorter or longer passive period can set in — a mutually agreed upon cease fire. Napoleon waged most of his wars at continuous intensity right up to the signing of the peace treaty; the Franco-Prussian War in 1870-1871 was no exception. During the Russo- Japanese War and the World War intensive fighting was periodically off-set by breaks in the fighting. Continuous intensive fighting can occur when one of the sides gains decisive victories from the very beginning and continues to do so. The reason for continuous victories can either be a numerical predominance (a large country against a small country) or a morally weak enemy lacking adequate armament.

Defeat of the enemy army and invasion of his territory will not force an energetic enemy to accept difficult peace terms. A country with expansive territory and natural obstacles can continue the fight and thus tire its enemy. In 1812 the Russians left Moscow; in 1918 the Germans still had a chance to defend themselves on the banks of the Rhein, but for the internal collapse.

The endurance and perseverance of a country is dependent in large part on the national form of government (monarchy, republic) and its constitution as well as its economic situation (an industrial or agrarian country). The victor must take into account that it is not enough to defeat the enemy army, but he must be strong enough to force the enemy to accept his peace terms. That is why the army's strength and spirit play an extremely important role in the peace treaty process.

## **The Main Methods of Waging War**

In general, there are two methods of waging war: attack and defence — offense and defence. The attacker is the one who makes the decision from the beginning to go forward, seek out the enemy and defeat him; the defender only thinks about how best to resist, at best he can get away without being totally defeated, but he cannot gain positive results. The end result of every defence must be an offense, because only by going on the offensive can any gains result. Therefore, a total defence from

beginning to end should be an exception; this method will be chosen only by the side completely overwhelmed by its sense of weakness and thinks only about how to save themselves from enemy attacks.

That does not mean that in war one side will always be the attacker and the other — the defender. If both sides are fairly equal in terms of force, both warring sides begin on the offensive. Both sides continue fighting on the offensive until one side receives such blows as to lose hope of winning and they move to the defence. Both the central nations as well as the allies, preparing for war, tried to increase their speed of mobilization and transport in order to get an initial power predominance, to invade the enemy's territory, to surprise him and to force him to go on the defence. On the Western front the Germans were on the offensive until the battle at the Marne, then they went on the defensive for some time, but returned to the offense on the Russian front where they continued attacks until the end of December 1914, and after about a one month break, continued until the autumn of 1915. As we can see, offense and defence often change during war, and one side fighting on the offense in one location on one front can switch to a defensive strategy elsewhere. That is why we use the terms "attacker" and "defender" to more clearly assess the fighting sides and their role during a certain period of the war. It should not be assumed, however, that the attacker always attacks and the defender always defends. What is more, the strategic attack and defence should not be confused with the tactical attack and defence. It is wrong to assume that the war commander is always free to choose offense or defence; that is hardly ever the case; the choice of offense or defence depends on higher priorities which determine the method to be chosen.

We should also never forget that war is a continuation of politics, so the method of waging war is dependent on politics. Thus we can say that the choice of offensive or defensive waging of war depends on the circumstances.

### **The Attack — Offense**

The strategic offense arises from national political concerns; politics attempts to set positive goals — provide asylum for individuals living elsewhere by annexing a certain territory, gain new trade routes, etc. The country feels strong enough to reach these goals, feels stronger than its enemy. During the World War, France's goal was to annex Alsace-Lorraine; France, together with England, Russia, Serbia and Belgium, felt strong enough to defeat Germany and Austria.



The objective of the war commander is to make use of circumstances before these circumstances change to benefit the enemy. During the Russian Japanese War, Japanese politics had set taking Kwantun peninsula and gaining Korea in its sphere of influence as Japan's goals. Japan could not feel stronger than Russia, but in the Far East Japan had predominance. Only one railroad, with a minimum capacity, led from the European part of Russia to Manchuria. The objective of the Japanese war commanders was to take advantage of this condition — to defeat the Russians who were in the Far East before Russia could move greater forces from the European part of Russia to Manchuria. During the World War, the objective of the German war commander was to defeat France sooner than Russia and England could manage to group all of their forces in the theatre of war.

The life force of every offensive war activity is speed, mobility, and the element of surprise. The first object of attack is the main force of the enemy. In order to defeat the enemy's main force, you must invade the enemy's land, seek out this main force and persuade them to fight on the invader's terms. That is the beginning program.

The attacker is consumed by the awareness that going forward (attacking) is his necessary and natural condition; this condition summons up much greater energy, courage and determination in his actions than it does on the defence. The attacker is always more active and more motivated than the one who waits — defends himself. The attacker has the desire to find the enemy and attack. This determination makes it easier to find the necessary means and also reduces the chance of errors and delusions. Everyone is clear on the goal, so mistakes can occur only in regards to reaching this goal.

The defender can only finally set his goal after the attacker's forces have appeared.

The main and final goal of war strategy is — to concentrate as much force as possible in the decisive place and time. Being on the attack makes reaching this goal easier: going forward and knowing your intentions is the easiest way to regroup units and achieve cooperation. The defence plan consists of one complete unified system that loses its internal unity as soon as one part of the system ceases to function: if the attacker is successful in one spot, then the entire attack will be successful.

We must also take into consideration the circumstance that the attacker will be able to surprise the defender if he chooses the decisive place and time. As a result of good scouting and circumstantial information the defender might learn of the place of attack, but he will not correctly know all the details. That is why

the attacker can almost always count on the defender not being completely ready in the main attack location. The defender, of course, will have time to correct his mistakes, because today's wars drag on for a long time and today's transportation allows for speedy movement of large military units, but we should not forget that today's theatre of war is very expansive and deep, which is why regrouping takes a longer time; the enemy also will use these same modern means of transportation. Any mistakes made during the first grouping can only be corrected as operations continue.

We should also note the fact that during an attack the army is continually moved to new terrain; regrouping or change of location has a refreshing effect on the army in dire conditions. Change of location has a huge effect on an exhausted army. During the World War, military units that had been sitting in the same positions for a long time, were overjoyed at news of relocation of any kind, even within the same region.

A strategic offense also has its negative aspects. A war of attack demands extreme energy of the army. Attacks demand unmerciful utilization of the army. The attacker is in continuous and perpetual motion — marches — until the goal is reached; no pauses, no breaks, helping laggards or sending for reserves cannot take place because the attacker will lose his advantage if he is compassionate — he will give the defender time to prepare. Armies incur great losses during continual big marches.

The attacker mostly invades the enemy's territory and must delegate some forces to protect his long rear section and transportation lines.

Invasion of enemy land summons up a burst of energy and nationalistic patriotic feeling. In the attacker's land no one is interested in giving everything to the army; the land that is being attacked, on the other hand, will give everything to protect themselves from the attack. Let us recall the establishment of the Latvian Rifle regiments during the World War: the main motivation was to defend themselves against the enemy, although Russia was not the Latvians' homeland. The attacker must always take into account that uprisings are possible in any territory taken by the attacker, and these uprisings are more prone to happen against the long rear section of the attacker's forces rather than the sections at the front. The deeper the attack into enemy territory, the longer the lines of communication and the more forces are required to guarantee functioning of these lines. All of these forces are lost as further attacks are carried out.

During peace time and in our land we perform calculations depending on existing transportation (railroads and roads). In enemy territory these calculations

are worthless, because they are dependent on how much the enemy, upon retreat, is able to incapacitate means of transportation (bridges, tunnels, etc.).

If there are fortified locations in the enemy territory (well organized, so they can be defended with a minimum of force), this again requires taking forces from the reaching of the main goal.

Soldiers are people and people have a well observed trait: if everything is going well — let it go — it is not necessary to expend any additional energy, but it is precisely during attack that this human trait can be catastrophic; the attack requires the utmost in energy from the top to the bottom, as soon as this super energy is lacking, even for a short while, the attack will not be successful.

The attacker must also take into account the political state of affairs: as in real life, so too in war, success tends to generate jealousy. The one who has begun gaining successes instantly gains rivals; no neutral party wants to be in a situation that they could not join in the discussion of peace terms. Legally neutral countries will always try to construct the peace treaty so that it does not give special advantages to the victor. During the World War, in which the USA took part, it did not agree with the terms of the Versailles Peace Treaty. It is very typical that the attacker gains friends and enemies depending on his success. During the World War the king of Romania was in allegiance with the German emperor, so Romania remained neutral for a long time, and had trade relations with both sides. Both fighting sides tried to get Romania to join forces; Romanian diplomats continued discussions about which side would win and it was not until 1916 that Romania joined the allies.

During attack operations one of the main phenomena is the fact that the battle activity is carried out only by the front lines of the attacker: the attacker's advance guard carries out the attack, therefore, the attacker's advance guard suffers the greatest losses. The defender's rear forces get drawn into battle gradually, the attacker's rear forces — only in extreme emergencies. The attacker has to expend his forces in all directions, the defender in only one.

The most important factor in each and every attack operation is — the so-called attacker moves forward, he must delegate forces to protect the rear, not to mention the forces needed to protect and guarantee functioning of communication lines and points. The attacker's forces melt like snow in the spring sunshine.

# SELECTED GENERAL RADZIŅŠ PAPERS PUBLISHED IN MILITARY JOURNALS

## THE MILITARY SITUATION IN LATVIA

(lecture presented at soldier training courses)<sup>18</sup>

### I

When can a farmer safely work in his fields and when can a city dweller safely go to work in the city without fear that he will be accosted by strangers who steal his belongings that he has worked so hard to acquire? I feel that will happen only when all people working illegally are caught and punished. It is not difficult to say what is legal and what is illegal when sitting in your office; it is also not difficult to loudly proclaim that such and such illegal acts are to be punished by such and such punishments. It is, however, very difficult to catch every criminal and to punish him, it is very difficult to force everyone to obey the law. In order to get everyone to obey the law, to ensure all of the inhabitants in a country that they are safe from theft and stealing, a very large organization with a strong armed force is necessary.

We see from examples in other countries that such an organization is needed; there is no cultural nation that does not have an armed organization for the protection of internal peace; it is called the police, the militia, or by some other name. Since these institutions are large everywhere, we understand that there is a considerable amount of criminal behaviour in all nations, and it is only with armed strength that these criminals can be forced to obey the law. Every nation must have a large number of people and expensive institutions that must be maintained to ensure that every citizen feels safe and protected from theft and stealing. If a country chose not to have an expensive police organization, each citizen would be forced to protect his own life and property, but this type of protection would not reach its goal; where there is one security officer, two thieves would attack him and they would be successful. Up to now there has been no nation that could get by without a police organization; this proves that there is no nation that has attained such a high moral standard that all of its inhabitants, without exception, voluntarily obey all rules and regulations. I believe there can be no doubt in anyone's mind

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<sup>18</sup> Latvijas kareivis, (The Latvian Soldier), No. 22, 23, 24 (March 14, 16, 17m 1920).

that to maintain internal peace and order the police are necessary, even though this is quite costly. There is, however, much doubt among some people as to the need for armed forces — the army — for national defence against possible attacks from the outside.

Following the signing of the Versailles Peace Treaty the world was promised eternal, continuous peace. The end of all wars forever! It seems that some of the authors of this appeal believed it would have results. I am convinced, however, that there were not many such believers among the people signing the Treaty. The following are my reasons for this conclusion.

The “eternal peace” slogan used in Versailles came from the USA. As soon as the main advocate of the eternal peace ideal, US President Wilson, returned to the US from Versailles, the US began building a series of fantastic new war ships. Therefore, even the US believed that they would be able to enjoy peace only if they had a strong war fleet. It is well known that it is much more expensive to build and maintain a war fleet than it is to maintain an army on dry land.

The government of England has made the decision to maintain a permanent army consisting of “only” 200,000 individuals. This number does not include, however, the colonial regiments whose numbers were impressive prior to the war and will only increase during the war. Besides, if we take into account that England has a general military service, that they did not have before the war, it is clear that after the demobilization of the army, these 200,000 will be used for war only; should the need arise, England will be able to grow a larger army on this base than they were able to do in 1914. In addition, it is not known at what other time England will decrease the size of its army to 200,000. We must also remember that England is located on an island group that is protected by the mightiest war fleet in the world.

It is not known by how much France is ready to downsize its army following the signing of the Versailles Peace Treaty. It is plain to see, however, that France is not demobilizing its army, which it maintains in very large numbers, which really does not fit with the eternal peace idea at all. The size of France’s army far exceeds the size of their army when France was preparing for war with Germany.

As specified in the Versailles Peace Treaty, Germany must downsize its official army, demobilizing it by sector. In reality Germany has organized a large unofficial army (*Einwohnerwehr*, *Ortswehr* and the like) that exceeds two million men at present.

Soviet Russia also has officially announced that they want peace and are downsizing their army and that some armies have already been turned into work armies. Unofficially it is known that precisely at this moment Soviet Russia is organizing a new army. What else could the promotion of old generals to high

and responsible positions mean? What else could the limitation of commissioners' rights and assignments mean? As far as transforming the army into work armies is concerned, that is happening because all able-bodied men have been mobilized so it is not possible to get workers from any other source than the army. What is more, reliable sources report that changing army units into work armies in no way means that the army is being downsized, but rather certain parts of the army are being put to work. A work army can at any moment be turned into a national army, because each unit's weapons and munitions are not turned over to be warehoused but remain with each unit.

Even if we do not hear unsettling political news, I feel it is enough knowing the above mentioned military situation to safely say that no one is thinking about eternal peace and yet, there is no shortage of political news regarding the fact that no one believes in eternal peace. The above mentioned not only shows us that there is no faith in global peace: if these countries were expecting the possibility of future wars to be as great as that prior to 1914, they would maintain their armies at the size they were before the World War. As we see, however, all these countries are maintaining much larger armies. Does that not show that today's political situation is very unstable, that war could break out anew at any moment and the only way to be protected from danger is to maintain a strong army in a state of complete war readiness? An army is very expensive, but not as costly as the sacrifices that will be incurred if the enemy crosses the border — ravages the land and takes a generous indemnity in the form of money and goods.

## II

What is the cause of this insecure situation that demands all countries to be in a state of constant war readiness? Each country has its so-called life interests; these interests are so important that the welfare of the entire nation and sometimes the possibility of future developments are dependent on them. For example, if all of England's and France's colonies were taken from them, these countries not only could not play a super power role, they would even have to reduce their population because all the inhabitants would not have enough to eat. We do not have to assume that England and France have to lose their colonies; it is enough to assume that trade with these countries would be suppressed, and not even under duress, but simply by independent but powerful competition. This would touch the life interests of England and France in a most painful manner. Following the Versailles Peace Treaty, the life interest issues of many nations remain unresolved, or have been resolved but not in a favourable way: one nation has lost its coal

reserves without which they cannot live, and the loss of which has totally shaken its national economy; another nation has lost its source of petroleum, a third has been divided up among two neighbours, etc. At this point I think it will suffice if I quote a member of the Versailles Peace conference: "Until the Russia issue is not resolved, there will be no peace in the world." The Russia issue has not been resolved nor is there any indication that it will be resolved in the near future. At present the largest segment of the former territory of Russia is under communist rule, which rules with the help of terror and wages war based on international slogans. But this will not last. The communist government has come to the conclusion that it is impossible to disseminate internationalist ideas among countries that have a strong sense of national identity and self-confidence; therefore, the communists want to start peace talks with other countries. This also shows that national ideas are starting to gain the upper hand over internationalism. Of course, we have to wait for all of the nations living in Russia to forget their differences and join under the slogan "one united, undivided Russia." In fact, communists have tried up to now, just like Denikin, to unite the former divided Russia. It would be naive to think that if class hatred ended in Russia and a united government was established, that Russia would voluntarily give up and forget all that it has been fighting for over the past centuries. Will Russia forget that from the 13th to 18th century it waged war to take over the Baltic seacoast? Does Russia need the Baltic Sea any less than it did in the 13th century? In the same way Russia will not forget the many other former out-of-the-way places it gained through difficult wars.

At any rate, the Russia issue will be resolved by war and the only deciding factor will be a powerful army. That is exactly why all nations try to maintain powerful armies. We too are forced to be involved in the resolution of this issue. If we want the issue to be resolved to some degree in our favour, it is of the utmost importance that we organize and maintain a powerful army. An army has helped us gain our freedom and only an army is capable of defending this freedom.

Even if we take a casual look at 1918 and 1919 and notice the new countries that were established, that received their rights and were recognized by other nations, we will see one and the same events everywhere: those who demonstrated strength were lucky, they received their freedom and rights. Very often the diplomats were discussing one thing, but as they were carrying on discussions in their offices, the army did something completely different — and the diplomats had to agree with what had been done. The diplomats could have talked for as long as they liked, but Bermondts was sitting in Jelgava feeling completely calm. He left Jelgava only when he was forced to do so — by the army. Diplomats could continue to talk and



write as much as they like, but the communists would continue to live in Latgale, just like the Estonians are doing now around Valka, if we had not driven them (the communists) out with our army. The Versailles Peace Treaty recognized Galicia and Bukovina, but the Poles and Romanians divided them among themselves, because Galicia had a small army; when this was done, the diplomats had no recourse but to agree.

It is difficult to maintain an army — everyone knows this, everyone concurs. If at present, however, all countries and nations are maintaining powerful armies, they most likely have calculated that it is less expensive to maintain your own army than it is to maintain an enemy army that occupies all or part of a nation; I feel we should do these calculations as well, and it is very simple: we have only to compare how difficult it was to maintain the Bolsheviks in Riga last year and Bermondts in Jelgava and how difficult it is to maintain our own army regiments.

### III

It is easy to demobilize and de-structure an army, but it is extremely difficult to reorganize an army, and it takes a very long time to do so. It is possible to downsize an army, but given today's situation, the fighting ability of an army should not be decreased. At present an excessive part of our army lives in the rear. There are two reasons for this unwelcome phenomenon. Our nation was established at the same time as our army was. In the past, war institutions did all the work while civil institutions are just now starting to take over their appropriate tasks from them. This whole time, activity of the state apparatus rested heavily on the war department that had to function like it or not, because even to this day we do not have a civil institution that would take on the maintenance of order and equipping the army with what they need. At present the army itself weaves fabric, tans leather, sews clothing and boots, makes sausages and canned goods, repairs railroads and telegraph lines and even repairs all sorts of automobiles — in other words, there is no area of national life that members of the army are not involved in. All of these jobs require many workers who all officially are in the army and get army funding. This is explained by the fact that other departments have not been organized nor have they started working to take on these necessary jobs. When the appurtenant departments will free the army of these inappropriate jobs, the number of army personnel will decrease. It seems the country will not really benefit by all of this, because the number by which the army rolls decrease is the same number by which the number of workers in other departments will rise, and it is quite possible that it will cost more to maintain these workers than it did when they were still in the

army. Another reason that our army has extra units is that our army still is in the organizational and training stage. We began to organize our army from nothing, so we are forced to gather all sorts of weapons and other items, to repair them, make missing parts, etc. What is more, we lack experts in all vocations and we have to train and educate them ourselves. All of these workers and students officially are in the army, but they cannot be at the front. These extra units cannot be decreased in the near future either; that will happen only when we do not have to build anything new, when the army will have attained its final structure and everything will function normally as it did in the old armies.

Thus, our army can be downsized only at the expense of the rear, that is, many of the war department institutions, for example, workshops, factories, etc. are turned over to appurtenant civil institutions. Decreasing the fighting force of the army would be a very reckless thing to do at a time when world politics is still unclear, each moment can bring unexpected complications. There are very many nations and very many parties that are dissatisfied with their present situation; this restless contingent is not asleep, they are working, and working very diligently and very secretly, therefore, we must not think we know all of their intentions and activities; this we will learn only when they present themselves openly. That is why all of the countries and nations that want to retain their rights and freedom maintain strong armies no matter how much it costs. Whose situation is safer — France's, England's, the USA's or ours? What do these super powers stand to lose if someone attacks them? In the worst case scenario, they would lose a part of their territory. But what do we stand to lose? Everything, everything we gained during the last year — our freedom and independence, we can again become Russian provinces. In that case we would again pay taxes to maintain the Russian army and we would send our finest young men to serve in the Russian army, and we would send as many as deemed necessary by the government in Petersburg and Moscow. Let us follow the example of the large Entente nations: we want peace, we long for peace, and that is why we are preparing for war. There will be peace when we suppress the enemy — to not touch us and to not attack us; there will be peace when no one dares to touch our freedom, independence and our rights. If the great Entente cannot rely on diplomatic negotiations, speeches and writings, but only relies on štiki (bayonets), how can we afford to do less? Do we think that everything could have been achieved by negotiations and will be achieved by negotiations in the future? We have gained our freedom with the army and only the army will guarantee our freedom in the future. There will be secure peace only when it is protected by a powerful and battle ready army.

# ABOUT WAR AND PEACE<sup>19</sup>

Last year was full of pain and difficult battles. The World War has ended but its consequences still remain. Socialistic experiments still continue in Russia, junkeristic Germany is still dreaming of a great Germany...we cannot predict when full and complete peace will exist in Europe, because the World War was not able to resolve all the urgent problems.

National rights of self-determination and other democratic principles have not yet fully been taken into account because of economic and political issues. The beautiful ideas and noble thoughts are nothing more than a platonic will; their full implementation has been postponed for an undetermined time. At present it is not possible to implement a total demolition of militarism, because the complicated political circumstances are not favourable for such an action. The same can be said of a national brotherhood, the League of Nations, eternal peace and similar ideals, the implementation of which in life will demand still more blood and political farsightedness. The power factor will continue to play the dominant role for the foreseeable future. Taking this into consideration, in the foreseeable future all nations will be forced to make great efforts to guarantee their position in the family of nations. The political and economic interests of various countries will often intersect, but the present circumstances will force them to find a certain *modus vivendi* in order to avoid an inevitable catastrophe. The desire of every conscientious and consistent democrat is that the complicated political knots be untied in a democratic way, but not cut — in other words, a road of split power. The political balance of Europe will waver only if individual countries will not be inspired by the same idea — a desire to keep the peace and to keep their attention focused on the raising of welfare and prosperity in their countries in the future.

Unfortunately, I have to conclude, as the year ends and the new one begins, that not all nations recognize this irrefutable truth as desirable. Among the many countries that assume this position is also Germany. Adhering to its traditional approach, Germany still harbours the hope of gaining a determinant role in world politics. There is no doubt that Germany will not succeed in these efforts. Germany has lost the World War and it will not dare begin a new direct conflict with the large democracies.

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<sup>19</sup> Brīvā zeme (The Free Land), No. 1 (January 1, 1920)

The events of the past months show that indirectly it is trying to change the political direction of things. The disturbing news of the intentions of the Prussian War clique this spring, Noske's<sup>20</sup> ambiguous politics, and financial and arms support of various armies shows the importance of the situation.

After defeating Kolchak, Denikin, and Yudenich, Soviet Russia has begun to speak in a more dictatorial tone. The entire world is thirsting for peace, the ravaged *sovpedia* as well. That is why it will spare no effort to get all nations to sign a peace treaty. It has not been successful yet, but has not lost hope of negotiating a peace treaty. On its road to peace with Europe, Russia must first and foremost take into consideration its immediate neighbours. Only the future will tell if a peace agreement will be reached.

With each passing day Europe is becoming more convinced that it will not be able to overthrow the Soviet system in Russia by use of force. For the time being all nations will have to take into consideration Bolshevik Russia as a government that expresses the wishes and thoughts of the Russian people. This, of course, has nothing to do with truth, but we will have no other alternative, since the anti-Bolshevik Russia collapsed after its first serious push against the Bolsheviks. Many countries are attempting to resolve the Russian issue, but as of yet no clarity nor consensus have been reached. Some political reasons point to hope that the complicated issue will soon be resolved and the desired certainty on the Russian issue will serve to unite all nations.

The World War and the revolution allowed many Russian nations to gain independence, which results in great political and economic challenges for former Russian provinces to ensure their future. These are great challenges not to be handled alone, but jointly. Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, etc., are all interested in the establishment of a joint front against their enemies, which are numerous. The enemies are just waiting for an opportune moment to attack and wipe all these freedom fighters off the face of the earth. The *entente cordiale* idea is not only a political fantasy, but political circumstances have forced us to place this on our agenda. If such a union is established, and most likely it will be, political independence is guaranteed for all nations.

Unfortunately, the establishment of such an entente is moving forward at a snail's pace. There are various reasons for this: the border issue, the interests of various groups and individuals, etc.

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<sup>20</sup> Gustav Noske was a German politician in the Social Democratic party. From 1919 to 1920 he was the first minister of the Reichswehr.

All obstacles must be averted soon and serious effort must be put forth to reach an immediate war convention among interested nations.

Germany and Russia both find it in their interests not to allow their neighbours to unite. Both countries will put forth great effort to create unrest and foster hostility among these independent nations.

Defeated Germany is extending a hand to Kolcak and Ko and Trotsky in Moscow. The peace agreed upon at Versailles has not completely come into force yet and lasting peace does not seem likely.

If the reasons for the World War in 1914 were located in the Balkans, then the germ for the next war can be found on the shores of the Baltic Sea.

Our prospects of national independence will not be very bright if we will not learn to unite and protect our interests against our enemies.

All for *Entente cordiale* — our motto for the New Year.

## War<sup>21</sup>

Not only every person, but also every animal, every plant, wants to live and each one of them has the right to live and use the gifts of nature. Not all nature's gifts are identical, however, and the claimants are numerous. In nature no two things are identical — no two leaves on a tree are identical; there are hills, valleys, flatlands, rivers, deserts and seas. Each place has its advantages and disadvantages. Every living creature, however, wants to get as many of the advantages as possible and no disadvantages — that is what everyone strives for. The Daugava wants a flat river bed from its headwaters to the sea, and has been working at this for centuries breaking down cliffs and rocks. Is that not war being waged between the water and the cliffs? Take a look at the banks of the Daugava and you will be convinced of this eternal war. Go into the forest and take a look around.

You will see many emaciated, withered trees and many that have dried out completely; in its youth the forest was thick, as it grew there was not enough soil nor sun for all the trees and the stronger trees overpowered the weaker ones, and the latter are dying or have died. Is that not a war? In the animal kingdom there is war at every turn.

Yes, but are we, cultural beings, similar to animals and beasts? No, never. We need to have brotherhood, equality along with culture. Do we Latvians not have

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<sup>21</sup> *Ilustrētais žurnāls* (The Illustrated Magazine). Riga. 1920, No. 3

the right to live in our land, do we not have the right to speak our language and uphold our unique traits and traditions, just as the pine upholds its unique status and does not turn into a spruce or birch? Do we not have the right to remain in our land and make use of everything given to us by the earth and the sun shining overhead? Do we not have the right to make our life as beneficial to us as possible, does not everything we see on our land belong to us?

Yes, but to the east lives the enormous Russian nation, that also wants to live as comfortably as possible. Our shores are touched by the Baltic Sea that makes it possible for us to meet many distant nations and get the things we do not have. The Russian nation living east of us also wants to get at the Baltic Sea in order to have eastern access to other nations. We will say to Russia: "Give us some of your riches and we will let you cross our land to get to the sea and back." The Russians will answer: "The sea is not only yours, it belongs to everyone, why should we give you any of our riches? We are much stronger so we will cross your land to the sea and do what we like; we have a natural right to live the way we find most beneficial, and we have the power to live like that." In the distant south oil seeps from the earth. Does this oil belong only to the people living there? Why should we pay these people for the oil with our hard earned money, say the Russians, let us try to get our hands on the oil ourselves.

The northern edge of the Carpathians along the source of the Elba River is rich with coal. Poles, Czechs and Germans live there, but who should use this coal? The population in Germany and England is larger than what they can support from local resources. The Germans and the English have to import food so their people do not die of hunger. The country that manages to get more from others will be able to live better using everything that nature provides. If England tells Germany not to sail on the sea to other countries, because otherwise it cannot get everything it needs, will the Germans be satisfied? If the Poles say they will take control of all the coal, will the Czechs and Germans be satisfied? If the Russians tell us they need the Baltic Sea and they will settle near the sea and continue to live the way they have for 200 years, claiming that the sea and the land between the sea and Russia is theirs, will we Latvians be satisfied? We will be satisfied only in the event that we do everything the Russians ask of us: we help them trade via the Baltic Sea, for which we will receive some recompense; since the Russians do not speak Latvian, we will speak Russian, and Russian speaking people will be of more use to Russians and will receive higher salaries. The Russians are orthodox, so it will be to our advantage to become orthodox as well, and when we become completely Russian, our lives will be just as good as those of the Russians.

In the natural world every plant, every creature defends its essence to the very end and never turns into something else. Among humans there are beggars, who do not want to be what they are, they pray to God for special gifts. All other people manage to get what God has given by their own efforts. Thus, the beggar is like the nation that does not want to defend its essence, and a nation like that is doomed to death and perdition. Every nation that respects itself as a nation will also defend itself to the very end, it will not allow strangers to take its natural resources, it will never become the enemy's slave, and will not give up its identity to be like the enemy and cease to exist as a separate nation. Even if, fighting to the end, it should be defeated and oppressed, maintaining and protecting its unique traits, it will throw off the yoke of bondage at an opportune moment and remain its own nation.

Just as every plant and every animal species, every human nation not only has its rights but also a natural responsibility to protect all of its natural rights. Since the natural rights of one nation often conflict with those of another, however, and giving up these rights means death or extinction, or at least a reduction in numbers, each nation with the desire to remain a nation must defend these natural rights with all its strength. The defence of these natural rights is the people's war.



# THE MORAL SIGNIFICANCE OF WAR<sup>22</sup>

People grouped together in tribes in order to better wage war; war was the reason that humanity began to develop an organized national life. That was in the distant past, but if we look more closely, we see that the influence of war is just as great nowadays. I am sure everyone has had the opportunity to observe the joy and warmth expressed between two people who had at one time served in the military together, even though at the time they were not friends. But people who experience war together, afterwards meet not only as friends but as the closest of relatives, as brothers. Nothing unites and connects people as closely as common suffering, when you have to look death in the eye, you have to share the last tiny piece of bread, there is no point in thinking about the future, not even the next moment, but you have to choose between victory or death. Countries and nations that have not experienced devastating wars are not united, they do not have a strong national self-assurance. Only joint suffering, the joint defence of your fatherland, elicits feelings of strong national self-assurance and the nation is welded into a homogeneous hard mass.

War is an examination of destiny that nations must pass time and time again. Shame on those nations that do not want to give up all other interests during this exam period. Nations that do not pass the exam, remain slaves to other nations for a long time, even centuries.

We have many examples. The Polish people lost their independence and lived in the servitude of other nations for more than one hundred years for the simple reason that they considered their local intrigues and quarrels more important than anything else. That same Polish nation became a large, powerful independent nation when each and every Pole said: "First I am a Pole and only then a socialist, monarchist or something else, so first I must listen to my government and only then to parties, organizations and their leaders."

Looking back through history, we see that not always is one language or one religion a prerequisite for forming a nation: Switzerland is inhabited by people who speak French, German and Italian, but they all call themselves Swiss; the same is true in Belgium and elsewhere. The frequent arduous wars fought by these nations

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<sup>22</sup> Republikas sargs (The Sentinel of the Republic), No. 4, March 28, 1920.

in order to gain independence united them much more closely than one language and one religion unite the Russian people today, for example.

During war, people are in constant and unrelenting danger. In each person, as in every living being, there is a very powerful self-preservation instinct (were this instinct not to exist, humanity would be extinct). In war, however, the victor is he who knows how to quell this instinct. The battle is won by the person who does not lose faith that he will win. The side that begins to retreat and flee has by no means lost the will to fight, it has merely lost faith that it will win, that is, it has given in to the instinct of self-preservation and, therefore, perishes. A tremendous wave of courage sweeps over an army going into their first battle, but upon seeing the fatalities and the wounded, courage evaporates and the instinct for self-preservation takes over; young soldiers, who have not yet experienced the gunfire of battles, always give in to the panic that sets in. It takes a lot of time and many battles to harden these young soldiers and then they become dashing and unrelenting. The longer a person has been in battle, the more he learns to manage himself, harden his will power, the growth of which is the growth of the mightiness of the individual and the entire nation.

An individual can be influenced by conviction and proof, but proof has no effect on a mob, which always operates according to its own particular psychology. An army, too, is a mob in a sense, so during battle, conviction has no effect on it; among the whistling of bullets and the roar of exploding shells along with the threatening atmosphere, the most noble example of conviction and personal heroism will be blown away by one coward who screams: "Hide if you can, we are surrounded!" In forming an army means other than crowd psychology must be used. Since the beginning of time these means have been war discipline and organization. During the Russian revolution many intelligent individuals appeared and suggested many means to replace discipline and organization, but if these intelligent individuals had not been too lazy to look into the pages of history, they would have noticed that the means they suggested have been repeatedly used in the past and abandoned every time as useless.

An armed mob becomes an army only when discipline has taken root in each and every individual, when it has become the strongest of all emotions and instincts. The work of thousands can be aimed at reaching a single goal only when these thousands are disciplined and obedient to one, carrying out his orders. Otherwise this armed mob will either paralyse its disunited and varied activity itself, or taken over by panic, will become more dangerous to its own country's inhabitants than

to the enemy army. Looking into history again, we see that highly disciplined and organized armies have always been victorious.

In ancient times there was no difference between civil and military government. During war the civil government took its position at the head of its army and after the war, army leaders again became civilian officials; the war organization and discipline developed while fighting turned into a civil resource. Thus, war discipline created the beginning of civil legislation. Nowadays, when anyone able to carry a weapon goes to war, when war training and education is a very brief process, it is impossible to imbue everyone with discipline during the period of war service. Discipline must be introduced and established in the nation. Only a nation raised on discipline will create a disciplined army. If the nation lacks discipline, if other passions and fervent issues take root among the people, there will be no discipline in the army. This kind of army will waste away and deteriorate, and this kind of national independence is doomed to a very short existence.





Figure 1. Radziņš family photo in 1899. Front row – father and mother. Children in the back row – brother Janis, sister, and Pēteris Radziņš in Imperial Russian Army uniform.



Figure 3. Father of Pēteris Radziņš.



Figure 2. Radziņš family photo. The Radziņš family was very religious and raised their children in kind — two sons and a daughter.



Figure 4. In august 1898 Radziņš enrolled in the 112th Ural Infantry Regiment located in Kalvarija (Suwalki province, Poland).



Figure 5. Pēteris Radziņš with brother in 1899.



Figure 6. Pēteris Radziņš in 1899. Radziņš attempted to join the army for the first time at the age of seventeen, but was not accepted because he was too young. Two years later Radziņš went to Pleskava and took the volunteer test at the cadet corps.



Figure 7. Pēteris Radziņš in the Imperial Russian Army.



Figure 8. Pēteris Radziņš in 1906 (judging from the photo, it might have been taken after Russo-Japanese war). At the end of 1904, when the Russo-Japanese War broke out, Pēteris Radziņš volunteered for frontline duty and in January 1905 became a member of the 10th Eastern Siberian rifle regiment. From the war Radziņš received his first medal — a 3rd Class of St. Stanislaus order (for “excellence in service during the war with Japan”).



Figure 9. Pēteris Radziņš in the Imperial Russian Army during World War I.





Figure 10. Pēteris Radziņš in the Imperial Russian Army during World War I.

Figure 11. The map of Ukraine in 1919. At the beginning of 1918, when the Ukraine hetman Skoropadskyi state was established, Radziņš, like many of the Latvian officers living in Ukraine at the time, also joined the Ukraine Army. He was appointed commander of the General Staff organizational and training department.




Figure 12. Ukrainian hetman of General Skoropadskyi presides the military parade 1918-1919.





Figure 13. General Davids Simansons in 1927. Commander-in-Chief of the Latvian Army from 10 July 1919–16 October 1919.



Figure 14. Lieutenant Colonel Eduards Kalniņš. Acting Deputy Chief of Staff of Army General Staff from July 1919- October 1919.



Figure 15. General Balodis around 1920-1921, the Latvian Commander-in-Chief during Latvian War of Independence.



Figure 16. General Pēteris Radziņš 1919-1920.



Figure 17. Eastern Front Headquarters of the Latvian Army during the Operation of Latgale.




**Karte Nr. 2 (Daugavpils ieņemšanas operācija)**

Figure 18. The Siege of Daugavpils. Colonel Radziņš planned and led the liberation of Latgale area.



**Karte Nr. 3 (Uzbrukums Pitalovas virzienā)**

Figure 19. The assault towards Pytalovo (Abrene).



**Karte Nr. 4 (Rēzeknes ieņemšana)**

Figure 20. The Siege of Rēzekne.



Figure 21. Polish soldiers in trenches in Daugavpils in the vicinity of the river Daugava in October 1919.



Figure 22. Marshal Józef Piłsudski and General Edward Rydz-Śmigły with staff in Daugavpils in January 1920.



Figure 23. Polish troops with orchestra in Daugavpils in 1920.



Figure 24. 5th Cesis regiment at the Latgale front in 1920.







Figure 27. Summer camp of the War School in Daugavpils. General P. Radziņš with officers. The first half of 1920.



Figure 28. Latvian delegation in the Bulduri Conference in August 1920. The Bulduri Conference began on the 4 August 1920 and lasted for a month. It brought together delegates from five states: Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland.



Figure 29. Delegates and observers of the Bulduri Conference. Latvian Prime Minister Kārlis Ulmanis is chairing the meeting in the White Hall of the Riga Castle in August 1920.



Figure 30. General Pēteris Radziņš 1924-1928. The French Legion of Honour Order on the neck. On the chest – Military Order of Lāčplēsis Class III and Polish War Order of Virtuti Militari Class V. On the pocket – Finnish Grand Cross of the White Rose. Over the shoulder – dark blue ribbon of the same order. On the buttonhole – Estonian Cross of Liberty Grade I, Class II.



Figure 31. State President Jānis Čakste and generals preside the parade. From the left: 1. Eduards Kalniņš, 2. Pēteris Radziņš, 3. Jānis Čakste, 4. Martins Hartmanis, 5. Kārlis Gopers and others. November 1926. Riga, Esplanade Park.



Figure 32. General Pēteris Radziņš and Colonel Martins Hartmanis during the Polish training manoeuvre in 1925.





Figure 33. General Pēteris Radziņš in the army staff “War gaming” in 1927.



Figure 34. Latvian army general officers and commanders. In the middle - General Pēteris Radziņš. 1926-1928.



Figure 35. General Pēteris Radziņš and War Minister Colonel Rūdolfs Bangerskis. 1925-1928.



Figure 36. General Pēteris Radziņš on the hydroplane. 1924-1928.



Figure 37. General Pēteris Radziņš on the warship "Virsaitis."



Figure 38. General Pēteris Radziņš in France. From the left: Colonel Aleksandrs Kalējs and Captain (navy) Arhibalds Keizerlings in 1926.

Figure 39. Pustiņa Roman Catholic Church in Robežnieki parish of the Krāslava district. General Radziņš and Dean Sigismund Tabore (1870-1941). Sigismund Tabore ordained on the 2 March 1893, Pustiņa parish dean from 1911-1933, resident of Krāslava church from 1933-1941. Shot when the Red Army was retreating from Krāslava on the 30 June 1941. Buried in the garden of Pustiņa church. A monument was opened in the churchyard in 1943.



Figure 40. Courland Division officers in 1930. General Pēteris Radziņš in the middle of the first row.







Figure 41. Funeral of General Pēteris Radziņš in October 1930. Pēteris Radziņš died of a heart attack on 7 October, 1930 in his apartment in Riga in Valdemāra Street.



Figure 42. Funeral of General Pēteris Radziņš.



Figure 43. Funeral of General Pēteris Radziņš in 1930. Riga Dome Cathedral. Farewell by priest Terins.



Figure 44. About 10.000 people attended the funeral. Among the attendees were President A. Kvisis, Speaker of the Saeima P. Kalniņš, Prime Minister H. Celmiņš, ministers, Saeima deputies, the Estonian Army delegation headed by Major General A. Tõnisson. The general was buried in the Riga Brethren Cemetery.



Figure 45. Memorial plate of General Pēteris Radziņš on the wall of the Presidential castle on the 11 November Embankment. Opening on the 11 November 2018. Riga castle is residence of the President of Latvia.






Figure 46. Memorial plate of General Pēteris Radziņš.



Figure 47. Major Agris Purviņš from the General Pēteris Radziņš Association with Pēteris Radziņš' brother's ganddaughters Teiksmā Slaidiņa (on the left) and Dzidra Celmina (on the right) at the memorial monument of General Pēteris Radziņš in his former homestead "Jaunvīndezes."

# PEACE ON EARTH<sup>23</sup>

How wonderful it sounds: peace following five years of war. How nice it is to imagine a life without the threat of danger, when each individual can do their job, and everything follows a lawful path. It is very natural for our people to discuss and consider their wish to have a peace treaty signed with Soviet Russia. However, a question arises: what kind of peace do we want and what kind of peace does Soviet Russia want, and what kind of peace can they give?

We want a peace that would guarantee Latvia's independence and give its people the opportunity to lift up their cultural and economic life. Thus, peace needs to be the kind that we can rely on for a longer time: we could safely demobilize the army in complete faith that no one will invade us from the outside nor cause a breakdown internally.

I do not believe that Soviet Russia wants to sign that kind of peace treaty with us. Bolshevik leaders have often said of their future: "Bolshevism can survive only if we manage to spread it throughout the world; if we do not succeed in doing so, Bolshevism is over." This is completely right. Thus, if we assume that the Bolsheviks will sign a peace agreement with the intention of fulfilling the terms of the agreement, then we also have to assume that the Bolsheviks have given up on their ideas and signing the peace treaty, they are also signing their political death sentence. I do not think there is any doubt that the Bolsheviks are not even thinking about this since they no longer feel the threat of Kolcak and Denikin. Thus, I also feel there is no need to doubt their deceit in signing a peace treaty. Anyone who does not believe me is invited to read some of the more serious Bolshevik newspapers to see what the Bolsheviks say about out of the way countries. We read in "Voennoe Delo" (a war commission publication with a dominant effect of Russian military politics — ed.): "The Baltic countries are a natural part of Russia; Russia cannot survive without these out of the way areas, thus, these out of the way areas must be annexed by Russia."

Is Soviet Russia capable of sign a treaty of permanent peace with us? The categorical answer is that they are not. First of all, because Soviet Russia is not recognized as a permanent country and its contracts have no judicial basis. A Soviet Russian peace agreement with us cannot be stronger than their peace agreement

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<sup>23</sup> Latvijas kareivis (The Latvian Soldier), No. 11 (February 25, 1920).



with Germany, which was annulled without the least contradictions. Thus, if someone else rules Russia after Lenin and Trotsky, they will not have to pay the least bit of attention to the Lenin peace treaty.

Let us look at the practical benefits of a Bolshevik peace. Once we sign a peace treaty with the Bolsheviks, will we be able to demobilize our army and open the border with Soviet Russia? If we do so, in no time at all Latvia will be overrun by Bolshevik propagandists and instigators; in addition typhoid fever and the plague will spread throughout our land. Last year in Kiev I got my hands on the minutes of a secret meeting of the Moscow Communist Central Committee; the minutes contained a detailed program about how to spread Bolshevism in countries not yet under Bolshevik rule. I would like to point out the following, among others:

“To make life difficult by artificially causing delays and disturbing traffic patterns on the railroads; disseminate all sorts of news, make it difficult for farm people to deliver their goods to towns, raise the cost of living. Artificially instigate hatred among classes of inhabitants: provoke newspapers; provoke various happenings, explaining them as having been done based on party and class interests. Carry out small attacks, railroad sabotage, etc., to make the people more anxious and then use that anxiety to promote hatred between parties and raise the cost of living. Use documented resources to promote unrest between various classes and parties. When that is achieved, join the restless parties and begin open agitation promoting the Soviet government. The ultimate goal: to overthrow the government and announce the already prepared directives.”

As soon as the borders are opened this program will immediately be implemented in Latvia as well. I feel the implementation of this program has already begun, because after the signing of the peace treaty prices have gone up on some things by more than 100%.

Is it possible that we, upon signing the peace treaty, could leave our borders closed, thus deter the influx of Bolsheviks into Latvia?

In order to completely close our borders we would need an army as big as the one we have at the front now. Otherwise, knowing the cunning of the Bolsheviks, closed borders will only matter to honest people, but those with deceitful intentions will get through and border protection in peace time will be a great provocative weapon for the Bolsheviks to promote political conflict.

Will the Bolsheviks carry out the various points of the peace treaty, even if only for appearances?

The answer is an absolute “no”, because they are not carrying out the provisions of the present peace treaty with the Estonians. According to the rules of the cease fire, it was not allowed to re-group your army at the front, but they did so immediately. According to provisions of the peace treaty it was not allowed to keep sectors of the Estonian Army in their army, but they not only have retained Estonian units, but immediately upon signing of the treaty they began forming new Estonian communist army sectors. They promised not to disseminate Bolshevik propaganda in Estonia, but even as we speak, several loads of propaganda materials for Estonia have been arrested. Why is it that following the collapse of Kolchak and Denikin the Bolsheviks are seeking peace along their entire western front?

Because along this front they have not been able to attain anything by war. They attacked Finland — they were driven back, they attacked Estonia — they were driven back; we easily drove them out of Latgale as far as we felt was necessary. Poland easily took all the borders on their front that they wanted. The Bolsheviks did not defeat either Kolchak or Denikin on the battlefield, they defeated them with internal unrest at the rear. Up until now the Bolsheviks have not been able to do anything to enemy armies on any front, if these armies did not succumb to Bolshevik agitation. The Bolsheviks have not been able to do anything against a nationally inspired army anywhere at any time. They are very well aware of this, therefore, they want to use different means to win Latvia and the other Baltic countries and annex them to Russia.

We have fought for Latvia’s independence; we have liberated all of Latvia. Has the blood of our brothers and sons been spilled in vain? Ask the men at the front why they have fought, spilled blood, experienced famine, extreme cold and utter exhaustion. They will tell you that now after having done the hardest part, they want to be sure that their brothers and friends have not shed their blood in vain; that the best of Latvia’s sons have not sacrificed their lives so that the Bolsheviks could come back into Latvia peacefully by diplomatic means after they had been driven out. The blood of our war fatalities and the suffering of the Latvian people will come back to haunt those who would add Bolshevik promises of paradise to our hard fought and hard won victory.

We know Bolshevik promises and their ways very well. We know full well what they are preparing to do, why they are sending their agents to Latvia with orders to join Latvian political parties; why the Bolsheviks are sending their most energetic communists with orders to join the Latvian Army machine gunners,

communications service and armed vehicle teams. The Bolshevik intentions are clear, and only those who have tired of working for national independence and welfare, those who take advantage of opportunities to gain personal benefit after the peace treaty, those who are looking for the easy life and think only of themselves, can possibly not understand this. These people, however, will be duped in the end.

# ETERNAL NEUTRALITY AND THE ARMY<sup>24</sup>

Considering that maintenance of the Army is very costly to the nation, and given our dire economic situation, the question automatically arises — would it be possible to arrange the protection of our country in a way that would let us get by without this expensive army? Suggestions are often heard to proclaim Latvia as neutral (this means the so-called “eternal neutrality”), since then we would not need an army at all. Such a neutral position, which would allow us to exist without an army, would be quite beneficial for little Latvia. Unfortunately, such a position is not that easy to attain: first, not all neutral countries can get by without an army, and second, attaining eternal neutrality is not that easy to accomplish.

The oldest neutral country is Switzerland: it was officially recognized as neutral in 1815. It is common knowledge, however, that Switzerland maintains an army, cares for it, and spends a lot of money for its upkeep; that is to ensure the battle readiness of this army. Thanks to its geographical location as well as specific state and national traits, it is more advantageous for Switzerland to maintain a militia rather than a permanent army. The other neutral nation, Belgium, (neutral since 1839) also had to maintain an army, but since its geographical situation differed from that of Switzerland, it maintained a permanent army. When a country is officially recognized as neutral, it is responsible for defending its neutrality: a neutral country is not allowed to wage war, but it must defend its neutrality with all its might; if this is not done, neutrality is not recognized. In 1870, when the French army was pressed at the Belgian border at Sedan and all retreat routes had been cut off, so the army had to either capitulate or cross the Belgian border, then Bismarck sent a request to the Belgian government — if the French would cross the border, Belgium must immediately disarm all the units that had crossed over the border; if that is not done, the German army will immediately cross into Belgium. To disarm the French army required a fairly good sized army and they already had to be positioned at the border. During the entire World War that just ended, Switzerland had to keep an adequate army at the French and German border regions. Of the neutral countries only the tiny duchy of Luxemburg was not

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<sup>24</sup> Latvijas kareivis (The Latvian Soldier), No. 123 (July 21, 1920).

required to have its own army, because this country is so small, that its army would be of no significance.

In order for a small country to be recognized as neutral, it first needs to be recognized as such by its neighbours — super powers — which also must guarantee its neutrality. Super powers will recognize a country as neutral if it is advantageous for them — they would never do so if it were not to their benefit. It is also necessary that a good percentage of the nation want neutrality and that it has become part of the national mind set — the country and people have to be totally independent of all external influences, with no exceptions.

Actually, Switzerland upheld a neutrality toward its neighbours several centuries before it was recognized as neutral in 1815; it never took sides in any issue, in all cases it behaved the same toward all of its neighbours. Switzerland is located in the mountains, so it is not advantageous to wage war through Switzerland; neither does it block any of its neighbours' strategic or trade routes. Switzerland does not have any great riches, it lives on the work of its industrious people. That is why its big neighbours (Austria, France, England, Russia and Portugal) decided in 1815 that everyone would be better off, if this difficult to traverse country would never belong to any of them, but it would remain as a buffer between the super powers; they all promised to maintain and defend this buffer zone. It is only because Switzerland itself wanted to be neutral, however, that the super powers managed to sustain its neutrality. As it did before 1815 and to this day, Switzerland has never carried out politics that would favour one neighbour or harm another. Switzerland does not give any of its neighbours privileges or advantages, it does not sign secret agreements, not to mention war conventions.

On the other hand, the situation and then its consequences were completely different in Belgium. In 1815 Belgium was united with Holland; in 1839 Belgium rebelled against Holland and the super powers recognized Belgian independence at the London Conference and after that, in 1839, its neutrality. This neutrality came not as a result of natural Belgian propensity and circumstances, but rather from the super powers, which needed a buffer zone at their borders. The minutes of the London Conference state: "The conference is occupied with such new agreements and contracts that would best combine Belgian independence with agreements, interests and security of other nations and thus sustain European security." Thus, Belgian neutrality was necessary for those countries that recognized and guaranteed this neutrality — England, France, Russia and Prussia. As long as there was peace among the guarantor countries, the neutrality was sustained, but when war broke out, the neutrality understandably dissipated.

Belgium had a neutralizing effect, but it was no longer neutral: it began to carry out colonial politics, it signed agreements giving one country advantages over another; the Belgian General Staff cooperated with General Staffs of super powers it was influenced by. That is why in 1870 and again in 1914, when talk turned to war, the issue of the fate of Belgium surfaced yet again.

The above makes it clear that there can be no talk of neutrality of the new countries that have split away from old Russia, at least in the near future, because the creation of these countries was possible via the impressions of some countries and they were created contrary to the will of Russia; as far as we can predict, these new countries will also be under the influence of other countries. From the first moment of their existence, they have given some of their neighbours certain privileges and advantages and have signed agreements with them. Thus, these countries do not and cannot act neutrally toward their neighbours and European super powers in general. If they were to be recognized as neutral, this neutrality would be even more artificial than that of Belgium. This neutrality would benefit only those super powers that determine the direction of world politics at the moment. As soon as there was a re-grouping of power in world politics, the neutrality of these new countries would fall away as totally unnecessary.

Considering all the above, we must conclude that our homeland cannot get out of the expense of maintaining an army by the recognition of Latvia as neutral. First, the ability of Latvia to neutralize circumstances is more than doubtful — Latvia's status as an independent country does not allow it to be neutral, and it has never been neutral. Second, even if Latvia were to be recognized as neutral and the super powers would guarantee this neutrality, Latvia could not, nevertheless, remain without an army; the guarantees of neutrality do not free a country from the responsibility of maintaining an army; neutrality, does, however, make a country responsible for defending its inviolability with all its might. Each and every country, including those recognized as neutral, can only defend their freedom and independence by armed force. That has been the case up until now and it is not likely to change in the foreseeable future. We must not breed rosy illusions about what could be, but rather draw all conclusions based on our circumstances at the moment.

# SOVEREIGNTY AND UNITY<sup>25</sup>

The sovereignty of Latvia and the other Baltic States strengthened day by day. If we compare the views of other nations and countries about Latvia during last year's October, then we see that their views relate to the rule of the same countries (we see that from their side) in October, and there is a visible and enormous difference. Last autumn, the vast majority of politicians in other countries saw Latvia as a temporary phenomenon. This was advantageous for some of them, and so they supported it, while it was disadvantageous for others, and so they tried to combat it. Both sides were convinced that the Latvian state would end once it had played the role that was assigned to it by its supporters. Now, in contrast, everyone sees Latvia as a permanent political factor. Even the reactionaries from other nations and, particularly, our large neighbours have come to the understanding that Latvia's sovereignty must be seen as a *fait accompli*, no matter how unpleasant this fact might be for them. The fact is that Latvia can in no sense be turned into a simple province of a neighbouring country.

The fact of Latvia's sovereignty is nonetheless very unpleasant for various social or political groups, and it is not really good for various neighbouring countries in their essence. This means that all relevant neighbouring nations and countries think that, irrespective of what kind of social order there is in this country. Each individual tries to get rid of all difficulties and inconveniences, and the same is true for every country. Indeed, each country must do things that serve the interests of the whole nation.

Small countries such as Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania can be pushed aside with various means if their existence is unpleasant for large neighbours. Those means were already practiced when Catherine II divided up Poland, Russia annexed Baku and Bukhara, England turned Boer Republics into its colonies, France taking over Morocco, etc. We do not even have to speak of the "independence" and "sovereignty" that was preserved for major Balkan countries which, at the end of the day, were larger than Latvia. None of those countries was fully sovereign. Until 1906, for instance, Bulgaria was under the influence of Russia, and Serbia was under the influence of Russia. There is no point in talking about Montenegro, because it has always been completely dependent on Russia. The dependency of

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<sup>25</sup> *Latvijas Kareivis*, No 244 (9 December 1920).



these Balkan countries on Russia was not fairly threatening, because the borders of Russia were not linked to the borders of those countries, which meant that Russia could not annex them. That is true even though the Russians were planning to merge all Slavic nations under its own rule, and that is why Bulgaria alienated itself from Russia and became dependent on Austria. That means that sovereignty was not completely lost, but there was the possibility that it might be lost in future.

For a long time before the division of Poland, its economic situation was very difficult. The Russian ambassador to Warsaw received huge sums of money from his government and made clever use of Poland's economic difficulties. He organised subsidies and bribes to create a very broad network of secret organisations. He used his agents to pay money to a great many supporters. These supporters of the Russian ambassador were not immediately supporters of Russia, but they simply received money for taking a stand against Poland's government under certain circumstances. The Russian ambassador was told by his government that he must not allow Poland to become stronger or to improve its economic situation. He was told that if that was not the case, then he must create events artificially which would give Russia a reason to protest. In order to keep Poland from growing stronger, the Russian ambassador used his agents to learn a great deal about its internal circumstances, and with the help of his supporters, he created opposition against any announcement from the government that would help to strengthen Poland. Thanks to this, it was very hard for the government to improve the situation in the country, and the authority of the government was constantly reduced. That was the secret approach by Russia. In open terms, the ambassador talked about "defending Russia's interests" in all areas of Polish life and in terms of all instructions from the state. He always looked for anything about which Russia could protest. At the end of the day, the most advantageous thing was incidents related to Orthodox issues. If an Orthodox worshipper or priests was somehow harmed in some corner of Poland, there was an immediate protest. If there were no such events, then they were artificially provoked. Each conflict between an Orthodox person and a Catholic person was presented as if it involved religious motivations, and so Russia once again had to defend the rights of the Orthodox. The same provocations and complications were seen everywhere. Russia protested once again, seeing an attack against its interests. Russia spent money to maintain and organise large bands and entire castes near its borders to create unrest so that Russia once again had reason to protest, because it saw the unrest as threatening for Russia itself or for Russians and Orthodox people who were living in Poland. Poland had to yield before every protest from Russia and do what the Russian ambassador told it to do. Otherwise,

Russia would amass its forces on Poland's borders, and Poland's military was not able to oppose it. Since 1772, Warsaw had basically been controlled not by the Polish king and the Polish government, but instead by the Russian ambassador. A few members of the Polish Sejm were bribed by the Russian ambassador, and that is why the Sejm rejected any law which the Russian ambassador did not like. Being very well informed about everything that was happening, the Russian ambassador simply did not allow the Sejm to do its work. Thanks to members of the Sejm who had accepted bribes, there were simply disputes among members, and the Polish Sejm was no longer able to take any decisions or issue any instructions. Any more or less important instruction could be issued by the Polish government only with the permission of the Russian ambassador. Of course, in legal terms everything was different. The Polish government, fearing yet another protest from Russia, first contacted the Russian ambassador to make sure that he would not oppose one instruction or another. Only then was the instruction issued.

These activities by the Russian ambassador meant that Poland was completely divided, and a large part of it was annexed by Russia without any difficulty. Russia's ongoing protests, agitation in Poland and the bribery of Poles showed the whole world that Poland was to blame, and that Russia had no option other than to annex Poland. This led to the lawful splitting up of another country, so to speak, and to the destruction of its sovereignty. That, however, can be done much more quickly and easily with war. Peace treaties and all international treaties remain in effect as long as it is advantageous to both parties that signed the agreement. As soon as the agreement is disadvantageous to one of the parties, it loses force. A new agreement has to be reached, or other paths must be sought. An international treaty cannot anticipate all incidents that will occur in future. That is why international relations, particularly among neighbouring countries, constantly face situations in which agreements are not perfect, but they can be applied to one or another article of the treaty and decided on the basis of that article. If the treaty is disadvantageous to one of the parties, and particularly if one of the parties is looking for reasons to create a conflict, then that will always be possible. In any case, no peace treaty is directly meant to ensure that there will be no agreement with the neighbour. What is more, there can never be a shortage of reasons to prove that the masses of people will be sure that the other party has violated the peace treaty, if not in legal terms, then on the basis of specific documents. The history of the world clearly shows that nothing is easier than to find reasons for declaring war. For that reason, people do not know the true causes of war when the war begins. They think that the causes relate to the latest conflicts, and there are facts that the side who has launched the

war, spreads throughout the world. The real cause of the war, however, is that one neighbour wants to get rich at the expense of the other neighbour, and if it cannot do so in another way, then it tries to achieve that with power.

Let us consider the possibility that one of our big neighbours wants to obtain territory and ports in Latvia, either through full dependency or simply by annexing it. This neighbour tells its ambassador, delegation, mission, or other organisation in Latvia to do the same things that the Russian government ordered its ambassador to Warsaw to do in the late 18<sup>th</sup> century — make Latvia's internal situation worse and create conflicts between Latvia and this neighbour. If the ambassador receives huge sums of money in pursuit of this goal, would anyone be surprised if his work has the most success in poor little Latvia? In little Latvia that will be done much more quickly and easily, and there will be major achievements of the type that the ambassador of Catherine II had in Warsaw. Will it be hard for this ambassador from the neighbouring country to find something that will allow the country to force the abrogation of the agreement? Oh, no. There will be people who will say that even though they are citizens of Latvia, they are also employees of the neighbouring country, and the Latvian government has done bad things in relation to them. This ambassador will never lack materials for protests. Initially that will involve a few people, then various incidents, then the work of a civil servant, and so on. Each protest will demand satisfaction and things that must be done. If that is not done, then the neighbouring country will, for its part, violate this or that article of the agreement. That will be very painful for Latvia, and the Latvian government will have no option but to comply.

Then there will be more and more important protests with great demands. Latvia can do everything possible to satisfy all articles of the treaty, but there will be protests nonetheless. These major demands will have to be fulfilled, because the neighbour will threaten to violate other articles of the treaty. Latvia will have no choice but to do everything that the neighbouring country's ambassador demands. The ambassador will explain to the whole world that all of this has to do with the treaty that was concluded between Latvia and its neighbour. No one else took part in concluding that agreement, and so implementation of the agreement is a mutual issue in which no one else should interfere.

This situation currently faces not just Latvia, but all of the Baltic States, taking each of them individually. That means that all of the Baltic States face a clear and present danger against their independence. None of them alone can defend its independence, except for Poland, which is quite powerful on its own. If, however, all of the Baltic States were to become tight allies in a bloc, then they could defend

their independence and the interests of their lives. An alliance among the Baltic States is a very important factor not just for those countries, but for all of Central Europe. This was seen in the attention that Europe focused on the Baltic State conference at Bulduri. The factor is even more important for the currently hidden enemies of the Baltic States. When the Estonian delegation returned to Revel from Bulduri, the desks and cabinets of the Estonian Foreign Ministry were looted — specifically those desks in which the delegation's documents were stored. Luckily, the documents from the Bulduri conference had not fallen into the hands of the invaders, but does this fact not show quite clearly that the alliance of the Baltic States is really touching someone's heart and that this fact is terribly unpleasant for someone? That cannot be anyone other than an enemy of the Baltic States — the one who is glaring at the three countries from a hiding place and is waiting for the moment when he can destroy the independence of the countries. If this hidden enemy could secretly break into the desks and cabinets of the Estonian Foreign Ministry, then that proves that its representatives in Revel are already active and energetic, and they have already achieved fine goals. There is no doubt that they are also working successfully in Riga, though they started that work in Riga later than they did in Revel.

The independence of the Baltic States was established only on the basis of the closest alliance among the Baltic States, and that must become a necessity for all political groups and classes of society which support Latvia's independence.

The thing is, however, that this alliance cannot be achieved just because governments conclude, and parliaments ratify a treaty or convention. It will only exist on paper, but its implementation will be difficult.

Every nationalistically thinking citizen of the Baltic States must be certain that the interests of his or her state are closely linked. An enemy who endangers one country also endangers the other one. If one of them loses its independence, then the others will also lose it.

Only if all of the Baltic nations are clearly convinced of the need for this close alliance, which means that all of the countries must stand up together against an external enemy, only then will it be the case that if one of the countries faces dangers, they will all truly stand up as a single country and a single nation. Only then will our enemy never dare to endanger our independence.

# DO SMALL COUNTRIES NEED A MILITARY?<sup>26</sup>

Latvia is recognised as a sovereign and independent country by its neighbours and the whole world. True, this independence and sovereignty were won with force, but now this job is done, and so there is an automatic question — do we need to maintain these armed forces and train them for the future? People are talking about eternal peace and the end of war for all time. People say that swords must be beaten into ploughshares. Perhaps it is advantageous to do so. We can agree with that, but we cannot beat machine guns, rifles and cannons into ploughshares, because it would be more advantageous to sell them, because humanity is not thinking about ridding itself of wars. Even the League of Nations has not ordered any of its member states to reduce the size of its army. I don't want to talk about this Utopian issue. I want to talk about the current situation, looking at it from the practical perspective. What goal is there if the tiny country of Latvia needs an army?

True, there is a habit in the world in terms of each independent country to have some kind of army, at least for representative purposes. Maintenance of an army is very expensive, and I think that Latvia could reject such an expensive representational resource. Still, I want to talk about a military that is useful for war, not about a representative army.

There is no doubt that Latvia does not have the slightest yearning to conquer something. It simply wants to protect that which it has won against an external enemy. Latvia, however, is very small in comparison to some of its neighbours. Each country's armed forces are approximately proportional to population numbers, and at the greatest level of sacrifice, an army cannot be larger than 10% of the population. This means that if normal life begins in our neighbouring countries and can establish armies that are proportional to their population, then Latvia's army will be very small in comparison to those big armies. Even if we put together Latvia's and Estonia's armies, they will be compared to the Russian army just like the Serbian army and the Austrian army were doubled in size in 1914. If we put together the armies of Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania, then the comparison with Russia's army is the same as comparing Serbia's army and the Austrian army. It

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<sup>26</sup> *Latvijas Kareivis*, No 44 (25 February 1921).

is worth maintaining an army only if it can reach the goals that are assigned to it. If not, then there is no justification for the expenditures of maintaining it. If an army cannot defend its fatherland, then it is unnecessary. When measuring it in comparison to Russia, Latvia's army is small in terms of numbers. In comparison to Germany, the proportion is a bit better. If we compare Latvia's, Estonia's and Lithuania's armies to that of Poland, then it is as little as Romania and Austria before the war. The size of Latvia's army is such that it can only be compared to the armies of Estonia and Lithuania. The point is that there is no expectation of conflicts with Estonia and Lithuania. Even during the most difficult times, when decisions had to be made about disputed border issues, everything was resolved peacefully. This, therefore, begs the question of what role Latvia's army can play in the future to serve Latvia's interests. In addition to Latvia and its neighbours, there are a great many large and small countries in this world, and their relationships with one another constantly change. Friends today will be enemies tomorrow, and yesterday's friends are enemies today. Countries are built not for one or ten years, but for centuries, and that is why we must remember that political circumstances change. Things that are in place today may not be in place tomorrow.

Latvia is small, and so is its army. It alone cannot defend its independence. If Latvia can defend itself, then it needs to find allies which will help in doing so. If Latvia's closest and natural allies also prove to be weak, then we need to find a larger and stronger ally, if not permanently, then at a time when there is a serious incident. If Latvia wants to base its security on a union with its closest and most natural allies — Estonia, Finland and Lithuania, then it is obvious that each of the members of this union needs an army, and the stronger it is, the better. This means that the armies of all of these small countries play a major role if these countries want to come together for defensive purposes. A defensive alliance is not possible without any army, and none of these countries will join a defensive alliance with a country that has no army. Why would someone be happy to defend me if I do not defend the other ally? That is the first job for the army of small countries.

Perhaps Latvia could find a friend among major powers that would take on Latvia's defence. Yes, that is possible and achievable, but not for free, because no one does anything for free in global politics. If a country helps another country, then that requires compensation. That means that if a major country took on Latvia's defence, then appropriate compensation would have to be paid. There tends to be two types of compensation. First of all, Latvia could give the major country certain economic advantages which, of course, would be very broad, not small. That, however, would be the first step towards losing independence, because

Latvia would no longer be free in economic terms. Then the next step would immediately be taken — some kind of political complication would mean that it would be necessary to bring the army of the defending military into Latvia and to keep it here. That would mean that Latvia would gradually become a colony. The second type of compensation is an army. Before the Great War, Russia promised to defend Serbia and Montenegro, Germany promised to defend Turkey, and other small countries had some kind of ally, whether permanently or only during a period of danger. No compensation was demanded for this defence. Major Powers constantly try to have a sense of balance among themselves, which means that each major power tries to find a situation in which there is no other major power which is much stronger than it in military terms. If two major powers have formed a union and have thus become dominant, then other major powers will try to form another union to strike a balance with the first one. The armies of small countries are numerically small in comparison to the armies of major powers in this day and age, but they still put something on the scales. The larger and stronger the army of a small country, the more advantageous it will be in terms of finding an ally among major powers. The armies of small countries have a larger role to play in the political combinations of major powers. Serbia and Montenegro were Russia's front line on the Balkan Peninsula. They were on the frontlines to carry out the will of Peter the Great in terms of conquering Constantinople. They were also on the frontlines in the war with Austria. Serbia and Montenegro performed this last role very successfully. The Belgian army was the frontline for France's left flank against the unfortified French border, and the Belgian army performed this role excellently. Without the Belgian army, the development of the war suggests that the Germans would have occupied Paris in 1914. Major Powers take on the defence of a small country if the small country also promises to defend them, but in that case, we need an army. That is the second job for the military of a small country. Let us assume that Latvia, whether alone or in an alliance with the other Baltic States, has no defender and guard among major powers, and so Latvia must fully rely on its own strength (or that of the unified Baltic States). One of the large countries starts to harass Latvia. Of course, there would first be diplomatic negotiations that would take on harsher and harsher forms and turn into threats and then a direct attack. The situation would be threatening, and Latvia's government would seek help from other major powers. We can be quite certain that there would be some kind of major power with a political direction that is completely opposite to the political direction of the invading power, and in that case the major power will want to help Latvia. First of all, however, it will not know what other major powers



will do. Second, it will need to prepare, and that will require quite a bit of time. If Latvia did not have its own army, it could be conquered during that period of time. The world's diplomats would face a *fait accompli*, which means that intervention in the conflict would be much harder. It is also true that everyone will help the one that is doing something, as opposed to one that is not doing anything. If Latvia has an army in this case, then it will be able to hold on at least until assistance from the major power arrives. A small army can detain an attack by a major power. Were Latvia to be in alliance with the other Baltic States, then the war would be so serious that some other major power would definitely intervene in the war in support of the Baltic States. That is the third job for the military of a small country.

People tend to think that Latvia could be recognised as a neutral country, and the major powers which guarantee this neutrality would also take on Latvia's defence. Recognising neutrality is not easy to achieve. First it is necessary to prove this neutrality in terms of the country's life. It means being truly neutral towards all other countries without any exceptions, and it would also apply to all areas of the country's life. I don't know whether that is possible at this time. That would require the recognition of neutrality by all of our neighbours. What would be good about France and England recognising Latvia as a neutral country at a time when Russia, Germany and Poland do not? The main thing is that neutrality by no means liberates a country from the necessity to maintain a military force. Countries which guarantee neutrality demand that the relevant country defends its neutrality with all of its strength. It is no accident that the smallest neutral country, Switzerland, is complaining that Belgium has been unwilling and unable to protect its neutrality. Before the war it did not behave neutrally, and its army was too small. If Belgium had had as strong an army as that of Switzerland, then Germany would not have dared to lead its invasion through Belgium. Or, to put it more precisely, it would not have been advantageous for Germany to do so. This means that in this case, too, small countries need a military.

When it comes to eternal peace in the context of the League of Nations, as I have already pointed out, the League has not freed any of its member states in terms of maintaining a military. Given all of this, and keeping in mind the fact that there are ongoing changes and regrouping of forces in global politics, the conclusion must be that even for small countries, an army is the only resource for ensuring their independence and sovereignty.

# TRAINING THE MILITARY AND BATTLES<sup>27</sup>

A military unit can be considered to be well trained if there is nothing that its members forget what they have learned and do not have to learn much of anything else when they are on a battlefield. That will not cost anything more. This is not easy to achieve. If we look at the last two decades, then we see that there have been wars during almost every five or six years — the English-Boer war, the Russo-Japanese war, the Italian-Turkish war, the Balkan wars and then the great World War. Each war uses new techniques and methods. If we look at the Great War, then we see that many things changed, and nearly every new expansion made use of something new. Latvia's current liberation war uses techniques that considerably differ from those that were used during the Great War. For that reason, there are all kinds of techniques that are considerably different from those that were used in the Great War. That is because a few techniques or forms in a single war have proven to be very advantageous and led to a victory. In that case, we cannot say that the same techniques and methods will be advantageous during the next war.

Wars teach people how to engage in war. The best lessons related to war come from war practitioners, but the practitioners and the war adventures cannot easily be used in real life. A participant in a war can never perceive the whole war, because he takes part in certain places and under certain circumstances in his own understood military force against a certain enemy force. Activities in current wars are so colossal that no one can really understand all of the circumstances.

War experiences can be fully useful for training if they have been examined on the basis of critiques of war. If one battalion attacks another battalion with certain tactical techniques and forms, and if the other battalion has certain techniques, then the latter one is fully defeated. The thing is, however, that this fact does not allow us to understand that the techniques and forms of the first battalion were better than those of the second battalion. There must be a thorough study of all circumstances of the battle, and only then will it be possible to make judgments about the utility or usefulness of the tactics that have been applied. Perhaps members of the other battalion had not slept for three nights, relaxed or eaten food.

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<sup>27</sup> *Latvijas Kareivis*, No 239 (3 December 1920).

Perhaps it did not have bullets, perhaps the soldiers were not trained, there were no officers, etc. War experiences must be evaluated critically, and only then can they be used in practice. Thus, for instance, Marshal Josh, who commanded the Paris War Academy in advance of the war wrote: "The Austrians were constantly at war, but they nevertheless knew how to understand them. The Prussians studied wars and understood them without going to war. The participants in some recent war very frequently and naturally continue to believe everything that they have vividly experienced. The tactics that they used to gain a brilliant victory will be the same in the next war. That is why they usually and gradually think about their experiences and techniques as certain specific and unchangeable tactical forms, irrespective of what the conditions are."

Each victory and each lost battle means that it is very easy to guess about the reasons for one tactical mistake or another, but it is very hard to identify the true reasons for victories or failures, because in almost every case, there will be not one, but several reasons. It is also very easy to prove the utility of each tactical technique on the basis of historical examples, but each technique can have negative examples from the history of war. It is very difficult to objectively and clearly discuss war events. If there is a failure, then everything is declared to be bad, and no one believes in judgments or instructions. If there is a victory, then each person considers himself as someone who understands things and is an authority. That is exactly what we must very much take into account. We have been very fortunate during Latvia's liberation war, without any failures and with endless victories. That means that those who have taken part may feel that all of our war activities and tactics are the very best ones, and so we must train our army only in the way that we have pursued this war. Such views are even worse than death, and during the next war, it can lead the army and the whole nation to total catastrophe. England waged endless wars in its colonies, especially with the mountain residents in India. Since the age of Napoleon, the English army was regularly beaten, or at least the opponent demonstrated great courage. The army of Great Britain was convinced of its abilities and art of war when it began the war against the Boers, and there was an unexpected surprise. Since December 1899, there has been one failure after another, and each has been greater. Something unprecedented in the war history of Great Britain happened: The English army was not just defeated several times, but during the first six months of the war, it lost 140 officers and 5,000 soldiers who were captured by Boer farmers. Thinking about this disadvantage and about the failures of the Russians in their war against Russia, British General

Sir John Hamilton, serving as the English military attaché for the Russian army in Manchuria wrote:

“The prouder an army is about itself and its past because of torpor and templates, the more unable is it to learn something from the experiences of other armies. Military representatives can identify or reveal the most important principles of training and battle capacities, and they can recommend them to the army of their fatherland with their best conscience. Most of the comrades who remained in the fatherland will focus as little attention on this information as Napoleon III did when he received news about the Prussian army before the beginning of the French-Prussian war from Stoessel.”

Each new war brings new surprises. These cannot be overcome with forms or torpid tactical techniques. A military force can only overcome these surprises if it is trained in the true art of war, but not on the basis of torpid techniques or templates. This true war of art has to be learned from the history of war, and not just in terms of one's own history of war. That is because the circumstances of war that existed in the past will not reoccur. Next time there will be something very different. The history of war is not a textbook with prepared and correct theories to be used in any appropriate instance. The history of war is also not a book to read when one has some spare time. This history is a very serious teacher for us, telling us that if we are sufficiently careful, then there are things that we have never seen and will not see, but at any moment they can be before us during the night in a simple or changed war. The history of war teaches us to understand the essence of these issues, but not the form. There are things which, if they appear before us and if there is war, then we as soldiers and instructors of war knowledge will have to offer our own, specific and exhaustive conclusion about how to overcome these phenomena and unexpected events. If we cannot do so and do not admit that there are new phenomena, whether they be new types of tanks, high tech weapons, air artillery or something similar that is unexpected and cannot be overcome, then our troops will simply raise their hands and put down their weapons. Only then will we see that our knowledge about war was comparable to the knowledge of astronomers who do not point their telescopes toward the stars in the sky but stars which decorate the uniforms of mighty, famous and wealthy statesmen. The history of war never provides us with prepared recipes in terms of engaging in a war. We must never use the techniques that led to victory during a war or battle

in the past without re-evaluating them. These techniques cannot be seen as a law, because the circumstances will never reoccur. Each war and battle involves new circumstances, and so the technique that led to a victory in the past can lead to total failure. The main role here is impassionate changing circumstances, the internal essence of the military and the personality of the commander. Things one person can afford that bring him victory will be the reason for a total failure for another person. War history must not teach us events, but instead the reasons for events. Events are easy to understand, but it is very hard to understand their reasons. This requires not just reading maps, but instead thinking and internally experiencing all of the aspects that were and could have been. It is necessary to understand the totality of wars. We must also keep in mind the so-called instances of fortune and misfortune. These unexpected events are favourable for those who are respectful, and for a long time, it never remains with the person who does not know how to link it to himself.

The history of our new army is only two years old. Training our army for possible future wars must be very serious and thoughtful. The history of our war is insufficient to see it as a total foundation. We must use the rich and multiple experiences of other nations, as well as their conclusions about the art and knowledge of war.

# PROPAGANDA AND SPYING IN THE MILITARY<sup>28</sup>

Wars have not been accidental during the past two centuries. Reasons for war emerge gradually. If they have existed for a long time, then people wait for an advantageous moment to go to war. That is why countries usually prepare for a war for a longer period of time — several years and centuries. Preparations relate to one's own country and that of the future enemy country in terms of all areas of the country's life, not just the military. One way to prepare for war is to engage in propaganda and spying vis-à-vis the military of the enemy.

Propaganda aimed at an enemy's force was hardly ever used before the great world war. First of all, it was not possible because of the strict internal regime of a peacetime military force, and there was very strong internal counterespionage. Second, armies only had war specialists who are hard to access with propaganda, while recruits for training that lasts for two to eight years were hard to carry propaganda, and so it was more advantageous to engage in propaganda in one's own country. This could propagandise the recruits for training, as well as those who were already trained, i.e. those who had been relieved of active service and registered in reserve forces. The military only engaged in spying to learn details about the army of the future enemy, its composition, size, tactics, armaments, mobilisation and operational plans, the characteristics of commanders and other information that is very necessary for a war. To weaken the enemy's country, national and, in exceptional cases, social propaganda was conducted. Thus, for instance, Austria spread propaganda in the Russian Ukraine about the idea that the Ukrainians were about to split away from Russia. Russia, for its part, engaged in pan-Slavic propaganda in Austria saying that all Slavic nations would split away from Austria. The war showed that the propaganda conducted by Austria had no success at all, while the Russian propaganda had great achievements. The soldiers who allied themselves with Germany and Austria surrendered on the battlefield without a shot fired during the first conflict. Propaganda aimed at enemy forces began during the Great War. In February 1915, for instance, I was in Northern Poland and experienced this. In places where Russian and German trenches were

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<sup>28</sup> *Latvijas Kareivis*, No 247 (12 December 1920).



very close to one another (about 50 steps), conversations began at night, when everything was quiet, in the German trenches, and supposedly the speakers were German soldiers. They talked about everything that was happening in Russia. Russian generals and commanders were living the good life and drinking alcohol in Petrograd, because they had expropriated state property. Everything that a soldier deserved was stolen, and that is why Russian soldiers are poorly dressed, freezing in trenches and have little food. They lack bullets because the money to purchase bullets was stolen. "Just go and look at the elegant life at your headquarters. You are currently commanded by such and such a general (naming the general). We beat him several times, and we will beat him now. Your commanders are sleeping, doing nothing and know nothing. You are like rams who are sacrificing your lives so that you can be slaughtered." The speaker talked or read aloud such topics every night and for many hours. True, such propaganda was not very successful, because everyone knew that it came from the enemy and could only bemuse dark and bad elements. Still, it did create a certain level of grouchiness among the Russians. Germany was not able to spread propaganda in Russia and behind the lines of the forces.

In late 1916, the tsar decided to conclude a separate peace with Germany. The English ambassador to Petrograd, Buchanan, prepared the overthrow of the tsar's government and did so when Tsar Nicholas II travelled from Petrograd to Mogilev to begin peace negotiations with Germany. When the tsar's government was overthrown and the revolution became deeper, Germany once again sent strong forces to deepen the revolution. This was very easily done in Russia. Russia's army was destroyed very quickly. That means that the first broad social propaganda attempts happened in Russia and ensured the very best results.

These attempts were repeated during the rest of the war, but that was hard to do because the borders of the warring countries were very strictly closed. That meant that extensive propaganda was not possible, because a few people could not propagandise entire masses of the nation.

Early in March 1918, the German and Austrian armies entered vast Ukraine, and it was very easy to cross its borders. During March, it so happened that I spent a long time riding the Ukrainian railways, and as a private individual, I was often in the same wagon with German soldiers. I very often saw a young person who spoke good German begin a conversation with the soldiers, initially talking about innocent things and then gradually starting to talk about the war, ending it, overthrowing the government, etc. During passenger control three times, I had a chance to see the documents of these clever speakers. They came from London.

Early in March, German soldiers strictly supported the war and final victory, and they refused to accept the propaganda. The propaganda, however, became broader and broader. By the end of March, every urban street had some private individual very energetically telling something to German soldiers who had gathered around him. The ongoing content of this talk focused on overthrowing the government, ignoring officers and ending the war. General Ludendorff and Marshall Foch wrote that the German forces had a very good mood during the middle of March, but since mid-July there were many deserters, grumbling about officers and tendencies to insist that the war must end. That means that over the course of three months, this propaganda spread from Ukraine and throughout Germany. This was facilitated by the fact that Germany was in very poor shape. Still, thanks to its peace treaty with Russia and the delivery of food from Ukraine, Germany's situation improved a little bit, as opposed to worsening. It is only propaganda that could explain the collapse of the Bulgarian, Austrian and Turkish armies, because in 1918, the condition of those three countries was much better than in previous years. That means that there could be no other causes for the collapse.

Now, after the great world war, revolutions and various liberation and other wars, the people of all countries are still very worried. They lack a specific direction, and many of them are dissatisfied. That is why masses of people at this time yield more easily to propaganda. All countries have nationally elected governments, so anti-state social propaganda can now only come from the Communists, i.e. from Soviet Russia. Soviet Russia, for its part, engages in this anti-state Communist propaganda at the highest level, spending all possible resources on it. Each country and nation has at least a few dedicated Communists. Each country and nation also has people who have nothing to lose and do not want to earn a living with honest work. Instead they are jealous about anyone who has somehow found work. For reasons of personal hatred or personal interests, they are prepared to join those who promise them more. All of these people gather around convinced Communists who are Soviet Russian agents. There is no doubt that some of these people are serving in the army. Communist agents and employees only have to find these people, establish contacts with them, provide them with money as a salary, and bingo — new communist cadres are ready. Such cadres are sought in each military unit, headquarters and institutions, and if they cannot be found, they are brought from a different military unit or institution. Some soldiers beg sincerely to be transferred to some other unit because it is close to where their relatives serve or where their father and mother live. They gradually establish a Communist organisation, which the Communists call a cell in each military unit, from the smallest to the

largest one. These cells are given very specific instructions about what they must do. We know that these Communists never say that they support Communism when they are among people whom they do not know very well. On the contrary, conversations with strangers are very moderate. The first job is to know everything that is happening in the military, which means that the assignment was given in the past to new spies. Next they have to try to talk about critical topics — things that are bad or unpleasant. They ask what dissatisfies soldiers and why. Then they have to look for the worst and most unpleasant things to explain that the commanders have evil intentions. Then each instruction and assignment from the commanders must be seen as something bad, etc. That can gradually create bitterness and unrest in a military unit. We are living in a period of time when personal or party interests are very often held above everything else, and that means such activities can often be seen and accepted as completely natural and by no means anti-state. By fomenting bitterness and unrest, the cell can find new supporters. That would be the first step. Once the organisation has more or less strengthened itself, it has relevant organisers and leaders in certain places, systematic work begins. This is done in parallel to the work of the commanders of the unit. When the commanders issue orders, the Communist organisation issues instructions in terms of how to respond to the orders — how to make it hard to explain the orders to the soldiers, what news must be disseminated and how, and which statesmen or military commanders must be criticised or defended. This is all decided at a higher level of the organisation, which then tells lower-ranking members to do what is necessary. Next there are various provocations to exacerbate tensions and create unrest in various areas. Thanks to the great cleverness, practices and substantial financing of the Communists, this work is so broad that it is not at all possible to discuss it in a short article. At the same time, these Communist organisations are carrying out the duties of spies from the past — collect information about the capabilities of a military, and so on. It is far easier to do this work now than was the case with spies in the past, because there is a fairly broad organisation and the fact that all of these organisations are part of military units. Communist employees are, in parallel, with the employees of military units, headquarters and institutions. They know everything, see everything, and get it into their own hands. It was very hard for spies in the past to bribe someone who could provide the information or steal a document. When spies in the past received a mobilisation plan or the table of organization, it could never be known whether the plan was the last one and the right one. Perhaps it had already been repealed and replaced for another one, and perhaps it has been amended. Soviet Russia uses its Communist organisations to

learn everything, and they perhaps do so not much later than the military units of the same country.

There is no doubt that the military successes of Soviet Russia can mostly be attributed to these organisations. This is strengthened by the fact that Soviet Russia never did as well in wars against national armies as it did against the Menshevik forces. It was far easier to create Communist organisations in Menshevik forces and to expand them. Behind the lines of the Menshevik armies, Communist organisations could even create rebellions and armed attacks. That was never successful behind the lines of national armies. That is why the most successful counterattack against these Communist organisations would be an increase in national emotions and consciousness. Every compatriot and every nationalistically thinking soldier must hold the interests of the fatherland much higher than party or personal interests. The spread of Communist organisations in an army is just as dangerous as the spread of consumptive bacteria in people's lungs. If the organisations or bacteria are not stopped from the very start, then they will create a deadly disease. Every Latvian soldier must take care of, and work only for, the army and its forces. Those who do that on the basis of their best conscience will not have time to do anything else. Still, each citizen of Latvia must guard the army just like the army guards him. The army is part of the nation, and its only duty is to protect the nation against enemies. This single duty is not easy, and the army will be able to carry it out only if it is not involved in other types of work — the disputes that occur among parties.

# PROPAGANDA AS A WAR RESOURCE<sup>29</sup>

Germany was not only the first country to go to war with its permanent army, but also the whole nation. It used not just its army, but the whole nation for wars. As long as this resource was young and other countries had not prepared the whole nation for war purposes, Germany had superiority (in 1813, 1814, 1815 and 1870-1871). Preparing for the World War, Germany took a small step forward. The entire German nation had to engage in the war, and all sectors of the country had to work for the army when the war began.

This was a small step, but thanks to the fact that other countries were not prepared for the war during peacetime, Germany lacked no munitions or weapons during the first year of the war, while allies suffered from a slight lack of finances. That was true even though all the sea routes were open to imports from abroad.

The war dragged on, there was a lot of time, and the English found a new and very powerful war resource. They came up with a new slogan — if the war is led by armed nations and if the war is decisive for the destiny and future of nations, then war must be waged not just with the entire nation and the country's forces on the battlefield, but also against all enemies that create threats against the country's business, trade, economic and political sectors, both internally and externally. The main resource for a political war is an enormous amount of propaganda. How much emphasis did England place on propaganda and how massive was this propaganda? This can be assessed on the basis of the simple fact that in February 1918, England decided to establish a propaganda ministry. Lord Northcliffe was appointed propaganda minister, and from the very beginning of the war, he controlled all propaganda because he owned most of England's newspapers, including *The Daily Mail* and *The Times*. He also had very close relations with major foreign newspapers such as *Novoe Vremya* in Russia, *Telegraf* in the Netherlands, and *Secolo* in Italy. As soon as the war ended, the ministry was dismantled, because it had finished its work and was no longer necessary. Press freedom in England meant that it did not have any official things to do. The enormous results of the work of this ministry (and particularly Minister Northcliffe) can be seen in a book that was published by the minister's first assistant and peer, Campbell Stuart, *Secrets of Crew House* (London 1920).<sup>30</sup>

<sup>29</sup> *Latvijas Kareivis*, No 64 (20 March 1921).

<sup>30</sup> Crewe House was the building in which the Propaganda Ministry was housed.

The main prerequisite for successful propaganda is to create a favourable atmosphere for it. As long as that is not the case, propaganda cannot begin in a military force or among civilians. The military and civilians are equally important when it comes to propaganda. A favourable atmosphere requires relentless propaganda, and that requires full certainty in terms of healthy national policies. Propaganda can begin only if there are strictly determined and fundamental political lines. The entry for propaganda can be facts which are founded on the truth. Arguments used for propaganda must never be contradictory. Any wrong step that is taken under the influence of various circumstances can never be repaired.

Propaganda on the Italian frontlines began in April against Austria. A newspaper was published in Polish, Czech, Yugoslavian and Romanian, and it was sent across the front lines with various resources. There were a great many proclamations, and the results of the propaganda were very evident in that the number of voluntary hostages increased very rapidly. When the Italian army successfully repelled an Austrian attack in June, the commander of the Italian military thanked his propaganda commission, insisting that it contributed a great deal toward the victory. The same and even greater successes of propaganda were seen in Bulgaria and Turkey, though it was harder to do in Germany. The director of propaganda had to be replaced, but a hard will and systematic work led to brilliant results at the end of the day.

The thing is that propaganda has now become a very serious weapon of war. If it is to create hopeful results, then it must be led from a single centre, and it must be fully harmonised with the country's present policies, and policies that will be implemented in the near future, because otherwise propaganda can create bigger problems for the country itself than for its enemies. Everyone knows perfectly well that Soviet Russia is conducting propaganda at no lesser a level than was the case with England during the war, and that Russia beat its enemies only thanks to propaganda. This is a fact that has not attracted much attention despite its importance. People say that propaganda is used because Russia uses war to spread its ideas. That is not a national war, it is a class war, and so propaganda cannot be banned because of certain ideas. Actually, that is not true. If Soviet Russia's propaganda was only meant for ideology, and not conquering, then the propaganda would tell the truth. Soviet Russian propaganda does not tell the truth. It promises to liberate other nations from slavery and to give people freedom, while inside Soviet Russia there is on freedom other than the freedom to die. Soviet Russian propaganda promises paradise on earth, but the fact is that Russia is full of famine and destruction.



That means that this propaganda is not aimed at spreading an idea. Instead it is meant to weaken current or future enemies; therefore, this is a war and conquering resources. Another fact is that as soon as the war was over, England dismantled its propaganda ministry and ended propaganda against Germany. When concluding a peace treaty, England ended its war with weapons and, therefore, its war with propaganda. England concluded a true peace agreement, and yesterday's enemy became a friendly neighbour. Soviet Russia concludes peace treaties, but only on the basis of weapons. The other resource — propaganda — keeps on warring. Is that a sincere peace? Events in Georgia certainly did not speak of the sincerity of Russia's peaceful approach.

Given the fact that England was enormously successful in using propaganda so as to beat the enemy, and the equal success that Soviet Russia is using propaganda to achieve its war goals, we must be sure that propaganda at the present time cannot be made a resource to spread certain ideas. Instead propaganda must be seen as a very serious political and military resource that can be used to beat an enemy during a war or no war. To defeat it only with propaganda. Lord Northcliffe's propaganda rules also say that "it is most useful to organise propaganda so that no one feels that it is propaganda, and certainly there must be no knowledge about the source of propaganda." In other words, well-organised propaganda makes sure that no one feels that there is propaganda, instead believing that no one will know who is organising the propaganda. Either we are propagandising and spreading certain ideas so that we get certain benefits, or that is done by our enemy so as to weaken us and conquer us with the use of military source or just using propaganda to divide up our forces and to lead them to a mutual war.

The only resource to combat an enemy's open or secret propaganda is to engage in propaganda about how an armed force defends itself with an armed force and use propaganda. The aforementioned Lord Northcliffe propaganda principles shows that propaganda cannot be used successfully in societies. Propaganda has to be organised by the government, and society can only help the government to the greatest extent.

It is certain that propaganda is a very serious weapon, and so the greatest attention must be focused on it.

# TECHNIQUES AND THE ART OF WAR<sup>31</sup>

Each new war uses technical resources that are unknown in the past. Information about these new resources is presented by the press, often in an incorrect light, and this information is received by vast numbers of people. This has major influence. The masses never want the true reasons for a victory or a defeat. That is difficult for the masses, which usually seek to find the reason for a victory or a defeat in an easily perceptible way even if that is a fantastic circumstance: New cannons, rifles, gases, tanks, betrayal, etc. That means that when new technical resources appear, they are usually seen as being of decisive importance in a war. To develop this idea further, people who know nothing about the art of war decide that the destiny of a war is based on technical resources and that the main thing in future wars will be technical resources and mathematical calculations. Sometimes these ideas appear in specialised military press outlets, where superficial critics try to explain the reasons for a victory or defeat with obvious phenomena without taking an in-depth look at the essence of the matter.

I remember three periods of war — the English-Boer war, the Russo-Japanese war and the Great World War. In all of these cases, the general press and the superficial war press tried to explain a victory by claiming that the victor used some kind of innovation in the war. During and after the English-Boer war, the whole world believed that modern rapid-shot rifles make a war all but impossible, while earlier war techniques cannot be used. Small groups of Boers organised patrols, and without any frontlines or any art of war, they often defeated the English quite severely. The conclusion was that frontlines are no longer useful, current firearms can only be used by certain people, and all former war tactics must be abandoned as useless, because the gunfire is so fierce that no front line can survive it, to say nothing of several front lines. No one can attack under rifle fire. English losses proved that, and this was used by pacifists and those who are calling for global peace. Jan Gotlib Bloch wrote a book which mathematically proved that war is no longer possible. The open minds of Russians largely believed this, and during the Russo-Japanese war, there was revenge for this credulity. Several years had to pass before the military press in Germany proved the true causes for the English failures. The English suffered losses because they were completely incapable in

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<sup>31</sup> *Jaunākās ziņas*, 12 June 1920 (No 132), 14 June 1920 (No 133), 15 June 1920 (No 134), 16 June 1920 (No 135).

terms of war tactics. The Boers won not thanks to their art, but because of fairly poor knowledge about the art of war. If the Boers had been better educated in the art of war, the English would have suffered even greater losses. The Boers did not know how to attack or to command war companies. At the beginning of the Russo-Japanese war, the idea that it is impossible to attack disappeared, and the war proved that it is possible to attack. The Russo-Japanese war, however, had a new factor — machine guns, trenches and heavy artillery. To be sure, trenches were used when they were necessary, and heavy artillery was used when it was possible. That helped the Japanese because of their good preparation for the battle, but trenches and heavy artillery were not the main cause for their success. The problem instead was that the Russians were not really battle ready.

During the early years of the World War, trenches were no longer seen as important, and most of the focus was on general battle readiness, manoeuvring and attack tactics. That is why there were intense and bloody battles in 1914 and 1914. Manoeuvres on the Russian front line were very extensive. Then, however, something very similar to that which happened during the Russo-Japanese war occurred. Both sides fortified their positions on both frontlines, and that led to a purely technical war. Because this happened during the whole latter half of the war, many people only experienced positional war and became sure that the war was certainly a positional war in which the main role was played by technical resources both in defence and attack terms.

Uninterrupted and endlessly long fortified lines are nothing new in the history of the art of war. They always marked out the eras when the art of war was deteriorating. When a nation becomes too elegant and soft, it becomes degraded, with morality sinking, and then the nation is no longer prepared to do everything possible to defend the fatherland. Instead people hide behind fortified lines and seek help from technical resources. The problem is that only a nation that is spiritually strong can defend its fatherland. Positions and technologies have never saved a country.

The Manchurians conquered China despite the wonderful and famous Great Wall of China. Roman states defended themselves behind wonderful positions which are still very influential and stretch for hundreds of kilometres (some are known as the Trojan Wall in Bessarabia). Walls and positions did not save Rome, and it was conquered by new and morally strong nations. During the 17<sup>th</sup> century, there were endless fortifications along the border of Germany and France, from the North Sea to the mountains of Switzerland. All of those were eras when the art of war was deteriorating.

In the area of war, just like any other job, there are people from various categories. One of the writers who describe war issues separates participants into three categories — geniuses, talented people, and craftsmen. Geniuses in the area of the art of war are very rare. There will be one over many centuries. Talented people are often found, but everyone else is a craftsman. When a new technical resource appears in a war, craftsmen are those who ensure a decisive role for it in the war or battle. War craftsmen always think about the battle when it is over. If someone has won, then that means that he did everything correctly, but if someone was defeated, then everything that he did proved that it should not have been done. War craftsmen criticise the war and quarrel after the situation of both sides are clear. They say that such or such a thing should have been done, and then there would have been a victory in the battle. That is just as easy as someone who sees the cards of others when playing a card game, and then tells the others that they should have played in a different way. This is a profane criticism by people who don't understand the things that are based on the previously known and true situation of issues. It is criticism that ignores the circumstances of the war, as well as the situation of their own countries and those of the enemy. Critics do not think about the consequences of other types of action. Sadly, such criticism is always very popular in society, and the profane critic gains the fame of a Great War authority. We often hear that the defeat at Soldava can entirely be blamed on General Samsonov. Of course, now that the circumstances which existed for both sides are known. These profane critics completely forget the circumstances which General Samsonov faced. I am far from considering General Samsonov a hero, but I certainly put him on a higher pedestal than is the case with many other Russian generals who received various classes of the Cross of St George, and have gained the fame of heroes. General Kornilov is one of them.

The craftsmen of the art of war always try to blame shortcomings related to equipment. "How can we fight if the enemy has better cannons than we do? They have gases, airplanes, tanks, etc." There is nothing stupider than such claims if we remember the Ancient Roman statement: "If the swords of our enemies are longer than ours, then step toward the enemy with one step further." That is the wisdom of talented people in the area of the art of war, not geniuses. Calculate the percentage of troops that died because of gases, tanks, etc. and then compare the result to the overall losses to see that nothing is serious here. What did the Germans achieve with their gases on the Russian front line? Nothing. What did the allies achieve with their tanks? Until the moment when a revolution began in Germany, the technical superiority of the allies could not ensure anything. The superiority of

equipment was on the side of the allies since the time when America began to take part in the war. Wars are won not by equipment, but by spirit, however, and while the central powers did not face a revolution, i.e. as long as delight about the war had not dissipated, the allies could not achieve anything with their superiority of technical resources. Compare all of the allied attacks to the German attacks prior to the end of 1918, when the so-called central countries had revolutions. Craftspeople in the art of war have evil criticism that tries to overthrow higher-ranking people so as to take their place and to achieve importance in the eyes of society. They are happy to criticize, but they do nothing because they are not able to do anything. It is easy to throw mud at someone else, but a profane person finds it quite difficult to do anything better. The efforts of craftspeople are aimed at earning more money and ensuring a higher daily wage. They sacrifice everything on the altar of this goal, because they have nothing to lose. Craftspeople in the art of war try to take everything away from the enemy and gain all of its advantages. If the enemy's sword is longer, than they will try to make their sword longer. If the opponent has gases, they will try to find stronger gases. If the opponent has tanks, they will try to find better tanks, etc.

Talented people in the art of war always try to find changed tactics or technical resources. These new resources are usually copies of former and famous military leaders, adapting their tactics to the current circumstances. They, of course, cannot achieve the results that were attained by the masters whom they see as an example. In 1870/71, for instance, the Germans adapted Napoleon's techniques, while the French had forgotten all about Napoleon's strategy. It was only in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century that Napoleon's war methods were reintroduced. The ideas of major war leaders and geniuses are simple, but it is very hard to use them. The higher the level of a soldier's talents, the closer he is to a genius, and the more easily and better can he adapt the ideas of major military leaders in the art of war. Weaker talents cannot use these ideas and only use their external forms. That means that they follow forms, not ideas. The more attention is paid to forms, but not ideas and the spirit, the worse the art of war, because each form ages. The strong copying of previous forms for an army's battle readiness is one of the most dangerous phenomena or, to put it more correctly, one of the most dangerous mistakes for craftspeople in the area of war. It leads to serious defeats. Talents who follow the techniques of major military leaders and external forms, transform the forms to adapt to modern circumstances, while craftspeople strongly copy these forms while totally ignoring the fact that circumstances have changed. That was the exact reason why the English failed in the Boer war and the Russians failed in the Russo-Japanese war.

True, after several heavy defeats, the English and the Russians abandoned their old forms, but learning new things during a war means the loss of a lot of blood. The art of war is difficult because knowledge and conclusions cannot be examined with experiments. It is not possible to organise small wars to determine whether the army's accepted tactical techniques are useful or not. Still, it is also possible to maintain the tactics of an army at the necessary level with pure intuition, as opposed to bloody experiments. Germany proved this by not taking part in any war after 1871. The tactical techniques of the Germany army were nevertheless at a higher level than was the case with other armies, including those that were waging war. Russia from 1877-78, England, and France were engaged in endless colonial wars. Science is what liberates us from fairly bloody and very expensive war failures. The science of war cannot be ignored, because that causes a serious action to the point where a nation can lose its sovereignty.

What about the geniuses of the art of war? Geniuses do not copy the techniques of opponents, because their approach is always simple. That is why people at the time recognise the genius, and that is why he is in no hurry to rush ahead of an opponent in terms of technical resources, tactics and training; instead he always finds ways of ensuring that technical resources make the superiority of the opponent harmless. 200 years before the birth of Christ, the war genius Hannibal found a way of ensuring that the far more superior armaments and tactical preparation of the Roman forces were completely irrelevant at the Battle of Cannes (that happened in all previous battles, but it was particularly evident at the Battle of Cannes). Nearly 2000 years later, the genius Napoleon found ways of ensuring that the good armaments and tactical preparations of the Austrians were pointless in wars in Italy in 1796 and 1797, as well as with all later battles against Austrians, Prussians, English and Russians. The poetry of the art of war means finding ways of paralysing the strengths of the opponent. This, however, can only be ensured by war geniuses. The poetry is only available to those who engage in the issues of war for the sake of art, not those who seek material benefits and cheap popularity from war.

The resources of geniuses which paralyse the strengths of opponents' are always moral, but not materiel factors. These are new ideas which eliminate the meaning of all war techniques that exist at that period of time. Napoleon's genius in the area of war created a whole revolution, and we still live with his ideas today. Because there are new and ever newer technical resources, many of Napoleon's techniques and ideas are no longer of use. People today cannot find new techniques that would be appropriate to the here and now. That makes it impossible, or very



difficult, to use their own ideas, and that leads to a deterioration of the art of war. The mass of new circumstances, in which a large role is played by increasingly new technical resources means that average people are confused and cannot find ways of applying new ideas to the art of war.

A war is a battle among nations which relates to the future of the whole nation, so nations must use all of their forces at the highest level. Nations must sacrifice absolutely everything and risk everything. That was the case when the war began in 1914. Bloody battles were in the spirit of Napoleon. Germany was encircled, and it transported nearly all of its forces to the western front so as to invade France. From there on, however, it experienced failures. To receive additional forces and to deal with the Russian army which was moving forward from the East, the Germans fortified themselves in France and sent some of their forces to the eastern front, where bloody manoeuvring battles continued until the autumn of 1915. The Germans invaded Russia and moved so far that any further movement became impossible. That was the moment when both sides fortified themselves in trenches along the front lines. The art of war left the stage, and a technical battle began. Central countries proved to be unable to wage a decisive attack against the English and the French, while a further attack on the Russian frontlines could not lead to decisive success simply because Russia's territory is too big. To be sure, if the German army had been commanded by a genius, then he would have found ways to paralyse the superiority of the allied countries in terms of equipment and troop numbers. The allies had a large superiority of equipment and troops, but they could not ensure a decisive battle so as to end the war. That meant that the war turned into a battle over fortified positions. This positional war is nothing new in the history of war, but it testifies to the greatest deterioration in the art of war. These eras always coincide with a collapse of morality, culture and progress. The World War could not end with battles; it ended with revolutions. The war ended, but the fact is that no victorious countries or defeated countries have returned to normal life. A deterioration of morality is seen everywhere, and there is no effort to return to normal cultural work. This deterioration is not the consequences of the war. It existed before the war, as well, but it was the war that allowed it to come out into the open.

This means that the broadest development of technical resources and, so to say, the effort to achieve everything in a war with technical resources occurs when the art of war is deteriorating. People try to compensate for their lack of moral strength with technical strength. The physical strength of a human being can be replaced with a machine, but that is not possible for moral strength, because a

machine, after all, has to be driven by the same person. That is why a morally strong army will always depend much less on technical forces than is the case with a morally weak army. Think about what the combat sides did between 1916 and 1918 with all of their mighty technical resources. Much less than in 1914 and 1915, when both sides had far fewer technical resources. Napoleon got to Moscow within a few months, and without any railroads, automobiles, the telegraph, telephones, the radiotelegraph, airplanes and other resources of this kind, but the Germans could not reach Moscow, and the French could not reach Berlin with those resources within four years. Is it not this which speaks of the differences in the art of war?

That is why poor little Latvia must focus particular attention on the science and art of war. Nearly all of the Latvian armed forces have a fairly large wealth of war experiences. These alone can only provide us with craftspeople, and none of them are excellent. The experiences require additional knowledge, very thorough knowledge. Attempts to go to war without theories is the same as for a blind person to walk around in a familiar place, but theory without practice is the same as a person who is not blind walking around in an unknown place. Let us not forget about Napoleon. After 1812, he complained that he had no generals, i.e. after so many wars and under the leadership of such a rich genius of practice. If we read the history of wars between 1813 and 1815, then we understand why Napoleon was complaining. Until 1812, he could organise battles all by himself, but beginning in 1813, Napoleon's famous marshals had to command a few independent operations, and these marshals experienced failure at every step or, to put it more correctly, did stupid things and destroyed Napoleon's situation. One of the main reasons why Napoleon lost the battle in 1814 and 1815 was that his marshals did not know how to wage war under changing circumstances. This was because of a total lack of theoretical preparedness despite a wealth of war experience.

# OFFICER AND SOLDIER<sup>32</sup>

Any country that has an armoured defence force has officers and soldiers — commanders and those who are subordinated to them. This is directly linked to the operations of armed forces. Wars are commanded by one person's will, not the collective will. Since ancient days, there have been attempts at collective command, and that has always led to very poor results. Kerensky was one who tried it, and everyone knows what happened to him.

Relationships between officers and soldiers were good until the Russian Revolution. One of the resources to foment the revolution ("bringing the revolution to life") was the artificial encouragement of soldiers to oppose their officers. The Communists are now using these resources in the countries where they are trying to institute a paradise system.

When the World War began, officers in all European armies were very much respected by their soldiers. The officers obtained this respect because of the things that they do and because of their moral strength. During the first year, this respect increased even more thanks to the heroism of officers and their self-sacrifice. The heroism of officers during the war is demonstrated if we look at statistics about how many of them fell in battle or were injured. In the Russian army division in which I served, more than 40% of officers and about 30% of soldiers were killed or wounded during the first battle on August 26, 1914, and the percentage of officers who were killed or wounded was particularly high. During subsequent battles at Warsaw, Rawa, Łódź, Przasnysz and Siauliai, too, the percentage of killed or wounded officers was higher than that of soldiers. I remember a night-time battle near Siauliai in May 1915, where the battalion lost seven officers and 18 soldiers.

The 74<sup>th</sup> regiment of the German army lost 31% of active duty officers, 20% of reserve officers and 14% of soldiers. The 11<sup>th</sup> rifle battalion lost 32% of active duty officers, 19.5% of reserve officers and 18% of soldiers.

Officers shared all of the difficulties, battles, marches and relaxation with their soldiers. At each battle, an officer presented himself to the enemy by appearing above the battlements so as to survey the surrounding area. When the attack began, he went together with the soldiers and was far more exposed because he needed to see his soldiers. Officers often went in front of their soldiers. When the night arrived

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<sup>32</sup> *Latvijas Kareivis*, No 130 (14 June 1921).

after a difficult battle and the situation calmed down, soldiers rested, but the officer could not until he had fulfilled all of his duties in terms of making sure that the soldiers had been fed, that the number of bullets had been supplemented, that wounded soldiers had been evacuated, news had been received about the battle, and orders had been received about what would be done the next day. During marches and relaxation periods, the officer was always the first one and the last one. He ate food from the same pot as the soldiers did, and he had the same uniform as they did. I once saw a battery commander on the battlefield who was walking toward an observation point fainting because he was so terribly weary and hungry. I also heard a company commander criticizing a junior officer for taking food from the pot when all of the soldiers had not yet eaten. It was a cold and rainy night, and I saw an officer sleeping under a fir tree while his soldiers slept in a barn and in tents. Has any officer become rich during military life and found a comfortable life? No, war and rank-and-file service cannot ensure wealth or a comfortable life, though on the other hand, they surely can damage one's health. How many people in other state and private sectors gain benefits and so-called welfare with much less effort than is required for an officer's work? No one objects, while an officer is often seen as a necessary evil and faces harsh agitation. In other countries many officers came from the upper classes, but the only difference between an officer and a soldier in Latvia was the amount of knowledge they had about wars. There are frequent cases in Latvia in which one brother is serving as an officer, while the other brothers are simple soldiers. That is why officers in Latvia cannot be seen as a separate class in society. They are simply a different professional category, just like doctors, attorneys, etc. The work of officers during peacetime and wartime is a narrow area of specialisation, and officers, therefore, cannot be dragged into other sectors. They cannot be used as agitation resources, by which I mean that if a political party is dissatisfied with the government it engages in agitation against officers who, in truth, must be entirely outside of politics. On the other hand, officers and the army cannot be used as an internal political weapon. Officers cannot be assigned duties or activities that are not part of their specialisation. Only then will officers and their work and moral characteristics receive respect and love from their soldiers and from the public at large.

# THE DUTIES OF AN OFFICER<sup>33</sup>

## I

Every army consists of commanders and subordinate people. All modern armies are made up of permanently serving war specialists who train and manage recruits or a mobilised nation. War specialists are officers. During peacetime they train the whole nation, and during wartime they lead the armed nation.

If we bring together several hundreds or thousands of people, train them for war activities, arm them and then divide them up into groups on the basis of a military organisation, then that will be a mob of armed people, not a military force. To turn them into a military, there must be military spirit and discipline. This is the main, most important and most difficult duty for officers. An army is strong only if the officers fulfil this obligation. The introduction of a military spirit and discipline is how officers who are military specialists differ from the managers of other sectors. The managers simply show how work must be done and demand that it be done, and they are less concerned about training their employees.

The Latvian word for an officer is “virsnieks” which more or less literally translates to the superior one, and that in and of itself shows that the person who has that name must be superior to his subordinates. The officer must be superior and set a better example in terms of morals, science (education) and physical development.

Napoleon said that  $\frac{3}{4}$  of a victory is based on moral strength, while  $\frac{1}{4}$  is based on material strength. This means that the moral training of a military force is most important. The role of each officer in this sense means that he must set an example in all areas in which he makes demands to his subordinates. He must never do things that he would not want his subordinates to do.

The first issue here is lawfulness. A state cannot exist if there is no lawfulness, and that is even more important for an army. Every officer must set an example of lawfulness. He must fulfil all laws very strictly, make sure that all of his subordinates do the same, and make sure that laws are implemented so that the laws protect them. If the lawful rights of subordinates are offended, the officer must defend them. If a soldier does not receive what the law says he should receive, then his

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<sup>33</sup> *Latvijas Kareivis*, No 86, 87 (5 June 1920).

commanders are responsible for that fact. If there is no lawfulness in a military unit, then the commander is to blame, to say nothing about a case in which the commander does not strictly obey the law.

War discipline is most tightly linked to general lawfulness, and everything that I have said about lawfulness fully applies to war discipline, as well. I have discussed war discipline in several articles, so this time I will only report the fact that war discipline can be introduced and taught only from the top to the bottom. If a military unit lacks discipline, then the blame rests with its direct commanders, because they also do not have discipline.

This training of lawfulness and discipline must be a part of the whole military's life and work. During peacetime that is training during free hours on battlefields, in barracks, on streets and in public locations. During wartime it relates to leisure, marches and battles. Officers must set an example and leave a good moral impression on subordinates.

If a manager demands that his subordinates never get drunk, then he must never be drunk. If a manager behaves impolitely at a club, a restaurant or elsewhere, then it is clear that he will not be able to ensure politeness among his superiors. If officers wear their uniform not just when on duty, but at other times, then that means that they must always be at the height of their military rank. Those who cannot should not wear the uniform. Russia's army would never have collapsed if the officers had done their best. The German army did not collapse after the revolution and a heavy war. The collapse of Russia's army began not in 1917, but in 1914, and it started from the top and among officers. The first sign was the stealing of the property of others, which was begun by officers. When the military moved forward, officers began to loot the most valuable things from abandoned homes and send them home. That began in 1914, and very quickly this process became extensive. Officers stole pianos, rugs, clothes, horses and even automobiles, to say nothing of gold and silver items. Soldiers saw that as an example. They could not carry around and send various things, so they looked for gold or money. That was the beginning of extensive looting. Everyone who managed to send a lot of property or money to their homes tried to get home or to the back of the lines. The concept that "the courageous ones were shot, the cunning ones were taken prisoner, the idiots are on the frontlines, and the smart ones are behind the lines" began to appear in 1915. The same commanders inculcated one of the ideas from the Communist programme into their soldiers — the rejection of private property. I will say that that was an official command from the commander in chief of the Russian army, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolayevich. It was secret command that was



received by Division N on November 1, 1914. The duke said that when Silesia was invaded, all of the valuable things that could be found in the industrial region should be taken away — factory machinery, farming tools, etc. Those things that were not easy to transport had to be destroyed irrespective of whether it belonged to the enemy state or private individuals. That applied to the private property of the enemy nation, and during a war it is easy to accuse any private individual of being an enemy and to take away his property. In practice it proved that that was not even necessary. Soldiers could simply grab anything that they liked. Who was going to complain? How would the guilty party be found? I will never forget something that one of my comrades at the academy predicted in August 1915 in Minsk: “Just wait, these same compatriots will stab us [officers] in the stomach six months from now with their swords.” It actually took a year-and-a-half, not six months, but the prediction was precise for the Russian army. Russian officers failed to set a good example for their soldiers, because they were weak themselves in this regard (the best officers either fell in battle or were crippled).

These are the most evident and vulgar moral properties that are visible to everyone. There are, however, many other properties that are hidden, and subordinates are therefore not seen as moral. This, in truth, has very bad effects.

## II

The first attempt to guess about the lack of courage with a few imagined excuses (inability, a lack of knowledge, illness, etc.) means that false reports are sent to superior officers: “Because of big losses and too much enemy fire means that I cannot...”

Each officer is responsible for his section, and if a subordinate or the entire section has done something incorrectly, then the officer cannot blame the subordinate in front of the commander: “The company commander did not do what he was supposed to do, and that is why this problem happened.” Officers must accept an example from one of the most famous war leaders in the 17<sup>th</sup> century, Turenne, who thanked his military after very victory: “I thank you, you have won.” After each failure, he said: “Forgive me, I was defeated.”

Particularly during difficult situations, officers can be heard whining, being disgusted about difficulties, and harshly criticising their superiors and the government. If an officer or war specialist says that the march is too long, the enemy is too strong or the enemy’s positions cannot be taken, what are the subordinates, non-specialists and those who do ordinary work supposed to think? How can a battalion repel an enemy’s attack if the commander says frankly that the gunfire

from the enemy is too strong and that “we” cannot withstand it? How can a military unit do its work if officers say that the government cannot do anything and does everything poorly? Such talk means demoralisation of the military force. If the enemy is too strong, then the officer should report that fact to his superiors without reducing his own section. If an officer is truly convinced that the government is acting incorrectly and erroneously, then he must report that to his superior and wait for an explanation.

Officers must know how to lead their subordinates not just on the battlefield, but during the entire service period, and they must train them. The highest rank officer has a larger subordinated military force and a more complicated organisation. He needs to know more.

Each officer must be familiar with general war theories and all of the details of weapon groups (infantry, artillery and others). He must also be familiar with the equipment that he has. The knowledge is not as simple as lots of people think, and some of our army’s officers have become sure of this because of officer courses. People can learn to drive an automobile that is in good shape in an hour’s time, but months, not hours, are needed to permanently drive it and maintain and repair it. The same is true of companies and brigades that are led into battles, and that is the same as going to battle. To permanently command, train and rear a company in the spirit of war, a great deal of knowledge is necessary. The art of war, moreover, is constantly developing and moving forward, and that is why each officer must constantly learn about and track the development of the art of war. Otherwise our knowledge about war will become old, it will have to be supplemented with the latest achievements on the battlefield, and that will cost a lot of blood. If an officer lacks knowledge, then his subordinates will sense that, and such an officer will lose authority and respect in the eyes of their subordinates. They will not trust him on the battlefield during a war, because the military unit will prove to be far weaker, even if the correct orders are issued. Without trust, there cannot be rapid and courageous actions. Officers must have knowledge and know how to train subordinates and explain things to them in every event. Officers must also be very familiar with their subordinated company. They must know each subordinate and take care of him. Officers can take care of companies only if they have a good knowledge of what it needs, what it does, what is lacking, how its situation can be improved, etc. If an officer does that constantly, then he will receive the trust and respect from his subordinates.

When it comes to physical superiority, it is impossible, of course, to demand that each officer is stronger and cleverer than every subordinate. It can be and must

be demanded that officers are more durable than their subordinates. Demonstrating durability during all difficult situations sets an example. If an officer says that the march is too difficult and that it is not possible to go forward, then what should the subordinates say and do? That means that if the officer is not more durable than his subordinates, then he is not doing his job. In a difficult march when subordinates are already tired, the officer must set an example with a bright facial expression and encouraging words to raise the mood of the military unit. After a march, the officer has lots of work to do. He must put all of his subordinates into their places, feed them, ensure their security, file reports with superiors and only then have the right to rest. Ongoing care about subordinates is possible only if the officer is durable and can easily deal with weariness, a lack of food, sleepless nights, heat, cold and other war-related difficulties.

During peacetime, too, officers must have better working abilities. An officer cannot attend lessons on the field or at barracks without pre-preparations. He must prepare for them, prepare the programme, know what to teach and know what and how to explain and demonstrate things. If not, the training will not be successful, and the trainees will be bored. Officers must always be interested in, care for, and ensure the welfare of subordinates in terms of housing, food, apparel, etc. It was long ago that old-time Russian officers arrived at training sessions after a delay, chatted, smoked and then went home. Training in the Latvian army is led by officers personally, and they are only helped by sergeants and corporals whom they have trained. That means that the officer must work harder in relation to training than his subordinates do. It is also true that officers must learn new things. War knowledge is constantly progressing, and an officer who does not keep that in mind will lag behind. Wars can only be won by moving ahead, and during peacetime, peace can only be ensured by an army which develops along with the science of war. In this sense, in the peacetime this is mostly represented by officers. The training, work and recognition of officers provide strength to the army. He, who receives more, faces more demands.

## ON GENERAL STAFF<sup>34</sup>

The organisation of a country's defence is a very difficult and complicated issue. This work is particularly hard for newly established countries that do not have experience with defence issues. The defence of peacetime depends on national defence organisations, which means preparing for war in all sectors. The military force must be trained, and its battle capacities must be increased. There is an old saying that soldiers on a battlefield only do things that they have learned during peacetime. Learning during a war proves to be very expensive and costs a lot of unnecessary bloodshed. Each army's mistake or negligence during preparations means that the cost is the bloodshed of the nation. I think it is necessary for Latvia's army to transfer to a peacetime, discussing the issue of one of the main defence sectors — the General Staff. Latvia has never had a military force, so we do not have a clear and correct sense of what General Staff is. It is often confused with other headquarters. All that we know has to do with the old tsarist army in Russia, and its system and techniques are very often seen as examples and foundations. The General Staff of Russia's army were not in the right place until the Russo-Japanese war. Only after the sad experiences of this war was proper attention paid to the General Staff. It could not be changed immediately, it was a gradual process. During the World War, Russia's army showed that the reorganisation of General Staff ensured the best results.

General Staff are nothing new in armies. They have existed for a long time, but with different names. The name of General Staff and limits on their operations occurred during the early 19<sup>th</sup> century, when people's armies began, armed nations went to war, and governments with mercenaries no longer did so. Prior to the French Revolution, there were small armies of mercenaries, and the commanders were one of the mercenaries or ruling kings, their close relations such as princes, dukes, etc. These commanders often had very little knowledge about the art of war, so they had "advisors" who were Chiefs of Staff. During the age of Napoleon, enormous armies appeared, and that made wars and battles more difficult. The battlefield was very broad. An 1813 battle at Bautzen had a front line that was more than 15 kilometres long. That meant that the commander could not survey the battlefield and personally lead the battle.

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<sup>34</sup> *Latvijas Kareivis, military supplement*, No 1 (17 February 1921).

Napoleon's marshals were famous after the first wars, and not just because of the knowledge that they had about extensive wars beginning in 1812. Some of these marshals were assisted by capable Chiefs of Staff. Napoleon's opponents did not do better. He was beaten in 1813, 14, and 15 not by General Blucher, but by the true commander — Blucher's Chief of Staff, Gneisenau. The founder of Russia's General Staff Academy and the most modern headquarters was the Chief of Staff of Napoleon's Marshal Ney, Jomini. After his commander fell in battle, he joined the Russian service. In 1805, Napoleon read a book by Jomini, "Great Tactical Deals," and after doing so, he said: "Can we even say that time is not moving forward? The young major teaches things that no scientist has proposed and only a few generals understand. How could Fachtet (the prefect of Paris) permit the printing of this book? After all, that means exposing all of my art of war to the enemy!"

In the wake of Napoleon, all European countries organised general conscription, which created enormous armies. That meant that the destiny of all countries was determined very seriously by wars. Preparing, assembling, training and arming these enormous armies was very expensive and difficult. Thanks to ongoing progressive and new technical resources, war as such became weightier and more responsible. Training and the command of armed forces required people with specialist knowledge and great work capability. All the major powers in Europe established military universities, and the most successful graduates were assigned jobs at General Staff. That meant that General Staff had the most capable soldiers. That should have been the case, but it was not always so. During the Russo-Japanese war, the Russian General Staff did not pass the practical test in terms of preparing the army and commanding it during the war. During the era of General Dragomirov as commander of the academy, there was a system of protectorates, with total arbitrariness. Most of the graduates of the academy were brilliant guard officers. Most of them were capable, hard-working and energetic, but after they were graduated from the academy, they were not given jobs that corresponded to their areas of specialisation. They sat around in offices or looked for other careers. The final word in preparing the armed forces rested not with General Staff, but instead with the royal court and its guards. The commanders of the academy after Gen. Dragomirov did things that suggested that the academy was quite liberal and even suspicious. Tsar Nikolai II visited the academy only once during his rule, though he visited other educational institutions quite frequently. After the Russo-Japanese war, the academy and the General Staff received the greatest attention. Entering and being graduated from the academy was positioned so that everyone was in the same situation, and protection and wealth were of no

importance at all. When General Scherbachov took over command of the academy that is exactly what happened. General Staff introduced useful reforms — two years in commanding a company, four months in commanding a battalion and two to three years in commanding a brigade. It was mandatory to deal with knowledge, there was a lot of time for learning, cadets were added to other weapons classes, and there was very strict attestation. Still, it is not easy to quickly change habits and procedures that have taken root for decades. The reforms had not completely taken root at General Staff at the beginning of the war, particularly among the older generations. Still, during the Great War, Russia's General Staff proved that it was at a higher level than was the case during the Russo-Japanese war.

The World War and all of the battles were commanded by the officers of the General Staff of the relevant countries, as well as by the direct commanders of military units. It was no accident that when discussing the war, the global press wrote not about generals, but about General Staff. When discussing Germany, the focus was on Ludendorff and Falkenhain, who were never senior commanders. General Staff were blamed for every failure, and the failures meant the dismissal not of commanders, but instead their Chiefs of Staff. This was particularly hard for a unit if the unit commander was not the officer of General Staff. In that case, the Staff were supplemented with one of the more capable officers from General Staff. In 1916, it was not Brusilov who broke through the front lines of the enemy; it was his Staff. Even if there is a totally capable commander with lots of knowledge and experience, the Chief of Staff must be helpful. If the commander is away, the Chief of Staff and the General Staff commander issue instructions and commands. If the commander of the General Staff is unable to do so, then he cannot be the commander. In that case, a different General Staff officer must be found — one who can be trusted. Even if a commander has poor relations with General Staff officers, they will still have a great influence on his war activities. Information arrives through them, and all instructions and orders pass through them. That is natural, and there is no other option. The most difficult and responsible work must be done by those who are best prepared for it in practical and theoretical terms. The most serious and responsible work must be done by the most capable employees. They can be General Staff officers or others, but if there is an army, then it needs General Staff.

Training of armed forces during peacetime involves the following areas of activity, which require a great deal of theoretical knowledge and war experience:

- 1) Armed forces organisations during wars and peacetime. We cannot simply take another country's organisation as an example and follow it. Russia's



army ended the war pettily, changing the organisation with which it started the war. Does that show that Russia's organisation was good? Germany and France changed their organisations substantially during the war, and at the end of the war, the organisations were quite different. Why did they do so? Did Germany or France have the most advantageous organisation at the end of the war? Here we have to look at the reasons upon which one type of organisation or another depends. These reasons must be compared to the country's financial, national, territorial and cultural circumstances so as to decide what would be the most advantageous peacetime and war organisation, keeping in mind the fact that fundamental principles that have been implemented in the past are hard to change.

- 2) The transfer of a military force from peace to war — mobilisation. This work demands the highest level of seriousness and specificity. Latvia's army is of importance only if it can quickly move from peace to war. Mobilisation plans must have very detailed work hour by hour. If a calculation is erroneous, the whole mobilisation process will fall apart.
- 3) Training of a military force to ensure that it does not have to be retrained on the battlefield. It is very hard to know what to teach, how to teach and how many men should be trained. The extensive experiences of the Great War on the western and eastern front must be taken into account. These experiences must lead to conclusions about possibilities in future wars, and it is on this basis that forms of training must be accepted. We must track war science and literature abroad and use it to train lower and higher-ranking officers. Training must be based on a single centre and a single set of principles so that there are no misunderstandings on the battlefield — conflicts among top commanders, distrust from top to bottom and vice versa, etc. These are phenomena which began in the Russian army after the first battles, because training of the Russian army (particularly high-ranking officers) was not unified.
- 4) Preparing and using a plan to launch a war when the military force exists during peacetime. For as small a country as Latvia, initial war operations may be decisive in terms of the whole war. Traffic organisation is of key importance here, because railroads have become a major war resource.
- 5) Of great importance is a partnership between the army and the coastguard.
- 6) Information must be collected about other armies and particularly possible enemies, making use of this knowledge for the army.

- 7) The issue of preparing a country for war (entire nations engage in present-day wars), including fortifications, roads, various industrial sectors, training of reservists, preparation of young people, etc.

These are the main sectors which require major theoretical and practical knowledge and seriousness, particularly because all of this work must be harmonised with the country's economic situation. 10-inch cannons are a good thing, but if our finances allow us to buy only two of them and if their cost were the same as that of 24 field cannons, then which ones should be bought? The country's economic situation makes it possible to offer training for all officers who are at least 20 years old for six months, or training for just some of them for 18 months. Which option is more advantageous? There are lots of questions of this type, and it is of critical importance not only to observe the proper fundamental principle, but also to bring it to bear.

None of the aforementioned sectors can be developed individually, because they are all closely linked. Organisations depend on tactics. Mobilisation depends on the organisation — the plan to launch the war, the first operations and, therefore, the placement of the military during peacetime. Decisions about all of these issues must be totally unified and based on the same principles.

These sectors do not tolerate changes. Once the order and fundamental principles are agreed, they must be preserved for a long time. Changes can be made in an active army, but the war is led by the nation and by mobilised conscripts. In that case, the nation's reservists who have been trained on unified tactical techniques in the past will face other tactical techniques upon mobilisation.

# MORAL BOLSTERING OF THE ARMY AND THE PEOPLE<sup>35</sup>

The World War and particularly the revolution have largely changed views about morality. Societies and organisations are being established for physical exercise, the spread of technical and general knowledge, the facilitation of art, literature, etc., but nothing has been heard about moral bolstering or the spread or facilitation of moral ideas. Society and the army focus only on material factors. We often hear the idea that modern wars are technical resources wars and nothing more. I heard the same after the Japanese war, when several fairly high-ranking people said that present-day wars are purely technical and material, which means that they can be calculated on the basis of mathematical formulae. The broader audience likes such ideas very much, and if someone foolishly says something with aplomb, then the ideas are accepted without any consideration and spread very quickly even though they do not have any foundation at all. The Russo-Japanese war proved exactly the opposite. The Russians were much stronger in material terms. They had a larger army and endless war resources. The Japanese only had moral strength, and that beat the material strength. During the World War, from the beginning to the end of the process, the superiority of material and technical resources was on the side of the Allies. They had a larger army, an even greater superiority in terms of war materiel and technical resources, and all of the world's material war resources were in the hands of the Allies. Germany had moral force, and the Allies could not overcome that with all of their unlimited and inexhaustible resources. As soon as the moral strength of Germany collapsed during the summer of 1918, it was very easy to beat it. An examination of each World War battle shows clearly that moral forces played the major role everywhere. Germany never had superiority on the Russian frontlines in terms of the number of soldiers and arms, but they always won battles. On the Western front, the Allies could not break through the German front lines with all of their technical resources. Even better examples are seen in the wars of Soviet Russia. The Menshevik armies were huge and well supplied with all technical resources, but they were morally degraded, and so they were rapidly destroyed by the Soviet Bolsheviks. The enormous Bolshevik army did not win

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<sup>35</sup> *Latvijas Kareivis*, No 146 (5 July 1921).

any battle against very small national armies that had very little war materiel and technical resources, but were very strong in moral terms. It is necessary to look at war events just a little bit to be completely certain about what Napoleon once said: "Victory depends  $\frac{3}{4}$  on moral factors and  $\frac{1}{4}$  on material factors." Recent wars have really shown that this is the case.

The point, however, is that moral forces have a dominant role in the lives of nations not just during wars, but also during peacetime. Germany was totally destroyed during the war and has to pay unprecedented reparations, but it is already starting to compete successfully in trade and industry with the victorious countries, including those that have enormous capital and gold and to which Germany has to pay reparations. How could Germany compete? Only with its moral strength. After all, England and France do not have fewer engineers and technicians than Germany does do. They do not have fewer factories and machinery, but Germany does not have colonies from which raw materials can be extracted and to which industrial goods could be sold. Germany has no fleet, no advantageous trade agreements or concessions, etc. That means no material advantages. Comparable examples exist in many other countries. For instance, we can compare Romania and Belgium. Romania suffered little in the war, has all the riches and major war benefits, but it is not flourishing. Belgium was badly damaged, but it is developing very quickly. The strength of a nation and an army is hidden in their moral characteristics.

Latvia's army and nation clearly demonstrated great moral strength during Latvia's liberation wars on the Bermont and Soviet Russian front lines. The moral strength of Latvian soldiers was best seen in its operations against the Red Army. Every day and ordinary events were ones in which small Latvian units took hostage far more soldiers than the number of soldiers in our units. In other cases, our small units captured the cannons and machine guns of the enemy. If such moral force existed in the army, then it is clear that the force came from the nation. The army came from the nation. Not just during war, but also during peacetime, the people of Latvia have demonstrated their healthy and strong moral force. Latvia was ravaged by war and is poor, but it is flourishing. Next door is enormous Russia with enormous resources. It did not suffer much from the war, and it is sinking rapidly, as opposed to flourishing.

If the Latvian people and the army demonstrated a high level of moral strength, then that does not mean at the end of the day that this strength has achieved its maximum and could not be greater. We must remember that Latvia had to engage in a liberation war which endangered Latvia's sovereignty, Latvia as a state, and the personal welfare and even freedom of every Latvian. If Latvia had lost the

war, it would now be a Soviet Russian province where the situation would be precisely the same as in our neighbouring Pskov and Vitebsk provinces — famine, epidemics, a complete lack of the most necessary things, as well as total personal insecurity and slavery under the Communists. Every Latvian understood this, and that increased the strength of every Latvian and every soldier. It was a life or death war with bodily and spiritual death for everyone. If we look at crime statistics in Latvia now and before the war, then we see that there is much more crime than there was before the war. The percentage of crimes during Latvia's liberation war was higher in our army than it was in the Russian army in 1914 and during the first half of 1915. Among the major crimes in the army are deserting, robbery and illegal arbitrariness. These are mostly cases that represent the degradation of the army. On the one hand, the army demonstrated great heroism and great moral force. On the other hand, the army does have symptoms of degradation, and that shows that most soldiers are very strong in moral terms, but there are also some soldiers with a very low level of morality. The army obtains strengths and weaknesses from the nation, and these properties can be increased or weakened in the army. During a long and difficult war, the army cannot make do without moral support from the whole nation, and the mood of each soldier largely depends on the mood of his closest relatives back home. Even if we do not compare Latvia's general crime statistics to the ones before the war, we can safely say that Latvia has a certain share of people who are weak in moral terms. Morally strong and weak elements tend to spread their influence and characteristics to others, and that basically means a certain war between positive and negative morals. Greater success in spreading views rests with those who find advantageous circumstances and receive more support. If most people have a strong and high level of morality, then presumably they would spread their influence to everyone and very quickly. The truth, however, is that there have always been more positive elements than bad ones. How can it be, then, that crime has increased? The thing is that good elements are less active. They are quiet and not pushy, and no one really sees their characteristics, and particularly the results of their activities. Bad elements are pushy and noisy, and the results of their activities are often very tempting to others, at least for a certain period of time. After all, everyone wants to become rich. Everyone knows someone who does easy work, gains all of the benefits of life and tries to encourage others to follow his example. He tries very cleverly to prove that no one should be a fool "in this day and age" in terms of not using advantageous circumstances. Fraud is nothing bad, it just cleverness. No one lives without giving or receiving bribes, and every sensible person tries to turn the state's property into private property if he is

smart enough to ensure that he does that in accordance with “the letter of the law.” Someone with an imbalanced nature and weak morals will easily yield before such talk and examples.

Countries with government institutions support good and positively moral elements. Official state support is very dry and unsuccessful. It is made up of laws, and bureaucrats monitor their implementation. The law in and of itself cannot raise morality. Negative elements will use words and deeds to prove very easily that the law is a rock on the road which blocks “fools” (honest elements), while it points out ways of avoiding the rock to smart people. Bad and morally negative elements also receive support — powerful, advantageous and very favourable support. This support comes from Communists beyond our border.

Raising the level of morality in the army and the whole nation requires more than just an official law. Raising morality must be ensured in the same way as increasing knowledge, art and physical education. In addition to official legislation, the government must help with other resources. Morally strong elements must be encouraged to be more active. The raising up of the nation’s moral views must begin in school and then continued at various organisations, associations, etc. The army will take things from the nation and will continue to enhance moral strength. This sector must be very broad in the army. The moral element must first be enshrined among officers, who must then strengthen it among career soldiers and then new draftees.



# THE IMPORTANCE OF MORAL STRENGTH IN A WAR<sup>36</sup>

## I

In the wake of major achievements in war and battle resources, people and soldiers often say that technical resources play the major role in war, while people who are soldiers only have a secondary role. The idea is that victory will be ensured by those who have better technical war resources or more of them. This is nonsense. Now, as always, people are the main element in wars and battles. Weapons (technical resources) are not decisive in battles; the people who use those weapons are decisive.

In previous wars with simple weapons, soldiers only needed enthusiasm or an example from commanders and comrades so that they could successfully wage battles which took a very short period of time. In addition to enthusiasm, a present-day soldier has to use very complicated weapons in times of danger. What's more, battles drag on and on, and so the enthusiasm that was present at the beginning of the battle dissipates completely. In that case, the soldier can continue the battle only if he has a constant source of moral strength. If we look at the use of technical resources, we see that that requires even greater moral strength. Aviation during peacetime relates to danger, but during a war, it requires extraordinary moral strength — flying and combating the enemy in the air means that any failure almost automatically means death. We know that the greatest percentage of fallen soldiers in the war came from the aviation sector. If we look at tanks, we see nearly the same. Sitting in a tank or armoured personnel carrier that attracts the enemy's fire is far harder than to be in an open field, where an individual is far harder to see and where he can hide in any little ditch. When Junger saw tanks on the battlefield, he declared that he would never want to sit in such a metal box. It is also true that the technical resources which the enemy has are not all that terrible if there is sufficient moral strength. Aviators with bombs and machine guns cannot achieve much if the relevant ranks adapt to the environment. Tanks do poorly at firing their guns when they are moving, and it is hard to steer them. Chemical weapons also are not

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<sup>36</sup> *Latvijas Kareivis*, No 212, 213 (1929).

as terrible as we might think. They must be in vast amounts before they are deadly — far more than is the case with explosives.

The best machine gun, airplane, cannon, tank and chemical weapon will mean nothing if the person who uses them lacks the courage of a soldier. At a difficult moment in the battle, he will abandon the weapons and seek shelter so as to avoid any encounter with the enemy. Lotharingus (an artillery specialist) wrote: The thing that helped us the most and, at the end of the day, always meant success for us was the strength of our infantrymen in close-up battle. That will always be the case. If a war in the future means any grenade trench can be taken over with a 42 cm gun, then the distance of the shooting would increase tenfold, and the speed of the shooting would increase to the same amount, but the battle will be decided by an infantryman in close-up battle.” That means that the results of a battle will always depend on moral strength.

Books about tactics always discuss the material and physical aspects of war, but they have little to say about moral factors. Regulations emphasise the great importance of moral factors at first, but then they turn to material and physical issues. That is because peacetime training for soldiers cannot calculate the scope of moral factors. This is not something that can be mapped theoretically, and during field training, it has to be assumed that the moral factors are equal on both sides. Any attempt to calculate them would be comparable to complete fantasy.

## II

Commanders during wars, and particularly those who command larger units cannot increase moral strength, at least in the short term, and during a war, moral strength does not yield before any calculation. A commander can quickly regroup numerical forces and material resources, and that is why tactics mostly have to do with the material and physical aspects of war.

The size of moral strength during war shifts. It increases when there is success and declines when there is a failure. The average, however, can be changed very slowly and over the course of a longer period of time. Russian corps which took part in the defeat of Austrians in August and September 1914 had strongly increased their moral strength, but when they were sent against the Germans at Lodz, the level of moral strength quickly collapsed after the first German attacks. Moral strength can be developed in peacetime, and it is not enough, moreover, to do so just in the army. The same must happen in the nation as a whole.

Lots is being said and written these days about how to cultivate moral strength among soldiers. Before the World War and in the more distant past, this was not

discussed much, and no attention was devoted to it in any military force in any country at all. Still, military forces fought courageously and with much self-denial in wars in the past. There are two reasons why it was possible to make do without the cultivation of moral strength in the past, while it is not the case anymore. First of all, soldiers used to be drafted for mandatory service for a long period of time, and during that time, soldier-like properties appeared by themselves. Now service periods are very short, and that is why cultivation techniques are needed. It is also true that never in the past was there anti-militaristic propaganda. Today lots of people are constantly proclaiming anti-militarism and hatred among the classes. Many drafted soldiers arrive with the opinion that there is no need to combat an external enemy; instead, battle must be waged against the “bourgeois.” Those are reasons why we must particularly focus on how to raise moral strength through cultivation during peacetime. I already mentioned that this must be done in the whole nation. The army can ensure such cultivation only in the army, but if that is a successful process, then it can gradually be spread among the whole nation, including those who went to army school and those who have been released from mandatory service.

# THE NATURAL AND NECESSARY URGES OF PEOPLE AND THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THESE URGES DURING WARTIME<sup>37</sup>

## I

Any normal and physically and morally healthy person has inborn and subconscious urges to reproduce so as to continue his or her dynasty, just as is the case in the world of plants and animals. Nothing else would be possible. If there were no urges to reproduce, then there would be no reproduction, the dynasty would not continue, and extinction would begin. Perhaps there have been animals with no reproductive urge or a very weak urge, but such species of animals are no extinct. We have seen that in history and in terms of various nations. Ancient Rome disappeared because the Romans did not reproduce, and new and fresh nations took the upper hand. They mixed with the Ancient Romans, and the modern Italian nation is what emerged. The pampered lives of the Ancient Romans led to a lower reproduction urge. History tells us that many nations have disappeared. Some have disappeared because they have been conquered and assimilated by other nations, but others have disappeared from our sightline because they have been forgotten (indigenous tribes in North America and Australia). There are European nations where population numbers are shrinking, while in others they are increasing rapidly. This speaks to the strength or weakness of a nation.

Someone with an urge to reproduce naturally has an urge to protect his family, particularly his children. We see this very vividly in the animal kingdom. A little bird attacks a big dog or person who approaches its nest. All animals defend their offspring against much stronger animals. There is no doubt that people have to do the same, because that is only natural. People have brains, and so naturally they had to expand the concept of protecting children, transferring this concept to all relatives, tribes, nations and then countries. If there are no such principles or if they are weak, then the nation and country will fade away.

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<sup>37</sup> *Latvijas Kareivis*, 1929, No 223 (2 October), No 225 (4 October 1929).

A person who is a sentient being cannot limit himself to the point where only his family, tribe, nation or country reproduce numerically. The brain and emotions of a healthy person also seek to establish and ensure the welfare of his family, tribe, nation and country. This is a completely natural urge. If a person's successor and family live under favourable circumstances, then it will be able to develop in physical and spiritual terms, will be stronger and will be able to ensure welfare in the long term. The ongoing reproduction and existence as such will be secure.

Healthy people, tribes and nations have an urge to reproduce, to protect one another and to ensure welfare, and the same urge is found in other healthy people, tribes and nations. This has led to conflict since ancient times, when they involve individual people, families, tribes, etc. Someone wanted a more advantageous and larger hunting or fishing area, while someone else wants to take over the area or part of it. Prehistoric people settled such issues by fighting one another. As people merged into tribes, nations and countries, such battles seldom involved individuals. They were battles among tribes, nations and countries. True, this begs a question. If, thanks to the merger of people into larger alliances, battles among individuals and tribes gradually disappeared, but now there is a battle among countries, will this battle among countries also disappear if countries merge together, as the League of Nations hopes? The development of humanity and the progress of technologies means that the battle is being transferred to larger alliances, but there are many laws of nature to suggest that battles will never disappear completely.

## II

There is combat throughout nature, starting in the plant world. A young forest is very thick, while in an old forest, trees are more distant from one another. What happened to the other trees? They fell in battle. The stronger ones survived, while the weaker ones withered away. If we look at human lives, we see an endless battle which involves not weapons, but all kinds of secret and open resources. This battle is no less horrifying than an open battle with weapons in hand. If we read newspapers, we see how many people are ruined in physical, spiritual and material terms. It is clear that the idea that one person's fortune is based on another person's misfortune is entirely valid. There is always a competition in which someone wins and someone else falls.

Since the World War, we have seen another phenomenon — an emphasis on nationalism. Each nation that has reached a relevant level of culture tries to establish an independent country, and that is why there are more independent countries in Europe in the wake of the World War than there were before it. The League of

Nations is trying to bring these countries together, and that is happening, but only insofar as it is compatible with the interests of the various countries and nations. No country or nation will voluntarily join an alliance which harms its interests.

The League of Nation claims that all international issues will be settled in a peaceful manner, and if that that proves to be impossible, then with pressure. This begs the question of which foundations the league will have in dealing with these issues. There can be two kinds of foundations. First of all, the foundation could be the idea that the situation must remain as it is today — no one can change the boundaries of their country with force. That would be the most conservative and reactionary approach, and that has never existed in the history of our planet. In that case, a dying nation which is unable to live and develop even though it has a vast territory and lots of riches in the earth would continue to control its territory and those riches, while a second nation that is flourishing and is able to live and develop, is still locked in narrow boundaries and territories, and a lack of riches from the earth means that it cannot develop its culture. That would mean no further development of the planet.

The other possible foundation for the League of Nations would be a decision that is in the spirit of development laws — settle conflicts in favour of the side that is more capable of development and has a higher level of culture. How can the League of Nations now, however, determine which nation is more capable of development? Before the Russo-Japanese war, who could have determined which of the two countries was more capable of development and had a higher level of culture and morality. Prior to 1912, would anyone have predicted Turkey's internal collapse, and prior to 1915, who would have predicted its recovery with the New Turk movement? Prior to 1914, who would have predicted the true internal weakness of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the true inner strength of Germany? These issues were fully addressed only during wars which showed which side had a greater capability for further development.

The League of Nations does not have any resources to force some country to obey its decisions. If the league finds such resources, they will only be sufficient against one small country. They could not be used against an alliance of countries (during the World War, it was all of Europe), because the resources would relate to the armies of both hostile alliances. Imagine France, Italy and Poland in one hostile alliance and England, Germany and Yugoslavia in the other. Which armed force would force the hostile sides to accept a decision by the League of Nations if it is disadvantageous for the countries?



Combat is a natural law, and it has been part of human nature since prehistoric times. If we can get rid of all prehistoric urges, then we will be able to prevent battles. In that case, however, there will be more lawsuits and larger police and other administrative organs, because then people would organise their lives exclusively on the principles of morality and ethics.

# DANGER<sup>38</sup>

Back when humanity was still barbaric, by which I mean the era between prehistoric people and cultured people, each person was almost constantly subject to danger. Prehistoric people faced all kinds of dangers — other people, animals, natural phenomena, diseases, etc. To support themselves and their families, people had to overcome these dangers by beating an opponent or competitor, beating animals and protecting themselves against natural dangers. Those families and tribes that proved unwilling or unable to overcome dangers were destroyed and disappeared without a trace. Those families and tribes that could fight and overcome danger survived and developed. From the very beginning people merged with totems and then families, tribes and nations so as more easily to overcome danger. This led to alliances of people, because individuals were still open to danger that they had to overcome themselves. There were battles with animals to get food, battles with competitors from the same tribe, etc. That is why a few people in each family and tribe had greater welfare and more influence on other family or tribe members, because they were stronger and more courageous in overcoming dangers and difficulties. The stronger and wiser people had better life circumstances and, eventually, a more privileged status. More powerful tribes battled for better hunting and grazing grounds, and that allowed them to develop further and further.

Danger conjured up a will to fight so as to overcome dangers and obstacles, and this is how humanity progressed. The urge for battle, thus, is the foundation for humanity's ability to achieve welfare, project and culture. The urge and will of battle are the healthy foundation of human nature. Even today and in cultural countries, people are constantly battling in all areas of life — trade, industry, agriculture, etc. The only difference is that these battles are hidden, and the victims of the battle are not visible and are hidden. Hospitals and shelters are just as full of the victims of the battle as is the case with war victims during an open war. The open battle or war happens if a hidden battle cannot ensure the intended goals. That means that battles continue to be a natural resource which helps humanity to progress and to attain a higher level of culture and development in physical, material and spiritual terms.

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<sup>38</sup> *Latvijas Kareivis*, No 229 (9 October 1929).

People have been aware of dangers ever since human minds developed, and so human nature, whether physical or spiritual, reacts strongly to any sense of danger. If danger appears suddenly, the first to react is the physical body. The heartbeat becomes faster, as does breathing. That means that the body is preparing for combat by strengthening the energy of muscles and brains. If the dangerous situation persists (e.g. under long-lasting artillery fire), many people become terribly thirsty and smokers really want to light a cigarette. That also helps to strengthen the body for battle. When facing dangers (as opposed to fears), human minds operate very quickly and sharply to differentiate between two different situations. One is when the person must not do anything if they remain inert (preparing to attack with heavy artillery bombardment or to shoot down an airplane). The other is when the battle may begin at any moment or has already begun. In the first instance, thoughts are fairly messy, but very fast. Sometimes people see their entire lives passing before their eyes. In the latter instance, thoughts are concentrated on the battle, and the mind is sharp enough to make correct and justified decisions on conclusions that would be quite impossible during peacetime or would be found only after a long period of pondering.

Danger is tempting and attractive to a physically and mentally healthy person, while someone who is not physically and mentally healthy will be afraid of everything. If people at a meeting, school or market were told that there is a little glass bottle with the deadliest poison, but in fact the liquid seems to be clear water, most people would go to take a look at this deadly liquid. We all remember how during the war, people brought various gifts and donations to military units because they wanted to be on the frontlines, they wanted to be “where there is gunfire.” Nearly anyone who feels any urge to be a hunter would really want to hunt a lion or tiger, not because he wants the pelt of the lion or tiger, but because this hunting is seen as something dangerous. A prehistoric ancestor is snoozing inside all of us, just waiting for the moment when he can pop up and release his instincts related to danger and combat.

# FEAR<sup>39</sup>

Prehistoric people were constantly endangered. There were dangers which people understood (another person, animal, etc.) and could overcome or at least had a chance to overcome. Other dangers were completely incomprehensible and were impossible to overcome — natural phenomena such as storms, floods or diseases, far superior enemies or many carnivorous animals. Danger that could not be overcome or seemed to be impossible to overcome created a sense of fear in people. Like many other prehistoric characteristics, this is still true of people today. The larger, the more incomprehensible and more unexpected the danger, the greater the sense of fear. The highest level of fear is a panic attack. If a person has no hope of overcoming danger, then there is no hope or will for doing so. The person is helpless in the hands of destiny. The minds go blank, and they have no physical strength to prepare for a battle. The person pales and has no thoughts or strength. Scared people often do things that should be done to overcome the danger, doing the opposite. During the war there were often situations in which a soldier who faced heavy fire from the enemy tried to save themselves by fleeing across an open field, as opposed to hiding in a ditch. Fear has no goal or compass to show the right direction, because the mind is blank. Fear also creates no instinctive reactions, because the instincts of prehistoric people in such cases have faded away. People in the past became totally paralysed because of fear, and cultured people today who feel a sense of fear submit themselves to the fates. A physically and mentally healthy person accepts a sense of fear only when encountering extremely strong, incomprehensible or unexpected dangers, and that means that a person who is easily frightened is not completely healthy in physical or mental terms. That is very evident when people get sick or are injured. The sickness or injury takes away lots of strength, and so the person becomes afraid of things that he completely ignored when he was healthy. A soldier from the World War told me that after a serious injury, he was in a hospital, and outside his window was a very steep mountain. The officer said that he was always afraid of this mountain, because he felt that it would collapse and bury the whole hospital, including him.

There are people who are afraid because of their human nature. In most cases that is someone whose physical or mental abilities have not developed normally

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<sup>39</sup> *Latvijas Kareivis*, No 231 (11 October 1929).

during childhood. There are other cases in which a normally developed or healthy person will be more courageous in some cases and more fearful in others. As noted, people who are sick, sense in their mind and subconscious that they have lost their normal strength to a greater or lesser degree, and so there is no hope of overcoming the danger. That leads to fear. For the same reasons, people yield before a sense of fear if they are tired, have not slept for a long time, have not eaten, etc. In such cases, people feel that their energy is dissipating and is not being supplemented. If the person rejects the sense of fear, his amount of energy (physical strength and nerves) will be supplemented. It is a matter of human nature to overcome danger and to win in a battle, and that is why people view a cowardly person with a certain amount of pity or scorn. The cowardly person is ashamed of his fear and tries to hide it from others. Fear is not a matter of honour; on the contrary, it is a matter of dishonour.

# WAR AND MORALITY<sup>40</sup>

If we consider war from the perspective of morality, then we need to break this question into two parts — national and personal morality.

When it comes to national morality, people tend to say that war as such is criminal and, therefore, unlawful. Pacifists (defenders of the idea of global peace) ask why someone who kills another person during peacetime is punished, but when a government sends thousands of people to slaughter thousands of people in another country, this slaughter is seen as heroism. This is empty babbling without any foundation. When someone attacks and kills someone else, the murder is very much different than a war. The murder is the will of a single individual, and that means that it is separate from and isolated from the will of others, and repulsive for the will, views and morality of other people and their organic or spiritual emotions. The killing of another person may have circumstances under which it is not murder, and so the person is exonerated by the courts and by all other people. This is not uncommon during times of peace. Not every killing can be compared to a murder. War involves a very different killing of other people, because that is done by nations. War is the will of an entire nation, not an individual. Common will is something higher — the highest organic engine for development, based on the fact that the nation, as a global organism, has the right to demand the opportunity to live and exist. The demand to live and exist can in no sense be called immoral. There can be cases in which nations or states engage in unlawful wars. There have been such cases in history — wars to pillage and gain riches. Such wars do not happen and cannot happen, however, in present-day Europe. The history of war shows that in three quarters of cases, the war is lost by the side that has unfairly launched it. If it has not lost, then the victory has proven to be too dear.

This explains the fact that present-day wars can be won only by a country in which the whole nation goes to war like a single man, and everyone has the same emotions about winning or dying. When a war begins, the government and its press can prove to the nation that the war is just, and the nation will believe in this, but not feel that the war is needed. That was the case with the Russo-Japanese war and, to a certain extent, the Great War. That was the main reason why Russia's army failed. The idea that the war was unfair in terms of Russia gradually seeped

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<sup>40</sup> *Jaunākās Ziņas*, 1920, 14 May (No 109), 15 May (No 110), 17 May (No 111).



through the whole army from top to bottom. That is the only way in which we can explain the enormous number of prisoners of war who ended up on the German side.

Another idea that relates to a situation in which a war as such is called immoral is the claim that war violates the Christian faith, because Jesus Christ denounced war. That is not true. The New Testament does not contain any denial of war, while the Old Testament has several scenes in which God orders nations to go to war. Jesus Christ says in the Gospel that he has not come to repeal the law, but to implement it. We also hear the complaint that soldiers were the ones who crucified Christ. This is nonsense and shows that anyone who makes that claim is ignorant of history. In Ancient Rome, military service was very honourable. Soldiers respected this honour, and the Roman government supported the military. That is why Roman soldiers were never used for any purpose other than to defend the state and to combat external or internal armed enemies. They did not carry out death sentences. Christ was crucified by Roman policemen who were armed and thus seen as soldiers. It was not long ago here in Latvia that the commanders of all of Russia's precincts were called officers.

The point here is that war as such cannot be called immoral, even if there are cases in which a state wages an immoral war.

When it comes to the effects of war on personal morality, it is often heard that war strongly weakens such morality. That is not true. The truth is that morality appears more openly during a war, when people are often facing the threat of death. When they look into the eyes of death, they very often demonstrate all of their instincts, no longer feeling that it is necessary to hide things that would be seen as immoral or evil during peacetime. During peacetime, people have such instincts, but they cannot be displayed openly. Such people oppress such instincts, though some satisfy them in a way that no one else knows about. If immoral things such as fraud, theft, looting, etc. appear far more often during a war, then that proves that this immorality is very common in the nation. During peacetime, when people have lawful and orderly lives, the government strictly oppresses such immorality, but during wars, they come to light. Armies come from the people, and only members of the nation can be part of the army. When General Staff had to collect information about neighbouring armies during peacetime, the information was collected not just about the army, but about the whole nation. The life of the nation completely characterises the army's activities during the war. If immorality spreads through an army, then that proves that morality in the nation has crumbled. The army of such a nation will never achieve any brilliant victories. If a nation's army suffers

great failures on the battlefield, then that is a medical diagnosis to show that the organism of the nation is rotting. Failures on the battlefield mean that the higher powers of the world are sending a warning to the people. If the people listen to the warning, they can improve themselves and will have a future. That happened in France, which received a warning in 1870 and 1871 and then improved its morality. The problem is with nations which do not heed the warning. Russia received the warning between 1904 and 1906, ignored it, and what is its situation now?

It is often said that war makes people rough externally and in their inner feelings. When a person spends months living in trenches, not rooms, spends several weeks without laundering his clothes, does not wash, eats what he can get and when he can get it, only talks and thinks about the war, and has no books or newspapers to read, it is clear that if such a person comes from trenches into a large city, he will externally seem to be rough and uncultured. If, however, we could peer into such a person's heart, we would see his cleanliness and subtlety. A person who has truly been moral and honest will only expand these characteristics on the battlefield, because a person who often has to stare into the eyes of death will not look at property with passionate eyes, will be sensitive in relation to his comrades, will share his last bite of food with them, and will never leave them in a critical situation. Someone who spends weeks under enemy fire and finds that his comrades are falling heroically one after another, will raise his eyes to the heavens and look for the power that rules all of the rulers of this earth. It is no accident that people say that the French nation found God during this war after losing this understanding since the age of the French Revolution.

When a new country is established with an army, the country and the army does not go down a fully determined lawful road. In that case, all human instincts have a very broad area of activities. The good characteristics of the nation combat the bad characteristics of the nation. If the good characteristics win, the nation can raise its sovereignty. Creative forces will overcome wrecking forces and will strengthen the nation's organism. If the bad characteristics prove to be stronger, then the wrecking forces will destroy everything that has been created, and the country which has just begun its life will soon end its sovereign life. Therefore, if we want to be sovereign country and nation, we must support all that is creative, moral and lawful. That has to be done not just by statesmen and civil servants, but by everyone who holds his or her independent fatherland dear. Lawfulness and morality must be present in the entire nation. Everyone must defend and support it, and in that case, lawfulness, morality and all other good characteristics will also be in the army.

# POLITICAL PARADOXES<sup>41</sup>

The Faculty of Medicine of the Königsberg University has awarded a *honoris causa* doctoral degree to General Ludendorff. The degree was awarded because his uncommonly broad knowledge about war saved the health and lives of countless German soldiers, protected Prussia against its enemies, and spread the fame of German military victories all the way to the deserts of Arabia.

The German newspaper *Bormacht* mocked the decision of the Königsberg University, asking where to find the countless lives which Ludendorff ended, and alleging that Ludendorff pushed hundreds and thousands of people into death. Where were Ludendorff's victories if the war was completely lost? After all, Ludendorff was responsible for this loss, the paper said.

Can a military leader be seen as the saviour of the life and health of his nation's citizens? The genial plans and orders of the leader would not have led to very brilliant victories, and the implementation of these plans and orders would demand vast sacrifice from the nation. The greater the war, the greater the battles, the greater the victories, and the greater the consequences of the victories, the greater will be the number of fallen and wounded troops. That means that the greater the military leader and the level of his fame, the greater number of human sacrifices will be attributed to with this fame. That is true on the one hand. On the other hand, there is the question of how many lives would have been sacrificed if the battle had been lost, not won. There is no doubt that the number would be far higher. If Ludendorff had not been victorious over the Russians at Tannenberg and the Mazurian Lakes, then the Russians would have defeated the German army, and the German army would have suffered far more losses in terms of fallen and wounded men. The Russians would have totally destroyed the German military and invaded Germany. The consequence would have been the loss of the lives and health of many peaceful residents.

Wars as such demand the sacrifice of lives and health, but the art of war leads to a victory, and the victory limits the number of victims on the victorious side. The greater the art of the military leader, the more the number of victims will be limited. When the war has already begun, the only way to limit the number of victims in the military force is to win every battle and every conflict.

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<sup>41</sup> *Latvijas Kareivis*, No 215, 217 (1921).

Starting a war is a completely different matter. Who begins and declares a war? Military leaders do not. That is done by the leaders of the relevant country's political and diplomatic world. Military leaders are often as far away from the reasons for launching a war as is the commander of a fire-fighting force from the reasons for a fire. Things written by Tirpitz, Kuhl and Ludendorff make it clear that the people who led the German armed forces were in no way involved in launching the war in 1914. On the contrary, Ludendorff wrote in 1911 and 1912 that Germany could not afford to be dragged into a war, because Germany's army was smaller than France's policy. For that reason, Germany must ensure obeisant policies, and if it wants to have equally harsh policies, then it must expand its army. Ludendorff used data and facts to show that in the event of war, the French army would be larger than the German army. Because of this presentation of negative evidence for Germany, Ludendorff was removed in 1912 from his important post as commander of Section 1 of the great General Staff. He was asked to return to a leadership role only when the diplomats had lit the fire of war. Equally harsh disagreements were between diplomats and military commanders in Austria. The commander of the General Staff, Conrad von Hötzendorf, warned Austria's foreign minister, Aehrenthal, several times to stop being harsh in his policies. In one letter to Aehrenthal, Hötzendorf wrote: "The leader of foreign policy must be aware of the foundation which supports foreign policy, i.e. the country's military forces. If the leader of policies is unaware of his country's military force, then his policies are not founded on any realistic foundation at all." The conflict between Aehrenthal and Hötzendorf ended with Hötzendorf being removed from his post as deputy commander of General Staff. The war minister ignored reports from the commander of General Staff and did not present them to Parliament or to the Cabinet of Ministers. Only in 1914, when the Cabinet of Ministers was discussing the issue of launching a war was the commander of General Staff brought in and asked whether Austria had any hope of success in the war. The commander of General Staff provided a definite answer: "Under current circumstances, Austria has no hope of success in the war." This reply upset the ministers, but diplomats immediately found an escape by posing another question: "Does Austria have better hopes for a successful war in the future?" The commander replied: "If Austria continues its current external and internal policies, it will not have hopes for a successful war in the future, either." This ended the role of the Chief of General Staff in deciding on whether to go to war. The conclusion of diplomats from the last reply was this: "If hopes in the future are not better than hopes at this time for success in the war, then the war must begin right away."

The great Prussian diplomat Bismarck had a different view of relations between politics and the military force of his country. When harsh diplomatic relations soured with France, Bismarck constantly engaged in harsh conversations to focus attention on reports from the Chief of General Staff about the status of military forces. In 1870, Bismarck decided on the final content of his final note when he received a certain response from the Chief of General Staff, General Moltke — that Prussia was prepared to launch a successful war against France. When preparing for the World War, political leaders in Germany and Austria did not feel that they must pay appropriate attention to the people who had to play leading roles in the war. Politicians prepared for war completely independently from military leaders. They declared war and then told the military leaders to go to war and win. While there is no critical situation and preparations are being made for it internally and externally, no attention is focused on the pronouncements of those who can be entrusted with the destiny of the whole country at the critical moment — war. The military leader is given full responsibility for the war, and often he is blamed for the start of the war. The military leader is blamed for the very first failures, even though these failures have been prepared by those who, during peacetime, prepared the armed forces and, during peacetime, found either allies or enemies in their neighbouring countries. Military leaders are blamed even if they win. In that case he is held responsible for major losses. All of those who actually launched the war and, during peacetime, prepared allies or enemies and their army, simply stand aside in such situations. They are not responsible for anything.

Each war must end with a victory for one of the warring sides and a loss for the other side. That means that one of the military leaders is naturally destined to disappear. A war only decides which military leader must die. One of the ancient specialists in the art of war declared that an army which loses a battle on the battlefield lost it long ago, before the war and during peacetime.

We are all convinced, and not without reason, that the victories of Marshall Foch made it possible for the independent Latvian state to be proclaimed. There is no doubt that there would be no independent Latvia if Germany had not lost the battle in the World War. There are even fewer doubts about the idea that if Russia had not lost the war, then there would be no independent Latvia. Of course, Russia was allied with France and England. If the Russian army had had the same success on the German frontlines as on the Austrian frontlines at the start of the war, then Marshall Foch would have been able to enter Berlin, but there would be no independent Latvia. Russia would have had more than enough ability not just to combat Bolshevism, because it would still have the army that was destroyed and

taken captive in 1914 by Ludendorff's forces at Tannenberg, the Mazurian Lakes and Łódź. If fate had smiled upon the Russian military, then no one would have thought about overthrowing the tsar. Ludendorff's victories paved the way for the Russian Revolution.

I remember very well something that an officer at Russian General Staff said in the autumn of 1915. He pointed to soldiers who were wandering around and said: "Just wait. Another six months will pass, and these same soldiers will turn their bayonets against us, the officers." Another officer from General Staff declared in the same autumn of 1915 that "Russia's only way of escaping catastrophe is to conclude not just peace, but also a convention with Germany." This means that serious observers in the autumn of 1915 understood clearly that Russia had lost all of its external and internal strength. Ludendorff took away this strength with his genially combined victories. It goes without saying that Ludendorff had no thoughts at all about Latvia's independence or about Latvia and Latvians as such. On the other hand, Marshall Foch, too, was insisting in the autumn of 1917 that no peripheral territories (except perhaps for Poland) could be allowed to split off from France's war ally, Russia. If Marshall Foch (France) had suggested that the Russian state might be split up, that would have been a betrayal against its loyal ally, Russia.

Is it not the case that all of this seems paradoxical?

# WHAT CAN WE LEARN FROM UKRAINE'S RECENT HISTORY?<sup>42</sup>

## I

Prior to the revolution, people who had not lived in Ukraine could not have imagined that the difference between a great Russian and a Ukrainian is almost the same as between a Latvian and a Lithuanian. In the past, the Russian state carefully hid anything that might point to the fact that Russia was populated not just by Russians, but also by other nations. At school we learned about a zone of black earth and about little Russians, and in classical Russian literature, we seldom found the word "Ukraine." Still, the word "Ukraine" was and remained so alien to us that we accepted it as a flower of literature and not a designation of truth.

Despite this, the fact is that there was a lively idea about an independent "Ukraine" in so-called Little Russia. True, this was the case only among some people who were part of the so-called "party of independents." The party was largely made up of smaller aristocrats, lower-level civil servants, teachers, etc. They were people who had closer links to the people and knew about and loved the nation. Many of them suffered various problems because of this approach. Members of the Ukrainian intelligentsia who only thought about a brilliant career and comforts in life were no longer called Ukrainians, because Ukrainian literature had been banned, and people were only allowed to speak Ukrainian in the villages. That is why the party of independents did not have many members of the intelligentsia. Ordinary people had partly forgotten about old Ukraine and its relative freedom. Ordinary people were more concerned about daily bread than about the fact that they were ruled by the "great Russians," but not by Ukrainians themselves. The Ukrainian loved the "great Russian," but because the whole administration and all the aristocrats either became "great Russians" or actually were "great Russians", there was universal hatred of these "great Russians", aristocrats and capitalists. For that reason, propaganda about Ukrainian independence, i.e. nationalist propaganda, quite naturally merged with socialist propaganda, and the idea of a struggle for independence melded together with a struggle against aristocrats,

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<sup>42</sup> *Latvijas Kareivis*, No 1, 4, 6, 9, 12 (1920).



capitalists and even the intelligentsia. This has caused and is now causing even greater losses because of the yearning for independence.

When Russia was defeated in the Far East, it once again cast its gaze on the Near East, and in the Slavic lands of the Donau monarchy, it started to introduce the idea of pan-Slavism, the aim being to merge all Slavic lands under the sceptre of a single tsar. The Austro-Hungarian Empire reacted to this by proposing the idea of Ukraine, beginning to implement it through Galicia and to the East. Ukrainians in Galicia won a few political rights at the expense of Poles. Classes were taught at the high school and university level in Ukrainian. Propagandists were the best representatives of the Ukrainian intelligentsia, including Professor Proshevski and others.

Despite all of this, prior to the revolution, the idea of an independent Ukraine was just a lovely dream in Russian Ukraine. The slogans of revolutionary freedom and the right of self-determination for nations launched energetic propaganda about Ukraine among Ukrainian prisoners of war. They were even brought together to form military forces for Ukraine.

True, the independents gained actual forces and resources for the Ukrainian state only after the collapse of the Russian army, with commanders deciding to position the idea of nationalism against the idea of Bolshevism. Military units and even frontlines began to be nationalised. The entire south-western and Romanian front lines were nationalised. The problem was that it is not possible to create an army from a nation that is carried away with propaganda. Ukrainian military units were not Bolshevik, but they were not much different from the Bolsheviks. The Bolsheviks reached Kyiv in 1918 and occupied it after fierce street battles. The Ukrainians had to retreat. The Central Rada of Ukraine understood that it was helpless and decided that only help from abroad would save Ukraine from the Bolsheviks. Because only central countries could offer real armed assistance, the Ukrainians turned to Germany.

Germany responded quickly and energetically. When returning to Kyiv, the Germans began to rule extensive and fairly wealthy lands. The Central Rada set off on a course that was democratic in social terms, but very chauvinistic in nationalist terms. People who wanted top jobs in the government did not need knowledge or experience. All that was needed was to be a democrat and a true Ukrainian. Thanks to this, many responsible jobs were taken over by various adventurers and speculators. They knew little of government affairs and cared little about the welfare of their motherland. Above everything else, they thought about their own personal interests, and they knew very well how to turn national property into their

own personal property. For these reasons, the Central Rada soon lost its authority and respect among people of all classes, including the Germans. Endless laws, instructions and orders were issued, but they were not harmonised and were often contradictory. The organs of one ministry hindered the work of organs at another ministry. At the end of the day, a poorly thought out agrarian law and instructions related to agriculture created complete distrust among farmers and aristocrats. The agreement with Germany said that Ukraine had to deliver a certain amount of grain to Germany, but that did not happen because of the utter incompetence in government. The Central Rada, which was in power only thanks to the Germans, launched secret negotiations with Poland about using Polish troops that were in Ukraine to kick the Germans out. Needless to say, these negotiations did not remain secret very long.

The sowing season was approaching. Because of the lack of specificity in the agrarian law and the relevant orders, landowners and people with no land did not know who owned the land and who was supposed to sow it. This worried both landowners and the Germans. The Germans had not received their grain, and the failure to sow fields meant that they would not get any grain in future, as well. This meant that common interests brought German landowners closer to those who were producing grain. Large landowners and capitalists in Ukraine established an "industrial-trade-finance association" which, in late April, convened a congress of grain producers in Kyiv. All meetings in Kyiv were banned at that time, but representatives of grain producers who were led by the aforementioned association and were boosted by the Germans, met at a circus building on April 29, and representatives of the majority class of Ukraine's residents passed a resolution to express distrust in the Central Rada and appointed a man called Skoropadsky to become Ukraine's new leader.

The Central Rada met the next day to discuss the situation. German troops surrounded the building and arrested several Rada members and government ministers, charging them with criminal offenses. The Rada decided to dissolve itself. This was a coup without any gunfire, no noise and without any rumours.

The former ministers who were charged with crimes were tried in open court. Newspapers in Kyiv printed their statements, and these leave an impression of utter hilarity and naiveté, to put it mildly. This first attempt to establish a state, it seems, should have convinced the Ukrainians that no matter what kind of success there might be, the work had to be done by experienced specialists. Someone who knows nothing about the sea cannot steer a ship down the Dniester River, and the

ship of state cannot be put into the hands of people who know nothing about the affairs of state.

## II The Ukraine of Skoropadsky

Pavlo Skoropadsky became hetman (a Central European title, usually referring to a military leader) of Ukraine and offered the best and most acceptable wishes to his people, forgetting that the road to hell is paved with good intentions. Skoropadsky was one of Ukraine's largest landowners and an officer in the Russian cavalry, but he was a man with weak will, and so he completely yielded before the industrial, trade and finance association, which was known as "Protofis." He did so all the more because "Protofis" had nominated him to become hetman. The hetman's policies were "Protofis" policies and vice versa. Historians have written about the French Revolution that the Bourbon restoration did not learn anything good and did not forget anything bad, and that can fully be applied to "Protofis." It was absolutely uninterested in very necessary agrarian reforms. The hetman supported reforms, but he continually postponed their actual implementation. One of the members of "Protofis," a major landowner, declared that he would not hand over a square centimetre of his land to farmers. "Protofis" remembered the 1905 Revolution and particularly the element of punitive expeditions therein. Germans refused to take part in this process, and so "Protofis" set up bands of voluntary officers. It is known that these were officers who could not find other work, which means that they were the worst of the worst. Under the influence of "Protofis," provincial and regional administrators came from the Black Hundreds movement, and no one cared about the fact that they had no administrative experience at all. The arbitrariness of these men can be described on the basis of the fact that a pig disappeared from an aristocratic estate in the Kharkov province. The owner of the estate owned a sugar factory, was a good acquaintance of the interior minister, and sent a telegram to the minister to say that chaos had erupted in the village, the Bolsheviks were becoming restless, and so a company of Germans needed to be sent to the village. The regional administrator, for his part, reported that everything was calm and that no Germans were needed, because they would only upset local residents. The German company was dispatched anyway, and the local punitive expedition used it as a smokescreen. It never did find who stole the pig, but it did sentence one-third of the men of the village to a lashing. One of the men from this process explained his heroism thus: "When I have to ride through villages during rainy weather, I do not clean my boots. Instead I order Jews and hooligans to lick off the mud from my boots with their tongues." This was declared by a middle-

aged Russian. Meanwhile, a total bacchanalia of speculation and bribery ruled the land. Civil servants with low salaries partied at restaurants and cabarets, paying thousands of roubles for their luncheons and dinners.

From the military perspective, the hetman government continued the programme of the Central Rada with all of its positive and negative elements. Here we must note that the Central Rada had launched colossal organisational work. All Russian military units that were still in Ukraine — entire divisions and corpses (their materiel, officers and a few soldiers) — were merged into the Ukrainian military. The war minister was a political member of the Cabinet of Ministers, and so all of the work in creating and developing the army was basically in the hands of the Chief of General Staff. He was a young lieutenant colonel from the Russian General Staff, and he was so clever and tactical that older colonels and generals from General Staff were by no means offended when a young colleague took the reins. Gradually, the best elements from Russian General Staff gathered at the Ukrainian General Staff, and they worked very productively, leaving political work in the hands of the Chief of General Staff. The Central Rada's ministries were full of chauvinism against anything Russian, but the General Staff demonstrated an equal amount of tolerance. All that was needed was men with talents who were prepared to work on behalf of the land.

This policy was kept in place during the hetman era. The Central Rada had never wanted to organise cadres and the material aspects of a future army, fearing that the army might cause a counterrevolution. The hetman, too, avoided this work, but for very opposite reasons — the fear that the army would, indeed, engage in a counterrevolution. The All-mighty "Protofis" announced that it would not finance the army and that no army was needed in the first place, because the Germans would protect the land and the capital at least for five more years. It must be noted that "Protofis" was made up of aristocrats and capitalists who saw themselves as true Russians. They didn't think much about the Germans in their hearts, but they were happy to live under German protection so that they would not have to give up a single iota of their privileges in favour of the Ukrainian nation.

From the spring until the late winter of 1918, Ukraine was the only happy island along the borders of the former Russian Empire. People could live in peace and buy everything that they needed at fairly cheap prices. People from all over Russia flooded into Ukraine, including increasing numbers of members of the intelligentsia whose focus was on a "unified and indivisible Russia." These people used all of the benefits of Ukraine's peace and order. They eagerly ate Ukrainian bread, but they denounced Ukraine as such at every step. Anyone who was found

in a Ukrainian uniform was declared to be a traitor. This Russian intelligentsia was so short-sighted that it purposefully sawed off the branch on which it was sitting.

During June and July, Ukraine could have turned into a powerful country which, a few months later, would be fully capable of preserving order inland and of not being afraid of a Bolshevik attack from the outside. All that would have been needed was land reforms, turning over at least a small part of the land of the royal court and the aristocrats to farmers for modest compensation. The hetman did not do that or anything else in terms of domestic policies, and that meant that at the end of the day, he found himself in the crossfire.

Supporters of the Central Rada quietened down after its dissolution, but they did not lay down arms. Instead they organised systematic propaganda throughout Ukraine. They accused the hetman and his government of restoring not just the old regime, but also indentured servitude in political and economic life (extortions against farmers). From the nationalist perspective, the hetman had shown himself to be a Russophile and altogether as a masked Russian governor general. Nationalist propaganda was of little influence in 1918, but once people enjoyed social and economic benefits, it gained new ground.

On the other hand, members of the Russian intelligentsia who were flooding into Ukraine accused the hetman of a betrayal of Russia. The most provocative rumours were spread. For instance, there was talk about some General Denikin who supposedly had declared that all officers of General Staff who had not left their shameful and traitorous service in the Ukrainian army by a certain date would be charged with treason against the state, and so on. Despite all of these rumours and agitation, however, Denikin's officers strolled freely around Kyiv in their full uniforms. Kyiv even had an open army recruitment bureau. All the more, Ukraine's government was prepared to provide various kinds of war materiel to the volunteer army.

Supporters of the Central Rada, the so-called "independents," demonstrated quite a bit of tact and understanding during this period. They said that they were completely capable of getting rid of the hetman, but they would not do so as long as he continued to act at least partially as a Ukrainian. The idea was that if the independents rose up against the hetman, they would soon be gobbled up by the Bolsheviks.

The Russian intelligentsia, for its part, believed that it would be better to be ruled by the Bolsheviks than to accept a sovereign or even autonomous Ukraine. During the summer, members of the Ukrainian intelligentsia who were in power were also not thinking about complete sovereignty, instead limiting themselves to

requests for greater autonomy. Most of the government, and particularly the war party, did not do anything to develop future relations between Russia and Ukraine. The only goal was to preserve order in the rich country so as to save it from the disaster of Bolshevism. Military circles even proposed a project of rapprochement via apparel — pinning two cockades to soldier's caps, one Russian, the other Ukrainian. Delegations were sent to talk to Denikin, but in vain. Rapprochement could not happen because Russian citizens who were living in Ukraine were far too militant. I was most surprised about the fact that these militant officers and generals did not join Denikin's army in the fight against the Bolsheviks, instead sitting around in Kyiv, Odessa and other cities, where they were engaged in fairly suspicious speculation. They had opened a whole series of open houses, gaming rooms and tearooms. Respected generals with the Cross of St George on their chest sat around in clubs, and all the administrators and even waiters were Russian military officers. At least 10,000 Russian officers were living in Kyiv, at least 10,000 in Odessa, and quite a few in other cities, as well.

Speculation, drunkenness and a wanton life in major cities, arbitrariness and bribery at the administration, and the lack of reforms and lawfulness — all of that soon attracted the relevant response. Rebellions broke out in several places, some of them quite substantial. In July, for instance, there was much unrest to the south of the Kyiv province. The rebellion in the Traschchansk region organizationally became a military unit (the "Traschchansk Division"), and thanks to clever manoeuvring it managed to avoid the German forces that were chasing it. The division crossed the Dnieper River, and between 10,000 and 12,000 troops crossed the Ukrainian border and joined the Bolsheviks. Later in July, there was a rebellion in the Svenigorodsk region. Rebels attacked the local unit of officers and locked them up together with two German companies that had appeared in the region, in a sugar factory. After a three-day siege, the captives surrendered because of a lack of water. German forces eventually put down all of these rebellions. The government and the Russian intelligentsia believed that the Germans would continue to protect them against their own citizens for some time to come, and so they paid no attention at all to the rebellions which were actually a harbinger of the coming storm. More serious and far-sighted people relentlessly demanded that governance in the country be organised so that at least internal order could be preserved with Ukraine's own forces. All kinds of innovations and reforms were proposed, but they all ran up against insuperable obstacles and disappeared in reams of paper.

### III The era of the hetman and volunteers

This was a brief period, but one that was full of deep experiences. When the destruction of German forces began in the West, a revolution flared up in Bulgaria, and everyone knew that Germany's might was coming to an end. This meant that Ukraine could no longer rely on it for assistance. The members of the hetman's court rarely remembered the fact that they had no army, but now they realised that one would very soon be needed. Fevered work began to create some kind of army, any kind of army. Ukraine had eight corps, four cavalry divisions and a group infantry and cavalry officers and instructors — some 2,500 in all. That was the Ukrainian military force which the hetman's government had established during the five months of his rule. True, he commanded a few volunteers groups, most of which were made up of officers.

To paraphrase Pushkin, "the unrest was secretly growing in the earth," and this unrest involved two sides — fans of a "united and indivisible Russia" and supporters of Ukraine's independence. Both sides wanted to get rid of the hetman's government, the former group so as to attach Ukraine to Russia, the latter group to establish a narrowly nationalist government. There was also a third side in the process, however. The Bolsheviks were carefully monitoring events and pouring water on the windmill of nationalist chauvinism. Russophiles who were encouraged by Denikin's successes appeared first, starting to agitate among officers with the threat that Denikin would soon appear in Kyiv and file charges against all of the hetman's officers for treason. Each honest officer should take off his Ukrainian uniform and then either flee to Don or, as a civilian, await Denikin's arrival in Kyiv. This propaganda was successful in that more than a few officers started to murmur about joining Denikin. At the same time, the all-powerful "industrial-trade-finance alliance" was putting pressure on the hetman. When revolution erupted in Germany and Ukraine lost all hope for German assistance, Hetman Skoropadsky announced that he was a Russian general who would continue to rule Ukraine only until the convening of a Constitutional convention. Denikin's people were allowed to establish groups of volunteers throughout the country, and such groups received support from the national treasury. One would think that the Russophiles would be satisfied, but the truth is that neither they, nor Denikin were pleased. The volunteers began to demonstrate more and more hatred toward Ukrainian officers, and Denikin received an emissary from the hetman in a most unfriendly manner.

Parties in favour of Ukrainian sovereignty finally lost the last shreds of their patience, and they began to speak up. There was a revolt against the hetman in Bila Cerkva in October, and the parties announced a new government to be headed



by Symon Petliura. The rebellion had humble beginnings, but it could not be repressed, because the hetman did not have an organised force and the Germans were already refusing to intervene in Ukraine's internal affairs; they had plenty of their own problems back home. It was also true that the army of volunteers that was emerging in Kyiv was hostile to them. They did not recognise the hetman, so armed forces throughout the land, both the volunteers and the Ukrainians, came under the command of Count Keller. By all accounts, he was a brave soldier, but a poor organiser, and even worse as a politician. As a nominal subordinate of the hetman, however, Keller was the actual ruler of the land. The volunteers became more and more hostile, and various volunteer organisations and headquarters started to pop up like mushrooms after a rain.

Supporters of Petliura grew in numbers, and soon they were endangering Kyiv itself. Initially, true, this involved various units that were not mutually organised. Each fan of Petliura in a region which was dissatisfied with the hetman gathered together his own unit, and without any co-ordination, off they went toward Kyiv, because there was a huge amount of booty that could be pillaged there. Soon enough, Petliura imposed a structure on the groups, instituting a directorate of five members, with Petliura as the most important one. He was also seen as the commander in chief of the armed forces. His Chief of Staff and the actual co-ordinator of the war was General Ozetsky, who had joined Petliura's organisation from the Central Rada and the main headquarters of the hetman. Ozetsky was a fairly cunning and two-faced individual, a former Russian guard member who was not particularly intelligent. Units sent against Petliura's group initially had certain success, but soon it turned out that local residents were hostile to the forces and that discipline was sorely lacking in the ranks. Defeats at Poltava were down to the outrageous negligence of Ozetsky's men, and soon Kyiv was besieged from the right bank of the Dnieper. The hetman and Keller's successor, Prince Dolgoruky, sought the help of the Germans. After lengthy negotiations, the Germans agreed. They went on attack and pushed Petliura's forces back. Soon, however, the attack stopped, because a disagreement had erupted between Prince Dolgoruky and German headquarters. Dolgoruky was a successor of Rurik and could not hide his haughtiness from the German generals. Despite this, the Germans told Petliura that he would not be allowed to enter Kyiv. They drew a line which Petliura's forces were not allowed to cross, and along this line, the Germans posted guards — not in sufficient number to actually protect the line. Meanwhile, a rebellion was beginning on the left bank of the Dnieper, but it did not develop quickly, and so

opposition to it was initially successful. By late November Petliura's men were approaching Kyiv from that side, as well.

Kyiv had just survived the threat of Bolshevism in January and February, and now, in mid-November, the situation was once again feverish. Volunteers drank in restaurants and clubs, and the newspapers were reporting that the Petliura bands would soon be destroyed. Still, the boom of cannons came closer and closer to the city, and bread became more expensive by the day. French forces at Odessa promised help to Dolgoruky, but that only worsened his relationship with the Germans. The promise, however, was just a promise, and the Germans announced that on the evening of December 8, they would be withdrawing their guards from Kyiv and ensuring order only in those parts of the city where the German forces were. Prince Dolgoruky understood the weakness of his forces perfectly well, but he did nothing to withdraw and protect his soldiers. He knew that Petliura's men would wreak terrible revenge on the volunteers. At 11:00 AM on December 8, Dolgoruky was told that Petliura's forces were breaking into the city. He replied, "What about the Germans?" and then left the room, leaving Ukraine to its destiny. Can a commander leave his subordinates without even explaining why he is doing so? Can such a commander ever hope to regain their trust? These soldiers were mobilised to fight not on their own behalf, but on behalf of Dolgoruky, and most of them were just as poor as Petliura's men were.

The uniforms of all of the volunteers disappeared in an hour's time in Kyiv, as if a magician had waved his wand. Those who did not manage to hide their signs of belonging to the volunteer army were dealt with quickly. During the night from December 8 to 9, there was endless gunfire in Kyiv. Many corpses, particularly in the peripheral parts of the city, were left on the streets for several days.

That was the end of the hetman government, because it had not forgotten anything (bad) from the era of the tsars, and it had not learned anything (good) during the revolution.

## IV

After conquering Kyiv and then all of Ukraine, Petliura's forces also took over all of the resources and riches of the hetman's regime. Rebellions against the hetman began in the periphery of the country before moving to the centre, so the hetman's supporters could not really remove anything from Kyiv. Petliura found fairly well-established finances, fairly good railroads (with on lack of rolling stock), a wealth of weapons and firearms, clothing and food for any army of 500,000 troops, fully trained cadres for eight corps and three cavalry divisions with the relevant

material, a commendable General Staff and a well-established apparatus of state. All that Petliura needed was the ability to make use of the situation so that life would proceed normally, and a new order could be imposed on the country. The international situation was favourable. Allied forces that had landed in Odessa did not help the hetman, because he was seen as a German friend and lackey. Petliura, as an opponent of the hetman, therefore, was also seen as an enemy of the Germans. Initially the allies viewed him positively, and Petliura should have made use of that fact. He did not. On the contrary, a conflict erupted near Odessa between the allies and Petliura's forces, and it was Petliura who was to blame. The Petliura government had the same process that is typical of all new countries with inexperienced governments. The Petliura statesmen overthrew the hetman, but then flew so high that they no longer saw the earth beneath them. We are the smartest and strongest ones of all, there is nothing to scare us, and we do not have to seek help from anyone else. We need no orientation, because we have our own.

Petliura entered Kyiv ceremonially on December 12. The reception was ceremonial, but the people of Kyiv did not cheer. They were very sad, because no particular far-sightedness was needed to realise that two months on, the Bolsheviks would arrive in Kyiv in the same manner. This belief was strengthened by Petliura's armed forces and by instructions from the government. The volunteer army of Petliura was full of suspicious unrest. Most of those who took part were unemployed (not wanting to work even though demand for labourers in Ukraine was very widespread) or people who had completed their agricultural work and were prepared to loot everything they could find. The officers were people who did not do well with the hetman because they arbitrarily took on various jobs about which they knew nothing. Upon entering Kyiv, the Petliura forces were made up of three corps — riflemen from Sech, people from the Black Sea region, and people from the area of Don. The first group was commanded by Austrian lieutenant Konovalets, the second by Russian Praporshchik Peleshchuk, and the third by Russian lieutenant colonel Balbachan. There were also other formations that were commanded by men who were totally unknown and in some cases were even illiterate. The same things happened as the ones that occurred during the era of the Central Rada. Someone who is unknown visits a member of the Rada or an uneducated minister and swears that he is a very honest and wise Ukrainian who was persecuted because of his nationalist leanings during the rule of the hetman, but now wants to serve and help Ukraine. He will organise a very strong military unit, govern a region or an industrial area, and so on. People believed such claims, made advance payment, and often found that the person then disappeared without

a trace. Others made use of their authority to engage in "requisition." Advances and authority were also received by various relatives or acquaintances of members of the Rada and ministers.

Power was taken by the "high directory," and ministries became socialist. A law on land nationalisation was immediately issued, and that proved to be as destructive for Petliura as the lack of agrarian reforms had been for the hetman. Ukraine's farmers all became hostile toward Petliura.

While the government in Kyiv was celebrating its victory against the hetman and the merger of Galicia with Ukraine (it was added to Ukraine under the auspices of the Western region of the Ukrainian People's Republic with broad rights of autonomy), Bolsheviks got busy in the northern and eastern parts of the country. It must be noted here that the hetman government had concluded something like a peace treaty with the Bolsheviks, which meant that the country was open to the Bolsheviks to a certain extent. They made broad use of propaganda so as to set up new organisations. When Petliura's Socialist government came into office, the Bolsheviks cleverly and sensibly made use of the circumstances in their own favour, both in political and in military terms. In the area of politics, agitators pretended to be true Ukrainians, but they quickly attacked anything that facilitated law and order, declaring that that was the order of the hetman and the old regime. Petliura could not immediately set up a new apparatus of state, because that requires a long period of time and much more intensive effort. Instead he used the governing institutions of the hetman, only replacing disloyal and harmful employees with others. The Bolsheviks made good use of this by claiming that this was messing up the order of the state. If someone tried to introduce and strengthen discipline in the military, the Bolsheviks immediately screamed that this was the old regime, something worse than the age of the hetman! We have a conscientious people's army, and we do not need forced discipline! We have and will have the discipline of conscientiousness!" This agitation by the Bolsheviks was supported by many honourable Ukrainians who did not know what they were doing. During the rebellion they had high-ranking jobs that were beyond their experience and knowledge. Sensing that they would lose their jobs in a country with the rule of law and not wanting to leave these jobs, these men unconsciously joined in with the agitation of the Bolsheviks.

In military terms, the Bolsheviks took advantage of the fact that borders were unprotected when Ukrainians took power, and they flooded border zones with agitators, fomented local rebellions and gradually started to take over frontier cities. Petliura's government asked Moscow why truce terms between Ukraine

and Soviet Russia were being violated, and the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Georgy Chicherin, told it that he had no intention of violating the terms of the truce and that no Soviet military unit had crossed the Ukrainian border. As far as he knew, Chicherin said, a few cities and regions in Ukraine had proclaimed themselves to be Bolsheviks and agreed to join Soviet Russia. On the basis of the right of self-determination, Chicherin was forced to accept such wishes so as to ensure order there. He added that it was very possible that the Soviet military would take over villages and cities that had decided to leave Ukraine and join Soviet Russia. Thus it turned out that the war between Ukraine and Soviet Russia was started by Kyiv, not by Moscow. That happened before Christmas.

Corps from the Black Sea and the Don area were sent to battle against the Bolsheviks, as were various military units that were on the left bank of the Dnieper River. At first the Ukrainians did quite well, but soon the circumstances changed. The unfortunate land nationalisation law, a lack of discipline in the army, the tendency of soldiers and officers to loot territories where they were — all of that led to a situation where people in towns such as Chernigov and Kharkov began to view the "people's army" as the most evil enemy of all. If scouts or a smaller unit appeared at a distant village, local residents beat them to death during the night. As soon as the rapidly, but not wisely, organised military force came up against its first failures, mostly due to the lack of sensible command, everything fell apart. Looting increased, because it was far more advantageous to do so when retreating than when moving forward. The hatred among local residents grew and grew. Right after the New Year, there were rebellions behind the army's lines, and by mid-January 1919, the entire left bank of the Dnieper was burning with Bolshevik-inspired riots and rebellions. That was not the only disaster. On the western front, a battle began with Poland. People in Galicia felt that Lvov was their capital city and had taken over the city. The Poles kicked them back out, and the battles between the Galicians and the Poles continued with success and failure, success and failure. The Galicians were part of Ukraine, so Petliura had to expand the Galician frontline from the borders of Galicia to Pripet. Until May, there were conflicts between Ukrainian and Polish scouts.

Battles on the Bolshevik frontlines made Petliura realise that his improvised military, its revolutionary leaders, partisans and individual units were terribly weak. Petliura hurriedly started to ask for help from hetman and Russian officers who were not hostile toward him, particularly from General Staff. This was too little too late. An army cannot be assembled in a few weeks' time, a military force that is in the middle of a battle cannot be reorganised, and the main thing is that

a battle-ready army cannot be established without strong discipline and order. Most of the former hetman officers had fled at the approach of the Bolsheviks, some to Don, others to foreign countries, and still others to the countryside, where they could pretend to be ordinary farmers. None of the officers wanted to serve in a military unit in which most of the new and older officers were people with a dark and unknown past. I personally sat at a table where the commander of the Black Sea corps had brought together the officers who were subordinated to him. I looked at them and could not believe that it was reality, as opposed to a nightmare. Their faces and conversations convinced me that I was among robber barons.

## V

Late in January, the people of Kyiv once again heard the booming of cannons. The Bolsheviks were coming. Petliura's forces lost again and again on all frontlines. Seeing that something was wrong with the army, but not understanding the essence of the matter, the Petliura government decided to destroy all evil by replacing the commanders of corps on the left bank. Men who had been hailed as heroes a month previously were arrested one after another. They were not the problem. The failures of the Ukrainian military rested with the way in which it was organised and commanded. People who are distant from military issues think that all that is needed for a person who wants to become a distinguished officer is to be heroic, cunning and shifty. That is not true. An officer must be aware of his assignments. A personal example is not enough to lead 100 or 200 men into battle. The personal example must relate to discipline, not just setting an example, but also being able to teach it to soldiers in terms of going on scouting missions, guarding military camps, maintaining contacts and knowing how to attack and retreat under any circumstances. Ukrainian officers did not know how to do that. They only knew how to encourage their soldiers to loot and to transport that which was looted. It turned out that all of them had lots of stolen things that they had to bring home, and they were far more concerned about that than they were about the steppes and fields of their motherland. It was also true that the officers who were "consecrated" in the Ukrainian and revolutionary order did not know how to rear their soldiers, although that is just as important as training them. Petliura understood the main causes of his war failures, and so he appointed as the Chief of his General Staff Russian General Bronski. He was a passionate patriot who was very honest, wise and energetic.<sup>43</sup> Petliura appointed General Sinclair from Russian General Staff as

<sup>43</sup> When convincing me to enter Ukrainian service, General Bronski said: "You help us (Ukraine) now, and maybe we will sometime help you Latvians."

the actual commander of the army, and many officers who had held responsible positions in the past were recruited. The freedom of activity was strictly limited, and only after the government moved from Kyiv to Vinnytsia in early February, could they put their ideas to the test. The Bolsheviks took over Kyiv on February 10, and during the latter half of February they began to wage their battle even further. Petliura had been negotiating with allied forces in Odessa since late December, but in vain. The allies insisted that Petliura's government had to find common ground with the Bolsheviks so as to work together in beating the Poles and the French. The Ukrainian army melted away like snow in the springtime. Some soldiers went home, others joined the Bolsheviks. The man who had insisted that Ukraine make nice with the Bolsheviks was fired, which was a victory, but then General Bronski died of typhoid fever, and that was a loss. His deputy, Schaible, was an equally professional person, but his non-Ukrainian surname meant that he did not have the authority and trust that his predecessor had had.

As the Bolsheviks approached Vinnytsia, the likelihood that the Bolsheviks would foment unrest in the town became too great, so the Ukrainian government, in the early days of March, evacuated further to the West. Petliura moved to the active army's headquarters, while all ministries moved to Kamenets-Podolsk. That did not protect them from the Bolsheviks. Bolshevik agitators took the same trains as the Ukrainian government. They fomented unrest behind the lines, and that is why the military units fell apart as quickly as they had been assembled in November. In late March, Petliura and the active army headquarters moved to Volochinsk near the border of Galicia. A few days later, the Ukrainian ministries returned to Kamenets-Podolsk, but the Bolsheviks were coming, and local Bolsheviks were planning to revolt. It seemed that Ukraine was facing its final hour. Petliura moved to Galicia, and lots of people fell into panic and fled to Galicia or Romania. Those who did not have the resources to flee, including some of the ministries, prepared to join the Bolsheviks.

On the Polish front line from the borders of Galicia to Pripet and along the northern front lines of the Bolsheviks, there was a small military unit that had been there since mid-December under the command of Russian Praporshchik Oskolko. In mid-January, the Chief of Staff sent General Aganeyev, an energetic and hard-working member of Russia's General Staff to see Oskolko. Aganeyev quickly earned the trust of Oskolko and quickly started to organize and command the military force. At a time when Ukraine's army had lost all of its battle capabilities and could not resist any pressure from the enemy, Oskolko's troops started to attack the Bolsheviks from all angles. Petliura could return to Ukraine



from Galicia, and the ministries in Kamenets-Podolsk were liberated and moved to Rivne in early April. The Cabinet of Ministers was reformed, and nationalists took power away from the socialists. Government work began anew. Oskolko increased troop numbers and continued to liberate increasing areas of Ukraine. Under his protection, other military units were established. Order was reinstated in the liberated territories, and all that remained was to keep on working. The achievements of Oskolko and Aganeyev, however, did not satisfy the yearning of the commander of the active army headquarters, Osetsky, for honour and self-love. Oskolko's units were drawing close to Kyiv, and when they were just about 30 kilometres away, they had captured more than 10,000 prisoners of war, lots of cannons and lots of war materiel. All that was needed to develop these successes, but Osetsky began to claim that Oskolko was not following orders. That was not true, but both Oskolko and Aganeyev were removed from their posts. Oskolko tried to object, because ministers supported him, but that was to no avail, and he and Aganeyev were forced to flee. The government remained in Rivne only for a short time. The nationalist government was deposed because it supported Oskolko and hoped to sue for peace with the Poles, and the socialists took over once again. The government immediately had to move from Rivne to Volochinsk on the border of the country. The Bolsheviks approached Volochinsk two weeks later, and the government was forced to seek refuge in Galicia. The government spent a long time in trains, because it could not stay anywhere for a longer period of time. First it moved to Zolochiv, but in June, the Polish army invaded with considerable forces and started to pressure the Galicians. The Ukrainian government moved to Ternopol, which was being approached by the Poles, but what then? The Bolsheviks had occupied Volochinsk, southern Galicia was free, but it was clear that the Poles would try to occupy it. Fortune smiled upon Petliura once again. The remnants of the Ukrainian forces kicked the Bolsheviks out of Volochinsk, and a mission sent to Poland reported that the Poles were prepared to start negotiations to reach a peace agreement. The Petliura government moved to Volochinsk, and the trip from Ternopol was marvellously successful. The railroad was full of trains, and even though the Poles had positions just 10 metres from the railroad, no one kept them from taking those trains hostage.

Petliura began negotiations with the Poles and ended contacts with Galicia, which the Poles were taking over. The Poles promised that they would not violate Ukraine's borders from Galicia, and so Petliura only had to deal with the Bolshevik frontlines. After experiencing the "paradise" of the Bolsheviks, the people of Ukraine rejoiced about Petliura's forces and supported them in all possible ways

— volunteering for the army and supplying it with bread, weapons and everything that it needed. Thanks to this help, Petliura's forces quickly moved forward. After Volochinsk it took over Proskurov, while the Petliura forces that were attacking from Southern Galicia took over Kamenets-Podolsk. The government returned there, as well.

# THE BALTIC STATES AND UKRAINE<sup>44</sup>

Ukraine proclaimed its independence in the summer of 1917, sooner than Latvia and Estonia did. Latvia and Estonia were weak and started their open independence battles much later. With the support of England and France, they achieved great success, while the Ukrainians faced a hard situation, with England and France not only not supporting them, but ignoring them. Ukrainians have been in a constant war with Soviet Russia since 1917. They are always trying to receive support from the Entente, but the requests from Ukraine are seemingly unheard even though Ukrainians spend a huge amount of money on foreign information. This unfavourable approach toward Ukraine at a time when the Entente is supporting the Baltic States, is often attributed to Ukrainian politics, but it seems to me that there are very different reasons and that it is very important for the Baltic States to be aware of these reasons.

We often hear that the Entente does not consider Ukrainians to be a separate nation, instead seeing them as Russians. The truth is that Entente governments know Ukraine very well. In late 1917, they engaged in negotiations with the Ukrainians and promised them support in the war against Soviet Russia, albeit, of course, under certain terms. Ukrainian nationalists did not like those terms, and so they sought help from Germany. When it gave support, everyone in Europe knew about Ukraine, but as soon as Germany was defeated, the Entente completely ignored Ukraine. This leads to the claim that the Ukrainians don't get support precisely because they sought help from Germany. The point is that the Finns did the same and were far more closely linked to Germany than the Ukrainians ever were, but nevertheless Finland is supported, and Ukraine is not.

There are several ways in which Ukraine differs very much from the Baltic States. First of all, Ukraine has 40 million residents, which means that it is much larger than the three Baltic nations taken together. Non-Ukrainians make up a very small percentage of the population, which means that if the Ukrainians were to establish their own country, it would be very homogeneous in terms of its population. Ukraine would be made up of a series of old Russian Empire provinces, with the fate of the Crimean peninsula still unknown. These used to be the empire's wealthiest provinces, known as the black earth district. In such a territory, Ukraine

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<sup>44</sup> *Latvijas Kareivis*, No 176 (21 September 1920).

would have enormous agricultural wealth (grain, livestock, all of Russia's sugar), as well as natural wealth such as the best coal and steel, extensive industry and the best Black Sea ports at Odessa, Nikolaev and Kherson. If the aforementioned provinces are taken away from Russia, then Russia becomes much smaller and poorer and with a disadvantageous geographic situation. It does not have enough bread, which has to be transported by great distances from Siberia. Sugar has to be bought and imported, and coal and steel for factories in Moscow and St Petersburg have to be transported from the distant Ural Mountains. Russia would have no ports apart from St Petersburg, which is closed from all sides, ports on the White Sea, and ports on the Pacific Ocean which are blockaded by the Japanese. If Ukraine becomes independent, then the Cossacks of the Don will also split away from Russia. In that case, Russia would no longer be a superpower. In terms of strength and wealth, it would be a second-class country. Russia's population would still be nearly 2.5 times higher than in Ukraine, but in military terms, Russia would not have superiority over Ukraine, because Ukraine has a homogeneous population, rich lands and a comparably much smaller territory with quite a few good railroads and waterways. Russia would have lots of non-Russians, the population is scattered around a broad territory with bad roads (except in the centre), and the whole nation is very poor, with most people being at a far lower level of culture than is the case with Ukrainians. By losing Ukraine, Russia would lose half of its strength and would become an Asian country in every sense of the word. Ukraine does not need anything from Russia, and if it were independent, it would play a great role in European politics. Without Ukraine, in turn, Russia would lose its role in Europe. The Entente is very much aware of this fact, and that is why it could not support Ukraine when the Russia issue was still up in the air. If Ukraine had received material and somewhat materiel support, it would have become independent and organised itself. During the past two to three years, it would have strengthened itself internally and externally, and while the issue of Russia was still being discussed, Ukraine would determine its own future and would not allow anyone from the outside to dictate it. In other words, while the Russia issue is being discussed, Ukraine would be able to determine its own direction and its own policies. Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and even a part of Finland can spend a year or ten years with sovereignty, but if they are not protected by a larger country, then they will not be able to defend their destinies. Oppression of those countries would not even need military force. Two big neighbours — Germany and Russia — can oppress them in purely economic terms. That is why the Entente found it possible to support these small countries while the Russia issue was still being considered.

If, in future, the Russia issue is settled and the small countries turn out to be useless or harmful, then they could easily be erased from Europe's political map.

We must note that the future of the Baltic States has not yet been decided, and they have not yet been recognised *de iure*. The destiny of the Baltic States will be determined by the Entente once Russia has a permanent government which the major powers of the world recognise.

The main role in determining the destiny of the Baltic States will be played by the life capacities of these countries, which will be evaluated on the basis of their internal order, lawfulness, economic capacities and military strength. Of course, each country cannot have much military force, but if the Baltic States were to form a close alliance, then their common strength could not be ignored. Ukraine will play the largest role when it comes to the strength of the Baltic States. If it splits off from Russia and joins a Baltic alliance, then the common strength will be sufficient for permanent defence. No one will dare to attack it. That means that we can say that the destiny of Ukraine will also determine the destiny of the Baltic States. I find it necessary to remind my readers that the destiny of the Baltic States was decided in Ukraine in 1709, when a victory at Poltava allowed Russia to access the shores of the Baltic Sea, which previously belonged to the Swedes. The destiny of the Baltic States was determined together with that of Ukraine (the rebellion of hetman Mazepa against Russia was crushed). Another important factor in the future destiny of the Baltic States will be the relationships that they have with their big neighbours — Russia, Poland and Germany. If two of these neighbours support the Baltic States or at least treat them favourably, then the third one will not be able to harm them.

New countries must be capable if they are to ensure their sovereignty and independence. They must organise the nation's life in every sector and be militarily strong. All new countries must form a tight alliance from the Arctic Ocean to the Black Sea. Nothing has yet finished or been established, and it is premature to rest on our laurels. We must work with as much effort and patriotism as was the case at the start of our nation. Otherwise all of our victories and benefits may slip through our hands.

# THE WESTERN FRONT LINE OF SOVIET RUSSIA<sup>45</sup>

Things that have happened on Poland's frontlines could be expected. The Soviet Russian army moved forward very swiftly, and now it is moving back to the East even more quickly. Soviet Russia cannot have a strong army on the Polish front lines, because it is not supplied with everything that is needed from the rear, and so it is forced to take everything that it can in the place where it is located. Maintenance of the army with local resources is very advantageous on the one hand, because that enormously reduces the number of military carts that are needed, and that means that the speed of the military can increase. On the other hand, maintaining a large military force just on the basis of local resources can quickly lead to the army's demoralisation. A very specific and strict organisation is needed to gather local resources and to divide them up among soldiers. If there is no such organisation, then the soldiers themselves will look for everything that they need, and this process will very quickly turn into looting. Military units will compete in looting, and not on the battlefield. They will go to places where they can hope to loot more, not to the places which are necessary on the basis of tactical or strategic considerations. Furthermore, a soldier who has stolen many things will want to bring them home, and so he will no longer want to move forward, instead wanting to retreat, particularly in the face of an additional attack by the enemy. That can happen with a totally organised and old military force (Russia's army in 1914 and 1915), while the Soviet Russian army cannot be seen as fully organised and arranged. That is why this evil phenomena, no doubt, are at a much higher level, and the retreat of the Soviet Russian army, no doubt, will be swift as long as the Poles have a military force that is not worn down and can constantly attack those who are retreating and those who are refugees. After a few days of retreat, no doubt, that will turn into simple and total running away.

Since 1917, we have several times seen these waves of people moving from East to West, back and forth, and right now there is no hope that we have seen the last wave. Perhaps the next waves will not move so far, and it seems that that will

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<sup>45</sup> *Latvijas Kareivis*, No 153 (25 August 1920).

be the case. Still, we have to expect the next waves even if they are not large or if they will only appear sometime in the distant future.

Russia's temporary government has concluded a temporary truce from the Bay of Finland to the upper swamps of Narva. Peace has been agreed with small nations that cannot be strong in the near future. Dealing with such nations in future will be no problem. Peace, however, has not been concluded with any country that might in future become so strong that any settling of accounts with them becomes a problem — Poland, Finland and Ukraine. If Russia were to leave these nations alone, then they could strengthen themselves to the point where nothing more can be taken back from them. Peace talks with Finland have begun, but we see that they are very slow, and Soviet Russia does not see any reason to yield. Negotiations have also begun with Poland, but it is likely that Soviet Russia will start with the border issue — not Greater Poland of the past, but the borders of Poland at this time.

Soviet Russia's most awful enemy is Russia. People in Latvia often say that Ukraine is a very negligible factor when it comes to the structuring of the next Russian state, and that seems to be the case now, when independent Ukraine consists only of the Petliura government and controls virtually no territory. Prior to 1917, no one knew anything about the Ukrainians and thought of them as lesser Russians. By the end of 1917, however, many people started to support the idea of an independent Ukraine simply to get rid of the Bolsheviks. During the past three years, the idea of Ukrainian independence has become very popular among residents and the intelligentsia. Since the end of 1917, the Ukrainians have struggled ceaselessly to gain the independence of their motherland. Who is fighting if the government cannot force anyone to go to war under endlessly difficult circumstances? Ukraine's army does not consist only of residents from those regions which the Petliura government controls. There are volunteers from all over Ukraine. Ukraine has received no help from the outside, and it is working only with its own capabilities and with amazing durability. No clothing, no weapons, no medications, food shortages, people dying from enemy bullets, from an unending typhoid epidemic, from cold and other shortages. They die with gritted teeth, and others come to replace them in defence of Ukraine's independence. Seeing the ceaseless increase in this idea of independence and the strength of the nation, politicians in Soviet Russia have focused maximum attention on Ukraine, both by engaging in ongoing attacks and by spending vast sums of money on agitation to organise rebellions and riots in Ukraine. Eight Ukrainian provinces with 40 million residents are far more important than all three Baltic States taken together.



The Baltic States, by which I mean an alliance among the Baltic States, could be a very strong factor, and that is why Soviet Russia has also focused maximum attention on the idea of such an alliance. It is using all possible resources and strengths to ensure that the alliance is not established and so that Soviet Russia does not, in future, have to deal with an uninterrupted front line from the Arctic Ocean to the Dniester River. Soviet Russia has managed to split up this long frontline and then to attack each enemy in turn. Time will tell who will win — the politicians and diplomats of Soviet Russia, or those of the Baltic States. The work of the current conference of Baltic States will show whether this first step will be in favour of the Baltic States or Soviet Russia.

# RUSSIA'S WESTERN PERIPHERY<sup>46</sup>

## I

Every nation and country spreads in those directions in which they face the least opposition. The Russian state, too, gradually spread its borders, mostly in those directions. Russia could not, however, easily get to the sea apart from the White Sea in the north. When the Russian Empire became big and strong enough to be free in terms of its future growth and welfare, maritime transport and trade were very necessary, and under Peter the Great, Russia tried to get to the Baltic Sea, even though this was an area in which it would face the strongest counterforce. Russia had tried several times in vain to access the sea. Peter the Great conquered the coastlines of the Baltic Sea, and his successors constantly expanded the territory, with Russia gradually pushing toward the west and the south-west. The Baltic Sea proved to be too small, and it freezes over during the winter, so Russia also needed the Black Sea. Sea transport then proved to be insufficient, and so there had to be direct land traffic with major powers in Western Europe. This direct contact with Prussia and Austria was achieved by the Russian Empire's annexation of Poland-Lithuania and Bessarabia. This move toward the west was necessary for Russia as a big country, because without maritime and land borders with Western Europe, it could not develop into a first-rate superpower. That is why Russia did everything that it could to drag its boundaries to the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea, simply trampling the nations, whether big or small, which stood in the way of the empire's ability to achieve its goals. The entire world watched this Russian expansion toward the west as a completely natural phenomenon, because in global politics, rights rest with those who have the strength, and strength is an excuse for anything that is done. Roads from inner Russia to the Baltic Sea and the borders of Germany and Austria passed through western areas of land, which was not advantageous, and that is why Russia decided that its job was to russify all non-Russians from the West. Because all nations to the west of Russia were at a higher level of culture (except for the Moldovans), attempts at Russification had very few results. True, this policy was very evident among Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, Belarusians and Ukrainians, because it hindered their national development.

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<sup>46</sup> *Latvijas Kareivis*, No 160, 161, 162 (1920).

The national consciousness of these nations ebbed, and they started to become accustomed to their destiny. The idea of national independence was upheld in narrower circles of the intelligentsia. In 1917, revolutionary Russia proclaimed the right of self-determination for nations, but in this case those were just pretty words. None of Russia's temporary governments had any intention of putting the idea of self-determination of nations into practice, because that would be very disadvantageous for Russia itself. The revolution has not yet allowed Russia to set up a permanent government, and a civil war is continuing in Russia, and that means that Russian parties are constantly playing around with the principle of self-determination. If a party (group, government, and army) faces hard times, then it looks for help from a new country and fully recognises it, but if the party wins, then it only recognises "unified and indivisible" Russia. When Bolshevism began, the Bolsheviks recognised all nations, but a few months later they wanted to oppress them. It has to be admitted that the revolution gave non-Russian nations a chance to strengthen their national consciousness, and because all of Russia was ruled by total organisational chaos, the nations that had found freedom started to implement order, organisation and lawfulness in their lands, simultaneously establishing their independence from Russia.

On the other hand, when Germany went to war against Russia in 1915, it tried to do everything that it could to weaken the empire, including attempts to awaken the national pride of nations that were in the empire and to foment hatred against Russia. After the Brest-Litovsk treaty, Germany occupied all of Russia's western hinterlands, including Ukraine, but it could not get the Russian intelligentsia to support it, and that meant no peaceful relations with Russia. Instead Germany started to openly support some of the new countries (Finland, Lithuania and Ukraine), the hope being that those countries would be Germany's friends. The Germans did not support the independence efforts of Latvia and Estonia, but the period of German occupation liberated the Estonians and Latvians from Russian rule and thus gave them a pause during which they could ponder the fact that they were no longer Russian citizens, and so they had to organise their own nation states.

Once Germany lost the Great War, the victors, of course, did not allow the Germans to stay or remain in the occupied Russian hinterlands, because otherwise Germany would have taken over vast tracts of land, if not as property, then at least in terms of new allies who would be under Germany's influence. Germany would not be sufficiently weakened, and that is why the Entente categorically insisted that German forces must leave all of the territories of the former Russian Empire, paying no attention to the fact that every territory that was abandoned

by the Germans was immediately run over by the Bolsheviks. Germany was more dangerous for the Entente than the Bolsheviks, and nations in Western Russia, apart from the Finns and the Poles, were quite unknown to the Entente. It also believed that a large Russia would be a counterweight against Germany in future, while new countries that were liberated from Russia might become Germany's friends. That is why all of the nations of Western Russia except for the Finns and Poles would have been left to their fate — i.e. returned to Russia, if Germany had left them. German forces, however, remained in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania under the command of Rüdiger von der Goltz. It would have been hard for the Entente to raise an army to kick von der Goltz's armies out of the region, particularly given that there were certain disagreements among Entente member states. That is why it proved to be very advantageous for the Entente in political and materials terms to have the Baltic forces expel von der Goltz and his armies from their territories. All that was needed was to provide those nations with weaponry, and not very much of it at all. Once the Goltz and Bermondts forces were gone, the Baltic States had played their primary role. Just when that had happened though, another problem appeared on the political horizon for the Entente. Soviet Russia was slaughtering one group of Russians after another who were friendly to the Entente, and it was starting to threaten the member states of the Entente itself, this despite the fact that all of the material support that was given to Russian generals was lost. Once again it proved useful to use the Baltic States as a buffer zone between Soviet Russia and Germany and as a counterweight, albeit small against Soviet Russia.

This is how political circumstances have so far been advantageous for the preservation of Baltic independence. The nations have proven their ability to organise their governments, and today they are a certain factor of strength, albeit quite small, which provides the Baltic nations with greater rights and hopes in terms of preserving their independence. As we have seen, however, the independence of the Baltic States became possible because the Russia issue had not yet been resolved. If the issue is finally resolved, then that will also have meaning for the Baltic States when Russia establishes a sovereign government that is made up of and supported by all classes. In global politics, no country or nation ever does anything for reasons of love; they only do things that serve their own interests.

## II

Since ancient times, European countries have cared little about Russia's western border, because they consider that to be an issue for Russia and Germany, Russia and Austria, and Russia and Sweden. Only the issue of Poland has been raised to

the international level of politics. Merchants in the world like shipping goods to Russia or buying them from Russia via Riga, Revel or Liepaja, as Russian cities. That is why not just Russia, but the whole world has been accustomed to viewing the Baltic Sea as Russia's natural border. Only Poland, which is a fairly large factor of political and military strength, and a historical ally of France, is not a matter of indifference for the world. It plays a major role as France's supporter in the East. The importance of other countries along the borders of Western Russia is transitory. They can be useful today and hostile tomorrow, depending on shifts in political friendships and disputes, and on which countries Russia wants to be friends with and which ones it wants to oppose. Still, this issue of the Baltic States can never be important for Europe, because these countries are in no way large factors of military strength.

The existence of these countries is important only for Russia and, in part to Germany (in regard to Lithuania). When Russia was expanding its borders westward in the past, that was never an issue for global politics. It was only an issue between Russia and the country whose land it wanted to take away.

As long as there were no limitations on Germany, and while it is necessary to limit Russia from the West, it is in the interests of superpowers to support the new country. How advantageous would be such support in future? No country does anything without benefits for itself. We must count on the fact that in future, new countries will be left to their destiny on the basis of what is decided by the former ruler of these new countries — Russia. At best, Western European powers will defend the new countries with diplomatic notes, but never with weapons in hand. A Western European power would defend the new countries with weapons only if the new countries themselves were strong enough to defend themselves against Russia with just a bit of support from abroad, i.e. if they were a strong military factor like Poland is at this time — countries which, when needed, can offer large military support to allies in Western Europe.

Taken together, all of the new countries completely split Russia and Western Europe, and that is the overall meaning of the new countries for Russia and the Russian nation. Each of the new countries also has separate meaning via which it lowers or increases the general meaning. The least unpleasant for Russia is Finland's sovereignty. Finland does not have natural riches and flourishes because its people are hard-working. Russian trade routes do not pass through Finland, and Finnish ports are of very negligible importance for Russian trade. Perhaps Finland would never have been conquered by the Russians if the Swedes had not gone to war against Russia to conquer the St Petersburg and Viborg provinces. Russia did

not need Finland much at all. Only recently, when the progress of technologies has meant that maritime wars are much broader, has Finland's coastline taken on a major military role. Without the Finnish shoreline, the St Petersburg-Kronstadt naval port is of no importance. St Petersburg is not safe if the coastline does not belong to Russia. That is the main importance of Finland for the Russians. In military terms, Finland is quite strong, the Finnish nation is totally alien to the Russians, and it has never yielded before any efforts of Russification. Russia does not have and will not, in the foreseeable future, have a naval or trade fleet, and the same applies to a major land force. Therefore we must hope that if Russia settles a peace agreement with Finland that ensures that St Petersburg is protected from the dryland side, then Russia, at least for the foreseeable future, will leave Finland alone. That is because Russia does not really need Finland at this time, and so it would be more advantageous for Russia to use its forces in a different, far more necessary direction than against Finland. Russia would try to annex Finland once it has reached its old western borders. Western Europe has known about Finland since ancient times as a separate part of Russia and a separate and autonomous part of Russia. That is why Western European nations have always focused more attention on Finland than is the case with some of the new countries.

Estonia and Latvia possess the entire Baltic Sea coastline from St Petersburg to the old border of Germany, and thus it cuts Russia off from the most advantageous ports. The one at St Petersburg cannot be seen as free if all of the coastlines of the Bay of Finland are in other hands — Finland to the North and Estonia to the South. That means that St Petersburg is losing its importance not just as a naval port, because even the smallest diplomatic conflict between Russia and Estonia or Estonia's allies will immediately increase tare and insurance costs, thus seriously hindering Russian trade. Enormous Russia cannot make do with the port at St Petersburg alone. The port freezes over during the winter, and Russia's railroad system was developed on the calculation that St Petersburg would only provide services to the northern part of Russia, while Central Russia would be serviced by Revel, the Baltic Port, Riga, Ventspils and Liepaja. Thus, if Russia wanted to make do with the St Petersburg port alone, then it would have to rebuild the entire railroad system or suffer major economic losses. We must also remember that limits on Russian trade would also mean limitations on those countries which engage in trade with Russia. Diplomats will object and say that free transit trade can be organised through ports on the Baltic Sea, but I think that it is indisputable that everyone wants to trade directly, not via an intermediary country, to say nothing of any political complications between Russia and the Baltic States which would very

much hinder trade. Russia will never waive its rights to the Baltic Sea. It could be forced to do so only with strength. If Russia is forced, as is the case now, to give up the shores of the Baltic Sea, then this will remain true only so long as Russia does not have enough strength to regain all of the ports on the Baltic Sea. Without the Baltic Sea, Russia is an Asian, not a European country. Russia needs the territory of Estonia and Latvia because of ports on the Baltic Sea, and Russia's history has proven this again and again. The coastline in Estonia and in Latvia are equally necessary for Russia. Russia cannot make do with just the Estonian coastline and not the Latvian coastline, and vice versa. We can certainly say that Russia will not try in the near term future to take over the coastline of the Baltic Sea only if that would be risky, i.e. if the condition of the Baltic States is firm enough in political and military terms that Russia would dare not try to regain the Baltic Sea coastline for itself.

### III

Further to the south from Latvia is the fourth new country — Lithuania. It is between Russia and Germany. Lithuania has the most politically important location at this time, because it separates Russia from Germany. Russia and Germany are natural allies. Russia is a land of agriculture, while Germany is a land of industry. There were no disputed areas along the former Russian-German border. Russia did not need Germany's territory, and Germany did not need Russia's territory. Russia and Germany have gone to war only twice — during the Seven Year War and the recent war. In both cases, Russia began the war under the influence of other countries, not because of Russian politics or in Russia's interests. Russia began the Great War on behalf of other countries, but it ended the war severely injured, while its allies ended the war with enormous gains. Germany was defeated, Russia was defeated, and it is quite natural that the two victims get along. This belief has been spreading in Russia since 1919, from those on the far left to those on the far right. We must expect that in future, Russia will seek all kinds of common ground with Germany. We can look for a Russian-German alliance, because the entire Russian nation, from communists to monarchists, is only looking at Germany, and the entire German nation, from Spartacists to monarchists, just loves the Russians. Russia and Germany have no naval or trade fleet, and that cannot be organised in the near term. That means that an alliance between Russia and Germany cannot be based on maritime traffic. Russia needs a land border with Germany. The land border has now been taken over by Lithuania, and so Lithuania needs to be removed from the road between Germany and Russia. If Russia and Germany want to pursue



their national plans, they must first organise direct contacts, whether in political or military ways. Only then can there be a full partnership between Germany and Russia, and that will directly depend on the factor that one or the other of them will think about enhancing their strength so that both sides can get what they want — the Baltic coastline for Russia and the Wisla bridge for Germany. For that reason, it seems to me that Lithuania is on the road that is most necessary for Russia, and so Russia will first try to push Lithuania off that road, and only then it will move toward the Baltic Sea coastline. The most advantageous route for Russia to the Baltic Sea coastline leads through Lithuania.

Further to the south from Lithuania is restored Poland. Russia and Poland have never been friendly, and we can assume that the relationship will remain hostile in future as well. The hatred between Russia and Poland is natural, because the countries do not have a specific ethnographic boundary. Along the frontier, there are lots of disputed areas in which both Russians and Poles live. National hatred is combined with religious hatred. Russia presents itself as the defender of all of the world's Orthodox people, while Poland is the driving wedge for Roman Catholics toward the east. The recent war between these two countries showed the extent to which this national and religious antagonism influences Russia and Poland. On no other frontline was Russia able to engage in an attack as was the case with the Poles. Even the Communists started to use Russian national and religious emotions, which they had never recognised anywhere before. Even now, when the Russian nation is terribly tired and weakened, this national and religious agitation has had enormous influence. Poland has taken over all disputed territories in Russia's and Germany's borders. That means that both Russia and Germany will be equally hostile toward Poland. That is one motivation — a common enemy — that merges Russia's and Germany's interests. The thing is, however, that Poland is a large country with an old national culture. It is rich with wealth and a well-developed industrial sector. That is why Poland is interesting to other major powers in economic terms, and as a strong ally with its military strength. That is also why it is by no means easy to settle accounts with Poland. Germany and Russia would have to prepare very well before they can successfully settle accounts with Poland. The last attack by Soviet Russia proved that very well. Russia and Germany have to strengthen internally, and then they need to take over the flanks of Poland to the North and the South. Lithuania is to the north. That means that it plays a very large role when it comes to Russia's activities against Poland. The last attack by Soviet Russia passed through present-day Lithuania, and that is one of the most advantageous directions. What is more, it enables a partnership with Germany to

cut Poland off from the sea and, thus, its allies. Lithuania has the road which Russia has historically used to go against Poland.

On the southern flank of Poland is Ukraine, which as a nation for a long time has lived as a sovereign and independent country. Sometimes Ukraine has been dependent on Poland, and sometimes it has been dependent on Russia, which eventually annexed it. Because Russians are closely related to Ukrainians, Russia did well in the Russification of Ukrainians, though by no means to the extent that was claimed by Russian officials during the tsarist era. Ukrainians had to work very hard to preserve their national characteristics, because books and newspapers in their language were banned. Ukrainian books and newspapers could only be found in Galicia. The government of old Russia claimed that Ukrainians are just Russians, but it can equally be claimed that they have as close a relationship with Poles as with Russians. The Ukrainian language is closer to Polish than to Russian, and Ukrainians do not consider Russians to be closer than Poles. In the past, Ukraine has leaned toward Poland, Russia and even Turkey. Perhaps Ukraine would have been much closer to Poland than to Russia if there were not a religious conflict between them. In all of Ukraine's folk songs and national books, Russia and Russians are called "Moskal," and for Ukrainians that means an enemy and a wicked person. That means that if Russia wants to encircle Poland's southern flank, it will first have to annex Ukraine and bring Ukrainian yearnings for independence to an end.

## SOMETHING ABOUT RUSSIA<sup>47</sup>

Very often we hear that when people are discussing one or another nation or state, the measuring stick for evaluation is its territorial size, population numbers, and natural resources. These facts are used to come up with an idea as to a nation's or a country's political influence on other nations and states. Such judgments are quite theoretical, and it never has much to do with actual lives and events. When thinking about Russia, therefore, the foundation cannot be its size and population alone. Nor can we base our judgment on things that its present government has said and thought. Instead we have to have a more or less thorough understanding of the Russian people and their characteristics. First let us turn to a statement by Russia's first historian: "Our land is large and rich, but there is no order therein." Then we have to understand that this statement by Russia's first historian has existed throughout Russian history, as if it were a law handed down by God. Russia has always been large and rich, but there has never been order therein. Indeed, there is a second saying — that disorder is Russia's strength. Russia's internal disorder has never demonstrated political disability. On the contrary, at times when there has been no great order in Russia, it has been very strong in external terms. Ivan the Terrible introduced tyranny in his land and fought against all of his enemies, but while he was doing so, he also waged very successful wars with external enemies and, among other things, levelled Vidzeme to the ground. Peter the Great conducted an internal revolution and destroyed the power of Russia's aristocrats, but he also conquered grand territories abroad, Latvia included. The tsar destroyed the power of Russia's aristocrats, but restored it to Baltic aristocrats after the Swedish Empire had taken those rights away. Catherine the Great conducted the most brilliant and energetic foreign policy at a time when massive rebellions were occurring inside Russia against her imperialist and aristocratic policies. The same was true during the age of Alexander I.

Russian policy has never been dependent on its internal situation. That may seem like a paradox, but it is true, and it is very correctly expressed in an old Russian saying: "What is healthy for the Russian is deadly for the German (foreigner)." That is true in politics and in Russia as such. Russia can never be measured with a foreigner's yardstick. In 1918, when Denikin and Kolchak were very successful,

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<sup>47</sup> *Latvijas Kareivis*, No 30 (8 February 1921).

one of the Menshevik journalists wrote that France has a small retailer's yardstick and England has an egotistical and imperialistic yardstick, and those could not determine Russia's fate or be a judge, because people in Western Europe were simply unaware of Russia's nature. They were unfamiliar with the Russian nation and knew nothing about the Russian "troika" which foaming horses pulled across the deserts of snow. The "troika" flies across the snow with chimes that resound. It resembles a bird, but it nonetheless arrives at a goal, even if the goal is pure fantasy. Only a Russian knows how to use this "troika," and so only Russians can determine Russia's fate and lead it from chaos back to statehood. English tanks and French cannons cannot transform Russia, just as it cannot be transformed by Communists and Jewish commissars. Russia is a riddle that no foreigner has solved, and anyone who has tried to discover Russia's secrets by force has drowned in Russia. Persian King Darius was forced to flee. Mongolians forced their way into Russia, but they melted and became subordinates in Russia. Swedish King Charles XII drowned in Russia. The genius who was Napoleon drowned in Russia with the military forces he had gathered together from all around Western Europe. The invincible forces of Hindenburg drowned in Russia. He did not give his weapons to the French, the English or the Americans, but he allowed unorganised bands of Russians and Ukrainians to disarm him without any battle at all.

One very proper description of Russia is that it is a land of impossible possibilities. This can be seen everywhere. I have pointed to military paradoxes, and I can add another one — one that is unprecedented in history. After a defeat, every army becomes weaker, but the Russian army does not. In 1905, Kuropatkin wrote: "We are becoming stronger after our defeats." After the World War, a German wrote: "Only in the Russian army is it possible that a military force becomes stronger after a defeat." Other aspects of Russian lives demonstrate the same impossible possibility. St Petersburg, which has one million residents, was built on a swamp. Odessa, another million, is barely 200 yards old. Only America can compete with Russia in terms of these kinds of phenomena.

If Russia cannot be measured with the yardsticks of other nations, then other nations cannot do so. They cannot compare themselves to what Russia is doing: "What is healthy for Russians is fatal for other nations." That was observed back in the day by Germany's Chancellor Bismarck. He was the ambassador to St Petersburg and was invited to take part in a hunting expedition. Bismarck was a bit late and far behind the others, and when his coachman wanted to catch the others, he got the horses that were pulling the troika to gallop. Bismarck saw that the troika was moving forward too quickly and asked the coachman whether the horses

were starting to become frantic (and here we must note that Bismarck had a fluent command of the Russian language). "Nothing," the coachman replied. The horses really were frantic, and Bismarck pointed that out, but once again the coachman replied "Nothing." The frantic horses ran off the road and galloped through ditches and tree stumps. "We will fall apart," Bismarck yelled. "Nothing," the coachman said. Soon the troika hit a tree stump and fell apart. Bismarck and the coachman fell into the snow. The coachman caught the horses and brought them back to the remnants of the sled. "What will we do now?", Bismarck asked. "Nothing," replied the coachman. He reassembled the sled as best he could and brought Bismarck to the hunting grounds. Bismarck repeated the word "Nothing" in one of his speeches at the Reichstag, pointing out that Russians are able to survive the greatest catastrophe. The Russian nation is not afraid of any catastrophe, because it is aware of its strength and its ability to escape any situation. This fearlessness and consciousness are instinctive, not the result of ideas or the operation of their minds. That is why Russia's history is littered with catastrophic situations after which Russia accidentally and very quickly begins to flourish once again. It is as if a wizard had waved his wand, with Russia shaking off its sleepiness, apathy and drunken craziness so as to once again start the most powerful and energetic activities. All neighbours are surprised. The shackles of the Tatars were thrown off, and chaotic eras ended in 1613, 1812 and 1856. The territorial size of Russia has taught the Russian nation to have broad characteristics. Russia does everything at such a broad scope that no other nation can do so. This fact must be taken into account by other nations, particularly those who are Russia's neighbours. Russia can survive things without any pain that would be lethal for others. Russia today is not at all like the Russia that existed five years ago, and perhaps five years from now, Russia will be completely different to the Russia today. That is because it is the land of impossible possibilities.

# THE MILITARY STATUS OF RUSSIA AND POLAND<sup>48</sup>

The Soviet Russian army launched an attack in early July along the entire western frontlines, and on both flanks it has moved forward for several hundred kilometres. The achievements have been enormous. Even during the World War, Germany's army was unable to move forward that quickly along its eastern frontlines. Last year and early this year, the Polish army was considered to be one of the strongest in Europe. Now the Soviet Russian army has proven to be even stronger. That is a fact.

First of all, as I wrote in one of my previous articles, there have been major changes in the Soviet Russian army. Recent news suggests that there is no longer a Bolshevik army; instead there is the army of old Russia with its good and bad characteristics. It must be noted that discipline in the Soviet Russian army is at a much higher level than was the case with the old Russian army. Each commander has the right to punish someone who has disobeyed orders with a death sentence then and there, without any trial at all, shooting that person like a dog (that was not the case in the old Russian army). The Soviet Russian army used to grant such rights to commissars, but now it rests with commanders (the Soviet Russian army does not have any officers, but it does have commanders). The Soviet Russian government declared this year that an army in which discipline is based only on the death penalty cannot win victories in battles, and so in preparing for the attack against the Poles, the government asked for help from the nation's religious and national emotions — those which the Bolsheviks did not accept and even mocked.

The latest calls for action from the Soviet Russian government have been signed by old Russian generals: "Russia, Russians, holy Orthodoxy," etc. That is the same that all Russian emperors, starting with Peter the Great and ending with Nikolai II, made use of in all wars.

The most visible characteristics of Russia's army include great durability against natural difficulties, and shortcomings in organisation and order — cold, heat, hunger, poor food, dirtiness, etc. It also is very courageous in battles, and has fairly substantial ambitions. No one else would go to war with food, clothing and

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<sup>48</sup> *Latvijas Kareivis*, No 12 (27 July 1920).

weapons that are as bad as those that the Russians use. We know that the poorer the supplies of an army, the stricter there must be discipline to send the army into battle. The Bolsheviks are perfectly aware of this fact. A nation that is as large as the Russians does not find it hard to mobilise more than one million troops, and it is not difficult to concentrate it on a specific frontline for a powerful attack. What is hard is to supply this military force with food, provender, apparel and munitions, and to transport sick and wounded troops. Top commanders in Poland knew all of this and hoped that Soviet Russia would not be able to send too large a military force to the western frontlines. In that case, the Poles could make do with just a bit of superiority, because their army was much better. News reports now tell us that the Soviet Russians have overcome all of these difficulties in the same way that the Huns and Tatars did in the past — people and horses survive on the basis of what they can find in the place that they are. They are not sad that the areas of land which they cross become deserts. No problem if troops are wounded and sick. Let them die, and those who are alive and healthy will move forward to find food, provender, clothes, etc. Railroads are only used to transport munitions, and they are up to the job. Soldiers can take away the last loaves of bread and meat of local residents. Let horses eat all of the grain that is growing on pastures. No problem — the more terrible the war, the better the consequences, that is the idea. In addition to supply problems, the Russians also had to deal with the difficulty of managing a large military force (the larger the army, the more complicated it is to manage it). Soviet Russia overcame these difficulties by getting old tsarist-era generals and officers on its side. Truly, these old military leaders are leading a Russian (not Bolshevik) army that is organised in accordance with the old spirit.

The Polish army was organised and trained on the basis of the newest examples, but it did have a few weaknesses. Easy victories had made it too haughty (Latvia's army should keep this in mind). Men in the army thought too much of their strength and scorned enemy forces. The Polish army had completely heterogeneous soldiers — Austrian Poles, Russian Poles and German Poles. The Austrians took the highest-ranking positions, while the Russian and German Poles were in military units. The two sides did not believe or trust one another, but distrust from top to bottom is the first reason for failure. Austrian General Staff are the most unfortunate Polish inheritance from the Habsburg monarchy. They have historically and typically led military forces to failures when circumstances are more difficult.

As I noted, such a fast retreat during the Great War was not even seen in 1915, when Germany threw all of its forces against Russia. That is why it seemed at first



that the Polish military would be completely disorganised after its first failures. It turns out that there is no disorganisation in the military units. They are completely orderly, but headquarters has issued theoretical orders which are out-of-date and completely wrong for existing circumstances. Military units do not know what to do, and their commanders, upon receiving such orders, are totally disciplined and passionate patriots, and they completely lose their minds. This is the main cause for Soviet Russia's victory, and the Russians know how to make excellent use of it.

As the Russians advanced and the Poles retreated, the military situation became much better for the Poles and much worse for the Russians, provided that the Poles did not lose their heads and remained calm.

The Polish army retreated to the area where the Russians and Germans had held positions during the Great War, which meant that the territory was quite damaged. The Poles only damaged transportation vehicles while retreating, while the Russians, who were surviving almost only on the basis of local resources, destroyed the territory completely. When the Russian army was stopped, it would quickly run out of resources, but it would be impossible to deliver them from the rear, because there was a lack of railroad material, and roads and bridges were destroyed. There was also reason to doubt whether there were sufficient resources in Russia's interior to provide all of what the army needed. That meant that the Russian army, when staying at the same place and not finding new and undamaged territories, would suffer great losses that might cause great problems in its battle capabilities. As the Russians advanced, the army shrank, because it had to take over and ensure order in territories that it had occupied. Those were small territories, but the Russians had to leave their garrisons in populated areas. There were also clear losses, particularly during the first battles. The weakened army might not endure a counterattack and would start to retreat with the same speed as it had when it advanced. The Poles only needed to keep their heads and their cold-bloodedness. The rear area of the Poles was shorter, its army was on a much narrower frontline, and the rear was very rich with railroads and highways. That meant that it was very easy for the military to regroup, and it was very easy for it to operate on the basis of the so-called internal operations lines. Command and activities of Poland's modern military was also made much easier because of the narrow frontlines. The Russian military, in turn, could by no means seem as appropriate for working with large masses on the narrow frontlines, because even during the Great War the Russian army did not do well in such situations. The Polish army would have much higher patriotic emotions and strengthened morals upon arriving at its ethnographic boundaries, but that was possible if the army

did not lose its consciousness from top to bottom. If the Polish army and its nation do not lose cold-bloodedness, then it will be able to defend its borders in all ways unless there is some unexpected factor in terms of threats from the rear.

The problem for Poland is that its borders at this time do not have any friendly neighbour. To the North and the West, neighbours are very hostile. If they do not do anything openly, then the Poles have to keep their military forces on the borders to repel hidden or masked activities. Secure sources tell us that there is no doubt that the German government will remain neutral and will not do anything hostile against the Poles, but we must remember that Prussian Junkers and Spartacists will do everything possible to harm the Poles and to help the Russian army to advance. That is why there is no reason to think that Poland will be attacked from the rear, but there could be various types of unpleasantness.

Peace negotiations between the two combatants are more advantageous for Poland, because that would provide it with a chance and enough time to bring order to and regroup its military, to mobilise and train new units, and to use patriotic fervour to raise the moral status of the army. It is not advantageous for Russia to wait for the results of peace negotiations, because Russia's terrible economic problems mean that the rear will not be improved in a short period of time. Russia must also pay attention to Vrangeli's army in the South. This means that Russia will have to yield in peace negotiations if it agrees to take part in them and, of course, if it knows that Poland is preparing for a further war in a cold-blooded way and with no internal problems. This can be very advantageous for Poland's theatre, which has been prepared since antiquity and is well known on both sides. This is the war theatre at which the General Staff of Russia, Germany and Austria played war games for several decades and tested their strengths during the Great War. The next few days will tell us what political occurrences will happen, because that will tell us whether another war storm will rage over the area that has experienced many wars before. We can only say one thing conditionally — if there is a war storm at this theatre, then it will be very strong and decisive.

## POLAND'S FRONTLINES<sup>49</sup>

When Soviet Russia's army advanced very quickly toward Warsaw in August, experienced war specialists knew that the success of this Soviet Russian army was not on firm foundations, and so its later retreat was not unexpected. Readers who have not examined news from the frontline in depth only learn about ordinary facts, particularly if those facts do not concern the reader. The truth is that these events are very instructive if we think about them to a certain extent and compare them to the events and facts of the Great War.

During the course of a month, the Polish army retreated, and the Soviet Russian army advanced along a straight line of more than 500 kilometres. When the German army waged a major attack against Russia in 1915, it managed to push back the Russian army in three months' time (June-August), calculating a straight line of 150-200 kilometres, and in the centre where the Russian army could always be bent — 400 km. After this manoeuvre, the Russian and German armies were unable to engage in any calculated operations. They needed several months to rest and bring order to their forces. The current Russo-Polish war, starting from August, is one in which both sides send constant news about harsh battles, operations, manoeuvres, large numbers of prisoners of war and enormous war trophies, but there is no information about fallen or wounded troops. Neither side, of course, reports about its losses, and it cannot do that, because that would serve the interests of the enemy. Everything, however, suggests that the number of fallen and wounded men is too negligible, and in most cases that is presented when one side starts a disorderly retreat. Before the Great War, there were theoretical discussions on the basis of statistics from previous wars about how massive can be losses in a battle before the military unit loses its battle capabilities. The demand was for military units to survive 25% of losses in terms of fallen and wounded men. At the beginning of the Great War, Russian armies maintained that percentage throughout 1914 and until the summer of 1915. On August 13, 1914, for instance, the 38th Division brigade lost 30% of soldiers and 42% of officers during a battle from 10:00 AM until 4:00 PM. It was evident that the enemy lost fewer troops, and only two uninjured men were taken as prisoners of war. Still, both sides remained battle-ready. On February 12, 1915, a 38th Division's company lost more than 30%

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<sup>49</sup> *Latvijas Kareivis*, No 187 (3 October 1920).

of its men because they were killed or wounded, but the company remained in place nevertheless. I am very sure that the number of fallen and wounded troops in the current Polish-Russian war is fairly negligible and on average, does not even reach a level of 5%. The number of prisoners of war and deserters, however, is vast, particularly in the Soviet Russian army, although the Polish army also has suffered great losses, as was seen in the decree that was issued by the head of state about granting amnesty to deserters.

The current pace of the war suggests that the armies have become quite weak in moral terms, and that means that they are not able to engage in serious battles. Here I find myself thinking about a prediction that was made long before the Great War — that all European countries will try to expand their military forces in numerical terms so as to prepare for a war that will be carried out by whole nations, armoured nations. These armoured nations will become quite demoralised during the war, and if an excellent military leader turns up with a numerically very small, but morally strong army, then this army will be able to force its will onto all armies with one million troops. It seems that the time has come when a numerically small army that has the same moral strength that existed in the Russian and German armies in 1914, could beat the enormous armies of the present day. If we only look at the percentages of losses (25-30% at the beginning of the Great War and less than 5% now), then that shows that one old army could operate successfully against five or six present-day armies. We also have to take into account that a military force that is good at shooting, and is more courageous and nimble would suffer fewer losses than one that is demoralised and poorly trained.

We Latvians must focus particular attention on these facts. Our military, successfully won Latvia's freedom, but that does not prove that it has reached its possible heights, instead indicating that the enemy force was far worse than ours. What would happen if our possible enemies had a very good military force? That would be much harder for us. If a country and nation maintain a military force, then it has to maintain the very best one, because otherwise there is no point in the process. If Latvia's small military force reaches the highest level of battle capacity and our possible enemies retain their typical battle capacity, then these enemies would need a massive army to beat Latvia. If, moreover, Latvia were in an alliance with a few neighbours which also have strong armies, then the Baltic State alliance (and, of course, its members) would face no threats, even if Russia has an army with one million troops, if that army is at its current level of battle capabilities.

The Polish War also tells us something in political terms. When the Polish armies retreated, Lithuania's army immediately took over all of the territories that

it wanted without counting at all on the Poles. Lithuania's army could do so, and the Poles could not defend the territory. Today, by comparison, the Polish army is advancing, taking over the territories that are advantageous to it and that it wants, and it is not counting at all on Lithuania. I do not know who is right in this Polish-Lithuanian conflict, from which I only get facts to show that in the present-day era, everything is based on real force, the force of the army. The army is the only thing that politicians and diplomats take into account, and that will remain true until there is a final peace. This peace, however, will not appear sooner, at least in our neighbourhood, than the resolution of the Russia issue. The Russia problem has now arrived at a new stage, because there is the new factor of Vrangél and Savinkov with support from France. Time will tell the direction in which this issue will move at this stage, but as long as the Russia issue is not decided, we must not rest on our laurels or even take a nap. We and our army must be alert and ready.

# DISHARMONY BETWEEN ENGLAND AND AMERICA<sup>50</sup>

In the past, all of the seas of the world were, to a certain extent, under England's supervision. Nothing can happen on the seas if England is unaware of it. During the World War, the United States of America enormously expanded its naval fleet, but for the time being, it cannot compete with England's fleet. The United States wants to win this competition and does not try to recognise England's primacy on the world's seas. In the past, the United States did not even think about expanding its influence outside of America and only tried to liberate America from European influence. When President Monroe issued his famous doctrine, "America is only for Americans," he also meant that "Americans are only for America." That continued for quite a while. Only in the late 19th century has the United States started to forget about the second part of this doctrine, trying to spread its interests beyond America. The first foray was the annexation of the Philippine Islands. They are part of Asia and used to belong to Spain. During the World War, the United States engaged in armed participation in European affairs. When the Versailles peace agreement was agreed, the desires of the United States were different from those of the other allies, and the United States has maintained its own counsel and has refused to recognise the Versailles treaty. This means that the participation of the United States in European affairs is not limited to the defeat of Germany; it is much broader. The United States can take part in, and influence, European affairs only via the sea, which is controlled by England. The things that apply to Europe also apply to Africa, because all of Africa's waterways are also under England's control. This is one area of disagreement between England and America, but it is not the main one. In economic and political terms, America is not as interested in European and African countries and shorelines as is the case with shorelines in eastern Asia. Countries and waterways in eastern Asia are much closer to America than to England, and the United States has firmed up its positions in the region by annexing the Philippines. That means that the United States is fully able to compete with England along the eastern Asian shorelines and even beat it. East Asia, however, also has allies of England. One is Japan which, after the Russo-

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<sup>50</sup> *Latvijas Kareivis*, No 46 (27 February 1921).

Japanese war, began to see it as the natural master of the seas in eastern Asia. The entire shoreline of eastern Asia, from the southern tip of Kamchatka and to the island of Formosa,<sup>51</sup> inclusive, is completely covered by islands which belong to Japan. Further to the south, moreover, Japan has occupied the Caroline and Marshall islands, which used to be German colonies.

This means that all of the ports in eastern Asia are in Japan's internal waterways. Before the war, America engaged in extensive trade with eastern Asia. Eastern Siberia and China were flooded with American goods. Now the Japanese are starting to push the Americans out of Asia. Before the war, the Americans were the de facto rulers of Kamchatka, but they are now being replaced by the Japanese, because the Japanese are much closer and have declared that they are supervising eastern Siberia, as well. The Philippines are also much closer to Japan than to America, and that means that Japan can threaten those islands at will. It is hard for America to compare its strengths against those of Japan in Asian waterways. Japan is at home there, while the Americans are far from home in terms docks, bases, warehouses, etc. If the United States wants to compete with Japan, then its navy must be much better than the Japanese fleet, and only then will it be able to defend the Philippine and Hawaiian Islands and its interests in eastern Asia. That is why the United States hurriedly began to expand its naval fleet immediately after the Versailles treaty was signed. The relationship between the United States and Japan has always been fraught.

The reason for this is not just Japan's expansionary yearnings toward the Philippine and Hawaiian Islands, but also the fact that America's west coast is teeming with Japanese emigres. America tried to set limits and bans against these emigrants, but Japan protested and strengthened its protests by threatening the Philippine and Hawaiian Islands. America often had to retreat. Japan is an ally of England, which means that arguments and conflicts with Japan are also applied to England by the United States. Every country tries to strengthen its situation with political combinations, and America is no exception. To push Japanese forces further away from America, Japan needs an enemy in its rear. Before the war, the enemy was Russia, which was big and strong and could limit free rule by Japan in eastern Asia. For the United States, a strong Russia that is hostile towards Japan plays the same role as a strong Poland that is hostile to Germany is to France. If there were a conflict between France and Germany, Poland would threaten Germany from the rear. If there were a conflict between the United States and Japan, a strong

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<sup>51</sup> Taiwan



Russia would threaten Japan's rear. It is only for this reason that the United States is still supporting the idea of an "indivisible Russia." The fact that the United States does not want to recognise Latvia *de iure* only proves that Wilson's political views do not accept Russia's weakening, particularly in terms of its fleet and its ports. We can expect that a new president will have different political views vis-à-vis Russia and the new countries. Defending the idea of an "indivisible Russia" cannot provide anything at all to the United States.

Since the World War and particularly since the revolution, Russia has been so weak internally that it cannot threaten Japan in any serious way so as to offer help to America. During the World War, Japan became much, much stronger. Russia cannot increase its strength at all, and it would be reduced if the new states were annexed by Russia by force. They, of course, would not accept such a situation. Presumably, people in America are aware of these circumstances, and so America is looking for other political routes and resources to strike a counterbalance with Japan, while forgetting about the fantastic indivisible Russia. America cannot change the things that Europe has decided when it comes to the destiny of European nations.

# EASTERN ISSUES<sup>52</sup>

Since ancient times, the fabulous wealth of the East has attracted the greed of European nations. Each country tries to get something of the eastern treasures for itself. Now that the war in Europe has long since ended, and no major wars are to be expected in the near-term future, the war in the East has not yet ended, and the political situation there is not just deteriorating, but on the contrary, is becoming even more complicated. If we are talking about the East, we must differentiate between the Near East — the eastern shores of the Mediterranean with Asia Minor, Arabia, Turkey and Mesopotamia, the Middle East — Persia, Turkestan, Afghanistan and India, and the Far East, where Japan is currently at the centre of the region.

The place where the World War began — the Balkan Peninsula — is now calm. Yugoslavia (Serbia-Croatia-Slovenia) has taken superiority on the Balkan Peninsula. Bulgaria suffered much damage during the war and is healing its scars. It has no chance for revenge in the foreseeable future. Only Greece is trying to expand into the territory of the Asia Minor peninsula. The Greeks are the eastern heirs of the old Roman state, and as such, they sometimes want to reinstate the old Byzantine Empire, if not in its previous borders, then at least in most of its former territory, including Asia Minor as a Greek state and greedily trying to take over Constantinople. When all of the riches of Asia had been divided up among European countries in the late 19th century, then all that was left in Asia were the remnants of the collapsed Turkish Empire. That is why, during the late 19th century, European powers focused maximum attention on Asia Minor and Turkey's Mediterranean coast. The coast of Asia Minor had basically been divided up into spheres of influence, mostly between England and France. Germany joined them, but since the World War, it has been pushed out of any participation in colonial politics. The efforts of the Greeks on one side and those of pasha Kemal<sup>53</sup> on the other pretty much touch upon the interests of France and England in Asia Minor. On the one hand, Greece is trying to get as large a territory as possible in Asia Minor while also seeing as its final goal some of the areas that are in France's sphere of influence. On the other hand, pasha Kemal is trying to defend Turkey's

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<sup>52</sup> *Latvijas Kareivis*, No 139 (26 June 1921).

<sup>53</sup> Mustafa Kemal pasha Atatürk (1881-1938), a Turkish war leader and the father and first president of modern Turkey.

inviolability in Asia Minor and to rid Constantinople of European rule. While there is a balance between Greek and Turkish nationalists under the leadership of pasha Kemal, European countries are not worried about the possibility of a Greek-Turkish war. To gain superiority over the Greeks, pasha Kemal started to talk about the idea of merging the Turks and all Islamic faithful in a war against unbelievers. The Greek army was seriously attacked by Turkish nationalists. It is hard to say whether Islamic propaganda strengthened the army, or the victories of the army strengthened the idea of Islam. It would be most proper to say that both of these things are supporting one another, but the final result was that pasha Kemal's victories upset England. That is because pasha Kemal is no longer hiding his desire to see Constantinople as the capital of Turkey, and he is trying to take over all of the Straits of Bosphorus. Kemal wants to bring together all of the old Turkish lands in Syria and Mesopotamia so as to establish a strong Turkish country and perhaps a strong Islamic state. Such a strong state would be most unpleasant for England, first and foremost because the straits of Constantinople, but also because such a country could, in future, endanger the Suez Canal and the straits of the Arabian Sea. That means that England is interested in limiting the success of Kemal and his people. They do not threaten France at all, but its interests are offended by the idea of a Greater Greece. The establishment of Yugoslavia created a very strong block against Germany from the south. The ideas of Greater Greece would conflict with the interests of Yugoslavia on the coasts of the Adriatic Sea. Greater Greece could be a counterweight against Yugoslavia if there were a conflict between Germany and France. During the World War, Greece took the side of the Entente not voluntarily, but because the fleet of the Entente put massive pressure on it. Turkey does not threaten France's interests in the Mediterranean. That means that France is quite calm about pasha Kemal's victories, and it does not want to support England in terms of limiting those successes.

Presumably, threats from England will be enough to ensure that pasha Kemal forgets about taking over Constantinople. Kemalists would not dare to go to war against England because they lack war materiel and soldiers. A friendship with Russia would not provide anything to the Kemalists, because Soviet Russia itself lacks everything. Pasha Kemal's friendship with Soviet Russia can only be explained through the division of the Caucasus, and the desire to bring to an end the influence of European countries there. Pasha Kemal ensured a voluntary boundary with Soviet Russia. Good relations with Soviet Russia meant that pasha Kemal had a safe rear and free hands in the West. Security in the Caucasus is also of great importance for Soviet Russia.

When it comes to the spread of Communism from the Caucasus to the South, that would be made impossible by a merger of Islamists in Turkey, Mesopotamia, Persia and India. The idea of Communism has failed in Russia itself, and it has long since had no achievements outside of Russia. The idea of Islam is entirely incompatible with Communism, and these opposing ideas cannot be spread simultaneously. Anarchy can be created in Persia and Mesopotamia. There is already anarchy there, but Communism cannot be imposed in the region. A country in an anarchic situation also cannot endanger England's India. That means that England faces no threat of Communism from the Caucasus. The merger of Islamists under the leadership of Kemalists also can have no success outside of Turkey. During its rule, the Turkish administration has never won the sympathies of non-Turks. Nations that were once under Turkish rule do not want to return to it. During the World War, Arabs rebelled against the Turks, and the people of Syria, Mesopotamia and Persia are also no fans of the Turks. Turkey has proclaimed a holy Islamic war during each war, including the World War, but Central Asian countries did not join in this time. There is no reason to hope that Kemal could now ensure that Islamists turn against the "unbelievers." The national and religious ideas of the Kemalists can only be successful in areas that are populated by Turks, where Kemal has actual influence and where he can send his military, instructors and weapons. We must also remember that the former Turkish state had no traffic or communications resources, and it does not have any at this time, either. It is no accident that when Turkey became an ally of Germany's, Germany first focused attention on roads and began to build the so-called Baghdad railway from Constantinople to Baghdad, the plan being to then extend it to the Persian Gulf. This railroad would merge the various segments of the Turkish state and make it possible to use all of the country's strengths and riches. It was no accident that all other European countries totally ignored this railroad, because it would allow Turkey to double the size of its army. It was no accident that England blocked the route of the railroad at the Persian Gulf. This means that there can be no talk about an attack by Turkey or the Caucasus against India. A rebellion among Islamists would by no means endanger England's rule in India. Without much effort it has been able to cause a conflict between those who believe in Buddha and those who believe in Brahma, and thus fully paralyse any Islamic movement so as to ensure that there will be no rebellion at all. Events in Asia Minor, by contrast, are a conflict among local interests, mostly between Greece and Turkey.

When the activities and plans of Greece or Turkey affect the interests of major powers — mostly England and France — the powers come up with their own

demands, strengthening them with threats. There is no force in Europe, the Near East or the Middle East that could stand up against England or France. Never in its history has England launched a war that it has lost. That means that there is no chance that England's presence in Asia Minor might launch a new and serious war.

There is even less likelihood of a serious war in the Middle East. There is no force there that could start anything serious against England's India. Persia is in complete chaos, and it has no real strength at all. Soviet Russia, too, has neither the strength nor the resources to support such an attack. Small bands can cross mountains and deserts, but present-day armies cannot. The only reasonable faction of strength on India's borders is Afghanistan, but it has no modern weapons or railways, and it is separated from the rich areas of India by deserts and mountains. England, meanwhile, has built a broad network of railroads and roads in India. It is easy for England to move its forces from one place to another and to supply them with everything that they need. An attack against India or even an attempt to threaten England's India from land would mean building railroads through deserts and high mountains. As long as there are no roads for an attack, there can be no attack. It seems to me that the current situation in the Near East and the Middle East gives no reason to expect any political complications that would cause a war so serious that it would have an influence on the coasts of the Baltic Sea.

# THE EAST AND EUROPE<sup>54</sup>

The Versailles treaty was supposed to create if not eternal, then at least long-lasting and uninterrupted peace in the world. Instead, there has been no secure and uninterrupted peace, not just in the whole world, but also in Europe. The Turks are combatting the Greeks in Asia Minor, there is no peace on the border between the Russian Caucasus and Persia, there is restlessness in English and particularly French colonies in Africa. There is also no peace in Europe. The issues of Vilnius and Silesia are still up in the air. Ireland is unhappy. Newspapers have recently reported that the Bulgarians have gotten in touch with the Kemalist Turks to talk about a possible joint war against Greece. In the Far East, there is still a war between Soviet Russia and the new Russian government that is supported by Japan. Those who concluded the Versailles treaty, true, did not deal with the Russia issue, which means that everyone is free to think what he or she wants about the matter. The fact that complete peace has not appeared proves that the peace terms have been most dissatisfactory for many nations and states. The World War occurred mostly in Europe. If Europe does not have a secure peace, and also no open war, then it shows that Europe, too, is not satisfied, while those who are dissatisfied dare not launch an open war, and are therefore acting in the shadows. This means that peace in Europe is maintained with military force. France and England have such great military superiority that no one dares to do anything that would speak against the will of the French and the English. If peace in Europe is based only on the superiority of the French and the English, then it can continue only as long as this superiority survives. As soon as the French and English do not have superior power there will be no peace in Europe. If war cannot happen in Europe, can a war in Asia be likely? There are two possibilities here. Either Asia is given permission to go to war, or Europe does not have the strength to keep it from doing so. The main participants and victors in the World War were also the ones who mostly dictated the peace terms — France and England. There is no doubt that they would not give permission to launch a war in Asia and particularly on the Mediterranean coastline which is completely governed by England and France. Here, I suppose, we must look for circumstances which very much limit the freedom of the French and the English to act.

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<sup>54</sup> *Latvijas Kareivis*, No 153 (13 July 1921).

Prior to the World War, Europe and particularly the societies of European countries dictated terms throughout the world. The United States of America could quarrel with Europe, but only in terms of American issues. The final word in all of the rest of the world belonged to Europe. Now that the World War is over, America did not ratify the Versailles peace treaty, and now there are voices in America who say that the economic aspects of this agreement should be fully nullified. In the Far East, the Japanese are acting wantonly, and they have no intention at all of asking for Europe's approval for what they are doing.

When Krasin concluded a trade agreement with England, there was a periodic phenomenon. When England was reticent and the trade talks were stalling, the Red Army started to move deeper into Persia. As soon as that happened, Krasin's negotiations again became more successful. Anyone who was watching this situation might have supposed that a Red Army invasion of Persia and subsequent threats from there against India had forced England to conclude a trade agreement with Soviet Russia. If England was not at all afraid of the possibility that the large, strong and rich tsarist Russia might invade India, then it would have no reason at all to fear a Red Army invasion of the subcontinent, simply because it cannot do so because there is impossible terrain between the two sides. The army of English India, moreover, is much larger and stronger than was the case during the rule of the tsars in Russia. There is no doubt that the military strength of Soviet Russia is not such that it could endanger India to the slightest degree. If far-sighted England paid attention to threats from Soviet Russia, then that had nothing to do with military issues and everything to do with propaganda. If England dislikes Soviet Russian propaganda in India, then there is no doubt that the ground in India is more fertile for propaganda. India has fanatically religious Buddhists, Muslims and Brahmins, and so there is every reason to doubt that the atheistic ideas of international Communism would find much traction there. Communist agitators, however, are prepared to bring all resources to bear. When attacking Poland, they spread the nationalist and Orthodox religion ideas of the Russians. There is no doubt that the same is happening in India. Communists agitated in favour of the national and religious independence of Indian nations. This has not been without success, as is seen in England's demand that Soviet Russia bring its propaganda in India to an end. Newspapers, meanwhile, are reporting that the armies of pasha Kemal are approaching Constantinople. England is insisting that there will be war if pasha Kemal decides to attack the city. France is neutral, and if pasha Kemal's forces were to enter Constantinople, the French military would not try to prevent them. It is even whispered that the French are secretly favourable toward the Kemalists, if



not supporting him actively. The result, thus, is that France is defending interests that are quite opposite to those of England in Asia Minor, and it is even pursuing policies that are hostile to England. How can that be? If France had truly struck a pose against England in Asia Minor, then in Europe, England would do the same to France by turning toward Germany. That means that we have to look for other reasons for this situation. One may be that it is not advantageous and perhaps is even risky for France to take a hostile pose against Turkish nationalists who are defending Islam. French colonies in North Africa and eastern India are mostly populated by Muslims, and in Asia Minor, too, vast territories are under France's sphere of influence. Presumably France is just as afraid of Kemalist propaganda as England is of Communist propaganda in India. We know that there are constant conflicts between French forces and the Arabs of Africa in Morocco. Hostility toward the Kemalists might turn these conflicts into a war that would spread to other colonies.

It used to be that European countries had no fears about rebellions in their colonies, because if one popped up, it could easily be repressed. During the World War, England and France used residents of the colonies in the war against Germany. Coloured residents learned that the "white devils" who had ruled them were by no means stronger and insurmountable. The residents of those colonies are now well trained in using the modern weapons of the war, and they know all about present-day and modern war. Weapons are not hard to obtain, because France and England have many enemies. Europe can no longer rule its colonies as it has done in the past. Europe's authority has sunk in the eyes of the rest of the world. Old Europe is weary and can only rule Europe itself. Other parts of the world obey European rules only insofar as those are advantageous to those parts themselves.

The weakness of old Europe was best seen in the English conference in Lisbon, which was attended by the prime ministers of all of the colonies that have autonomy. Prior to the World War, it would never have occurred to any colony that the policies of London's cabinet might be out of line with colonial policy. Foreign policy was run from London, and colonies were not allowed to interfere in that policy at all. England ruled the seas, and the British Empire covered one-fifth of the world's land and one-quarter of the world's population. London decided global policies. While it was busy with the World War, however, the colonies became more independent in their lives, and suddenly the world realised that the colonies have interests which in many cases are not compatible with England's interests. Canada has already opened a diplomatic outpost in Washington. London wants to reinstate a war convention with Japan that would be aimed against America. In response,

the prime minister of South Africa, Smuts, had this to say at the aforementioned conference: "America is a land that we love the most in the world and feel that it is our predecessor." The prime minister of Australia said that there could be a convention with Japan, but only if it was not aimed against America. It turned out at the London conference that the interests of Great Britain's dominions are in the Pacific Ocean, but not in America. The dominions in the Pacific Ocean want to be in close contact with America and no other country. Far-sighted English people can do nothing other than accept the will of their dominions, because otherwise all that will be left for England will be to sit around and rule its islands in Europe and nothing else. That means that in future, Great Britain's foreign policy will be based on the interests of the Pacific Ocean, not Europe.

The World War caused a dissipation of European forces, but on the coasts of the Pacific Ocean, there are new power groups — America, Great Britain's colonies, Japan and China. They will determine global policies in the future. England sees its colonies as far more important than anything that is happening in Europe. The status of France as a major power is also dependent upon its overseas colonies. That is why England and France, which are supposedly upholding peace in Europe, are to the greatest extent bound up in their colonies, particularly in the East. Japan is not yet a totally strong counterweight against America and the colonies of Great Britain in the East, but it is organising a powerful group of people from the yellow race in the hope that it will be able to compete with the Anglo-Americans. Nations and countries in Central Asia are also trying to organise forces, and Turkish nationalists are taking the lead there. Russia is chaotic right now, but it will eventually join one or another of these new groups of strength, and it is very possible that it will join the eastern groups. If one of the new groups in Asia or the Pacific Ocean butts up against one of the countries that are preserving the peace in Europe, then the forces of that country will be withdrawn from Europe, and in that case Europe may find itself without the military strength superiority that is necessary to keep the peace.

# JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA<sup>55</sup>

Most people think that wars appear like fires — there is an accidental dispute, quarrel or conflict, neither side is ready to yield, and bingo — the war is on!

That has not been true for a very long time. At least for the past three centuries, reasons for war have existed long before the war as such, with sides just waiting for the most advantageous moment to go to war. France started preparations for a war against Germany in 1871, and Russia and England started to prepare for the same war in 1907. Now, when we are learning about an exacerbation of tensions between Japan and the United States, we cannot consider that to be an accident or misunderstanding which might lead the two countries to war. Wars among nations today begin only if the true interests of the nations' collide. That has been the case for Japan and the United States for quite some time. The causes for this collision relate to the emigration policies of the Japanese people, which are based on national and general yellow race principles.

The fatherland of the Japanese people — the Japanese islands — have been densely populated since antiquity. Until 1867, the Japanese seemed to be asleep just like all other Asian nations, and that mean that the destiny of these nations was that they would be exploited by European nations and countries.

The Japanese nation awoke in 1867, and that led to energetic work on behalf of the fatherland's independence and the sovereignty of the nation. Asia and the yellow race cast off the shackles of the rest of the world. The Shimonoseki peace treaty gave Japan control over the Formosa Island, thus becoming a direct neighbour of the Philippine archipelago, which was owned by Spain. Japan hoped to take control of the territory if not by force, but at least by concluding an agreement with Spain.

The United States of America, however, popped up first, and after going to war with Spain in 1898, it took away the island of Cuba and paid 40 million roubles to Spain to buy the Philippine Islands. The Filipinos are a mongrel race, and when they realised that they had been taken over by one lord instead of another, rebelled against the United States with far greater ferocity than they had when rebelling

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<sup>55</sup> *Latvijas Kareivis*, No 234 (28 November 1920).

against Spain. The result was that the United States simply had to conquer the Philippines. The United States had to install more than 500 military bases and send 465,000 troops to the islands, while Spain had held them with a bit more than 200,000 men. Once the rebellion was crushed, the United States began theoretic management of the islands.

The United States promised to withdraw from the islands once local residents were sufficiently developed and organised to take over administration of their own islands. To keep this promise, the United States tried to make nice with local governments in the hope that the Filipinos might want to join the United States. That was an impossible mission, however, both because local residents were apathetic, and because their national relatives, the Japanese, were engaging in energetic propaganda. In 1918, under Japanese pressure, the United States promised to withdraw its forces from the Philippines. We know it did not happen, and there was no shortage of reasons as to why.

We think that Latvia is mostly for Latvians, and Japanese people have the same idea — Europeans are not allowed to rule Asia and take advantage of it. The Japanese were the first to awaken from their Asian slumber, and so they consider themselves to be the defenders of Asia. First of all that means control over the Pacific Ocean from Vladivostok to Singapore. The first step was to occupy Formosa, the second was to annex Korea and take over Manchuria's railroad system, and the third was to occupy Chindao during the World War. That meant that Japan became the ruler of the Yellow Sea, blockading it from three sides. England's Weihawei port was completely surrounded by the Japanese, and Japan is now the full and only ruler of the Yellow Sea. Even more for the Japanese are the Caroline and Marshall islands, which Japan took away from Germany during the World War. They mean that Japan is now the closest neighbour of the Philippines. All sea routes to and from the Philippines, as well as the underwater telegraph cable from the islands, are under Japan's control. The Philippines have been totally surrounded by Japan, and in the case of war, it would be far easier for Japan to take over the islands than it would be for the United States to defend them. We can presume, therefore, that the United States will not go to war against Japan over the Philippine Islands. It would be better to transfer them to Japan than to risk losing America's influence in the Pacific Ocean, because the result of an armed conflict related to the Philippines would unquestionably be a Japanese victory.

The issue of the Hawaiian Islands is far more complicated. The islands are in the middle of the ocean between America and Asia. 100 years ago the islands were almost annexed by Russia. Then they were independent, and only due to artificial

politics, the islands were annexed by the United States of America in 1900. Japan objected to this, but no other country supported the protest. Since then, Japan has done everything possible to get local residents on the islands to oppose the United States. The United States are well aware of Japan's activities and efforts, and so it is not saving money on strengthening the islands. In 1910, the United States started to build an enormous naval port to the west of Honolulu at Pearl Harbour, not sacrificing any funds for that purpose. The hope is that the Hawaiian Islands will be fortified to the point where they play the same role for the United States of America as Helgoland for Germany in the North Sea, or Malta for England in the Mediterranean. The Hawaiian Islands, however, are in a different situation. The Japanese know much more about the islands than the US officers do. The islands have approximately 200,000 residents, among whom more than 100,000 are Japanese, including a very large number of former officers, reserve officers and soldiers. Given the seriousness, patriotism and nationalism of the Japanese, these residents would be able to conquer the islands all by themselves. During the World War, I learned more about the work of the Japanese General Staff, which stood at a much higher level than the German General Staff. This means that if there are political complications, the destiny of the Hawaiian Islands is not much better than that of the Philippines. These are issues on Japan's political agenda, but that is not the end of Japan's aggressive efforts. When people in Latvia discuss Japan, they see it as a small country. That is wrong. The idea that Japan is small is based on two reasons — the Japanese are short, and Japan seems to be comparatively tiny on the map of Asia. Being short by no means limits the nation's ability to work, and the Russo-Japanese war proved that military capabilities were also not limited. The size of Japan is small only in comparison to big Asia, and in comparison to Europe it is very big. Japan's territory without Korea and Formosa is larger than Great Britain and Ireland taken together. In terms of the number of residents in 1907, again not counting Korea, Formosa and other colonies, it was 50 million people, with another 14 million people in territories that were annexed in 1895 and 1905. That means that in terms of population numbers, the only country in Europe that is larger than Japan is Russia. The Japanese population is increasing by 1% per year. The country's territory is insufficient for this growth rate, so Japanese people constantly emigrate to convenient places such as Korea, Formosa, the Philippines, the Hawaiian Islands and America's coastline. Since 1890, most Japanese have immigrated to America, where their major working abilities and small life requirements made it easy for them to compete with the Caucasian race. Between 1906 and 1907, more than 30,000 Japanese people immigrated to America. This has been a threat to America, and so

it approved a law to limit this immigration. Americans don't like the Japanese, because they refuse to assimilate. No matter where they live, they stick to their nationality and establish "their own" country in the other country. That is why the United States of America banned immigration, and Japan has constantly protested about this fact. These are the main problems between the United States of America and Japan. The United States of America and Japan both know very well that in future, they will have to engage in a war which determines who actually owns the Pacific Ocean with all of its sea routes. If the Monroe Doctrine was in force in America to say that "America is only for Americans," then Japan wants to ensure the other side of this doctrine — "Americans are only for America." That is why America's gains in Asia and the Pacific Ocean must be transferred to Asian nations. The leaders of those nations undoubtedly agree with Japan at this time. Japan, for the time being, is the only leader of the yellow race, and it has to be said that there is no leader in Europe which has the same strength and political wisdom. Japan took part in the World War, but only insofar as that served its interests and those of Asia. During critical moments in the World War, it was sometimes reported that Japan was prepared to send its military to the European battlefield, but the truth is that Japan had no intention of doing so. Instead a military force was sent by America, not by Japan. America understands that very well. In 1915, the secretary of war of the United States resigned because Congress rejected his request for funding to fortify the Philippines. A well-known publicist in America, Thomas J. Millard, has warned Americans about Japan's ambitious efforts. He has argued that Japan is constantly trying to create conflicts, that it is constantly encouraging its people to hate America, and that at the same time, it is conducting very different propaganda in America to claim that the Japanese are the very best friends of America, and so there is no reason to think that Japan is endangering America in any way. Millard also proves that Japan did not take part in the European war for reasons of justice, but only to the point that the interests of Japan and Asia were served. Even more light is shed on this issue in a book that was published in Japan by the "National Defence Society." It is about Japan's land and naval officers and civil servants, and the title of the book is "War between Japan and America." Hundreds of thousands of copies of this book were distributed along the whole coastline of the Pacific Ocean. "Sixty million Japanese who are loyal to their emperor are burning with the desire to start a war with the United States," the book says.

"This war will prove to the haughty Americans that the Japanese nation and Japanese soldiers cannot be beaten. We beat the Chinese 30 years ago,

and the whole world knows that in 1904 and 1905, we crushed the army of big Russia. Now we are much stronger. We have two reasons to launch a war against America. First of all, there is the inhumane treatment of Japanese immigrants in America, and second, there is the totally incorrect American law against Japanese immigration into America.”

I am not at all wanting to suggest that a war will erupt between Japan and the United States of America either now or in the near future. On the contrary, I think that in the near future, all problems and conflicts will be resolved peacefully. The purpose of this article is to note that there are conflicting life interests between Japan and the United States which could lead to war, and that this conflict of life interests has existed for a long time. That is why a war between the United States and Japan has been hanging in the air, just like the war between Central European countries and the Entente began to hang in the air in 1907.



# DIPLOMACY AND WAR<sup>56</sup>

War is the continuation of diplomatic work. When a country or nation cannot achieve anything with diplomatic negotiations and notes, it tries to do with force. Once that begins, however, the work of the diplomat has not ended. It continues to relieve the military force in moral terms and numbers from the inside. When war erupted between Prussia and France in 1870, Bismarck and his vast talents as a diplomat ensured Prussia's back against Russia and Germany's coastline against England. That allowed the Prussian army to focus all of its forces toward France and win the war. Bismarck also knew how to explain the importance of the war to his nation and thus led the whole nation to rejoice in terms of one man going to win or die. Victory did happen, and it provided the Germans with brilliant expectations and possibilities until the World War.

During the war between Russia and Turkey in 1877/78, Russian diplomats could not ensure a Russian flank from the side of Austria, so some of the force had to be kept because of ensuring that flank. Russian diplomats did not know how to explain the meaning of the war to their nation, and so there was no enthusiasm at all.

When the World War began in 1914, English diplomacy did particularly well. The agreement of the whole nation was needed to start the war, and diplomats ensured that by cleverly discussing the issue of Belgian neutrality with the English people. Central European countries also knew very well how to explain the meaning of the war to their people, and so there was much enthusiasm about going to war. During the war, however, the work of Central European diplomats was quite weak in comparison to that of English diplomacy. During the war, England won the support of Italy, Romania, Greece, Portugal and America, as well as many other countries which declared war on Germany, but did not engage in the war directly. Central European countries, by contrast, did not find any allies at all. That is why Germany lost the war despite the brilliant work of the German army. The Entente won not just with its military, but also with its diplomacy. The German army's extraordinary heroism could not cover up mistakes made by German diplomacy.

A thorough review of what Soviet Russia has done, shows that there was fairly harmonised work between the army and the diplomats. In early 1918,

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<sup>56</sup> *Latvijas Kareivis*, No 118 (15 July 1920).

the Bolsheviks has destroyed all of Russia's army, so they did not have any military force. Germany took over everything that it wanted or needed without any problems at all. The Bolsheviks had to engage in an external war against Germany and an internal war against the monarchists, but the Bolsheviks won both wars very successfully with diplomacy. They concluded peace treaties with the Germans on the northern and Ukrainian front lines. The Bolsheviks cleverly told people from other Russian parties that all Russians must now come together against Germany as the external enemy and help to re-establish the army. Even the most convinced monarchists who later joined Denikin, Kolchak or Yudenich believed the Bolsheviks, and worked very hard in organising the Red Army. When Count Mierbach proposed that monarchist groups in Russia become allies of Germany and promised that St Petersburg and Moscow would be liberated in 24 hours' time (occupying the latter city with a brigade of automobiles), the Russian monarchists refused, because they thought this would betray the Entente (this view was introduced by the Bolsheviks). That meant that Bolshevik diplomats used Germany's invasion of Russia in their own favour, convincing old officers to help assemble the Red Army. Clever use of Russian monarchists and fans of an indivisible Russia in Ukraine during the hetman era, the Bolsheviks used the monarchy and Ukrainian socialists to overthrow the hetman government, and two months later they had occupied all of Ukraine. Bolshevik agitators avoided Ukrainian socialists when conquering Ukraine, and one of the members of the Directory (Vinnichenko) joined them for all time and is still one of the Bolsheviks.

After the monarchists helped to assemble the army, the Bolsheviks began a war on all frontlines. A good and battle-ready army cannot be organised quickly, so the war was not very successful for the Bolsheviks. Diplomacy helped. Kolchak overthrew Boldirev, Denikin quarrelled with the Kazakhs of the Don and then Kuban, and a war between Denikin at Petliura was provoked. For a long time, Petliura was not allowed to become friends with Poland and Romania, and Yudenich quarrelled with Estonia. Behind the lines of all of the enemies, moreover, the Bolsheviks organised armed rebellions. The Bolsheviks have bragged about the fact that they sent 38 million gold roubles behind Denikin's lines and that the 38 million roubles and interest were repaid to them. That is how the Bolshevik diplomats helped their army.

Until last winter, the Bolsheviks mostly had to fight with the military of their own nation — the Russians. Nearly all of the Russian forces were depleted last winter, but new forces appeared on the Bolshevik frontlines — the national armies of various new countries. Agitation against the armies of these alien nations (Finns,

Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, Poles Ukrainians) was far less successful than was the case with Russian armies. The only option was for the agitators to secretly lean toward the opposition of alien nations. That was extensively done in Ukraine, where the agitators leaned toward the Socialists. It was easier, however, to cause conflicts among these new countries so as to weaken their forces. There are no two neighbouring countries that have borders with Soviet Russia and have very good relations between them. Is this an accident, or is a hidden hand leading the process? When the Polish army came into Latvia to help us, no less than once a week there were rumours about conflicts between our army units and those of the Poles. This information was so well positioned that people easily believed it, and it was difficult to repel it. In some cases representatives of the Entente asked for explanations from headquarters, saying that they had very specific news and that our headquarters were only hiding facts. We know that there were no conflicts during that period of time, but these rumours were also not accidental. Certain people fabricated it to create hatred between us and Poland. The Bolsheviks also made good use of the last Polish attack to reach the borders of 1772 and to establish the Ukrainian state. In Russia, the Bolsheviks played the nationalist strings and got most of the intelligentsia to support them, after a period of time when such people tended to be neutral. After Poland's attack, a great many generals and officers from the tsarist army joined the Red Army, and that helps very much to explain the successes of the Bolsheviks.

Things that diplomacy cannot do with words and documents are done by the army with force, and when the army lacks strength, diplomacy once again comes to help it.

# THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE<sup>57</sup>

The Washington Conference is mostly attended by the same countries that were allies in the war against Germany. The official goal is to achieve mutual rapprochement and understanding so that it would be possible to limit an expansion of armed forces, so that countries no longer have to spend as much money on maintaining them so as to improve the country's economic and cultural situation. The conference might also deal with a few international issues which are, in one way or another, linked to the preservation of military forces and with the possibility of war as such. In other words, the Washington conference is yet another step forward toward preventing war and ensuring eternal peace. That is an official goal, and politicians think so. This official goal and the hopes of pacifists are strengthened by the fact that the United States of America has launched a disarmament programme which means stopping the building of the largest warships, decommissioning some of the old warships, taking into account each country's interests about the sea and the strength of its naval fleet when discussing a fleet reduction programme, and measuring the strength of a fleet with the tonnage of large warships. America is also proposing that no new warships be launched during the next ten years, specifying the scope of fleets — 500,650 tonnes for America, 604,445 tonnes for Great Britain, and 299,700 tonnes for Japan. America is proposing that the issue of the fleets of France and Italy be discussed later. A look at this American programme suggests two things to me. First of all, the discussion is only about navies, with no discussion at all about land forces. Second, the issue of naval forces is applied only to America, England and Japan. Without any discussion about the fleets of smaller countries, America is proposing that the issue of France's and Italy's fleet be postponed, which means that the main issues (Japan and England) will be resolved, and there will be time to discuss the French and Italian fleets.

The third element of America's proposal by no means speaks to disarmament, instead focusing on what each country does to serve its own interests. The interest of each country about the sea depends on the size of the country's fleet. The larger the navy, the larger the country's interests, and the larger the country's interests, the larger the navy must be. America wants to keep its dominant status, and that is seen in its proposal about the size of the fleet for Japan, England and

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<sup>57</sup> *Latvijas Kareivis*, No 216 (17 November 1921).

America. America's fleet would be almost as large as England's fleet, and nearly two times larger than Japan's fleet. This means that this is an issue of competition, not disarmament. America is strong right now, while Japan is trying to become stronger than America on the sea. America is trying to preserve its current status with competition and peace. Precisely the same discussions occurred in 1908 between Germany and England. England ruled the seas, but the German fleet began to grow substantially. That meant that England could be less certain about ruling all of the seas. The only options were to expand the fleet extensively or negotiate to ensure that Germany would limit its fleet. We know that these discussions and negotiations yielded no results at all. After the discussions, England and Germany started to prepare even more seriously for war. Things that US President Warren Harding told the press showed that he had no great hopes about the conference. He called for closer international co-operation even though America is not a member of the League of Nations. Harding has also insisted that the United States support the independence and inviolability of the Chinese states. Russia used to support the same idea. After the Russo-Japanese war ended, the peace treaty allowed Japan to take over the Quantun peninsula from China. Russia then announced that it was in its interests to insist on China's independence and inviolability, and so it could not permit Japan to take over any part of Chinese territory. The Japanese gritted their teeth and left the Quantun peninsula, but soon Russia (as the defender of China's independence) occupied the Quantun peninsula itself. That was one of the main reasons for the Russo-Japanese war. Harding has said that England's disarmament issue is separate, because England needs to transport raw materials by sea. The truth is that England's situation in terms of naval disarmament is separate for America, because England, on the one hand, is an ally of Japan, but on the other hand, England's colonies are certainly friendly towards America. That means that if there were a war between Japan and America, England could not support Japan. It also means that America can support England's interests so that in return, England supports America's efforts to disarm Japan.

The Russo-Japanese war began shortly after the Hague peace conference. The World War began not too long after Germany and England discussed limitations on navies. America is now quite openly claiming that the Washington conference is the last broad attempt to prevent war. The likelihood of war is also seen in the fact that the war in Europe has not ended despite the existence of the League of Nations. Seemingly in spite of Washington's disarmament conference, the Serbs have invaded Albania, the Ukrainians are warring against the Soviet government, and there are many other places where war can begin at any moment. Why did

the major powers that established the League of Nations and are now meeting in Washington not stop existing wars? After all, it would be logical to end present wars and then talk about disarmament and how to prevent future wars. If that does not happen, then there are probably reasons for it. The small wars that exist at this time are not all that important, while the possible war of the future may be so important that there is no point in focusing attention on these small wars.

The bottom line is that the goal of the Washington conference is not to prevent possible future wars in general, but instead to prevent a war which is standing on the threshold already. We must hope that with joint efforts and good will (which exists at this time because European countries have not yet relaxed from the World War) will prevent war for a more or less long period of time. Still, we will be able to feel that the war is truly prevented only if the reasons for war are prevented, by which I mean reasons for a conflict of interests between America and Japan. I would not want to say that these reasons cannot be avoided, but it is not easy to hope that they will be avoided.

The world is still very far from eternal peace.

# NATIONAL DEFENCE ISSUES<sup>58</sup>

The fact that all countries spend a lot of money on maintaining an army, and ensuring various other national defence activities, proves that each perpetually existing country must take steps to guarantee its perpetuity. Agreements are reached at various conferences regarding the downsizing of armed forces, but this does not show an effort to avoid war, but rather an attempt to gain predominance over possible enemies. The conference attendees had the final word at the Genoa Conference not based on the size of each country's population, but rather on the size of their army.

Armed forces are the main, but not the only, national defence measure. Much is written about the armed forces, but we seldom read about the other measures.

Today's wars are waged by nations, not armies; battles take place over vast territories, not a 4 square km large battle field. Thus, national defence is dependent on the appropriate preparation of the entire country. National preparation includes issues of foreign and domestic politics, as well as issues of territorial and materiel preparation. I would like to discuss the latter.

## I

The World War experience clearly shows the significance of preparation of the fatherland. France had constructed fortresses along its border: the German army had to go through Belgium, take the long way around, losing a lot of time while traveling on demolished roads. When the German Army reached Paris at the beginning of September 1914, the same French Army that had suffered nothing but defeat throughout the month of August, carried out a counter attack against the same German Army that had nothing but victories in August — and the French Army's attack — the battle at the Marne — ended successfully. Why? Because the 250 verst long flank of the French Army, stretching from the Swiss border to the fortress of Verdun, was totally protected by fortresses, and the French could transfer their forces from their right wing to the German right flank using the roads at the rear. On the other hand, the right flank of the German Army had a 300 verst long rear with no railroads, making it impossible to do any serious re-grouping

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<sup>58</sup> Latvijas kareivis (The Latvian Soldier), No. 118, 120 (May 28, 1922).



of forces; had the Germans managed to take even one of the French fortresses, the results of the 1917 war would have been different.

The preparation of Eastern Prussia was even more interesting: in the middle of August the German Army fought with the Russian Rennenkampf Army, the battle was a draw; at the end of August this same German Army defeated Samsonov's army, at the beginning of September they defeated the Rennenkampf Army on the Prussian-Lithuanian border, and at the end of September the majority of this army set off on an attack march from Krakow, bypassing the right flank of the Russian 9th and 4th Army, arriving at Warsaw at the beginning of October. It was possible to re-group so quickly because the territory had been properly prepared. We can learn a great deal from the preparation and defence of the territory of Prussia, because the conditions are similar to those in which war would be waged in Latvia. Prussia is successfully defended by one small army, while the attack on Prussia was carried out by two Russian armies, each of which was bigger than the German Army; of course, the genial vigilance of the Germans was also key, but without the proper preparation of the territory, their goals could not have been attained.

Preparation of a territory for war consists mainly of building roads and fortresses. Latvia is not capable of building fortresses, because this is something only wealthy France can afford to do. Besides, during peace time, fortresses do not contribute to culture and the economy, they even have a negative impact on the latter. The defence of Eastern Prussia was based on active operations to build an extensive network of roads among some natural obstacles — marshes and lakes. Roads are also very important to the economy. Thus, preparation of this territory for war actually coincides with the promotion of economic development. Our potential theatre of war — Latgale — with its many marshes, lakes and forests; in case of war in Latgale, we will have to fight using a small army (the same as the Germans did in Eastern Prussia) against a much larger invading force. While Prussia had very good roads, however, Latgale has a shortage of roads. Road construction pertains mainly to railroads and highways, or good roads in general — in all seasons. As far as railroads are concerned, Latgale does not have fewer railroads than any other part of Latvia; besides, Latvia cannot build new highways at the present. The railroads in Latgale are fairly good for waging war, but the railroads in Latvia are in dire need of improvements. The great river Daugava splits Latvia into two parts, and there is only one railroad bridge across the Daugava. (The Daugavpils railroad bridge does not play a role here, because it does not connect Latvian railroads). Eastern Prussia was separated from Germany by the Vistula River; so many bridges were built across the Vistula that 11 trains

could cross at the same time; there is only one bridge across the Daugava; from a military perspective, this places our railroad network really low on the list. We must not forget that one of the main reasons Russia lost the war with Japan was the fact that only one railroad line connected Russia and the Far East. Did the war with Japan not cost Russia more than construction of the Siberian railroad? If this one bridge would be damaged during war time, Kurzeme and Zemgale would be completely cut off from the theatre of war, we have to take this possibility into account. Fortunately, we have already built a second railroad line across the Daugava — Jelgava — Jaunjelgava — Krustpils — Rzekne; but the bridge across the Daugava at Krustpils — Zilani has been destroyed. In case of war this bridge would be of vital importance. I don't think this bridge is any less important than the Bulduri bridge for commercial purposes; our defence department ought to insist that building a second bridge over the Daugava is both necessary and urgent. Another important issue regarding railroads is the Riga-Liepaja railroad, one part of which now goes through Lithuania. If a railroad is to be built across Latvian territory, it is important to considering all the military requirements: this is vital so that in case of war the railroad is not in danger. As I have said, Latgale is somewhat successfully connected by rail to the rest of the railroad network in Latvia, but the question of capacity of this system arises. Prior to the World War, the following were requirements for the Russian railroads traveling to the theatre of war: from single rail lines — 19 pairs of army trains and from double rail lines — 40 — 49 pairs of army trains. Now — after the World War experience — Latvia should not have lesser requirements of its railroads. The military department must insist on this; if our transport capacity is not adequate, mobilization would not take place as quickly as necessary and this would seriously hamper the timely re-grouping of forces. Thus, we would lose the one advantage that small countries have — speed and the related speedy transfer of war activity to enemy territory. These are urgently serious issues related to railroads. As far as roads are concerned, Latgale is way behind the rest of Latvia, and in the case of war it is precisely Latgale that will need the greatest number of good roads. Prussia had better roads than the rest of Germany, and this paid off numerous times during the World War, not to mention the fact that these roads visibly raised the economic level of life in Prussia. If we cannot afford highways, then it is possible to build the same kinds of roads in Latgale that exist in the remainder of Latvia. If the marshes, lakes and forests in Latgale remain without roads, and the rivers remain without bridges, in case of war we will have to forget about Latgale and transfer defence activity to the Aiviekste, Lubāna, Pitalova marsh line; in case there are no roads or bridges, these marshes

can become a deadly trap for our army. So who has traditionally built Latvia's highways? Latvian farmers — rural inhabitants. Why then can we not ask that of Latgale farmers now, to build highways in Latgale as well; besides, the government could help by taking over building better bridges. The defence department must map out the most important transportation routes and road hubs, and then insist that these roads are built. Roads are a very important defence issue, and they are also one of the most important cultural and economic issues.

## II

War materiel includes machine guns, cannons, airplanes, automobiles, horses, wagons, ammunition, clothing, etc. Some of these items are only good for war — machine guns, cannons, ammunition, etc., while others are good for war but also for general use: airplanes, automobiles, horses, wagons, etc. The former are purely the concern of defence departments, but the latter are an issue important to general peace time life. No defence department maintains these items during peace time in the quantities that would be necessary for war; this certainly is not possible for a country as poor as Latvia. If our country were rich, it would nevertheless be disadvantageous for our defence department to maintain these supplies in the quantities necessary for war; the airplanes, automobiles, etc. would not be new and we would have to go to war with used vehicles. That is why only a minimum of such materiel should be maintained during peace time for certain war assignments, training purposes and free time needs. The defence department must, however, see to it that during war there is materiel in sufficient quantities, at the required time, and all of the items be of the best possible construction.

Aviation has become one of the main weapon categories: victory in the air will be the first step to total victory. In warfare today, it is necessary to have a great number of the newest type of airplanes and a great number of well-trained aviators. Latvia, too, needs not ten planes but hundreds.

The use of automobiles is continually increasing, transportation at the rear as well as transportation at the front is much more convenient with automobiles than with horses: they are faster and also less expensive, because automobiles only "eat" when they are in use, while horses need to be fed all the time.

During the Latvian war of independence our country was sustained by the farmers: if there is war again, the farmers again will be tapped into as a main source — both old land owners as well as new farmers. In order for these supporters of Latvia to be able to give more, we should not take from them what they need the most — horses, because during war automobiles can be easily used instead of

horses. There is no doubt that all transportation connected with sanitary needs, artillery parks, transfer of men at the rear, or larger groups at the front, can be carried out by automobile; especially if the people of Latgale are forced to build roads in their province, equal in quality to those in the rest of Latvia.

Air traffic, or at least air mail service, is being established throughout the world: thus, aviation sustains itself with its peace time activities. Any country that has these means of air traffic will have many airplanes and many aviators in case of war. If a country desires to prepare their own armed air forces, aviation must reach out during peace time and support the development of air traffic. The defence department in collaboration with its war aviators must define the types of planes suitable for war, the types that can be easily and swiftly transformed into war planes. The defence department could offer a certain subsidy to private businesses to help with the acquisition and upkeep of these planes, while the government could offer certain privileges to those involved in air transport or air mail services, on the condition that if war breaks out, the planes are taken over by the war department. In this case, war aviation warehouses would have to ensure various parts and armaments in order to quickly transform these planes into war planes. The war aviation sector would need relatively few specialized airplanes for specific war missions, training and trial flights of the newest airplanes; of course, if finances allow, some battle squadrons should be maintained, so that they can be activated in the hours following the announcement of mobilization, while all the planes taken over from the private sector would not be ready until the next day. In preparation for the World War, France built its air force mainly on various private aviation associations, paying them bonuses for innovations, attaining flight records and offering subsidies for airplane maintenance. As war began, all of these planes were taken over by the army. Today's air battles require various types of airplanes, but almost all of them can be used for peace time needs as well. Only by developing the private aviation sector during peace time, will the country have enough aviation workshops, extra spare parts, and well-trained aviators. If the defence department decides to set up an air force appropriate for war all on its own, it will either be very expensive, or, in case of war, the air force will be outdated and very weak, and there will be no airplanes or reserve pilots.

This and more can be said of automobiles. It would be a total waste of money, and useless expenditure for the defence department, to purchase and maintain all the automobiles needed for war during peace time. It is only necessary for the defence department to define the types of automobiles needed: trucks, ambulances, passenger cars, tractors, etc. and offer minimal privileges to vehicle owners on

condition that in case of war, the vehicle in a certain condition (with such and such spare parts and equipment for transportation of patients or artillery shells) is taken over by the war department. Those same vehicles under certain rules can be used for training and manoeuvres.

Besides automobiles and airplanes there is a lot of other equipment that also needs to be prepared for use in war. Given today's great selection and speedy progress of technologies, it is impossible to purchase this equipment and store it for war. It is also impossible to use of it during peace time: the national economy is always expensive and never profitable, and the military service is not meant for all sorts of commercial businesses; if a soldier is involved in private business, why must he be considered part of the national sector, especially the defence sector, which only deals with preparation for war? Besides, this sort of acquisition of war materiel was practiced by all countries: regarding horses — horse registration and horse mobilization. Now this method, with some additions, must be applied to many and varied types of equipment.

The duties of today's defence department do not only include preparation of the army, but preparation of the entire country and its people. Defence departments must see to it that the country has all the necessary equipment for waging war, that there be enough of this equipment and that it be of the appropriate quality. In case the country does not have some of the necessary equipment, or has very few pieces, this equipment must be imported. The defence department must have an accounting of all nationally available and militarily useful devices; the defence department must be responsible for their condition.

All national forces must be used in national defence, because war is waged by the entire nation with all its might.

# SOME OBSERVATIONS ON NATIONAL DEFENCE ISSUES<sup>59</sup>

At present Latvia is at peace with its neighbours. I have a feeling, however, that this is only a temporary situation. No one can predict how things will be settled in the east. Thus, the behaviour of the east during its possible period of transformation is also unpredictable. The issue of whether there will be war or peace along our eastern border depends on our strength: no one touches the strong and no one takes the weak into consideration. That is especially pertinent to our time.

I notice the regular smiles; these people think I would like to see all Latvians armed with a gun just like last winter,<sup>60</sup> because that kind of situation could be more economically damaging than an invasion from outside.

No, first of all, I do not believe that all of our nation's sons should be in the army; I wouldn't even dream of saying that Latvia must incur the huge cost of maintaining an army. I only want to point out that we should not look to the future through rose tinted glasses — we must be alert. Secondly, I would like to mention some statistics regarding army size and maintenance in some countries prior to the World War.

There is a widespread view in society that the most militaristic country in the world before the World War was Germany, and this militarism notwithstanding, it lost the war: therefore, militarism did not save Germany, but rather brought it to ruin. This opinion is wrong. Quite the opposite is true: if Germany had been just as militarily strong as its neighbour France, then Paris would have most likely been taken in 1914, and Germany would have finished the war in 1915 as the victor. Prior to the war, the size of their armies was the following: Germany — 761,000; France — 883,000, of which 85,000 were Arabs, Moroccans and blacks. Thus, France with a population 1/8 smaller than that of Germany, maintained a larger army during peace time. During peace time 1.2% of Germany's inhabitants were in the army, but in France — 2.1%. Prior to mobilization the number of men with military service training in Germany was 2,772,000; in France — 3,123,000. The number of untrained men who would have qualified for mobilization based on age and health

<sup>59</sup> Latvijas kareivis (The Latvian Soldier), No. 193 (October 10, 1920)

<sup>60</sup> P. Radžins wrote this article in October 1920 and talked about January 1920 when Latvian army had its greatest size. Thus “all Latvians with a gun”.

status was 775,000, in France — only 87,000. Therefore, if Germany had been just as militaristic as France prior to the war, up to 650,000 men would have remained in the reserves, which would have been transferred to the right wing to replace four suddenly missing corps (one at the Liege fortress, one at Antwerp, two on the way to East Prussia against Rennenkampf), and the German right wing not only would not have had to retreat, it would have gone on the offensive and carried out a deciding battle. Paris would have been taken and France would have been totally defeated if not in 1914, then in 1915. France saved itself thanks to its tremendous readiness for war during peace time and came out of the war victorious.

The numbers, in turn, show how large a peace time army can be compared to the number of inhabitants. Latvia should never have to bear the burden that France did with 2.1% of its inhabitants in the army, however, Latvia must not reduce its armed forces to less than 1% of its inhabitants. The Latvian Army should maintain a permanent army of 1.1% to 1.2% of inhabitants, that is, almost Germany's norm.

Regarding expenditures for maintenance of the army, Germany spent 10 rubles per inhabitant before the war and France spent 16.5 rubles. Of course, pre-war norms are not applicable today, perhaps only slightly if calculated in gold. These expenses are directly related to the wealth of the nation, and a poorer Latvia has no need to maintain an army as expensive as that of a wealthy France.

If a country and its people must defend their rights by force, then they must use all their force, not only a part of it; each part separately can be easily defeated, while the entire force would have resulted in victory. France used all of its force from the very beginning and that is why France was the victor. Our small nation must take special note of this. Giant Russia started the war with only part of its force, but Russia is a huge country. Our territory is small and if we do not survive the first attack, we will be conquered.

If culture and manufacturing in France did not suffer from the fact that all men having reached the age of 20, without exception, were in the military service, I think Latvia can also do this. Today governments no longer wage war, nations do, and war determines the destiny of nations; that is why the entire nation, without exception, must bear its defence service personally and materially. There cannot be any exceptions to this, because any exception will be unjust regarding those who serve. There were various privileges and facilitations used in Russia, but why offer these to one at the expense of another? For example, let us look at facilitations based on family status, where the father's working life was up to the age of 60: do tradesmen, doctors, lawyers who have reached the age of 60, make less money than these same people at the age of 55? Let us look at labourers at age 59 and



60. Will there not be enough cases where the health condition of the 59-year-old will be worse than that of the 60-year-old? Very often the people receiving legal facilitation are in better circumstances than those who do not legally qualify for this facilitation. For this reason, I think Latvia would be wise to follow the example of France and prescribe that defence service is mandatory for everyone with no exceptions. Only physically handicapped people could be exempt from defence service if they are incapable of physical work; people with various incapacities can work in the offices at the rear — in workshops, warehouses, on staff, etc.

By doing so, equality would be achieved, thus providing the opportunity, in case of need, to use maximum national force in defending their rights.

Experience shows that during peace time, military service should be two years. It must be noted, however, that in 1913 France went from a two-year peace time service to three years. A two year military service will not be a hardship in Latvia, because the country is small enough that military leaves will not be a problem; if additional leaves are awarded for hard work and sense of responsibility, leaves will be fairly frequent. Two years of service pertains to everyone who, in case of mobilization, needs to supplement peace time military units. There will be more years of calls to service in Latvia, so there will be a surplus of soldiers in case of mobilization; these men will comprise additional battalions, get additional training and then supplement the active army based on the army's losses due to illness, the number of wounded and the number of fatalities. The part of the nation assigned to supplemental battalions can be less trained: they can be older men whose training is a bit outdated, as well as younger men who for some reason have not served their full two years. This latter category can become a reality in Latvia only after some time; at present the advantage must be given to those men participating in war.

National defence issues must be viewed very seriously, because it is a question of life and death for Latvia. We must not forget the last few years.

# THE ISSUE OF THE DEFENCE OF THE BALTIC ALLIANCE<sup>61</sup>

Everyone understands that the Baltic countries are small not only compared to the super powers, but also in relation to the smaller countries in Western Europe such as Belgium, the Netherlands and others. That is why it would be very difficult for these countries to live completely independently of each other: there would be huge expenses and great difficulties. By forming closer ties and handling some state sectors together, these countries can be much more successful. Why do two friendly neighbour countries with identical and joint interests need to protect their border from both sides? At worst, the protection can be “one sided”, that means one country guards on half of the joint border, the other country guards the other half. At best, the joint border does not need to be protected, if the necessary customs and trade agreements are signed. This would completely eliminate the expense of maintaining a border patrol. Similar arrangements can be introduced in the railroad, postal service and other sectors. An even greater importance and significance of a Baltic Alliance is in the area of defence. While national economic growth depends on an alliance in trade, manufacturing, the postal service, railroads, etc., a defence alliance would be responsible for guaranteeing the independence of the Baltic countries in the foreseeable as well as the more distant future.

We can read a fair amount in the newspapers about a Baltic Alliance in regard to national economic interests. In contrast, there is nothing in the newspapers regarding a Baltic Alliance on the issue of defence. It is understandable that national defence issues must be kept secret, so neither military alliance (convention) rules nor the fact of the existence of such an alliance, if it were to be formed, can be disclosed. I do not want to write about these secret issues. In my opinion, the other side of this issue is very important. Agreements governing trade, the railroads, or the postal service do not touch, without exception, the entire nation, and even if they do, the impact is minimal. On the other hand, the entire nation is interested in a defence alliance (military convention), and they are extremely interested, even going so far as to give their lives for their country. Today's wars are national wars, not wars fought by armies separate from the nation. If the army is to win the

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<sup>61</sup> Latvijas kareivis (The Latvian Soldier), No. 109 (May 20, 1921).

nation's war, it is necessary that the entire nation as one go to war, that the entire nation participate in the war, both with weapons at the front and in the interior of the country, supplying the front line with the necessary supplies, and supporting the front both materially and morally. In today's wars no national sector can remain in peace time status as war breaks out. In order to be able to rally the entire nation to war, the entire nation must understand why it is being called to war. The nation must be convinced and dutifully go to war. When the nation comes into contact with a hostile neighbour — a neighbour that tries to take away its independence, then, of course, the entire nation will rise up: all earlier discussions and events have convinced the nation that the enemy wants to destroy their independence. If the conflict arises between one of our small allied neighbours, things will be different: there will be a lack of conviction regarding what the issue really is: is our friendly neighbour being fooled by the enemy, or is the enemy preparing to swallow up the independence of our neighbour? Clear conviction will never be achieved for the simple reason that the enemy getting ready to attack will take advantage of the press to loudly scream to the world that they, of course, are peace loving, but this small neighbour keeps bothering him. It is quite easy to imagine that in the event of Russia preparing to invade Estonia, there would be no shortage of news spread around Latvia that Estonia started the war with Russia. That is why the small Baltic nations very early on must be convinced that if one of the members of the Baltic Alliance declares war, the governments of the other members are completely sure of the reasons for war — in other words, who caused the war; thus, if the government calls the nation to war, the issue is the defence of the Baltic countries, not the desire to conquer on behalf of the Baltic countries. Further, the Baltic nations must be completely sure regarding the following: each of them can hope for independence in the future only if none of them gets robbed of their independence; if this year one of the Baltic countries loses its independence, it is safe to say that next year the second and the third would lose their independence. Therefore, each of the Baltic countries and each of their nations, must be completely sure that an attack on one of the Baltic countries is, at the same time, an attack on the other Baltic countries. Of course, the attacker, beginning war with one of the Baltic countries will, at the same time, try to split the other two from the Alliance by offering various benefits and privileges. In today's era, a Baltic Alliance is a great military asset, and the enemy that would have the desire to conquer these countries, would, without a doubt, try to fight with each one separately, one after the other. The duty and responsibility of our press and the press of the other Baltic countries is to convince the masses of the following truth:

An attack on one of the Baltic countries is, at the same time, an attack on the other Baltic countries, despite the promises and guarantees of the attacker.

If one of the Baltic countries declares war, or it feels the threat of war, the governments of the other Baltic countries call their nations to war; the nations can be sure that they are being rallied to a defensive war, that a war defending the independence of all the Baltic countries is underway; there are no other goals.

If the Baltic countries declare war in defence of one of their members, then all of them must wage the war as if it had been declared on them; that is — with total force and energy, the nation rising up as one.

The main, and almost the only, guarantee of Baltic (each individually and all three together) independence is a close defence alliance. In the question of defence, the Baltic countries must be so well united that they form one whole defence organism.

If it is important to establish an alliance between the Baltic countries in the area of trade, manufacturing, railroads, postal service, etc., it is vitally important and even crucial in the area of defence — it is a matter of survival.

### **The Riga Conference and the self-defence of the new countries**

At the present moment, all of the countries that have been established on the former western edge of Russia have signed, or are in the process of signing, peace treaties with Soviet Russia. At the present moment these former western Russian countries have gathered in Riga for a conference; the aim of the conference — to sign conventions and among them, also a war convention. Since preparations for the conference took place while these countries were still at war with Soviet Russia, it might seem too many that signing a peace agreement with Russia has eliminated the aim of the conference, or at least has eliminated the issue of war conventions. The issue is not by any means eliminated, it has only become clearer and more precise, because the latest events have clarified each country's political status as well as the mutual relationships between these countries.

If you want peace — prepare for war. If you are strong and ready to fight, no one will dare to interrupt your peace. We — Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Ukraine — can be ready for war, but we cannot individually be strong. In order to be strong enough defending our peace, our rights and our independence against an attacking enemy, we must all unite — that is the aim of a war convention. Latvia drove Bermondts from its borders, but did not cross them. Latvia drove the Bolsheviks from Latgale, but again did not go farther to conquer foreign territory,

although going farther was very tempting and success was guaranteed. To define its northern and southern borders, Latvia gives in to everything, even compromise, to assure that controversial issues are solved peacefully. Does that not clearly show Latvia's peace-loving nature?

Was not the ousting of Bermondt and the release of Latvia proof enough that Latvia is strong enough and able to defend its freedom, independence and rights? That no sacrifice is too great for any Latvian when it comes to this defence? War protects our right against foreign harassment and tyranny; preparing for war is defence; the better prepared we are for war, the greater our hope for peace — signing a war convention is one of the very powerful means by which to defend peace. The events of this year show clearly enough how closely connected the destinies of the new countries are. These countries are too small to act expansively in all state sectors, but uniting in conventions, together they will be able to achieve that which would be impossible separately, solely by themselves. Truth and justice play no role in world politics, nor do charity and other noble emotions. The deciding role in world politics is played by power and self-interest: everyone does only that which benefits him, if only it is possible to do so with one's own abilities, taking into consideration the circumstances of the moment as well as instances and circumstances predictable in the future. Is it of any benefit to any of the super powers in the west or east to help us free of charge, to expend their forces and finances for the sole reason of ensuring the freedom and independence of small nations — Latvians, Estonians, Lithuanians, Finns, etc.? It is, however, advantageous for Finns, Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians to support each other, because by supporting each other these nations also support themselves. These newly independent countries are all in exactly the same position and, therefore, are a threat to all others. For this reason, it is vital that these countries closely unite. One of the members of such an alliance is the Riga Conference.

# A POLITICAL OR AN APOLITICAL ARMY<sup>62</sup>

One of the issues on the agenda of state legislation is the military service law and the active service regulations, or disciplinary regulations, on our agenda. Both the first and the second define the rights and responsibilities of soldiers. The very important issue of soldiers' political rights needs to be resolved. Actually, the decision needs to be made whether to allow politics in the army or to keep the army outside of politics.

Do soldiers have the right to participate in national and municipal elections, election campaigns, meetings, political demonstrations? Do they have the right to belong to political parties, deliver political speeches, etc.? Or do they not have these rights, thus the army is viewed as a weapon of the government, but not that of political parties.

In all parliamentary countries, the government exists as long as it has the majority support of parliament; as soon as the parliament is not satisfied with the government, the government falls, and a new government with the support of the majority of the parliament is established. Thus, in real life the government only carries out the wishes of the majority of the nation. Given this — the national powers need only carry out the wishes of the national majority — that is, the wishes of the government; no matter which party or parties make up the government, it carries out the wishes of the majority. The army, without the least contradiction, will carry out the wishes of its legal government only if there are no political parties within the army itself. If this is not the case, the army or its sectors have the option of not carrying out the government's orders, given that party discipline very often is potentially stronger than war discipline. If the army has political rights, the majority in each sector of the army will side with one or another political party. If a political party has the majority in a certain army sector that is hostile toward the government, how can that sector carry out the government's instructions or orders, since they are completely contrary to the party's views and possibly are totally against those views. Let us say the parliament wants to overthrow the government, but if the majority of the army is on the side of the governmental parties, the army

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<sup>62</sup> Latvijas kareivis (The Latvian Soldier), No. 109 (May 20, 1921).

could forbid the overthrow. The army can play a deciding role in any governmental crisis, even by simply organizing demonstrations. It is not even necessary for the entire army to do so; it is enough if the garrison in the capital city does so. Some people will tell me that it is not necessary to give soldiers all the political rights of the citizens, it is possible to give them the right to vote, as it did during the Constitutional Congress elections, and limit their other rights so that politics does not harm the army. If the army is given active political rights, these rights must be given totally and completely. There can be no compromise; compromises can result in even more serious misunderstandings. If a soldier is given the right to vote in parliamentary elections, it is necessary that he uses these rights responsibly, he should know who and what he is voting for — thus, an election campaign must be carried out and soldiers themselves need to hold meetings and give speeches, they have to campaign. During election time, the work of army sectors will turn into political campaigning. The position of army leaders, especially officers, will be very strange. An officer or an army leader is not a teacher or instructor that has classes at certain times every day after which he goes home and has no further connection with his students. Much more is demanded of an officer or an army leader. An officer must be an educator and also a master. He must learn in depth about the lives of every one of his subordinates; he must take care of food, clothing, cleanliness and order; he must also see to the intellectual and spiritual life of his subordinates, give advice, explain things and answer each and every question his subordinates may have. Therefore, during election times the leader and officer will have to explain election issues to their subordinates — that is, run a political campaign. Each officer or leader will have the opportune moment to give a verbal thrashing to his boss, neighbour or competitor. It will be easy to explain the actions of his personal or political enemy to the soldiers: the way you are fed, how you are treated, how training sessions are run...all depends on the fact that your commander is not a member of the right party. In sectors where the commander is a member of this or that party, things are completely different: everyone is well fed, well clothed, the leaders get along well with their subordinates, training sessions are easy, etc. Remembering the dire experiences of the Kerenski period, officers will have to join the party that the majority of the soldiers in any sector belong to; otherwise the relationship between officers and soldiers will be pointed, and could become hostile with the same consequences we saw during Kerenski's time.

The constituent of soldiers constantly changes in army sectors: this year the majority will be from the Farmers' Party, so the company commander will join this party; the recruits the following year could form a social democrat majority and the



company commander will have to switch to that party; two years later the majority in the company could be from Latgale, and the company commander has to change his political conviction yet again. If soldiers belong to political parties, the party which at the moment is in charge of the government will assign higher positions in the army only to their party members, and never to a soldier in an opposition party. There will be a bilateral competition; the soldiers will compete to get their party in charge of the government, and the ruling party will compete to get more members of their party in positions that hold more weight in the army. What would the soldiers be robbed of if they were denied political rights? Peace time armies will mainly consist of men called up for active service. As we hear, the age for active service will be younger than 21, however, all political rights will be assigned only to those citizens who are already 21: thus, one part of the active servicemen will not have any political rights; that leaves only those who have reached the age of 21, but would it be a tremendous loss if these men did not have political rights for one year? This would come at a time they have been taken from their homes, from their work — thus, they are also removed from their direct interests and find themselves influenced by other circumstances. At home they perhaps would have voted for a different party than they vote for while in active service. The smallest portion of the army consists of permanent officers — career servicemen; these are people who have chosen the military as their life's profession. They enjoy certain active service rights and privileges that are combined with certain restrictions. The career service in its essence does not allow political activity. If you cut a tree with a shaving knife, you will not be able to shave with it; if the army and its leader is used as a party political weapon, the army will not be fit to carry out its direct responsibilities. I do not believe that any political party believes that higher ranking soldiers should be active in politics. A real soldier does not play politics, nor does he try to make a career of military service by playing politics and always trying to please the more powerful party rather than by using his military talents. From a military perspective, his involvement in politics can be a real danger to the army. Each order or action of an army leader or officer can be given an evil nuance by spreading rumours of what has been said at political meetings. Thus, the leader's authority and good relationships with his subordinates will be destroyed. A leader cannot be open and direct as can a soldier; he constantly has to manoeuvre depending on the political stream; otherwise he will be tossed onto a sandbar. Considering the short time span of military service, training will suffer greatly, because both soldiers and officers will be busy with meetings, speeches, campaigns, etc. Training will also suffer from the leaders who try to get in the good graces of their subordinates by

making training sessions less demanding: it is possible to get good results through laziness. Thanks to politics, the soldiers who play politics in the army will squeeze out the specialists who are well versed in war issues, but do not play politics. Should the army be political or apolitical — this is an issue that must be resolved with the greatest sense of gravity and seriousness.

# A PERMANENT ARMY AND A MILITIA<sup>63</sup>

## I

Now that the Latvian nation has gained its liberty solely through its heroic army, which has also given the nation the opportunity to convene its Constitutional Congress, which has begun to build the country in all areas, it can be expected that one of the first questions on the agenda of the Congress will be the future organization of the Latvian Army and possibly its existence.

Despite the fact that it is only thanks to the army that we have reached the point that we can convene the Congressional Congress, despite the fact that even now the Congress can function only because it is protected by the army, and despite the fact that everyone should be able to see that the army is the only real national power — objections to this heroic Latvian Army can be heard.

Some say that the army has done its job and is no longer needed, forgetting, intentionally or not, that it is necessary to defend the independence that was won at such great cost, because there is still no peace in our neighbouring countries. We should remember the phrase: "There will be no peace in Europe until the Russian issue is resolved."

Others say quite openly that Latvia has not needed an army for quite a while, from the moment that the last of Bermond's men left our territory, because we would have been able to get along with the Bolsheviks without an army. This getting along obviously refers to the same sort of relationship we had in the autumn of 1918 when Latvia was ruled by comrade Stuchka. The existence of an army presumably does not allow a normal life to develop (obviously meaning that a "normal life" was what we experienced under Stuchka), therefore, the army is harmful and it should be destroyed (just as Kerenski destroyed the Russian Army and gave over power to Lenin and Trotsky).

Up until now, no one has dared to openly begin the destruction of the army, but efforts have been made secretly. Just as at one time in Russia, so too here; first attempts were made to weaken and destroy the army's discipline, the main stronghold and foundation of the army. Our heroic army did not fall for these devilish tactics and other means were tried, for example, provocative rumours

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<sup>63</sup> Latvijas kareivis (The Latvian Soldier) No. 68, 70, 71, 72 (May 12, 15, 16, 18, 1920).

were spread about the government, leadership, etc.; the aim of these rumours was to spread the opinion that all the hardships that the nation and the army are now suffering were the fault of the leadership and government.

When a lay person attempts to discuss specialized issues, the result almost always tends to be comical; but when it is done with evil intentions, it is sad and can be very harmful to the issue in question. During the time around the election of the Congressional Congress, some parties used the following slogan as part of their campaign — “a national militia instead of an army”. We can assume that the issue will be discussed at the Congressional Congress. That is why I feel it is necessary to discuss this issue from a military perspective.

When someone maintains that we need a national militia instead of a permanent army, to me this seems just as silly as telling a farmer that he needs a black horse. It is quite likely that a wealthy man who needs a horse simply for recreation, will seek out a black horse and will purchase it if he likes it, even if this black horse is a colt or has an illness and it will need to be trained or medically treated. The situation with the farmer is different, because he needs a work horse: he will seek out a strong horse and will pay no attention to whether it is black or grey; since the farmer needs the horse for work, a colt or a sick horse will not do, because it will have to work immediately; besides, the farmer also will consider his available finances.

Talking about the army, first we must resolve one question — does Latvia even need a military force? If Latvia needs a military force, what are the duties of such a force and what duties should it be able to carry out? The duties that the military force will be expected to carry out will also determine the nature of the force; and, of course, national financing and other types of support need to be taken into consideration. If you need to saw firewood, you buy a rip saw, if you need to saw boards, you buy a power saw — not the other way around.

I think that most people will agree that Latvia needs a military force, if Latvia wants to be an independent and free country, because it has gained its independence entirely thanks to its heroic army and only the communists can maintain that Latvia would have managed to achieve the same results without an army. All other nations that are now gaining their independence and establishing new countries also achieved this with their armies. This independence must be defended in war as well as in peace time. The only means to do this is a military force. Without a military force the country can soon lose its independence. Recent history of the last twenty years, which we ourselves have witnessed, provides enough examples of this. One has only to remember the Boer nations, Korea, Morocco, and Persia.

Besides, these countries lost their independence during a period of relative world peace, compared to today. The mentioned countries lost their independence because they did not pay attention to their armies, did not consider them important, and saw them as an unnecessary government expenditure. Could not the fate of these countries serve as a warning to our country, which has just gained its independence, our country that is located in an area where peace is not to be expected? Will Russia, no matter what kind of government it has, ever voluntarily give up the sea coast it has hungered for since the 13th century that it once conquered and ruled from the 18th to the 20th century. Will our sea now be less necessary and less profitable for Russia than it was 700 years ago? Just because the Bolsheviks want to sign a peace treaty in no way means that Russia is giving up its efforts forever. They want to sign peace treaties with some of our neighbours to separate them and to deal with them individually. This is so obvious that the Bolsheviks themselves see no need to hide their motives. Therefore, if Latvia wants independence and peace, it needs a military force that is able to defend its borders against external enemies.

## II

Latvia, like any other country, needs a military force for internal protection, defence and security. Without such a military force, it is possible that a 100 strong gang of robbers would terrorize a city or an entire region; such gangs could rob national warehouses, the national treasury, banks, etc., not to mention private property. To avoid such cases and to avoid even their likelihood, it is necessary that an armed force be located in the country's largest territorial centres. Thus, a military force is necessary to safeguard a country from external dangers, as well as to uphold internal security and order.

What are the duties of the Latvian Army? What duties must it be capable of performing?

As far as internal security and order is concerned, the army must be capable of enforcement not only in army post locations but throughout the entire territory, helping in situations that are beyond the capabilities of civil authorities.

When talking about safeguarding Latvia from external dangers we draw your attention to Latvia's geographic and political situation. Latvia has land borders with Estonia and Lithuania, and two super powers — Russia and Poland; only a narrow section of Lithuania separates Latvia from a third super power — Germany. Latvia's land borders do not have natural barriers such as mountains, rivers, lakes and marshes; all of Latvia's borders are completely open to enemy attack. To continue — the territory of Latvia is rather small. If a hostile enemy army entered

Russia or Poland about 100-200 versts deep, this would mean nothing to these countries (only about 1/100 or 1/50 of their territory). If the same happened in Latvia, however, this means about 1/3 to 1/2 of the territory of Latvia. A good army can traverse 100 versts in four days, and using the railroads, even more. Thus, Latvia would lose 1/3 of its territory along with everything in that territory that would be necessary for waging war — not yet mobilized people, war materiel, economic resources, etc.

For these reasons, if Latvia wants to maintain an army, it must be an army that can meet the enemy at its very borders; if the army cannot do so, then, given Latvia's circumstances, it would be insignificant. If our army will not be battle ready in time for any potential war situation, it will never attain battle ready status, because it will be impossible to mobilize additional soldiers from territories taken by the enemy. In about two weeks the enemy will pass through all of Latvia. Thus, the geographic situation of Latvia demands that the Latvian army be capable of rapidly going from peace status to war status — it must be able to mobilize very quickly.

I hope we will always have friendly relations with our small neighbours. However, if danger ever did threaten from one of our neighbours, we must evaluate their army so as not to fall short, and we must find a way to mobilize at least as quickly as they can.

The situation is different regarding Latvia's large neighbours. Of course, in the future Latvia's small army will not be capable of successfully fighting Russia's army of the future. In this kind of situation, Latvia would seek help among its small neighbours or one of the super powers. In case Latvia, in close cooperation with its small neighbours, would have to wage war against Russia, speedy mobilization is vital, and it is much more vital for Latvia than Estonia, Finland and Lithuania, whose geographic situation is much more favourable than that of Latvia. If one of the super powers agreed to help Latvia, let us not forget that their help would not arrive on the first day nor on the second day, it could take weeks; thus, the Latvian army would have to wage the most difficult part of the war by itself; if it is not in a position to meet the enemy at the border, it is very likely that in the weeks that we wait for assistance all of Latvia could be overrun by the enemy. If the Serbian army would not have been able to mobilize successfully in 1914 at the onset of the Austrian attack, it would have been conquered very quickly and would not have been able to continue the war; in other words, continuing the war would have been much easier for Austria. Latvia's political situation also demands that its army be capable of speedy mobilization; otherwise the Latvian Army loses its significance;

its upkeep might be very expensive, but without adequate funding it is not capable of carrying out its duties.

Thus, in case of war, the small Latvian army may very well fight off a larger enemy army until help arrives from friendly small countries or a friendly super power. In order to do this successfully, the Latvian army needs to be well prepared — well-trained, disciplined, well-armed, etc., that is — it must be in the top echelons of the military arts; it is better that it be smaller (due to national financing constraints) but with better battle capabilities. This, albeit small, military force needs to be ready on the first day of any potential war, because training inexperienced men on the battle fields costs a lot of blood.

Starting in the 19th century, wars were waged not by armies but by armed nations. (Actually, this was not a 19th century invention, since the ancient Greeks and Romans armed the whole nation, and Medieval Germans attacked Rome not with an army but with their entire nation or tribe in the full sense of the word). An armed nation means that in case of war all of the nation's sons capable of carrying a weapon get turned into soldiers. That is why today's peace time army is not really an army but rather war training for the nation. Today's peace time army consists of two parts: 1) war specialists for whom the knowledge of war and war issues are their full-time job, and 2) the nation's sons, who are called up for a certain time for training and war. In this sense waging war is similar to many other special professions. For example, building a railroad requires specialists, from engineers to clerks; but the hard labour is carried out by labourers hired when the work starts and let go when it is done. The same is true in waging war with the difference that war is a very important undertaking for a country, since it often decides the destiny of the country. In war every hour costs a lot of blood, that is why waging war must be taught, especially since waging war today is not as simple as digging ground for a railroad levee. The basis of both, however, is the same: specialists — the men who run the war waging process and well-trained labourers/soldiers. It is the same in almost all armies of the world.

### III

What is the basic difference between a permanent army and a militia?

Technically the difference is that in a permanent army young men having reached service age are trained as part of a single procedure, that is, they are drafted and remain in so-called active service, which was 2-3 years in most armies in the world prior to the World War. During this time the nation's sons receive theoretical and practical war training, they are trained in how to deal with the hardships of



war, they are trained as soldiers — in discipline, stamina, team spirit. Training ends at the end of this 2-3 year period. Those graduating from active duty remain on reserve lists until the age of 38-40.

In militias, on the other hand, young men of service age are called in once or twice a year for short training sessions of 2-8 weeks. If these training sessions are totalled up, the result is about two years of service. That is the situation in the Swiss Army. Thus, the length of training does not differ substantially between a permanent army and a militia. It is more convenient for the country and its people if war service training takes place over short sessions during the time of year when people have more free time from work. From a military perspective, however, this type of training schedule is rather inconvenient.

Each and every young person who has spent two years in a permanent army has completed his war training and in case of war is called up as a totally trained soldier. In the militia, however, two years after the initial call-up the training course is not completed; thus, in case of war these young men still need to be trained. The militia is not battle ready upon mobilization, the young men still need to complete their training. As I already mentioned, the most important factor for the Latvian Army is speedy battle readiness. In addition, as already noted, we also need the army to maintain internal security and order, at least for the next 5-10 years, until the world has become more peaceful and Latvia has been freed of gangs and attempted uprisings by hostile neighbours. A militia is not capable of performing these duties; a different armed force will be required in this case.

A militia's battle capabilities are doubtful, although I do not have examples to substantiate this, because militias have not participated in wars in the 19th nor 20th century. Considering the experiences of the World War, it can safely be said that at the beginning of a war a militia will always be weak; perhaps their infantry could gain enough training during a few weeks in difficult conditions, but all the specialized and technical militia sectors will have gained their practical and theoretical knowledge only when it may be too late to put it to use. There may be some gentlemen who will remind me that specialized and technical sectors will call up people who have experience in the respective sector. First of all, civil and private professions do not include all war specialities, for example, artillery specialists, mortar specialists, machine gun specialists, field engineers, etc.; secondly, war navigation, war aviation, war engineering, riding duties, are as far removed from trade navigation, recreational aviation, civil engineering and sports riding, as war activity is from rabbit hunting. Prior to the World War, France was in first place in recreational sports aviation and they ridiculed German airplanes. During the first

year of war, however, French aviators dared to fly over German positions only at a distance that they could be protected by French cannons, because they were incomparably weaker in air battles than were the German pilots.

Thus, a militia does not fulfil the requirements that Latvia must demand of its army, neither as far as battle readiness is concerned nor in the area of battle capability.

Let us look at yet a third factor — the expense of an army — how much does it cost the country and its people? Which is more expensive — a permanent army or a militia? As I have already mentioned, the armed forces in all of today's countries consist of two parts: all men of service age who have been trained at once or periodically for war, and war specialists who do the training and in case of war, are war commanders. Training of the people in a militia can be less expensive in the sense that people can be trained during down time at work. It is also important to remember, however, that militia training requires many training sessions, which means extra driving, time off work — this time is lost both for work and for training, and it is needlessly lost.

As far as war specialists and instructors are concerned, their support in a militia system is more expensive, quite a bit more expensive than in a permanent army.

These war specialists and instructors must be in a permanent army; during the time there are no trainees (militia system), specialists and instructors must not work in private business, because they will not retain their knowledge and will not be able to teach others. They must constantly follow and be on top of the latest in war studies, they must constantly be involved with them both theoretically and practically, otherwise they will fall behind specialists in other countries, they will lack adequate knowledge and in case of war, will not be able to fulfil the duties of a good war commander. Specialists will have aged, and of course, the nation will be trained in outdated war waging techniques. Besides, war specialists and instructors must also be undergo stamina training, otherwise they will be bad leaders in case of war. For example, if soldiers are tired after a march of 20 versts, their leader must not be tired; a leader does not retire for the night until he has completed all of his duties: anti-enemy security, status inquiries, subordinates' rest schedules, reports to his direct superiors, etc.

#### IV

In order to successfully train recruits in a short period of time in the militia system, a great number of war specialists and instructors are needed, much greater than the

number of officers and non-commissioned officers and instructors in a permanent army. In the former Russian army it was required to have one instructor for every 7-8 recruits. The number of instructors cannot be smaller in a militia, considering the short training period. Thus, for 150 recruits, that is one company, no fewer than 20 instructors will be needed, plus a company commander and a platoon commander. In a permanent army a big part of these can be selected from the best of the soldiers who have completed one year of training. In permanent armies the infantry company (a shorter training is sufficient) has 3-4 officers and 4-8 non-commissioned officers, who have been hired for further service; that means about 7-12 hired people make up part of the company. To successfully run a training session, a militia will need at least 25 professionals, trainers. Each company will also need cooks, quartermaster sergeants (treasurers), etc., a total of about 30 people will be hired at impressive salaries. These calculations pertain to a company, but if we consider larger units — battalions, regiments and divisions, the number of people on permanent staff will be much larger because all of the office and household (economic) staff must be permanent, otherwise army institutions will not be able to function. When men get called up for short term training, everything must be in place upon their arrival — accommodation, beds, food, weapons, training plan, in other words — everything necessary, and quite a lot of people are required to take care of all of this.

This is the situation in the infantry, but specialist army sectors will require an even greater number of these people who are in permanent military service. In addition to what I have already mentioned, we cannot forget war materiel and weapon receipt, storage and maintenance, so that everything is in complete war readiness and arranged in a way to promote speedy distribution. It really does not matter who the people will be doing these tasks — soldiers or private individuals hired based on work contracts; they will all have to be paid a salary, and this salary will be paid from the same national treasury that the nation pays into.

As far as maintenance of internal security is concerned, a militia army cannot be used for this purpose. Special security guards will be required to guard national property (war property as well). How many guards will be required for all of Latvia? Not less than 6000 (not counting border guards). All of them will be hired based on work contracts — with impressive salaries that will be paid from the national treasury, out of the pockets of the people.

I have only pointed out in general the items that demonstrate the great expense of a militia and their minimal battle capabilities. The situation is clear to anyone even a bit familiar with the organization of armed forces and war activity.

The idea of a militia is not at all new, it has been tried several times. More than 100 years have passed since statesmen throughout the world have thought of and tried various means of introducing the kind of military organization in their countries that would provide the strongest and largest army at the lowest cost — that is the dominant idea in any army's organizational process.

An army is organized for the defence of the country, therefore, it must be appropriate for the country's geographic or political situation. There are countries, whose geographic or political situation counters the threat of speedy invasion; the rate of mobilization is not especially important for these countries. Sweden and Norway are protected by the sea; it is impossible to carry out a speedy surprise attack on either one. Switzerland is protected by high mountains and its political situation is incredibly good (Switzerland has been recognized as neutral by the European super powers since 1815).

The situation in Latvia is different. Our main threat of invasion is on dry land; up until now our land borders have been easily crossed by enemies. For the World War the Level I divisions in the Russian Army were mobilized on the 6th day, but the Level II divisions on the 12th day following the announcement of mobilization. This rate of mobilization is considered slow, and justifiable and tolerable given the size of the territory of Russia. For this reason Russia could not greet the enemy at the border, it sacrificed a 100-200 verst strip of territory to the enemy. It could do so, because the loss of such a strip of land was hardly felt by Russia. The Latvian Army, on the other hand, cannot and must not give up such land areas to the enemy; it would be a huge, and possibly a fatal, loss for Latvia. That is why our army has to be organized in such a way as to be quickly convertible from peace time status to war status.

As I said earlier, there are no basic differences between permanent armies and militias. During peace time all the armies of the world consist of permanent personnel (cadres), who prepare themselves and train the nation in the activities of war. Militias differ from permanent armies only in the length of training sessions and their chronological organization: in permanent armies training happens as one continuous process while in militias it is carried out in several shorter periods; as a result, a militia is less battle capable and less able to mobilize quickly; besides, militias cost more, if we calculate national treasury expenditures, than permanent armies.

If Latvia does not want an army that only looks good and is suitable for representation, but one that is meant to deal with real potential war situations, Latvia must organize an army that is appropriate given its geographic, political

and economic situation. It is more than clear that Latvia's situation is that which dictates the first demand of an army — speedy mobilization and a strong war capability from the first days of war.

# SEA STRATEGY IN THE WORLD WAR<sup>64</sup>

That is the title (*Die Seestrategie des Weltkrieges*) of a small book by Vice Admiral Wolfgang Wegener, in which he discusses the activity of the German and English fleets from a strategic perspective. The Germans developed a fleet prior to the war, but German diplomats and politicians did not understand what goals must be set for fleets in case of war; thus, diplomats did not understand, that the reaching of this goal must be prepared by diplomatic means. Since war is politics only using different means, the wrong pre-war politics resulted in the wrong (lacking a goal) activity of the fleet during the war. The German fleet had no strategic goal nor objective in the World War. According to war plans, the German fleet had to be active in the North Sea, strategically defensively and tactically offensively. This is an example of total lack of understanding of sea strategy. There was nothing in the North Sea that needed to be strategically defended via tactical attacks: the Allies had no sea routes going through the North Sea; guarding the shoreline is not one of the strategic duties of a fleet.

The German fleet would have managed to carry out a tactical offensive only if the English fleet had wanted to sail into the North Sea. The English fleet did not have the least strategic need to sail on the North Sea, aside from the question of prestige. Even if the German fleet had managed to severely defeat the English fleet in the North Sea, it would have been only a local tactical victory with no consequences and effect on subsequent war action. This was also proved by the battle at the Skagerrak. The English fleet had been given a strategic assignment — to protect sea routes through the Atlantic Ocean. While these routes were not under threat, the English fleet had no reason to look for a fight with the German fleet.

The wrong politics regarding the fleet's goals and the wrong sea strategy resulted in the large and expensive German fleet spending the entire World War doing nothing and having no effect on the results of the war, except for their submarine activity, which was not, however, strategically supported by the German fleet. The strategy of a fleet is totally dependent on geographic situation. If the geographic situation does not allow for favourable strategic positions, they must be attained by diplomacy during peace time, and jointly by diplomacy and the fleet during war time.

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<sup>64</sup> Latvijas kareivis (*The Latvian Soldier*), No. 175 (August 7, 1929).

The author pronouncedly emphasizes the fleet's strategic axioms during peace time and war time, comparing the activities of the German fleet and the English fleet; the latter operated completely strategically correctly and appropriately for England's situation. The author just as pronouncedly points out the great connection that exists between the activities of diplomacy and the fleet both during peace time and war time. From time to time he also touches on the strategy of land armies.

This excellent scientific work should be recommended reading for our older fleet officers as well as our fleet leadership — fleet users and the older land army leaders, who might have to collaborate with the fleet. It should be even more required of our political and diplomatic leaders and those who are responsible for developing our sea forces at any given time, in order to be completely clear on what kind of goals we need our sea fleet for. If the goals are set correctly and precisely, then, based on the goals themselves, it will be possible to determine what kind, and what size, of sea fleet we need, and make sure that diplomacy prepares the reaching of these goals via fleet activity during war time.



# AVIATION<sup>65</sup>

Today our aviators have organized an Aviation Festival to show the nation our Air Force and demonstrate their capabilities, and also to raise funds for families of aviators who lost their lives. It is commendable how the public is introduced to the work that aviation does and its significance in national defence. As the nation becomes better informed about these issues, it will be convinced that national defence is impossible without a strong air force. Our aviators have a lot to show: the art of flying, energy, diligence and determination. These are the qualities they exhibit in their everyday life, in their work, and they will demonstrate them during the festival. The majority of our aviators have exhibited, and proven, their battle capabilities in war.

There are people, who seeing our pilots' beauty and agility in the sky, believe that we are strong in the air and we have nothing to fear from war in the air — thus, we do not need to incur additional expenses by expanding our Air Force. Careless people will possibly get this impression at the festival. This opinion is the biggest and gravest mistake, the consequences of which would be felt by every Latvian citizen, especially those living in our cities, during war. The next war will begin in the air, and it will begin very quickly: the very day and hour that diplomatic ties are cut, if not some hours earlier. War in the air will not begin at the border, it will begin over the entire territory, war will be waged against the country as a whole. Nowadays, during peace time, there are flights over very long distances — from Riga to Moscow, regular daily air traffic takes place between Paris and London, the distance is about 400 kilometres. We can safely say that a 400-500 kilometre distance is an ordinary flight. Calculating our land distances in terms of flight distances we see that it is only about 400 km from Sebeza to Liepāja. Thus, in case of an air attack, there is no point in Latvia that enemy aviators could not easily reach. The English General Groves expressed his opinion in the newspaper *The Times*:

“World leadership is still based on the development of military strength which has been proven by the period following the World War. Airplanes make it possible to take a new war “deeper”. It would be a grave mistake to view the air attack in the World War as a standard for the next bomb

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<sup>65</sup> Latvijas kareivis (*The Latvian Soldier*), No. 220 (September 30, 1923).

attacks. We have to assume that despite all international agreements bombs filled with deadly gasses will be used against major cities. Civilians will not be spared in the next war! The sea no longer protects England, but rather supports an aerial invasion”.

These General Groves’ words are the bitter but absolute truth.

The first victory, or the first losses, will take place in the air. The consequences will be dire for two reasons. First, activity in the air is very rapid over the entire area making an extreme moral impression not only on the army but on the entire nation and government, breaking the will to continue fighting. Second, he who will have lost in the air will have his hands and feet tied in the war on land: there will be no news about the enemy, but the enemy will have very detailed information; the artillery will shoot only at what is visible from the ground, while enemy artillery will see everything from the air; the army will always feel the threat of aerial attacks, there will be no time and no place for even the slightest rest. The only sure means against enemy aerial attacks is a strong air force. Therefore, we must strengthen our Air Force sparing no expense in purchasing materiel. We must not be close-fisted in this regard, otherwise the consequences can be devastating. Our aviators are capable, energetic, diligent and determined. We must give them enough good airplanes along with other materiel, thus ensuring our security and expedient national defence.

# AVIATION AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN WAR<sup>66</sup>

Ever since ancient times man has attempted to imitate the birds as he observed them flying easily and majestically in the sky. In the very beginning man attempted to conquer the sky using only the means of the birds. We all know the Greek legend of Icarus, who attempted to fly with wings that he made himself. Leonardo da Vinci has left extensive literature about the flight of birds. Until the 17th century, all attempts to fly were only carried out with the help of wing-like structures. Afterwards, thanks to knowledge and technique, it became possible to rise up into the air without wings — on the so-called aerostats. It is interesting that the early attempts to use aerostats were fairly successful, and this method of aerial navigation developed rather quickly and immediately was used for military purposes.

The first aerostat was made by the Duke of Chartres in 1784 and just 10 years later an aerostat was used to observe the French Army's (led by General Jourdan) battle at Fleurus in 1794. The war activity of this first aerostat was not successful: the observer had provided incorrect news and the aerostat was abandoned as useless. It was never investigated whether the observer or the aerostat had been at fault. As we can see from descriptions of the battle, the reason for the unsuccessful results was very simple: the observer had never been up in the air before and could not orient himself — he had seen the enemy forces, but was unable to determine where they were located and where they were going. Development of aerial navigation only really began 100 years later (not counting efforts in 1852 and 1862). A great deal of attention was focused on aerial navigation at the end of the 19th century and it began to develop. Test flights were made with airships as well as airplanes. It was possible to rise up in the former, but they went where the wind blew them, it was not feasible to steer them in the desired direction. All tests with the latter were unsuccessful. Thus, at the end of the 19th century and at the beginning of the 20th century airships won. Only anchored aerostats were used for war purposes. Thanks to advances in technique, lightweight gasoline motors were constructed in

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<sup>66</sup> Latvijas kareivja militārais pielikums (The Latvian Soldier Military Addendum), No. 4 (April 5, 1921), No. 6 (June 6, 1921).

the early 20th century, and they were put to use in airships<sup>67</sup> as well as airplanes. Duke Zeppelin worked with airships in Germany, while France, America and England tested airplanes. At first there was no success with airplanes and only beginning in 1908 did flying begin to develop incredibly fast.

A French pilot went to Petersburg in 1908 to show the wondrous things his plane could do — he rose up 2-3 fathoms (1 fathom = 1/50 verst or 2.13 m) and flew a distance of 100-150 fathoms in a straight line; by 1911 even the Russian Army had war pilots who took a very active part in major manoeuvres that same year. At the outset of the World War, the airplane had overtaken the airship, but great hopes were still placed on the latter as well.

At the beginning of the World War, France was in first place as far as aviation was concerned, it had the greatest number of pilots and the best airplanes and the majority of flight records were set by French aviators. Russia was reportedly second, but in reality second place went to Germany. The development of flight in France differed considerably from that of Germany. The first difference was in the type of airplane engines: in France, as in all other countries, rotating airplane engines were used, while Germany used stationary engines (automobile engine type). The French engines were considerably lighter, so at the same engine power the French engine and the entire airplane was lighter than the German airplane.

Given this, French airplanes had set height records — up to 6000 metres — and speed records — up to 150 kilometres per hour. Prior to the beginning of the World War, Germans began to set flight distance records. French airplanes were built for setting records, German airplanes were built for endurance, and the same was true of pilot instruction and training: the French beat the Germans in all the aesthetic and focus flights, but the German pilots were able to fly in bad weather — in bad weather without a good place (aerodrome) to take off and land, etc. As far as Russia is concerned, it had some French airplanes, specially made for Russia in France, therefore bad quality, and some Russian made airplanes that were even worse, because the French engine works in Moscow produced very low quality engines, that never produced the power they were programmed to produce. They had plenty of planes: the aviation sector and aviation school was noted on the body (although not on every one), making it easier to make selection for the army aviation sector.

The outdated airplanes were unable to fly higher than 1000 metres, they were unable to fly in windy weather, and they were unable to fly in even slightly bad

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<sup>67</sup> With the name 'airship' I mean those devices that are lighter than air — various types of aerostats.

weather. Not only in Russia, but in France and Germany as well, war aviation was in the beginning stages — that is, in flight test status, when nothing is certain nor precise.

If the World War has made any creative contribution to our lives, aviation comes in first; during the war it took such steps forward that still seemed impossible just prior to the war.

As the war began, the aviation situation was approximately the following: there were one- and two-seater models, monoplanes and biplanes; the speed was 80-150 kilometres per hour, take-off speed was up to 2000 metres in 40 minutes; flight time was 4 hours calculating 90 versts per hour = 360 versts, or 180 versts there and back (of course, in a straight line only), reconnaissance flight altitude was 800-1200 metres; possible extra weight (bombs) was no more than 4-10 kilograms; there were no defence or attack devices on board, an air battle was considered to be totally impossible; there were no communication devices on board except flares, that is to say, the pilot could signal only by using different coloured flares.

Reconnaissance work was the main, and almost the only purpose of aviation, and in favourable weather conditions, of course; in isolated cases pilots were used to ensure communications — to send news. It was accepted that bombardments from airplanes were possible, but there were no appropriate bombs and neither pilots nor planes were prepared for this. That is why an Austrian pilot threw pears from his airplane at the beginning of August, 1914 — it seems they were quite tasty.

From the very beginning the war demanded all of the nation's strength, aviation had the same demands: both from the pilots and the inventors of the planes. The former and the latter took great steps forward, or rather — each pushed the other forward. The pilots demanded airplane improvements, the airplane builders provided funding and the opportunity to proceed, taking advantage of technological progress. Aviation continually developed throughout the war years and by the time the war was over, aviation had reached the level noted below. There were several types of airplanes, each one appropriate for its special assignment; the main types were:

Two-seater biplanes, armed with a machine gun, the pilot in front, the observer and machine gun in back (plus a stationary machine gun), a mounted camera, a 16-260 horsepower engine.

One-seater monoplanes, biplanes and triplanes with one or two stationary machine guns, a 100-200 horsepower engine.

Two-seater armoured monoplanes and biplanes with one mobile and one stationary machine gun, a 200 horsepower engine.

Two-seater night planes with 1-5 machine guns, 15-200 horsepower engines, and large plates.

The first, third and fourth types also included a radiotelegraph, bombing apparatus and some other devices; their speed was 160-180 kilometres per hour; flight altitude up to 6-700 metres. The second type did not have any extras but had an extremely powerful engine, the airplane could reach an altitude of 6000 metres in 15 minutes, it could easily do various death loops, falls, spirals and other manoeuvres that no bird has been able to do in the air.

Some larger airplanes — two engines, each 150-260 horsepower, 4 machine guns, and there were experiments with small calibre cannons; besides the pilot and observer, the crew included machine gunners; a radiotelegraph for greater distances; the plane could carry up to 1000 kilograms munitions (bombs), its speed was 150 kilometres per hour.

The largest planes with 3-5 engines. All five engines were up to 1225 horsepower; a crew of 9-12 people; 5-7 machine guns or small calibre cannon; a powerful radiotelegraph; its speed was 120-130 kilometres per hour, flight time — 10 hours; capable of carrying 4000 kilograms (216 poods<sup>68</sup>), the total weight of the airplane including munitions — 14000 kilograms; capable of an altitude of 4500 metres. These planes were improved towards the end of the war in terms of speed and transportable weight, 12-18 cylinders, but the improved planes no longer had the opportunity to be used in the war. The newer armoured planes also did not get used in the war.

These airplanes were constructed based on the objectives they were to carry out during the war; on the other hand, it was possible to have new objectives only if we had the appropriate airplanes. Aviation objectives, continually increasing, by the end of the war were the following: reconnaissance, both short range and long range reconnaissance as well as night reconnaissance. Day reconnaissance included both short range and long range reconnaissance complete with photography. Of course, it was possible to run into the enemy while doing reconnaissance, which could not be avoided, it had to be accepted as part of carrying out the objective; therefore, reconnaissance pilots had to be very strong.

While flying reconnaissance it was possible to spot good bombing targets, so the pilots had to bring bombs with them. The first type of airplanes were used for these reconnaissance flights; long range reconnaissance was done in airplanes with powerful engines (260 PS), but short range reconnaissance used planes with less

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<sup>68</sup> Pood - Russian unit of mass (16.38 kg)

powerful engines. Speed was not necessary for night reconnaissance, it can only be carried out at short range, because otherwise the airplane can get lost; targets of night reconnaissance include highways, railroad stations (enemy shooting batteries). The third type of plane was used for night reconnaissance, they had a low speed, large wings to facilitate take-off and landing at night, and to enable them to carry a large number of bombs, because it is easy to spot good bombing targets and machine gun targets at night.

Adjustment of artillery fire; the objective is for the pilot to remain in the air while artillery is firing, to see where the shells land and to notify the battery. Sometimes the objective also included showing the battery the targets. These objectives had been planned even before the war, but they were never carried out in real life. In 1914 the objective was achieved in the following way: if the target had to be shown, the pilot would fly to the target and send up a certain coloured flare; the artillery would fire their first shot in that direction; after that the pilot would again, using agreed upon signals (turning the airplane), show where the shell had landed. In 1915 a radiotelegraph was used for this purpose: the pilot reported by radiotelegraph where the shell had landed. This objective can be successfully carried out by using the first type of airplane if it is equipped with a radiotelegraph station.



## SOME COMMENTS ABOUT PEACE<sup>69</sup>

Any international agreement remains in force only as long as it is advantageous to both parties having signed the agreement; as soon as it becomes cumbersome for one or other party, the agreement loses its significance. The Latvian nation and government truly wanted peace as they joined in peace talks and signed a peace agreement with Soviet Russia: having driven the enemy from its land, Latvia did not acquire any new territory, but only defended its land and nation; not a single step was taken which could be interpreted as an attempt to take over new territory — Latvia tried to get along with its neighbours and to remain in good relations with them, therefore, Latvia wanted peace; peace was useful and necessary for Latvia.

It is a bit different with Soviet Russia. It had signed peace agreements from the beginning of its existence, but only when it was forced to do so; as soon as its strength allowed it would break these agreements (agreement with Germany, agreement with Ukraine).

Last winter, Soviet Russia signed a peace agreement with Estonia, but it is appropriate to ask when and under what conditions? Russia carried out a desperate battle against the Estonian Army, but all of their attacks, with serious casualties, were beaten back; in other words, when Soviet Russia saw that it would not be able to overcome Estonia by force, only then did it sign a peace agreement. There might be someone who would respond that the Bolsheviks could have gathered such an enormous army against Estonia as they did this time against Poland, and they would have defeated Estonia. At the time the Bolsheviks were unable to do so: the Denikin invasion had not yet been completed, they had no reserves and Latvia was finishing off its operations against Bermondt, and the Bolsheviks had to count on our attack. If the Bolsheviks had not wanted to conquer Estonia, they would not have sent thousands of men to their death against Estonian positions. The threat of our attack and that of Poland forced Soviet Russia to sign a peace agreement with Estonia in order to free its army from the Estonian front and secure Petersburg from the southwest. To find out how Soviet Russia is complying with the peace agreement signed with Estonia, and how convinced the Lithuanians are about the existence of such an agreement, please feel free to talk to the Estonians themselves.

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<sup>69</sup> Jaunākās ziņas (The Latest News), No 192 (August 24, 1920).

Soviet Russian diplomats managed to sign a peace agreement with Estonia earlier than Latvia could begin their march to release Latgale; that is why sectors from the Estonian front appeared at the beginning of our attack. Nevertheless, our courageous soldiers along with our friends in Poland's famous army managed to throw the Bolsheviks out of our home land. After that our strategic position became very advantageous: we took up favourable nature borders; the Polish Army covered our right wing, and the left wing was covered by a marsh which is impossible to cross in the spring. In addition, the Polish front faced our front almost at a straight angle stretching east along the Daugava to Polotsk. The Poles helped us release Latgale, so the Bolsheviks had to count on the fact that, if they were to attack us, the Poles would attack them from the sides and the rear in the Drisa-Polotsk region. As long as there existed a strong Poland, it was dangerous to touch Latvia, they would have to deal with Poland first. So as not to have to do battle simultaneously with Poland and the small but powerful Latvian Army, and seeing our aspirations for peace, the Soviet Russian diplomats were more than ready to begin peace talks with us, offering the same to Poland, yet at the same time energetically preparing to attack Poland. Peace talks had no effect on these actions, but victories or losses on the Polish front did, and this was reflected during the peace talk process. Although the invasion of Poland by the Soviet Russian Army cannot be considered a conquest of Poland, and the Soviet regiments in Poland were closer to being defeated than the Polish Army two months earlier, the moral significance of this invasion is immense. Perhaps, taking advantage of the situation, Soviet Russia would have signed a peace agreement with us, but the threatening figure of Vrangeli appeared on the southern horizon at the same time. The Soviet government did not fear Vrangeli's victories — Denikin's victories had been much greater — but his government, reforms, and the support of the inhabitants scared Moscow's demagogues.

These circumstances forced the Soviet government to sign a peace agreement with Lithuania. It is not possible to wage war with everyone simultaneously; it is much easier to smite enemies one at a time, one after the other. Since the 13th century Russia has waged wars to gain control of the Baltic Sea; governments and governmental structure changes over the years, but this aim has remained unchanged. Have Russian interests changed today? The Soviet government relentlessly affirms that Communism must be spread throughout the world. The Bolsheviks are attempting to spread Communism to its neighbours, especially those nations that were once part of the Russian empire, by annexing these countries to Russia. The Soviet government cannot live without this, because famine is

widespread throughout Russia; thus, they need to annex regions that have had a chance to take a break from this Communist “paradise” and have managed to secure a good life for themselves by hard and honest work. The first aim of annexing these regions is to lessen the famine in Russia. The Soviet government is working very systematically, not letting any opportune moment slip away, and not feeling any shame in using any kind of means necessary to reach their goal.

We can all still remember our misunderstanding with Estonia when our army invaded Latgale. What were the causes of this misunderstanding? Only Communist money and propaganda. Who funded the spread of provocative rumours about clashes between our army and the Polish army when the latter was in Latgale? It was, of course, done by those who found it very important to separate us to go on and defeat each of us separately.

Soviet Russia’s “love of peace” was clearly visible as the Communists broke into Poland. Polish army documentation shows that the Communists were determined to conquer all of former Russian Poland, in other words, renew the boundaries of the old Russia. If they were successful, some other new country’s turn would come after Poland.

There is still another issue. On behalf of Latvia, the desire for a peace treaty expressed the will of the entire nation, while on the Russian side it was the act of only a small group of people, those who rule Russia at present. If this group is pushed aside, their signed peace treaties would automatically be null and void, and the new government could look at things from their perspective. He who does not live for today alone but thinks about the future, must think not only about peace but also stand guard over that peace.

# SOVIET RUSSIA'S PROPENSITY FOR INDIA<sup>70</sup>

Soviet Russia needs war, first of all, because via war with an external enemy it is possible for them to turn away the attention of the nation from the critical domestic conditions; war can prevent and suppress domestic unrest; secondly, based on Soviet Russian thinking, war begets war — it is possible to support the army by continuous warring. War has stopped on all European fronts, it is not advantageous to begin new wars here, at least until spring. Wars have been abolished in Europe, it is difficult to carry out propaganda for renewed war activity; first, because peace treaties have been signed, and second, all of the Red Army knows that war here would be difficult and will not result in war booty. India, however, is a totally different story. There are countless tales of the riches of India, there will be many who desire to gain these riches and enjoy the wondrous treats of India. Second, India is very far away and all the restless Soviet Russian red troops can be sent there, including those that would have to be disarmed. Similarly, revolutionary France sent Bonaparte and his entire army to far distant Egypt to wage war and keep them from getting involved in national domestic issues.

The army that would be sent to India can be promised many things: riches, a good life, good food, the chance to free the Indus people, numbering in the hundreds of millions, from English rule and the resulting gratitude and acceptance by these people, and many other benefits. The old tsarist Russian propensity for India can also come in handy for propaganda purposes: it was last autumn in the war against Poland that there were loud cries about orthodoxy and the eternal hatred between Russia and Poland. Russian propensity for India is very old. Even Peter the Great dreamed of conquering India. Following Peter the Great this propensity surfaced time after time and flared up quite brightly fairly often. Satisfaction of this propensity slowly progressed; one step was the conquest of Turkestan.

Russian power spread to the Pamir Mountains where its border reached the English border. These Russian efforts were especially pronounced during Russia's golden age, that is, prior to 1905. At the time England was considered to be the main enemy of Russia. War because of India was considered only a matter of time.

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<sup>70</sup> Latvijas kareivis (The Latvian Soldier), No 252 (December 18, 1920).

England regarded this Russian propensity very seriously. To protect itself from Russia, England signed a convention with Japan in 1904. In the war against Japan, Russia was weakened and pulled back from India. Immediately following the war with Japan the propensity for India flared up even more intensely: in place of the Yellow Sea they had lost, to gain the Persian Gulf or even the Indian Ocean.

The magnitude of these efforts and preparations for them can be observed in the inclusion of India (along with Prussia and Galicia) as a potential theatre of war in the curriculum of the General Headquarters Academy. It was only in 1901, after Russia had already signed an agreement with England regarding spheres of influence in Persia, that India was removed as a potential theatre of war from the curriculum of the Academy; the road to the Persian Gulf, however, remained (Afghanistan and Balochistan, ruled by England); thus, even after that, war with England was not ruled out. Even after 1909, when Russia had drawn nearer to England, and Germany was considered Russia's main enemy — and Russia was already aspiring to Constantinople, even then wealthy India was not completely forgotten. Russian intelligence was of the opinion that all of India was looking to the north, and that there was a popular legend among Indus people about the white tsar who would free them from English bondage. These legends and tales were spread among the Russian people as well. Today it will not be difficult for the government of Soviet Russia to start spreading these legends and tales anew.

As far as England is concerned, it has long been preparing for Russia's potential invasion of India. Roads were constructed along India's northern border and some fortresses were built as well; the latter were really much more suitable for minor domestic unrest, but they could also play a certain role against the Soviet Russian Army.

Soviet Russia has two means of conquest: firstly propaganda, and second, the army. Of course, in a war with England both of these will be put to use.

There is no doubt that Soviet Russia sent its propagandist army to India a long time ago. There is also no doubt that Soviet Russia has a false idea of India's hostility toward England and its government. These ideas are based on outdated information. It is true that previously all of India viewed the English as their oppressors, and with good reason, I am sure: famine was mentioned very often, in fact "the Indus dying a famine death" has remained a well-known saying. On January 20, 1909 the Evening Journal wrote: "There is no darker page in the history of the world than the news about England's activities in India, where they oppress a foreign race with such methods that we should all be concerned about the rule of King George." All of this was also discussed in England's parliament, as the issue

of India has been a topic of discussion since ancient times; the English themselves were critical of the activities in India. England is farsighted, and England's colonies are most satisfied with their metropole<sup>71</sup>. Thus, there can be no doubt that in India all possible means were used to appease the nation regarding the government, and there is no doubt that these means have accomplished the desired results. India, however, is very far away, and India is very big; news about what is going on there takes a long time to reach other parts of the world and thus the world is misled and misinformed with old news about India. Now the German general headquarters admits its only mistake was that it had not predicted prior to the war that England's colonies would behave so favourably toward their metropole, as was proven by the World War. There is no reason to doubt that Germany also sent its propagandists to India and tried by all means to achieve an uprising in India. This uprising did not occur and England sent its Indian army not only to conquer German colonies, but also to the battle fields in France. Since the Indus could not stand the French climate, however, they were used to protect other colonies during the final years of the war; the rest of the colonial army was sent to France. The main fact remains, however, that the uprising in India did not occur. If Germany was unable to achieve this with its propaganda during a time that England would have been unable to suppress the uprising, I feel that now Soviet Russia would have even less hope of provoking an uprising of any reasonable magnitude in India.

Regarding a direct march on India by the Soviet Russian Army; to me that seems even more difficult to believe considering the technical equipment available to Soviet Russia, army maintenance, and its internal organization to date.

First, geographic circumstances must be taken into account in addition to England's Indian colonial army. A war march would have to go through the Pamir Mountains and then through the Himalayas or — first through Afghanistan and the Hindu Kush and Galiman mountains. According to all available statistical information, a war march through the Pamir Mountains is impossible — this direction is completely closed off. If the Red Army were to go through Afghanistan, this sovereign country must be taken into account; as far as we know, there is no Soviet government there. In addition, the road through Afghanistan is not an easy one. According to statistical information from the period of the czars, in order to pass through Afghanistan with a sizeable army, it was necessary to build roads and a railroad; the march to India itself in reality would take several years. This was

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<sup>71</sup> Homeland or central territory of a colonial empire.

calculated on the assumption that there would be enough technical and material means for the army itself, as well as for road and railroad construction.

There is a third route — through Persia and Balochistan. This is a very long way, leading through many mountains and deserts; thus, it is even more difficult than going through Afghanistan.

If the Soviet Russian Army would somehow overcome all of the hardships and would arrive at the Indian border, it would immediately run into English fortresses guarded by the English colonial army — an army that is excellently organized according to all of the local requirements; an army with a wealth of experience and an army used to local conditions. The Soviet Russian Army, on the other hand, would find itself in completely unfamiliar conditions and in an unusual climate; then it would turn out that they are completely inappropriately dressed and equipped. In this difficult situation they would have to wage war against the English army. Therefore, I do not think that Soviet Russia could possibly have serious intentions of carrying out a march to India. Perhaps it wants to threaten England so that the latter is more compliant; Soviet Russia, however, can never hope for its army to have serious successes in India. Besides, I believe that Soviet Russia is well aware of the fact that if it would initiate an invasion of India in one way or another, it would begin war with England. England will not fight only in India: England will block all of Russia and the latter will once again be ostracized from the entire outside world.



### **The Sources for the Illustrations:**

The family archive of Ms Teiksma Slaidiņa (General Pēteris Radziņš's daughter's granddaughter), figures no 2; 3; 8; 10; 28; 29; 35; 36; 38; 41; 42; 43; 44. The General Pēteris Radziņš Association, figures no 1; 11; 15; 18; 19; 20; 21; 23; 30; 31; 39; 45; 46; 47. The Latvian War Museum, figures no 22; 25; 27; 30; 33; 34; 37; 40. The State Archives of Latvia, figures no 4; 5; 6; 7; 9; 13. The Polish National Digital Archive, figure no 32. The Ukrainian Central State Historical Archive, figure no 12. Private collection of Mr Janis Hartmanis, figure no 16. Private collection of Mr Andris Zeps, figure no 17.

When reading, studying and researching the works of General Radziņš, one must take into account what the General said about the importance of understanding the history of war when planning the development of modern armed forces:

“Every educated leader in war must thoroughly study the history of both war and politics because it is an expected part of their knowledge, their specialty, and their peacetime preparation work.”

Every new war brings new surprises. These surprises cannot be overcome by formations or stagnant tactical techniques; an army will only be able to overcome these surprises if it is trained in the real art of war, not according to rigid techniques and templates. This true art of war must be learned from the history of war, but not only from one's own history because the conditions of war that once existed will not repeat a second time: something completely different will be faced in every new situation.

The ideas of great leaders in war are simple in their genius, yet extremely difficult to apply. The greater a soldier's talent – the closer he or she stands to this genius – the better and easier it will be for him or her to employ the ideas generated by these great leaders in war. Those of lesser talent, who are unable to fully comprehend and interpret an idea's deeper meaning, are limited to applying only outer constructs, i.e. they follow not ideas but forms. The more that form is stressed over concept and function, the less effective becomes the art of war – for every form is destined to become outdated. For an army, the strict copying of previous forms is one of the most dangerous things that can happen, or more precisely, one of the most dangerous actions that a practitioner of war can undertake – because it will undoubtedly lead to defeat.

The General Pēteris Radziņš Association

