

Baltic Security and Defence Review

Volume 15, Issue 2
2013

Baltic Security and Defence Review is the bi-annual publication of the
Baltic Defence College

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ISSN 1736-3772 (print)
1736-3780 (online)

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Cover and print: www.ecoprint.ee

Electronic version of the Baltic Security and Defence Review can be
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All articles of the Baltic Security and Defence Review are also available
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Note from the Editor—Issue 2 2013

The Baltic Defence College has produced another issue of the *Baltic Security and Defence Review* with a good mix of articles that cover current European security issues such as Russian soft power, Poland's geopolitical view of the Baltic, the rise of China and implications for Europe, as well as the future of the US in Europe and the role of the US in Europe. But we also have a mandate to encourage scholarship in the broader aspects of security, especially in the Baltic region, so we included an article on Finnish military ethnography. We have a strong interest in promoting scholarship in the military history of the Baltic region so we have an article on the Estonian Independence War and on the Swedish military view of the Baltic region in the interwar period.

Call for Articles

The BSDR is a peer reviewed academic journal and we publish articles on issues considering all aspects of Baltic security, as well as articles that deal with aspects of European security and broader conflict as well as current issues that affect the NATO nations, such as counterinsurgency and recent campaigns. Of course, we still try to maintain a Baltic focus. We are published in both print and e-editions. We invite scholars and officers to submit articles for the *Baltic Security and Defence Review*. Articles should be in English, well-researched, and be between 6,000 and 12,000 words. Articles are to be submitted in word format electronically to the editor. We use Chicago style endnote citations. Each article will be published after a blind review process. If an author has any questions we can send a style guide. If you are interested in submitting an article to the BSDR please send an email to the editor: Dr. James Corum, Dean of the Baltic Defence College, Tartu Estonia. Email: james.corum@bdcol.ee

Ingrians in the Estonian War of Independence: Between Estonia, Russia and Finland

By Kari Alenius- Associate Professor, Department of History University of Oulu, Finland

Introduction

In the years 1918–1919, during the Estonian War of Independence, several thousand foreign volunteers fought as subordinates of the Estonian government. Nearly 4,000 volunteers arrived from Finland and participated in battles during the winter and spring of 1919. The majority of Finns returned to their homeland in April when their original service contracts ended. In the spring of 1919 a few hundred volunteers from Sweden and Denmark arrived in Estonia, serving in the Estonian army until the autumn of 1919.¹

Forming their own entity were the White Russians of the Russian Civil War. Already in the autumn of 1918 the German occupation administration in the Baltic had allowed Russian anti-Bolshevik groups to organize military units in the area of Pskov. This force was known as the Northern Army (*Russkij Severnyj korpus*, RSK). As the World War ended in November, 1918 the Northern Army comprised about 3,000 men. When Germany began a withdrawal from the Baltic, and Soviet Russia began to conquer the territory back after the conclusion of the armistice, it became essential to organize relations between the RSK and the Estonian (and Latvian) national governments.²

An agreement of co-operation against Bolshevism and Soviet Russia, which had launched an attack on Estonia, was signed between Estonia and the RSK on 1 December, 1918. The Estonian government promised to maintain the Northern Army and the Northern Army promised to submit to the command of the Commander-in-Chief of the Estonian armed forces. At the same time the RSK promised not to interfere in the internal affairs of Estonia, although in principle White

Russians did not recognize the independence of Estonia. In any case, in spite of their mutual distrust, a mutual enemy led Estonia and the Northern Army to co-operation. In practice cooperation was carried out during the winter and spring 1919 when Soviet Russian troops were repulsed from Estonian territory. In the late spring and early summer of 1919 the RSK and Estonian army were able to temporarily occupy fairly large areas east of Estonia. The Russian forces grew to 20,000 men, thus becoming by far the largest foreign force subordinate to the Estonian armed forces.³

As a consequence of the conflicts between Estonia and the RSK, General Laidoner, the commander-in-chief of the Estonian army, withdrew from the command of the Northern Army in June 1919. From then on, the Russians operated independently without being directly subordinate to the Estonian armed forces. To distinguish itself from a similar White grouping operating in Murmansk, the Northern Army changed its name to the Northwest Army (Severo-zapadnaja armija, SZA) in July 1919. In July, mainly because of pressure from Great Britain, self-government for North-West Russia was formally established as background for the SZA. General Yudenich became the commander of the army, replacing General Rodzianko who had been commander in the spring and summer. The Northwest Army suffered a crushing defeat in the autumn as it tried to capture St. Petersburg, and at the turn of 1919–1920 the forces of the SZA that had withdrawn back to Estonia were disarmed and disbanded.⁴

Among the various groups fighting the Soviet Russians -- Estonians, Russians and foreign volunteers-- there was another significant military group – the Ingrians. These were the Ingrian Finns and neighbouring kindred peoples to the Estonians who had been recruited either by conscription or had volunteered their service under the subordination of the Estonian armed forces. Ingrians initially served in the Estonian armed forces as a battalion, then as a regiment (two battalions) that was organized in the spring of 1919 and served until the end of the War of Independence. Detailed information regarding the strength of the Ingrian forces has not been preserved and it is probable that at one time more than 1,000 men were in the service, and according

to some reports more than 2,000. Several hundred Ingrians also served in the RSK/SZA forces independent of the Estonian forces. By the summer of 1919 Ingrian recruitment was formally part of the Northern Army; however, it was a separate department.⁵

In principle, as long as the Estonian Commander-in-Chief acted as the Supreme Commander of the RSK, the Russians did not have direct command over Ingrians. In any case, there were a significant number of Ingrians in the military and they played an important role in the events. Indeed, the dispute over the status of the Ingrians was the main reason for the rift between Estonia and the RSK in June of 1919. The Russians feared the national aspirations of Ingrians, namely, the Ingrians desired either autonomy for their homeland, or independence, possibly integration with Estonia or Finland. In an effort to crush separatist efforts in the bud, the RSK demanded the disbandment of the Ingrian Regiment, which Estonia agreed to in June 1919. Thus the White Russians were also able to recruit the strongly pro-Russian Ingrians into the service of the SZA, but the majority either escaped home or joined the new Ingrian Regiment created as part of the Estonian army. This new regiment composed of Ingrians served as part of the First Division of the Estonian army and no longer had any organizational links with the SZA.⁶

The role of Ingrian units in the war is generally known. The main political developments that relate to the conflict between Estonians and Russians over the Ingrians are also fairly well-known. In their dissertation and Master's theses Karsten Brüggemann (*The Establishment of the Estonian Republic and the end of 'one indivisible Russia'*) and Heikki Rausmaa (*Estonia's Relations with the Northwest Army, November 1918 – January 1920*), as well as Kai Kela (*The Freedom Fights of Ingria, 1918–1920*) and Taisto Raudalainen with Toivo Flink (*The Ingrian Regiment in the Estonian War of Independence, 1919–1920*) have dealt with the topic in greater depth than previous researchers. In addition, there is Pekka Nevalainen's study (*Iron on Ingria's borders. Ingrian national struggles and Finland, 1918–1920*) deals with events in Western Ingria to some extent, although the book focuses on events in Northern Ingria on the Finnish border.⁷

However, none of these studies focused on investigating Estonia's attitude and relationship with Ingrians. Instead, the noted research dealt with broader themes and their emphasis lies elsewhere. Therefore, it is possible to complement existing research about the Ingrians who lay somewhere between the Estonian, Russian and Finnish interests. This article focuses on analysing why Estonia acted as it did in its relationship with Ingrian soldiers, and on the national aspirations of Ingrians during the Estonian War of Independence in the years 1918–1920. However, to do this it is also necessary to analyse Finnish and Russian attitudes, as these partly help to explain the policy of Estonia.

Finland refuses to cooperate with Western Ingrian representatives

For the Ingrians Finland would have been the most natural cooperative partner. Ethnically, the Ingrian Finns were the very same people as the inhabitants of Finland. In Finland, nationalist elements sought the incorporation of Finns and ethnic Finnish peoples within the recently established independent Finnish state. Similar political and military struggles centered on ethnic nationalism took place all over Europe in the aftermath of the First World War. The goal of the groups in all these cases was to draw national borders along ethnic lines, if possible. The only problem was that in all these cases the objectives of different peoples clashed and no consensus could be found regarding where 'ethnically fair' borders were supposed to be. In addition, the economic and historical-political interests of states and peoples did not necessarily coincide with the residential areas of ethnic groups.

From a Finnish perspective the area inhabited by Ingrians was divided into two different geopolitical zones. Regionally and demographically the Karelian Isthmus North of St. Petersburg included only a small part of Ingria, but it was of primary interest as at least a partial inclusion of Northern Ingria in Finland appeared possible. Northern Ingria shared a border with Finland, and if the border negotiations regarding the Karelian Isthmus succeeded from a Finnish perspective, the border of the old Grand Duchy of Finland could be moved somewhat south. The old border travelled twenty to thirty

kilometres north of St. Petersburg; therefore an extensive change of the borders certainly was not in question, taking into the consideration the safety of St. Petersburg. However, the inclusion of a part of Northern Ingria appeared within the realm of possibility.⁸

From a Finnish perspective most of Western Ingria, which was located between St. Petersburg and Estonia, was more problematic. As long as the metropolis of St. Petersburg existed, it prevented a geographic connection between Finland and Western Ingria. For the Finnish state leadership, the idea of a Western Ingria that was physically separate, but yet part of Finland, was completely impossible. In this case, St. Petersburg would have become surrounded on both sides of the Gulf of Finland, which Russia as an autonomous superpower would certainly not approve regardless of the government in power.⁹ This strategic consideration was the main reason why efforts for the freedom of the majority of Ingria, in other words Western Ingria, did not gain any support from Finland. Due to the St. Petersburg issue, in the case of Northern Ingria the Finnish state leadership was also cautious and from 1918 to 1920 gave only minimal support to the volunteer forces.

In spite of the strategic calculations of Finland the Ingrian Finnish national elite desired to free their homeland from Russian rule. If incorporation with Finland was not possible the aim was to at least achieve an autonomy from Russia that was as broad as possible.¹⁰ The Main Committee to Assist Estonia (*Viron Avustamisen Päätoimikunta*, VAP) was established in Finland in December 1918 to support the Estonian fight for freedom. Finnish authorities did not dare to directly support the Estonian government in its fight for an independent Estonia, but support was organized through the unofficial non-governmental civic organization. The VAP coordinated the formation of Finnish volunteers and sent them to Estonia.¹¹

In a similar effort to promote Ingrian national aspirations, an Ingrian Temporary Governing Committee (Inkerin Väliaikainen Hoitokunta, IVH) was established in Helsinki on 31 January 1919, which mainly consisted of Ingrians who had long lived in Finland. The goal of the Committee was to guarantee the democratic social order and cultural

autonomy of Ingria. The Committee attempted to achieve the same status as that of the VAP, but this goal was not accomplished due to the reluctant position of the Finnish government. The VAP certainly supported the goals of the IVH in principle and attempted to influence the Finnish government so that the wishes of Ingrians would be taken into consideration. In practice however, the VAP was not ready for concrete action but mainly kept up debate on issues with Ingrians and with the Finnish government.¹²

A major blow to Ingrian hopes came from the Finnish government at the end of December 1918. At this time a delegation of Ingrian intellectuals brought a letter outlining the national aspirations of the delegates to the Finnish government. The primary objective was to join all of Ingria to Finland, but if this did not succeed broad cultural autonomy for Ingrians would be sought. If this, in turn, did not succeed then the delegation asked that Finland should help Ingrians in achieving more autonomy in religious and cultural matters, also possibly including a certain extent of economic decision-making power.¹³

In principle the Finnish government showed sympathy for Ingrian hopes, but already in the meeting at the end of December it was made clear to the Ingrian delegates that inclusion with Finland would be unacceptable. The Finnish government also refused to give any concrete promises for assistance or to commit to the longer-term support of Ingrians. The only instance in which the Finnish government saw it fit to assist the Ingrians was in acting as a mediator for the victorious states of the World War. Due to a proposal of the Finnish government, in the spring of 1919 the Ingrians drafted a proposal for the cultural autonomy of Ingrian Finns, and the Finnish government submitted it to the Paris Peace Conference. At the Conference, the draft did not receive much attention from the superpowers and the proposal accomplished nothing.¹⁴ In principle, Finland had the same enemy as the Estonians and Ingrians, but strategic calculations on the issue of St. Petersburg prevented the Finnish government from providing concrete support to the Ingrians in their fight for freedom.

In this context the failed plan of February 1919, by which Finland and Estonia would both attack St. Petersburg, should be mentioned. In this case also, the Ingrians were the initiators, but the plan ultimately failed as Finland was unwilling to take part. When the Ingrian leadership failed to gain concrete support for its ideas from Finland in December 1918 and the following months, the IVH turned to Estonian Lieutenant Colonel Hans Kalm. Kalm who commanded the Finnish regiment 'Pohjan Pojat' ('Sons of the North') as part of the Finnish volunteer forces in the Estonian War of Independence as he was interested in the overthrow of the Bolsheviks in general as well as in establishing Estonian independence.¹⁵

In February 1919 the IVH discussed with Kalm the possibilities of continuing an offensive in eastern Estonia towards St. Petersburg and onwards. According to the proposal of the IVH, Kalm's regiment would join the Estonian army, the regiment would be strengthened, and after this the Finnish, Estonian and Ingrian troops would begin a broad offensive towards the east together. The estimate was that about 30,000 men from around Estonia would be enlisted for the attack. When the attack began, it was essential that another strong attack towards St. Petersburg and Olonets Karelia was directed from Finland. In this case, the Red Army would not be able to concentrate its forces in one direction, but would be left between two fronts and thus would face defeat by the Finnish-Estonian-Ingrian forces.¹⁶

If successful the plan would have freed Ingria and created an ideal opportunity for accomplishing Ingrian autonomy, or perhaps even more. Estonia would have guaranteed its independence as well as Finland, and Finland would have the opportunity to join the broad areas of Karelia and Vepsia, on the northeast and eastern sides of St. Petersburg, to itself. Kalm presented this proposal to the political and military leadership of Estonia as well as to the VAP. The attitude of Estonians towards the issue, for example that of Johan Laidoner, was positive, but from the beginning Laidoner had doubts about Finland's willingness to participate.¹⁷ These doubts were proven to be well founded. There was disagreement among Finnish state leaders, and in principle those who were sympathetic to the proposal, Mannerheim for

example, thought that the timing was wrong. Finland was not prepared and the victors of the World War could not provide sufficient support to such large and daring operations. At the very least, time was required to see if the conditions became more favourable. The VAP also came to the same conclusion using the same logic.¹⁸

Thus, within a short time, the Ingrians had been let down by the attitudes of the Finnish leaders and the leaders of the VAP. Although the national aspirations of Ingrians were considered to be legitimate in Finland, assisting them was considered to be unrealistic and supporting them was deemed dangerous in the circumstances Finland faced at the end of 1918 and early 1919. The 'favourable moment' that Finns awaited never arrived. Thus, the Ingrians had no alternative but to intensify their efforts for cooperation in the direction of Estonia.

Estonia's political leadership was willing to cooperate with Ingrians

It is reasonable to argue that the Ingrians received special attention and more sympathy from Estonian military and political leaders than the relatively small number of Ingrians would have warranted. Multiple factors point to this. First, Estonia's political leadership was ready to make formal agreements with the Ingrians at an early stage when the number of volunteers was no more than a few dozen. Second, there was a readiness to grant Ingrians special status as part of the Estonian armed forces. Third, Estonia's political leadership sought to defend Ingrians for a long time, even at the risk that the touchy relations with White Russians, which were much more militarily and politically significant than the Ingrians, would become complicated because of the Ingrian question.

Immediately after its creation, the Ingrian Temporary Governing Committee had turned to the Finnish government to discuss what kind of political and military support Finland could give to promote the Ingrian issue.¹⁹ When the Finnish state leadership refused concrete measures, the Committee proposed cooperation with the Estonian

government in mid-February 1919. The Estonian reception of the Ingrians was noticeably more generous. The Estonian provisional government considered the proposal of the Ingrians on 17 February, 1919 and decided to respond affirmatively.²⁰

From earlier historical works the impression is given that an agreement was reached between the Ingrians and the Estonian government after lengthy negotiations only at the end of March.²¹ In reality, the Estonian political leadership made a decision a month earlier, as soon as the IVH proposed cooperation. Already on 21 February, 1919 the Estonian General Headquarters granted Paavo Tapanainen, a member of the leadership of the Committee, permission to deal with the matter of Ingrian volunteers and to move in relation to these matters within the entire Eastern front. In the same context, all Estonian civil and military authorities were directed to give Tapanainen every possible assistance. The next day, the Estonian Main Headquarters ordered an Ingrian liaison officer to the headquarters of the First Division, under whose leadership Ingrian volunteers began to be assembled as a reserve battalion of the division.²²

The correspondence of the Estonian General Headquarters in late February and early March already referred to, 'the final decision to help the Ingrian people'. The following measures were taken: On 18 March, 1919, the Estonian government appropriated funds to the War Ministry to be used for fitting out Ingrian units.²³ The fact that a formal agreement between the Estonian government and the IVH was made on 26 March, 1919, after these measures were taken, was only a formal confirmation that clarified the respective rights and obligations of the parties. The initiative came from Commander-in-Chief Colonel (later General) Laidoner, who responded positively to cooperation with the Ingrians and supported the objectives they had set.²⁴

In the agreement the Ingrians committed themselves to serve in the Estonian armed forces, and in turn, Estonia agreed to train, equip, and service the troops. The agreement also determined that Ingrian units would only be used in the Ingrian region, namely in their home district.²⁵

About a month earlier the Estonian government had made a similar contract with Latvian volunteer units serving in the southern regions of the country.²⁶ Thus, a precedent already existed. The difference was that in the case of the Latvians, the question was of a larger population than the Estonians themselves who were also fighting for the attainment of a fully independent state. In other words, in March the Estonian government drew a parallel between the small population of Ingrians (only slightly more than 100,000 people) to the Latvians, who had a population double that of the Estonians (about 2 million people).

Also notable was the attitude of the Estonian state leaders and the rapidity with which Estonia agreed to the proposals of the Ingrians. In this context it is worth noting that the Ingrians, the vast majority of whom were of Finnish nationality, received a negative reception in Finland, which was nationally 'their' country. Instead, Estonia, from whose perspective the Ingrians were ethnically 'only' a kindred nation, was ready for immediate cooperation. Of course, in the background were the military realities of the time. Finland was not in an open conflict with Russia, while Estonia was fighting a Russian invasion. Thus, Estonia had a greater need for cooperation with all quarters that could offer even the slightest help. Second, the central areas of Ingria directly bordered Estonia on its eastern side, while Finland had a smaller connection with Northern Ingria in the Karelian Isthmus. In strategic terms, Ingria was significantly more important to Estonia.

Estonia's military and government leadership welcomed the objectives of the Ingrians in taking over Ingria and conquering St. Petersburg. The purpose was to defeat the remaining strategic threat to Finland, Ingria and Estonia by making St. Petersburg a neutral free city. Estonia's leadership regarded the plan as good and workable, although it doubted Finland's willingness to undertake such a major project. However, Finland rejected the operation and the Entente Powers that were otherwise interested in overthrowing the Bolsheviki were not ready to support the project in the spring of 1919.²⁷ In any case, Estonia's hopes and those of the Ingrians were parallel, and this created good conditions for cooperation. Although the conquest of St. Petersburg was perhaps unrealistic, and although Ingria could eventually remain part of

Russia, in any case there the military aid offered to Estonians from the Ingrians was useful as long as Estonia's own War of Independence continued. And if, as a result of the war, it was possible to create some form of national cultural autonomy in Ingria as part of Russia, this would also act as a security zone for Estonia.

Thus, essentially Estonia had strong national interests to cooperate with the Ingrians. The impression left by the correspondence between Estonian authorities in February and March 1919 was that Estonia was not only willing to help the Ingrians, but was ready to go far to support their hopes. One background factor was likely the Finnish identity of the Ingrians: for instance, Prime Minister Konstantin Päts equated the Ingrians with Finns.²⁸ This was not a minor matter because the Estonian national elite related very positively to Finland and Finns. During the Estonian national awakening of the late 1800s Finland was taken, in all respects, as a model for Estonia and the Finns had been granted almost uncritical admiration by the Estonians. By the 1910s this attitude was commonplace among Estonians. If the independence of Estonia were not feasible the second preferred option for the Estonians was for a federation with Finland.²⁹ The arrival of Finnish volunteers to the assistance of Estonia in January 1919 undoubtedly further increased the sympathy of the Estonian people towards the Finns. It was logical to include the Ingrians, a Finnish tribe, as part of this cooperative pattern which included an ethnic attachment.

For the same reason it was logical that, from the perspective of the Estonian state leadership, the preferred alternative regarding the organization of Ingrian volunteers was to link them within the context of other Finnish volunteers. It was Estonia's hope that when the original service contract of the Finnish volunteers expired in April, 1919, a new unit would be formed from volunteers willing to continue in service specifically for the occupation of Ingria. The concept was to include the Ingrian companies and battalions in this broader Finnish volunteer force. The plan, however, fell through when only a small portion of the volunteers who had come from Finland were willing to continue their service in Estonia from the spring onwards. Thus, the Ingrians could not be included in the desired Finnish unit, but the Finnish volunteers were

included in an Ingrian unit in training. In early May the Ingrian volunteers accounted for about 400 men in Estonia, which could now finally form a battalion ready for military action.³⁰

The special care that Estonians took of Ingrians was also apparent after this. The Estonians wanted to keep the existence of an Ingrian unit within the Estonian armed forces a secret from their White Russian allies until the last moment. It is likely that the Estonian leaders realized that supporting the national goals of Ingrians would easily lead to disputes with the White Russians, who reacted negatively to any separatist tendencies. In spite of their military cooperation, White Russians were not willing to recognize the independence of Estonia and it could be safely assumed that they would be even less sympathetic regarding the independence or autonomy of the Ingrians. The aim to capture St. Petersburg from the Bolsheviks was a mutual one of the Russians, Estonians and Ingrians, but turning St. Petersburg into a neutral city and removing Ingria either in part or whole from Russia was completely at odds with the future desired by the RSK. The agreement between the Estonian government and the Ingrian Temporary Governing Committee was therefore kept in secret by both sides, and not even a hint of it was leaked to the Estonian press in the spring of 1919.

According to the agreement the area where the Ingrian battalion would be used was to be in Ingria. Under this secret agreement one problem was that the RSK also operated on the same front and sector the Ingrians were responsible for inevitably bordered the White Russian army area of responsibility. In the capacity of Commander-in-Chief of the front, however, General Laidoner still had the possibility to make one special arrangement. When a large offensive was begun in the mid-May in the East, the Ingrian battalion was subordinated to the command of Estonian Navy Commander Admiral Pitka. Subordinated under the navy and with the support of the British Navy, the Ingrian battalion participated in a landing in the Gulf of Kaprio behind the Red Army lines on 15 May, 1919.³¹ From there that point the Ingrians were supposed to continue the attack in the direction of St. Petersburg's important defences, the Krasnaya Gorka coastal fortress. In this way it

was possible for the battalion to avoid contact with RSK forces. If the Ingrian battalion had participated in the main offensive on the Narva River line, from the outset it would have had to cooperate with the neighboring White Russian forces and friction would have resulted.

There was also another reason in using the Ingrians in the invasion of the Ingrian coast than merely delaying cooperation with the Russians. It was in both Great Britain's and Estonia's interests to destroy Russia's Baltic fleet, which defended St. Petersburg and with which it was possible for Russia to operate in the entire Baltic Sea region. The White Russians would have preferred to have the fleet surrender to them and have it in their own use after St. Petersburg was occupied by a land invasion. By invading the Ingrian coast with Ingrian forces it was possible to prevent White Russians from interfering in the operation against the Baltic Fleet. Estonia did not want to use Estonian forces lest it should be too strongly labelled as a party in the Russian Civil War. For political reasons it was also impossible to reveal the true nature of the operation, but officially it was to be seen as assistance to the Whites in invading St. Petersburg. When in 1919 the British fleet largely succeeded in its operation, accusations that were quite correct were made by the White Russians--that Great Britain (and Estonia) had deliberately wanted to undermine Russia. Great Britain naturally rejected these allegations.³²

If both Estonian and White Russian troops, for different reasons, were seen as undesirable in the conquest of Krasnaya Gorka, then the Ingrians were in every way suitable. As the fortress was located in Ingria its conquest could be presented as a natural part of freeing their home district from the Bolshevik yoke.³³ The Estonians' delaying tactics to withhold the existence of the Ingrian battalion also succeeded. The commander of the RSK, General Rodzianko, only became aware of the issue when Russian ground troops under his command made contact with the Ingrians who had landed a few days after the attack began.³⁴

The first objective of the Ingrian battalion, the conquest of the Kaprio Castle, was not immediately successful. The battalion suffered heavy losses and had to retreat to the west and settle in to defend.³⁵ However, at the end of May 1919 the battalion held a large area of

Northwest Ingria. The Estonian leadership now allowed the Ingrian Temporary Governing Committee to organize the governance of the occupied area and to take other measures, which awoke great distrust and formal, angry protests from the RSK. However, at the end of May and early June 1919 the Estonian leaders still stood absolutely on the side of the Ingrians and showed tangible support for their nationalist efforts. As noted, these efforts were in stark contrast to Russian ambitions. The attitude of Estonia's state leadership changed only during June, when the disputes between the Russians and Ingrians escalated to the brink of confrontation.

Estonia's attempts for compromise between the Russians and Ingrians fail

Although the military success of the Ingrians was not yet clear in May 1919, it still aroused enthusiasm in the local Finnish population. More volunteers joined the battalion and in occupied areas compulsory conscription to the army was implemented. As a result of these and other additions, the strength of the battalion grew so that it was possible to expand it to a regiment. General Laidoner gave the order to reorganize the battalion as a regiment on 4 June, 1919. The conscription of non-Estonian Russian citizens in the Estonian armed forces was one factor which led to protests from the RSK's leadership. Another key measure was that the Ingrian Temporary Governing Committee was able to establish its own commandants in the conquered area.³⁶ Although the reorganization of the government was necessary, among other things to ensure food distribution for the civilian population, from the Russian perspective it undoubtedly appeared as separatist activity which defied the Northern Army's right to govern areas outside of Estonia which had been part of the old Russian Empire.

The third important measure, which especially provoked opposition among the White Russians, was the declaration made by the Temporary Governing Committee on 26th May to the population of the occupied territories. The declaration the Temporary Governing Committee announced that no Tsarist regime was desired in Ingria in

place of the Bolshevik one. All Ingrian Finnish and Estonian residents were invited to gather under the national flags of Ingria so that they could safeguard their national interests against Russian oppression. Ingrians were also banned from joining 'foreign forces,' which in this context meant the White Russian Northern Army. Overall, the declaration was a clear expression that Ingrians aspired to freedom from Russian subordination. If full independence or accession with Estonia or Finland were not possible in any case 'Russian oppression' was to be prevented in the future--for example through wide-ranging autonomy.³⁷ This declaration was a public challenge to the RSK and to Russia's rulers in general, regardless of their political stripe.

The Ingrian Temporary Governing Committee would not have been able to accomplish any of these aforementioned activities if it did not have the approval and backing of the Estonian national leaders. Even in May 1919, Estonia clearly rejected the protests that the Ingrian action aroused on the White Russian side. For example, on 23 May General Rodzianko protested to General Laidoner that he would not allow the Ingrians to independently organize 'dual governance' in areas freed by the RSK. In his reply on 26 May Laidoner rejected Rodzianko's protests and reminded him that the Ingrian unit acted under the authority of Admiral Pitka, and not Rodzianko. Therefore, Rodzianko had no authority granted by military hierarchy in areas controlled and held by the Ingrians.³⁸

Although on 26 May Laidoner skilfully dodged the question of principle as to who had the right to govern the captured areas of Ingria, the question arose again and could not be avoided. As White Russian protests increased the attitudes of the Estonian leaders began to change to a search for compromise. In June 1919 the strength of the Northern Army increased to 20,000 troops and it quickly managed overrun new territory on the Eastern front. In other words, the power of the RSK increased considerably and it became more likely that Estonia would end up in conflict with the RSK. To mitigate this threat in the second week of June (5th to 12th June, 1919) General Laidoner began attempts to reach a compromise. Laidoner agreed that the Ingrian regiment would be

operationally subordinated to the RSK, although he still retained the supreme command of the front and thus the highest level of authority over the affairs of the regiment. Secondly, he announced to the Temporary Governing Committee that it had to stop the mobilization of Ingrians through conscription. Thirdly, Laidoner informed of the Temporary Governing Committee that local commandants were to be assigned to their posts in coordination with the RSK.³⁹

Attempts to compromise, however, did not yield the results Laidoner desired. The Ingrian Temporary Governing Committee for its part refused to compromise regarding the power that it had attained in occupied areas. For example, the Committee would not yield to the will of the Estonians over the issue of assigning commandants to their posts, although Laidoner again recommended it on 16 June.⁴⁰ On the Russian side, General Rodzianko also refused to negotiate with the Ingrians and instead threatened the regiment's commander with a court-martial. On 16 June Rodzianko also ordered that the Ingrians be disarmed and, essentially, disbanded the regiment. The opportunity to carry this order out presented itself because the regiment had just suffered heavy losses in the direction of Krasnaya Gor'ka and was forced to retreat in disarray nearly 30 kilometres to the west. The officers of the Ingrian regiment and most of the men escaped to Estonia or scattered to their home villages. A smaller number agreed to join a battalion led by the Russians, which fought from then on as a regular part of the RSK.⁴¹

In practice, the Northern Army disengaged from Laidoner's command in mid-June 1919. The Estonians were then left with two options: to either try to force the Russians to return to be subordinate under the Estonian Commander-in-Chief, or to concede their defeat in the dispute over power and prestige. As the war against the Bolsheviks was on-going in the east and relations with the Baltic-German Freikorps were coming to a head at the same time in the south, Estonia's leaders felt that it made no sense to gain yet another enemy in the White Russians. On 19 June General Laidoner ceded the supreme command of the Eastern front and Estonia announced that its cooperation with the

Northern Army had ceased.⁴² Estonia thus withdrew its material support from the RSK and left it to survive on its own. At the same time the formal subordination of the Northern Army to the Estonian armed forces was finally ended.

However, this issue demonstrates one of the major aspects of the war-- the RSK was openly insubordinate towards its formal commander. So Estonia could not leave the issue with only a declaration that cooperation had ceased. On 19 June General Laidoner established an Estonian–Russian commission to investigate the conflict between the Ingrians and the RSK. In completing its work at the beginning of July, commission's final report did not decide on any conclusions per the policy towards the Ingrians. However, per the report the Russians returned military equipment confiscated from the Ingrians as the equipment was from the Estonian army stocks. In the same context, personal property seized from Ingrian soldiers was compensated.

In establishing the commission Estonia was not primarily driven by the issue of the Ingrians. The issue was about Estonian prestige and also Estonian material. The RSK escaped its insubordination without any legal penalty so the settlement of this episode was a political compromise on the Estonian side. From the perspective of Ingrian and Estonian relations, the case showed how far Estonia was ready to defend its Ingrian allies. The attitude of Estonia's leaders was very sympathetic to the Ingrians, but when the Ingrian dispute led to the danger of drifting to war with Northern Army then Estonia gave in. Estonia had to cope with an on-going multi-front war for independence for its independence and to so not to endanger their national goals the Estonians were forced to act in breach of their principles and sympathies.

Ingrians once again under the protection of Estonia

After Estonia announced that the agreement for cooperation with the Northern Army had been terminated, the situation changed

again from the perspective of Estonian–Ingrian relations. Now that the White Russians were completely independent actors, Estonia no longer had to balance preserving relations with the Russians and avoiding internal conflicts among the armed forces under the Estonian Commander-in-Chief. The situation by late June was simpler and clearer than before. Estonia mainly needed to refrain from open verbal attacks against the Russians. In other matters, Estonia was able to rebut the criticism and demands presented from the Russian side as unfounded interference in Estonian internal affairs.⁴³ As there was no longer any agreement between Estonia and the RSK/SZA, Estonia was also no longer obliged to submit an account to the Russians of how Estonia related to the Ingrians and how the affairs of the Ingrians were treated within the Estonian armed forces, or the territory it had conquered in Ingria.

It is evident that from the end of June onwards Estonia's leaders returned to those lines that it had followed regarding Ingrian policies before the conflict with the Northern Army in May–June. To prevent more serious clashes between the Ingrians and Russians, on June 19 Estonia ordered the evacuation of Ingrian soldiers to the Estonian territory of Narva-Jõesuu. There, Estonia immediately began to reorganize the Ingrians as a detachment. As noted above, from that time on the new Ingrian regiment served as a regular unit of the First Division of the Estonian army, and its area of responsibility on the front was the Ingrian coast. The regiment moved to the front at the beginning of August, and during the autumn the strength of the regiment grew to over 1,000 men. At the front the regiment's area of responsibility was defined to prevent potential conflict with the White Russians, so that in the later stages of the war units of the SZA would not be situated as neighbours.⁴⁴

The RSK/SZA opposed the establishment of an Ingrian detachment within the Estonian army, claiming that it was hostile towards the Russians. The criticism was directed at both Ingrians and Estonians who had established the detachment and allowed it to continue its operations. Estonia, however, rejected the criticism. In reply

it was possible to refer to Estonia's need to accept all those into its forces who wanted to fight against Bolshevism.⁴⁵ This was also undoubtedly true. Instead, the argument that the recruitment of Ingrians in the Estonian Army was acceptable as there was similar hostility towards Estonia among some units within the forces of the Northern Army (for example among the Baltic German battalion) was dismissed as political rhetoric. This could not be an adequate reason to establish an anti-Russian unit within the Estonian army. But in the situation of the summer of 1919 the reference to Baltic Germans within the service of the RSK was useful in refuting the Russian argument. If in its position the RSK allowed the existence of a similar unit, the RSK could not demand that Estonia abandon its own.

The establishment of a new Ingrian regiment, now fully under the aegis of Estonia, showed that the Estonian state leadership was still sympathetic towards Ingrians. Although the acceptance of Ingrians within the Estonian army also benefited Estonia, at the same time it strongly supported Ingrian nationalist efforts. Estonia's attitude is shown even more clearly by the fact that from the end of June 1919 onwards Estonia allowed exactly the same actions in Ingria that had particularly angered the Russians in the spring. In areas that they held Ingrians were allowed to organize the local government and establish conscription into the Estonian army. This occurred in spite of repeated protests from the SZA.⁴⁶ One important factor in the background of Estonia's activities was the fact that the SZA recruited Estonians living on the eastern side of the Narva River into their own forces. In principle, there was a prevailing consensus between the Estonians and the White Russians that Estonian recruits were to serve within the Estonian armed forces and Russian recruits within the Northwest Army.⁴⁷ The status of the ethnic Estonians was, however, vague, as long as there was no official agreement between Estonia and the White Russians on state borders and the determination of citizenship.

In a new display of support for Ingrians, at the end of July 1919 Estonia allowed Ingrian activists permission to establish the Finnish language paper 'Narva News (Times)' (*Narvan Sanomat*), which appeared

one to three times a week from the summer of 1919 until 1921. The paper was intended specifically for Ingrian Finns, and focused on propagating the national and political ambitions of Estonia and Ingria.⁴⁸ The central focus was on support for Ingrians in the fight against Bolshevism, as well as the establishment of closer ties between Ingrians and Estonians. The paper restrained itself from open demands for independence and from direct attacks against the Russians and Russia, although the destruction of the tsarist regime and Bolsheviks were unequivocally supported by paper.⁴⁹ Overall, the Narva News acted as a press outlet for the national aspirations of Ingrians – which also furthered the interests of Estonians under the patronage of the Estonian government.

At the same time, it is evident that a sympathetic attitude towards Ingrians was not only present in the Estonian national leadership. Estonia's leading newspapers showed great sympathy towards the Ingrians and, in some cases, demanded that Estonia do more for the Ingrians. Mention of the Ingrian regiment, and Ingrian issues in general, appeared in Estonian newspaper columns starting in mid-May 1919 when the detachment made its attacks in the rear of the Red Army while under the command of Admiral Pitka.⁵⁰ The positive tone in official war bulletins and in all mentions of Estonian military operations created the grounds for a positive public image of the Ingrian volunteers. Still, newspapers of the time were short and the Ingrians mentioned only in short stories, so the news was not presented widely. Only the conflict between the Ingrians and Russians in mid-June brought the Ingrian issue visibly before the Estonian public.

Estonia's leading newspapers wondered why the Russians had disbanded the Ingrian regiment, which had fought with distinction. At the same time, newspapers praised the courage of the Ingrians in fighting for their home areas and for Estonia's freedom. The worsening relations with the RSK were attributed entirely to the Russians and the disbandment of the regiment was clearly regarded as an injustice. Newspaper editorials demanded a thorough examination of the Russian–

Ingrian conflict and support for the nationalist efforts of Ingrians.⁵¹ The Estonian government was not mentioned by name in this context, although theoretically the issue was about the government as it was the only party that could directly affect events in Ingria and defend the Ingrians.

Thus, the sympathies of Estonia's leading newspapers were clearly on the Ingrian side against the Russians. Some of the published articles were translated from Estonian and published in the Finnish newspapers, but the content was edited by the Finns.⁵² The perspectives of the Russians were not translated nor their newspapers quoted. In addition, the views of the Estonian press were shared by the Finnish press and a sympathy for the Ingrians and their national goals was generated.

After July 1919, when the conflict with the RSK had lost most of its news value, Ingrian issues received little notice in Estonia's leading newspapers. During the autumn and winter 1919–1920 the new Ingrian regiment and Ingrian issues appeared at random in newspaper columns when events at the front were noted.⁵³ The basic views on the Ingrians remained positive although no major stories about Ingrians and Ingria appeared. The Estonian state leaders also remained sympathetic. The Estonian government and military leaders were positive about the Ingrians serving in the Estonian army, but opportunities to influence the fate of Ingria ceased to exist when Ingria was incorporated into Soviet Russia in the Peace of Tartu in February 1920. Only a few Ingrian villages on the eastern shore of the Narva River – a total of approximately 1,000 Finnish people – remained with Estonia. In the future, the Finns were granted the same minority rights as Estonia's other minority nationalities.⁵⁴

General Laidoner, who had been centrally involved in the matters of the Ingrians during the war, wrote briefly of the Ingrian Regiment and of the national aspirations of the Ingrians in his war memoirs in the mid-1930s. Laidoner's memoirs mildly criticized the


Ingrians. According to him, the Ingrians, drunk on their military success, 'grew too big too soon... and wanted to immediately take control of the areas they had conquered'.⁵⁵ On one hand Laidoner is correct in stating that the conflict with the Russians came from this matter. On the other hand, Laidoner himself and the Estonian leaders had supported the aspirations of the Ingrians in the spring of 1919 and even directly encouraged the Ingrians to promote their national interests.

Estonia chose a realistic wartime policy towards the Ingrians in the spring and early summer of 1919 only to change it later on. The commander of the Estonian armed forces, however, did not readily acknowledge his early 'wrong' assessment of the situation after the war, but put the blame upon others. When the war failed to provide freedom for Ingria, the decisions of 1919, in the style of Laidoner's memoirs, were regarded as those of the Ingrians themselves and partially characterized as foolhardy actions. According to Laidoner's memoirs, the Estonians had no part in the birth of problems, but the problem was in the Russians and Ingrians, who were unable to adequately understand each other. Otherwise Laidoner provides a positive attitude towards the Ingrians in his memoirs.⁵⁶

In summary, it is evident that Estonia's national leaders related very positively to the Ingrians and to their national aspirations during the Estonian War of Independence. Estonia allowed the Ingrians to form local governments in conquered Ingrian areas and supported the Ingrians when their efforts collided with Estonia's other allies, the White Russians. However, to avoid open confrontation with the White Russians, Estonia gave in in June 1919 and the Northern Army disbanded the Ingrian regiment, which it regarded as separatist. After this, Estonia again took the Ingrians under its protection by creating a detachment of Ingrians within the Estonian army and by allowing the Ingrians to continue to govern the Ingrian region.

In the background of the Estonian position were shared military interests with the Ingrians. An autonomous, non-Bolshevist Ingria would

have improved Estonia's own security. In addition, the Ingrians were regarded as Finns, towards whom the Estonian national elite had felt great esteem for decades. Thus, the Ingrians were felt to be very close nationally and culturally, and the sympathy and support given to them followed accordingly even though the attitude of the Estonian leaders strained relations with the White Russians. In this case, Estonians were only united with the latter by a common enemy.



Map The military operations in Western Ingria, 1919. 'Inkeriläiset' = 'Ingrians'; 'Venäläiset' = 'Russians'; 'Suomi' = 'Finland'; 'Pietari' = 'St. Petersburg' (Source: Niinistö, p. 185)

¹ Jukka I. Mattila and Jarkko Kemppi, *Viron vapaussota 1918–1920 (Estonian Liberation War, 1918–1920)*. (Jyväskylä: Gummerus, 2006), pp. 75–87.

² Heikki Rausmaa, *Viron suhteet Luoteisarmeijaan marraskuusta 1918 tammikuuhun 1920 (Estonia's Relations with the Northwest Army, November 1918 – January 1920)*. Yleisen historian tutkielma (Unpublished M.A. thesis). (Helsinki: Helsingin yliopisto, 1990), pp. 14–16.

³ Karsten Brüggemann, *Die Gründung der Republik Estland und das Ende des 'Einen und unteilbaren Rußland'. Die Petrograder Front des Russischen Bürgerkrieges 1918–1920 (The Establishment of the Estonian Republic and the end of 'one indivisible Russia'. The Front of St. Petersburg in the Russian Civil War, 1918–1920)*. (Wiesbaden: Harrasowitz Verlag, 2002), pp. 127–130; Rausmaa, p. 18–25.

⁴ Brüggemann, pp. 261, 267–272, 398–404; Pekka Nevalainen, *Rautaa Inkerin rajoilla. Inkerin kansalliset kamppailut ja Suomi 1918–1920 (Iron on Ingria's borders. Ingrian national struggles and Finland, 1918–1920)*. (Helsinki: SHS, 1996), pp. 58–61, 117–120.

⁵ Nevalainen, pp. 55–57, 119; Rausmaa, p. 34.

⁶ Nevalainen, p. 57; Mattila and Kemppi, pp. 126–129; Taisto Raudalainen and Toivo Flink, *Täällä pohjantähden alla on nyt kotomaamme. Inkerin rykmentti Viron vapaussodassa 1919–1920 (Here beneath the North Star is Our Homeland. The Ingrian Regiment in the Estonian War of Independence, 1919–1920)*. (Tartto: Inkerinsuomalaisten Tallinnan seura / Viron Inkerinsuomalaisten liitto, 2001), pp. 22–23.

⁷ Brüggemann (2002); Rausmaa (1990); Kai Kela, *Inkerin vapaustaistelut 1918–1920 (The Freedom Struggles of Ingria, 1918–1920)*. Pro gradu -tutkielma (Unpublished M.A. thesis). (Oulu: Oulun yliopisto, 1997); Raudalainen and Flink (2011); Nevalainen (1996).

⁸ Kela, pp. 20–21; Nevalainen, p. 41.

⁹ Kela, p. 21; Nevalainen, pp. 43–45; Rausmaa, pp. 28–29.

¹⁰ Minutes of an Ingrian refugee meeting, 24 Nov 1918, Inkerin arkisto (Ingrian archives) 4 a, Kansallisarkisto (Finnish National Archives, KA).

¹¹ Mattila and Kemppi, pp. 79–81.

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- ¹² Minutes of an Ingrian meeting, 31 Jan 1919, Inkerin arkisto 4 a, KA. See also Mattila and Kemppe, pp. 119–121; Nevalainen, pp. 44–45; Raudalainen and Flink, p. 9.
- ¹³ Ingrian memorandum to Finnish Minister of Foreign Affairs, 20 Dec 1918, Ulkoministeriön arkisto (Archives of the [Finnish] Ministry of Foreign Affairs), 11 II, 1. See also Nevalainen, pp. 42–43; Raudalainen and Flink, p. 9.
- ¹⁴ Nevalainen, pp. 42–43; Raudalainen and Flink, p. 9.
- ¹⁵ Mattila and Kemppe, p. 122; Nevalainen, pp. 47–48.
- ¹⁶ Kela, p. 27; Mattila and Kemppe, p. 122; Nevalainen, pp. 45–47.
- ¹⁷ Kela, pp. 27–28; Nevalainen, p. 47; Rausmaa, pp. 28–30.
- ¹⁸ Mattila and Kemppe, p. 122; Nevalainen, p. 48; Rausmaa, pp. 29–30.
- ¹⁹ Nevalainen, pp. 44–46; Jussi Niinistö, *Heimosotien historia 1918–1922 (A History of the Kinsfolk Wars, 1918–1922)*. SKS, (Helsinki: SKS, 2005), p. 184.
- ²⁰ Minutes of the Estonian provisional government, 17 Feb 1919, *Ajutise valitsuse koosolekute protokollid 1918/1919*. (Tallinn, sine anno); Colonel Soots to Minister of War, 4 Mar 1919, Eesti Riigiarhiiv (ERA) 495-10-71, 3.
- ²¹ Raudalainen and Flink, pp. 10, 14; Kela, pp. 26–31; Mattila and Kemppe, p. 121; Nevalainen, pp. 47–49; Rausmaa, p. 28.
- ²² Document of Tapanainen, 21 Feb 1919, ERA 495-10-71, 1; Laidoner to Minister of War, 27 Feb 1919, ERA 495-10-71, 17.
- ²³ Colonel Soots to Minister of War, 4 Mar 1919, ERA, 495-10-71, 3; Decision of the Estonian provisional government, 18 Mar 1919, ERA 495-10-71, 8.
- ²⁴ Colonel Laidoner to Minister of War 27 Feb 1919, ERA 495-10-71, 17.
- ²⁵ Agreement between the Estonian provisional government and the IVH, 26 Mar 1919, ERA 2315-1-23, 121.
- ²⁶ Agreement between the Estonian provisional government and the Latvian government, 18 Feb 1919, ERA 2315-1-23, 55–56.
- ²⁷ Nevalainen, pp. 45–48; Niinistö, pp. 185–186.

²⁸ Decision of the Estonian provisional government, 18 Mar 1919, ERA 495-10-71, 8.

²⁹ For the Estonian image of Finland, see Kari Alenius, 'Veljeskansojen kahdet kasvot. Naapurimaa-kuva' ('The Two Faces of the Sister Nations. The Images of Neighbors'), ed. Heikki Roiko-Jokela, *Virallista politiikkaa – epävirallista kanssakäymistä. Suomen ja Viron suhteiden käännekohtia 1860–1991 (Official Policy – Unofficial Dealings. Turning Points in the Relations between Finland and Estonia, 1860-1991)*. (Jyväskylä: Atena, 1997), pp. 15–23.

³⁰ Mattila and Kemppe, p. 125; Nevalainen, p. 50.

³¹ Pitka to Laidoner, Laidoner to Pitka 17 May 1919, Inkerin arkisto 4 a, KA.

³² Rausmaa, pp. 35–36.

³³ For general aims of the battalion, see Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Estonian envoy in Helsinki, 20 Mar 1919, Agreement between the Estonian provisional government and the IVH, 26 Mar 1919, ERA 2315-1-23, 117, 121.

³⁴ Rausmaa, pp. 37–38.

³⁵ Mattila and Kemppe, p. 126; Niinistö, p. 186.

³⁶ Announcement of IVH, 4 May 1919, Laidoner to Nevalainen, 24 May 1919, ERA 495-10-71, 33; Copies of Rodzianko's telegrams, 14-15 June 1919, Inkerin arkisto 5 b, KA.

³⁷ Declaration No 1 of the IVH (undated), Declaration No 2 of the IVH, 26 May 1919, Inkerin arkisto 2 a, KA.

³⁸ Rodzianko to Laidoner, 23 May 1919, ERA 2124-1-548, 238–239; Laidoner to Rodzianko, 26 May 1919, ERA 495-10-71, 48.

³⁹ Laidoner to Ingrian regiment, 12 June 1919, ERA 957-11-67, 130.

⁴⁰ Laidoner to Ingrian regiment, 16 June 1919, ERA 957-11-67, 131.

⁴¹ Report of the Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, July 1919, ERA 957-11-193, 11–12.

⁴² Report of the Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, July 1919, ERA 957-11-193, 11–12.

⁴³ Colonel Rink to Rodzianko, 27 June 1919, ERA 957-11-118, 86.

⁴⁴ Laidoner to the Minister of War, 28 Aug 1919, ERA 495-10-71, 173.

⁴⁵ Colonel Rink to Rodzianko, 27 June 1919, ERA 957-11-118, 86.

⁴⁶ Ingrian regiment to local commandants, 1 Aug, 5 Aug 1919, Inkerin arkisto 4 b, KA; Kaapre Tynni to Captain Pekkanen, 31 July 1919, Inkerin arkisto 4 g, KA.

⁴⁷ Rausmaa, p. 48.

⁴⁸ Chief of staff of the 1. Division Commander, 28 July 1919, ERA 495-10-71, 165.

⁴⁹ See, for instance, *Narvan Sanomat (Narva News)*, 2 Aug 1919; 'Mitä rauhaan sopii' ('What is fit for peace'), *Narvan Sanomat (Narva News)*, (16 Aug 1919).

⁵⁰ 'Ingeri olud' ('The circumstances in Ingria'), *Postimees* (22 Oct 1919); 'Ingeri wabadusepüüded' ('Ingrian strives for freedom'), *Waba Maa* (15 May 1919).

⁵¹ *Postimees* (18 June 1919); *Postimees* (27 June 1919); 'Kurbmäng Krasnaja Gorka all' ('The tragedy by Krasnaya Gorka') I–II, *Päewaleht* (1 July 1919, 2 July 1919); *Tallinna Teataja* (26 June 1919); 'Ingeri wabaduse wõitlusest' ('Of the Ingrian fight for freedom'), *Waba Maa* (21 June 1919); 'Ingeri küsimus' ('The Ingrian question'), *Waba Maa* (25 June 1919); 'Meie wäerind' ('Our front'), *Waba Maa* (26 July 1919).

⁵² *Postimees* (23 June 1919); 'Ingerlased ja Wene põhja korpus' ('The Ingrians and the Russian north army'), *Waba Maa* (23 June 1919).

⁵³ *Postimees* (16 Oct 1919); *Päewaleht* (14 Oct 1919).

⁵⁴ Kari Alenius, 'Säilyä vai sulautua? Suomalaisen ja suomensukuisten vähemmistöjen asema Virossa vuosina 1918–1925' ('Assimilation or retainment? The position of the Finnish and kindred minorities in Estonia, 1918–1925'), *Faravid*, Vol. 27 (2003), pp. 200–208.

⁵⁵ J. Laidoner, 'Mõned mälestused ja mõtted Põhjakorpusest ja Põhja-Lääne armeest' ('A few recollections and thoughts about the North army and the Northwest army'), ERA 2123-5-563, 10.

⁵⁶ J. Laidoner, 'Mõned mälestused ja mõtted Põhjakorpusest ja Põhja-Lääne armeest' ('A few recollections and thoughts about the North army and the Northwest army'), ERA 2123-5-563, 9–10.

Coping with a New Security Situation – Swedish Military Attachés in the Baltic 1919–1939

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Introduction

The end of the First World War changed the security situation in the Baltic dramatically as the empires of Germany and Russia crumbled and gave rise to a range of new states with a different status in Swedish thinking – Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. It also meant that Germany was no longer a strong regional power, but still maintained the possibility of becoming one in the future. Russia was embroiled in civil war and the Soviet-Union emerged from the ashes as the potential threat in the region. This meant that for a large part of the 1920s Sweden became a primary military power in the Baltic, yet still an unwilling one. The status of being a military power brought demands for action, which were evident in the discussions concerning Swedish intervention in the Finnish Civil War. The élites and the right were more or less in favour, the liberals were sceptical, and the Social Democrats strongly averse. The result was that Sweden did not intervene, apart from sending arms, and granted officers leave to serve in Finland and allowed the creation of a volunteer “brigade”.¹

This article will summarise how the Swedish military élites, particularly in the 1930s through the military attachés, assessed the “new” states of Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland from a strategic point of view. What assessments were made concerning the military developments in the region? What were the foundations of their analysis? The article is based on the results from research funded by the *Baltic Sea Foundation* called *The Sea of Peace under the Shadow of Threats*, published in 2013 and the forthcoming book, *Från Viborg till Narva och Lemberg: Svenska militärattachés bedömningar av Östersjöområdet under mellankrigstiden (From Viborg to Narva and Lemberg: Assessments of Swedish Military Attachés in the Baltic in the Interwar Period)*.

Total War as a Model of Interpretation

It is often stipulated that total war was born during the 1800s and was dependent on industrialism in its later stages. It is also often stipulated that General Ludendorff coined the term *Total War* in 1935 in the book *Der Totale Krieg* with the expressed purpose of explaining why Germany was defeated in the First World War, and also to point out that this was not the fault of the military but a result of political and civilian failure. This was *der Dolchstoß* in its essence, but the components of total war were defined long before that and the debates of which war was the *first* total war are numerous.²

During the 1950s an investigation was made by a group of high-ranking Swedish officers led by the former Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces (1944–1952) General Helge Jung. In 1957 the book *Öst, väst och vi (East, West and Us)* was published in which the war potential of the future was debated. In the group, former military attaché to Riga, Berlin, Zürich and Moscow, Major General Curt Juhlin-Dannfelt participated with a study of the relationship between war potential and peacetime economy. In his book he defined that war potential rested on three components: economic capacity, administrative competence and moral fortitude.³ The economic aspects were divided into population, agriculture, provisions, natural resources, industrial resources, industrial capacity, arms production potential, transports and infrastructure. Juhlin-Dannfelt pointed out that the Soviet Union had surpassed Great Britain, France and West Germany in production of resources and threatened to surpass the West in its entirety. But he also pointed out that the communist system contained many flaws slowing production, but also that a victory in the coming great war was not guaranteed only by large material production capacity.⁴ In the Swedish context the study pointed to the construction of total defence as a response to total war. The study also offered an understanding to how we can view total war.

Historian, Eric Hobsbawm has expressed that mass mobilisation only was possible in modern, high-producing industrial economies since traditional agrarian economies could not mobilise the majority of the population. The primary problem was how to finance war since total war demanded total economic control.⁵ Professor Alf W. Johansson

connects total war to railroads and industries, allowing the mobilisation of more soldiers and also to transport and supply them. This allowed for the execution of strategic encirclement, but at the same time the development of machine guns, repeating rifles and rapid firing artillery made strategic encirclement impossible.⁶

The problem of defining the components of total war is related to the fact that it is connected to all aspects of society, but also that all wars have different phases and arenas. The totality of war is different during different phases and on different arenas, all depending on context.⁷ It has also been said that total war demands total history because if one is supposed to study total war one has to study demography, technology, industry, social phenomena, politics and changing political patterns, expansion of public power and diplomacy, apart from studying only the military sphere.⁸ This could be understood by the fact that total war is a cultural history in which, for example, images of gender and its changes apply.

I have chosen to define total war in this study in the same manner as the Swedish military attachés assessed other states' possibility to resist aggression and also the forces undermining such a possibility. Total war is more related to economy and control and not particularly to purely military phenomena. Economic historian Lennart Samuelsson has, in his books on the economy and society of the Soviet Union in the interwar period, pointed out that Marshal Tukhachevsky was instrumental in defining how wars in the future would be fought. For Tukhachevsky total war demanded militarisation of society as a whole. Future wars should be fought outside the Soviet Union and should be fought quickly and with modern technology. This meant that the adversaries had to be divided and that the Soviet Union had to attain maximum industrial readiness. The Soviet concept of future war brought the possibilities of quick and decisive victories. This was only possible if a militarised society existed and where the resources were used for a form of mechanised cultural war.⁹

In a modern total war the distinction between civilian and combatant was broken down.¹⁰ Ideas of total mobilisation of the entire

society were not only a Soviet concept, but were a common ideology in the interwar era. The German veteran, writer and fascist thinker Ernst Jünger defined that weapons and tools, workers and soldiers, were all essential and all the same thing. Both industrial production and war demanded continuous organisation, mechanisation and a quintessential will.¹¹ However, I will apply Curt Juhlin-Dannfelt's division between economy, administration and moral strength as way to discuss Swedish strategic views on the Baltic and combine these with military training, capacity and equipment. It is essentially a historical definition of total war.

Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Total War

In the reports from Swedish attachés in Riga positive images of the future for the Baltic States were rare. There was also the conclusion that these states would not be able to resist a Soviet attack. The attaché to Riga between 1927 and 1932, Captain, and later Major Juhlin-Dannfelt, met the Estonian Chief of the General Staff General Juhan Tõrvand in February 1933 (although Juhlin-Dannfelt had already been selected as the attaché to Berlin in 1932). Tõrvand was not very positive regarding the future or Estonia's possibility to resist Soviet aggression, seen as inevitable. Tõrvand advised Sweden to put all her efforts into aeroplanes, air defence, navy and submarines, something Juhlin-Dannfelt accredited to egoism. The most relevant is, however, the tone of General Tõrvand, which is characterised by despair and hopelessness.¹² His views actually summarised the Swedish strategic view on the Baltic States. Perhaps there was a grace period of a few years, but the Soviet Union would with a mathematical certainty "solve the problem", and then nothing could be done.

In economic terms the Swedish attachés believed that that Latvia enjoyed a better economic situation than Estonia as the industry was larger. This complemented an otherwise agrarian economy. In Latvia, trade was also more developed and the Soviet trade was especially lucrative. In a letter of September 1928 Juhlin-Dannfelt summarised a conversation with Estonian Minister Eduard Virgo on Soviet trade. His opinion was that Latvian industry needed the Russian contracts and that

the Soviets deliberately tried to make all the Baltic States economically dependent on Russia. Juhlin-Dannfelt otherwise defined the Baltic economies as strongly agrarian and meant that bad harvests easily gave rise to hunger and, in turn, to communist agitation.¹³ In a letter of 1931 he returned to economic resilience in combination with the signing of a customs union between Estonia and Latvia, ending the trade war between the two. The Estonian economy was struck harder by the depression, followed by the Latvian economy. This made Estonia the weakest link and several times during the 1930s conscripts were sent home due to economic problems.¹⁴ The Lithuanian economy was rarely described in relation to the other Baltic States, as Lithuania was the *bête noire* in the region. The Lithuanian economy was entirely agrarian, and the agrarian depression of the early 1930s gave rise to enormous problems in the Lithuanian economy. From this came also serious peasant unrest in the autumn of 1935, almost described as a civil war. It was problematic that the Civil Guard in Lithuania were recruited from the peasant groups and hence the peasants were armed in their protests. The reasons for the economic problems were international, but acquired a specific Lithuanian character. The existence of Civil Guards was an important trait of all the studied cases.

The cause of the problems of the Baltic economies was the same as, for example, Finland and came from the fact that the Russian revolution, the Communist coup d'état, the wars of liberation and the civil war had destroyed the economic structures of empire. Estonian agriculture as well as the Finnish metallurgical industry depended on trade with St. Petersburg.¹⁵

According to historian Max Engman, the dissolution of empire destroyed an otherwise well integrated economy, in turn giving rise to economies dependent on single commodities, without the integrating forces of empire. The Latvian economy was, for instance, more industrialised and depended on Russian imports of raw materials.¹⁶ This was the foundation for the Baltic land reforms and the ensuing processes of nostrification – i.e. transforming the economy and the ownership of all resources into the hands of the majority ethnic group. In the Baltic States the land reforms created too small farms based on the

expropriation of lands from Baltic-German estates. The reform satisfied land hunger but were economically doomed which, in turn, led to political destabilisation as smallholders together with veterans founded armed organisations at odds with the government. In Estonia a solution was to try to invest in industrial development to manage economic hardship. When this plan failed the only solution was to again try to develop the agrarian economy.¹⁷ Depression and agrarian crisis also brought a higher degree of natural economy among smallholders and farmhands. Owners of middle-sized and large farms could initially borrow money from banks, but as the markets became more localised and small industry was struck by lower consumption the farmers were hurt.¹⁸ The economic pressure chiselled away at the political and military foundations of the Baltic States. The Civil Guards in turn were often recruited in agrarian society and the agrarian depression meant that the disenchanted poor farmers turned into more extremist organisations. A security problem followed as guardsmen were armed and constituted a constant threat of a coup d'état.

In terms of administration the Swedish assessment described a slightly organised chaos in Estonia, Latvia as semi-chaotic, and Lithuania as in total disarray. Baltic societies were crammed with intrigues, scheming and politicised officers, and the military staffs did not function due to the intrigues. Estonia was the least corrupt, partly because General Törvand was the Chief of the General Staff for over ten years, but this was cosmetic. The administrative competence in the Baltic States, as well as Estonia, was generally found lacking. This, in turn, led to a poor use of resources. The small resources of Estonia could, therefore, not be channelled to military needs. The assessments made by Swedish military attachés mainly dealt with military phenomenon and institutions where the officer corps in the Baltic States, were at best seen as schemers. In regards to training, everything was seen as quite well organised.

The moral strength was built on an understanding of national characteristics and stereotypes, and also concerning minorities and their perceived loyalty. The Swedish reports from the Baltic States were filled with discussions on various minorities and their relations to the state and

their reliability. In general, Baltic soldiers were described as well-trained and in possession of the “moral” force to be able to resist aggression. Some of the minorities were also seen as having the same morale force, for example, the Baltic-Germans could be counted on in the event of war with the Soviet Union. The Russians could be loyal if they were, “led the right way”. Jews were described as completely disloyal and could only be used in administrative duties. One can, of course, wonder how many Jewish conscripts there could be every year in Estonia, and whether this would be a threat to the potential success of the Estonian army in the event of war? The answer was, of course, none. But the purpose was to point out an enemy in order to be able to militarise and organise society. The State President Konstantin Päts on January 17, 1935 said:

The Constitution we own today is not the one we can remain with. We must convene a national assembly. Our people must be reorganised. The old parties must disappear and be replaced by [corporative] organisations representing the trades. Although it will be hard, all trade organisations must be united under a single roof. All must understand that they are organisations belonging to the Estonian free state. As long as the people is not organised in this manner, no parliament will convene and no elections will be held.¹⁹

Reading the Swedish reports from the Baltic States one gets the impression of states being torn apart by minority struggles – although often fabricated one. Lithuania especially was in a fix during the late 1930s in their relations with Germany concerning Memel. The Lithuanian army and other elite circles were, however, positive to Germany and at odds with the government of Russia. In a report from November 1938 the Swedish attaché to Riga, Major Lindqvist, travelled to Memelland together with the British military attaché. During the second day they visited the city of Šilute/Heydekrug and found the hotel packed with *Memelländers*; “who under diligent beer drinking sang various German patriotic and Memel-songs”. The hotel proprietor was one of the leaders of the outlawed German organisations. He told Lindqvist that the *Memelländers* could no longer be bought with less than full *Anschluss* to Germany.²⁰ Lindqvist went on to describe the journey giving the

impression of an almost feverish activity. The Lithuanian representatives and the Lithuanian population were described as almost besieged. Later during the journey Lindqvist described a dinner at the Swedish consul in Memel with a number of prominent *Memelländers*. Their opinions were that 90 per cent of the *Memelländers* were in favour of a German solution, and this view was also found among the Lithuanians. The reason for this was that the Lithuanians under Russia had been treated harshly, but in the countryside the German manor owners had treated the population well and therefore they all had become almost German.²¹ Lindqvist shared this opinion as he had heard the same thing from other sources.

At 8 p.m. the *Memelländers* gathered at the theatre square after the torchlight procession. The participators amounted to around 6 500 people and the spectators along the streets were approximated at around 10 000. At the sporting arena (the goal of the demonstration) 12 000 spectators had gathered. [...] At the head of the torchlight procession marched a large band from the German youth organisation in white shirts, black shorts and white socks (all organisations had been banned up until the preceding day, but were now performing; drilled and fully uniformed). After this followed massed standards, in which the German national flag was found but no Lithuanian flag. Immediately after marched the “Heinlein” of Memelland, Dr. Neumann, in black uniform and black boots, followed by approximately 50 bodyguards. Thereafter followed numerous youth groups; all dressed in black uniforms. The red armbands missed the swastika as far as we could see. Apart from this the march contained contingents from all trades. [...] At the very end of the demonstration was a banner declaring: “Der Heimat treu”.²²

After this Lindqvist summarised his impressions from the journey and the revocation of the state of emergency in Memel. The Jews had already begun to liquidate their businesses and prepare their move to “Great Lithuania”. The most important fact was that there were German organisations, under the surface, all ready to act immediately. They could mount demonstrations and events without anything being printed in the newspapers. The conclusion was that Lithuania could no longer withstand the German propaganda.²³

Lindqvist's analysis of his journey to Memel bears witness of the sentiments found in the Swedish reports from the Baltic States. It was a quagmire of political movements, active beneath the surface while the official rhetoric was a thin layer of varnish proclaiming that everything was good and orderly. Lindqvist's report also showed that not all minorities in the Baltic States were loyal. Whether this assessment came from chauvinist behaviour from the majority population or something else remains to be shown. Poland had the same problem in Danzig, which also held a strong Nazi-movement under the mayor Hermann Rauschning. Danzig was a League of Nations mandate and free city, and therefore Poland could not intervene with force. But Poland manifested its military power in the city by landing troops and combined that action by alternately mounting political campaigns expressing moderate policies.²⁴

The military capacity of the Baltic armies was initially assessed as quite good, although the officer corps was described as uneducated, scheming and politicised. The economy was poor and exercises and manoeuvres were often postponed. But all the same, the results were seen as adequate. The armies of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were seen as equal in performance, but it is striking how well the Lithuanian army was described in reports. The concept of wars in the future was nowhere to be seen in the reports – not at least as a fully defined doctrine. It comprised of armoured warfare, airpower and most importantly, the cooperation between infantry and artillery. Airpower was mentioned, but only sketchily as was motorisation and mechanisation.²⁵ In a message from 1935 Brunsson reported on tactics, equipment and organisation of the armoured forces in the Baltic per an order from Stockholm. In Estonia and Latvia the conclusion was that the terrain was not suitable for tanks and that tanks in any case were unaffordable. In Lithuania the view was more positive. In all cases the equipment standard of tanks was found lacking as most tanks were surplus Renault FT-17 tanks from the First World War combined with a few purchases of more modern tanks in the 1920s. Still, the number of tanks was low.²⁶

Another thing the reports found lacking was cooperation between artillery and infantry, another important lesson from the First

World War. In any case, neither the attachés, nor anyone else, had a clear view of what war would be like in the future. A common assessment was that the Baltic armies and Civil Guards were too positive concerning their own capacity to beat the Russians, a feeling coming from a Baltic misinterpretation of the wars of independence. Swedish attachés and officers stressed the differences between the modern Red Army and the haphazardly organised units of the civil war. Otherwise a common remark was that the equipment of Baltic armies was elderly and came from the various postwar surpluses as well as from different enemies. As a result, the small arms and artillery were of different origin and different calibres, a logistical nightmare as the Estonian army alone had at least three different service rifles all in different calibres.

Concerning alliances the Swedish attachés maintained that the only viable military option for Estonia and Latvia was an alliance with Poland, something that was also a risk as Polish adventurism and chauvinism could easily lead to war. Another possibility entertained was that the League of Nations would succeed in curtailing the military arms race. But as that organisation deteriorated this was not a credible option. Therefore it was only the great powers (Great Britain and France) and their actions that could save the Baltic States. The Molotov-Ribbentrop pact knocked the air out of the possibility of balancing Germany against the Soviet Union, which left Great Britain and France alone. These powers had already failed to protect Austria in 1936 and Czechoslovakia in 1938, the latter in alliance with Poland since 1935. Sweden could not act on something that the Baltic States themselves had not anticipated. There was no warning for Sweden and when the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact was signed the Swedish analysis had hinged on the fact that a war would resemble the war of 1914–1918, with Great Britain, France and Russia on the same side against Germany.²⁷ The independence of the Baltic States was not a primary Swedish interest compared to the importance of Finland, which overshadowed most things. The Swedish assumptions were, from the beginning, that the Soviet Union would sooner or later restore the borders of Czarist Russia. The assumption was also that the Baltic States could do nothing to resist and that the League of Nations would be toothless.²⁸ Finland was in the same

strategic situation as the Baltic States, but was a much larger opponent for the Soviet Union and also in possession of a defensible border.

The Soviet Invasion of 1939

In the reports from Riga in 1938 and 1939 it is evident that the attachés described a situation where the world rushed towards an abyss. After the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact the Baltic States proclaimed that it was none of their business, although the military leaders of Latvia expressed concern that there were secret clauses giving Russians the option to invade the country. The analysis of Major Lindqvist was that there was major concern combined with official declarations maintaining that everything was calm.²⁹ During the last days of August and the first days of September 1939, when the war had already broken out, Lindqvist reported on Baltic alerts and the callup of reservists. Germany had unsuccessfully tried to encourage Lithuanian hostility to Poland. On 16 September Lindqvist wrote after a visit to Kaunas that the major Soviet forces on the borders most likely would go into Poland, alternately that the USSR prepared an invasion of Estonia and Latvia. On the 17th it was obvious that the USSR had invaded Poland in fulfilment of its alliance with Nazi-Germany.³⁰

On 22 September 1939 Lindqvist met with the Soviet military attaché to Riga to discuss the future. Colonel Tsoukanov, as spelled by Lindqvist, was convinced that the Russian armies would stay in Poland after annexing the areas inhabited by Russians (in fact inhabited by Byelorussians and Ukrainians). According to the Soviets these groups had been persecuted under Polish rule but were now liberated. The USSR would resist any reinstatement of Poland, but Lindqvist assumed that there was need for a buffer between Germany and the USSR. He maintained in a message that the Soviet attaché had said similar things concerning minorities in the Baltic States as such pretexts had already been used to explain the invasion of Poland. He was certain that something would happen shortly.³¹

On 23 September Lindqvist reported that Soviet troops were concentrated on the Estonian-Soviet border and that the Estonian

Minister for Foreign Affairs Karl Selter had been invited to Moscow. Lindqvist cooperated intimately with the American military attaché Major Huthsteiner, and the American's reports were often enclosed. General Laidoner had, in conversation with Huthsteiner, said that he did not want to mobilise, but still maintained his readiness to do so. He hoped that Russians and Germans would fall out after trying to share their prey – Poland.³²

A few days later Lindqvist reported that the Russian demands on Latvia included the use of the harbour in Ventspils. In his report he also mentioned the wrenching events in Riga. The Polish attaché demanded to make his official farewell before leaving Riga, but was told that Poland no longer existed. The Estonian Chief of the General Staff General Reek, and the Latvian Chief of the General Staff General Hartmanis, had asked the German attaché to Riga, Colonel Rössing, for help in the event of a Soviet attack. Rössing had answered that Berlin would not listen to any requests or pleading.³³ On 27 September Lindqvist telephoned the Intelligence Section in Stockholm to convey that the Soviet demands on Estonia were Baltischport (Paldiski), garrisons and air bases on Ösel (Saaremaa) and the use of Tallinn harbour. Later on military garrisons elsewhere were added. Laidoner had proclaimed that he would rather mobilise the army and fight, while Prime Minister Eenpalu suggested that the Soviet demands be met. State President Pāits decided to follow the latter course, a decision leading to great consternation in Riga.³⁴

A few days later Lindqvist wrote that he had met the Latvian head of intelligence, Colonel Celmiņš, who also the founder of the *Perkonkrusts* (*Thunder Cross*), who described the seriousness of the situation. According to Celmiņš the Russians would make impossible demands, but that the Latvian army now was deployed and that Latvia would have to fight alone as Estonia had betrayed the cause.³⁵ During the first week of October 1939 negotiations between the Soviet Union and the Baltic States were held. On October 3, 1939 it was announced that the German minister in Riga had proclaimed that Germany would not support Latvia. Lindqvist meant that this was the final evidence that Germany had sold out the Baltic States to the USSR.³⁶ On October 6 the Soviet “pact” with Estonia and the Soviet troop deployments were

finished. In correlation with this Lindqvist had received messages that censorship had been introduced from the first day of the Soviet invasion. Lindqvist had received the marching order from Colonel Maasing, the head of Estonian military intelligence.³⁷ The Soviet troops in the northern column marching into Estonia were scrutinised by Lindqvist, who assessed the behaviour and appearance of the Red Army as good. Huthsteiner had seen the southern column and Lindqvist had read his report. The heavy weapons and equipment were more numerous in the south than in the north, but the general impression was negative.³⁸

The characteristic tone of the reports from Riga up until the Soviet invasion was dejection. All Swedish reports from 1927 and onwards had emphasised that the Estonian army was well trained and equipped. Communists and others were held at bay and the defence plans for the border already drawn up. In the reports defeatist statements are found, but the primary reason for the Baltic States acceptance of Soviet troops on their territory in 1939 was the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact preceded by the impotence of the Western Allies. Concerning the agreement between Latvia and the USSR, Lindqvist had been informed by the Chief of the General Staff General Rozensteins that:

The General also spoke of the internal security situation in Latvia and stressed that there was no threat from the home grown communists. After the agrarian reform the majority of the population, the peasantry, were not susceptible for communist propaganda and that the relatively few communists in Riga and other cities were disorganised and unarmed and under close supervision by the state. [...] My general impression is that the Latvians in the now concluded military negotiations have asserted themselves better than the Estonians. In the future they will not be as appallingly compliant to the Russian demands as their northern neighbour was.³⁹

This statement illustrates the disheartening effect that occurred when Estonia, the state seen as the most credible among the Baltic States, was the first to crumble. Only a few days before the Latvian acceptance of the Soviet demands the former head of intelligence Colonel Grigorijs Kikkuls was appointed Latvian military attaché to

Stockholm, something that suggests that Kikkuls probably was an important Swedish informer.⁴⁰ Yet another important factor surfacing as a result of the Soviet invasion of Poland was the “solution” of the Vilna-issue. Now it was resolved in favour of Lithuania as the Vilna area was transferred, although the happiness was short-lived.⁴¹ The Swedish attaché to Riga and his assistant in Tallinn, Lieutenant Carl Eric Almgren, reported during 1940 on the Soviet projection of power in the Baltic States. Sweden’s strategic situation worsened considerably with the new Soviet bases established in the Baltic States, mainly because the Red Fleet was no longer trapped in the Gulf of Finland.⁴²

Poland and the Future War

The assessments of the Swedish military attaché in Poland were, from the first to the very last, a history characterised by consternation. There was scepticism towards conditions in Poland and a general negative attitude about its capability to develop in a positive way. The main problems were an adventurism in foreign policy and chauvinism concerning minorities. This was combined with a slightly more optimistic opinion concerning the Polish armed forces.

Industrially and economically Poland was struck hard by depression and the same factors mentioned above affected Poland’s agrarian economy as it increased debt and turned inward. Indeed, the economy was just as agrarian as in the Baltic States and Polish agriculture depended on historic structures. The land reforms of 1919–1920 were inevitable and motivated as a means of fighting communism. This meant that agriculture was not organised in a manner to allow for rapid modernisation or industrialisation, but was organised around purely political reasons. The Polish land reform was more modest than the Baltic reforms because in Poland the land had to be expropriated from the strong Polish gentry and their manors. There were few foreign elites who owned land so all agricultural reforms affected the ruling circles.⁴³ As a result, Polish agriculture was as hard to manage in economic terms as in the Baltic States. When depression struck Poland it struck hard. Eric Hobsbawm describes this process when as the globalised economy of the interwar period stopped working and was replaced by

protectionism, tariffs and regulations. Unemployment was always a major problem, particularly in Eastern Europe where economies were more sensitive to the “seismic” shock waves, from the derailed American economy. Indeed, world trade declined by 60 per cent 1929–1932.⁴⁴

Industrially there were few positive impressions among the attachés, but the Polish project of creating a central industrialised heartland in central Poland in the late 1930s was seen in a positive light. The “Four year plan” was the holistic approach that was required and Major Torén noted that there was a need for a central administration to manage industrialisation. The concept a “state directed economy” was everywhere according to the attaché, but the problem was the lack of capital. Torén believed that the plan for a central industrial region behind the Wisła and San Rivers was essentially a good plan.⁴⁵

In Poland there was also a significant difference between reality and the proclaimed successes. In this aspect Poland was no different from the other authoritarian regime. In a travel report by Lieutenant Colonel Wallman from November 1937 Poland was described as a confusing country because it had been devastated by the Polish-Bolshevik war and a century of Russian rule. Infrastructure was particularly bad, especially in the east. In the eyes of Wallman, Poland was a distressingly poor country with an industry only capable of producing military equipment. The consequences of this were somewhat diverse. First, Poland was described as chaotic both concerning administration as well as in economics. Secondly, poverty was abysmal. This condition, on the other hand, had the positive effect that conscripts were more than willing to do their military service as they were both clothed and fed in the army. Wallman continued to emphasize the glowing patriotic spirit of Poland saying that not even a century of oppression had killed the Polish spirit.⁴⁶ In general, the Swedish officers’ assessment argued that Polish industrial and economic development was deficient. The depression struck all the nations and part of the economic hardship came from the worldwide depression. But the Polish agrarian economy meant that economic hardship was multiplied.

Administration in Poland was, in general, portrayed as better during the 1930s than during the preceding decade. Characteristics of the former period were scheming and politicised officers at odds with each other. Political controversies and conflicts between legionnaires and former Austrian officers were common themes in Swedish reports. Legionnaires were described as uneducated corporals promoted above their capacity. Former Austrian officers were well educated, but often old-fashioned. Minority issues were always present in the Swedish reports as issues that took up the attention of the government. In Poland the handling of minority issues was somewhat simpler than in the pre-war Habsburg Empire, which had had different administrative languages as opposed to the Poland's hard-line policy of Polonisation. This policy deteriorated the relationship between minorities and the Poles and hampered administration and economic development. Sometimes Swedish attachés expressed a negative view on parliamentarianism, which was described as political squabbles. This was particularly true for states such as Poland where the nature of politics was seen as very different from Sweden. This opinion was common in reports up until the coup of 1926, but after this there was a perception of less squabbling. This did not however mean that Pilsudski was seen as a positive force in Polish politics. Indeed, this was quite the opposite. One thing differentiating the reports on Poland from the reports on the Baltics was that there was not the same sense of uncertainty. Poland was seen as more stable and there was rarely any impression that at any moment there could be a communist coup. Poland had been grounded in authoritarian measures and control since 1926, but the Baltic States only since the mid-1930s.

Militarily there were definite problems in managing a defence budget amounting to over 40 per cent of the national product. Most of the budget, however, went to feeding and clothing the large number of conscripts and few funds and resources were left to modernise the army. The relationship between officers and soldiers in the 1930s were often described as patriarchal but positive.

“Also interesting were the tasks and activities of the educational officer. Allegedly there was one in every unit. The translation of the word used in conversation with me was the German *Erziehungsoffizier*, it

is perhaps not entirely adequate [...] included not only the evocation of patriotic love and general military virtues, but was seriously directed to the character-building of the soldiers [...] almost gave the impression of fatherly care. This care was extended also to include leisure and personal details such as hygiene and table manners.⁴⁷

This also had something to do with moral aspects as well as training and administration, particularly in this respect the best use of their resources. In the travel report from Colonel Falk on the Polish 22nd Mountain Division in Przemyśl there were references to Poland being a large steppe without hills or forests. Everywhere cows, goats and women with bare feet could be seen, together with children, beside small insignificant farms and primitive barns. From a military point of view these conditions forged good and hardy soldiers, as opposed to Sweden where public welfare had degenerated the conscripts. According to Falk, among the Polish soldiers there was a thirst for knowledge and a very good relationship between soldiers and officers, which was not often seen in Sweden. Polish soldiers had a pronounced belief in authority and a strong sense of discipline. The army was a guarantor of national independence.⁴⁸

Morals were, as mentioned above, dependent on the relationship of the state to its minorities and served as a means to manifest order through parades. These can be analysed as visual manifestations of the eternity of the Polish nation. But in a few reports from 1938 and 1939, Major Torén and the former attaché recalled to duty, Lieutenant Colonel de Laval, indicated there was a certain weariness with parades in Poland. Parades were well-organised and with tidiness and demeanour, but the spectators were not as enthusiastic as before.⁴⁹ However, minority issues were the factor that most of all threatened the manifested orderliness of Poland. In a report from July 18, 1939, Major de Laval wrote ominously about the Polish minorities. The report was quite conventional in its layout with a short description of the various minorities. The only difference from before, where Jews and Ukrainians were described as the foremost threats to the Polish state, was that Jews were now described as entirely loyal to Poland. This was quite natural as the relationship between Poland and Germany had deteriorated during the summer of

1939. Communism was still strong in the eastern parts of Poland and the German minority was no longer loyal to Poland.⁵⁰ In general, in the Swedish reports the Polish soldiers were seen as loyal, while disloyalty was found among the minorities. This information probably came from the Polish General Staff, who had explained their view on the minorities. Some of the information came from what the attachés themselves saw. However, the units they visited were carefully selected and in these units the soldiers were Polish and did not belong to the minority groups.

Soldiers were assessed as well trained and drilled. In a report from November 1937 Major Torén wrote that the general training of the Polish army was good, as well as the training of the common soldier. But the opposite view also surfaced. In March 1938 the assistant military attaché, Lieutenant Montgomery, visited the Infantry Combat School in Rembertów and his assessment was that the education was deficient, especially since the unit was a particular training battalion with eleven months of training behind it. The cooperation between infantry and artillery was poor, shooting was aimless, firing lines were without depth, and machine guns were positioned without cover, and many other problems were noted. The positive aspects were the offensive will of the soldiers, a positive attitude to military service, and the hardiness of the common soldier.⁵¹ These assessments were more or less common descriptions as Polish soldiers were deemed as hardy, sturdy, capable of marching long distances, somewhat stupid and untrained, but possessing a good spirit.

The now somewhat worn opinion that the Polish army of 1939 was completely inferior as compared to the German army, which marched into Poland with a finished and complete doctrine of *Blitzkrieg* and simply finished Poland off in a few weeks, is certainly tainted. Palmer's description written in the 1970s was: 'The Polish state of Rydz-Śmigły, Mościcki and Beck was a social and military anachronism; swords and lances made little impression on panzer divisions.'⁵²

This view has been common concerning Poland and her armed forces ever since the Second World War, but has been proven wrong. In fact, the Polish army of 1939 was well equipped, in relation to Germany

(which had only a few panzer divisions in 1939) and also in relation to Sweden, as several artillery systems were the same. The Polish anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns were modern Bofors guns and in their day seen as fully adequate.⁵³ The main shortcoming was the lack of motorisation and the number of trucks-- but concerning armour the Swedish attachés saw Poland as well equipped with modern tanks. Lieutenant Nils Stahre from the regiment of Älvsborg was attached to the Polish Armour School in 1937. He argued, in a very technical report, that the Polish armoured units were well trained and equipped with good and sturdy tanks.⁵⁴ The assessments were well in line with the international trends and views on tanks, i.e. the French school that the primary mission of tanks was to support the infantry. The Polish army can hardly be blamed for not introducing a more visionary approach to armoured warfare. In any case, the Poles did not have the financial means to have significant armoured or motorised forces. Concerning air forces, the Swedish assessment came mostly from a report by Captain Carl Bergström in 1937. His conclusion was that the Polish air force was not an independent branch of the service, but still had significant numbers of planes and a high combat value. The problem was that the equipment was not fully modern and that the supply of bombers had been postponed due to the goal of equipping the air force with Polish-made aeroplanes.⁵⁵ Again Bergström's assessment was in line with international trends. The goal to be self-sufficient in aircraft existed everywhere, which was also the case in Sweden which during the war worked intensively to build an aeronautical industry. Initially the industry could not meet the demands of the forces and aircraft purchases were made in Italy and also in Germany.⁵⁶ Still, the Polish aeronautical industry became substantial and supplied the Polish air forces with adequate equipment. The problem was that the enemy had aircraft that was better than adequate and also used it in a new and unexpected manner.

In a report from 1938 Colonel Kellgren wrote on the development and capabilities of the Polish army in a future war and made comparisons with travels in Poland in 1932. His conclusion was that Polish tactics was very offensive as they were developed from the experience of the Polish-Bolshevik war in which the offense often knocked the spirit out of Red units. The view of the Polish officers was

that soldiers, in order to be kept in a state of high morale, should go on the attack as this suited the Polish temperament. However, according to Kellgren, such a reliance on the offense could lead to horrendous losses against well trained and disciplined opponents. The lessons of 1919 were no longer viable as the Poles had then attacked demoralised Bolsheviks, as opposed to their modern adversaries. Kellgren concluded that the only thing that could justify a Polish offensive was if there were enough tanks and artillery to keep the enemy occupied while the infantry attacked.⁵⁷

The Polish army introduced a defensive doctrine in 1938, but this was not put into practice. After the German attack and under German pressure the Polish generals reverted to what they knew--counterattack. On August 28, 1939 Lieutenant Colonel de Laval wrote from Warsaw that Poles saw themselves as individualists as opposed to the German "horde-people", and the Poles were good and death-defying soldiers. De Laval emphasised that these ideas were combined with a general lack of practical organisation; "a part of Polish national character". The conclusion was that Polish morale was good, but that the end result would be bad for Poland. On the other hand, Germany should not expect to crush Poland within a few weeks.⁵⁸

According to the Swedish assessments Poland was not ready for total war, but on the other hand, no one was. Poland was as well, or probably better, equipped to deal with her adversaries than most. The problem for Poland was similar to the conditions in the Baltic States, the strategic situation was unattainable. Through the German occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1938 the length of the border between Germany and Poland doubled. The appeasement of the Western Allies was the main reason that the Polish border was un-defendable. Equally important was that Poland, allied to Czechoslovakia since 1935, took part in the German occupation and annexed the Czech district of Teschen. With a border doubled in length and the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact signed, the situation was hopeless. Poland, as opposed to the Baltic States, chose to fight anyway, partly because there was no other option.

Finland – Sweden’s Ally 1938–1939

Finland was the state that Sweden possibly could imagine to be allied to, but for most of the 1920s and 1930s alliances were not an option. One of the reasons was the language issue, in which the Fennomans fought with Swedish minorities. Of equal importance were Swedish domestic policies as the Swedish Social Democrats were strongly against allying with the “Whites”. But also on the Finnish side there was a strong scepticism against cooperating with Sweden. Finland was also sceptical to what Sweden could do to guarantee Finland’s independence. Swedish defence policies made Sweden an unattractive military partner and this destabilised the region. However, it was significant that concerning Finland, the possibility of cooperation arose. It was only towards Finland that Sweden was willing to deviate from non-alignment. Membership in the League of Nations was, in a way, an alliance, but it had been proclaimed from Nordic states upon entry into the League that they reserved the right to decide which sanctions to take part in.

Finland was also the state most similar to Sweden, and there was a greater understanding of Finnish political life from the Swedish horizon than was the case of other nations. Historical relations were important in the Swedish view of Finland. Sweden understood the details of the Finnish political system and appreciated the Swedish laws of Finland. In general, the historic dimension was very important in the analysis sent home by the attachés. But through closeness in history came problems, as this concept of closeness was challenged by Finnish nationalists and extremists. Through the proximity of history Finland was also judged more harshly than other states. Concerning Poland and the Baltic States, there were no Swedish illusions nor were there strong relations, therefore Sweden often was pleasantly surprised. This was not the case of Finland where assessments were sterner. Yet another factor separating Finland from the others was that the Finnish borders were seen as easily defendable, but also as “natural” ones in both geographical and cultural terms. This made the tasks of the Finnish armed forces delicate, but manageable. The USSR could not attack on a broad front although a quick look at the map suggested they could. Indeed, the

reality was quite the opposite. The roads and infrastructure channelled Soviet possible thrusts to a few areas on the Karelian Isthmus and along the roads further north. In the Winter War of 1939–1940 this scenario is exactly what happened.

Economics was not a common topic in the military reports and there were several reasons for this. The Finnish economy was more resilient against the depression than the economies of Poland and the Baltic States. The economy of Finland was more diversified and not dependent on particular products, as opposed to Estonia where dairy was the economic base.⁵⁹ The answer to the question as to which economic and industrial factors played into the Swedish assessments of Finnish resilience was that the general economic capacity was seen as favourable. At an industrial level there were greater problems as the Finnish aeronautical and automotive industries were minute, as was the capability to produce heavy artillery.

Concerning administration the Swedish military assessments expressed a scepticism towards the Finnish political system, which was seen as shaky when many governments succeeded each other in the 1920s. However, it can be noted that this was the case in Sweden as well as many governments fell on issues of defence or agriculture.⁶⁰ This common European problem with the crisis of the liberal political system did not lead to the disastrous consequences in Sweden nor in Finland, as commonly occurred through much of Europe. In Finland, right-wing extremism was stronger than in Sweden. But from an administrative point of view there were few, if any, Swedish concerns over civilian administration in Finland. This can be illustrated in the reports concerning the Lapua Movement and the Mäntsälä-Rebellion in 1932, in which the Minister of the Interior Erik von Born was described as a breakwater in an ocean of extremists. This opinion was facilitated by the fact that von Born belonged to the Swedish People's Party and as a consequence seen as inoculated against extremism. The major administrative problems came from the competition between different groups of officers, particularly between the Jaegers and the former Czarist officers. These contradictions threatened to make the army less effective. This was quite common in the reports from all the states

studied as the processes of nostrification gave rise to these kinds of conflicts. The Swedish officers consequently assessed younger officers, i.e. the Jaegers as uneducated upstarts. An issue of equal importance in the state administration was the civil guards. Its existence, with its own Central Staff and a geographical structure, created competition between the army and Civil Guards.

The Swedish assessments of the moral qualities in Finland show as many negative judgments as do the reports from Poland and the Baltic States. From a Swedish point of view the minority issues in Finland were much more problematic than elsewhere. The fact that the minority was Swedish was difficult in itself, but the real issue was that this minority was seen as superior to the Finns by the Swedish attachés. On the other hand, these culturally superior Swedes were still criticized by Finns. The language issue was a recurring problem in the relations between Sweden and Finland, politically as well as militarily.⁶¹ After the “Nordic turn” in Finnish foreign policy in the 1930s, Finland officially tried to improve its relations with Sweden, but the language issue continued to throw a spanner in the works. One example of the more Nordic aspirations in general was the celebration of *Finnish Week* in Stockholm in April 1936, something described in a positive account in the Finnish press. In the same report there was also a piece about Fennomans attacking the influence of Sweden in Finland’s economy. The newspaper *Suomen Heimo* argued that Swedish influence should be fought with: “measures that have a striking resemblance to that in which the Jewish business in Germany at the time was treated...”⁶²

During 1936 and 1937 the language issue was described in Swedish reports as something destroying the Finnish state. If the Swedish minority were alienated it would diminish the Finnish military capacity, the reason being that Finnish soldiers were believed to be in need of leadership from more cultured and educated officers and non-commissioned officers, i.e. Swedes.⁶³ For such views on the language issue and the characterisation of Finnish officers as schemers, the Swedish assessment was that the Finnish army was not as good as it could be. The individual soldiers were exceptional, as they were in Poland and the Baltic States, but the Swedish assessments of the officer

corps were the same. Finnish officers, as well as Poles or Baltics, were described as scheming and political and lacking education. This was a trait that was toned down from the mid-1930s, partly because younger officers came into senior positions in the Swedish army, many who had combat experience in Finland in 1918.

Concerning the Finnish army and the capacity to wage modern total war, this capacity increased during the 1930s according to Swedish reports. In the reports of Colonel Ehrenborg and Major Ekström from Finland, Estonia and Latvia in 1935, the collective impressions were that magnificent work had been done over the years and that the armies had reached a point where their value began to show. There were still common weaknesses in education, but this was weighed against the good attitude and morale of the soldiers. Ehrenborg and Ekström emphasised that a common trait was the patriotic love between the people and army in all the visited countries.⁶⁴

Again the same short notes concerning tanks and aeroplanes came from reports on Finland in similar terms from Poland and the Baltic states. Such equipment was expensive and small states rarely had the possibility to adequately rearm with modern weapons. In a message from 1936, Major Tengberg wrote about manoeuvres with tanks at the Nyland Regiment, among other things to test the capabilities of tanks. The manoeuvres showed in particular the vulnerabilities of tanks. However, according to Tengberg, tanks should not be underestimated if they were modern models.⁶⁵ The Finnish attempts at motorisation were also described in a similar manner, as was the air forces. These forces were assessed as numerically and materially inferior.⁶⁶ In Swedish reports the Finnish army was described as lacking modern weapons and equipment. Modern tactics were described as deficient. It was often pointed out that the influence of the civil war of 1918 was too dominant in Finnish military thinking. The same thing had been noted concerning Poland and the Polish-Bolshevik War, as this experience had influenced the military's views on future war. Swedish attachés often commented that these wars had nothing to do with modern warfare. But, in the end, if there was one army up to the task it was the Finnish army, followed by

the Polish army. The advantage of the Finnish army in comparison with others was one of geography and a border that could be defended.

Conservative Assessments of Future Wars

If one takes a holistic approach to the military assessments of the Baltic it is evident that there is a strong conservative bias. The elements of conservative thinking can be traced in the assessments and a number of central elements surface in the analysis.

The military attachés were militarists and it would be odd if they weren't, but it was not a 1914-style Prussian militarism. It was a militarism centred in their role in society and the role of the army in society and politics. Militarism in their sense entailed loyalty, military honour, culture, education and hierarchy, channelled through a respect for the King, and sometimes the government. In their assessments on foreign militaries their militarism influenced the reports through the concept that officers should not scheme and play politics. For them it was a question of respect for hierarchy and social unity. The army was the foremost example of national cohesion and the foremost national symbol. The Swedish assessments therefore became negative as most officer corps in the Baltic during the 1920s were described as corrupt. This was related to the foundation of the new states in the region and during the 1930s the state structures had been formalised and, as a consequence, the assessments of other nations became more positive. History was central in their militarist opinion since history constituted the "natural and organic" relation between state and armed forces. Swedish militarism also influenced assessments as part of an international military culture. Things in line with this culture were seen as positive and things outside as negative –recognition was the key.

Concerning constitutionalism, this was also an important part of the hierarchic definition of society and the relations between state, armed forces, politics and people. In the Swedish reports on the Baltic States, Poland and Finland, there was only a positive view presented on Finland as a functional constitutional system. Poland and the Baltic States were all described as dysfunctional, mostly due to the minorities and their

relations to the state. In these assessments there was also an inherent scepticism of the liberal political systems that took inspiration from Wilsonian ideals. When these systems derailed there was almost a sense of *schadenfreude* among the attachés. Again it was Finland that was different from all the others as the attachés maintained a positive image of the historical origin of Finnish laws, associated with the relations between power, state and armed forces. In Finland the threat came from revolutionaries, mostly right wing revolutionaries during the 1930s, who had proclaimed Sweden and Swedes as the enemies. According to a conservative view these Fennomans manifested their immaturity to rule justly because they could not put themselves above their own egotistic opinions. This was also a conservative parade view founded in a pessimistic view of humanity and the relation to history. History was the cement holding society together.

The agrarian ideals, sometimes defined as anti-modernity, existed throughout the period in the Swedish assessments of Polish, Finnish and Baltic armies. Peasant boys were described as better soldiers from a physical point of view, but also concerning the skills that soldiers needed. Peasants were also believed to have a mental firmness above that of workers. Farmers and peasants were seen as trustworthy anti-socialists as they emanated from a more “traditional, natural and organic environment”, where social relations were natural and had sprung from history. Modern society and the city were threats to the natural order. Industrial workers and others were not nearly as good soldiers as peasant boys. Work in cities was in no way nearly as natural as farm work, closely connected to views on modernity. The city was characterised by leisure, comfortable living conditions etcetera, all making soldiers less hardy. Sweden was in many respects a more modern society and education was way above the other Baltic nations, but this also made Swedish soldiers more easy-going and not as physically fit.

Nationalism was another strong influence that formed the assessments in many ways. One of these ways was expressed in the Swedish nationalist position during the early 1920s towards Finland, in support of Swedish minority in Finland. Another way was the constant assessment of popular nationalism as positive, but not if nationalism

existed among minorities (as long as the minority was not Swedish) that constituted a centrifugal force. Nationalism was a double edged sword as it could both be a uniting and a divisive force. Chauvinist nationalism and the processes of nostrification and language issues were often seen as quite distasteful by Swedish attachés, who often described them as a sign of immaturity. Their view was that if nationalism was natural then it also had its natural and organic base in history and religion. Fennomania, or Latvification, in the eyes of Swedish officers seemed childish. The states were seen as young, absent of a long history, and therefore their nationalism became chauvinist and challenging, i.e. more of a threat than an asset. This was connected to overly broad nationalisation campaigns driving the centrifugal forces among minorities and threatening to crush the states. This was seen as dangerous, and in some cases completely inappropriate, particularly if the minorities were seen as culturally superior – i.e. Swedes in Finland or Germans in Poland and the Baltic states. The ideal society for Swedish attachés in their views on minorities was a society that was homogenous, united and patriotic. In essence it was an idealised image of Sweden, perceived to be homogenous, but not fully united as the liberals and socialists had destroyed national unity through egotistic policies. This was yet again an offshoot from a pessimistic view on humanity.

Anti-socialism combined with pessimism was common in Swedish assessments. Anti-socialism was mostly turned against communists, but often it also had an anti-Semitic tone with concepts of the “Jew-Bolshevik”. Interestingly it was not Social Democracy in Finland that was a problem in Swedish reports. They were not seen as a positive. Instead, the main threat came from the right-wing of the Coalition party together with the agrarians as they were the foremost supporters of the Lapua movement. Aside from this the threat communism in all its forms was a major threat. Essentially, no other question was of equal importance as the threat from the Soviet Union in its various forms. For the attachés the main thing was to decide how resilient the states were by studying communist influence, which was all governed by the Comintern. There was a basic understanding that the newly founded states were especially vulnerable to be undermined by communist conspiracies.

Another important discourse among the attachés was Social Darwinism and concepts of modernity. The former had changed character and did not comprise the same teleological approach were states naturally replaced each other in an eternal power struggle. Social Darwinism had been replaced by other more modern approaches, but there still were Darwinist ideas present in the assessments. This particularly concerned Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, as they were seen as having no future. The Soviet Union would “naturally”, from its geopolitical position, be drawn towards the coastlines and sea lanes and would “solve the problem” of the Baltic States. Poland could also be devoured, but this was not seen as a certainty as in the case of the Baltic States. Finland was described as being a “natural and organic” state, but still under threat from the USSR. Modernity was characterised by ambivalence concerning change. In the conservative point of view modernisation to preserve existed as a concept, but not as much as it did in the civilian sphere. There was, and had always been, a contradiction between tradition and modernity in armed forces, as there was a definite strategy to modernising warfare in the technical sense, but at the same time maintain the historical legacy. The relationship between modernity and tradition was always present.

But what role did these conservative opinions play in the assessments of the future? They played a fundamental role as the ideologies of hierarchy combined with militarism, and as a pessimistic view of humanity as defined in the assessments sent to Stockholm. In the next step the reports were analysed and made into strategic policy. Hence, conservative analysts in the General Staff interpreted the reports made by equally conservative attachés, forwarding the concepts to conservative chiefs of the General Staff, tasked to cooperate with a civilian Minister of Defence, often with a diametrically opposed position. These conservative assessments in many cases inflamed the political controversies concerning defence.

Another central issue in this study has been to note how important recognition was for the assessments. Swedish attachés in general assessed what they recognised in a positive way. Hence Swedish assessments of Prussian-style drill became more positive than one

concerning haphazardly uniformed freedom fighters. This did not mean that there was an inherent Swedish-German relationship, or a Swedish appreciation of Prussia, but that the Prussian drill signified a “real” army. The opposite was the freedom fighter in civilian dress with a cockade. These soldiers gave the impression of revolutionaries among the professionals. There was often a feeling of discomfort for attachés when civilians were armed, both because it reminded people of revolution but also because it signified amateurism. In this process a recognition of the military code and culture became central. It was partly through visual phenomena in celebrations and traditions that transformed „new” states into “real” states. Military manifestations became central in the creation of statehood through historicising and recognition. The military attachés were the receivers of a message sent by the local general staff using the language of military culture. The military attaché instinctively recognised what should be manifested and continuously assessed these factors as positive.

A following question is what role did this play in the assessments sent to Stockholm? The answer is that the Swedish attachés consequently assessed what they recognised in a more positive way, and therefore their opinions influenced the capacity of the new states to manifest order and capacity. The reports concerning celebrations and traditions rarely had anything to do with military capacity. An example is reading the reports of celebrations concerning the distinctly historicising manifestations of the Estonian army in the 1930s with the (Swedish) victory at Narva in 1700 as a centrepiece. The celebrations gave the impression of an orderly and well-functioning state, while in fact the opposite was the case.

Ideas concerning future wars were another basis for the assessments made by Swedish military attachés. It is often argued that the analysts of the interwar period were wrong in their assessments of the future and the manner in which wars would be fought. Of course it is intrinsically hard to foretell the future and it is at the same time quite easy to be wise in hindsight. The Swedish assessments were well in line with the international trends of the interwar period. Concerning armoured warfare Sweden came to the same conclusions as many others in the Baltic, i.e. that the terrain made the use of tanks complicated and

therefore there was little reason to worry. At the same time, small groups of officers proclaimed that tanks should be used in large numbers and for breakthroughs, combined with other arms. The problem is that this concept did not exist anywhere during the interwar era, apart from the Soviet Union and Germany, and also perhaps in the mechanised trial units in Great Britain and France. The most common way to use tanks was the French concept with tanks serving as support for the infantry. The Swedish attachés, as well as almost everybody else, described this as up to par. Airpower was discussed in the same way, and air forces around the Baltic were seen as irrelevant if they did not have strategic bombers. Sweden tried to follow the trends and purchased medium bombers from Germany in accordance with common international thinking. In this case as well the assessments were well in line with the general international trends. However, the most important issue was the cooperation between infantry and artillery and this was directly linked to the lessons of World War I. Swedish officers in general believed that cooperation between infantry and artillery was always found lacking and undeveloped.

The history of the observed states was of immense significance in the assessments. History and the historical understanding of the attachés coloured their analysis both in a positive and in a negative way. A developed tradition of history and recognition, as in the case of Finland, constituted a positive foundation, but also in a negative when Finland departed from the Swedish “track”, and then analysis became merciless as a result. For example, the lack of historical understanding in Sweden affected Lithuania. The Swedish view on Lithuania was one of disinterestedness. Recognition was the key and there were no elements of this between Sweden and Lithuania. Recognition also became important in the assessments during the 1930s and the many coup d'états carried out in the region. Pilsudski's coup in 1926 was described as distasteful, but also through the lens that there were no alternatives.

It is possible to relate this to Ernest Gellner's typology of new and old states as well as to the phases of nationalism as defined by Miroslav Hroch. The observed states had a birth phase when their borders were punched out of the crumbling empires. During this birth

phase Sweden was sceptical towards Poland, positive to Finland and wondered about the Baltic States. The “birth phase” was finalised through the peace treaties of Tartu (Dorpat) in 1920, and a phase of maturing ensued. Sweden was positive to the existence of the *randstaaten*, with a positive view of Finland, and less positive views concerning Estonia and Latvia, and sceptical about Poland and Lithuania. Adulthood would then come in the 1930s when the states were firmly established with functioning political systems. Most of these states accordingly never reached adulthood as the processes were derailed in coup d’états. Defining how the Swedish military perceived these states during these three phases a pattern becomes visible. The main thing for Sweden was maintaining the independence of Finland and seeing that Finland was not caught by the siren of Poland. If the other states managed to survive it was, of course positive, but it was not a primary Swedish interest. The status quo was the preferred outcome. If the Baltic States survived it was positive, but the signs were not good. However, Sweden assumed that Poland would survive, but probably only after border “corrections”.

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² Per Iko, "Det totala kriget" Unpublished Lecture, National Defence College 2010-05-04. An important source is Arthur Marwick et al. (red.), *Total War and Historical Change: Europe 1914–1955* (London 2001).

³ Curt Juhlin-Dannfelt, *Öst och väst: synpunkter på krigspotential och fredsekonomi* (Stockholm 1958), p. 9.

⁴ Juhlin-Dannfelt (1958), pp. 215–217.

⁵ Hobsbawm (2004), pp. 62–65.

⁶ Johansson (1988).

⁷ Ian Beckett, "Total War", i Colin McInnes & Gary Sheffield (red.), *Warfare in the Twentieth Century* (London 1988), p. 28.

⁸ Jay M. Winter, "The Economic and Social History of War", i Jay M. Winter (red.), *War and Economic Development: Essays in Memory of David Joslin*, citerad i Roger Chickering, "Total War: The Use and Abuse of a Concept", i Manfred F. Boemeke, Roger Chickering & Steve Förster (red.), *Anticipating Total War: The German and American Experiences, 1871–1914* (Cambridge 1999), p. 27.

⁹ Samuelsson (1999), pp. 102 & 113–116, jfr Martin Kahn, *Measuring Stalin's Strength during Total War: U.S. and British Intelligence on the Economic and Military Potential of the Soviet Union during the Second World War, 1939–45* (Göteborg 2004).

¹⁰ Mark E. Neely, "Was the Civil War a Total War", i Stig Förster & Jörg Nagler (Red.), *On the Road to Total War: The American Civil War and German Wars of Unification 1861–1871* (Cambridge 2002), p. 51.

¹¹ Ernst Jünger, *I stålstormen* citerade av David D. Roberts, *The Totalitarian Experiment in Twentieth-Century Europe: Understanding the Poverty of Great Politics* (London 2006), p. 168

¹² Gst/utr, Riga, 2000 BI: 1, utgående från Riga, Handbrev no. UA 2 den 28 februari 1933 från major Juhlin-Dannfelt till C Gst/utr.

¹³ Gst/utr, Baltikum, 200 Ela:3, Handbrev Litt. no. U A 32 den 21 september 1928 från Juhlin-Dannfelt till C Gst/utr.

¹⁴ Gst/utr, Baltikum, 200 Ela:6, Handbrev Litt. no. U A 4 den 4 februari 1931 från Juhlin-Dannfelt till C Gst/utr och Ela:6, Meddelande no. 57 den 12 september 1931 om Litauen, Meddelande no. 65 den 11 mars 1931 om Estland samt Ela:8, Meddelande no. 10/1933 den 27 januari 1933 om Estland, samtliga från Juhlin-Dannfelt till C Gst/utr.

¹⁵ Köll (1994) & Mikael Korhonen, "Krigskonjunktur och fordringsanspråk: den finländska metallindustrins förluster till följd av ryska revolutionen 1917", i Max Engman (red.), *Väst möter öst: Norden möter Ryssland* (Stockholm 1996), pp. 239–250.

¹⁶ Max Engman, "Imperieupplösningar och ekonomisk nationalism", i Max Engman (red.), *När imperier faller: studier kring riksupplösningar och nya stater* (Stockholm 1994), pp. 264–270

¹⁷ Engman "Imperieupplösningar..." (1994), pp. 274–276 and Köll & Valge (1998).

¹⁸ Palmer (1970), p. 207.

¹⁹ Gst/utr, Baltikum, 200 Ela:10, Rapport no. 1/1935 den 26 januari 1935 från major Brunsson till C Försvarsdepartementet, s. 2.

²⁰ Fst/und, Baltikum, 206 utgående, BI:3, Meddelande no. 71 den 7 november 1938 från major Lindqvist till C Fst/und, s. 1–2.

²¹ Fst/und, Baltikum, 206 utgående, BI:3, Meddelande no. 71 den 7 november 1938 från major Lindqvist till C Fst/und, s. 3.

²² Fst/und, Baltikum, 206 utgående, BI:3, Meddelande no. 71 den 7 november 1938 från major Lindqvist till C Fst/und, s. 4–5.

²³ Fst/und, Baltikum, 206 utgående, BI:3, Meddelande no. 71 den 7 november 1938 från major Lindqvist till C Fst/und, s. 6–7.

²⁴ Stjernfelt & Böhme (2007), p. 19. This in turn was based on L. Denne, *Das Danzig-Problem in der deutschen Aussenpolitik 1934–1939* (Bonn 1959).

²⁵ Gst/utr, Baltikum, 200 Ela:3, Rapport no. 17 den 16 mars 1928 om bristande motorisering av det lettiska artilleriet. Ela:6, Meddelande no. 22

den 11 mars 1931 om polskt flygbesök i Estland och Lettland för flygplansförsäljning. Meddelande no. 24 den 14 mars 1931 om estniska flygvapnets propagandatour i landet. Samtliga från ryttmästare Juhlin-Dannfelt till C Försvarsdepartementet/C Gst/utr.

²⁶ Gst/utr, Baltikum, Ela:10, Meddelande no. 40/1935 den 16 november 1935 från major Brunsson till C Gst/utr.

²⁷ David M. Crowe, *The Baltic States and the Great Powers: Foreign Relations 1938–1940* (Boulder 1993) & Wilhelm M. Carlgren, "Den stora överraskningen: regeringen och Moskvapakten", i Bo Hugemark (red.), *Stormvarning: Sverige inför andra världskriget* (Hallstavik 2002), p. 144.

²⁸ Wilhelm M. Carlgren, "Sverige och Balticum sommaren 1940", i Bo Hugemark (red.), *Urladdning: 1941 – blixtkrigens år* (Hallstavik 2002), p. 355.

²⁹ Fst/und, 202:3, El:2 vol 4, Meddelande no. 100/1939 den 25 augusti 1939 från major Lindqvist till C Fst/und, s. 1–3.

³⁰ Fst/und, 202:3, El:2 vol 4, Meddelande no. 105/1939 den 31 augusti 1939 om lettiska fältbefästningar vid gränsen, Meddelande no. 108/1939 den 5 september 1939 om Litauen, Rapport no. 19/1939 den 11 september 1939 lettiska reservister inkallas, samt Rapport no. 20/1939 den 16 september 1939 om ryska trupper vid gränsen, samtliga från major Lindqvist till C Fst/und eller C Försvarsdepartementet.

³¹ Fst/und, 202:3, El:2 vol 4, Meddelande no. 115/1939 den 22 september 1939 från major Lindqvist till C Fst/und.

³² Fst/und, 202:3, El:2 vol 4, Meddelande no. 117/1939 den 23 september 1939 från major Lindqvist till C Fst/und.

³³ Fst/und, 202:3, El:2 vol 4, Meddelande no. 119/1939 den 26 september 1939 från major Lindqvist till C Fst/und, s. 2. Se även Norberg (2002) som påpekar att Rössing tidigare varit attaché i Stockholm.

³⁴ Fst/und, 202:3, El: 2 vol 4, Meddelande no. 122/1939 intertelefonerat till avdelning U den 27 September 1939 kl. 14.40 från major Lindqvist mottaget av överstelöjtnant Torén, tidigare attaché i Warszawa.

³⁵ Fst/und, 202:3, El:2 vol 4, Meddelande no. 128/1939 den 29 september 1939 från major Lindqvist till C Fst/und.

³⁶ Fst/und, 202:3, El:2 vol 4, Meddelande no. 132/1939 den 3 oktober 1939 från major Lindqvist till C Fst/und.

³⁷ Fst/und, 202:3, El:2 vol 4, Rapport no. 23/1939 den 6 oktober 1939 från major Lindqvist till C Fst/und, angående avtalet och Rapport no. 27/1939 den 18 oktober 1939 angående marschordningen.

³⁸ Fst/und, 202:3, El:2 vol 4, Rapport no. 28/1939 den 19 oktober 1939 från major Lindqvist till C Fst/und, om norra kolonnen, och Rapport no. 30/1939 den 24 oktober 1939 om den södra kolonnen.

³⁹ Fst/und, 202:3, El:2 vol 4, Rapport no. 32/1939 den 26 oktober 1939 från major Lindqvist till C Fst/und, s. 2–3.

⁴⁰ Fst/und, 202:3, El:2 vol 4, Meddelande no. 139/1939 den 10 oktober 1939 från major Lindqvist till C Fst/und, s. 2–3.

⁴¹ Leonas Sabaliūnas, *Lithuania in Crisis: Nationalism to Communism 1939–1940* (Bloomington 1972).

⁴² Lars Ericson (Wolke), "Buffert eller hot? De baltiska staterna i svensk militär planering år 1940", i Bo Hugemark (red.), *I orkanens öga: 1941 – osäker neutralitet* (Hallstavik 2002), pp. 128–132.

⁴³ Max Engman, "Imperieupplösningar..." (1994), pp. 272–275.

⁴⁴ Hobsbawm (2004), pp. 110–113 & 116.

⁴⁵ Fst/und, Polen, 202:3 El:13 vol. 2, Rapport no. 5/1938 den 19 februari 1938 från major Torén till C Försvarsdepartementet.

⁴⁶ Fst/und, Polen, 202:3 EIII:13 vol. 1, Överstelöjtnant vid Kungl. Signalregementet S. E. R. Wallmans rapport över studier inom polska och finska arméerna anbefallda genom generalorder 702/1937 den 29 november 1937, s. 1–2.

⁴⁷ Fst/und, Polen, 202:3 EIII:13 vol. 1, Överstelöjtnant vid Kungl. Signalregementet S. E. R. Wallmans rapport över studier inom polska och finska arméerna anbefallda genom generalorder 702/1937 den 29 november 1937, s. 3.

⁴⁸ Fst/und, Polen, 202:3 EIII:13 vol. 1, Överste Falk vid I 12 rapport över genom generalorder 2052/1937 anbefalld tjänstgöring i polska armén odaterad, s. 1 & 2.

⁴⁹ Fst/und, Polen, 202:3 EI:13 vol. 2, Rapport no. 23 den 3 December 1938 från major Torén till C Försvarsdepartementet och EI:13 vol. 3 Rapport no. 19 den 10 Maj 1939 från major de Laval till C Försvarsdepartementet.

⁵⁰ Fst/und, Polen, 202:3 EI:13 vol. 3 Rapport no. 32 den 18 juli 1939 från major de Laval till C Försvarsdepartementet.

⁵¹ Fst/und, Polen, 202:3 EI:13 vol. 1, Inkommen rapport den 3 november 1937 från major Torén till C Fst/und och EI:13 vol. 2, Rapport no. 11/1938 den 14 mars 1938 från major Torén till C Försvarsdepartementet.

⁵² Palmer (1970), p. 224.

⁵³ Fst/und, Polen, 203:3 EI:13 vol. 1, Rapport no. 33 den 15 juli 1937 från major Torén till C Försvarsdepartementet.

⁵⁴ Fst/und, Polen, 203:3 EIII: 13 vol. 1, Löjtnant Nils Stahres I 15 rapport över tjänstgöring vid polska pansarvapnet jämlikt generalorder no. 344/1937.

⁵⁵ Fst/und, Polen, 203:3 EIII: 13 vol. 1, Kapten Carl Bergströms rapport över tjänstgöring vid polska flygvapnet 15/11 – 4/12 1937 odaterad.

⁵⁶ Böhme (1982).

⁵⁷ Fst/und, Polen, 203:3 EIII:13 vol. 1, Rapport över studier inom polska armén 1. – 21. juli 1938 av Överste H. Kellgren enligt generalorder 770/1938, s. 6.

⁵⁸ Fst/und, Polen, 202:3 EIII: 13 vol. 3, Rapport no. 37/1939 den 28 augusti 1939, från major de Laval till C Försvarsdepartementet.

⁵⁹ Eellend (2013).

⁶⁰ Eriksson (2004), Gerdner (1946) and Schüllerqvist (1992).

⁶¹ Gst/utr, Finland, 200 Ela:33, Meddelande no. 49 den 3 april 1936 från major Tengberg till C Gst/utr.

⁶² Gst/utr, Finland, 200 Ela:33, Meddelande no. 65 den 2 maj 1936 från major Tengberg till C Gst/utr, s. 3.

⁶³ Exempelvis Gst/utr, Reserapporter, Elg:118, Reserapport av Kaptenen vid I 16 B.V. Hjärne jämlikt generalorder 1016/1933 med rapport över utrikesstudier den 13 november 1933, s. 7. Hjärne är dock inte negativ till de finska soldaterna tvärt om men har grundförståelsen att svenskar är mer intelligenta och bättre skickade att styra.

⁶⁴ Exempelvis Gst/utr, Reserapporter, Elg:120, Reserapport av Tf Chefen I 14 Överste Ehrenborg och förste läraren vid SS, majoren i armén, kaptenen vid I 2 Ekström med rapport över tjänstgöring utom riket den 14 februari 1935, s. 30–31.

⁶⁵ Gst/utr, Finland, 200 Ela:34, Meddelande no. 111 den 17 september 1936 från major Tengberg till C Gst/utr, s. 2.

⁶⁶ Gst/utr, Finland, 200 Ela:34, Rapport Litt. no. S. 40 den 1 juli 1936 från major Tengberg till C Utrikesdepartementet om motorisering, Elg:119, Reserapport av kaptenen vid Flygvapnet J.E.R. Stenbeck jämlikt generalorder F 168/1933 med underdånig rapport över kommendering vid Finlands flygstidskrafter den 1 juli 1934. Stenbeck var som redan nämnts en av de mer hyllade flygvapenofficerarna under 1930-talet.

(Re)Constructing Russian Soft Power in Post-Soviet Region *

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*“Russia and the Russian world should be vivid and compelling.
Knowing Russian should be fashionable and useful.
Russia and the Russian world should represent
a plan for the future, not a memory of the past.”*

**- Vyacheslav Nikonov, Executive Director, Russkiy Mir Foundation
(Mir means Community, Peace, World.)**

Contemporary Russian intellectuals and political leaders have been chasing the dream of a great nation since the collapse of the Soviet Union (Tsygankov, 2007). This collapse was described by President Vladimir Putin as a major geopolitical disaster of the century and in his Presidential Annual Address Putin explained why he considered this to be a disaster of such an importance: [...] *for the Russian nation, it became a genuine drama [...], because [...] the epidemic of disintegration infected Russia [...]* (Address, 2005). For decades of the Cold War Russia had represented itself as the center of gravity of the communist ideology in the bipolar world, but all integrating forces of this communist world order evaporated together with the implosion of the Soviet Union. Not only was the new state of Russian Federation deprived of the Soviet Union's – what Joseph Nye (1990) would call – soft power potential, it had to face disintegration from within. When in 2000 Vladimir Putin took office, his primary task was to take control of the political situation in the country and, with the help of authoritarian methods, he managed to do so quite effectively in very limited time. This strengthened Russia not just from within, it gave confidence to its traditional diplomacy which was strongly tied to such hard power resources as gas, oil and

* This article is the product of a Russian studies project financed by the Lithuanian Council of Science

military might. From the *realpolitik* point of view, Russia under Vladimir Putin managed to get control of the situation in most of the post-Soviet region, and the outcome of 2008 Russian-Georgian War is a good illustration of that. But the Kremlin is still haunted by the dream of a great nation, a dream which should be shared not only by Russian society but by neighbors in the post-Soviet region as well. Since the concept of soft power entered the Russian political discourse it could be called a dream to finally find an effective soft power vision, one that would make contemporary Russia attractive to the world. This strong yearning is represented in the recent speech of Vladimir Putin during his meeting with the Russian ambassadors working abroad:

“our diplomats are well versed in the traditional and familiar methods of international relations, if not masters in this field, but as far as using new methods goes, ‘soft power’ methods, for example, there is still much to reflect on” (Speech, 2012).

The focus of this article is the Russian quest for a soft power vision in the post-Soviet region in the past two decades (1990-2010). Russia’s (re)construction of this power will be analyzed through several perspectives: first, different competing strategies of Russian soft power will be presented and compared; second, the activities of different governmental and non-governmental institutions engaged in implementing it in the region will be analyzed; third, documents dealing with Russian soft power will be looked at. This will help better understand the past, present and future thinking of the Russian government about how Russian soft power should be employed in the post-Soviet region. This research combines discourse and policy analyses. This approach helps to reveal the dominant Russian view towards soft power policy in the region and its competing alternatives; to disclose the struggles between expert and policy/decision-making groups which propagate different visions of this power for Russia; to demonstrate the Russian institutional potential for such policies and to what extent this administrative resource is used, and how it is reformed by the Russian government. This approach allows us to speak about the potential consequences of Russian soft power policies for the post-

Soviet region. It gives a critical context for better understanding the new foreign policy initiatives of Vladimir Putin.

Russia's search for its soft power vision can be divided into two distinct time periods. During the first decade democratic processes, although facing enormous obstacles and setbacks, slowly took hold in Russia and encouraged Western sympathies. But at the same time, one must stress that the enormous Soviet administrative public diplomacy resource was slowly degrading. Once very effective institutions froze their activities. This was due to a paradigm shift in the Russian foreign policy thinking-- from the center of attraction for Communist ideological sympathizers into something new. The decade was marked by the quest of Russian experts and politicians for this "something new". The intellectual debate about the future of Russian integration strategies that took place during Yeltsin's rule is especially important because it was at this time that the ideas about the Russian World were first formulated first and the concept developed for later practical implementation.

The second time period, the years 2000-2010, could be described as the decade of Putin's reign (which included Medvedev's presidency). This is where Joseph Nye's concept of soft power enters the Russian academic and political discourse. During this period the practical implementation of sometimes conflicting strategies for the new Russian soft power vision took place. This was due to competition between different political and intellectual groups, governmental institutions and personalities (M. Kolerov vs. V. Nikonov). But by the end of the second decade one can observe a political consolidation under one general soft power vision, the core of which is represented by the Russian World concept. This is especially evident after two policy documents were drafted: the *Russian Foreign Policy Review* (2007) and the *Russian Foreign Policy Concept* (2008) which incorporated the notion of humanitarian tools into the Russian foreign policy discourse.

This article will examine in detail the competing Russian soft power visions: from the geo-economical concept of the "Russian World" presented by the Piotr Schedrovicki and Efim Ostrovski group to the idea of "transnational corporation Russia" put forward by the duo of Gleb Pavlovski and Sergey Chernishov, which are concepts of antifascism and sovereign democracy. This will help to put the

contemporary idea of the Russian World—that today dominates the Russian establishment’s thinking about soft power-- into a critical perspective.

The article follows the evolution of different institutions that deal with soft power issues. Special attention is given to the fact that the modern Russian Federation inherited vast public diplomacy resources which could be described as the institutional soft power resource of the Soviet Union. Much of its potential was lost during the Yeltsin years, but now more and more “old” institutions are being reformed and much is borrowed from the past experience of the All-Soviet Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries (VOKS) and the Union of Soviet Societies for Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries (SSOD). This is especially interesting because the implementation of new ideas about Russian soft power is sometimes delegated to institutions and people with a strong legacy of the Soviet Union’s foreign policy experience. This link with the past is especially evident in the activities of Roszarubezcentr, which was (re)established in 1994 and later reorganized into Rossotrudichestvo. Additionally, the article will focus on the establishment and activities of two important institutions that were given the task of increasing the Russian soft power influence in the post-Soviet region: the Presidential Administration’s Department for Interregional and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries and the Russian World Foundation. Special attention is focused on the role of the Russian Orthodox Church in developing and spreading the Russian World concept as the spiritual center of integration for the region. The article also deals with how the soft power dimension of Russian foreign policy in the post-Soviet region is represented in official documents and strategies. Specific attention will be given to the concept of humanitarian tools of Russian foreign policy in the region as a means to turn the new soft power vision into practice.

The Golden age of Soviet Soft Power

Ever since Joseph Nye (1990) coined the concept of soft power it attracted the attention of academic community and foreign policy practitioners. In the West it soon became a norm (and fashion) to use and misuse this idea in academic and foreign policy discussions:

“In the ensuing years, I have been pleased to see the concept enter the public discourse, used by the American Secretary of State, the British Foreign Minister, political leaders, and editorial writers as well as academics around the world” (2004, p. XI)

However it is important to note that during Yeltsin’s presidency this trend did not enter the Russian academic and policy discourse. Only in 2004, when Joseph Nye developed his concept further in the book *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* did Russia experts – working in the West and not in the Russian academia – started to speak about the potential of soft power in Russia. One of the first of these scholars was Fiona Hill (2004) who was followed by Andrei P. Tsygankov (2006) who did considerable research on Russian soft power. Both authors started to consider the benefits of the recently developed idea of soft power to understand contemporary Russian foreign policy. They saw the Russian energy and economic policies through the prism of Joseph Nye’s concept. They presented a broad interpretation and included means of economic pressure – which under traditional thinking would be part of hard power – as an example of Russian soft power. At the same time the social-political changes that swept across Georgia in 2003 and the Ukraine in 2004 made Russian experts and politicians consider the idea of soft power even more seriously. This Western concept received considerable negative publicity in the Russian media and academic environment, but at the same time it was stressed that Russia had to catch up with such Western power strategies in the post-Soviet region and use them effectively to counter foreign influences (see Kapa-Myрза, 2005).

The late arrival of Joseph Nye’s idea to Russian academic and public discussions, and the general negative reaction to the Rose and Orange revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine that were considered to be inspired by Western soft power practices, made the concept of soft power somewhat *alien* and *hostile* in the Russian discourse. It was alien because it had American origins and was viewed as benefiting American interests (see ПАВЛОВСКИЙ, 2009). It was hostile because, at worst, it was seen as targeting the Russian society and, at best, as competing with Russia for influence in the post-Soviet region (see Kapa-Myрза, 2005). Therefore, it is paradoxical when Russian politicians and experts say that

Russia is lagging behind in the use of soft power, which they see in a negative light, and stress the need to catch up and include this new tool in Russia's foreign policy toolbox.

But is this really a new foreign policy tool that Russian politicians have yet to master and experts yet to comprehend? Does this mean that during Yeltsin's presidency there were no attempts by the Russian government to, "get what it wants through attraction rather than coercion and payments" (Nye, 2004, p. X)? Indeed, those well versed in the foreign policy practices of the Soviet Union could say that such contemporary Russian discussions about the importance of soft power is like redefining a wheel because the Soviet Union was a soft superpower in the Cold War. Joseph Nye himself pointed to the fact that the Soviet Union had an enormous potential to attract and was America's primary competitor in the realm of soft power (2004, p. 73) partly because of the appeal of Communist ideology and the legacy of fighting fascism in Europe, and partly because the Soviet Union positioned itself in opposition to Capitalism, Imperialism, Colonialism and to many other negatively perceived Isms. One might note that the Soviet Union had created an enormous institutional machine to spread its ideology. At the time such a policy was not defined by Joseph Nye's terms, instead it had other names: ideological struggle (*идеологическая борьба*) or propaganda and agitation (*пропаганда и агитация*):

Ideological struggle for the hearts and minds of billions of people around the planet is taking place. And the future of mankind depends on the outcome of this ideological struggle. (Стукалин, 1983, p.7)

From the very beginning the leaders of the Soviet Union paid special attention to Soviet ideological attractiveness abroad. This was an enormously important tool in the foreign policy toolbox even among competing Soviet ideological trends. Lev Trotsky encouraged it for the benefit of spreading "permanent revolution" throughout the world, and Nikolai Bukharin held it important for showing the world the benefits of Stalin's socialism in one country. This was done by using propaganda and agitation. Frederick C. Barghoorn draws parallels between Communist propaganda and agitation and the religious propaganda of

the Catholic Church. A few intelligent and dedicated individuals could be *converted* to “correct” Marxist-Leninist ideology and later they could do agitation work amongst the masses (1964, p. 12). When Pope Gregory XV established *Sacra congregatio christiano nomini propaganda* – a congregation for evangelization and to counter the spread of reformation – he specifically saw it as a two-step process. First, missionaries had to be prepared in the *Collegium Urbanum* and only later would they go abroad to evangelize the unconverted. In the Soviet Union communist ideology became a substitute of religion to which the *unconverted* could be drawn to. This process of ideological conversion through propaganda was especially important for the Soviet Union because, as Frederick C. Barghoorn puts it, it produced revolutionaries that were determined to change their respective social and political environment to suit Soviet interests (1964, p. 16). The existence of strong ideology that suggested common future and a specific social, political or economic project – even such a utopian one as Communist society – is enormously important for success. For more than a decade after the collapse of Soviet Union contemporary Russia lacked such an ideological base for its soft power vision, until it started concentrating on the idea of the Russian World.

Gintautas Mažeikis (2010, p. 247) summarizes the structure of Soviet propaganda and agitation in this way: first, long term ideological work which consisted of fixed elements (Marx’s, Lenin’s, Stalin’s works) and flexible elements (based on the decisions of the Communist Party congresses); second, thematic propaganda campaigns which continued for several years or decades and were tied to a specific political, social or economic context (e.g. ban the bomb, no to apartheid, yes to the peace movement, etc.); and finally, specific practical “micropropaganda” work by specialists on ground taking into account the local environment. The importance of ideology for the success of propaganda and agitation is evident. The other important assets are institutional capacities and human resources.

Throughout the Cold War, the Soviet Union was a global power because it was able to control the political environment and the behavior

of others not just with the help of military or economic pressure, but also by employing an enormous institutional propaganda machine to spread the Soviet values and propagate the Soviet worldview. First of all, Soviet leaders used the network of Communist parties and movements around the world under the flagship of the Comintern which was established in 1919. Later, it was succeeded by the Cominform which existed until 1956. This experience of international Communist organizations and popular front movements was transformed in 1958 into the Union of Soviet Societies for Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries (SSOD), created as a successor to the All-Soviet Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries (VOKS). The work done by the network of friendship and cultural organizations had a fixed ideological agenda, but was flexible on specific topics and themes: during the Comintern years it was mainly “the union of international proletariat and the spread of socialism”; before and after World War II the topics focused on the fight against “fascists and warmongers”, later, on the Soviet struggle against “colonialism and discrimination” and on “peace, democracy and socialism”. Experts on the Soviet Union defined this as semantic adaptiveness (Barghoorn, 1964, p. 29): the “proletariat and working class” in later propaganda messages was turned into the “people masses or peace-loving people” and still later into a simple and catch-all “the people”. Such semantic adaptiveness can be found even through the Gorbachev’s policies of “perestroika” and “glasnost”. This entire ideological struggle against the Capitalist block was orchestrated by experienced specialists from the International Section of Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party.

Soviet experience shows how important the ideological base and the effective network of institutions are for a country’s ability to attract. The collapse of the Soviet Union came together with the collapse of Communist ideology. Russia lost its global soft power reach and since then is searching for such an integrating ideology not just on the global, but even on the regional – post-Soviet – scale.

Yeltsin's Decade: the ideology vacuum in Russian foreign policy in the post-Soviet region

In the beginning of the 1990s Russia not only lost the integrating ideology of the Communist utopia, but the institutional potential of the Soviet Union's public diplomacy was slowly degrading as well. This was due to the objective reality of lack of funds and the pressing problems that Russian leaders had to face internally as the first priority. Only several years later it became evident to the Russian government that the country was losing the competitive advantage of the Soviet Union's soft power experience and practices. In 1993 President Yeltsin signed a decree on Russian centers of science and culture abroad, which specifically stated the need to "preserve the system of Soviet cultural centers and Soviet houses of science and culture abroad and on this basis to develop a unified Russian policy of humanitarian, cultural, scientific and informational relationships with the foreign countries" (Order, 1993). A year later this task was given to Roszarubezcentr which in 1994 became a successor to the SSOD and VOKS. However, it is important to note that such humanitarian relations of Roszarubezcentr with foreign countries excluded the countries of the post-Soviet region.

During the Soviet era, Russia became a global power with global ideological aspirations and with institutions and human resources to implement this. The geopolitical drama for Russia during Yeltsin's presidency was that the country not only lost its global reach, but had to find its regional identity with attractive ideology and foreign policy capabilities. Therefore, in order for such political projects as the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), or foreign policy concepts as the "near abroad" and the "compatriots policy" to be attractive to post-Soviet societies in the long term, they first of all had to be based on an attractive ideology and supported by effective institutional capabilities. One has to admit that this was a Sisyphean task for the Yeltsin administration, not just because it concentrated on internal, not external, political and economic challenges, but because at the time it was following the Western path of democratization. In other words, the Russian political elite in the beginning of the nineties did not need an alternative ideology for the post-Soviet region because they themselves

were attracted by Western soft power – the vision of a liberal democratic Russia being part of the Western community. The first half of that decade was a period of westernizers in Russian foreign policy; this trend is represented by Andrey Kozyrev as foreign minister up until 1996. As Andrey P. Tsygankov puts it “[this school of thought] argues for the “natural” affinity of their country with the West based on such shared values as democracy, human rights, and a free market, [...] vision of “integration” and “strategic partnership with the West” assumed that Russia would develop liberal democratic institutions and build a market economy after the manner of the West” (2007, p. 380).

This initial alliance with the West did not mean that *realpolitik* thinking was gone from the contemporary Russian foreign policy discourse. In such an analytical establishment as the Council for Foreign and Defence Policy (SVOP), which was created in 1992 by prominent Russian political scientists, security and foreign policy experts, there were discussions about how to maintain Russia’s influence in the post-Soviet region. In 1992 the *Diplomaticheskii Vestnik* (magazine of the Russian MFA) put forward an article by Sergey Karaganov – one of the founders and a longtime chairman of SVOP – in which he encouraged to use Russian *compatriots* who after the collapse of the Soviet Union ended up in the *near abroad* --and to turn them into a foreign policy tool in the post-Soviet region. This idea later became known as the Karaganov Doctrine. It is important to stress that this doctrine was not based on integrating the soft power idea, but instead was based on the pure interest of keeping Russian influence in the near abroad. It had to be done not by promoting the return of Russian speakers to Russia, but by facilitating through all means their stay in the near abroad with the hope of using them as a tool for implementing Russia’s interests in the post-Soviet region. Even more, the Russian government saw itself as legal heir to the USSR and began a policy of advocating the rights of compatriots. This mimicked the tactics of the Soviet Union when its leaders would reply to any Western criticism with a “What about...” --the apartheid in South Africa; or jailed trade-unionists; or the Contras in Nicaragua, and so on. This kind of Soviet policy was labelled as “whataboutism” by Edward Lucas (2008). Contemporary Russian “whataboutism” made a semantic adaptation of such Soviet tactics and, when faced with

criticism, started focusing on the rights of Russian speakers, for example in the Baltic States.

Although without a distinct integrating ideology, the idea of using compatriots in the near abroad was borrowed from the Soviet experience of network organizations, such as VOKS or SSOD. It was all about talent spotting and the creation and support of a new NGO network.

Gregory Feifer stated that SVOP “was instrumental in the ouster of pro-Western former Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev in 1996 and the installation of Primakov in his place, ending a brief diplomatic honeymoon with the West” (2002). On the other hand, as Andrey P. Tsygankov said, new foreign minister Yevgeni Primakov made an ideological U-turn: “He thought of Russia as part of Eurasian, rather than European, continent [...]; his civilizational priorities included the restoration of Russia’s great power status and dominance in the former Soviet region, more restrained relations with the West, and strengthening of ties with non-Western nations” (2007, p. 377). Such geopolitical ambition needed an ideology that would be an alternative to the Western one for the post-Soviet region. Apart from the change of leadership in the Russian foreign policy establishment, two important events happened, which significantly pushed Russian political experts towards a search of an alternative ideology. First, in 1998 Russia had to face a serious financial crisis which became a final blow to the confidence of society and the political elite in liberal economic and social reforms. Second, the NATO led military campaign in Kosovo targeted a historical Russian ally, Serbia, and was perceived as unilateral action against the Russian interests in the very heart of Europe. It put under question Russia’s affinity with the West. Kiril Rogov’s interview about the people behind the media project Polit.ru is a good illustration of the disillusionment of the intellectuals during the Kosovo crisis. He speaks about how Modest Kolerov – who later went to work for the Putin administration – came to Polit.ru as a liberal, then gradually shifted towards the right, and during the Kosovo crisis became a vocal anti-American Slavophile (Porob, 2012).

The change of direction under Yevgeni Primakov, the financial crisis of 1998, and the NATO led operation in Kosovo created a

favorable situation for discussions on alternative ideas and foreign policy strategies in the post-Soviet region. There were many think tanks and expert communities which started to rethink Russian Western orientation, but amongst those were two significant groups (politechnologists and public relations practitioners) which chose to concentrate on the vague idea of “Russianness” or the “Russian World” and its applicability to the Russian foreign policy in the post-Soviet region. This idea became the central soft power theme during Putin’s presidency, therefore it is important to understand its sources.

The first group of experts was related to the magazine “So-obshenye” which specializes on politechnological and PR topics. Later they established the project “Russian Archipelago”¹ which by its name represents the core ideas of those authors: archipelago is an interconnected chain of islands which can be united not just geographically, but politically, socially and culturally as well. The initiators of the “Russian Archipelago” called it the social networking project of the “Russian World”. The most prominent in this group are Piotr Shchedrovitsky and Efim Ostrovsky. At the end of the nineties, these authors described their vision of an integrating Russian Word, which could be summarized in this way:

1. There is equal number of “Russians” outside and inside the borders of modern Russia;
2. The core of the Russian World concept is the Russian language;
3. “To speak Russian” is “to think Russian”, and this means “to act Russian”;
4. Humanitarian tools should be used to facilitate the Russian World concept.

In his article “Humanitarian tools and real politics” Piotr Shchedrovitsky (2000) argued for a constructivist approach. He said that integrating political concepts could be created with the help of humanitarian tools, the media and public relations, and in the end they would have real political consequences. He, together with Efim Ostrovsky, saw the Russian World as a geo-economical political concept that could be an attractive alternative for the post-Soviet region. As the Russian Archipelago declares:

“The Russian World became an environment for humanitarian-technological projects of Piotr Shchedrovitsky’s cultural school and the Ostrovsky Group” (Павлов, 2004)

The other group of intellectuals that influenced the concept of the Russian World worked together on publishing a book series of Russian philosophy and political thought called “Inoye”. Later they established the internet project “Russian Journal”². This group is best represented by the duo of Gleb Pavlovski and Sergey Chernishov. They supplemented the Russian World concept of the above mentioned intellectual group by putting forward an idea of “transnational Russia”. For Gleb Pavlovski and Sergey Chernishov the most important aspect of the Russian World was its networked nature and interconnectivity, and the Russian language together with internet technologies became a basis for that. The input to the Russian World concept of this duo could be summarized as follows:

1. They presented the idea of “New Transnational Russian“, borrowing it from the concept of transnational corporations which spread their activities throughout the world but were closely interconnected at the same time;
2. They viewed the Russian World as a very modern concept that should be based on internet technologies and social networking projects.

Probably for the first time during this decade, Russian compatriots were no longer viewed as a mere tool of Russian pressure in the post-Soviet region. Experts started to think how to curry favor with members of the Russian diasporas and how to make them Russia’s soft power emissaries. The next Russian leader had to think how the Russian World could be effectively put into practice using NGO’s, embassies, websites, and a network of organizations promoting Russian language and culture.

Putin’s Decade: Russian World – A New Soft Power Vision for the Post-Soviet Region

During the decade of Vladimir Putin’s reign (including Dmitry Medvedev’s presidential term), as Andrey P. Tsygankov puts it, “the

Kremlin has overcome many of its weaknesses of the 1990s and reached consensus on some principal objectives of Russia's foreign policy, such as the preservation of Russia's global influence and its status as a regional great power" (2010, p. 44). After 2000 Russian leadership managed to consolidate the internal political situation and started to orientate its attention outwards – to foreign policy strategies in the post-Soviet region. Some think that this comeback had nothing to do with soft power strategy:

„As the West turned to climate and hunger, as it celebrated "soft power" and the cracking of sovereignty under the hammer blows of humanitarianism, Putin went back to "hard" power, using gas to cow his neighbors from the Baltics via Belarus to the Ukraine, and tanks to reconquer what he claims is rightfully his.” (Newsweek, 2008)

Anders Aslund adds to this: “in the former Soviet Union, almost all countries are seeking trade and security with anyone but Russia, because Putin is using all sticks and no carrots” (2012). But this is an extreme point of view that represents part of the reality. Even accepting that Vladimir Putin is highly effective in the use of hard power in the post-Soviet region, one has to recall that Joseph Nye once said that some “may be attracted to other by hard power, by the myth of invincibility and inevitability” (2004, p. 9). This is especially true for the post-Soviet countries that have a legacy of authoritarian leadership, where significant parts of society feel nostalgia for the “Soviet greatness” – which now they associate with Russia – and long for a strong authoritarian leader – which now they associate with Vladimir Putin. In other words, hard power can be attractive for some as well. The Soviet hard power myth of invincibility and inevitability can be associated with Putin's Russia and can be used in foreign policy.

The above mentioned authors are only partly right in evaluating the Russian comeback because Russia under Vladimir Putin strengthened its position not only with the help of hard power, but by reconsidering its soft power strategies in the post-Soviet region as well. Joseph Nye stated that soft power is difficult to master because the resources are outside the government control and in the end it has indirect impact

(2004, p. 17). But after Vladimir Putin started to implement the “power vertical” concept in practice the question of control became secondary for the soft power strategy. The prime question became the question of ideology. Vladimir Putin brought in the ideology behind the Russian soft power and this is specifically what foreign policy practices in the post-Soviet region lacked during the Yeltsin years. Already in 2001 Vladimir Putin stated:

“The notion Russian World has from time immemorial extended far beyond the geographical boundaries of Russia and even far beyond the boundaries of the Russian ethnos. [...] Tens of millions of people speaking, thinking and, perhaps, more important - feeling Russian live outside the Russian Federation.” (Speech, 2001)

It is clear that Vladimir Putin’s idea of the Russian World borrows significantly from Piotr Schedrovicki’s, Efim Ostrovski and Gleb Pavlovski’s, Sergey Chernishov’s understanding of this concept. After it became clear that there is an urgent need for ideology behind the Russian soft power, the other important question was whether it was possible to use the institutions, organizations and the concepts that were created or emerged naturally during Yeltsin’s decade for implementing this new soft power vision. Gleb Pavlovski, who under Vladimir Putin became one of the most influential politologists in the Kremlin, when taking up his job said that,

„Russia is doing a revision of its foreign policy in the post-Soviet region and of its foreign policy tools. The concept of the “near abroad” is left behind and is totally dead; one cannot expect any attempts to revive it. The concept of the “near abroad” was the very reason [...] behind the primitivization of Russian politics in the post-Soviet region. [...] Today the topic of the “near abroad” is not valid.” (Павловский, 2005)

The primitive – in Pavlovski’s terms – use of the “near abroad” and the “compatriots” concepts during the previous decade could have corrupted Russia’s soft power prospects for years to come. As Joseph Nye puts it, the effectiveness of soft power is affected in positive or negative ways by a host of non-state actors within and outside the country (2004, p. 98). For many years a network of compatriot organizations acted in the post-Soviet region without any clear unified

ideology and vision, and in this way could have contributed in creating a disabling environment for future Russian soft power policies. Based on Enri-East research (project funded by the European Commission and in Lithuania implemented by the Lithuanian Social Research Center, Vilnius), Vadim Smirnov concluded (2012) that Russians in the post-Soviet region, especially in the Baltic States, sometimes identify themselves more with Europe than with motherland Russia. Baltic Russians are more mobile in the direction of Europe than in the Eastern direction. The legacy of Karaganov's doctrine, the ideological disorganization of compatriot organizations and the lack of a unified integrating vision, particularly for Baltic Russians, has made the European soft power an attractive option. In other words, after the Yeltsin decade, Russian compatriots in the post-Soviet region shifted from being a Russian foreign policy tool to becoming a target for the new soft power strategy. Before concentrating on the ideology of the Russian World, it is important to follow the steps the Kremlin took that led to this new soft power strategy.

After Vladimir Putin came to power he first had to fill the internal ideological vacuum. Gleb Pavlovski says (2005) that his first task was to reconstruct Russia itself, its identity, and later to work on Russia's external ideology and its future soft power vision. On this external dimension Andrey P. Tsygankov associates Vladimir Putin, and Gleb Pavlovski, with the Euro-East ideological trend in foreign policy (2007). On the ideological spectrum, he places Putin between Kozirev's Westernizers and Primakov's Eurasianists. It means that Putin's foreign policy had to represent European and Eastern ideas at the same time.

Gleb Pavlovski, when discussing Russian future foreign policy with Stanislav Belkovski, labelled the ideological dimension representing Europeaness simply as antifascism:

"Russia really is an empire, but I would like to remind that since the 20th century it has been an antifascist empire. And this is enormously important to us. We want to preserve this antifascist, in essence, European quality" (2005).

Such an ideology helps modern Russia under Vladimir Putin to present itself as the “true Europe” (in contrast to the “false Europe”, which is represented by the new EU member states accused by the Kremlin of past collaborations with the fascist regime and revisions of World War II) and relate to the core European values. Antifascism becomes not only the center of the internal Russian identity building strategies, but also an essentially European part of its foreign policy ideology. This theme becomes a central issue around 2004-2005 (during the celebration of the 60th anniversary of Victory Day) in domestic politics as well as in Russian foreign policy in the post-Soviet region and has stayed on top of the agenda until now. However, such an approach is like a dual edged sword because it balances on the same dividing lines as the concept of “new vs. old Europe.” This ideology may be attractive to Western Europe, but it alienates Eastern Europe, which in the Russian foreign policy discourse becomes the “other” to the community of “true antifascist Europeans”.

The idea of “sovereign democracy”, on the other hand, fits in the Eastern spectrum of the Euro-East ideological trend. This idea allows defining countries which are attracted by the European soft power and strive for Western integration as “guided democracies” – the same label given by Andrei Okara to the Yeltsin period:

“Sources of our legitimacy are found in Russia, not in the West, like it was during the ‘guided democracy’ of the Yeltsin era.” (2007)

“Sovereign democracy” becomes an attractive concept for authoritarian leaders throughout the world, trying to neutralize external influences (as well as internal civil pressure for change). In Russia this idea became very important during and after the Rose and Orange revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine. The paradox is that today contemporary Russia, with its concept of “sovereign democracy”, connects itself to such leaders as Syria’s Bashar al-Assad and finds allies amongst the autocrats in the Asian part of the post-Soviet region. This fits the Eastern trend because it represents Eastern autocratic political culture. That is why “sovereign democracy” as ideological base behind

Putin's soft power attracts some political elites, but alienates the post-Soviet societies facing autocratic regimes.

Antifascism and sovereign democracy had a dual use: they helped Kremlin in its internal identity building strategies and became the ideological base behind the new soft power vision. However, for Vladimir Putin the most promising ideology for soft power in the post-Soviet region became the Russian World concept. The Russian President declared his support for the idea of the Russian World during the congress of Russian compatriots in 2001. The previous intellectual debates about the Russian World received a new inspiration. Gleb Pavlovski's group developed the idea further, this time from the Kremlin's insider position. The Russian World, over several years, became a more coherent concept.

There are different ways to define it, but in the context of soft power it is important to point out the following three aspects of this idea: (1) the geography of the Russian World; (2) the language of the Russian World (3) the religion of the Russian World. First of all, the term geography is very conditional because the whole idea of the Russian World is about transcending geographical barriers. The Russian World could be interpreted globally referring to all Russians scattered around the world, but that is only partly true. The center of the Russian World is the three Slavic nations of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. It could be called the integrating core of the Russian World. The "union of the three" historically is even referred to as the Holy Union:

"The core of the Russian World today is Russia, Ukraine and Belarus," as Saint Lawrence from Chernihiv said. "Russia, Ukraine and Belarus – it is all Holy Rus" (Kirill, 2009).

The language and the religion of the Russian World have become the factors that make it possible to enlarge the territory of this concept and stretch it to the maximum. The role of the language can be described in the words of famous Russian etymologist Oleg Trubachiov from his 1992 book "In search of unity" published just after the collapse of Soviet Union:

"It is time to remind us all, who are dulled by the economic difficulties of our time, that material collapse of Soviet Union does not imply that the collapse is total and irreversible, because, I dare to say, it did not touch the best and the strongest link of this union – to which I relate professionally – this is the union of language" (Масленникова, 2007).

The metaphor of “the union of Russian language” has an especially strong soft power potential because it attracts all Russian speakers to the Russian World despite their nationality. The Russian language becomes the glue for contemporary politechnologists which allows take the pieces of the post-Soviet region and stick them together. The third important aspect of the Russian World is the role of the Orthodox Church. When the idea of the Russian World was debated just amongst intellectuals and experts at the end of the Yeltsin decade, it did not show much prospects for the future. Things changed when Vladimir Putin decided to use this concept in the public and political discourse during his presidency. However, it is important to stress that the idea of the Russian World got an enormously strong boost when the Russian Orthodox Church decided to join in. Patriarch Kirill in the Third Assembly of the Russian World proposed to use the term “Russian world country” (страна русского мира):

“The term 'a Russian world country' could be introduced into usage. It would mean that a country sees itself as part of the Russian world, if it uses Russian as the language of international communication, promotes the Russian culture, and preserves the general historical memory.”(2009)

In his speech at the Assembly, the Patriarch suggested to add Moldova to the list of the countries of the Russian World. One of the strongest religious and spiritual interpretations of the Russian World by Patriarch Kirill came in 2010. During his meeting with a journalist from the Ukraine he said that the spiritual union and common culture is “the main criteria for distinguishing good from evil” (Kirill, 2010). Such emotional and spiritual description by the head of the Orthodox Church concluded the formation of the Russian World as an ideology for Russia’s soft power in the post-Soviet region.

Another important factor for the success of Putin's new soft power vision is the resources behind the new ideology, which include institutions and specific foreign policy tools. It was clear to Kremlin's politechnologists that compatriot organizations and their Moscow-based umbrella institutions from the Yeltsin era needed a considerable reshuffle. Therefore, in 2005 Vladimir Putin appointed Modest Kolerov – who came to Kremlin from Gleb Pavlovski's environment of politechnologists – to head a newly formed Department for Interregional and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries at the Administration of the President of the Russian Federation. Surprisingly, under the guidance of Modest Kolerov, the Russian foreign policy in the post-Soviet region stood in total contradiction to the Western idea of soft power. Up until 2007, when Vladimir Putin sacked Modest Kolerov from his post, the Kremlin's policy in the region can be defined as battles of information wars. This may be partly due to the personal character of the first head of this presidential department and, partly, because Modest Kolerov chose to implement policies based on the ideology of antifascism rather than the Russian World. Therefore, in 2007 came another important institutional reshuffle when the Russian World Foundation, headed by Viachiaslav Nikonov, was established. Viacheslav Nikonov, who comes from the intellectual and politechnological background of SVOP which was especially active during the Yeltsin era, chose a softer strategy corresponding to the Western understanding of soft power, but – what is even more important – his foundation devoted its activities entirely to the practical implementation of the Russian World ideology. To add to the institutional soft power capacities, Roszarubezcentr was reorganized into Rossotrudnichistvo in 2008 and in 2012 it got Konstantin Kosachev – a vocal supporter of soft power strategies – as a new head of the institution which proudly relates its history to the activities of Soviet VOKS and SSOD.

Apart from institutional reforms, Vladimir Putin signed new directives that outlined foreign policy tools to be used for the implementation of this new soft power strategy. The new means to implement the strategy can be described as humanitarian tools of Russian foreign policy. The official outline of such humanitarian tools

can be found in *The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation* (2008) and *The Russian Foreign Policy Review* (2007). The Concept, drafted in 2008, states that Russia sees its goals in “protecting the rights and legitimate interests of the Russian citizens and compatriots living abroad; [...] expanding and strengthening the space of the Russian language and culture; [...] consolidating the organizations of compatriots; [...] contributing to learning and spreading the Russian language; [...] firmly countering manifestations of neo-fascism, [...] attempts to rewrite the history [...] and revise the outcome of World War Two; [...] building up interaction with international and non-governmental human rights organizations to strengthen universal norms in the area of human rights without double standards”. The Review elaborates more on the arsenal of specific humanitarian tools and divides them into distinct parts: (1) human rights, (2) defense of compatriots’ interests, (3) consular activities, (4) cooperation in the sphere of culture and education, (5) and informational or media support.

Some may wonder about Dmitry Medvedev’s input into the Russian search for a new soft power vision. It may be briefly concluded – with one significant remark – that during his presidency he simply implemented Vladimir Putin’s vision into practice and continued the planned reform of the institutions in charge of Russian soft power. However, there is a significant remark relating to the political agenda of modernization which became Dmitry Medvedev’s political program for action. In Joseph Nye’s terms, one of the ways to success in soft or smart power is a strategy of “starting at home” (CSIS, 2007). Therefore we may conclude that if Medvedev’s modernization project had been successful it could have been turned into very effective soft power for the post-Soviet region. Unfortunately, the modernization program has been gradually taken off the political agenda during Vladimir Putin’s third presidency. Thus, Medvedev’s legacy may be described as the lost opportunity for Russian soft power in the region.

Conclusion

Today soft power has become a trendy term in the Russian political and academic discourse. President Putin writes about it in his

pre-election article in the *Moscow News* (2012), he speaks about it with Russian ambassadors working abroad (2012), Prime Minister Medvedev discusses the concept during his meeting with the representatives of Rossotrudnichestvo (2012), and the new head of this agency, Konstantin Kosachev, declares it to be his priority for action in the new post (2012). However, the Kremlin and its politechnologists have a way of transforming Western concepts and making them suit Russian realities. In his article, “Russia and the Changing World,” Vladimir Putin specifically mentions “illegal instruments of soft power” (2012). As soon as the legislation of foreign NGO activities is passed, such Western soft power organizations such as USAID are forced to end their activities in Russia. While some of the Russian officials are trying to master the new language of soft power, others at the same time semantically adapt old Soviet anti-Western rhetoric that suits their daily political needs. The institutional reform which is taking place (e.g. Rossotrudnichestvo) revives the Soviet tradition of ideological struggle. The most recent illustration of this is the decision to re-establish the SSOD in its new form – the RSOD (Russian Union of Friendship Organizations)³.

The analysis of the Russian quest for a soft power vision during the two decades shows that the Kremlin has come a long way to reach such a distinctive realization of this concept and its possible uses in the post-Soviet sphere: from the collapse of the Soviet potential to attract and the loss of ideology behind the Russian foreign policy in this region during Yeltsin’s years to a competition of ideologies and gradual mobilization of support behind the idea of the Russian World as the future soft power vision during Putin’s years. The Russian World as an ideology for Russian soft power has a huge potential because of its positive integrating capacity as opposed to the traditional anti-Western rhetoric. Minister of the RF MFA Sergey Lavrov recently declared that such an understanding of soft power will be included into Russia’s new foreign policy concept, which is now being drafted (2012).

This analysis covered the time period up to 2010, but as a concluding remark it is important to stress that since then a new foreign policy idea has emerged on Vladimir Putin’s political agenda – the idea of a Eurasian union. This idea creates new competitive environment for the

Russian World concept and brings new uncertainty to the Russian soft power vision in the post-Soviet region. This recent developments partly supports the skepticism of some of the experts (Menon, Motyl, 2007) about the ability of Russia's leadership to design a coherent long-term plan with appropriate institutional, material and intellectual support. , and this is in part because the Kremlin is fundamentally weakened by the competition of rival factions with their short-term mercantile goals.

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² See <<http://www.russ.ru/about>> [2012-10-12]

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What Does Finnish Military Ethnography Involve?

By Captain Juha Jokitalo- a member of the faculty in the Leadership Department, Finnish Air Force Academy

Abstract: This article describes the application of the ethnographic approach to studying the military community within the Finnish Air Force through the fieldwork carried out for a doctoral dissertation. The research seeks to increase the understanding of the mechanisms of formation of the organisational culture of the Air Force. In order to gain an understanding of how an air force culture takes form Pilot Reserve Officer Course conscripts were chosen as the central object group of the main study. The choice of the subject group is based on the hypothesis that the special status of officer pilots shapes an air force culture toward generating a specific culture within the military community. The fieldwork stage of the study follows a socio-psychological perspective. A similar approach is often applied to studying symbolic constructions in micro cultures or eliciting data on the social environment of those interviewed. In social psychology, attention focuses on social life: interaction between human beings, the relationship between a human being and culture, and the socialness of an individual's psychological activity. The study also presumes that interactions between the life worlds of modern day adolescents and this organisational culture also shed light on other phenomena related to a military community. For the above reasons, the conscripts, future pilots, were observed mainly during their basic military training period. Data was also collected by means of specific group interviews and one-on-one discussions. Principles of collective ethnography were applied to the field study in which observation was conducted by a "combat team" of two Air Force officers with different educational backgrounds. Thus, the approach could also aptly be called "combat team ethnography."

There were two researchers collecting data for this study. The approach of the first researcher was focused on individual - that is how the identity of a military pilot is developed. The other researcher focused

on the construction of the organisational culture of the Finnish Air Force. This difference between approaches enhanced our discussions as a part of mirror technique.

Ethnographic Research Conducted by Finnish Researchers

As a scientific branch conducted by Finnish researchers, ethnography goes way back. It dates back to at least the 1840s when Matthias Alexander Castrén (1813-52) made long and gruelling expeditions to Siberia. According to Juha Pentikäinen, professor emeritus of the science of religion, ethnography, in fact, refers to field work in which the researcher works in the field for an extended period of time and learns to communicate in the language of the subject. In fact, in the 1990s, Pentikäinen made almost twenty ethnographic expeditions to Siberian indigenous peoples to study the Sámi people and shamanism. On the Nordic Ethnography Society website¹, Pentikäinen cites the definition of ethnography by religious scientist and linguist Castrén as follows:

"Ethnography is a new name for an old thing. It refers to a field of science that studies the religions, social conditions, manners and customs, ways of living, and dwellings of peoples, in a word: all that has to do with their external and internal life. Ethnography could be considered part of cultural history, even if not all peoples have written history. Consequently, ethnography is their history.

There is a good reason for calling the cultural history of the Finnish military forces, following Castren's definition, military ethnography. Many ways of thinking and attitudes still prevalent today derive from this history. The ethnographic approach opens up opportunities for considering these ways of thinking and attitudes, some of which may have evolved into basic presumptions.² Ethnography is characterised by relatively long field research periods, the versatility of data, methods and analytical methods, conducting research in the living conditions of the people studied, and the central importance of participating, observing and experience in the research process.³

When it comes to Finnish military communities, the Continuation War (1941-1944) is an ethnographic period of key importance. Knut Pipping, who served as an NCO in a machine gun company at the front, conducted observation work on his company as a unit at work, rest, in combat, including its individual members and their reactions to different events and the formalities of the military command. Knut Pipping, a sociologist and later Professor of the University of Tampere and the University of Turku, wrote Komppania pienoisyhdistykuntana (Company as a Society in Miniature) which contains detailed description of an unofficial relational system and the system of norms of the men in his unit.⁴ The most recent ethnographic study on Finnish military dates from 2010. “Tunnetut sotilaat” (Known Soldiers) by three researchers affords a splendid description of the life of a company in the 2000s in a peacetime framework⁵.

Today, ethnography is an international research orientation applied in several fields of science. In addition to anthropology and sociology, it is applied to history, medicine, science of religion, education and upbringing. Today's ethnographic research has several foci and it goes to various sources for information. The central data collection methods include observation, participation and interviews. These methods aim at obtaining more versatile and profound information on the subject from different perspectives⁶. However, modern ethnographic research does not seek to present one unique truth; different individuals have lived their personal experiences and consequently attach a different truth to them⁷.

Ethnographic research can be regarded as a story that describes a phenomenon in a way that on its basis the reader can get an adequate picture of it and how it was created by the researcher⁸. The story proves that he knows the phenomenon, which contributes to reliability. The use of ample data further contributes to reliability, especially in case the saturation point is nearing.

My study includes emphases of the so called school ethnography. It is a branch which involves a feature in school life a researcher takes an interest in Syrjälä⁹. As pointed out by Lahelma and

Gordon, the evolution of society and education become contextualised in school ethnography¹⁰. According to them, the school ethnographical research pursued in Finland can be considered comparative or cross cultural. It has departed from gender differences and inequality between boys and girls. The objective is to conduct a critical social analysis with emphasis on methodological dialogue and ethical considerations.

Soldiers as Ethnographers

The ethnographic perspectives of this article derive from the research work I am conducting for my doctoral dissertation. As the working title of the dissertation “The Organisational Culture of the Finnish Air Force as a Specific Military Community Culture” suggests the study covers areas not easy to understand – and understanding them will take time. It is fair to say that the subject matter lends itself to multidisciplinary scientific research, even if my perspective is first and foremost that of social psychology. Considering the present stage of the study, the article does not discuss all the stages of ethnographic research, data analysis for instance. This article could be described as instructions or a report based on ethnographic working models in which theory and practice become intertwined¹¹.

I became interested in this subject matter when, at the beginning of the 2000s, I was working as a teacher and group leader of cadets at the Air Force Academy. Earlier, I had served in the Army for 14 years where I had received my officer’s education. As I transferred to the Air Force I realised that the culture of the new organisation differed obviously from the so called general, or military, culture typical of the Army. The difference between the cultures became all the more clear to me as I started working with the cadets in particular. The clearest difference was visible in the interaction, especially, of pilot cadets as a group. Inspired by these observations I completed comprehensive group leader studies in order to be able to guide their studies more effectively and to understand the essence of my observations. Similar observations guided me later, too, when, to complete my Master of Arts degree in military sciences, I had to choose a subject matter for my final thesis.¹² When considering an appropriate research approach and method for my

doctoral thesis I became interested in ethnography. At some point, I came to notice that having chosen this method the experience I had acquired over the years as a soldier could amount to significant value added to my work.

Ethnography is not something military leaders are necessarily very familiar with. A commander eyeing his troops or a company commander watching the batch having just arrived has, however, conducted a central ethnographic activity- observation. Ethnography is, however, much more. It is long term, planned activity with a specific goal. Eskola and Suoranta present the characterisations summed up by several researchers. According to them, ethnography involves the following¹³:

- *Human activity is studied in everyday situations as opposed to an experiment setup constructed by a researcher. The researcher spends an extended period of time in the culture under study.*
- *Research data is collected from a number of different sources. However, different forms of observation, dialogues and interviews constitute the principal sources of information.*
- *Collection of data is relatively unspecified, unstructured. Classification of data is not done according to existing categories. The researcher's conscious and unconscious preconceptions of the subject guide the research.*
- *One specific situation or the activity of one specific group may be the subject of the study.*
- *The analysis involves the meanings contained, including the associated motivations or goals.*
- *In reports, findings are presented principally as written descriptions or explanations.*
- *Reporting in quantities and graphic presentations is secondary.*

Ethnography refers to a research approach aimed at consciously increasing human understanding of the subject studied, in this case the organisational culture of the Air Force. In several contexts, the

researcher is called an “ethnographer”. From a philosophy of science perspective ethnography is a very wide-ranging and cross-scientific method, due to which the associated concepts and their uses are very wide ranging as well. Symbolic interactionism generally regarded as a research method in social psychology is the most important and most referred to philosophical basis for ethnographic research on teaching and the researcher’s orientation.¹⁴

My study focuses on one of the central ideas of symbolic interactionism: when in interaction with others, the meaning of things becomes accentuated to a human being¹⁵. The ethnographic core of my study is made up by pilot reserve officer conscripts - people from whom future fighter pilots will be selected. They are the key informants of my study aimed at gaining an understanding of how the organisational culture of the Air Force has become constructed¹⁶. Their importance as informants is emphasised by the fact that from the first day in military service they are trained for duties in the very core of the Air Force - anti-aircraft operations. They also differ from the rest of the batch of conscripts in many ways. This becomes evident when one considers their demanding and long selection process. They are also very conscious of how special they are. This is reflected as bi-directional inequality among the entire batch of conscripts¹⁷. From day one they also make up a tightly knit group of their own. Due to their special status, the social interrelationships and interactions made up an important part of my data collection. According to organisation researcher Edgar Schein, patterns affecting a culture can be identified provided the research process is long enough. Schein defines the creation of a group as the creation of a culture. In this case, it is the establishment of the group of conscripts selected for pilot training.¹⁸

A great amount of data was collected for the study. In addition to field research data obtained from working with conscripts, it also includes student assignments in professional military personnel training as well as written documents involving the subject matter. The ethnographic research approach is characterised by having data obtained by combining different types of sets of data¹⁹. This could not be achieved by using one method only. As a research approach, when it comes to data collection for example, ethnography is different from

conventional studies conducted with questionnaires and interviews that require the researcher's presence in an organisation or work community for a limited period of time only²⁰. Ethnographic research, in turn, is characterised by long-term collection of observation data. The researcher stays for extended periods of time in the community and culture he is studying²¹. My own relationship with the military community has been built over 28 years, the last 14 of them with the organisation of the Air Force.

In the Field with a Combat Partner

A fellow researcher, Lt. Col. Harri Pyyhtinen, started to assist me in the field stage and the subsequent data analysis. He is also a flight officer and is preparing a doctoral thesis on the development of the identity of a pilot. We became a combat team, and this is the reason why the field stage was carried out as a sort of collective ethnography²². This explains the use of the forms "I" and "we" in the article. I got the idea for doing my research work in this way from the main architect of "Tunnetut sotilaat" (*Known Soldiers*), Professor Tommi Hoikkala of the Finnish Youth Research Network (Nuorisotutkimusverkosto). Hoikkala calls this method the "mirror technique": two researchers study the same milieu applying participant observation. The researchers live in the milieu under study, observing the same subject and conducting "corrective dialogue" on their observations. The method is a type of observation triangulation wherein the researchers control each other's observations. Another characteristic of the method is that the researchers may arrive at differing interpretations regarding the same instance of observation²³.

The term "field" is a frequently used concept in ethnography. It is easily associated with exercises carried out in the terrain. In ethnography, however, it has a wider meaning. Huttunen suggests that "field" should be understood in combining the views of several ethnographers as a rather flexible term in modern research²⁴. The term "field" does not necessarily refer to a place. It can be understood to denote a community or even the everyday life of a given community. In current research, field is more often understood to denote a space made up by social relationships than a physical space.²⁵ "Field" may be

considered to be composed of different entities. In his ethnographic work Palmu establishes his own categorization by modifying Atkinson's definition (1992) of "triple constitution of the field" into three entities including physical field, written field and textual field.²⁶

A more profound understanding of human activity and the activity of organisations requires the researcher have a capacity to be flexible as he moves from one social situation to another²⁷. In their extensive ethnographic analysis on the school, Gordon established levels of observation with regard to the researcher and field for orienting their observation work.²⁸ They divided the concept of school into three levels: the official, informal and physical school. The official school is defined by syllabi and other documents. Everyday life in the school is built up by the interaction that takes place when teaching is going on, and teaching is based on official documents. The concept of official school also includes the rules of the school and the hierarchy between different actors. The informal school is made up of the unofficial interaction taking place in the school together with student cultures and unofficial hierarchies. The physical school refers to the interplay of space, movement, sound, time, and people's physical presence. The researchers applied the same classification to analyse their own experiences as well. The official aspects researcher negotiated and agreed on matters relating to the entry into the field including observation, participation, interviews and the collection of data. The informal aspects researcher covered the unofficial pupil-teacher relationships as well as the contradictory feelings that came up during the field work stage. The physical aspects researcher dealt with experiences related to a person's personal and physical space.

Currently, my field of research involves, first, physical spaces including the exercise areas and facilities in the garrison. The research work I conduct involves, secondly, my daily professional duties. As head teacher of leadership in my teaching duties I encounter members of all the personnel groups. In addition to teaching, my work includes pedagogical planning which opens up horizons referring to the core of the activity of the Air Force. Overall, my work makes up a sort of cycle with the young, budding conscript pilots with their world of experiences having just entered military service as the starting point. We made

observations on their behaviour for about six weeks. At the end of the cycle stands the Air Force Command with its instructions and commands. In the middle, in the core of the culture of the organisation, are situated, for example, flight instructors, fighter pilot officers and all those who contribute to the maintenance of a credible air defence with their personal work contribution. A third entity is made up of data from the core with which I try to obtain as comprehensive a picture as possible of the factors that contribute to the development of the organisational culture of the Air Force.

In the ethnographic research tradition collecting ample data serves the purpose of generating specific information with the basic idea of building information through participation, making use of different sets of data as well as through the dialogue of data and theory.²⁹ This ample data includes field diaries and recorded “corrective dialogues” I have had with my fellow researcher on their background. Recorded group interviews likewise make up a specific set of data. Numerous photographs are also included to make recalling situations easier. The support data includes various syllabi and learning reports related to the training of salaried personnel. We both keep a personal diary as well, for writing down thought processes all through the research.

According to Huttunen³⁰ data collection takes a relatively long time. (e.g. Howell 2006, Caplan 1997). This is how all data gets pinned down in a temporal perspective; and at a temporal distance it is easier to see that a piece of discourse is always generated at a certain point in time, in a certain context. My personal observations confirm this. From writing this article almost a year and a half has passed from those interviews and we are slowly starting the analysis of the data. Listening to the tapes and reading the transcripts bring the situations vividly back into my mind. According to our experience, the year that has passed has put enough distance between the subject and us in order for us to be able to place our observations in the right context and perspective.

Research Process is Kindling Interest

The research work was launched long before we actually set off to the field. Usually, one tries to mark a distinct starting point or event for a process. Alasuutari cites that in a qualitative study in particular, it may be difficult to mark a specific starting point because it always relies on some earlier research in some respect or an earlier experience by the researcher³¹. In the introductory chapter of the article the observations presented of the pilots' specific culture may be referred to as the starting point of the present study in this sense. Otherwise, in its main characteristics, my research work follows the process of ethnographic research as presented by figure 1




Figure 1. Process of ethnographic research (Syrjälä, L & al. 1994)

Before launching the fieldwork phase I applied for permission to conduct research in accordance with the instructions of the Finnish Defence Forces. Having obtained permission, I made an agreement on

our procedures with the chief of the unit. One of them involved providing information. In accordance with my research plan, I informed the personnel having participated in conscript training about the conduct of the research. We held two events for our key informants and told them as much as possible about it.

Obtaining Research Permission and what it Meant

Engaging in field work may sound uncomplicated in an authoritative organisation once permission has been obtained. However, it may provoke concern. An official research permission issued by the Commander of the Air Force made access to the field easier, because in a hierarchical military organisation no lower ranking person would oppose someone authorized to grant such permission. We often reflected on what this would mean to the people studied. How would the people react to a situation implying the involvement of the leadership of the organisation? Due to these questions we made the decision to conduct our study with as much openness as possible, stressing the fact that we were independent researchers pursuing academic objectives. In a briefing for the personnel I was as precise as possible about my research and its goals.³² I also told them about the ethical considerations involved including the intended use, confidentiality, and how the data would be saved.³³

In an ethnographic study, the researcher becomes faced with his own prejudices and attitudes and those of the subject. My own attitudes were influenced by my experience from the time I trained conscripts. Attitudes may vary from those of an advising consultant to a contractor or inspector.³⁴

Based on my earlier experiences as a trainer I assumed that our observations may have looked like a training inspection for an individual trainer or chief of unit. I recalled several similar situations from my trainer days: It is natural to try to do the best in all kind of tests, and inspections do not differ in this respect. So we tried to present issues in as positive a light as possible. There was the feeling that presenting criticism would have been like a vote of non-confidence towards one's

superiors and the system. I cannot estimate to what extent such experiences influenced the choice of subjects or their observation, but I am sure that my experiences did have role on this. Despite my assumptions described above, we were well received. Several people who had been involved with the training of the pilot reserve officer students wanted to hear what we researchers thought about the work they had done.

Due to long-term field work and its social nature, the interaction between the actors involved is bound to deepen. Different kinds of social situations, the group dynamics and social relationships they involve and the official status of the participants may sometimes make the researcher take on surprising roles.³⁵ These and many other situations in the field showed us that a researcher conducting ethnographic work may find himself in other roles as well.

In the field, we wore the same outdoor uniform as the conscripts, however without any insignia. This seemed to be the right thing to do- even if it gave rise to interesting phenomena. Soon enough, we came to see how much power was attached to insignia. We felt that we had gained the conscripts' trust soon enough. We had told them that they did not have to address us with protocol in any situation. They said "hello" to us and came to talk to us like old friends. The most surprising thing I personally found about not wearing insignia was that in some military type situations I truly felt I had lost my military rank. Was my feeling justified? Was I not considered to rank higher than a conscript?

Observation

According to Salmela, "in a cultural study observation involves some social or personal situation, event or phenomenon. What aspects to be observed are selected and defined decidedly according to the perspective from which the phenomenon is viewed. For example, when invited to a gala, a chef de cuisine, fashion designer, florist, photographer for a women's magazine, a person suffering from lactose-intolerance, a psychologist, speech therapist and an anthropologist would each probably pay attention on different things."³⁶

Determining the observation method to adopt was one of the key features having influenced the field work. We strived to act as so-called perfect observers who do not participate in the activity in any way³⁷. Observation methods can be classified according to how much the researcher takes part in the flow of the situation at hand and the social interaction³⁸.

For example, a social situation includes the following observable features³⁹:

1. space
2. actors
3. activities
4. objects
5. periods of time
6. goals
7. emotions

First, we made a detailed observation plan based on the conscripts' weekly activity programs and made a prior decision which conscript period events to observe. This, however, proved to be an approach hardly beneficial to our ethnographic analysis purposes. The events in the field quickly showed that a too strict observation plan would stand in the way of a more profound understanding of the subject. Being there in person we made a quick decision to participate in the conscripts' military service together with them, and we encountered situations that made us reconsider whether having a precise observation plan made sense or not.⁴⁰ The fact that observation situations often contained an element of surprise significantly influenced our observation. Unexpected situations kept feeding our curiosity and also initiated new thought processes. Based on such situations and our intuition, we were led to observe situations that would have remained unobserved had we complied with a

precise plan. One such event took place towards the end of week one as I was getting ready to go home:

As I was walking down the hall I heard one conscript saying that after dinner the pilot cadets would teach a class. In the weekly program there was no mention of such a class. The conscripts were enthusiastic indeed. I called home saying I would not be home just yet- I would have to work a bit later. I started to find out what was going on. I asked one GBAD cadet and he had not heard about such a class. Instead, he took the initiative to call some pilot cadet to ask about the class. He found out that the whole pilot cadet course was coming to "teach a class" to the conscripts on the pilot reserve officer course. So I waited a while and the cadets arrived in their flight overalls. I asked them if it would be okay if I came along because I was working on a study and they said it was OK. The cadets went in front of the classroom all in one group and the conscripts took their seats. The class took a little bit over an hour and the conscripts listened attentively to the young cadets' stories about what the training would have in store for them...

Based on these observations we made adjustments in our overall observation plan making room for flexibility so that modifications could be made as the working day continued on. We were constantly compelled to reconsider our decisions from several different perspectives, the most important of which had to do with research ethics and the status of the researcher. We often asked ourselves "did I make the right decision" or "am I where I should be". We also noticed that, as professional soldiers, we paid attention to different types of things than someone observing our organisation from the outside would. In our cooperation the differences in our points of view due to our different educational backgrounds also became very clear. Having received my education and training in the Army and having served in that culture for a long time I saw things differently from my partner who had received his pilot training in the Air Force. Constant, critical consideration was called for, indeed, especially when it came to choices.

In research work, ethicality is not a consideration that can be singled out. Instead it can relate to several different perspectives. According to Pohjola, a study that takes a critical stance and is ethically

sustainable implies that the researcher consciously gives a thorough consideration to the sustainability of the decisions taken, including choices, during the various stages of the research process and considers their implication to the reality and consequences that his research is creating.⁴¹ The practical decisions taken in the field reflect on the ethical questions related to the writing and publishing of the study.⁴² We were also concerned about the suitability of the cases studied in relation to the formulation of the problem.⁴³

The events in the field confirmed that ethnography was the most suitable approach for this type of study. An established daily timetable included “an official liturgy”, but the daily life was filled with all manner of unofficial happenings that were only observable on site. An extract from the field diary shows how small the pieces are that make up the picture that is the organisational culture. This also shows how the researcher’s intuitive orientation in the field may lead him to important observations. In this case, we are looking at a situation where the conscripts were practicing bed making. Following my intuition, I entered the room and asked the four conscripts around how they felt about it all. We had off a good conversation. The comment below came up at some point:

“Sure they treat us differently because they know that we’re here in earnest and that one day we can be their work buddies. We’re important to them...”

Despite being “an old war horse” the everyday life of the conscripts made me review my thinking. Being a researcher coming from within the organisation I sometimes had to reconsider my background commitments.⁴⁴ Certain practices of conscript training I observed challenged my current understanding of learning and information. One incident involving those issues came up in the conscripts’ first week that was especially full of activities. The conscripts kept hurrying from place to place, from one class to another, from the barracks to the depots, and of course, they had their first military drills. Thinking back about this, a metaphor comes to mind: the conscripts have been ordered to stand on an unknown shore and they do not know each other and an enormous

wave surges over them. The wave is full of new information, norms, and rules and the metaphor of standing on the shore reflects the collective assumption that no matter how overwhelmed they feel, the conscripts are expected to be able to assimilate information- no matter in how small or detailed bits it comes. They should be able to absorb it standing or sitting upright, and answer questions in the correct manner. Even in a situation in which a previous person deviates from the correct answer posture which is then critiqued, they finally they ask you the good old question: “Does anyone have any questions?”

In the situation described above the experience world of today’s young people came face to face with the culture of an organisation. This is the type of situation where a researcher can find small crumbs of information to build his research on. Such situations, however, challenge the researcher’s orientation and the entire research frame, so that observing may well turn into developing. I asked myself how a generation that has been taught self-guidance and critical thinking would respond to situations such as the one described above? I also wondered what kind of learning strategies the youngsters would apply to such situations. In such situations I came close to being distracted from observation work by ideas for developing education.

Our idea was to observe the same subject writing our observations down in our field diaries. In fact, this was done almost daily excluding some days when I worked alone. What is worth noting is that on such days my observations lost complexity and my thought process became weaker. The diary entries served as “fil rouge” for our discussions.⁴⁵ The dialogue also deepened our observations and increased our understanding of the subject.

Challenges of Ethnography

A researcher who comes from a military organisation is influenced by its strong culture. As Pipping says “...but I was not learnt only the norms (standards) and policies, but also I had assimilated them: I thought they were correct and compulsory. This caused that I was observing different issues of military life for certain point of view, which

is different than what neutral and objective observer would have done.”⁴⁶ Pipping emphasises how important developing the research methods of sociology is. Recent discussions of ethnographic research emphasize the importance of considering what kind of influence the research itself has on the perspectives of the researcher and his analysis. The ability to change the point of view is an important aspect in modern ethnography and can be called as an ability to “see things differently.” The researcher must also be able to report the situations that changed his view to understand how the interpretation and analysis of the observed situation are made.⁴⁷

Ethnographical writing is challenging. The researcher must always be aware of proper writing to illustrate to the reader all the experiences and concepts. How does one convey ideas so that they are not oversimplified or lost in the researcher’s jargon?⁴⁸ Ethnography is a game played with words⁴⁹.

Contrary to Pipping during the research I experienced changes in my point of view. The first significant change occurred at the start of the field phase of the study. I noticed that I treated new military pilot conscripts (“ducks”) like experienced professional pilots. These new pilot students are called as “ducks” because of the duck badge on their flight suits. My attitude was based on the way our organisation treated all pilots equally. They are treated as single homogenous group, which is at the same time admired and disliked. Soon it became obvious that some conscript leaders from other troops disliked or even hated “ducks”. At the beginning of the first week of conscript service these leaders came to tell them that they were boastful and arrogant. Some called them “super goat”, meaning a person with a demanding education but with many extra liberties from military discipline. This developed a stronger team spirit and more distance towards other conscripts among the ducks.

This change in the point of view was essential for later observations. I now saw the “ducks” as a group for whom the organisation transforms the most important issues of its activity. I started to realise how a special status is developed in ducks, also at the subconscious level. Earlier I thought this would happen only between

pilots, as shown in the unofficial lesson given by the pilot cadets noted earlier. I realised that there are structures in the organisation that are also maintained by other people working in the Air Force. These are the people who expect ducks to behave in pilot role from the very beginning of their military service. The duck status was also created through physical structures. They lived in separate barracks which were better furnished. I interviewed the janitor of their barracks and he told that the air conditioner had to function well because the better conscripts were living in these barracks – by which he meant ducks.

Group interviews

In ethnography interviews serve to obtain data. Group interviews are ideal for examining culture. In a one-on-one interview a person can tell about a culture, but in a group interview the culture is present, and when the members of that group talk to one another they come to use “inside” terms. The researcher may notice things not evident in a one-on-one interview: concepts, ways of perceiving things, unofficial norms and cultural structures that formed within the group. A group interview also differs from a regular individual interview in that group dynamics changes the interviewer’s role. In a group interview the group members do not only respond to the interviewer’s questions, but also to each other.⁵⁰

At the end of the field period we held an open group interview with the pilot reserve officer conscripts of which they had been informed beforehand. The interviews were recorded. There were seven groups in total with six to eight students each, with each room constituting a group. At the beginning of the interview we told them about the nature of the event and encouraging them to express their views freely. We started the interviews by looking at photographs taken in the course of the past weeks. These took the interviewees back to the activities of the past weeks and also made the session more relaxed. We chose pictures that would give a good cross section of the conscript time so far. As the interview progressed we asked them three loosely formulated questions: The first question was, “has the education met your expectations?”. Adaptation was examined with the question, “to which

issues has it been difficult to adapt.” The third question was about their interaction with other conscripts. In other respects the interview followed group dynamics. We also wanted to make notes in the field diary without disturbing the flow of the interview for additional information about the event. The analysis of the interviews is still unfinished but thus far it can be said that these questions worked well as an activator and focused the discussion on these themes. Unstructured interviews brought up significant and surprising issues.

A group interview is a free discussion in the course of which the participants can express their views freely. This is why the participants tend to give a great deal of information about a phenomenon under study. In a group interview the interviewer talks to the whole group asking individual members questions from time to time. The method is well suited for studying meaning structures in small cultures, or for obtaining information about the social environment of the interviewees. Generally speaking, the students who participated in the interviews and unofficial discussions were motivated to contribute to scientific research. In several situations, some interviewees asked for information about the goals of the study. From this point of view, one could consider that we had been successful in creating a good relationship based on trust for the interviews. According to Kuula and Tiihinen, an informal interview, even one that is filled with emotion is not just a casual meeting of two individuals⁵¹. Per se, it always departs from the framework of a study, and the interviewees are well aware this.

Field Diaries

In ethnographic writing field notes make up the data. At the same time they constitute both the research data and the results of the interpretations made by the researcher on the basis of his observations.⁵² We started a ”corrective dialogue” on the basis of our field diary notes by looking at photos taken in the field. The discussions varied from ten to sixty minutes. They were usually informal and sparked new ideas. Surprisingly, the discussions often led to new research methodological questions. A tone indicative of respect for the colleague’s observations and comments sparked a discussion leading to areas neither of us would

have come to alone.⁵³ Our daily discussions were recorded and transcribed. In this way, our field diary notes gained in depth.

*"If you didn't write it down in your field notes then it didn't happen (at least so far as being data for analysis is concerned)."*⁵⁴ (DeWalt and DeWalt 2002, 141.)

Field note data may include different components depending on the study. For example, note taking in an observation situation may be done by writing down individual words, abbreviations or sentences. Later, the notes are broken down and written in a more complete form based on key words or sentences. Based on our discussions we drew up a chart for writing down our most important reflections. The data included the title, date and place of an event. At times we preferred taking notes outside the specific observation situation so as not to disturb the session. Our field and personal diaries were marked by a great number of notes involving methodological and ethical choices. They both help the researcher to keep track of the research process or for finding arguments to change directions.⁵⁵

As mentioned, field diary notes may vary from individual words to extensive descriptions depending on the situation. According to Al-Nikkelä, note taking has an effect on reporting which he classifies as critical and conventional.⁵⁶ In this classification conventional reporting describes the state of things, whereas critical reporting asks whether things could be different. Critical ethnography may include elements that give an indication of an aspiration for emancipation and change. A conventional ethnography report is directed to the academic community. Critical ethnography is targeted to the same readership, but the ethnographer writes his report on behalf of the subjects.

In my study it becomes evident that it is difficult for the ethnographer to draw a line between conventional and critical reporting. The notes in the diary show this clearly. Some of them pose the question why things are the way they are. In my study, this is made evident by the conscripts:

'Do you happen to know why the sweater has to come first in the closet? Nobody needs a sweater, it's so hot.' (2010, *hottest summer of the century*).

Reflection of a Beginner Ethnographer

In ethnographic research, the researcher's epistemological background commitments refer to his conception of the human being and of reality, and his conception of the nature of information. The information sought and obtained by the researcher is, per se, human, subjective and based on his values. Information is part of a person's social life and culture.⁵⁷

An ethnographic expedition may be an amalgam of great opportunities and true chaos. On the one hand, it may give the researcher freedom that may, at best even in a familiar landscape, lead him to the source of completely new phenomena. The researcher may be inspired to do observation work and collect data on a host of new and interesting things. The journey may, however, suddenly reveal itself as particularly challenging. The researcher's reflection capacity may near its limits and he may have concerns about the preciseness and reliability of his observations. All through of the process of observation, being the instrument of observation, the researcher should be able to observe himself as well. Patterns of social behaviour have an impact on his behaviour. In fact, this is a special challenge for observation work. The ethnographer might find himself overwhelmed by unexpected situations, so he might react to his observations instinctively - actuated by his own experiences. How should the presence of such inner, personal motives by the researcher in an ethnographic report be reacted to?

The ethnographer does not seek to generate patterns of behaviour, but increase human understanding of social life, arouse discussion and new ideas. This is why conventional ways of considering reliability and generalisation in research do not apply to ethnographic research.

As far as I have seen, in the background commitments of the researcher the instruments of interpretation are not explained clearly

enough. The researcher is “between the rock and the hard spot.” On the one hand, the ethnographic research tradition requires rather ample data and extended periods of time working in the field. On the other hand, a beginning researcher may not be confident enough with regard to his observations and therefore strives to collect great amounts of data. As a result, the amount of observations may weaken the analysis made on its basis. The question is: how does the ethnographer manage to carry his background commitments all through the research process? In this respect, the combat team ethnography applied proved to be particularly valuable. By asking questions aiming for more precision, the research partner was able to re-lead him to more relevant perspectives.

Tuomi and Sarajärvi note that, in principle, the types of problems described above tend to arise in qualitative research.⁵⁸ They refer to the reliability and impartiality of observations. When conducting qualitative research the researcher is the creator and interpreter of the research setup. This may also explain the narrative character of the ethnographic interpretation tradition. A deep understanding of the interdependence of the researcher’s background commitments, interpretations of observations and the overall analysis contributes to the quality of ethnographic studies. So, the researcher should be able to describe and justify in his text out of which possible choices to choose, what solutions are proposed, and how he arrives at his final solutions.⁵⁹

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The Future of U.S. Bases in Europe—A View from America

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Abstract: The Obama Administrations latest rounds of cuts will significantly reduce the U.S. force posture in Europe. Budgetary considerations, not changes in the strategic environment, appear to be driving these cuts. These reductions will limit America's ability to project power into Africa, the Middle East, and Central Asia. The Administration's policy is sending the wrong signal on America's commitment to transatlantic security and will embolden U.S. adversaries in the Euro-Atlantic region.

Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. military presence in Europe has been viewed as low-hanging fruit for those looking for savings in the defense budget. Reductions in the U.S. military capability in Europe are often carried out without considering the affect such moves may have or how such moves will be viewed by friends and foes alike.

At its peak in 1953, the U.S. had approximately 450,000 troops in Europe. Due to the Soviet threat to Western Europe, the U.S. had good reason to base a high number of U.S. troops in Europe. During the early 1990s, as part of the "peace dividend," U.S. troop numbers in Europe were slashed. Paradoxically, in the early 1990s, use of U.S. troops based in Europe increased while their numbers were being reduced.¹ Today, approximately only 64,000 U.S. troops remain permanently based in Europe. The Obama Administration's attempt to "pivot" its defense focus to Asia, while simultaneously cutting defense expenditure to its lowest level in decades, is jeopardizing the future of the U.S. military presence in Europe.

In January 2012, the Obama Administration announced the withdrawal of at least two brigade combat teams (BCTs)² totalling approximately 8,000 soldiers and 2,200 combat service and support soldiers from Europe by 2014. In addition, the Administration

announced that key aviation assets would be removed from their permanent bases in Europe. These cuts have been supported by some Members of Congress and media commentators who believe that basing U.S. troops in Europe is a Cold War anachronism.

However, basing American troops in Europe directly serves U.S. national security interests. Of course, the presence of U.S. forces in Europe contributes to the collective defense of U.S. allies on the continent, but this is a consequence of, not the reason for, maintaining a robust presence. The challenge for U.S. decision makers is to keep a military force that can promote U.S. interests in the region without creating a culture of dependency on the U.S. security umbrella among America's European allies. The commonly held belief that U.S. forces are in Europe to protect European allies from a threat that no longer exists is wrong. In fact, forward basing U.S. troops in Europe is just as important now as it was during the Cold War, albeit for different reasons.

From the Arctic to the Levant, from the Maghreb to the Caucasus, Europe is at one of the most important crossroads of the world. U.S. bases in Europe provide American leaders with flexibility, resilience, and options in a dangerous multipolar world. The huge garrisons of American service personnel in Europe are no longer the fortresses of the Cold War, but the forward operating bases of the 21st century. The U.S. needs to have the tools available to react to events in America's interests. Hence, a robust and capable presence of U.S. military forces in Europe is just as important today as it was during the Cold War. This is why force reductions in Europe are worrying.

Trans-Atlantic Relations seen in a Wider Context.

To better understand the Obama Administration's position on European basing one must place this issue into a wider context on how the Administration views trans-Atlantic relations. President Obama has shown little affinity towards Europe. Trans-Atlantic relations are rarely a factor in the Administration's geo-political strategy. Other than hollow overtures about U.S. and EU free trade in the President's most

recent State of the Union address Obama has shown little interest in Europe. In part this has been the result of the Administration's so-called "pivot" to Asia and the way such a policy is perceived by America's European allies. Ever since President Obama announced his so-called "pivot" to Asia, there has been extensive debate in European capitals on what this policy means, and if it really signifies the beginning of the end of serious U.S. engagement in Europe after more than 70 years.

President Obama's stance on Europe and his "pivot" to Asia tend to be viewed differently depending on where one looks in Europe. Many in Western Europe, more focused on EU integration and dealing with the financial crisis than strengthening trans-Atlantic relations, have largely been ambivalent towards the U.S. administration's lack of European engagement. In fact, some in Western Europe have welcomed Obama's aloofness and feel more conformable with less American leadership in Europe.

However, Eastern Europeans tend to take a different view. To many in the former Warsaw Pact, and the three Baltic countries, President Obama's level of interest in the region has been disappointing compared to his two predecessors. For example, the Clinton administration oversaw the addition of the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary into NATO and sent thousands of American troops into harm's way to help pacify the Balkans. The Bush administration saw a further seven countries join NATO and paved the way with two more countries, Albania and Croatia, to join soon after his presidency.

Furthermore, George Bush ushered in the best U.S.-Eastern European relations in years and visited Eastern European countries seven times in his first term, compared to Obama's three. (Bush visited Eastern European countries a total of 21 times during his two terms). As things stand President Obama will be the first American president since the end of the Cold War not to welcome in a new member of NATO.³ To date, the new U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry has visited Europe on seven occasions. He has not visited a single Eastern European

country. While a lot of this may seem merely symbolic, perceptions and symbolism matter in international affairs.

Due to America's pivot to Asia, and the subsequent disengagement from Europe, many in Europe now believe that America can no longer be automatically counted on as a partner. Most now believe that American and European interests, while still sharing some similarities, are increasingly diverging. This point of view has been a driver of policy in many European countries. For example, the lack of U.S. engagement in Europe was one of the unofficial assumptions used when factoring the defense and security requirements during the United Kingdom's 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review. This view was reaffirmed by the crisis in Libya, and the lack of U.S. willingness to get involved there early on when the UK and France clearly made it a national priority.

The view that Europe's status has been downgraded under the current administration was further reinforced by the Pentagon's recent defense guidance. Issued in January 2012 and entitled "Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense," it contains barely a mention about Europe. In the whole 16-page document—one designed to give the U.S. Armed Forces and the civilians supporting them the Defense Secretary's broad vision and policy priorities—Europe and NATO receive only one short paragraph. And neither Europe nor NATO is mentioned in President Obama's foreword for the document.

Missile defense is another area where the U.S. has been inconsistent and weak in terms of European policy under Obama. The Administration has not only slowed down the implementation of missile defense in Europe, it has also reduced investment for it. When the Obama administration abruptly cancelled the emplacement of missile-defense components in the Czech Republic and Poland, commonly referred to as the "Third Site," back in 2009, those two countries felt as if the rug had been pulled out from underneath them. This was especially the case after both had offered unwavering support for missile defense in spite of staunch Russian opposition, and had strongly supported the U.S.

invasion of Iraq when it was fashionable in Europe to disagree with the war.

To make matters worse, it was reported that the Administration announcement cancelling the Third Site was done without first informing the leaders of the Czech Republic and Poland in a timely manner. To add insult to injury, in the case of Poland, this announcement was made on September 17, 2009, the 70th anniversary of the 1939 Soviet invasion of Poland. The treatment of Poland and the Czech Republic has tarnished America's reputation outside the Euro-Atlantic area. There are many partners in the Middle-East, especially the Gulf, who are wondering if they would be discarded in the same way as Poland and the Czech Republic if the Administration seeks an accommodation with Iran over its nuclear program. Consequently, many in Eastern Europe see a night-and-day difference between the levels of U.S. enthusiasm that existed for the region before and after President Obama entered office.

A Puzzling Distance

The lack of emphasis now placed on Europe by the U.S. must confound many European partners, who have ranked as some of America's staunchest allies since 9/11. After devoting so much blood and treasure to wars in Iraq and Afghanistan over the last decade, usually at great political cost at home, many wonder what it was all for. At the end of the day, it is not just Europe that loses out from an aloof American European policy. There are many reasons why the U.S. needs to stay engaged with the Continent.

Through NATO, some of America's closest military partnerships have been tried and tested. When critics in France and Germany were complaining that the U.S. was "going it alone" in Iraq, 23 European countries, 17 of which were also members of NATO, sent troops to Iraq. The troop contribution to Iraq of countries such as Poland, Italy and Georgia measured in the thousands. The UK

contributed 46,000 troops for the initial part of the invasion. Many European countries deployed troops to Iraq at great political cost.

European troops have even a greater presence in Afghanistan. Of the 50 nations, besides the United States, that have contributed 45,000 forces to the International Security Assistance Force, approximately 80 percent of these troops (37 nations) are European. Together, these 37 nations have contributed nearly a third of the military personnel serving in Afghanistan. It is true that there have been some shortcomings, such as major European powers not doing all they can in Afghanistan or disagreeing outright with the U.S. over Iraq in 2003. But on the whole, no other region of the world has been willing to back U.S. foreign policy objectives in the same way as Europe.

U.S. Forces in Europe Today

The U.S. has 21 main operating bases, primarily in Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, Turkey, and Spain. The number of U.S. installations in Europe has declined steadily since the Cold War. For example, in 1990, the U.S. Army had more than 850 sites in Europe, but today the total number for all services is approximately 300.

As part of a broader policy that is shrinking the U.S. forces around the world, the Obama Administration's most recent defense cuts will deeply impact the U.S. military footprint in Europe. These cuts send the wrong signal about America's commitment to transatlantic security and will embolden U.S. adversaries in the Euro-Atlantic region. Most importantly, the move will reduce the ability and flexibility of the U.S. to react to the unexpected in Eurasia and the Middle East.

On January 26, 2012, the Pentagon announced reductions in the U.S. military force posture in Europe:

- Inactivation of one A-10 squadron at Spangdahlem Air Base in 2013.
- Inactivation of the 603rd Air Control Squadron at Aviano Air Base

in 2013.

- Reduction of V Corps headquarters structure after deployment to Afghanistan later this year. It will not return to Europe.
- Inactivation of the 170th Brigade Combat Team (BCT) in 2013 and the 172nd BCT in 2014—a reduction of more than 8,000 soldiers that completely eliminates the U.S. Army’s mechanized capability in Europe.
- An additional reduction of approximately 2,500 soldiers in enabling units of the U.S. Army in Europe over the next five years.

The Air Force Cuts.

The inactivation of the 81st Fighter Squadron and the Air Control Squadron will create significant gaps in U.S. aviation capability in Europe. Disbanding the 81st Fighter Squadron, which is expected to deactivate and leave Europe after 53 years in June 2013, also means retiring its 20 A-10 fighter aircraft.⁴ The 81st Fighter Squadron played a key role in U.S.-led operations in the region and beyond, including the first Gulf War, Bosnia, Kosovo, the no-fly zone in Iraq in the late 1990s, Operation Iraqi Freedom, Operation Enduring Freedom,⁵ and most recently over Libya as part of Operation Unified Protector.⁶

The Defense Department has offered little public explanation of the logic of removing this capability from Europe. During his 2012 testimony to the House and Senate Armed Services Committees, Admiral Stavridis justified the decision by saying said that “even though we’re taking out some aircraft, we’re going to bring some new aircraft and (sic) including the V-22 which is optimized for special operations.”⁷ Nobody disputes the combat effectiveness of the V-22, which has proven itself in Iraq and Afghanistan. The V-22 is a very welcome

addition to USAFE and will provide U.S. commanders in Europe an additional capability, especially U.S. Special Forces in Europe.

However, the V-22 is not a substitute for the A-10. The A-10 is a ground attack aircraft that can destroy a main battle tank at a range of 6,500 meters using cannon capable of firing up to 4,200 rounds a minute.⁸ The V-22 Osprey is a vertical takeoff and landing tiltrotor aircraft that can carry up to 32 troops. As Admiral Stavridis pointed out in his statement, the V-22 is optimized for special operations, not ground attack. The capabilities offered by the A-10 and the V-22 could not be more opposite. Therefore, the assertion that V-22s can replace the A-10s is misleading.

The Army Cuts.

At the time of the Obama Administration's announcement in January 2012 the U.S. Army in Europe has two heavy BCTs (the 170th and 172nd Brigade Combat Teams in Germany), one Infantry BCT (the 173rd Airborne Brigade in Italy), and one Stryker BCT (the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment in Germany) permanently based in Europe. Because they constitute U.S. Army in Europe's primary armored force, cutting the two heavy BCTs will leave a significant capability gap in the U.S. ground forces. This echoes the analysis of the 2005 Overseas Basing Commission, which warned against removing a heavy BCT from Europe.⁹ Despite this warning, the Obama Administration is removing both heavy BCTs. The deactivation of the 170th BCT took in October 2012. A casing of the colors ceremony took place on October 9, 2012, marking the end of 50 years of having U.S. combat soldiers in Baumholder, Germany. The inactivation of the 172nd BCT is expected to take place in October 2013. In addition, the U.S. Army in Europe will see a further reduction of approximately 2,500 soldiers from enabling units over the next five years. In all, more than 10,000 soldiers will be removed from Europe.

In his testimony to the House and Senate Armed Services Committees, Admiral Stavridis justified this move by stating that the loss of these two BCTs will be mitigated by a dedicated BCT based in the

U.S. that will rotate its battalions to Europe for joint training. However, a single infantry battalion rotating through Europe cannot provide the same capability as two permanently based heavy BCTs provide.

Admiral Stavridis told Congress that the current BCT structure is “static and essentially parked in Germany.” He went on to say that dedicating a BCT in the United States to focus on Europe would allow its battalions to rotate to places like the Balkans, the Baltics, or other places in Eastern Europe.¹⁰ A renewed U.S. focus on these regions is welcome, but a single BCT based permanently in the United States cannot properly meet this ambition by occasionally rotating one of its battalions to Europe for joint training. Furthermore, elements of the BCTs based in Germany and Italy already deploy to Eastern Europe when they are not deployed on combat operations overseas. For example, elements of the 173rd Airborne Brigade carried out exercises in the Ukraine and Poland in 2011.¹¹

The decision to reduce the number of BCTs in Europe appears to have been based on perceived financial savings, not an empirical or strategic review of U.S. force requirements. On April 8, 2011, the Obama Administration initially announced that it was reversing the 2004 decision to remove two of the four BCTs from Europe and would instead only bring one BCT back to the United States. The Department of Defense provided the following justification:

Based on the administration’s review, consultations with allies and the findings of NATO’s new Strategic Concept, the department will retain three Brigade Combat Teams in Europe to maintain a flexible and rapidly deployable ground force to fulfill the United States’ commitments to NATO, to engage effectively with allies and partners, and to meet the broad range of 21st century challenges.¹²

In fact, former Defense Secretary Robert Gates said that no U.S. troops would be brought back from Europe until after 2015, when NATO leaders had agreed to complete the handover of security responsibilities to the Afghans and end combat operations, Gates implicitly acknowledged the importance of U.S. forces in Europe in supporting expeditionary campaigns, such as the one in Afghanistan. It

also highlighted the strain on EUCOM, which was trying to carry out joint training operations in Europe while supporting operations in Iraq and Afghanistan with only four BCTs.

A mere nine months later on January 25, 2012, the Obama Administration changed the policy, announcing that two BCTs will return back to the U.S. from Europe no later than 2014. The Administration has not explained what changed in the geostrategic picture of Europe since April 2011 so it can only be assumed that perceived cost savings, not strategic rationale, drove this decision.

The main reason usually given by proponents of reducing U.S. military bases in Europe is the perception of saving money. This is apparently the rationale for the Obama Administration's recent decision. However, the facts do not support this argument. First, reducing U.S. troops from Europe and achieving the same capability by regularly rotating units from the United States is not economically viable because deploying two mechanized BCTs and their equipment overseas to Europe would incur huge costs.

The Obama Administration has demonstrated this point with its unwillingness to rotate the same capability to Europe that they are removing. Instead of two BCTs, only one infantry battalion will rotate to Europe at a time. This is dangerous, shortsighted, and based on the false assumption that the U.S. can project the same degree of power with rotational forces as it does with troops permanently based in Europe.

The Case for U.S. Troops in Europe Today

There are strong economic, political and geographical reasons to keep large, robust and capable U.S. military forces in Europe.

The geographical case: Emerging threats from a dangerous region. The geography of the U.S. European Command shows why the region matters. The 51 countries in EUCOM's area of responsibility include approximately one-fifth of the world's population inside 10.7 million square miles of land and 13 million square miles of ocean.¹³ EUCOM has physical borders with Russia, the Arctic, Iran, Asia Minor, the Caspian Sea, and North Africa. Most of these areas have long histories

of instability and a potential for future instability that could directly impact the security interests and economic well-being of the United States. One of the most obvious benefits of having U.S. troops in Europe is its geographical proximity to some of the most dangerous and contested regions of the world. This proximity of U.S. forces gives policymakers the ability to respond quickly to a crisis.

To the south of Europe, from the eastern Atlantic Ocean to the Middle East and up to the Caucasus is an arc of instability. This region is experiencing increasing instability from demographic pressures, increased commodity prices, interstate and intrastate conflict, tribal politics, competition over water and other natural resources, religious tension, revolutionary tendencies, terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and frozen conflicts. This region also has some of the world's most vital shipping lanes, energy resources, and trade choke points. This is a recipe for instability. Recent instability in North Africa after the popular uprisings in 2011 has shown the utility of basing robust U.S. military capabilities near potential global hot spots. For example, when ordered to intervene in Libya, U.S. commanders in Europe were able to act effectively and promptly because of the well-established and mature U.S. military footprint in southern Europe.

Inside Europe itself the Balkans has a potential for future instability. Although security has improved dramatically in this region, there is still a potential for more violence. On a positive note, Albania and Croatia have joined NATO, and Croatia will soon join the EU. The situation in Kosovo still remains fragile. As recently as August 2011, elements of the 12th Combat Aviation Brigade were deployed to reinforce NATO's Multinational Brigade East in Kosovo after conflicts arose at border control points.¹⁴ The security situation in the Balkans is far from settled.

To the north, the Arctic or the High North is becoming more contested than ever before. During summer months, Arctic ice has been decreasing in size and new shipping lanes to Asia are opening as a result. Even if the recent reduction in Arctic ice is a cyclic phenomenon, it poses security challenges in the present. Of course, the U.S. has an

interest in stability and security in the Arctic because the U.S. is an Arctic nation. The American commitment to NATO is also relevant because four of the five Arctic powers are in NATO.¹⁵

Geography also plays an important role in missile defense, especially against medium-range and long-range missile threats from countries such as Iran. Locating major missile defense assets in Poland, Romania, Spain, and Turkey would help to protect U.S. interests and European NATO allies.

Russia is also important to the U.S. troop presence in Europe. With the Cold War over, Russia no longer poses a direct military threat to Western Europe, but Russia's future is uncertain. For some NATO members, Russia is still a force driver in military planning. For other U.S. allies, such as Georgia, Russia continues to be an aggressor. Nothing indicates that Russia is on a path to reform. Its economy is in tatters, its demographics and aging population are putting pressures on the state, and its government is best described as a thugocracy. In Russia democratic freedoms are in retreat, corruption is endemic, and the future is bleak. The same failings of the Soviet Union a quarter of a century ago are starting to reappear in Putin's Russia. Even with Russia's current economic difficulties, Vladimir Putin clearly indicated during his presidential campaign that he will invest heavily in Russia's military. In an article for *Rossiiskaya Gazeta*, Putin stated:

Under these circumstances, Russia cannot rely on diplomatic and economic methods alone to resolve conflicts. Our country faces the task of sufficiently developing its military potential as part of a deterrence strategy. This is an indispensable condition for Russia to feel secure and for our partners to listen to our country's arguments.

*We have adopted and are implementing unprecedented programs to develop our armed forces and modernize Russia's defense industry. We will allocate around 23 trillion rubles [\$775 billion] for these purposes over the next decade.*¹⁶

Putin has also linked strengthening the Russian economy with modernizing its armed forces. In the same article Putin suggested that financial investment in modernizing the Russian Armed Forces must "serve as fuel to feed the engines of modernization in our economy, creating real growth and a situation where government expenditure

funds new jobs, supports market demand, and facilitates scientific research.”¹⁷ Although Russia by itself should not drive the U.S. military presence in Europe, the second-order effects of Russian-induced instability in the region should be an ongoing NATO concern. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the fall of the Berlin Wall caught many by surprise. Western leaders should not allow a resurgent Russia catch them by surprise, too.

The Economic Case: Stability Equals Prosperity. A stable, secure, and economically viable Europe is in America’s financial interest. Regional security means economic viability and prosperity. For more than 60 years, the U.S. military presence in Europe has contributed to European stability, which has economically benefited both Europeans and Americans. The economies of the 27 member states of the European Union,¹⁸ along with United States, account for approximately half of the global economy. The U.S. and the members of the EU are each other’s number one trading partners. The potential impact of the current Eurozone crisis on the U.S. makes European economic stability more important than ever before. The Eurozone crisis could turn into a security crisis. For example, any instability or civil unrest resulting from Greece defaulting or leaving the Eurozone could spill over into the Balkans. Nobody can predict the security effects of the current Eurozone crisis.

The economic case also illustrates the importance of the greater European region to energy security and the free flow of trade. Some of the most important energy security and trade corridors are on the periphery of Europe as are some of the world’s most dangerous and unstable regions. European economies depend on oil and gas transported through the volatile Caucasus and several maritime choke points. As Arctic sea lanes start to open, shipping is increasing in that region, creating new security challenges.

The Political Case: Relations with European Allies Are Best Done Through NATO. The U.S. troop presence in Europe is the strongest signal of American support for NATO. Regardless of its institutional shortcomings, NATO has anchored the U.S. inside Europe for the past

64 years. It is important for the U.S. to engage its European allies through NATO, especially with the EU looking fractured and weak. Since the EU's failed 2004 Constitutional Treaty, the political situation among EU member states has become more fragile and incoherent. Recognizing this in 2005, the U.S. Overseas Basing Commission stated that the French and Dutch referendums rejecting the EU Constitutional Treaty "highlighted the continued weakness of the [European] Union and thus the importance of NATO to our relationship with Europe."¹⁹

The 2009 Lisbon Treaty, which replaced the failed Constitutional Treaty, was finally ratified by all EU member states after great political cost and controversy. Ireland initially rejected the Lisbon Treaty in the June 2008 referendum, but passed it in a second referendum in October 2009. Lingering political fallout from the Constitutional and Lisbon Treaties, coupled with the current Eurozone crisis has increased the risk of political instability in Europe. The current economic and political situation has also made the EU unpopular among Europeans. However, NATO still enjoys a high degree of increasing popular support. A recent Eurobarometer poll found that only 31 percent of Europeans have a positive image of the EU,²⁰ compared the most recent German Marshall Fund on Transatlantic Trends, which reported that 62 percent of Europeans thought that NATO was an essential organization.

Considering the EU's bleak future, the U.S. needs to continue multilateral political engagement in Europe through NATO. Maintaining full participation in NATO allows the U.S. to maintain a leadership role in European affairs in a way the EU would prevent. With all of the problems and the uncertain future, NATO should continue to be the primary interlocutor for U.S. engagement in Europe.

Capacity Building: Training European Allies to Fight. A capable and militarily strong NATO is in America's interest. NATO is only as strong as its member states, which is why joint training between U.S. forces and its allies is vital to keeping NATO a strong alliance. Preparing the militaries of European allies to deploy outside of NATO's borders offers huge benefits for the United States. In 2010, the U.S. carried out 33

major multinational training exercises involving 50,000 troops from 40 countries in Europe. Many of these training exercises were to prepare European allies for deployments to Afghanistan. Approximately 80 percent of the countries with forces deployed in Afghanistan are European.²¹ If these European troops were not in Afghanistan, U.S. would need to have deployed more troops. For example, a Georgian infantry battalion²² is fighting alongside U.S. Marines in Helmand province, one of the most dangerous parts of Afghanistan. The more America trains its allies to carry out challenging missions, such as in Afghanistan, the more they can share the burden carried by the U.S.

However, former EUCOM commander General Bantz Craddock told the House and Senate Armed Services Committees in 2007 that wartime deployments left him without the forces needed for exercises and other security cooperation in his area. Removing two more Brigade Combat Teams, as the Obama Administration is planning, will exacerbate this already difficult situation.²³

Opposition to U.S. bases in Europe is getting stronger.

There has been stiff opposition from various corners in the U.S. to the continued presence of U.S. forces in Europe. Often the opposition to U.S. forces in Europe's stems from the false assumption that they are there to protect Europeans. By extension, it is therefore believed by opponents that the U.S. tax payer is subsidizing the defense of wealthy Europeans who have decided to cut their own defense expenditure for the benefit of a bloated welfare state.

Perhaps the strongest opposition comes from the Republican controlled U.S. House of Representatives. In the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year (FY) 2013, the House of Representatives passed an amendment that called for the removal of all four U.S. Army Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) currently based in Europe. (It is likely that a similar amendment will be considered in the upcoming FY 2014 NDAA.)

The sponsors of the amendment, Representatives Mike Coffman (R-CO) and Jared Polis (D-CO), argue that the U.S. should not be subsidizing the defense of its European partners at a time when many European nations are cutting their own defense budgets. The 2012 Coffman–Polis amendment, which was passed by a vote of 226–196, went further than the Obama Administration’s current proposal and calls for the return to the United States of all four BCTs currently stationed in Europe and their replacement by rotational forces. However, this measure was not included in the Senate Conference Report and, therefore, did not make it into the NDAA.

Much of the frustration in the U.S. Congress is due to the lack of defense spending and investment in Europe. As an intergovernmental security alliance, NATO is only as strong as its member states. Of NATO’s 28 members, 26 are European. Of these, 21 are also in the EU. European countries collectively have more than two million men and women in uniform, yet, by some estimates only 100,000—a mere 5 percent—of them have the capability to deploy outside national borders.²⁴ Since 2008, the 16 European members of NATO have reduced their military spending. Reductions in many NATO countries have exceeded 10 percent.²⁵ In 2012, just four of the 28 NATO members—the United States, Estonia, Britain, and Greece—spent the required 2 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) on defense. France fell below the 2 percent mark in 2011.

The lack of defense investment by Europeans has had a direct impact on recent overseas operations. At the height of the combat operations in Afghanistan, many European NATO members were having difficulties deploying just dozens of troops at a time. When Europeans do send troops, many are restricted by numerous caveats, such as no flying at night or no combat patrols beyond a certain distance from a base.²⁶ Even though on a much smaller scale compared to Afghanistan, the recent campaign in Libya fared little better. What started off as a French–U.K.-inspired military adventure had to be quickly absorbed into a NATO operation because the Europe did not have the political will or military capability (without the U.S.) to see the mission through to completion. Regarding Europe’s contribution to the

Libya operation, former Secretary of Defence Robert Gates summed it up:

*However, while every alliance member voted for the Libya mission, less than half have participated at all, and fewer than a third have been willing to participate in the strike mission. Frankly, many of those allies sitting on the sidelines do so not because they do not want to participate, but simply because they can't. The military capabilities simply aren't there.*²⁷

This is mainly the result of a decrease in defense investment by the members of NATO since the end of the Cold War, and the lack of political will to use military capability when and where it is needed. The lack of defense investment by Europeans since the end of the Cold War, and the subsequent dependence on the U.S., has planted the seed of discontent among U.S. lawmakers. It is true that the presence of U.S. forces in Europe contributes to the collective defense of European allies, but this is a consequence of, not the reason for, maintaining a robust military presence.

The Way Ahead.

Far from reducing the U.S. military presence in Europe, the Obama Administration should examine ways to increase the U.S. presence, especially on Europe's periphery and with allies who have been committed to Euro-Atlantic security. In 2004, General Jim Jones, EUCOM commander, told Congress that any "new bases should have a transformational footprint, be geo-strategically placed in areas where presence yields the highest return on investment, be able to both contract and expand as required and should...take advantage of our developing ability to rotationally base our forces."²⁸ His advice still applies today.

Some believe that the European region is yesterday's news and that the U.S. should focus on defense and security issues in Asia. Indeed, the U.S. and its allies are facing emerging security challenges in the Asia-Pacific region. Furthermore, the world's economic interdependency means that factors that affect the security situation in Asia will often

directly affect Europe. U.S. force posture in Asia and U.S. force posture in Europe are complementary. It is not a zero-sum game.

Some believe that the U.S. should not have a robust military presence in Europe because the Europeans should defend themselves and that the U.S. should not be providing a security umbrella at the expense of the American taxpayer. However, the primary objective of U.S. forces in Europe is to provide a forward-based military capability that gives U.S. decision makers timely and flexible military options in defending America and promoting American interests in the broader European region. The U.S. contribution to the collective defense of Europe is simply a positive side effect.

The Administration's justifications for cuts in U.S. military capability in Europe do not add up. No matter how it is spun, V-22s are not a replacement for A-10s, and a rotating infantry battalion is not the same as two heavy BCTs permanently based in Europe. The Administration's cuts in the U.S. force posture in Europe are part of a large array of defense cuts that will weaken America and its allies. The decision to remove a large number of U.S. troops and their associated military capabilities from Europe and the Administration's disgraceful treatment of Poland and the Czech Republic over missile defense plans sends the signal to European allies that America no longer cares about Europe.

The U.S. military presence in Europe deters American adversaries, strengthens allies, and protects U.S. interests. Whether preparing U.S. and Allied troops and deploying them to Afghanistan or responding to a humanitarian crisis in the region, the U.S. can more quickly and effectively project power and react to the unexpected using its forward-based military capabilities in Europe. Reducing this capability will only make America weaker on the world stage.

In the past 90 years, the U.S. has disengaged from Europe on two occasions: during the early 1920s when the U.S. occupation force left the Rhineland and during the huge troop drawdown in the early 1990s. Both cases saw new eras of instability and warfare on the continent. America's economic and security interests require a stable Europe, and the U.S. military presence in Europe contributes to this.

¹For example, between 1990 and 1993 the number of U.S. soldiers in Europe decreased from 213,000 in 1990 to 122,000 in 1993, and the number of U.S. Army installations across Europe dropped from 858 to 415. However, during this time the U.S. Army in Europe command supported 42 deployments required 95,579 personnel. U.S. Army Europe, “History,” <http://www.eur.army.mil/organization/history.htm> (accessed May 12, 2013).

²A brigade combat team is a self-contained combined arms formation and the basic deployable maneuver unit in the U.S. Army. There are three types of combat brigades: Heavy Brigade Combat Teams, Infantry Brigade Combat Teams, and Stryker Brigade Combat Teams.

⁴U.S. Air Forces in Europe Public Affairs, “FY2013 Budget Cuts to Impact U.S. Air Forces in Europe” Spangdahlem Air Base, Germany, February 22, 2012, <http://www.spangdahlem.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123290946> (accessed May 11, 2013).

⁵Spangdahlem Air Base, “81st Fighter Squadron,” October 21, 2010, <http://www.spangdahlem.af.mil/library/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=7910> (accessed April 30, 2013).

⁶Joe Pappalardo, “Air War over Libya, in the Pilots’ Words,” *Popular Mechanics* March 31, 2011, <http://www.popularmechanics.com/technology/military/planes-uavs/air-war-over-libya-in-the-pilots-words-5486669> (accessed April 12, 2013).

⁷Stavridis, testimony, March 1, 2012.

⁸Airforce Technology, “A-10 Thunderbolt (Warthog), United States of America,” <http://www.airforce-technology.com/projects/a-10/> (accessed April 13, 2013).

⁹Dempsey, “Questioning EU’s Will, U.S. Panel Backs NATO.”

¹⁰Admiral James Stavridis, testimony before the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives, March 1, 2012, <http://armedservices.house.gov/index.cfm/2012/2/fiscal-year-2013-national-defense-authorization-budget-request-from-u-s-european->

command-and-u-s-africa-command (accessed May 17, 2013).

¹¹News release, "U.S. Army Europe Looks Back at a Busy, Productive 2011."

¹²News Release, "DOD Announced U.S. Force Posture Revision in Europe," U.S. Department of Defense, April 8, 2011, <http://www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=14397> (accessed May 23, 2013).

¹³Stavridis, "European Command."

¹⁴News release, "U.S. Army Europe Looks Back at a Busy, Productive 2011," U.S. Army Europe, January 5, 2011, http://www.eur.army.mil/news/archive2011/2012-01-05_YIR2011text.htm (accessed April 11, 2013).

¹⁵U.S., Canada, Norway, and Denmark (Greenland). The non-NATO Arctic Sea power is Russia.

¹⁶Vladimir Putin, "Being Strong," *Foreign Policy*, February 21, 2012, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/02/21/being_strong (accessed April 11, 2013).

¹⁷Ibid.

¹⁸Any further mention of the European Union in this document refers to the 27 independent and sovereign nation-states that collectively form the European Union.

¹⁹Judy Dempsey, "Questioning EU's Will, U.S. Panel Backs NATO," *The New York Times*, September 13, 2005, <http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/12/world/europe/12iht-nato.html> (accessed May 22, 2013).

²⁰European Commission, "Eurobarometer 76: Public Opinion in the European Union," December 2011, p. 20, http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb76/eb76_first_en.pdf (accessed April 11, 2013).

²¹Admiral James G. Stavridis, "European Command Posture Statement," testimony before Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives, and Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, March 30,

2011,

http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/postures/posture_eucom_30mar2011.pdf (accessed May 11, 2013).

²²This commitment from Georgia will be doubled in the autumn of 2012, making Georgia the largest troop contributor per capita.

²³General Bantz J. Craddock, statement before the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives, March 15, 2007, <http://www.dod.mil/dodgc/olc/docs/TestCraddock070315.pdf> (accessed May 11, 2013).

²⁴Nick Whitney, "Re-Energising Europe's Security and Defence Policy," European Council on Foreign Relations *Policy Paper*, July 2008, p. 20, http://ecfr.3cdn.net/678773462b7b6f9893_djm6vu499.pdf (accessed April 3, 2013).

²⁵News release, "Military Balance 2012," International Institute for Strategic Studies, March 7, 2012, <http://www.iiss.org/en/about%20us/press%20room/press%20releases/press%20releases/archive/2012-eb1/march-1290/military-balance-2012-press-statement-b956> (accessed May 22, 2013).

²⁶David P. Auerswald and Stephen M. Saideman, "NATO at War: Understanding the Challenges of Caveats in Afghanistan," presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 2009, p. 9, <http://www.aco.nato.int/resources/1/documents/NATO%20at%20War.pdf> (accessed April 3, 2013).

²⁷Robert M. Gates, "The Security and Defense Agenda (Future of NATO)," speech delivered in Brussels, June 10, 2011, <http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1581> (accessed April 3, 2013).

²⁸General James L. Jones, statement before the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, September 23, 2004, <http://armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2006/March/Jones%2003-07-06.pdf> (accessed May 25, 2013).

SECURITY COOPERATION BETWEEN POLAND AND THE BALTIC REGION

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Abstract

The paper discusses the Polish perceptions about the Baltic region security in relation to political, military, economic and social security areas. Warsaw's position is the focus; however, the three Baltic States viewpoints are also discussed. The paper is based on official positions and documents. One of important aspect of the article is related to highlighting the common initiatives of the four nations to enhance their security both regionally and also within international organizations e.g. the European Union and NATO. The conclusions present possible developments and areas of future cooperation that are important for all nations involved in the predictable short-term timeframe.

Introduction

The Baltic Region has always been important for Poland and this importance is even more important in the current geopolitical situation in Europe compared to the past. The collapse of former dependences related both to Poland and also newly independent countries of the region: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania created a new situation. All the nations also had similar ambitions to be closer to the West, to get under American security umbrella and finally to join NATO and the EU. At the same time, they partially (Poland), or entirely (three Baltic States) started to build national structures in all domains of modern society. It was a complex challenge as national security “manifests itself in all areas of activities of an entity.... Within the framework of international and

national security we can recognize such the fields of security as: economic, social, military, public, environmental, information, etc.”¹ It was a necessary and urgent mission to guarantee stability of the security system of nations, to preserve the continuity of policy, territorial integrity, economic development and the prosperity of the people.²

This article will cover the Polish perception of the region’s security in relation to possible threats that could endanger the region. The challenges will be related to such security areas as: political, military, economic and the social domain. The Warsaw position will be the main focus. However, the other national viewpoints will be discussed to clarify specific areas of concern. This study is based on official statements and documents. An important aspect will be to highlight the common initiatives of the four nations to enhance both their security regionally and also as a part of international organizations. The conclusions will present some possible options and areas of cooperation that will be important for all the nations involved in the predictable short-term timeframe.

Regional Solidarity

From the Polish perspective, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia are important and integral elements of Polish national security. This it is not related to purely military threats but also to further spheres of national security, including: the economy, social affairs, energy, transport, the cyber domain and others³. This perspective is linked with historically driven national interest in preserving integrity and security focusing not only on USA, the UE and NATO umbrellas but also on building regional institutions and groupings based on solidarity and common perception of possible future challenges. This is why the need for such regional cooperation was highlighted in strategic level documents at the beginning of 1990s that recognized the still existing threat from the East and put an accent on the need for cooperation with eastern neighbours.⁴ Also, in 2007, in the Republic of Poland’s Security Strategy (*Strategia Bezpieczeństwa Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej*), regional cooperation was stressed and included the importance of the Baltic region for national security. This was in line with NATO approach to the complex

contemporary challenges, which are differing in nature. The document stated that it was important to preserve and develop security cooperation with partners in the Central Europe and also the Caucasus. It was also highlighted that the Baltic region was important for NATO as a part of solidarity policy and also for Polish national security in all its domains.

Fig. 1. Poland and the Baltic States.



*Source: Poland: Eastern or Central European country? PolishForums.com,
(Warsaw 17 September 2011)*

<http://www.polishforums.com/history-poland-34/poland-eastern-central-european-country-15305/18/> [accessed: 16/04/2013].

The Strategy recognizes the complexity of contemporary security, as mentioned previously, and is identifying the European Union (EU) role to support non-military domains of every nation's identity to help to face challenges related to it. In this case, the EU undertakings are

important for the Eastern Europe by providing provisions for the development of the whole region and also as a significant element of European stability. The strategy precisely pointed out the need and importance of increasing good relations with “*Lithuania and other Baltic States*” based on bilateral relations, but also in the framework of EU politics.⁵ The specific role of Vilnius is not surprising as the country directly borders Poland creating a direct land link between the Baltic region and the rest of Europe. It also possesses the biggest territory, population and capabilities among the Baltic States. What is important is that Warsaw clearly recognizes each single nation as a separate state and does not treat the region as one entity, which is often done in the case of some other nations. The strategy treats the energy security very seriously, directly mentioning the importance of the Polish LNG (Liquefied Natural Gas) terminal in Świnoujście, which is supposed to be completed mid-2014. The terminal, when merged with gas pipelines such as the Baltic Pipe and the Gas Interconnector Poland - Lithuania (GIPL), would enable diversification of gas supplies of the Baltic States contributing to their energy security.⁶

Since 2007 many important changes have occurred in the world and in Europe and closer cooperation among EU nations have become more important. Among such changes are the USA shift from Europe into the Pacific region, more activity by regional groupings inside Europe, and the Euro Zone crisis. At the same time, the challenges for the Baltic regional security started became more obvious as exemplified by the Russian compatriot policy, energy related crises, the ambitious program of modernization of the Russian armed forces and the huge military exercise in the regions bordering the Baltics. The new developments demand closer cooperation, at least from Polish foreign policy point of view. In the case of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania Polish policy is related to factors linked with national perception of threats and challenges. First, the region directly borders Russia and Belarus and there are possible future problems related to those nations’ possible instability with direct implications for Warsaw. In addition, all three countries are both NATO and EU nations, so solidarity with them is not only desired but also an obligation in the framework of a properly understood relationship enhanced by international treaties including rights and

obligations indicated in the Article V of the Washington Treaty. Such obligations are treated very seriously in Warsaw. There is also another factor related to the region. The relations with the USA and the Baltic States is similar to Poland; the relations are very close and friendly as these countries considers the US relationship as one of pillars of national security. Such the situation makes bilateral and multilateral relationships more important, which is demonstrated by reciprocal visits of top level politicians.

The Polish approach to Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania was presented in the Priorities of the Polish Foreign Policy 2012-2016 released in March 2012. The document presents the official position of Warsaw regarding current developments in the world and in the neighbourhood as it describes possible threats and opportunities. When discussing diverse directions and dimensions of regional cooperation it recognizes similarity of approach to analogous risks stating that, "Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia share many common views and interests, especially with respect to Eastern issues, Euro-Atlantic security and the EU's development."⁷⁷ Moreover, the Priorities also note that, "in relations with Lithuania, the goal for the next few years is to build partnership on the basis of pragmatism, mutual respect and respecting international agreements, including also in the area of treatment of national minorities. Estonia's experiences in e-administration and cyber security are an inspiration for Poland. In 2011, Poland became a member of the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence. Active participation in the Centre's work will enable meeting the challenges in new areas of defence."⁷⁸ Nevertheless, when presenting tasks related to regional cooperation, no Baltic State is mentioned nor is the role of the region from precisely defined Polish perspective, a country with aspirations to be regional leader.⁹

In general, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are important as their geopolitical location has always been linked with the security of Poland. There is also a historical motivation. Currently, cooperation is more extensive and bilateral visits and multilateral meetings support building relations based on common and national interests. The examples of this include the meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Visegrad, Nordic

and Baltic countries, which was conducted lately in Gdańsk on the 20th of February 2013.¹⁰ The meeting was hosted by Ministers of Foreign Affairs - Swedish Carl Bildt and Polish Radosław Sikorski. What is significant is that the meeting was a discussion forum of three regional groupings (Visegrad-4, Nordic countries and Baltic States), presenting Warsaw's desire to facilitate wider Baltic cooperation to strengthen the EU and Europe as a whole. The participants discussed such topics as single EU market, energy security, transportation unification, the Eastern Partnership, developments in Russia and also European security. The meeting concluded with common statement in which, "The Ministers expressed their interest in gradually bringing the Nordic/Baltic and Visegrad regional cooperation closer together."¹¹

The problems of regional cooperation of Northern and Central Europe were also discussed during the Seminar in Tallinn on 12 April 2013. The seminar was organized by the Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Embassy of the Republic of Poland and with the presence of ambassadors from other nations. The topics focused mainly around regional issues and especially significant was the title of the speech by Dr. Olaf Osica, Director of the Eastern Studies Centre in Warsaw, "United we stand, divided we fall? Themes and challenges for Nordic, Baltic and V4 cooperation."¹² This highlighted the need for joint initiatives to support the international policy of any member of the region.

Those are just a few examples among the many politically motivated initiatives that support regional teamwork and, at the same time, support the role of Poland as partner and facilitator of a common approach to face challenges together. These initiatives are increasing as long as the importance of the regional solidarity, in the framework of the EU is receiving more attention among Central Europe nations. Such initiatives and active involvement in closer neighborhood interactions present an evolving international policy of Warsaw and recognize the value of closer cooperation not only with Western Europe. However, Poland is still seen as the country in which "strategic interests are tied with bigger military powers in Europe – in particular Germany and France in the form of 'Weimar' cooperation – and it remains traditionally

pro-American, having committed to a substantive fleet of F-16s. Yet it is anxious to keep its fingers on Central European affairs.”¹³ Thus, official meetings are an important element of building common understanding but they must be followed by tangible mutual initiatives which show that the integration of interests is ongoing. For Poland, it could be a factor strengthening its political position based on close cooperation on the East flank of both NATO and EU. From a political point of view, it could be also support partnership with the US by building regional relations in which Warsaw would be desired partner. Moreover, this card could be played within such entities as the Weimar Triangle framework or the Visegrád Group.

Enhancing bilateral relations

The bilateral contacts between Warsaw and each nation in the Baltic region are rather active and focus on enhancing the already existing cooperation. In November 2012 President Komorowski visited Riga. During the meeting with President Bēriņš he discussed broadening cooperation in energy sector, transport, and common approach to the EU budgets and also the shared standpoints within NATO regarding issues concerning the region. They also agreed, following the European Security Strategy, to promote Western values in the East, including common political principles when supporting the Eastern Partnership (EaP).¹⁴ Warsaw is also very seriously considering Latvia as a partner in building future gas connections, partly to enhance bilateral and regional security, but also as important contributor to investments related to nuclear energy projects.

Poland is also carefully monitoring the fiscal issues. President Bēriņš of Latvia signed on 15 February, 2013 signed the act to implement the Euro and replace the national currency – the Lat. The Saeima, the parliament of the Republic of Latvia, approved the law on 31 December 2012.¹⁵ Warsaw is also considering the Euro as a future currency. However, the terms and dates are not clear at this time. The Euro as the national currency has already been implemented in Estonia and Lithuania and this confirms that, “the euro remains our strategic goal. Nevertheless, we’d like to see a clearer and more stable situation in

the euro zone at the time when we adopt the euro.”¹⁶ The current Lithuanian Prime Minister Algirdas Butkevicius also holds that position saying, “although de facto we already have the euro, unfortunately we do not feel all the advantages of the euro area” and “the Social Democrats-led government is planning to introduce the euro in 2015.”¹⁷ So, there is shared position among the concerned nations-- which is important-- as the introduction of Euro to all of them would further enhance trade exchange and supporting mutual stabilization and security, and the integration of national financial and free market.

Cooperation with Estonia is increasing in many fields and politicians of both nations are highlighting the importance of good relations. This is visible during official visits and presented in official statements. Both countries shares concerns regarding the policy of Russia to use its energy resources as economic instrument of power. Thus, the Estonian decision to refuse the Nord Stream AG Consortium to conduct research in its exclusive economic zone was understood. The decision was linked to national security, ecology, and the possibility to conduct research concerning national resources.¹⁸ This approach was understood as an example of the similar geopolitical concerns of both countries, especially in the field of energy security. The confidence in Poland’s potential and common interest was expressed by President Ilves of Estonia in Cracow during his visit to celebrate the 20th anniversary of the Institute for Strategic Studies. The president said that, “Poland is a country that could be a leader in the European Union and NATO. It has a position that allows it to speak of things that if would come out of other mouth would go unnoticed.”¹⁹ Thus, he was referring to a reciprocal feeling on the Polish side in the sense of belonging to a common regional security system. Estonia was among the first countries to suffer from a cyber-attack and Estonia is an advocate of establishing common efforts to face such the threats. The importance of that dimension was visualized by creation of the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (NATO CCD COE) in 2008. Poland is participating in the Centre’s activities in a correct understanding that threat.

In March 2013 the Polish Premier Tusk again met with President Ilves and Premier Ansip in Tallinn. The focus was on security concerns, the Eastern Partnership, energy sector and transportation systems (Rail Baltica). Premier Ansip recognized the Polish contribution to Baltic Air Policing and Premier Tusk was interesting in the experience related to joining the Euro zone. He was congratulated for successful tackling the economic crisis. Tusk was also interested in sharing information related to the exploration of shale oil and the utilization of renewable energy sources. So, there are many areas to share information and the bilateral will exists to help each other with current challenges. It was even courteously mentioned that “all Estonians know that Poland is the only major country in the world that understands the problems of Estonians.”²⁰ The Estonian will and readiness to build-up regional security was expressed in February by the Estonian Minister of Defence Urmas Reinsalu during a speech in the National Defence Academy in Warsaw. He commented that, when building national security, a nation cannot rely only on United States. In parallel it is necessary to create national defence capabilities based on local and European potentials and experiences. Reinsalu declared the need for regular meetings of government, ministerial and armed force officials and the need to conduct military exercises to enhance NATO readiness to effectively react to situation of an ever-changing global security environment.²¹ Such a position was followed on 20 May, 2013 when Polish-Estonian consultations were held in Warsaw that focused on security. During the meeting, the representatives of both nations’ Ministries of National Defence and Ministries of Foreign Affairs discussed strengthening bilateral cooperation within NATO as well as the EU.²² The practical dimension of teamwork was presented by exercise the “Spring Storm 2013” in Estonia (09 - 25 May 2013) with contingents from Belgium, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and United Kingdom.²³

The bilateral relations of Poland and each Baltic State are still determined by many circumstances related to the developments of last few decades. All the four nations are members of identical international and security organizations and they have a similar circle of allies in the international arena, so it is natural that they would cooperate closely to build a common security and economic space. This space is based on

multilateral platforms: the Euro-Atlantic, the Baltic-Nordic forum and others. The cooperation is, in general, a proper one. However, there are some national internal challenges influencing cooperation at different levels. There are no major problems relating to relations with Estonia and Latvia, although historically there were some struggles on the territory of both nations involving Polish troops. However, the relations between Warsaw and Vilnius are influenced by historic events that inspire statements and decisions at the political level based on the need to preserve local support for actors and these make bilateral relations more complicated. Such historically driven catchwords are skillfully used by radical politicians and they play with fire when using them for short term gains. It is dangerous because such language can significantly harm bilateral relations and also influence elections with long-term consequences at different levels from the regional to the national administrations.

The situation seems to be stabilizing. This was demonstrated by the visit of the Lithuania Premier Algridas Butkevicius to Warsaw on 12 February 2013. During the meeting with Polish PM Donald Tusk the focus was on economic cooperation and energy security, but talks also included the situation of the Polish minority in Lithuania. Bilateral relationships are complex, and on one side there are efforts to develop market mechanisms, that are critical to continue the development of both nations, especially when facing a crisis. There are still problems but they could be solved easily through common sense and good will. The situation is currently much better as the Lithuanian Poles' Electoral Action Political Group (Lietuvos lenkų rinkimų akcija – Lithuanian) has 8 seats in the Seimas of the Lithuanian Republic, and is also part of the government²⁴. A change is expressed by both sides as there are common geopolitical interests. On 16 February 2013 President Komorowski said that both nations, “are going parallel in the same direction and we are together in the framework of democratic world, together in NATO and in the EU.”²⁵ The former President of Lithuania, Valdas Adamkus, expressed sympathy for Poland's aspirations to be a leader among the Central European nations, but he advised that it would not be possible without good relations with Vilnius. There is hope that, in the long term, bilateral relations will no longer be influenced by internal policy issues

although such issues will be always present in election campaigns. There is also a shared understanding that both nations need each other, however Poland is – up to some extent – in a better situation because the size of the nation actually matters.

The document 'Priorities of the Polish Foreign Policy 2012-2016' mentions the region noting that the importance of improving relations is understood, "however, the low starting point for Polish political engagement should count as a weakness" so "the Polish northern policy, which is currently being drawn up, needs to be tailored to regional dynamics."²⁶ It must be supported by breaking historical prejudices and stereotypes and developing better understanding. There is significant role for diplomacy in this dimension and it opens the door for all other activities and initiatives. Moreover, common undertakings are profitable to raise regionally related issues at the top EU level supporting their implementation. It should be supported by closer links of regional groupings e.g. closer cooperation of Visegrad-4, NORDEFECO, and also think-tanks as the Baltic Development Forum, the Polish Institute of International Affairs and the Centre for Eastern Studies in Warsaw, the International Centre for Defence Studies in Tallinn, the LT Think Tank in Vilnius, the Latvian Institute of International Affairs in Riga and others. The role of dialogue and discussion must be strengthened to facilitate cooperation and a common approach, which is boosting development of the region and the Baltic nations. Thus, relations are improving and this is perceived by politicians and there is time for making informed decisions.

There is still potential for the further development of cooperation in the military domain especially as threats are evolving and they are currently not only conventional in nature as various asymmetric threats are emerging and these are trans-border in nature. To deal with these the need for close cooperation is growing which will require more common and comprehensive initiatives. The bilateral relations are more intensive and support mutual recognition and dialogue, which enables a better understanding in terms of solving sensitive problems. It is especially important in the context of the "slow down" of the Eastern Partnership dynamics as the Ukraine has decided not to sign a trade and

cooperation agreement with the EU. The Kiev economic agreement with Moscow could be a signal for Warsaw, Riga, Tallinn and Vilnius to enhance closer relations to facilitate multilateral support.

The need for enhanced economic cooperation and synchronization

From the economic point of view the geopolitical location of Poland plays a significant role in relation to the whole Baltic region. This is related to the fact that, "Poland's convenient situation in the centre of Europe, at the crossroads of its main transportation routes, means that goods can be exported from the country all over Europe and thus reach over half a billion consumers."²⁷ This is especially important now as, in spite of the European economic crisis, there are indicators of economic recovery, especially in Baltic countries, so the trade volume is likely to grow. One of important issues for Warsaw, Vilnius, Riga, and Tallinn is the diversification of energy sources, which is economically important, and also has political and security dimensions. The energy resource crises of recent years related to downsizing or the cutting of supplies by Gazprom have been a means to send a political warning. Moreover, Gazprom can enforce high prices. For example, Lithuania pays the highest energy prices in Europe as a result of its unequivocal policy regarding energy. The monopoly of one supplier, especially in relation to natural gas, is uncomfortable and unacceptable for any nation. The complexity of energy security was highlighted by President Komorowski during his visit to Riga in November 2012. When discussing the national and regional risks he said that, "one of the most forthcoming domains could be energy security. Both Poland and Latvia are looking for ways to diversify the supply of strategic raw materials."²⁸ The same problem was discussed in Warsaw in November 2012 at the National Security Bureau (NSB) during talks between the Head of the NSB Mr. Koziej and the Estonian President's Security Adviser Mrs. Maigre. Poland recognizes the need for such the contacts as these could facilitate²⁹ the following: better regional integration and encouragement of a free energy market, developing infrastructure to including building nuclear power plants, and researching the options of gas shale exploration and distribution.

Fig. 2. Proposed location of the Gas Interconnection Poland – Lithuania (GIPL).



Source: 'Case made for a Poland to Lithuania gas pipeline', Pipeline Industry Marketing Solutions (15 February 2012), [accessed: 21/04/2013],

http://pipelinesinternational.com/news/case_made_for_a_poland_to_lithuania_gas_pipeline/066218/

However, the talks should involve a deeper discussion to coordinate energy related projects including not only the economy but also the political dimension. For example, Poland is constructing a LNG terminal in Świnoujście, which will be ready in 2014. At the same time, a similar LNG feasibility studies are continuing in all the Baltic States. From the Polish perspective, to fully utilize the terminals the important

element of infrastructure should be the Gas Interconnection Poland – Lithuania (GIPL), as this could enable the flow of gas in relation to West – East and the East – West, providing new opportunities.³⁰ Another important element also would be the inclusion of the Latvian Inčukalns Underground Gas Storage Facility into the project, extending the capabilities of the whole system. However, according to the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs Sikorski, the economic feasibility of LNG terminals and gas pipelines must be done very through, as e.g. building both Klaipeda LNG terminal and GIPL is not cost effective in the case of Lithuania.³¹ That aspect is directly related to energy security and also the desire of each side to preserve its independence as much as possible. It is connected with the experience of Russian dominance in the Baltic energy market so diversification is also linked with an aspiration to create feasible options, which could be exploited to have desired flexibility to make really autonomous decisions.

Poland is also interested in nuclear energy and it is considering two options. The first one is focusing on building two nuclear power plants having a total capacity of 6000 MW. The project is currently ongoing, proceeding with local issues and a contract to build the first reactor. The project is supposed to make the first energy block operational in 2024. The advantage is that it could be automatically incorporated into the existing energy network.³² The second option has been related to the Warsaw contribution to the Visaginas nuclear power plant. However, in December 2011 the PGE (Polska Grupa Energetyczna – Polish Energy Group) “decided to freeze our participation in this program before making any formal commitments.”³³ Nevertheless, Poland is still following the development program and negotiations with the Japanese Hitachi firm and this was discussed in April 2013 during the meeting of prime ministers of all four nations. The lead nation is Lithuania and the strategic partners are Estonia and Latvia. The challenge related to the Visaginas project is a lack of grids linking it with the Central Europe. This is why the Polish – Lithuanian Energy Grid and ESTLINK II connecting Estonia and Finland are directly linked with the feasibility of that nuclear power plant as they are the only options to break the isolation of the whole region and positively influence its energy security.³⁴

The Polish – Lithuania energy partnership is a priority not only for Warsaw, it is also important for Vilnius as expressed by Linas Linkevicius, the Minister of the Foreign Affairs. He said that a common approach to energy related projects and infrastructure should be a priority and that no issues should hamper it, including minority matters. He expressed the desire to make a clear division between strategically important matters and internal disputes used for interior political games.³⁵ The Polish involvement in energy endeavours is important as it could help to stabilize and normalize gas prices, especially as Gazprom fees differ significantly among European nations, which is not acceptable in the long run. Only diversification and common effort can leverage the current uncomfortable situation. Another issue is related to shale gas, as if “Europe focused on developing its shale gas resources it could negotiate better deals from Russia’s Gazprom, a key supplier for the continent” and could be “good instrument for our long-term negotiations.”³⁶ The key point is that Poland and the Baltic States possess this resource and it is recognized by Gazprom as a potential threat for resource supremacy when it is fully exploited. Consequently, more common and unified efforts are important and these should include sharing experience to exploit that emerging opportunity.

A further challenge is related to the collective development of a common European energy market and linking it with all “Energy Islands” such as the Baltic region. Poland is an important contributor to close that energy gap and to support the solidarity of the EU in that fragile domain. Especially as infrastructure is rather expensive and no single nation is able to cover the enormous costs to enforce a joint approach, it needs to be supported by EU funds. The close cooperation of Poland and the Baltic states and the common funding of energy projects by the EU are highly recommended. Such a collective approach would be advantageous not only for the region, but also for the EU in longer perspective.³⁷ It is important to highlight the role of Lithuania, which is following very a clear and strict policy to mitigate its dependency on one supplier. As such, it is important for Warsaw and Brussels, being important allies in the region and also required constituents of any deal because of their geopolitical location, plan to build the nuclear power plant and it should be supported if requested

and economically accepted. The country is also critical partner to develop land transportation infrastructure to include both Rail Baltica and Via Baltica. The current rail and road systems are not fully meeting expectations and they could, to some extent, support also flow of goods to increase trade volume, but also energy security by enabling the flow of some quantities of LNG or petroleum. However, both projects have been delayed even though there are funds dedicated to support it, “from EU financing under the TEN-T priority project.”³⁸

In general, Warsaw’s policy in relation to Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania follows the way of thinking in Brussels and is enhanced by geographical proximity. There are a few options to improve the current situation to include: a joint approach to receive funds from the EU for common projects, mutual foreign direct investments, improving the climate for investments and easing tariff barriers for exchange of goods and services, exchanges in the field of research and development, and advancing transportation systems. From this perspective Poland has also one more advantage; it is a relatively large market so there are many export opportunities for all three Baltic States. This is worth consideration, especially as the nations are successfully recovering after the crisis period. As a result, Warsaw, being a relatively big market, could encourage enhanced trade relations with all the nations. From an economic point of view there are good reasons to increase the political engagement with each of the states to better integrate the EU free market, including the fragile areas of each nation’s security e.g. energy security.

Sharing common military security concerns

The beginning of the political change in Europe in the 1990s automatically influenced military domain of the security. The focus of Poland and all the Baltic states was on joining NATO and to create close cooperation with the US as guarantors of the security while facing the developing situation on the continent. Poland was the first to join the organization and also supported Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in their efforts based on full understanding of their strategic importance for both NATO and Warsaw. An example of cooperation was the creation of the

Lithuanian-Polish Peace Force Battalion (LITPOLBAT)³⁹ for peace-keeping missions being, “one of the most vivid expressions of strategic partnership between Poland and Lithuania.”⁴⁰ Moreover, soldiers from all the nations were involved in the Multinational Division Central-South (MND-CS) in Iraq where Poland was the lead nation. Serving together during a variety of missions was an enabler of creating closer interaction, sharing experiences, and building understanding and lasting friendships. The cooperation also related to military education such as the Polish Tadeusz Kościuszko Land Forces Academy in Wrocław which started cooperation with regional military academies. This is still continuing and is demonstrated by mutual visits and common training exercises. Additionally, Poland recognizes the importance of the Baltic Defence College, founded in Tartu, Estonia on 25 February 1999 by Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Polish officers have been educated there from 2001 and Polish instructors have been part of the Directing Staff since 2003.⁴¹

Poland is also continuing its support for the region and the Polish Air Forces completed the fourth rotation of the Orlik mission over Baltics in April 2012.⁴² The mission is also important from a Polish security point of view. According to the former deputy commander of the Polish Air Forces, “a permanent mission would be a reasonable option as it could be also associated with the protection of the Polish airspace. At the same time, the Polish Air Force and also other contributors can demonstrate their support and the unity of the Alliance.”⁴³ From the political and military perspective the Polish contribution to NATO mission should be continued enhancing national, regional and European security. It is understood and “Polish pilots will continue contributing in securing the airspace over Baltic States” as security threats are shared among respective nations and reliable members of the Alliance.⁴⁴ The statement was linked with recognizing a common stand point to be presented at the NATO Summit in Chicago, putting an accent on the importance of Article V of the Washington Treaty as a warranty of the territorial integrity of all the nations. Moreover, the significance of future projects, including air defence and the anti-ballistic missile shield concept was highlighted. What is significant is that the meeting was attended by the Estonian and Latvian Presidents: Toomas Ilves and Andris Bērziņš. Lithuanian President Dalia

Grybauskaitė did not participate due to internal national issues. It was commented that it is necessary “to separate difficult matters in relations with neighbours from the security problems in the region.”⁴⁵

Poland is also involved in the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (NATO CCD COE) located in Tallinn since 2011, as the Cyber threat is tangible issue of the E-society and Estonia was subject to such the attack in the past.⁴⁶ This centre is an opportunity to share experience and to train personnel to meet such challenges in the future. Poland also cooperated with Lithuania and Latvia within EU Battle Group (EUBG) which enlarged the European Union’s leg of common military security initiatives.⁴⁷ Another on-going project is the Lithuanian, Polish and Ukrainian brigade, the LITPOLUKRBRIG, with Poland as lead nation. This unit is to contribute to peace support operations in a way similar to the previously mentioned LITPOLBAT. The project is under coordination.⁴⁸ However, negotiations are still ongoing and the unit will not be operational in the first part of 2014 as staff training and field exercises are required to achieve full operational capability before deploying it to any mission. Moreover, there will be no need and capabilities to use and sustain as a brigade for peace support operations.

The region is also recognized by NATO as some Centres of Excellence (COE) have been created. As mentioned previously, there is the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence COE in Tallinn and Poland is represented there. Another one, the Energy Security COE in Vilnius, was accredited in October 2012 and it is dealing with very important aspect of regional concerns. Also Latvia has proposed hosting the Strategic Communication COE during STRATCOM Conference in Riga in June 2013. Poland is about to launch the Military Police COE in Bydgoszcz which is supposed to be fully operational in 2013. Such centres are opportunities to work closer in domains related to security and to share experience, so it is necessary to provide mutual support and manning to utilize such research and knowledge hubs. They are also an expression of national ambitions to have a NATO- related entity on their territory and that this trend contributes to overall security within specific domains. Nevertheless, their full utilization as facilitators of cooperation

requires national representation of all the nations mentioned in each COE and this is still not the case. Although costs are an issue, such hesitation should not take place as shared concerns and threats demand a level of close association and trust, which is always supported by personal relations. Poland should also learn from the Estonian experience in territorial defense in developing credible Defence League Forces (reserve forces) as similar forces are currently being remodeled in Poland.

Cooperation is still on-going and there is the presence of Polish units in the region in the framework of exercises such as “Baltic Host” in 2012 or “Spring Storm“ in 2013 at Amari air base in Estonia, or “Saber Strike 2013” hosted jointly by all three nations.⁴⁹ However, there is an impression that such exercises are not as effective as they should be. For the Baltic States the bilateral relations with US is one of the most important factors contributing to their security, and Poland is less attractive in that sense. Moreover, membership in NATO is also key component of military doctrines which were enhanced by, “the 2010 annex to the contingency plans for Poland (Eagle Guardian), but the question of the staff and field exercises needed to enable the implementation of those plans remains open.”⁵⁰ As a result, cooperation with Poland was important especially for Lithuania as a result of its geographical location and the common threats, related among other things to the Kaliningrad Oblast.

Fig. 3. Polish Su-22 in exercise “Spring Storm“ in Amari air base in Estonia (May 2013).



Source: ‘French fighters also participating in Estonian defines forces’ exercise Spring Storm’, Baltic News Service (20 May 2013),

<http://news.postimees.ee/1241820/french-fighters-also-participating-in-estonian-defense-forces-exercise-spring-storm> [accessed: 23/05/2013].

Cooperation with Estonia and Latvia is rational and politically sensible and supports capabilities to face conventionally understood threats. Such a balanced approach will be continued following the developments in the regional of economy including building capability to underpin energy security. Both countries are also looking north as there are emerging new possibilities to cooperate more closely with the Nordic nations. These developments are also historically driven, especially in the case of Estonia and its close links with Finland. The situation in relation to Lithuania is evolving as it is also influenced by historical relations. Poland was among the Lithuanian priorities regarding national security, but recently Vilnius is also researching the Nordic option as alternative. The countries, after consolidation of their defence and achieving membership in NATO and establishing good relations with USA, started to look for regional options to support security. In addition, security domains are evolving and priorities are slightly shifting, highlighting the importance of asymmetric threats. So this requires Warsaw to be more proactive in the military domain and the good step into that direction

was the creation of a military attaché position exclusively for Estonia. Previously, the attaché for both Latvia and Estonia was located in Riga and naturally the focus on Tallinn was not strong enough.

Table 1. Defence expenditures as a percentage of GDP.

	Country/GDP % for defence	2010	2011	2012
1.	Poland	1,8	1,7	1,95
2.	Estonia	1,8	1,7	2,0
3.	Latvia	1,0	1,0	1,4
4.	Lithuania	0,9	0,8	0,8

Source: NATO, Financial and Economic Data Relating to NATO Defence, Communiqué PR/CP(2012)047-REV1, (Brussels: 2012), Table 3. Defence expenditures as a percentage of gross domestic product and Websites of respective Ministries of Defence.

An important fact is that the countries are still restrained by budgetary shortcomings. However, the financial situation is supposed to improve as all of them are recovering and are in positive situation. The leading nation is Estonia, and that country achieved the level of military expenditures desired by NATO – 2% of GDP.⁵¹ Such a budget is necessary to implement the “Estonian Long Term Defence Development Plan 2009 – 2018“ that aims to enhance capabilities of armed force and the Defence League. There is also progress in Latvia as after a period of austerity in funding the armed forces, the year 2012 showed improvement as the defense budget moved from 1% GDP to 1,4%. The additional spending supports the development of the National Armed Forces and the Home Guard.⁵² The Lithuanian military budget is stabilized below 1%, but it will probably grow as the economic situation is improving. In 2013 it should grow by more than 50 million litas (EUR 14.5m) from 870.2 million litas in 2012, to 923.9 million litas, and should continue rise in the future.⁵³ This will mean that 10 per cent of troops

will be ready for international operations and “approximately 50 per cent of the land forces shall be prepared to be deployed outside the territory of Lithuania.”⁵⁴ What is important is the “development of regional military cooperation projects with Republic of Poland, with an aim to build regional military capabilities”⁵⁵ is one of goals related to security. Poland is also reaching the required NATO limit of expenses which will help to develop military capabilities to make country a reliable and strong regional force and make it an attractive partner for Baltic partners. This is especially important as Warsaw has an ambition to be recognized as regional power.

The military cooperation should be enhanced at whatever costs it takes. The most recent Russian exercises next to region’s borders such as “Zapad 2013” (or “West 2013”) are a signal that the Western countries are considered seriously by Russia and that Minsk is ready to support Moscow as it is also a partner in the Collective Security Treaty Organization. The exercise presented the readiness and capabilities to conduct major combined joint operations. The message is strong and should not be ignored, although the threat of regional conventional conflict is very low. The trade agreement between Russia and the Ukraine and the suspended negotiations of Kiev with the EU proves the effectiveness Russia using various instruments to pressure other nations. The concern are also linked with the deployment of short range tactical missile systems, such as the Iskander SS-26 to Kaliningrad Oblast, and plans to deploy a regiment of Su-27SM3 fighter jets to Belarus. All those developments are close to Polish, Estonia, Latvian and Lithuanian borders and serve as a warning for the West to demonstrate closer military cooperation and defense solidarity. It also highlights the importance of Article V of the Washington Treaty and also stresses the seriousness of the Article III which requires developing national capabilities. Enhanced Polish involvement into such extended cooperation programmes would also support Warsaw’s position in relation to leading European nations within the EU and NATO.

Conclusions

Polish relations with Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are important for Warsaw as they are also supporting the role of Poland in the region. There are political initiatives which are important for all these countries to include regional groupings such as Visegrad-4, the Council of the Baltic Sea States, NORDEFECO. Membership in NATO and the EU serve as basic guarantors of their security in all the dimensions of power. Among the external threats the Polish security strategy recognizes that any reliance on a single supplier of strategic resources requires a response of diversification. The collapse of the process of European integration, totalitarian regimes in the neighborhood, international terrorism, organized crime, economic disturbances in the integrated global market, cyber-security, and ecological threats⁵⁶ are seen as external threats. Such threats are also shared by Poland and three Baltic States, which highlight the need to cooperate and to develop bilateral and regional projects. The threats are also recognized as global challenges and acknowledged in the European Security Strategy, so regional cooperation is fully in line with the overall EU perception of threats.⁵⁷ At the same time, it must be understood that Russia is closely following developments within the EU and is exploiting its regulations and internal differences very skillfully.

The areas of common interests and cooperation are growing and they have already moved out of the typically understood definitions of security in the conventional sense. The current relatively stable situation in Europe is shifting the security focus into non-traditional areas and that trend is influencing all four nations considered in this article. Such risks as: fragility of energy supplies, finance crises, cyber-attacks, organized crime and terrorism are making regional relations much stronger as they are transnational in nature and a solution requires cooperation and sharing responsibilities, as no single nation can handle them alone. Among these key issues energy security is a challenge which is clearly recognized as new pipelines and infrastructure are built in the north and south of the region to preserve the current status and reliance on one supplier. This actions support the monopolistic resources provider to preserve high prices and its existing market for products. The integration of regional infrastructure and free energy market are the desired tools to

reduce such reliance. Poland is an important element of that approach and it is also in Poland's interest to develop the LNG terminal and build nuclear power plants so that access to Baltic market is also economically driven. The development of economic links could significantly support the EU's integrity, eliminating, at least partially, the Baltic "Energy Island." The region also has much to offer to Poland by providing trade expansion opportunities.

Poland is visible in all Baltic States and is contributing, and will contribute, to Baltic security. The Polish Air Force presence is one example of this. Another example of Poland's visibility is the active involvement in military exercises in the area. The whole region is strategically important both for the defence of Polish territory and for enhancing the capabilities of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in all domains. The role of Warsaw is understood and geopolitical location is one advantage. Poland is also associated with the goal to play a more active role in Central and Eastern Europe. In this way Warsaw is linked with building relations with the three Baltic States, although Warsaw is also looking north as the NORDERCO framework is another attractive option for expanding national security efforts. The four countries are making a significant effort to better understand each other and to exploit opportunities on bilateral basis within the EU policy. At the same time, Poland is endeavoring to integrate regional efforts and there is still considerable potential to continue teamwork as threats are evolving that face the whole region. This is why the greater integration of countries surrounding the east flank of the Baltic Sea is essential. Although the presence of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania is not especially visible in Polish official documents, the bilateral contacts and visits are creating a promising picture for future relations as all partners understand the need for mutually orchestrated efforts.

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- ² Krzysztof Załęski, 'The Evolution of the Security Notion and Its Influence on the Concepts of Armed Forces Employment', *Baltic Security and Defence Review*, Vol. 13, Issue 1 (2011), p. 10.
- ³ Close cooperation with the countries of the East Europe was mentioned by the Polish MFA as important element of building trustworthy image of Poland as credible member of the Euro-Atlantic Security Community. Read also: *Priorytety Polskiej Polityki Zagranicznej 2012-2016* (The Priorities of the Polish Foreign Policy 2012-2016), (Warsaw: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, March 2012), p. 6. Available at: <http://www.msz.gov.pl/resource/d31571cf-d24f-4479-af09-c9a46cc85cf6:JCR> [accessed: 16/04/2013].
- ⁴ Marcin Mróz, 'Podstawowe problemy obronności Polski – dokument rządowy z 28 czerwca 1994 – w świetle polskiej doktryny obronnej' (Elementary problems of Polish security - a government document of June 28, 1994 - in view of the Polish military doctrine), (Warsaw: Chancellery of the Sejm, Information No 246, September 1994), p. 4.
- ⁵ National Defense Bureau, *Strategia Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej* (National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland), (Warsaw 2007), para. 43, 45, 49.
- ⁶ *Ibid.* para. 68.
- ⁷ *Priorytety Polskiej Polityki Zagranicznej 2012-2016*, op. cit., p. 18.
- ⁸ *Ibid.* pp. 18-19.
- ⁹ Read: *Ibid.* pp. 20-21.
- ¹⁰ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Co-Chairs' Statement Meeting of Foreign Ministers of the Visegrad, Nordic and Baltic states 20 February, 2013*, (Gdańsk: 20 February 2013); <http://www.msz.gov.pl/resource/eb1b882a-1d7e-4b66-b326-8f1b17da98a9:JCR> [accessed: 20/04/2013].
- ¹¹ *Ibid.* p. 3.

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- ¹² Embassy of the Republic of Poland, *Seminar on the cooperation of Northern and Central Europe*, (Tallinn: 11 April 2013), http://www.tallinn.msz.gov.pl/en/news/tytul_strony [accessed: 16/04/2013]. The topics were as followed: “Baltic and Visegrad ways to the EU and NATO – lessons learned” by Mr Andres Kasekamp, Estonian Institute for Foreign Policy; „Nordic cooperation and NB8-V4 cooperation prospects” by Mrs Fredrike Tamas Hermelin, Deputy director of the EU Department, Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs; „Nordic-Baltic-Visegrad cooperation as an engine of deeper European integration” by Jarosław Cwiek-Karpowicz, the Polish Institute for Foreign Affairs (PIFA).
- ¹³ Xymena Kurowska and Bence Németh, ‘The Central European playground: Who plays what?’ *European Geostrategy* (22 May 2013), p. 3.
- ¹⁴ ‘Wizyta prezydenta Bronisława Komorowskiego na Łotwie’ (President Bronislaw Komorowski’s visit in Latvia), *Tygodnik Biura Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego* (National Security Bureau Weekly), No 113 (Warsaw 2012), p. 4
- ¹⁵ ‘Euro na Łotwie od 2014 roku’ (Euro in Latvia in 2014), *tvn24*, (15 February 2013), <http://www.tvn24.pl/biznes-gospodarka,6/euro-na-lotwie-od-2014-r,306555.html>, [accessed: 27/05/2013].
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NATO Commander General Lauris Norstad and the Art of Alliance Leadership

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Of all of the aspects of strategic leadership, alliance leadership is one of the most difficult. All alliances, even the closest, experience considerable friction caused by national conflicts of interest, different strategic perspectives, and differences in military cultures. Leadership of a military alliance requires not only professional military competence, but also an array of political talents, such as the ability to negotiate, persuade and inspire foreign governments and senior officers. Strategic leadership also requires vision, the ability to articulate the vision to a non-American audience, as well as the political/managerial ability to get the vision implemented through a complex alliance organization.

One of the most important and influential alliance leaders of the Post World War II era was General Lauris Norstad USAF, who played a central role in shaping and developing NATO policy and strategy from 1950 to 1963. From late 1950 to 1956 he served as air commander for NATO's Central Front at a time when NATO's airpower was being rapidly built up to deter the rising Soviet menace. From 1956 to 1963 he served as Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) and worked to mold NATO into an effective Alliance, to unify European defense efforts and to ensure Europe could provide a credible deterrent to Soviet aggression.

By any reckoning Norstad was one of the most successful alliance military commanders that America has ever produced. Norstad first played a central role in building a capable NATO air force in the 1950s. As SACEUR he managed an often fractious alliance with a deft hand, oversaw a major buildup of European defense capabilities, worked effectively to develop NATO as a fourth nuclear power and guided the alliance to consensus on several major strategic issues. Under Norstad, NATO reached a level of political/military cohesion it has rarely since

achieved. His leadership was pivotal in developing NATO from a new and weak alliance in 1950 to a genuine and credible deterrent to Soviet ambitions by the time of his departure in 1963.

There has been relatively little written about Norstad and his role as NATO air commander and SACEUR because he was not an alliance commander in wartime. Indeed, Norstad is virtually ignored in US military writing on strategy.¹ Ironically, his lack of fame is due to his success in his primary mission of deterring conflict with the Soviet Union. Norstad's major victories were not won on the battlefield, but rather in government councils and at the negotiating table. Nonetheless, they were important victories in the Cold War.

An examination of Norstad's leadership as a NATO commander provides some useful insights into the role of the soldier in making strategy, not just executing it. Norstad had not only to deal with strategic debates within the US government but also had to balance US strategic positions with those of America's allies. This article will focus on how Norstad managed alliance issues and formulated alliance policy as the senior air commander in Europe and as SACEUR. As commander of the NATO air forces on the Central Front he had to manage the delicate issues of German rearmament. As SACEUR he had to face the major strategic issues of his day, namely developing a NATO nuclear weapons strategy and dealing with the 1961 Berlin Crisis. Finally, an examination of Norstad's role provides some insights into the different strategic approaches of the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations.

Development of a Leader

Norstad had an exceptional exposure to the process of grand strategy and of high level coalition operations early in his career and he demonstrated a genuine talent in both strategy making and coalition operations, a talent that rocketed him from the rank of major at the start of World War II to major general at the end of the war. Lauris Norstad was born in March 1907 in Minnesota, the grandson of a Norwegian

immigrant and son of a Lutheran pastor. He grew up mostly in small towns in Iowa and Minnesota and was admitted to West Point in 1926.² He was a popular, but undistinguished cadet, graduating in 1930. He went to flight school and earned his wings and transferred from the cavalry to the Air Corps in 1931.³ As a young officer he served in a variety of flying and staff jobs and got his first experience of coalition warfare in 1941 when he was selected by General Arnold and the air staff to go to Britain for three months to observe Royal Air Force operations against the Germans. In December 1941 Norstad was a 34-year old major in Washington serving as G-2 (Intelligence officer) of the Air Combat Command. Within hours of the outbreak of the war, Norstad was working to implement the Rainbow War Plans with Air Corps Brigadier General Karl Spaatz (later full general and first chief of staff of the USAF). Norstad's first exposure to grand strategy came later that month when he was present as a staff officer at the Arcadia Conference in Washington DC from 24 December 1941-14 January 1942, the first Allied leadership conference of the war.⁴

In July 1942 Norstad, now a colonel, was appointed deputy chief of operations for the 12th Air Force, then being readied as for the war in North Africa.⁵ For the next year and a half in North Africa and the Mediterranean, Norstad worked closely with several of the Army Air Forces' (AAF) top officers, including Hoyt Vandenberg and Carl Spaatz, both later to become USAF chiefs of staff.⁶

The Mediterranean Theater was a good place to learn coalition operations as the Americans and British set up a truly combined command system. In January 1943 the air command in North Africa was reorganized and RAF Air Chief Marshal Tedder was named commander for all air forces in the Mediterranean Theater. Norstad, appointed as assistant chief of staff for plans and operations for the Mediterranean Allied Air Forces (MAAF), had a British group captain (equivalent of a US colonel) as his deputy. For the rest of the war, mixing British and American officers at the top level of command and alternating with US commanders and British deputies – and vice versa – became the norm in the theater.⁷ Norstad worked with senior RAF

officers on a daily basis and also came to know many of the top British strategic personalities, including Solly Zuckerman, the British air staff's senior strategic advisor.⁸

In 1943 Norstad, promoted to brigadier general in March 1943, became the Director of Operations and Intelligence, with a British air commodore as his deputy. When Tedder was called to Britain to serve as Eisenhower's deputy for the Allied invasion of Normandy, Ira Eaker became commander of MAAF, with Air Marshal John Slessor as his deputy.⁹ In the Mediterranean, coalition staffs planned major operations and strategic bombing and interdiction missions in the theater were centrally planned and assigned to both American and British air units, the only consideration being to assign the most suitable unit. British and American bombing operations were thoroughly coordinated – in notable contrast to the air war waged in Northwest Europe where there was little coordination between American and British bomber and tactical air forces. The spirit of cooperation found between the senior airmen in the Mediterranean can also be contrasted with the air war in Northern Europe, where the senior air commanders, including General Spaatz, Air Marshal Harris and Air Marshal Leigh Mallory, could not agree on a coalition air strategy or create a coalition command for the air war.

In June 1944 Norstad was called back to Washington to serve as General Arnold's chief of staff. In 1945 Norstad, at 38 years, was promoted to major general. When World War II ended, Lauris Norstad had an unusual resume. During the course of the war, he had skipped the usual progression of command positions—squadron, group and wing commander and instead had served in senior staff positions both in Washington and at a major fighting front. More important for Norstad's later assignments, he had spent two years as part of a coalition organization. In planning and executing the North African campaign, he had worked closely with Eisenhower, briefing him regularly on the air operations. In the Mediterranean Allied Air Force, he had come to know Air Marshals Tedder and Slessor extremely well. He would work closely with both men in the 1950s when he was stationed with NATO, when Slessor served as Chief of the RAF and Tedder, as Chief of the

British Joint Staff. Like Eisenhower, Norstad seemed to have a knack for working in a coalition environment and getting things done without ruffling too many coalition feathers. It seems to have been an innate skill, part of his personality that made him a good “Allied team player.” Indeed, many of America’s best senior leaders of World War II, like Spaatz and Patton, though they proved to be great commanders in leading American forces to victory, had well-deserved reputations for their inability to work with coalition allies.

Through 1946 and 1947 as Army deputy chief of staff for plans, Norstad played a key role in negotiating the service unification agreements that resulted in the creation of the Defense Department and the establishment of the Air Force as a separate service in 1947.¹⁰ The service negotiations forced Norstad to work closely with the top levels of the US military and civilian leadership for a year and provided a young general with further valuable experience in dealing with strategic issues. In 1950 Norstad noted that the position of commander of the US Air Force Europe was coming open. With the creation of NATO in 1950, the US command arrangements in Europe were being reorganized, and it promised to be an exciting command opportunity. He got the job and in late 1950 he was off to Europe with a recommendation from the Air Force chief of staff that he receive his fourth star—which he did in 1952, at the age of 45. This would be Norstad’s first major operational command.

Planning German Rearmament

When Norstad arrived in Europe, the whole organization of US forces in Europe was being restructured in light of the establishment of NATO and General Eisenhower’s appointment as NATO’s the first military commander. Norstad wore two hats as USAF commander for Europe: Commander of USAFE with its headquarters in Wiesbaden, Germany, and Commander in Chief of Central Front Air Forces, with headquarters in Fontainebleau, France. One of the first tasks that confronted Norstad on his arrival was supporting German rearmament efforts, specifically, helping the Germans establish a new air force. This

was a highly sensitive political issue as Britain and especially France insisted that any future German military force would have to be carefully negotiated and built solely within the context of a European military force or within NATO.¹¹

After the Berlin Crisis of 1948-49, the creation of a democratic West German state in 1949 and the establishment of NATO that same year, the US became a staunch supporter of German rearmament undertaken within a NATO or European context. To meet NATO's force requirements set at the Lisbon Conference of 1950, a substantial contribution by Germany was necessary. With US approval, Konrad Adenauer's German government began studying rearmament concepts in 1949 when he assembled a military advisory group that reported to his office. The invasion of South Korea by Soviet-backed communist forces in June 1950 made the issues of European and German defense even more urgent. In October 1950, a group of fifteen former Wehrmacht senior officers met at Kloster Himmerod in the Eiffel Mountains to develop a program for German rearmament within the context of the Western Alliance. The meeting, which had the blessing of the Adenauer government and the US European command, is counted as the "Magna Carta" of the Bundeswehr and laid the foundations for creating the armed forces for a democratic West Germany. The Himmerod Conference was chaired by retired General Adolph Heusinger, who became the first "General Inspector" of the Bundeswehr. The attending officers were mostly former army men; only one former Luftwaffe officer, retired General der Flieger Robert Knauss, was present. The officers outlined a plan to create an army of twelve armored and mechanized divisions for the Bundesrepublik and a small navy designed to defend the Baltic and North Seas. Both concepts met with American approval and support.¹²

The main point of German/American disagreement was in the German concept for an air force. Some of the German proposals were practical ideas for quickly building an air force. The German officers proposed developing a German air force equipped with American jet aircraft and would copy USAF unit organizational structure. As the new

Luftwaffe would start out with American equipment, maintaining a US style of organization and unit structure greatly simplified procurement and logistics. Yet the central proposal for the new Luftwaffe organization that came from Heusinger and his army staff differed radically from American and British concepts of airpower. The former officers, who formed a shadow military staff under Adenauer, proposed to establish a German air force of approximately 831 combat aircraft to serve as a branch of the army, whose squadrons would be directly attached to army corps and divisions and under direct army command. The proposed air force would be a specialist close support force and not a balanced force capable of strike and air defense missions. Indeed, the air defense of West Germany was virtually ignored by German planners. This ran counter to the positions of both British and American air doctrine.¹³

Norstad arrived in Europe just as the US dramatically increased its troop and air force commitments to European defense in response to the Korean War. From 1950 to 1953 the US increased its troop strength in Germany from one to five divisions and the US Air force in Europe (USAFE) to an equal degree. In June 1950 USAFE had 15,146 military personnel supported by 19,425 civilian employees. By June 1953 USAFE had grown to 84,602 military personnel and, counting civilian personnel, a total of well over 100,000 people.¹⁴ One of Norstad's first orders to his staff was to draw up plans to put twenty-eight US aircraft wings into Europe by 1954—a 600% increase from 1950.¹⁵ With such large US forces committed to European defense, and President Eisenhower's insistence on major US defense cutbacks after the Korean War, the US government wanted the Europeans to take up greater responsibility for their own defense—and this meant helping the West German government rearm as quickly as possible.¹⁶

The concept of a German air force as an army-controlled support force was completely unacceptable to Norstad and the USAF leadership. The US air staff called the air power doctrine outlined by the German officers at Himmerod “the doctrine of a defeated enemy” and “naïve.”¹⁷ Norstad had been with the AAF in North Africa when the

Americans had tied their air units to ground commanders in precisely the same fashion as proposed by General Heusinger. It had not worked well then, and Norstad was convinced it would not work now. After North Africa, the US air doctrine insisted that air units be placed under central command that would cooperate with the army, but not be directly tied to it. For Norstad and the American airmen, flexibility was the key to the effective employment of airpower. Because of the range and speed of aircraft, air units could be quickly dispatched to operate anywhere in a large war theater. Centrally commanded aircraft could concentrate and mass aircraft for decisive effects at the order of the theater commander. Norstad wanted to see a large German air force that had full equality with the army and navy. His view of a reborn Luftwaffe was a force capable of a variety of missions including air defense, tactical transport and tactical interdiction as well as close support of army units. Norstad's goal was a Luftwaffe with the latest equipment, fully integrated into the two Allied tactical air forces in Germany, and capable of providing air support to any NATO mission along the entire front. Through his tenure as US air commander, Norstad would work through numerous political obstacles to achieve this goal.

In April 1951 the first German official proposals for developing an air force were set forth at the Allied Rearmament Conference sponsored by NATO and held in Bonn. German plans called for an air force of 1,900 first line aircraft including fighters, fighter-bombers for ground support, reconnaissance planes and light bombers with the main part of the force ground support aircraft. The air force would be parceled out, assigned to specific divisions and corps of the army. The last part of the plan, as expected, met with strong opposition from the USAF.¹⁸

Norstad's approach was to work quietly behind the scenes to influence the Germans to accept the concept of a balanced German air force established as an independent service and under NATO command. Norstad asked the US Air Staff for permission to form a formal USAF advisory group to the German military staff that would replace the system of informal contacts already in existence and push the German

planning to adopt the British/American position on airpower. Norstad commented, “One of our greatest concerns in the matter has been in seeing that the German air force, when it is formed, is patterned along lines that will permit its effective use as part of the defense forces of the Western Powers rather than see it parceled out by direct assignment to ground units for limited objectives. We have been disturbed that this might happen unless qualified advisors were on hand to work directly with the Germans on their early planning”.¹⁹

Norstad’s initial attempt to form an air advisory group to guide the German planners was stymied by NATO politics. The Americans, British and West Germans were ready and willing to begin planning for German rearmament in late 1950 when French Prime Minister Rene Pleven dropped the bombshell of his government’s position on German rearmament. The Pleven Plan, as it came to be known, called for the creation of a supranational European army, in which the German army would be organized into brigades and incorporated into multi-national European divisions. National divisions would be incorporated into multinational corps. The whole plan, which would have resulted in a logistical, doctrinal and training nightmare – not to mention the language problems—was proposed with the primary intention of ensuring that in a new German army no German could command anything larger than a division. The European army would be under the command of the European Union and be associated with NATO.²⁰

The Pleven Plan brought the US military and US State Department into some conflict. John Foster Dulles, Eisenhower’s secretary of state, initially favored the plan as a means to get European consensus for a rapid rearmament program. The leading US and British military leaders were opposed to the Pleven Plan due to the sheer inefficiency of the scheme. Multinational units would have presented a host of administrative and logistical problems, not to mention the problem of getting agreement on a common unit organization and operational doctrine. The US and British military leadership preferred to see national armies, each with their own complete command, logistics and training structure and organized into divisions and corps, each

capable of conducting major operations. The British and American military also wanted the German forces committed to NATO, which already had an existing command structure, rather than to a European Union force that had no military command structure and would require years to establish. German chancellor Adenauer and his military advisors favored the American view as a framework for German rearmament as the issue of German sovereignty was a central theme of Adenauer's foreign policy and the idea of simply contributing small units to French and British commanders was unacceptable. Yet, even though the Pleven Plan was rejected by the Germans and opposed by the US and British militaries, France had the authority under the Four Power Agreement to insist that its proposal be discussed by NATO and the Allied Powers. Since France had veto powers over German rearmament issues, the British and Americans had to spend three years negotiating a way around the impasse.

With German rearmament issues stuck at the top levels of the European Defense community and NATO, there was no official framework to allow direct military planning between the Adenauer government's shadow defense ministry and the US military in Europe. In 1951 the small air staff set up within the German shadow defense ministry sought US Air Force assistance in discussing the creation of a new Luftwaffe, with an emphasis on reconstructing airfields, deploying German air units and creating a training program for a new air force.²¹ The USAFE was happy have direct contact with the German planners and in early 1952 Norstad appointed several officers under Col. Schroek of the USAFE Operations Section to be responsible for liaison and aerial rearmament planning with the Germans.

However, helping the Germans rearm required some clever diplomacy and some developing a means of working around the French. Simply sending a USAF liaison team to work with the Germans in Bonn was out of the question because the French insisted that all German rearmament issues had to be discussed through the European Defense community Interim commission, where the Americans had only observer status. German and American air force planners met at USAFE

Headquarters on 8 January 1952 and agreed to work around the French by having a series of “informal” meetings in which the German air force planners would visit USAFE headquarters and “informally discuss” air rearmament issues.²² Norstad kept a close eye on the developing relationship with the small shadow Luftwaffe staff. He wanted the Americans to provide full assistance to the Germans to ensure that a modern German air force was built as an independent service, and committed to NATO command and doctrine.²³ In 1952 Norstad requested the authority to create a USAF military assistance group to facilitate liaison among USAFE, the German government and the European Defense Community Planning Group. When the State Department turned down the request to avoid friction with the French, Norstad allowed the “informal” meetings between German and American air planners to continue. When the French got wind of the talks and insisted that all German rearmament issues be settled through the European Union Norstad got a ruling from Washington that the German/American air planning could continue since only *formal* contacts were forbidden between the German and American military planners, and thus *informal* contacts between the German and American staffs were acceptable. Through 1952 and 1953 the *informal* meetings between the shadow Luftwaffe staff and USAFE increased both in frequency, and in the variety of subjects discussed. Despite political restrictions, the German and American officers laid the groundwork for German rearmament. To move the process along, Norstad had to overcome bureaucratic restrictions imposed by NATO and the US Defense Department. For example, air defense planning required deploying an extensive radar network, but US security regulations precluded sharing information about Allied aircraft control and warning centers with German planners. Finally, in 1953, the Pentagon granted an exemption from security regulations to allow USAFE planners to share information with accredited German military personnel.²⁴

The German/American air force discussions bore fruit and in August 1952 the German shadow defense staff had dropped the idea of the Luftwaffe as an army aviation force. The new policy was to establish a fully independent German force integrated into NATO command -- just as Norstad had wanted.²⁵ In 1953 the French scheme for German

rearmament was dropped and the Allied Powers agreed on creating national German armed forces to be integrated into NATO. A USAF military assistance group was authorized and soon moved to Bonn to finalize German air rearmament plans.²⁶ General Norstad made building a new Luftwaffe a top priority for the US Air Force in Europe, so in 1954-1955 the USAFE developed a large-scale training program for the new Luftwaffe. The German shadow military staff under General Heusinger was well-staffed for the task of creating a new army, but the air staff of the German shadow defense ministry was grossly undermanned.²⁷ Norstad, aware of the deficiencies of the German defense office, set his own staff to drawing up a comprehensive plan for German Luftwaffe basing, logistics and support forces.²⁸ The USAFE staff also developed a plan for the specific basing of German units as well as a training plan for a Luftwaffe cadre.²⁹ In January 1955, on the eve of formal German rearmament, the German air staff admitted to the Americans that they had neither the time nor personnel to prepare their own plan for Luftwaffe logistics, basing and support structure. Norstad had anticipated this and presented the German military staff with a complete basing and logistics plan for the Luftwaffe. The German defense ministry was glad to get ready-made plans for their air force, and the US plans were approved by the German government without any debate or modification.³⁰

Because Norstad had set a high priority for building a new Luftwaffe, the USAFE set up a special training command in 1954-1955 under a brigadier general. The new command, USAF Training Headquarters-Provisional, was responsible for training a large Luftwaffe cadre and the commander reported directly to Norstad. As part of the German rearmament program, the USAF created a three-base training complex in southern Germany, supported by a large USAF depot and a vast quantity of US equipment was shipped to Germany, including hundreds of training planes. The whole command was set up and ready to receive German trainees on "E-Day", 1 January 1956, the day the training for the new Luftwaffe was to begin.³¹

At the start of the process there were serious problems due to the Bundestag's inability to manage and finance their rearmament programs. USAFE had initiated more than thirty major construction projects for the new Luftwaffe bases in 1955 and by the end of the year the German defense ministry was millions of dollars in arrears to the US Air Force. Although the Adenauer government was strongly committed to German rearmament the problem was the first German defense minister, Theodor Blank, who was a mediocre manager and, even worse, a poor politician. The Bundestag was reluctant to vote defense funds partly because Blank failed to keep the Bundestag committees fully informed on military issues. In addition, Blank disliked the press and refused to work with the media to present a strong case to the public on the importance of a strong Bundeswehr for Germany and NATO. Given Blank's failure to work with the Bundestag, the German parliament predictably put armaments appropriations on hold. What began as a political squabble grew into a crisis for the new Bundeswehr. The financial crisis was so severe that USAF Col. Schall, project officer for the German air force training program, predicted that the large training program set up by the USAF would likely fail.³²

Rather than allow the financial crisis to strangle the Luftwaffe at its birth, Norstad moved quickly and imaginatively to avoid the proverbial crash of German aerial rearmament. In 1956 USAFE pulled \$9.3 million out of their budget to finance the German air force. In order to keep training going, the USAF found \$1.7 million to pay for training German instructor personnel. By reallocating various funds from throughout the US Air Force Europe, Norstad ensured the Luftwaffe training programs could continue until the West German Defense Ministry sorted out its bureaucratic muddle.³³ In committing US resources to get German rearmament moving Norstad took a risk that would be unthinkable for many American senior officers then or today. But Norstad had established a relationship of trust with the Germans and had a thorough understanding of the senior German political and military personalities. The Luftwaffe training program had been based on signed agreements with the US government and Norstad was sure that the Germans would eventually honor their commitments and that the Bundestag would eventually move to appropriate the funds

and sort out the thoroughly disorganized defense ministry. Norstad's judgment proved correct.

The poor German showing during the first rearmament phase of 1955-1956 was an embarrassment for the Bundesrepublik in its bid to become a major NATO partner and in October 1956 Chancellor Adenauer pushed Blank out as defense minister and replaced him with the young and energetic Bavarian politician Franz Josef Strauss. Under Strauss, a very capable politician who was skilled in dealing with the Bundestag and the media, the West German defense budget grew rapidly --from 3.4 billion DM in 1956 to 7.970 billion DM in 1958. Strauss quickly reorganized the Luftwaffe's rearmament and training program and the financial problems soon evaporated. The Luftwaffe activated its first squadrons in 1957 and the force grew steadily. By 1963 the Luftwaffe had achieved its full planned strength of 92,000 personnel and seventeen well-equipped, well-trained operational combat wings that were incorporated into the 2nd and 4th Allied Tactical Air Forces.

The rearmament of Germany in the late 1950s was one of the great successes of NATO. The creation of large, modern, West German armed forces made the NATO deterrent against the Soviets far more credible. The creation of the West German air force was a huge step forward in ensuring a credible air defense of the vital Central Front. General Norstad deserves considerable credit for working around political restrictions and for anticipating and planning for the rearmament problems that were likely to occur. Without Norstad's guidance, careful planning and several timely interventions, the establishment of the Luftwaffe would have been delayed for years.



Norstad as SACEUR circa 1960 (USAF Photo)

Nuclear Weapons and Europe

The most contentious issue for the US military in the 1950s, and for NATO from the 1950s to the 1980s, was the role of nuclear weapons in the defense of the United States and the Western Alliance. This became a central issue during Norstad's tenure as US Air Force Commander in Europe from 1951-1956, and as SACEUR from 1956-1962. It is specifically in these roles, developing nuclear war and deterrence strategy and negotiating nuclear issues with NATO partners that Norstad stands out as an important strategic leader.

Eisenhower's top priorities as president when he assumed office in January 1953 was first to end the Korean War and then to enact

substantial cuts in the US defense budget. In a defense policy described as “The New Look” (a take-off on the name of Christian Dior’s first major fashion show after World War II), Eisenhower insisted that the primary defense of the US and the West would be carried out by the US nuclear arsenal, under the doctrine of massive retaliation. Conventional forces would serve largely as a tripwire to trigger nuclear attack in the case of Soviet aggression. Eisenhower’s strategic view was clear and paralleled that of the NATO powers. He believed that the foundation of US power was the strength of the US economy and that the massive defense outlays of the Korean War had dislocated the economy. Since sustained economic growth could not be achieved in an overly militarized economy and nuclear weapons were cheaper than maintaining large conventional forces, the army and navy budgets would be drastically cut after the Korean War.³⁴ At the same time, the Air Force, then responsible for virtually all of the US nuclear force, actually grew in size. Not surprisingly, the army chiefs of staff under Eisenhower, General Mathew Ridgeway and later General Maxwell Taylor, strongly protested and opposed the massive cuts that Eisenhower imposed on the army. Yet Eisenhower stayed true to his course throughout the 1950s. Looking back today and understanding the central role that US and Western European economic strength played in defeating the Soviet Bloc, Eisenhower’s policy can now be assessed as a sound long-term strategy.

Several aspects of Norstad’s character contributed to his success as NATO commander. Alliance leadership requires real political savvy and Norstad, like Eisenhower in World War II, possessed impressive political skills. Few politicians and fewer soldiers, even those of great ability, have the kind of political skill and insight to make an international alliance work. Norstad had a well-deserved reputation as a negotiator from the interservice negotiations of 1947. In political dealings Norstad said that his success came from his “turn of mind.” In negotiations he described himself as “tough but patient. No one could outlast me...”³⁵ Norstad also worked hard to understand the attitudes of the NATO countries. Norstad, a quick study, prepared intensely whenever he had to deal with NATO governments on any major issue. “I learned early to work at preparation...So I studied the countries, I knew the

governments but I also knew the opposition people (shadow cabinets) and I spent almost as much time with the opposition people as I did with the government.”³⁶

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In mid-1950, the debate about nuclear weapon strategy had just started when Norstad was tapped to move to Europe at the end of the year, to take over as US Air Force Commander in Europe. Norstad’s preference for a more selective nuclear targeting strategy had not changed, so he would come into conflict with LeMay several more times on this issue. One primary issue was SAC’s monopoly over all nuclear weapons in the late 1940s and early 1950s. Another issue was the relatively small number of nuclear bombs available in 1950-51. Until there was an adequate stockpile of atomic bombs, the deployment and control of the few available became a contentious strategic issue.

Norstad insisted that SAC’s strategic targeting plan take NATO requirements into account and allow NATO input into the target plan itself. In 1951 the staff at SHAPE developed the “Eisenhower Plan” for

Western European defense, which proposed that SAC units be allocated to NATO and on call to bomb targets identified by SHAPE.³⁹ SAC and the Air Staff resisted the idea of allocating SAC units to NATO support as a threat to SAC's ability to carry out the strategic war plan. However, SHAPE was determined to break SAC's monopoly of nuclear weapons. After considerable debate, and a visit by LeMay to confer with Eisenhower and Norstad in Europe, SAC and SHAPE agreed in October 1951 to coordinate atomic missions. A SAC element would be stationed in Europe to control SAC units in the theater and to coordinate any atomic missions in support of SHAPE. The Joint Chiefs would allocate the atomic weapons, Norstad would select the targets in the theater, and he and the SAC element would consult on the methods and SHAPE would ask the Joint Chiefs to authorize the strikes.⁴⁰ It was the first break in SAC's monopoly of atomic weapons.

In February 1952 at the conference of NATO ministers at Lisbon, NATO set out the ambitious goal of establishing a large, conventional defense of Europe as its official strategy. NATO planned to eventually field ninety divisions against the Warsaw Pact. NATO set a short-term goal, for the end of the year, of twenty-five divisions to be combat ready in Europe, and 25 reserve divisions ready within thirty days of mobilization. The ground forces would be supported by an air force of 4,000 planes. NATO hoped to have 75 divisions and 6,500 planes ready by the end of 1953.⁴¹ Although solemnly approved by all the NATO nations, there was never the slightest chance that this ambitious program for NATO conventional defense would ever be implemented. In the early 1950s the Western European economies had mostly recovered from the World War and were beginning a period of dramatic, sustained economic growth and prosperity. The massive military buildup endorsed at Lisbon would have required such a high level of militarization of the Western European economies; it would have stymied economic growth and progress. While the military forces of NATO grew considerably in size and sophistication during the 1950s, military budgets were all relatively limited, for no government was willing to commit political suicide by strangling the economic boom with military spending.

From 1951 to 1955, Norstad's chief concerns were to build up the NATO air forces and to create a nuclear weapons force under the operational control of SACEUR, with the goal of building a credible deterrent in Europe. There was no doubt that under Norstad's tenure as NATO air commander and as SACEUR, the primary deterrent to Soviet aggression against NATO was the US nuclear force under SAC. As NATO air commander, Norstad worked steadily to develop a NATO nuclear war force and strategy and to win the SACEUR more control over nuclear targeting and some of the nuclear forces.

Through 1951-52 Norstad carried out a series of complex negotiations with the French to lease and rebuild five airfields in the French protectorate of Morocco for the basing of US long-range strategic bombers. It was a difficult and expensive proposition, but Norstad's negotiations were successful. Soon US B-36 bombers were operating out of Morocco. The heavy, nuclear-capable bombers in Morocco were not officially assigned to NATO but were under Norstad's operational control as a specified commander under the Joint Chiefs of Staff.⁴² The US strategic situation in Europe also improved in June 1952 when the 49th Air Division arrived in England and was assigned to the USAFE. The 49th Air Division was equipped with B-45 bombers designed for nuclear weapons delivery.⁴³ Another major favorable development for the US strategic position in Europe was the development of small, tactical nuclear bombs in the early 1950s. The early tactical atom bombs, such as the Mark 7 bomb, were capable of only a few kilotons explosive force and were light enough to be carried by a wide variety of available aircraft. The Mark 7 weighed only 1,600 pounds and the F-84F fighter-bomber could be modified to employ it.⁴⁴ Tactical nuclear bombs were first deployed in 1952, and by the mid-1950s a fairly large number were available in the US and Europe. The US Air Force put a heavy doctrinal emphasis on employing small nuclear weapons by tactical units, and from 1955 onward the delivery of tactical nuclear bombs was a major part of the Air Force fighter course at Luke AFB. Several fighter-bomber squadrons in Europe were modified for the nuclear attack mission and pilots were trained to deliver tactical weapons. As the tactical nuclear weapons came on line, they became an indispensable part of NATO defense doctrine. In 1954 SHAPE

recommended reducing the conventional manpower requirements set by NATO and replacing troops with tactical nuclear weapons.⁴⁵ That year the North Atlantic Council authorized NATO military commanders to plan for nuclear weapons—regardless of whether the Warsaw Pact used them first. The concept that NATO would never initiate an attack on the Warsaw Pact, but would also have the right to use nuclear weapons if attacked, became a core strategy of NATO for the next forty years. Through the complex negotiations and numerous NATO strategy sessions of the 1950s, Norstad was at the center of things as he helped build a NATO nuclear deterrent and argued for an expanded role for nuclear weapons in NATO doctrine.

In 1956 Eisenhower appointed Norstad as SACEUR, a position he would hold for six years. Norstad had not just been appointed SACEUR by the US government. As NATO's military chief; he had been voted on and confirmed by the governments of the NATO Council. As SACEUR Norstad drew his command charter from two sources; he was an instrument of the US government as an American general, but was also responsible to the whole NATO Alliance. To the irritation of many in the US government and military, Norstad emphasized his role as an Alliance leader during his NATO tenure. He saw himself as responsible to the European governments, as well as to the US, and worked unceasingly to ensure that the views and concerns of the NATO nations were properly represented to the US government and Joint Chiefs. For Norstad, the NATO Alliance was the centerpiece of American defense strategy, and the alliance had thus to be kept strong and healthy. He insisted that NATO nations could not and should not be treated as junior partners of the US. His was the most political job in the US military. On a daily basis he had to deal with an array of European governments and defense ministries, as well as with the US Defense and State Departments and the US Congress. Such a job required tact, negotiation skills and the ability to compromise on many issues, without going beyond the bounds set for him by the US government. In many cases, Norstad was required to lobby his own government to change policies that worked against NATO, and to enact new programs to enhance NATO. The SACEUR job also required true strategic leadership. NATO was still new and untried in 1956, and

without some strong leadership and a clear strategic direction, NATO had the potential to dissolve into quarreling factions – the Anglo-Americans, the French, the Germans, the Scandinavians—each committed to a defense strategy at odds with the rest of the alliance.

Norstad had always been known as a clear thinker and an articulate spokesman. A great part of his job in political and military councils was to reassure the alliance members of the US commitment to NATO and to develop a strategic defense plan for Europe that would reach broad agreement within the alliance. From the start of his tenure as SACEUR, Norstad worked to make NATO the “fourth nuclear power” in the world (the others being the US, UK and Soviet Union). Norstad’s motivation for creating a European nuclear force was to alleviate the primary fear of Europeans concerning the efficacy of NATO. The nagging doubt whether the US really would pursue all-out nuclear war with the Soviet Union on behalf of Europe in the case of a Soviet attack. NATO was an effective deterrent only if the Europeans (and Soviets) could be sure that the US nuclear commitment was strong. As early as the mid-1950s the French and German governments expressed the desire to have their own nuclear deterrent forces ---just in case the US commitment to Europe wavered. Rather than see the growth of independent national nuclear forces, Norstad wanted to divert these perfectly sensible desires for national defense and national sovereignty into a NATO approach to nuclear forces that could provide the Europeans with a credible deterrent force of their own, but always within the context of the Alliance.

The story of Norstad’s work to build up NATO’s military deterrent force is very long and complex. Norstad faced the daunting task of convincing the US State Department and Joint Chiefs to loosen the virtual US monopoly on nuclear forces and actively support building a credible nuclear force under European control and NATO command. On the other hand, he had to negotiate with the NATO nations to support and finance an Alliance nuclear weapons force and to forgo their preferences for their own national forces. Norstad apparently had developed his strategic views on these lines even before he became

SACEUR. As SACEUR he would use his considerable abilities as a negotiator and spokesman to convince both the US and European leadership of his strategic vision.

Upon becoming SACEUR in 1956, Norstad put his staff to work developing proposals to create a NATO nuclear stockpile, the core of which would be the new intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) that had been developed in the United States. A NATO-controlled intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM) force would have the capability of hitting targets within the Soviet Union and, in Norstad's view, would greatly strengthen the credibility of NATO by reassuring European governments that might doubt the US commitment to massive retaliation against the Soviet Union in case of a Warsaw Pact invasion of Western Europe. Norstad believed that a NATO nuclear force would be complementary to, but not replace, the US nuclear deterrent. In a 1957 speech Norstad explained that his proposed NATO force would provide a strong local defense against Warsaw Pact aggression, thereby "giving pause" to the Soviet leaders—who would then have to make the decision to retreat, or press on and face the full power of massive American retaliation.⁴⁶ Norstad had to lobby the US government, meet with the president and testify before Congress to win support for his strategy.

There was considerable criticism of the Norstad concept within US government and academic circles. Many preferred simply to increase the US strategic nuclear arsenal and saw problems ahead if Europeans were given greater access to, and control over nuclear weapons.⁴⁷ Eisenhower supported the Norstad plans, however, and at the North Atlantic Council heads of governments meeting in December 1957, Norstad was authorized to establish a NATO stockpile of nuclear weapons. IRBMs would be deployed to Europe and put at SACEUR's disposal.⁴⁸ Norstad began a series of negotiations with European governments to buy and man US nuclear missile systems and station them in Europe with US forces holding the warheads ready for use under a "dual key" arrangement. Some of the NATO countries, notably Norway and Denmark, had already enacted firm policies to forbid

nuclear weapons on their soil. Other NATO nations were more receptive to basing missiles on their territory. For the short term, Norstad adopted a piecemeal, nation-by-nation approach to nuclear basing agreements simply as a means of getting the foot in the door. Italy and Turkey accepted the US plan; each nation agreed to buy three squadrons of Jupiter liquid-fueled IRBMs and base them in their territory. The British agreed to a deployment of Thor missiles.⁴⁹ The first generation of IRBMs, the Thor and Jupiter missiles, were liquid-fueled and therefore posed a serious safety risk. They were also large and scarcely mobile. In short, they weren't very useful weapons, but Norstad decided to deploy them in anticipation of a new generation of Polaris-type IRBMs under development that would be far more mobile and, because of their solid-fuel, far safer to store and move.⁵⁰ By 1962 SACEUR had a total of 120 Thor and Jupiter IRBMs stationed under Allied command in Europe. It was a good start to a true NATO stockpile.⁵¹

The issue of nuclear weapons in Germany, much like the issue of rearmament, was very contentious. Given the German political conditions, Norstad did not ask them to take part in the IRBM program. Then in 1958 the Adenauer government volunteered to buy nuclear-capable Matador C cruise missiles from the US, along with 300 Nike-Ajax anti-aircraft missiles (also nuclear capable) for the Bundeswehr, to be under dual key arrangements with the United States. After a heated debate, the Bundestag accepted the creation of a German-manned nuclear force for the Federal Republic.⁵² As Norstad built up NATO's nuclear stockpile under a series of bi-lateral agreements, he faced numerous objections from the US State Department and Defense Department, seeking to delay the deployments until technical and funding questions could be addressed.⁵³

Indeed, Norstad faced objections to his strategy from the US State Department throughout his tenure as SACEUR. Friction between the State Department and the armed forces over foreign policy issues is nothing new. Eisenhower, however, allowed a considerable degree of debate on strategic issues within his administration, acting as umpire and making the final decisions. Norstad's ability to articulate his strategy was

essential since he was called to Washington numerous times to brief Eisenhower and to testify before Congress. In fact, Norstad proved exceptionally effective in dealing with Congress, winning a body of supporters and admirers on Capitol Hill.

Whereas Norstad oversaw the creation of a NATO nuclear weapons stockpile under dual –key arrangements, his goal was to establish a truly European nuclear force whereby the US would supply NATO nations with nuclear technology and systems, and the Europeans would have the primary control of the weapons under guidelines set by SACEUR. The genesis of the Multilateral Force (MLF) concept, Norstad’s idea was picked up and backed by the State Department in 1960. The MLF negotiations that continued into the 1960s would eventually founder due to French President Charles de Gaulle’s insistence on French control of nuclear weapons on French soil, and the demand that the US assist France in developing her own independent nuclear force. Although willing to compromise on numerous nuclear issues, neither Norstad nor the US government could accept the French positions. It would lead eventually to France’s leaving the military side of NATO in 1966.



Thor Missile circa 1958 (USAF Photo)

The Berlin Crisis of 1961

After the first Berlin Crisis of 1948-49, caused by a Soviet blockade of West Berlin, the city remained a prosperous Allied enclave within Soviet-occupied Germany. However, during the next decade the mere existence of West Berlin as a prosperous and democratic open city in the midst of a totalitarian state put an enormous strain on the stability of the Soviet puppet government in the east. After the brutal suppression of East German demonstrations for democracy in 1953, increasing numbers of East Germans simply abandoned their country as a hopeless case. Carrying no more than a suitcase, they would travel to West Berlin, then from West Berlin to West Germany, where the booming economy offered economic opportunity as well as political freedom. By the late 1950s the flow of East Germans to the West through Berlin (the East-West German border having long been closed) had become a hemorrhage. In Berlin's last year as an open city, more than a million East Germans entered West Berlin to move to West Germany. Since East Germany had only eighteen million people, the existence of Berlin as an open city spelled eventual doom for the East German state.

In 1958 the new Soviet leader, Nikita Khrushchev, initiated a new crisis over Berlin when he demanded that the four-power status of Berlin be changed. Berlin should be demilitarized and all Allied forces (US, British, French) withdrawn from the city. Although Khrushchev eventually withdrew his demands, the situation remained tense. Berlin was not specifically a NATO issue, but as senior American officer in Europe, Norstad was responsible for the security of the small US Army garrison in Berlin. If a confrontation over Berlin arose it would soon become a NATO issue, and Norstad therefore had to plan US and NATO responses to threats against Berlin.⁵⁴

In case of general war Berlin could not be defended with a garrison of 6,000 US, 3,000 British and 2,000 French troops, versus twenty-two Soviet and twelve East German divisions.⁵⁵ However, an all-out Soviet attack was only one of several plausible threat scenarios.

What was more likely was another blockade of the city, which would require another airlift. Yet another possibility was a limited Soviet military action against Berlin or the Allied autobahn routes connecting Berlin with West Germany. Norstad, concerned with the tense situation, met with the US Joint Chiefs of Staff and proposed forming a tripartite planning group to allow the French and British staffs at NATO headquarters (SHAPE- Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe) to participate in non-NATO contingency planning for a Berlin crisis codenamed "Live Oak." Canada was also brought into the Live Oak planning because of its role in NORAD and any increase in US military alert levels would require Canadian participation.⁵⁶ Between October 1959 and September 1960 a variety of contingency plans to deal with aggression against Berlin were developed. It was regarding Berlin that the limits of the US massive retaliation strategy were evident. All the plans to defend Berlin's status were conventional force plans. The British were reluctant to plan for Berlin because the British government did not feel that Berlin was worth an all-out war. The French were much more willing to use force over Berlin, but only if the Soviets used force first. Canada was clear, from the outset, that it would not support any use of nuclear weapons over Berlin. Still, the Live Oak planners developed a variety of plans using limited ground forces to protect Allied convoys and to ensure the Allied status of West Berlin.⁵⁷

When the Kennedy administration entered office in January 1961, the Soviets thought that Berlin would be a good place to test the new administration. In March 1961 Khrushchev ratcheted up the rhetoric over Berlin with a series of bellicose statements. This pushed the Kennedy administration to conclude that Berlin planning needed to be part of worldwide US strategy. The Kennedy administration's character, and its desire to approach policy making in a very different manner soon put it at loggerheads with Norstad and undermined the relationship that the US and Norstad had built up with Europe through the 1950s.

The new Defense Secretary Robert McNamara favored bringing NATO into the Berlin planning. The Kennedy administration relied on

a small group of academics and former officials to advise them on Berlin. Former Secretary of State Dean Acheson and Professor Henry Kissinger were among those brought in for advice. It was clear that anything larger than a small response by a US Army battalion or brigade would require bringing the NATO Central Region into the planning process. Even if the US opted to “go it alone” in a crisis, deployment of a US division or more would require that the NATO allies plan to cover the West German border.⁵⁸ In August 1961 the US government directed that NATO be included in Live Oak planning. On 17 August, the day after the Berlin Wall went up; US Secretary of State Dean Rusk addressed the North Atlantic Council, arguing for a NATO linkage to Berlin based on three principles: Western troop presence in Berlin, free access to Berlin for the Western Allies and West Germans, and the economic survival of Berlin.⁵⁹ The US Joint Chiefs instructed Norstad to prepare plans for unilateral US military action over Berlin, to include operations at corps level into East Germany supported by air and naval forces. The Joint Chiefs favored unilateral US action due to a perception of French and British unreliability on the Berlin issue.

The Kennedy administration and Norstad held very different views of contingency planning for Berlin, and their disagreements would be among the reasons for McNamara’s removal of Norstad as SACEUR in 1962. Essentially, the Kennedy administration was enamored of the concepts of graduated response and planned escalation in guiding planning. In a series of meetings between Norstad and the administration in Washington, Norstad argued against the concepts of “graduation” and “escalation” as they implied an inflexible approach which would automatically escalate the US and NATO response to increasingly higher levels in response to each Soviet action. To Norstad this meant that once force was employed, it could quickly get out of control. In a meeting with the Joint Chiefs and President Kennedy in October 1961, Norstad argued against the escalation concept, preferring the terms “pause” and “threshold.” Norstad pointed out that several NATO governments, including Canada, had already refused to consider nuclear weapons in case of hostilities over Berlin. Other NATO nations refused to agree to the Kennedy administration proposals for a twelve-division assault up the autobahn or a rigid plan for “ordered escalation.”

Norstad maintained the supreme importance of having a catalog of flexible plans that would meet with NATO approval. He had already developed several plans with German General Hans Speidel, commander of NATO's Central Front, which included a division-level operation and the use of both conventional and small, tactical nuclear weapons.⁶⁰

McNamara and Kennedy's strategists, clearly unhappy with Norstad's approach, dispatched retired General Lucius Clay, former High Commissioner of Germany, to act as the special envoy of the president. Clay's presence in Germany was irritating to Norstad and the NATO staff, who believed that Clay's special mission was more likely to confuse the situation than help it. Kennedy gave Clay a vague charter to somehow deal with the situation, but no actual power or responsibility to take any actions on the part of the administration. When Clay returned from his brief trip, he reported to Kennedy that the Western planning over the threat to Berlin was "too weak" and "too timid." The Kennedy administration soon gave Norstad a set of plans, based on a four-phased escalation of military action that progressed to selective nuclear strikes in the second phase. Norstad argued that the plan went too nuclear, too fast, but dutifully passed the plans on to be considered by NATO as a whole. As Norstad had predicted, the US approach to Berlin planning was generally unacceptable to NATO, and most of the plans submitted by the US were rejected by NATO in early 1962. Even Britain, America's most reliable ally, rejected the views of the Kennedy administration. When virtually the whole of NATO balked at the Kennedy administration's demands Kennedy's circle of advisors held Norstad responsible, despite the fact that Norstad had drawn up the specific plans the administration had requested and had quickly brought the plans and strategic options before the top NATO councils.⁶¹

During the Berlin Crisis of 1961, he managed to do things, in his words, "quietly and firmly." He later said that there were times when "everybody... particularly the American government... seemed to get a little hysterical."⁶² He was sure that he could handle the situation, and that he had the confidence of the NATO governments (aside from Kennedy's administration) to handle the situation. In recalling the crisis

he said, "I would not be provoked into doing anything I shouldn't do...It was not my job to manage a bang (meaning war)."63

Norstad Fired

Norstad had done a superb job as an alliance commander during his six years as air commander for the Central Front and six years as SACEUR. Under Norstad's direction, NATO's force and readiness posture had improved dramatically. Although there were many points of contention between NATO and the US, especially concerning the French policy on building an independent nuclear force, the relations between the US and the Alliance were strong and friendly. Norstad's planning and support of German rearmament had greatly increased the conventional forces on NATO's vital Central Front.

When the Kennedy administration had come to power in 1961, Kennedy's inside circle was convinced that the US military strategy needed wholesale revision. Kennedy, Defense Secretary McNamara and the inner circle of policy advisors viewed the senior US military leadership -- and that certainly included Norstad -- as too identified with Eisenhower. They wanted the old guard thrown out and replaced with men, such as General Maxwell Taylor, seen as personally loyal to Kennedy. In fact, it was blatantly unfair and inaccurate to think of the top generals of the time as "Eisenhower's men" or as "Republican generals" merely because they had served under Eisenhower when he was SHAPE commander or president. For his part, Norstad had always stayed strictly aloof from American party politics and as a senior officer he had given no indication of party affiliation. While serving in the Pentagon from 1945 to 1950 he had worked closely with the top circles in the Truman administration and gotten along well. Indeed, he was on much friendlier terms with Truman's Secretary of State Dean Acheson than he was with Eisenhower's man John Foster Dulles. Moreover, Norstad treated the senior leadership under Eisenhower precisely as he had treated the senior leadership under Kennedy. In numerous trips to Washington from 1951-1962 to brief the administration and discuss NATO policy with the president, secretary of state and Joint Chiefs, he

had always stated his positions clearly and argued his positions forcefully. No one in the Eisenhower administration regarded him as a “yes man”, especially as he often differed on policy issues with Dulles and the State Department, as well as with members of the Joint Chiefs. More often than not, he won his debates with the State Department and Joint Chiefs over issues such as the deployment of missiles to NATO and giving the SACEUR a greater role in the nuclear targeting strategy.

As the new administration settled in, the major NATO nations made it clear to Secretaries Rusk and McNamara that they were very happy with Norstad’s leadership as SACEUR. British Prime Minister Harold McMillan pointedly told McNamara in 1961 that Britain would be pleased if Norstad stayed on indefinitely.⁶⁴ In six years as NATO’s senior air commander and six years as SACEUR, Norstad had been remarkably successful in leading the Alliance, winning the trust of European heads of state and senior military officials. Under Norstad the NATO nations were treated as full partners, not junior partners, in Western defense. The European powers were confident that Norstad not only understood their views and positions on NATO policy and strategy, but that Norstad would fairly and accurately represent their views in Washington.

Under Eisenhower, strategic policy had included input from a broad spectrum of the government -- to include the president’s advisors, the State Department, the Defense Department, the Joint Chiefs and senior commanders such as Norstad. Debate over policy among the military services, or between Norstad and the State Department was seen as acceptable. After all the issues were argued, Eisenhower made the final decisions. Although the process of setting strategic policy was somewhat cumbersome under Eisenhower, the process at least ensured that all options were thoroughly considered. The state of civil/military relations under Eisenhower was sound. While Eisenhower routinely denied the army’s requests for larger conventional forces, at least the army could state its case before the president. Together with the Joint Chiefs, commanders with major strategic responsibilities, such as LeMay at SAC and Norstad at NATO, played key roles in the military policy

debates. Under Kennedy all this would change. Strategic decision-making authority was consolidated in the White House. Kennedy and a small circle of advisors, including his brother the attorney general, set strategic policy, while senior generals and admirals, largely seen as Eisenhower-era dinosaurs by Kennedy's circle and McNamara's staff of civilian experts, began to be cut out of the strategic process. In the view of Kennedy and MacNamara, Norstad and the Joint Chiefs served best as functionaries, carrying out the will of the administration and little more. Norstad was an early target of the Kennedy administration because his position as SACEUR made him appear too independent. It was up to Secretary McNamara to remove Norstad.

By 1962 the insufferably arrogant Robert McNamara, having been on the job for all of one year, was convinced that he had mastered the intricacies of strategy and of dealing with NATO. In his first major foray into NATO diplomacy, McNamara was the proverbial bull in the china shop. In a speech at the annual NATO defense and foreign ministers' meeting in Athens in May 1962, McNamara boldly argued that the NATO nuclear deterrent – the SAC forces assigned to NATO, IRBMs and NATO's tactical nuclear weapons-- did not constitute an effective deterrent and that NATO required a large-scale conventional force build up.⁶⁵ Belittling the NATO nuclear deterrent so carefully built up by Norstad and his predecessors came as a shock to NATO, because for a decade US policy had been to reassure the Europeans about the effectiveness of SACEUR's nuclear forces.⁶⁶ McNamara's hectoring of the European nations and their defense policy failed to produce the results the Kennedy administration wanted. McNamara's approach was to have NATO strategy imposed by Washington. While the Europeans understood that the US had the primary say over NATO strategy, they at least appreciated the pretense of being consulted. McNamara treated the NATO nations as if they were unruly division chiefs of Ford Motor Company. Essentially, the decision making process employed by McNamara and the Kennedy administration discouraged alternative political and military perspectives.

Unhappy with the European's negative and almost hostile response to his new strategy, McNamara blamed Norstad rather than question his own approach. McNamara wanted Norstad fired and a new SACEUR appointed who would dutifully make the Europeans accept a US-imposed strategy. A month after the Athens meeting Norstad met with McNamara, Secretary of State Rusk, and several senior NATO officers. At the meeting McNamara pointedly expressed his regret that Norstad's serious health problems would force him to retire. Norstad was, in fact, in excellent health and the NATO officers all knew it. It was a puerile way of telling Norstad he was being fired. As the meeting progressed things heated up and McNamara turned abusive. The Defense Secretary bluntly questioned Norstad's integrity as an American officer, asking whether Norstad was more loyal to the US or to NATO. This insult was the final straw for Norstad, and one of the few times that he is known to have strained to control his temper.⁶⁷ After recovering his composure, Norstad asked to be retired. When McNamara said he wanted Norstad out of Europe in a few weeks, Norstad almost blew up again. The appointment of SACEUR had to be approved by the Atlantic Council and the major NATO nations at least had to be consulted about the next SACEUR. If cut out of the process by McNamara, French President Charles de Gaulle was more than willing and able to hold up NATO business by delaying the approval of a new SACEUR. So Norstad was given six months to conduct some quiet diplomacy and smooth the way for General Lyman Lemnitzer to be approved as the new SACEUR.⁶⁸ Kennedy and McNamara were unhappy with the delay as they were eager to remove Lemnitzer from his post as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs so that Kennedy's favorite general, Maxwell Taylor, could replace him.

Despite McNamara's comments, NATO had a sizeable nuclear deterrent that was quickly being modernized. In appreciation of Norstad's work, the NATO nations showered honors upon him. Charles de Gaulle presented Norstad with the Grand Cross of the Legion of Honor, with the comment "everything that could and should be was done on behalf of the Atlantic Alliance."⁶⁹ German chancellor Adenauer awarded Norstad the Federal Republic's Grand Cross of

Merit. The awards to Norstad were understood as a rebuff to the Kennedy administration.⁷⁰

Upon Norstad's retirement in early 1963, he worked for Corning Glass as a director responsible for their overseas operations. He said that, unlike many other retired generals, he wanted employment outside the defense industries. He thought he would enjoy working in a civilian business where he could use the management skills he had learned in the army and air force. By all accounts, Norstad was quite successful as a businessman and finally retired from Corning after more than a decade of service. He settled in rural New York State, where he died in 1988.

Norstad as a Leader

So, what made Norstad a highly effective military alliance leader? To start with, Norstad was a consummate military professional. During World War II he won a reputation as the best planner in the Army Air Forces. There were few in the Air Force who could match him for his understanding of strategy and doctrine. When he arrived as a lieutenant general in Europe, he already had credibility as a military leader even though his senior assignments were all in staff jobs. In his receiving his first true command posting as USAFE Commander his career paralleled Eisenhower and Marshall, who rose to top command positions without holding command at the lower levels.

Throughout his tenure as SACEUR, Norstad worked the NATO Alliance carefully. He knew in advance what he could reasonably ask governments to do, and what he couldn't. In this way, he was able to push through a policy to build up a NATO nuclear weapons stockpile. Norstad even got Britain, Italy, Turkey and West Germany to purchase nuclear missiles for their national forces and accept policies that included dual-key control of nuclear weapons. Norstad handled German rearmament brilliantly from behind the scenes. Due to his experience as NATO air commander, Norstad was far better informed on the development of the Luftwaffe than Chancellor Adenauer and his top military advisors. As the Luftwaffe grew, Norstad patiently encouraged

the Germans to fit their air force into the NATO structure even though that had not been the intention of the first commanders of the Bundeswehr, who had wanted the Luftwaffe to be a small air corps for army support. Because he was well-informed on German military aviation issues, Norstad anticipated the problems the new German air force would have in training and supporting the force, and he had solutions worked out to the problems before they arose.

A successful strategic commander needs vision-- and Norstad certainly had that. As SACEUR he concentrated on the building the NATO Alliance as a strong, cohesive and credible deterrent to the Soviet Union. For Norstad, the Alliance was of primary importance, so he put all of his energy into making the Alliance work. Although he was an American general, ultimately responsible to the US government, he was also appointed by the NATO nations to serve as their military commander. He took his responsibility to the NATO nations very seriously, working to represent their concerns and interests. Like Eisenhower in World War II, Norstad was criticized by some US senior generals and leaders as “having gone over to the Europeans.” Eisenhower, who had faced criticism that he had “become British,” certainly understood and ignored these criticisms of Norstad. Apparently, facing sniping from subordinates and peers on the issue of national loyalty are part of the job of a successful alliance commander.

Norstad concentrated on the big political and strategic issues as NATO commander, leaving his senior military commanders with the responsibility for running the day- to-day military training, planning and operations. He had a truly international staff, with commanders including Frenchmen, Britons and Germans in top positions. He trusted his coalition as professionals who would get the job done. Given the size of NATO and its forces, micromanaging the Alliance would have been impossible and Norstad didn't try. Although he had a hectic social and political schedule, Norstad knew how to pace himself. He made sure to take time for golf, and kept weekends and a couple of weeknight evenings free to be home with his family. When he took over as SACEUR, the senior staff was delighted with Norstad's somewhat laid

back style, in contrast to the preceding SACEUR General Gruenther, who had a notable reputation as an obsessive micromanager. Not surprisingly, Norstad's approach worked better than Gruenther's, and it was certainly better for morale.

As SACEUR Norstad saw NATO as not just another job; it was a crusade. Norstad believed in NATO and he was also a clear thinker with an exceptional ability to articulate his ideas. In testimony to Congress, in making plans at the Pentagon, or in proposing new strategies before the NATO Council, Norstad could be relied upon to carefully think through all aspects of the big issues. He was also known for his ability to listen carefully to other people's ideas, as well as to express his own. At the strategic level of leadership, the importance of having vision, of being articulate and of persuading others cannot be underestimated.

He had his first experience with strategic planning and coalition warfare early in his career, and proved himself highly competent in both fields. During World War II, Norstad recognized in himself a special knack for dealing with coalition issues. While most American military officers are notably uncomfortable in dealing with coalition politics and issues, Norstad clearly enjoyed this kind of challenge. In fact, after he retired as SACEUR he remarked that he had enjoyed the job more than any of the previous NATO chiefs.⁷¹

Norstad's personality traits were central to his success as a commander. He was almost always calm and collected, and he exuded confidence. The only notable instances when he came close to losing his temper were his meetings with McNamara -- a very understandable reaction. His personal style worked well in a military coalition. He was cool, rather than flamboyant. People who worked in the Pentagon under Norstad or in NATO headquarters at Fontainebleau during Norstad's tenure as SACEUR have described Norstad as personable and gracious with his staff and military colleagues. People liked to work for Norstad. As for his ability to get along with political leaders, he is one of

the few Americans who ever got along with Charles de Gaulle—certainly a remarkable accomplishment.⁷²

One can see an interesting contrast in the style of strategic leadership between the Eisenhower and the Kennedy Administrations. One administration offers a sound model of a strategy process, and the other does not. As SACEUR in the 1950s, Norstad was allowed to propose strategic policy and argue his case at the top levels of the administration. Eisenhower, who had the final say, allowed a considerable degree of debate among his top military and civilian leaders and neither the military nor the civilians were cut out of the process. There was plenty of very healthy friction to ensure that a wide variety of policy options were reviewed and considered. In contrast, as discussed in H.R. McMaster's book, *Dereliction of Duty*, the Kennedy administration is a model of how not to do strategic policy.⁷³ From the start strategic discussion was limited only to Kennedy's inner circle, with the military leadership effectively cut out of the process. Because debate on fundamental strategic issues was restricted, there was far less input from people like Norstad -- who had been dealing with strategic level issues for two decades when McNamara came into office. The attitudes and approach that got the US into Vietnam were already evident in the way that McNamara and Rusk dealt with Norstad and NATO in 1961-1962. McNamara and Kennedy's advisors felt they could deal with NATO far more effectively than Norstad. In fact, after Norstad's relief, US/NATO relations went quickly downhill, and much of the Alliance cohesion that Norstad had built up was lost. By 1966, when France pulled out of the military command of NATO, the exact opposite of McNamara's goal had been achieved. By the mid-1960s NATO conventional defense was in far worse shape than in 1962, when McNamara had demanded more defense effort from the Europeans.

The career of Lauris Norstad should serve as a model of an effective alliance military leader. He led the alliance through a series of crises and complex problems and greatly strengthened NATO's military position, all the while using his diplomatic skills to keep the sometimes fractious political and military leaders on board. As a strategist he has few peers in the American military traditions. Norstad understood the complex interplay between politics and policy and military problems and

threats and helped guide and lead the NATO alliance through its first fifteen years. He is one of the rare examples of a true soldier and diplomat and policy maker and serves as reminder of the difference that individuals can make. It is fair to say that Norstad was the last SACEUR who served as a major player in policy making rather than just policy execution.

¹ The one major biography of Lauris Norstad is Robert S. Jordan, *Norstad: Cold War NATO Supreme Commander*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000). Marc Trachtenberg's *A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement 1945-1963* (Princeton University Press, 1999) discusses Norstad's role in some detail. Other than those references, there is relatively little that focuses on Norstad as an alliance commander. In the large body of leadership studies published by the US military and used in US military schools there is nothing to be found on Norstad.

² On Norstad's early life see Jordan, pp. 14-20.

³ Norstad Interview early 1970s. Norstad Papers USAF HRA. Part 1. p. 7. Norstad agreed to a series of interviews with USAF historians circa 1970 and the transcripts of several tapes of interviews are to be found in the USAF Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB AL.

⁴ Richard Davis, *Carl A. Spaatz and the Air War in Europe*, (Washington: Center for Air Force History, 1993), p. 68 see also Norstad Interview p.8.

⁵ Davis, pp. 100-101

⁶ Phillip Meilinger, *Hoyt S. Vandenberg, The Life of a General*, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989) pp. 29-30

⁷ *ibid* pp. 34-36

⁸ Davis p. 232

⁹ Jordan p. 37

¹⁰ *ibid* p. 158

¹¹ For an overview of the US/German program of aerial rearmament and Norstad's role see James Corum, "Building a New Luftwaffe: The United States Air Force and Bundeswehr Planning for Rearmament, 1950-1960." *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 27, No1, March 2004, pp 89-113.

¹² The complete text of the Himmerod Conference is found in: *Die "Himmeroder Denkschrift" vom Oktober 1950*, ed. Hans-Jürgen Rautenberg and Norbert Wiggershaus, (Karlsruhe: MGFA, 1985), pp. 36-56. This work also contains an extensive commentary on the Denkschrift and the text of

other documents relating to German security planning in 1950. On the German air force see Section 2, Luftwaffe paragraphs a-f, pp. 45-48.

¹³ David Clay Large, *Germans to the Front*, (University of North Carolina Press, 1996), pp. 98-99

¹⁴ Richard Emmons, "UAAFE Profile: Personnel Strength and Organizational Change 1945-1985", Report from USAFE Historian, pp. 8-9. USAF HRA Doc. K570.04 1945-1985.

¹⁵ In fact, the USAF did not, in the end, realize this figure and USAF strength in Europe peaked in 1953 with 91,000 officers and airmen, 5,158 US civilians and 39,882 foreign national civilians. See footnote 14, p. 11.

¹⁶ Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt (MGFA), *Anfänge Westdeutscher Sicherheitspolitik, 1945-1955*, Band 2, (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1989) pp. 27-31

¹⁷ Wolfgang Schmidt, "Von der 'Befehlsaufgabe' zum 'Briefing': Die amerikanisierung der Luftwaffe während der Aufbauphase der Bundeswehr", *Militärgeschichte*, 3 Quartal, 2001, p. 44.

¹⁸ USAFE Historical Branch, *USAFE's Assistance to Create a New German Air Force*, 1956, p. 5. In USAF HRA Doc. K570.04M 1952-1955.

¹⁹ Letter from General Norstad to General White, 7 July 1952, USAF HRA Doc. K570.04-13, 1945-1985

²⁰ Monttescue Lowry, *The Forge of West German Rearmament: Theodor Blank and the Amt Blank*, (New York: Peter Lang, 1990) pp. 108-116

²¹ Historical Branch USAFE, *USAFE's Assistance to Create a New German Air Force*, p. 9-10

²² *ibid* 11-12

²³ *ibid* p. 5, 16

²⁴ *ibid* p.13

²⁵ Schmidt, p. 44

²⁶ USAFE Historical Branch, pp, 17-21

²⁷ On the eve of rearmament in November 1954, the Luftwaffe Staff had twenty-eight sections in its organization table, yet of these, six sections, including the very important organization, personnel and communications sections had no section leader. For organization charts of the Luftwaffe planning staff of the early 1950s see Dieter Krüger, ed., *Dienststellen zur Vorbereitung des Westdeutschen Verteidigungbeitrages*, Teil 1 in *Findbücher zu Beständen des Bundesarchivs*, Band 40 (Koblenz: Bundesarchiv Koblenz, 1992) pp. xcii-xciii.

²⁸ USAFE Historical Branch, pp. 13-20

²⁹ *ibid* p. 31.

³⁰ *ibid* pp. 70-83

³¹ HQ, USAF, "CINCUSAFE's Monthly Summary, August 1955", para 9 in USAF HRA Doc. KW-7330-HI, Jan-Jun 1957.

³² Historical Branch USAFE, *USAFE's Assistance to Create a New German Air Force* p. 90

³³ *ibid* 89-93.

³⁴ For a good overview of the budget issues and strategy of the early 1950s see Walton S. Moody, *Building a Strategic Air Force*, (Washington: Air Force History and Museums Program, 1996) pp. 445-457

³⁵ Norstad interview, USAF HRA Tape 3

³⁶ *ibid* p. 8

³⁷ Norstad interview, Tape 3

³⁸ *ibid* p. 8

³⁹ Moody, *Building a Strategic Air Force*, p. 366

⁴⁰ *ibid* pp. 367-369

⁴¹ George Mitchell, *Mathew B. Ridgeway: Soldier, Statesman, Scholar Citizen*, (Mechanicsburg PA: Stackpole Books, 2002). P 118, Moody p. 447

⁴² Moody pp. 434-437, 370

⁴³ *ibid* p. 369

⁴⁴ James Gibson, *The History of the US Nuclear Arsenal*, (London: Bison Books, 1989), pp. 84-85

⁴⁵ David Schwartz, *NATO's Nuclear Dilemmas*, (Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 1983) p. 32.

⁴⁶ *Ibíd.* p. 58-59

⁴⁷ *Ibíd.* p. 52

⁴⁸ Jordan, p. 105

⁴⁹ *ibid.* pp. 111, 125.

⁵⁰ *Ibid* p. 111

⁵¹ On the history of early IRBMs see Jacob Neufeld, *Ballistic Missiles in the United States Air Force* (Washington DC: Office of Air Force History, 1990) pp. 222-227, 232-233

⁵² Schwartz pp. 70-73

⁵³ Jordan p. 125

⁵⁴ For a though examination of NATO and US planning on Berlin see Sean Maloney, "Berlin Contingency Planning: Prelude to Flexible Response, 1958-63", *Journal of Strategic Studies* 25, no. 1 (March 2002) pp. 99-134

⁵⁵ *ibid* p.102

⁵⁶ *ibid* p. 104

⁵⁷ *ibid* pp. 104-106

⁵⁸ *ibid* pp. 108-110

⁵⁹ *ibid* pp. 109-110

⁶⁰ *ibid* pp. 110-112

⁶¹ Jordan pp. 196-207

⁶² *Ibíd.*

⁶³ *Ibíd.* p. 9

⁶⁴ Jordan p. 7

⁶⁵ *Ibid.* pp. 7-8

⁶⁶ *ibid* p. 8

⁶⁷ *ibid* p. 9

⁶⁸ *ibid* pp. 9-10

⁶⁹ *ibid* p. 12

⁷⁰ *ibid*

⁷¹ *ibid*

⁷² The author's father worked at NATO headquarters in France when Norstad arrived as air commander in the 1950s and he and other officers saw Norstad as a cut above previous senior commanders in his competence, management style and leadership.

⁷³ see H.R McMaster, *Dereliction of Duty*, (New York, Harper Perennial, 1997) pp. 4-31

The Rise of China and the Departure of America: Operational Implications for Europe (2013 Joint Course Prize Paper)

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Abstract: This study analyses how the rise of China will change the international system and how it will alter decisions and actions taken by the United States. As such, it will also analyse the operational implications for Europe resulting from the United States military capabilities' relocation to Asia-Pacific. This is an important topic as the European Union enters the era of new international order and faces new challenges for its security cooperation. By defining a security strategy the EU has acknowledged the importance of European cooperation as well as cooperation with the United States. Nevertheless it still examines the ways to cooperation. This paper utilises Realism – in particular, the Power Transition Theory – to account for China's rise and America's response to it. It combines theory with historic and contemporary actions, draws conclusions and makes recommendations. The study finds that with the United States' rebalancing of its military efforts to the Asia-Pacific, which could be compounded should the US become distracted by a crisis in East-Asia, Europeans may face a number of capability-driven operational implications as well as operational implications resulting from political differences, should they seek to undertake their own military operations. This work also analyses existing and evolving forms of security cooperation within Europe.

Introduction

“Almost as if according to some natural law, in every century there seems to emerge a country with the power, the will, and the intellectual and moral impetus to shape the entire international system in accordance with its own values.”

Throughout the modern history of international relations there have been several great powers influencing the entire international system. The Spanish Empire reached its global apex in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries with its vast silver mines in New Spain (Americas). The Dutch Empire then took over with its West and East India trading companies during the seventeenth century, which propelled the Dutch Republic into the well-known 'Golden Age' with military, scientific and cultural hegemony. The British Empire followed, which eventually came to comprise almost quarter of Earth's land territory at its peak in the nineteenth century, with its political, cultural and linguistic influence well recognised even today. Each of these hegemonic powers gained significant economic and cultural dominance in the international system and they all failed, eventually giving ground to the new hegemonic power.

The devastating defeat of Nazi Germany in 1945 gave birth to a new international order with the United States and the Soviet Union balancing each other's influence over the international system. During the Cold War Western Europe became almost formally a protectorate of the United States with the vast American military presence in Europe. Half a century later, the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union marked the start of new changes in the international system.

The United States, as the only global superpower for the last couple of decades, has decisively influenced international relations. Even more, after the collapse of the World Trade Center scholars came to consider the United States as a hegemonic state – 'state that is so powerful that it dominates all other states in the system'.² As America took a leading role in the newly established coalition against terrorism, new borderlines between states were drawn based on the participation in the United States-led coalition. In a joint news conference with French President Jacques Chirac on 6th November 2001, President George W. Bush clearly showed the hegemonic character of the United States by stating:

Over time it's going to be important for nations to know they will be held accountable for inactivity, you're either with us or against us in the fight against terror.³

Yet, as the United States and its partners were busy fighting the war on terror, China started to appear on the international scene. And with China 'experiencing the fastest growth in GDP per capita of any major economy in human history' the build-up of its military capability has become increasingly rapid.⁴

Despite the fact that the United States President Barack Obama officially welcomes the peaceful rise of China, at the same time he has stated: 'As we end today's wars, I have directed my national security team to make our presence and mission in the Asia Pacific a top priority.'⁵ This change of strategic focus of the United States, rebalancing its efforts from today's wars to preparations for the future challenges with regards to rise of China, will inevitably reshape its military distribution over the globe.

This paper will analyse how the rise of China will alter the international system and how this will reflect in decisions and actions taken by the United States. As such, it will also analyse the implications for Europe resulting from the rise of China, particularly the operational implications due to the United States military capabilities' relocation to the Asia-Pacific. It is hypothesised that the relocation of the United States' military capabilities to Asia-Pacific will have operational implications for Europe and therefore new forms of defence cooperation within Europe will be required to allow Europeans to defend themselves and undertake crisis management operations in their crisis-prone eastern and southern neighbourhoods.

The first chapter of this paper will set the analytical framework of this study, using Realist ideas and Power Transition Theory.⁶ Realists state that national security and state survival is the core value that drives states' actions. Realism will help to justify and interpret actions taken by

the United States and China in particular as well as relations between European countries. Power Transition Theory tends to explain power relations in the international system as well as why, how and when wars occur. This theory will provide the understanding as to how and why the United States may deal with challenges that emerge in relation to the rise of China.

China's rising power status is recognised internationally and it will be analysed in the second chapter of this study. China increased its 'military spending for 2012 to about 670 billion Yuan (US\$106.4 billion)', Indeed, China's defence expenditure has become the second largest (albeit by some margin) after the United States.⁷ While China's military capacity is expanding, the country's intentions are still undefined and unclear to international society and therefore could pose a threat to the existing international order.

The end of the 'Cold War' era – as well as war on terror – led the United States to reduce its military presence in Europe. It is clear now that with the Pentagon's new strategic guidance – 'Sustaining US Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense' – released in January 2012, the United States perceives most European countries as producers of security rather than consumers, leading to further reductions in its military presence in Europe.⁸ Whether or not the United States military will depart from the Europe, leaving its allies on their own, will be the main concern of chapter three.

Chapter four will look into the existing European security system and to what extent it depends upon the United States' military capabilities. The operational implications for Europeans resulting from the United States' military departure from their continent will be analysed in the chapter five. NATO Secretary-General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, declared after the Libya operation in 2011: 'the operation has made visible that the Europeans lack a number of essential military capabilities.'⁹ This chapter will discuss operational challenges caused by deficiencies in certain military capabilities.

1. Realism and Power Transition Theory

International relations as an academic discipline was established after the First World War to analyse and understand why different conflicts and wars between states emerge and how the rise of conflict could be mitigated. This chapter will look in to the most influential international relations theory – Realism. It will help to justify and interpret actions taken by the United States and China as well as to support recommendations for European security cooperation. To understand the rise and fall of Great Powers and what implications it has on the international system Power Transition Theory will be utilised.

Basic Realist ideas and assumptions can be describes as:

(1) a pessimistic view of human nature; (2) a conviction that international relations are necessarily conflictual and that international conflicts are ultimately resolved by war; (3) a high regard for the values of national security and state survival; and (4) a basic scepticism that there can be progress in international politics that is comparable to that in domestic political life.¹⁰

Realists consider states as rational actors in the international arena, therefore putting national interests ahead of morality, international law and international organisations. As former British Prime Minister Lord Palmerston is reputed to have put it: ‘We have no permanent allies, we have no permanent enemies, we only have permanent interests’.

Realists operate with a core assumption that there is no overarching authority in the international system and that the state’s primary concern is national security and state survival. The fact that all states must follow their own national interests means that other states can never be relied upon completely. That also makes treaties and other international agreements between states simply pragmatic arrangements

that will be set aside if they conflict with national interests. Realists state that: 'all states must be prepared to sacrifice their international obligations on the altar of their own self-interest if the two come into conflict'.¹¹ They also endorse that all states live in a self-help system and they all pursue power in order to feel safe in an anarchical system of international relations.

The Ancient Greek historian, Thucydides, who is considered to be a father of Realist ideas, argued:

*All states, large and small must adapt to that natural, given reality of unequal power and conduct themselves accordingly. If states do that, they will survive and perhaps even prosper. If states fail to do that, they will place themselves in jeopardy and may even be destroyed.*¹²

Thucydides' point leads to the Power Transition Theory which sees the international system as a hierarchical order with a Dominant Power at the top of the system and Great Powers, Middle Powers and Small Powers structured beneath. The term 'Power Transition Theory' comes from Kenneth Organski's classic work 'World Politics'.¹³ This theory rests on three components: structure of international relations, dynamics of the international system and policy issues facing the world.¹⁴

In order to analyse the dynamics of international relations, Organski studies the power, satisfaction and dissatisfaction of states. The Power Transition Theory sees power as a combination of three elements: the number of people who can work and fight; their economic productivity; and the effectiveness of their political system. The population and its productivity in particular are seen as essential components of national power. The state's political capacity to extract resources and therefore expand national power and achieve national goals increases the state's ability to move up the power pyramid. The theory argues that the size of the population determines the power potential of a nation, and that developed countries that have undergone demographic transitions have stable populations. Developing countries,

on the other hand, are still undergoing demographic transition and their populations continue to grow. If the growth of the population is associated with improving productivity and economic growth and high political capacity, states will experience significant increases in their national power and eventually succeed as with states with stable populations. A challenge to the international system will emerge if one, or a few, great powers that experience a significant increase in their national power will be *dissatisfied* with the existing international order.

A country's satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the rules of a world order drives it towards war or peace. According to the proponents of Power Transition Theory, the dominant power is considered to be satisfied with the international system since it sets the rules together with those at the top of the hierarchy. Satisfied nations usually interact cooperatively and are likely to form stable alliances. The lower a country is in the hierarchy the more dissatisfied with established norms and international leadership it is. Conflicts are caused by a dissatisfied nation's determination to improve its political position in the hierarchy and challenge the *status quo*. Power Transition Theory therefore argues that:

From the perspective of war, the most potentially dangerous condition in the international system occurs when a society at the top of the global hierarchy, with a smaller population that has already achieved sustained growth, is passed by a rapidly growing nation with a much larger population.¹⁵

Power Transition scholars suggest that policy makers need to strive for levelling the differences between nations and that when differences disappear, cooperation rather than confrontation becomes the rule.¹⁶ They claim that any satisfied Great Powers, even if they are set to overtake the hegemon, are not expected to engage in conflict and a peaceful transfer of responsibilities results because of economic and security benefits derived from the existing international system. Recent history offers an example for the peaceful power transition between Great Britain and the United States. In the early twentieth century the

United States ascended to replace Great Britain as the world's leading economy and both sides resolved all disputes and potential conflicts peacefully. On the other hand, dissatisfied rising powers will strive to establish an international system under their own rules, even if this gives rise to conflict, e.g. Japan or Nazi Germany.

The Power Transition Theory suggests that the hegemon needs to expand its alliance system in order to stay ahead of contenders, and thus avoid being overtaken. Each new alliance member, even a small nation, adds to the pool of resources for maintaining the status of Dominant Power. As a result of China's development and the impact of its expanding influence on the international system, 'China and the United States are inescapably engaged in a power transition process' dragging with them the rest of the world.¹⁷

2. Rise of China

The Industrial Revolution in the eighteenth century marked the rise of modern European and American powers, leaving far behind the rest of the world, including the Chinese empire. About two hundred years later China is re-emerging by introducing itself as a modernised and independent country with a rapidly developing economy and an average GDP growth of ten per - cent annually over the past three decades.¹⁸ This chapter will review China's economic growth, followed by increase in its military capacity, as well as the challenges the country presents to the international system.

1978 marked the start of the Chinese economic reforms launched by Deng Xiaoping – the paramount leader of the People's Republic of China. He replaced Mao Zedong's state owned, planned and closed economy with a 'socialist market economy' based on competition and diversified ownership as well as welcoming foreign investment and integrating the national economy into the global one.¹⁹ By joining the World Trade Organisation in 2001, China accelerated its integration and 'by the year 2010 reached 48.2% at Trade to GDP ratio'.²⁰ The European Union and United States are the two largest trading partners of China in

2011, accounting for more than thirty per cent of China's trade.²¹ This data indicates China's integration in to Western-led world economy, and implies that the country benefits from the existing international order, thus setting the preconditions for China to become a satisfied Great Power in the long run. However China's trade with developing economies is increasing rapidly, while simultaneously slowing down with developed countries, thereby reducing Beijing's dependence on the West. As He Weiwen, co-director at the China-US-EU Study Centre at the China Association of International Trade, puts it: 'China's trade with ASEAN will increase faster than with the US and EU, and ASEAN is likely to become China's largest trading partner in the coming years'.²²

By the end of the twentieth century 'China Rising' and 'China Threat' came to be perceived by the West as synonyms and dominated the discussion of international policy towards China. It soon became clear that China, with its population of over 1.3 billion people and increasing productivity has the potential to become the largest economy in the world. This may allow Beijing to become more assertive regarding its national interests and more militarily capable to support them. Economic development and an explosion of trade, as well as increased energy and raw material consumption, have led to naval modernisation and military development to sustain an uninterrupted energy flow.

For almost two decades China has had a two digit yearly increase in its military spending reaching US\$106.4 billion in 2012.²³ Defence experts estimate that the actual military spending of China tends to be a little over fifty per cent higher than the official defence budget.²⁴ China's military modernisation is aimed at improving its war fighting capabilities across land, air and sea components affecting areas of manpower, technology, training and doctrine, task organisation, logistics, and command and control. There is significant emphasis on developing capabilities associated with space, electronic and cyber warfare as well as nuclear weaponry and its delivery systems. Many scholars admit that China's shift from merely controlling and safeguarding its periphery to securing its wider interests happened when Hu Jintao introduced the

People's Liberation Army (PLA) with 'New Historic Missions', otherwise known as the 'Three provides, and one role':

(1) providing an important guarantee of strength for the party to consolidate its ruling position, (2) providing a strong security guarantee for safeguarding the period of important strategic opportunity for national development, (3) providing a powerful strategic support for safeguarding national interests, and (4) playing an important role in safeguarding world peace and promoting common development.²⁵

As a result of the 'New Strategic Missions' statement, the PLA, as defined by China's 2006 White Paper, began to develop intra-regional mobility, improve capabilities in air-ground integrated operations, extend maritime depth as well as to increase air strike capabilities, air and missile defence, strategic air projection and strategic nuclear deterrence.²⁶ Just after the publication of China's 2006 White Paper actual tests of a direct-ascent anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon, the fielding of an anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM), and the development of the stealthy J-20 fifth-generation fighter aircraft started as early as in January 2007.²⁷

All this is part of China's anti-access and area-denial strategy, meant to 'limit or deny a superior armed force from conducting threatening military operations'.²⁸ Put in other words, this approach is designed to limit the United States' power projection capabilities in the region. Chinese anti-access strategy is missile-centric, planned in multiple layers, and reaching out more than 1,500 kilometres. New ASBM's, also called 'carrier-killers', can be launched from mobile platforms into the atmosphere and then guided to the target, possessing a threat to anyone within range. The launch of China's first aircraft carrier in September 2012 and successful landing of a jet fighter on it later the same year marks a new phase in the country's long-term strategy, signalling a shift

from a primarily anti-access posture to one that includes elements of power projection.²⁹ Indeed, the development of military capabilities has increased Beijing's political confidence as well as perception of China as a Great Power on the international stage. Self-confidence among China's leaders has led to the development of trade relations with countries usually seen by the West as hostile in most cases.

Western concerns over human rights violations in certain countries and sanctions imposed by the US or EU mean little in view of China's pragmatic way of achieving its national goals. Pakistan, Sudan, Zimbabwe, Venezuela, Saudi Arabia and Iran are just some of China's partners for energy supplies, although each has a dubious reputation regarding the dignity and well-being of their citizens. As the largest importer of Iranian oil China, 'has openly dismissed the US sanctions against Iran', therefore demonstrating its political maturity and intentions to not comply with Western interests when national interests come into conflict.³⁰

Great Powers by their very nature have higher needs and the Chinese perceive Western countries as unwilling to share with them the resources they need for a better life. On the other hand, the West, and the United States in particular, see China as on the way to becoming the most powerful nation in Asia and that 'the quest for power', as Realists put it, has no end. For them, Regional Powers will naturally aim for Great Power status, therefore challenging the *status quo* of the United States and the existing international order. For the US as the dominant power, the greatest challenge is to: 'accommodate China on the world's scene as a major economic and political power' in order to avoid potential conflicts, preventing China from becoming greatly dissatisfied – and thus a threat.³¹ Ideological differences as well as political regime contradictions add to uncertain and potentially unstable relationships between the US and China. Therefore, Chinese leaders are eager to promote the image of a rising China as a peace loving and responsible power, introducing the concept of 'peaceful development of China'. It attempts to reassure the world that the rise of China will bring more opportunities and benefits rather than threats to peace and the existing

international order. In addition, China seeks cooperation instead of confrontation.

With regards to American-Chinese relations, Joseph Nye reminds us of Thucydides' warning:

*Belief in inevitability of conflict can become one of its main causes. Each side, believing it will end up at war with the others, makes reasonable military preparations which then are read by other side as confirmation of its worst fears.*³²

3 Departure of America?

The emergence of China as a Great Power in the twenty-first century has greatly transformed its relationship with the US. The Asia-Pacific in the last ten years has become a key driver for United States' economic and security policy, leading to the downsizing of the American military presence in Europe and the deployment of additional forces to the Asia-Pacific. This chapter will explore to what extent United States military will depart from Europe, leaving its allies on their own.

America's interests in the Asia-Pacific date back to the nineteenth century. With America's 'expansionist agenda' set by President James Polk, and as a result of the 1898 Spanish-American War, the US acquired groups in the Pacific Ocean, including the Philippines, Guam, the Hawaiian Islands and more.³³ Expansion of territories and increasing trade with the Asia-Pacific countries led to numerous military conflicts and a permanent United States' military presence in the region.³⁴ The decisive victory in the Second World War and demise of Japan as a major challenger in the region paved the way for a new regional order drawn together by the military power of the United States. During the Cold War, the US increased its global military presence. Many European countries, as well as Indonesia, Japan, Philippines, South Korea and many more became hosts to United States' military bases to balance the Soviet Union's Eurasian influence.³⁵ The military protection against the Communist threat provided by the United States created the core for continued military and economic cooperation with host nations.

The collapse of the 'Berlin Wall' established a new international order, leading the United States to review its military dispersal over the globe and to close many of its overseas bases including many in the Asia-Pacific region. The 'War on Terror' at the start of the twenty-first century led to new priorities resulting in the further reduction of the United States' military presence in Europe, as well as in the Asia-Pacific.³⁶

In January 2012, admitting that China is rising as a regional power, the Pentagon passed new defence strategic guidance – '*Sustaining US Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense*'. This document acknowledges China's military build-up and Washington's necessity to maintain regional access and the ability to operate freely in the region.³⁷ The guidelines recognise that China over the long term will have the potential to affect the United States' economy and security. When the Secretary of Defence, Leon Panetta, introduced the new guidance, he stated:

*The "smaller and leaner" Joint Force of the future must be prepared, in conjunction with allies and partners, to confront and defeat aggressors anywhere in the world, including those seeking to deny our power projection.*³⁸

As a response to China's anti-access and area-denial strategy the guidelines emphasise investments in United States' military development and implementation of a Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC).³⁹ This document outlines the 'Air-Sea Battle' concept, the implementation of which is actually translated into action by a new Air-Sea Battle Office and increased investments in the systems and capabilities the US needs to defeat anti-access threats.⁴⁰ Since the Asia-Pacific theatre is primarily a naval and air theatre, the 'Air-Sea Battle' concept is perceived by leading analysts as a 'concept that contemplates attacks to penetrate Chinese airspace to eliminate key elements of the Chinese anti-access and area-denial networks.'⁴¹

As described by Norton Schwartz and Jonathan Greenert, the 'Air-Sea Battle' concept is developed to project power anywhere in the world to protect the United States' partners and allies if they 'become unable or unwilling to resist an adversary's growing influence'.⁴² Under the JOAC there is an 'Air-Sea Battle' concept and 'Gaining and Maintaining Access' concept (GMAC), unofficially known as 'Land-Land Battle' concept which is run by the US Army and US Marine Corps.⁴³ As described by Caitlin Lee, the 'Air-Sea Battle' concept focuses on anti-access strategy while GMAC deals with the area-denial concept. GMAC is designed for a land invasion utilising smaller forces as entry force deployed from ships operating at sea or nearby bases and followed by heavier forces if required. As the GMAC is not coordinated with the Air force and Navy it is still an 'interim product'. But as Caitlin Lee points out:

*Army officials say they have already begun to work with J-7 Directorate on a new document, known as the Joint Concept for Entry Operations (JCEO), which will turn GMAC into a fully joint concept.*⁴⁴

America's strategic pivot to Asia-Pacific embraces also an increase in its military presence in the region. As President Obama put it in a speech to Australia's Parliament on 17 November, 2011:

*Let there be no doubt: in the Asia-Pacific in the 21st century, the United States of America is all in. It was, he said, a deliberate and strategic decision: America was here to stay.*⁴⁵

In November 2011 – to avoid a future Chinese anti-access missile salvo – the United States agreed with Australia to deploy 2,500 Marines to the northern part of the country as well as reaffirming the US-Philippine alliance by signing the 'Manila Declaration'.⁴⁶ Furthermore the United States' and Vietnam's military-to-military relations have deepened to include the refurbishment of long-abandoned air stations from the Second World War scattered across the Pacific.⁴⁷ Although this

may appear to be aggressive deployments near the borders of China, Washington is trying to avoid any direct confrontation.

As the Power Transition Theory suggests, the hegemon needs to expand its alliance system to stay ahead of contenders, and thus avoid being overtaken. This seems to be the case of the US. While lacking the capability to expand globally it is shifting away from its European allies and seeks new allies in the Asia-Pacific to balance the expansion of China. With the New Defence Strategic Guidance the United States perceives most European countries as producers of security rather than consumers, and that gives it the legitimate ground for further reductions of its military presence in Europe.

4. The European Security System

The overwhelming Allied defeat of Nazi Germany in 1945, followed by the vast American military presence in Europe, provides the groundwork for understanding the European security system. To prevent such devastation in the future, European leaders, especially British leaders, were eager to promote European political and economic cooperation under British and American leadership. As early as 1947, notions about an integrated Europe were brought to the agenda of the European and the North American leaders, culminating with the Congress of Europe in 1948, known as the Hague Congress.⁴⁸ In March 1947, France and Britain signed a defensive pact, known as Treaty of Dunkirk, against an attack from the east.⁴⁹ The pact was enlarged by the Brussels Treaty in 1948, when five European democracies initiated a collective self-defence concept for the first time.⁵⁰ The Schuman Declaration in 1950 gave birth to European political and economic cooperation, sixty years later transforming itself into the European Union, as it is known today.⁵¹ The fast recovery of Europe after the Second World War, and the cooperation initiatives between European countries were, in fact, achieved with US assistance. With the Marshall Plan in place in 1948, the Americans played a major role in the recovery and restoration of Europe.⁵² Through the Economic Cooperation Administration the United States provided US\$13.3 billion in aid to

Western Europe which stimulated economic growth as well as promoting trade.

With the growing Russian threat it soon became clear that only transatlantic security cooperation could deter aggression. In April 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty was signed between the United States, Canada the United Kingdom and nine European countries, creating the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO).⁵³ Later the same year Soviet Russia conducted its first atomic explosion, thus putting an end to a four-year American monopoly on the atomic bomb. At the same time the Mutual Defence Assistance Programme between Europe and the United States was initiated. This programme appropriated US\$1.4 billion to build Western European defences.⁵⁴ The outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 quickly led NATO member states to understand the necessity of integration and coordination of their military forces as well as the establishment of a centralised headquarters. As a response to the increasingly hostile foreign policy of the USSR the United States increased its military presence in Europe from 120,000 troops in 1950 to over 400,000 by 1953.⁵⁵ By forming the Warsaw Pact, Soviet Russia with its repressed satellites dragged the two alliances into an arms race and the Cold War era.⁵⁶ Throughout the Cold War, Europe built its military strength and capabilities around the military presence of the US and the collective defence provided by NATO. This is why the security system of the Europe, and the EU in particular, cannot be viewed separately from NATO, especially after the expansion of the Atlantic Alliance and the EU during the post-Cold War era.

Economic ties between European countries as well as institutionalised political relations empowered them to grow and flourish in a stable and secure environment. This could never be done without the Atlantic Alliance and the US providing security for Europe. The end of the Cold War brought a whole new perception of threats in Europe, leading European democracies to downsize their military forces and cut defence spending. Relative peace in Europe made it hard to justify the necessity of defence spending to the general public. In 2008, when the economic crisis hit most of the European countries, another defence

cuts took place. They reached over twenty percent in the smallest EU countries and around eight percent in the largest countries.⁵⁷ US Defence Secretary, Robert Gates, in his 2011 speech in Brussels pointed out that: 'United States share of NATO defence spending has now risen to more than seventy five per-cent's' and warned European partners 'that the US Congress and the American people were growing tired of picking up most of the tab'.⁵⁸

Despite American efforts to spread defence spending within the NATO, most European countries still continue to reduce their military budgets. Indeed, in 2012 only the US, UK and Greece, out of NATO's twenty-eight allies, spent more than the two percent of GDP on defence per the target set by NATO.⁵⁹ The *NATO Secretary General's Annual Report 2012* clearly identifies major problems associated with the defence cuts of alliance member states:

There is a risk, first of all, of a widening intra-European gap. While some European Allies will continue to acquire modern and deployable defense capabilities, others might find it increasingly difficult to do so. This would limit the ability of European Allies to work together effectively in international crisis management.

Second, we could also face a growing transatlantic gap. If current defense spending trends were to continue, that would limit the practical ability of NATO's European nations to work together with their North American Allies. But it would also risk weakening the political support for our Alliance in the United States.

Finally, the rise of emerging powers could create a growing gap between their capacity to act and exert influence on the international stage and our ability to do so.⁶⁰

Nevertheless, the EU in the last decade has addressed global security challenges and promoted defence cooperation among EU member states. In 2003 the European Council adopted a European Security Strategy (ESS).⁶¹ As an integral part of the Common Foreign

and Security Policy (CFSP) as well as Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), the ESS identifies a range of threats and challenges to EU security interests.

Meanwhile in 2010 at the NATO Summit in Lisbon, the heads of state adopted a New Strategic Concept.⁶² Both documents address similar threats, as James Rogers puts it:

*The European Security Strategy, like the New Strategic Concept, declares that traditional threats like geopolitics and invasion are a thing of the past. Rather, it “securitises” a range of cross-sectors threats, such as forms of extremism and radicalisation, terrorism, the threat from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, particularly by rogue regimes, organised crime and climate change, among similar issues.*⁶³

Indeed, the EU and NATO possess the same understanding of the global environment; both papers fail to recognise the rise of new powers in Asia-Pacific and imminent challenges associated with that. With CSDP in place, the EU has succeeded in creating an EU Military Staff – designed to plan, coordinate and run EU military operations as well as developing the concept of battle groups – small, highly mobile and self-sustainable stand-by forces. The EU currently runs four military missions and eleven civilian missions throughout the world.⁶⁴ Despite the relative success of EU security efforts Europe, as well as NATO, faces a growing problem of achieving consensus among its members.⁶⁵ It has even led to emergence of new groupings or ‘Islands of cooperation’ within the EU.⁶⁶ Sir David Richards in his 2011 lecture at Royal United Services Institute stated:

*The UK will require other carefully chosen alliances over the coming decade through which to influence the strategic landscape and help determine the outcome of fast moving crises, all at minimum cost.*⁶⁷

This is an increasing threat to EU security cooperation and can lead to further fractionalisation among European and also NATO states. Keeping in mind the Realist approach to international order, where all states must be prepared to sacrifice their international obligations on the altar of their own self-interest (if the two come into conflict) NATO, and the EU in particular, must understand how to incorporate different national perspectives and strengthen existing security structures, but at the same time to not lose the primary purpose they serve.

5. Operational Implications for Europe

After the Libya operation in 2011 Anders Rasmussen declared: 'The operation has made visible that the Europeans lack a number of essential military capabilities'.⁶⁸ This chapter will assess Europe as a geographical entity, looking through the perspective of the EU and NATO. To identify shortfalls in the military capabilities of non-US members of NATO it will examine NATO's most recent operation in Libya, 'Unified Protector'. It will identify potential operational implications caused by the withdrawal of the United States' strategic focus from Europe.

The operation in Libya, where the United States was 'leading from above', clearly demonstrated that in military terms Europeans still depend on the United States. It revealed that non-US members of NATO lack, either entirely or in sufficient quantity, critical enabling capabilities and operational expertise. In relation to critical enabling capabilities, Europeans were shown to lack a cruise missile strike capability, as well as having serious shortfalls in intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance, refuelling and other logistical capabilities, all of which are required to sustain an air campaign.⁶⁹ The United States accounted for seventy-seven percent of air-to-air refuelling missions, enabling NATO to conduct successful, long-range air strikes as well as maintain sufficient combat air patrols over Libya.⁷⁰ The first strikes on Libya on 19 March, 2011 involved more than 120 Tomahawk cruise missiles to open Libya's air space for NATO air operations.⁷¹ The US provided ninety-seven percent of the cruise missiles used to attack

Libyan air defences.⁷² Indeed, besides the United States only the UK possesses this critical strike capability within the NATO. As pointed out by defence correspondent Thomas Harding:

*Defence insiders say as many as 12 of the weapons have been fired from the hunter-killer submarine Triumph [UK] in the past four days. If this is correct, the Navy will have used up to 20 per cent of its 64 Tomahawks in the opening salvos of the war, leading to fears that it is "burning through" its armoury.*⁷³

This could never be accomplished by Europeans exclusively since there is simply not sufficient cruise missile capability within Europe. The United States also sold precision guided munitions to its allies when Europeans run out of this critical equipment. As perception of the likelihood of conventional war in Europe is relatively low it is apparent that many Europeans do not have stockpiles of expensive and advanced weaponry. Since the United Nations Security Council's Resolution 1973 prohibited any occupation force on any part of Libyan territory, intelligence and target acquisition depended heavily on remote-controlled aircraft (RCA).⁷⁴ The United States contributed almost eighty-percent of all RCA assets in support of the operation, identifying another capability shortfall of Europeans.⁷⁵ In fact, the UK is the only NATO European country to possess armed drones, which were widely used throughout the entire operation more than 140 times.⁷⁶ Besides RCA assets, provided primarily by the United States, the geospatial intelligence of the operation relied solely on space assets of the United States.⁷⁷

With regards to operational expertise, operation 'Unified Protector' revealed that 'European allies lacked the required know-how to provide their aircraft with proper targeting information'.⁷⁸ The United States' dispatched more than one hundred personnel to the NATO Targeting Centre to fill this capability gap. Since air campaigns of contemporary operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Iraq or Afghanistan were led and planned by the US it is transparent that Europeans lack this critical expertise.

Meanwhile, the EU has conducted more than twenty military and civilian operations over the last ten years displaying operational command and control deficiencies.⁷⁹ Despite the fact that the EU has a military staff, the organisation has limited command and control capability. For its military operations the EU relies on member states' command and control structures, which are made available for operations. France, Germany, Italy, Spain and Poland drive the idea that the EU should have its own operational headquarters. This initiative is strongly opposed by the UK, which argues that any EU military headquarters would rival NATO's command and simply be a duplication of effort.⁸⁰

Consequently, with the United States' rebalancing its military efforts to the Asia-Pacific, and should the US become distracted in some form of crisis in East-Asia, Europeans may face a number of **capability-driven operational implications** if they seek to undertake their own military operations (i.e. Libya or Mali). With the Lisbon package of the Alliance's most pressing capability needs in place NATO identifies capability shortfalls and addresses its member states to obtain essential military capabilities.⁸¹ To overcome shortfalls of non-US members of NATO the alliance has developed a *Smart Defence Concept*, while the EU introduced the *European Defence Agency*.⁸² Both platforms are designed to boost cooperation among allies in developing, acquiring and maintaining military capabilities. The central idea of both concepts is pooling and sharing, or in other words, pooling resources and sharing the results in constrained defence budgets.

Nevertheless, the acquisition of previously listed capabilities by non-US members of NATO or by the EU member states does not necessarily mean that nations will make those capabilities available for possible operations. The lack of will to assume burdens marks **operational implications resulting from political differences** of Europeans. It is essential, that in constrained defence budgets where countries alone are not capable of projecting sufficient power, they can rely on one another if needed. If the United States' military capabilities will not be available for operations in the European neighbourhood

there will be no one to fill the capability gaps if certain European countries decide not to contribute their military forces. As Mariot Leslie, the British Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council, pointed out:

There is the perennial NATO issue of whether or not nations are going to make available the assets that they have assigned to SACEUR. Addressing that is as much a political question as it is a capabilities question. We have two problems. Do we have the capabilities – that is what the capabilities initiative will address – and is there the will to deploy them? It would be nice to have them while working on the question of the “will”.⁸³

By opposing European military engagement in Libya, Germany – for example – demonstrated the growing fragmentation among European countries. The EU’s *Lisbon Treaty* addresses defence cooperation challenges by initiating ‘Permanent Structured Cooperation’.⁸⁴ The concept calls on the most capable EU member states to form an ‘avant-garde’. As described by Tomas Valasek, “By coming together – by exercising together, forming multinational units – the presence of a core group will inspire other states to strengthen their militaries in order to qualify for membership of the group.”⁸⁵

Despite good intentions the avant-garde concept actually reinforces fragmentation by dividing European countries into more and less capable as well as by creating new exclusive and artificial forms of cooperation within the EU. As argued by Valasek, “Rather than pursuing a single ‘permanent structured cooperation’, the focus of EU countries and institutions should be on encouraging the formation of multiple, discreet, regional ‘islands of co-operation’ whose members will partly integrate their militaries.”⁸⁶

Indeed, cooperation trends -- whether based on economic, security, political or regional interests-- have long existed in Europe. British-French military cooperation was once again reaffirmed by the

signing of ‘The British-French Defence Cooperation Treaty’ in 2010.⁸⁷ The Benelux economic union extended its cooperation into the field of defence in 2012. ‘The Belgian-Dutch naval cooperation is the main inspiration and bench mark for the renewed Benelux defence cooperation.’⁸⁸ The Nordic States have developed from close political and economic cooperation into defence cooperation.⁸⁹ The Baltic States have extended beyond political and economic cooperation and created a joint military education institution, the *Baltic Defence College*, as well as enhanced their defence cooperation by signing a defence cooperation pact in 2013.⁹⁰ The Czech Republic and Slovakia are in the early stages of defence cooperation.⁹¹ Therefore, the achievement of political consensus within these ‘islands of cooperation’ is relatively easy because countries in the same region share a common threat perception along with a certain level of trust and cohesion.

Conclusion

For almost two decades China has had a two digit yearly increase in its military spending, which has allowed it to develop an anti-access and area-denial strategy meant to limit or deny a superior armed force from conducting threatening military operations near to the Chinese homeland. In response the US has not only refocused its strategic emphasis on the Asia-Pacific region, but has also issued a new defence strategic guidance. This codified the implementation of a Joint Operational Access Concept as well as two accompanying concepts: the ‘Air-Sea Battle’ to overcome anti-access systems; and ‘Gaining and Maintaining Access’, which is designed for land operations.

As suggested by the Power Transition Theory, the hegemon needs to expand its alliance system to stay ahead of contenders and thus avoid being overtaken. As argued by the Realists, ‘the quest for power’ has no end. Therefore, China will naturally aim for Great Power status, consequently challenging the status quo of the US and the existing international order. By redefined relationships with Australia, the Philippines and Vietnam, along with deployments to long abandoned air stations from the Second World War scattered across the Pacific, the US

has demonstrated its intention to stay ahead of China. In the meantime, David Lai claims that China and the US are already engaged in a power transition process.⁹²

Consequentially, forced to concentrate its strategic and operational assets in the Far East, the US is shifting away from its European allies. Throughout the Cold War Europe built its military strength and capabilities in relation to the military presence of the US and the collective defence provided by NATO. The end of the Cold War brought with it a significant reduction of European armed forces in numbers as well as in allocated budgets. As this study has argued, the relocation of the United States' military capabilities to the Asia-Pacific will have operational implications for Europe and therefore new forms of defence cooperation will be required to allow Europeans to defend themselves and undertake crisis management operations in their conflict-prone neighbourhood.

The NATO operation 'Unified Protector' in Libya clearly demonstrated that Europeans lack critical enabling capabilities as well as the required operational know-how. Meanwhile, the EU – for its military operations – relies on member states' command and control structures, which are made available for operations. Apparently, there is no system in place to allocate those command and control structures. Consequently, as the US rebalances its military efforts to the Asia-Pacific, and should it become distracted by a crisis in East Asia as a crisis erupts simultaneously in the European neighbourhood, Europeans may be unable to respond. Not only do they still lack certain essential operational capabilities, but the growing fragmentation and political differences among Europeans could prevent an adequate response. This paper suggests that, if Europeans wish to retain credibility, they will have to acquire capabilities that match future operational requirements and mitigate the operational implications of the change of the United States' strategic focus. Whether Europe proves capable of a coherent response will be a shaping factor of foreseeable future in European politics.

Since there is little political cohesion within Europe, and as European countries have begun to develop new forms of security cooperation, this study suggests that the EU countries focus their security efforts on existing and evolving regional 'islands of co-operation'. The Baltic States in particular must focus their efforts on accessing Nordic Defence Cooperation structure to become an integral part of political and military decision making process of Nordic region. The European Union though, should encourage the formation of multiple, discreet, regional 'islands of co-operation' and enhance their security cooperation by addressing their needs. Since this paper has not studied possible interactions between 'islands of cooperation' and the EU institutions, further research on this topic is of vital importance to address operational implications resulting from political differences.

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