

The Commandant's Introduction

By Michael H. Clemmesen

The Baltic Defence College is doing its very best to ensure that successful graduates are as well prepared as possible to assist with the development of the concepts and structures of their future armed forces.

However, the College is limited to providing a theoretical foundation in a profession that is as practical in its character as that of a doctor of medicine. For the officer to develop into a true professional, the structure and activities of the armed forces that the graduate return to must be capable of offering him or her the opportunity to gain realistic and practical experience in their profession.

If the best staff course graduates do not get that experience soon after the course, the effect of the year in the College will be much diminished. These officers may still

wear uniforms, but they will not develop into high quality military professionals, who can contribute to a focused force development process. The reason for the failure may either be a poor personnel management and career planning system which fails to select the officers for the appropriate appointment post Staff College or the forces are too underdeveloped and have too few appointments to support professional development through demanding, realistic, and progressive command and staff tours of duty.

The difference between the best Western general staff officer tradition and the Soviet model is the deep understanding in Western armies that the staff officer must serve regularly with and command troops in order to retain and develop his professional understanding and skills. Any other solution is a harmful fallacy.

Some of the best BALTDEFCOL graduates from the first three Joint Command and Staff Courses have received very suitable postings, where they could put into practice at battalion level what they learned in the course. However, the number of such graduates is very limited and even the best battalion commander cannot train himself, his staff and the headquarters and the logistics elements of his unit. Only a combined arms framework – a brigade – can train the units and their cadre in a realistic way.

The first step is to establish the brigades in order to provide the necessary training-architecture. We are still waiting for the necessary small and focused nuclei of brigade staffs to be created in Estonia and Latvia. However, this is not enough, in itself, to improve the situation. The

brigade commander and staff should be given full authority, responsibility and accountability for the practical combined arms training of the cadres and leadership support elements of the existing and developing units of the future brigade – combat, combat support, and combat service support. It is thus essential that the key part of the brigades come to life in reality, that they do not remain as paper projects only.

The training activities that should have started long ago include study periods for unit and subunit commanders and specialist staff personnel covering both tactical and support subjects, tactical exercises without troops, reconnaissance followed by war gaming in the tactical trainers, signals and command post exercises, logistics exercises, and field exercises for each of the combat units reinforced by the combat support and combat service support units. Most of these training activities are low-cost and have low visibility, but they are essential for the development of staff course graduates into professional commanders and general staff officers.

Field training exercises are costly and therefore they should be as demanding and realistic as possible – not Soviet type, well-rehearsed “Potemkin Village” demonstrations. They should only take place, after the skills and understanding of commanders and staffs have been developed by other training activities.

The higher level – land force or operational – headquarters are not in a position to conduct realistic training for units, their commanders and their staffs. Instead they should run a similar full spectrum of training activities for the formation and above headquarters.

An army, with its professional cadre, is not created by building infrastructure, buying equipment and recruiting personnel who can be assembled for parade and shows. Instead an army comes to life through a varied spectrum of intense, demanding, realistic and sustainable training activities that develop both those trained and the trainers into professionals.

The initial brigade staffs need not to be large. There may not even be an officer ready for the permanent posting as

brigade commander in the first couple of years. However, the developing staffs should have a small handful of highly qualified, dynamic young officers (some with a Joint Command and Staff Course training background and the rest with Junior Staff Course/Captains Course training), and they should have the clear – initially overwhelming – responsibility to develop the units into a combined arms formation and be provided with the necessary resources.

The Baltic Defence College, NATO, the supporting states and the graduates are waiting for development in this field to take place as soon as possible this year. We are waiting for implementation of one of the long sequence of force structure initiatives.

The main difference between the best NATO army units and what the Baltic states have now is not in equipment. It is in the difference in the intensity and quality of training.



Michael H. Clemmesen

Baltic Warmth: Strategic Change and Professional Military Education

By Dr Peter Foot*

Military Colleges in Eastern Europe are facing profound challenges and competing responsibilities - and the recent events in Iraq have only deepened the problems. In a period of changing global security priorities, Alliance enlargement and nation building, such colleges are the places where national priorities and threat perceptions are passed to the next generation of military officers and security policy makers; where shifting regional concerns are rehearsed; and where the obligations of Alliance membership are exercised. They are also the settings where, going beyond acquired structures, security sector reform is consolidated or weakened. Because of its unique multinational character and track

record, the Baltic Defence College in Tartu, Estonia, represents a concentrated version of the problems encountered by all providers of military education from the Baltic to the Balkans.

* * *

The three Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania belong to that disparate group of post-communist states which regained not only political independence from Moscow but national existence as well.¹ Former Warsaw Pact states at least had peacetime national military structures and personnel - even if wartime command and control entirely by-passed national capitals and came under the direct command of the General Staff of the USSR.² They therefore had some

basis for establishing national command structures within their emerging political systems. However, for the people, politicians and militaries in the three Baltic states, the task of post-Soviet transition included the creation of national defence forces from scratch. Apart from uniform design, unit names, a few battles - and some inspiring stories of anti-Soviet resistance following both World Wars - the states had virtually nothing on which to build appropriate, structured, properly funded and democratically accountable armed forces after 1990.

That formidable challenge has led to a revisiting of ideas that had currency after 1918, that other 20th century moment of strategic change for the Baltic states. These

* Dr Peter Foot is Deputy Dean of Academic Studies (External Relations) in the Department of Defence Studies at King's College London

ideas flowed from the basic question confronting all small states: How to reconcile limited size and resources with national security requirements? *Any* small state next to such a much larger one will have some security concerns flowing from that geographical fact. Indeed, the question was relevant to European states far bigger than the Baltic Three. As such, it was not a question adequately answered by Lenin or Wilson, by the Treaty of Versailles or by the interwar sequence of Treaties that followed, either individually or in aggregate. In the Baltic region after 1918, largely left out of the Versailles settlement, ideas developed about cooperation and integration as the means of surviving in a Europe dominated by large states.³ Not much is remembered about the Baltic League: it came to very little in practice but included the notion that foreign policy harmonisation and military alliance building would provide for more state security than their absence.⁴ Those concepts are today very relevant to Baltic political calculations and strategic assessments; they are part of the reason the three

states have not made some of the errors that characterised their development after 1918, leading in all three cases to reactionary, authoritarian regimes with dubious democratic credentials, with little mutual understanding and no external support. As was said rather cruelly during the interwar years: 'the views of the Balts were of no interest to anyone'.⁵ Since 1990, one might say that the whole thrust of the three Baltic states' development has been to attract the right kind of interest and to deflect any interest that might be hostile.

For both purposes, the method has been to pursue national objectives in concert across the three states. The creation of the Baltic Defence College as a tri-nation solution to national staff training needs flowed from exactly this perception. However, the moment of restored national sovereignty is not an easy time to discuss and implement transnational ideas about harmonisation and integration. In the area of security, the three Baltic states have been ready to cooperate to a considerable extent - and this has two main causes. First, in the immediate aftermath

of regained national existence and independence, there remained the unifying problem of Russia's proximity and intentions - just the 'wrong' kind of interest to concern the Balts. Whatever sophisticated analytical conclusions are made further West about Russian capabilities and intentions, popular sentiment about Russia in all three countries remains largely negative.⁶ This may be an exaggerated fear but it is one that political leadership is unwilling to confront. Substantial Russian minorities reluctant to integrate do little to help. The Tartu Peace Treaty of 1920 still causes irredentist problems between Russia and the three Baltic states about the precise definition of borders; the current borders are those drawn by Stalin for administrative purposes and cede areas to Russia which, back in 1920, were included in the sovereign territory of the three then-newly-independent countries. The existence of the Kaliningrad pocket on the Baltic coast and the connected issue of Russian access rights also exacerbate things. The deeply reactionary, unreconstructed regime that dominates

Belarus reinforces a general sense of geostrategic unease. Secondly, all three states accepted that applications to join NATO would be politically strengthened by developing unity in military matters. Initially, Russian hostility to Baltic membership was palpable; after George W Bush's election and later the transforming events of 11 September 2001, the workings of the NATO-Russia Council and the closeness of Moscow and Washington on counter-terrorism, reduced Russian opposition to virtually zero. Applying together, it was hoped, would leave NATO with virtually no choice but to accept all three, regardless of varying degrees of readiness for membership.⁷ In fact, Alliance politics overtook this calculation: for small members, NATO has always been more interested in the number of flags in the line, showing unity of purpose and resolve, than in their actual capabilities.

The degree of Baltic military unity achieved to date is more than a temporary response to fears about Russia and the political imperatives of NATO's joining procedures. It has a whole raft of ac-

Table 1: Baltic Security Cooperation

Tri-nation Activity	BALTSEA ⁸ countries involved
Baltic Management Group	Policy co-ordination among the 3 Baltic states
Baltic battalion; air surveillance network, naval squadron, military exercises	The three Baltic states sponsored by Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States
Baltic Defence College, including Civil Servants' course	
Peace support within IFOR & SFOR in Bosnia	Denmark and the three Baltic states

tivities to give it substance, backed by external sponsors.

The results seem to confirm the readiness for security co-operation among the three. However, it is also true that external sponsorship of such activities has been sustained and considerable. It has been the countries listed in the Table as members of the BALTSEA group who have, from a Baltic perspective, demonstrated the 'right' kind of interest. The extent to which constructive, transnational co-operation in the security field would have happened in the absence of such sponsorship is a matter for speculation. Much clearer are the results to date. From the outset, the sponsors' animating objective

has been to pursue a policy of international co-operation with the Baltic states, leading to their inclusion in post-Cold War security arrangements, followed by a more equal partnership leading to NATO (and EU) membership.⁹ Far from being of 'no interest to anyone', the Balts are now seen as among the most attractive role models for post-communist transition in the security context of contemporary Europe.

But just how real *is* all of this? Or is it a further example of what Dutkiewicz and Plekhanov have called 'the politics of mimicry'?¹⁰ Essentially, the argument is that external pressures on states in Eastern Europe, coupled with complex and differing

internal conditions, have forced them to adopt a strategy of pretence and superficial imitation of western civil-military norms, multinational cooperation and military capabilities. At its toughest, the general case is: 'East European transformation mimicry has manifested itself in half-way reforms, in [the] introduction of formal structures instead of building capacity and content, sometimes in outright falsification of reality'.¹¹ The transparency in defence planning and budgeting across the three Baltic states may be defence enough against the seriousness of the accusation (a charge more applicable to some countries in the Danube Basin). But that is no reason to avoid testing the progress achieved to date in two areas: contributions to regional, alliance and national security; and performance in domestic security sector reform programmes.

It is here that the Baltic Defence College provides a useful lens through which to sharpen focus on the issues. Perhaps the most successful example of intra-Baltic co-operation, it serves as a focus for

regional security thinking and doctrinal development, multinational exercises, democratic control of armed forces, civil-military decision-making, and officer cadre professionalisation. It also is progressively undergoing 'baltification', as it is called - the gradual transfer of funding, staffing and training to the three states themselves, thereby reducing the direct support of sponsoring states over time. It also is in close connection with the respective defence ministries; it wargames scenarios, with the Chiefs of Defence participating; and represents the supply of the best military officers and defence department civil servants.

Choosing the Priorities

Contributing to regional, alliance and national security would seem at first sight to be the obvious purpose of military forces of small states placed in today's strategic context. It is certainly central to the work at the Baltic Defence College, backed internationally by the sponsors and by the Baltic ministries of defence and for-

eign affairs. The problem is how to operationalise this general aspiration. Conceptually, there is the question of determining whether, in reality, the requirements of the region, of the alliance-of-choice, and of the nation state are easily reconcilable. The available local attempts to do so are various and reflect different traditions, political cultures and judgements about risk. Finland, like Sweden, equates national security with a loose, regional partnership supported by Total Defence structures; but Sweden, with its enthusiasm for network-centric defence concepts and capabilities, is now markedly different. Poland, as a major Baltic player, has never shown interest in Scandinavian ideas of Total Defence¹², and has instead become a relatively energetic new NATO member whose compass rarely shows the need to look to the north. For good or ill, Belarus goes it alone entirely. For themselves, the three small Baltic states reacted to the choice in a similar, undifferentiated way: use the generosity of sponsoring states to provide the strategic and military know-how lost since the signing

of the Nazi-Soviet Pact condemned them to a half-century of political oblivion; develop national structures and plans as befits new nation states proud of their regained sovereignty; pursue NATO and European Union membership at the earliest opportunity; and get involved in peace support operations that can enhance credibility and show the capacity to contribute to other multinational actions in due course. This last point was the purpose behind the formation of the Baltic Battalion, established under British auspices in the first instance. It illustrates both the willingness of the states to think broadly and shows the limitations in being able to operationalise this: the manning of the Baltic Battalion now drains officer talent to the detriment of staffing national needs in ministries of defence and in preparing for NATO membership. Too much apple pie can be indigestible*.

So how has the Baltic Defence College responded to the tensions between re-

gional, alliance and national security needs? At the outset in 1999, but still quite late in post Cold War terms, the basis for operational teaching was territorial defence, especially the defence of capital cities at risk of a Russian- or communist-led strategic coup, allied to Swedish and Finnish ideas about Total Defence.¹³ This had the great benefit of linking the new states' military training and leadership firmly with both national interest and public prejudices about Russia. In military terms, it meant that officers could be trained to command national battalion-level formations (about 600 personnel), following an operational doctrine that suited the three states. Officers could use the concepts and skills of mission command to achieve their objectives. Interestingly, the requirements of the Baltic Battalion figured very little in training programmes, reflecting the way it was not linked to national purposes, other than demonstrating a degree of unity between the participating states. In

sum, two things were achieved: first, the professionalisation of the officer corps and national interest were closely intertwined; secondly, national needs were harmonised across the three states in a regional context which included Sweden and Finland (both, incidentally, major sponsors of the College). It might not have been perfect in every way but it did unify the Baltic 'horseshoe', stretching round from the Katagat, through Lapland to the Lithuanian-Kaliningrad border. For the three Baltic states, joining NATO finally to 'solve' the problem of Russia seemed the logical last step in that process.

Politically a natural choice, it disturbed the apparent mutuality of interest between national and regional security. Once alliance membership is key, training needs move away from ensuring territorial and political integrity towards preparing for collective defence. Now, command and leadership training becomes capability-based, with acquired skills being applicable

* At the time of editing this article, the three Baltic ministries of defence have made the decision to disband the BALTBAT and replace it with other forms of tri-lateral co-operation between the armies of the Baltic states (editor's note).

to a variety of settings. The familiar military concepts of defence, attack and delay continue to be exercised but without the specifics of national geography as the setting. Operational doctrine loses its national character and raises the issue of which doctrine to follow – a problem small states have in an alliance such as NATO. Major states like Britain and France plan divisional-sized operations; Denmark and the Netherlands plan at full brigade level. In both instances, there is a critical mass sufficient to require national operational doctrines to fit into the NATO scenario. Moreover, NATO doctrine itself is pitched at the high operational end of military planning (divisions and corps) and so offers an alliance framework for national contributions of major or medium size. For nations mostly able to deploy and sustain abroad only at the battalion level, no such framework is available. To make things more difficult for the three Baltic states, NATO's revised command structure, prefigured at Prague, disconnects regionally-based military leadership from traditional nation-state defence needs. That

old stand-by of national defence, robust redundancy, is rejected in favour of leaner and more efficient Allied fighting forces. The two new major commands, Operations and Transformation, will concentrate respectively on confronting post-9/11 challenges (with deployable Task Forces being the means by which they are met beyond NATO's borders) and on upgrading of Alliance doctrine, acquisition planning and technology to the levels already reached by the United States.¹⁴ This is a very different set of circumstances than were envisaged when Baltic NATO membership was sought and is complicated further by the fact that existing NATO members long ceased to see Russia as military threat to the Baltics or anywhere else, even in the long-term.

The Baltic Defence College, as a think-tank and policy-resource, is fully aware of these problems. As the main provider of professional military education for nation-states caught in these difficulties, the choices to be made are less clear. Traditionally, one thinks of staff colleges carrying out the functions determined for

them by national armed forces and ministries of defence. In this case, the three states are finding it understandably hard to agree on common responses to these challenges. The mechanisms for accession to NATO are bilateral ones between the Alliance's headquarters in Brussels and national capitals. The Membership Action Plan process begins a rhythm which, after membership has been achieved, turns into the annual review cycle that has internally characterised NATO for decades.¹⁵ Above all, it concentrates on individual nation's requirements and contributions. This is a process with plenty of potential to create disunity or shades of understanding. Latvia, for example, has a different desk officer to the one supporting Lithuania and Estonia – an example of what is often referred to as the 'revolving door' of different officials giving not always consistent advice. Under current Alliance thinking, the Lithuanians and the Estonians have been recommended to abandon territorial defence as the best way to maximise their Alliance contributions – but they have reacted dif-

ferently to the advice. Lithuania has accepted the recommendation in entirety, planning to dispense with territorial units and organization as the basis for national defence, creating a new Special Forces Command,¹⁶ establishing a new deployable brigade, and developing a degree of Homeland Security on the American model. Estonia, on the other hand, insists on maintaining strong elements for territorial defence: partly due to the heritage of Finnish training among its officer corps;¹⁷ partly for the larger, nation-building purposes of maintaining a visible link between the conscript Army and all geographical regions within the state; and partly to prepare Host Nation Support facilities for subsequently arriving NATO forces. Latvia, for its part, remains wedded to the territorial concept, the defence of the capital city, and to using a strategic coup as the nation's fundamental basis for national military planning and structure.

Clearly, heterogeneity rather than uniformity characterise current Baltic states' security and military thinking at the national level. In such a setting, the Baltic

Defence College will not be free to determine its own curriculum entirely independent of the three main participating countries. Equally, it will have a role that very much helps determine how the best officers are prepared for regional, alliance and national service. For a start, courses must continue to attract NATO or NATO-candidate staff and students: American, Canadian, British, Danish, Dutch, Czech, German, Hungarian, Polish, Romanian and Norwegian personnel are not only regulars on the senior staff course but are regarded as significant for the international standing of the college and of the three Baltic states themselves.¹⁸ The three states are preparing their own courses at the junior military academies to common standards set by the College. Attendees on the Civil Servants' Course designed for the three Ministries of Defence will need NATO-centric exercises to maximise their professional effectiveness and career opportunities. In addition, the courses serving Baltic personnel at full colonel level are training officers who are going to be posted direct to NATO jobs in Brussels

and Mons or manning NATO desks at their own defence ministries. All of this suggests a continuing momentum towards the 'new model NATO' and its training needs.

Graduates of the College are likely to agree but make the case not so much 'because of NATO' but that any security order - with a strong or weak NATO or without it altogether - is likely to be weakened by the re-nationalisation of defence and that small states remain in the same position now as they did in 1918, with insufficient resources to defend themselves. Much of what might be seem instinctively sensible from a national Central Staff perspective is not self-evidently appropriate or beyond challenge. Territorial defence, for example, really requires a fast mobilisation system, based on conscripts and made robust by a substantial investment in reserve forces. Territoriality in defence also concedes a degree of passivity that is unwise in an era of asymmetric warfare and suggests a bias towards ground forces that sits uncomfortably with the Alliance's commitment to joint and combined formations. The assumptions

underlying Total Defence include high levels of expertise in governance, economic and industrial self-reliance, individual and civic responsibility and international non-alignment: none of these conditions obtain, or are insufficiently developed, in the Baltic states. Fears about a strategic coup, reflecting worries about potential 'fifth columns' in the immediate aftermath of independence, and perhaps reinforced from time to time by Russian pressures on one or more of the Baltic states, can surely now be dismissed as the basis for national military planning. Handling the Russian minority question is just that: an example of an ethnic minority problem much less acute than those experienced elsewhere in Europe. Finally, small states do not need to emulate across-the-board military competence but find areas of expertise that are both related to national need and which can serve as part of larger, multinational formations. As the Alliance has now accepted the principal of role specialisation this is a particularly attractive option. The best students might even remind their senior officers of Mor-

ris Janowitz's concept of constabulary forces:

"The military establishment becomes a constabulary force when it is continuously prepared to act, committed to the minimum use of force, and seeks viable international relations, rather than victory, because it has incorporated a protective military posture."¹⁹

Writing in 1960, Janowitz could not have known how every element of that sentence speaks evokes aspects of global security high on most agendas since 1990. More specifically today, the relevance of this categorisation - vision, almost - of military force in the professional context of Crisis Response Operations is obvious.

These arguments are not subversive in any sense. They are professional challenges to senior ranks brought up in and conditioned by the Cold War and not daring to dream of national restoration. "Young Turks" are rarely welcomed by those senior to them. However, in the Baltic setting, things are progressing well for the participating states. An analysis of Baltic Defence College graduates since

2000 shows that about half of the Baltic students now occupy significant positions in Central Staffs; about a third in operational jobs, frequently in command or as Chiefs of Staff; the balance goes to training and education.²⁰ Given that the Central Staffs also receive virtually all of the civil servant graduates in addition, this represents a considerable inflow into the policy and administration areas. In general, it looks as though the three states are using their own graduates in a similar way. Apart from the observation that increasing the proportion of postings to training jobs would expose the younger members of the Baltic officer corps to the freshness of the graduates, this looks like a constructive use of skills, leadership, analytical ability and talent - at least, when looked at from a parochial, Baltic state perspective. It is certainly impressive when measured against what other new invitees to NATO have achieved in providing the trained personnel necessary to make a working reality of reformed structures for the security sector. Here, at least, the charge

against Baltic states of 'mimicry' is clearly unwarranted.

However, when seen from a broader perspective, these positive developments take on the character of 'not enough'. The NATO alliance for which membership was applied in 1999 is no longer the alliance that exists today. 9/11 and the 'Transformation Summit' in Prague 2002 come in between. And NATO's February 2003 crisis offered the Baltic states the first fresh opportunities to reflect on expectations since the enlargement and other decisions taken in Prague. A series of questions makes the point.

- What value will new members place on an Article 5 'guarantee' – for all applicants the *sine qua non* of their application – in the light of repeated official suggestions to avoid an over-reliance upon it?

- Given the shift in the Alliance's command structure away from territoriality and towards expeditionary operations and transformation, is the promise by larger allies 'to be there', in time and with enough, a responsible basis for national planning?

- In the wake of the February 2003 debate about Article 4 and Turkey's right

to request discussions on its concerns, how does a small state get to be heard if it feels threatened?

- Will the currently strong public opinion supportive of national defence forces be sustained for forces being used beyond NATO's new boundaries?

- Can small nation conscript-based armies really generate 'niche capabilities' for instant deployability and alliance-enhancing service overseas?

There are, of course, answers to each of these challenges, answers which can reconcile at least two out of the three arenas: regional, alliance and national. But they are likely to be more convincing to major powers and to international staffs than they are to the hard pressed ministries and armed forces of small states confronting the full realities of NATO membership. The Prague 'Transformation Summit' ushered in a great deal more than another wave of invitations to join NATO. In an era of fears about weapons of mass destruction and effect, and about terrorism and asymmetric warfare, this is

fully understandable. But NATO is now a harder place in which to be a good, new ally

For the Baltic states, the necessity would seem to be to increase their mutual cooperation. The logic of 1918 remains a constant. If the Baltic states do not provide Baltic security answers, either no-one else will or the answers will be contradictory. Continuing security integration is the most obvious and most manageable way to demonstrate to sceptical national populations defensive solidarity vis-à-vis eastern neighbours. A 'de-Baltification' of policy – with, say, Lithuania linking to Poland and Estonia seeking Nordic answers from Finland – is certain to produce disappointing results. Smallness has its price: without cooperation under continuing international sponsorship for the time being, Baltic voices are unlikely to be listened to in Brussels. And harmonisation in equipment acquisition and personnel training and education maximises the potential contribution towards NATO. Fortunately, the Baltic states have two instruments able to en-

sure a continuation of constructive co-operation. The first is for the Baltic Management Group operating at the high policy level to prevent any drift towards Baltic unilateralism. The second is for the Baltic Defence College itself to increase its intellectual leadership and strategic analysis role for the three states while it continues to train and educate future civilian and military leaders in the security sector. Its output represents the real national, alliance and regional 'transformation' in the Baltic: skilled and educated people make processes; processes make structures work. It is a regional resource still under-used by government departments and armed forces. But ensuring trination harmonisation will not be sufficient. Small states like these still require some mentoring for the time being; the College is an excellent example of how it can be done without prejudicing national primacy. The external sponsors of Baltic developments have a need to protect their considerable political and economic investment in the region by staying closely engaged - and the choices for them in

prevailing conditions of strategic change are not easy or self-evident. However, if they revise their priorities too soon, then it is likely that it is not just the Baltic states that will feel the cold.

¹ Some post-communist states have an even tougher job, having never had a recognised nation-state existence until the break-up of the Soviet Union.

² See Michael Sadykiewicz, *The Warsaw Pact Command Structure in Peace and War*, Santa Monica: Rand, 1988.

³ In her comprehensive work, scarcely any references are made to Baltic issues: see Margaret MacMillan, *Peacemakers*, London: John Murray, 2001.

⁴ Some politicians went further than others, advocating economic unification as part of the security 'survival' package. Certainly both the security and economic aspects are in evidence today for Baltic states, with NATO and EU enlargement proceeding in parallel. A good discussion is Marko Lehti, 'Baltic Cooperation After the First World War: Independence through Integration' in Tālvas Jundzis (ed.), *The Baltic States at Historical Crossroads*, Riga: Academy of Sciences of Latvia, 391-404.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 436.

⁶ This holds true for the Russian ethnic minorities in each of the states; cultural and other links have not translated into large-scale identification

with Russia's international position. See 'Results of trust amongst non-Estonians towards state institutions' - <http://www.saarpoll.ee/raud3.htm>; and 'Result of trust amongst Estonians towards state institutions' - <http://www.saarpoll.ee/raud2.htm>.

⁷ In the event, the NATO Prague Summit, October 2002, accepted 7 new members and set a common timetable for accession, May 2004, regardless of the well-known disappointments experienced with the previous accessions by the Visegrad Three.

⁸ See the Baltic Security Assistance (BALTSEA) web site at www.baltsea.web for fuller details of all defence-related activities.

⁹ Julian Elgaard Brett, *No New Dividing Lines: Danish Defence Support to the Baltic States*, Copenhagen: Danish Institute of International Affairs, 2002, p. 5.

¹⁰ Piotr Dutkiewicz and Sergei Plekhanov, 'The Politics of "Mimicry": The Case of Eastern Europe' in Albert Legault and Joel Sokolsky (eds.), *The Soldier and the State in the Post Cold War Era*, Kingston, Ont: Royal Military College of Canada, pp. 113-142.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p.115.

¹² Finland and Sweden do not share the quite same concepts of Total Defence. Compare the entries in The Swedish Agency for Civil Emergency Planning, *International CEP Handbook 1999-2000: Civil Emergency Planning in the NATO/EAPC Countries*, Stockholm 1999.

¹³ The model for this is Estonia 1924: Bolshevik elements in Tallinn were activated, with a view to

taking control of key infrastructure points, then applying for fraternal Soviet help. In the event, the coup failed: the Bolshevik cell was very weak and prompt action by the military and police contained the incident.

¹⁴ Completion of the new command and control arrangements will be agreed at the June 2003 Ministerial Meetings. See *Defense News*, 20 January 2003, p.6.

¹⁵ For details, see NATO Handbook 2002, Brussels: NATO Office of Information, 2002, pp. 63-67.

¹⁶ Lithuania had a Special Force unit in Afghanistan.

¹⁷ Finland's long tradition of Total Defence, conscription and national mobilisation has been part of the training received by many Estonian officers since 1994. Although such security features are hard to envisage for such a small country as Estonia, the legacy of this training has created an on-going division of opinion within the Estonian officer corps.

¹⁸ The non-Baltic students have a vital, informal mentoring role for their Baltic colleagues on course.

¹⁹ Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait*, New York: The Free Press, 1960, p. 418.

²⁰ Data provided by the Baltic Defence College. The figures are: Central Staff 53%; Operations 30%; Training 15%, with 2% uncategorised.

The Effective State

By Lars Johannsen*

The goals secured

Each of the three Baltic countries, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have held several free and fair elections in which power has changed hands. With the resumption of economic growth in the mid 1990s, the transition to democracy and the market developments can only be deemed a success. Furthermore, sustained independence has been secured through membership of NATO, and the three countries are now racing to modernize as a part of the process of securing membership of the European Union. The importance of membership for the three countries can hardly be underestimated. With respect to economy, membership not only promises transfer of funds to modernize infra-

structure but also secures access to the vast European market. Politically it naturally implies some transfer of sovereignty from the respective domestic political systems to European institutions but it also gives the three countries a stake in European politics and promises of resolution to cross-border political, economic and social problems.

Notwithstanding that Estonia and Latvia still have to ratify membership of the EU by national referenda; the challenge of EU membership is less about the low level of economic development compared to the 'old' EU-members than it is related to the nature and requirements of European integration. More than anything else the EU is a regulatory body that depends on the national public administrations to implement EU legislation

– the *acquis communautaire*. If the national public administrations fail the whole project of the inner market and the economic union become meaningless, as it will result in different rather than uniform standards across the continent. In this respect EU integration exacerbates the process of modernising the public administrations in the Baltic states. As argued previously¹ the consolidation of democracy and the process of modernization and development require a usable state: a state that is both responsive to society and effective in the realization of policies on the ground.² Responsiveness and effectiveness in conjunction with the process of democratization and marketization implies that the post-communist state needs not only to transform itself vis-à-vis its relationship society but should be

* Dr. Lars Johannsen is Associate Professor at the Department of Political Science, University of Aarhus, Denmark.

strengthened with respect to implementation capacity.

This article is the second in a series of two that attempts to compare the responsiveness and the capacity to implement political decisions in the three Baltic countries.³ The first article focused on the responsiveness of the state, in particular the expressed intent and factual involvement of societal interests in the policy process and the perceived extent of misuse of position. It was found that the state elites in all countries express the desire to involve societal interest but Lithuanian and Latvian administrations have more factual experience with such involvement. Moreover, even if misuse and corruption is a problem in all three countries, it appears less of a problem in Estonia than in the two other countries, which riddled with corruption to a larger extent also face the risk of being captured by particular interests at the expense of the common good.

All of the three countries are thus 'still on the road' in developing a modern responsive European state and all of the three

countries face the daunting challenge of building implementation capacity in the face of European integration. The article aims, specifically, at gauging the extent to which top-decision makers⁴ (1) believe in the development of modern bureaucracy, (2) reports the existence of a centre for the coordination of policies and (3) experience problems in the process of implementation.

Small countries – large central administrations?

The civilian central government in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania respectively on average employed 19, 47 and 47 thousand civil servants in the five-year period from 1996 to 2000 (table 1). The figures cover a relatively large contraction in Estonia (34 percent) and a relatively large expansion in Lithuania (27 percent) compared to the previous five-year period. In relative terms the central governments of the two countries are, however, of the same size but smaller compared to the Latvian central government and between

2 to 3 times larger than the average size of the central government in Central and Eastern Europe.

This oversize, which to some extent can be explained by the smallness of the countries not being able to exploit the economies of scale, is also expensive as the wage bill in all three countries takes up a large share of the GDP. However, despite the expenses the average 'take home' for the civil servants has, in real terms, only improved in Latvia with real wages at a small loss in Estonian and a staggering decline of 82 percent in Lithuania.

While these developments may help us to explain the high degree of turnover of staff as civil servants move to other and more prosperous positions in other sectors of the society, large central administrations do not necessarily imply that they are more effective let alone more efficient. As will be made evident in the following the civil services of the three countries are facing enormous challenges in the redesign of public administration and confront a cocktail of implementation problems partly related to the process of mod-

Table 1. Wages and size of the central government

	Lithuania*	Lithuania*	Latvia*	Latvia*	Estonia*	Estonia*	CEE average†
	1991- 1995	1996- 2000	1991- 1995	1996- 2000	1991- 1995	1996- 2000	1996- 2000
Civilian Central Government**							
(,000)	37	47	47	47	29	19	
(% pop.)	1.0	1.3	1.9	1.9	2.0	1.3	0.5
Public Employee Wages							
Total Central gov't wage bill (% of GDP)	3.6	10.3	6.3	9.4	5.6	8.3	6.7
Total Central gov't wage bill (% of gov't exp.)	15.9	15.2	19.6	11.7	7.8	12.8	14.4
Avg. gov't wage (,000 LCU)	4	14	1	2	18	44	
Real avg. gov't wage - 1997 price (,000 LCU)	73	13	1	2	46	44	

*Data are for the latest year available; **excluding education, health and police, if available; LCU = Local Currency Unit; † Averages only generated if data are available for at least 35% of the countries in that region or sub-region.

Source: World Bank

ernization and partly stemming from the systemic legacy of communism.

Political oversight and administrative neutrality

In the redesign of public administration the three countries need to develop a modern cadre of civil servants, i.e. a professional civil service appointed and promoted on merit and guided by nor-

mative principles regarding expected behaviour and performance standards for each function. Even though communist bureaucracy on paper resembled the Weberian merit system⁵ a modern administration represents at least on two points a radical break with the past. First, communism implied detail instruction rather than professional standards regulating behaviour; professional standards that are necessary to strike the balance between

uniformity (much in demand in societies with rule of law), flexibility and adaptability to address problems as they appear. Second, one cannot underestimate the importance of the politicization of communist bureaucracy and the control with dire individual consequences if the line of the party was broken.⁶ This politicization itself inhibited professionalism and merit based promotion leaving civil servants to guess the wishes of their

'masters' rather than analysing and presenting real options. In real terms it resulted in policy failures. Furthermore, the control culture developed into a 'pass the buck' culture where few if anyone would take responsibility.⁷

Questioning the still existence of politicization in the public administration we find that the ministers in our surveys, in general, do not believe in the value of having party comrades appointed (table 2), but in all three countries a rather large turnover is reported when a new minister is appointed (table 4) and many of the ministers, in particular Lithuanian, will reserve the right to appoint 'their' civil servants (table 5). While the responses to the first question is in concordance with the civil service laws the responses to the two other question reflect that the reality is far from the prescription of the laws.

These findings are supported by King's survey where the separation of career position from political influence is unanimously supported but at the same time it is also unanimously recognized not to be the case in the Baltic states.⁸ King offers a cynical

explanation arguing that it might be the case that ministers once they have filled vacancies with their loyal supporters suddenly

see the value in creating stable structures. However, the pattern does not necessarily only reflect a politicized administration.

Table 2. Civil servants should not be members of governing coalition party

	Estonia	Latvia	Lithuania
Agree	10.0	6.0	2.0
Disagree	36.0	36.0	42.9
Strongly disagree	18.0	42.0	49.0
Of no significance	36.0	16.0	6.1
Total (N)	50	50	49
Total (Percent)	100.0	100.0	100.0

Question: Do you agree that it is desirable that civil servants are members of a governing coalition party?

Table 3. But many are replaced

	Estonia	Latvia	Lithuania
Most	6.0	6.5	
About half	8.0	8.7	
Less than half	58.0	69.6	65.4
None	12.0	4.3	32.7
Do not know	16.0	10.9	1.9
Total (N)	50	46	52
Total (Percent)	100.0	100.0	100.0

Question: In general, how many of the ordinary administrative staff are/were replaced when a new minister from another party appears/ed in the ministry?

Table 4. Naming my own civil servants

	Estonia	Latvia	Lithuania
Strongly agree	6.1	6.1	39.2
Agree	51.0	40.8	45.1
Disagree	36.7	38.8	11.8
Strongly disagree	2.0	14.3	2.0
Do not know	4.1		2.0
Total (N)	49	49	51
Total (Percent)	100.0	100.0	100.0

Question: *In your opinion, is it better when ministers themselves can appoint their civil servants?*

Comparing the responses from the three countries it is evident that the Lithuanian ministers to a higher degree prefer a stake in the appointment and promotion of civil servants than their colleagues in the two other countries. On the one hand this fits nicely with theory of politicization. Given that the Lithuanian political parties historically are larger and better organized than respectively Latvian and Estonian political parties, that there is a tradition for majority governments and that politics is more polarized in Lithuania,⁹ the issue is not

only more evident but the expected pay-off of capturing the civil service is also larger. However, on the other hand it is still about half of the Estonian and Latvian ministers who desire a stake in the personnel procedures and on the face of it replacements do also seem to be more common in the two countries than in Lithuania. This suggests personalization rather than politicization of the administration in the sense that ministers will want to build a cadre that are personally loyal to them. Thus patronage-based relations where favours and loyalties are exchanged come to dominate.

Irrespective of the explanation (and probably it is a function of both) as a reflection of the soviet administrative and political culture it is also counter-productive conditions hampering the development of a professional civil service and in conjunction with a high degree of turnover it impedes the gradual accumulation of knowledge and experience necessary to build administrative capacity. Moreover, patronage or politicization leave, just as in previous times, the civil servants to second guess the wishes of their masters resulting in flawed advice that at its worst leads to policy failure.

Cross-cutting coordination

Oversight and policy coordination are important to any government, and in particular to transition countries operating under budgetary constraints and at the same time steering in a market economy, is a complex issue involving numerous policy instruments and agencies. In this respect the patronage-cum-politicization

of the civil service can in the long run create agencies and departments that operate like little chiefdoms impeding oversight and policy coordination within the executive. However, in the first instance there is little to suggest this is the case in the Baltic states where the Ministries of Finances (MOF) appear to be the primary coordinating institutions recognized by (table 5) the frequency by which the MOF's exert influence (table 6).

The unparalleled importance of the MOF's should not only be seen in the light of domestic budgetary constraints. The dominance must also be seen against the background that budgetary oversight and development of policy coordination among the economic and financial ministries and institutions are important prerequisites for membership of the European Union. As such these developments are evaluated, on a yearly basis, in the reports from the Commission. However, it is not only a question of EU membership. The need for fresh credit and support from international financial insti-

Table 5. The most influential ministry. Percent answering "Finance Ministry"

	Estonia	Latvia	Lithuania
Ministry of Finance (percent)	50.0	44.1	48.6
Total (N)	44	34	37
Total (percent)	100.0	100.0	100.0

Question: Which ministry do you consider to be the core ministry in terms of influence on decision-making in other ministries?"

Table 6. Frequent influencer. Percent answering "Finance Ministry"

	Estonia	Latvia	Lithuania
Ministry of Finance (percent)	87.8	88.2	84.3
Total (N)	49	51	51
Total (percent)	100.0	100.0	100.0

Question: In the cases where other ministries tried to influence proposals in your own ministry, who did it most frequently?"

tutions like the IMF, EBRD and the World Bank has also propelled this development.

With the structural parallel in the three countries it seems safe to conclude that the development of a ministry with core cross-cutting capabilities is a function of both domestic necessity (all three countries face budgetary constraints) and pressure from the outside.

Implementation capacity

Despite the development of a coordinating centre, it seems little surprising that many, and in Latvia and Lithuania most, of the ministers believe that the communist civil servants did implement political decisions more efficiently than present bureaucrats (table 7). As prob-

lems of patronage and the politicization of the civil service also existed during communism this is hardly the explanation. Part of the explanation can probably be found in the high turnover, but

it is perhaps more the general confrontation with a total reorientation of the state - to steer rather than row and the development of central governments where none previously existed,¹⁰ in addition to

the complexity and lack of knowledge about the policy instruments needed to see the country through and beyond the transition from communism.

Given this perceived decline in implementation capacity it is perhaps surprising that we again find the ministers expressing values concurrent with the development of a modern bureaucracy. Thus when asked about whether they themselves take responsibility for policy failures or problems more than 9 in 10 answer in the affirmative (table 8).¹¹ If not surprising then it is at least a brave position considering the number of experienced implementation problems (table 9).

We questioned the ministers whether they had experienced one or more out of eight commonly known obstacles to public policy implementation¹² and not unexpectedly the lack of resources came out on top named by, respectively, 76.0 and 96.2 percent of the Estonian and Lithuanian ministers. Considering the shortage of financial resources in the last decade this response probably reflects reality more than the 'automated' reaction

Table 7. Efficiency in communist systems compared to now (pct.)

	Estonia	Latvia	Lithuania
Agree	46.0	54.9	73.1
Disagree	50.0	31.4	21.2
Do not know	4.0	13.7	5.8
Total	100	100	100
N	50	51	52

Note: Agree collapsed from strongly agree and agree; Disagree collapsed from strongly disagree and disagree.

Question: In your opinion, did the civil servants implement political decisions more efficiently under the communist system than they do now?

Note: Total not weighted by country sample size.

Table 8. The buck stops here: personal responsibility for difficulties

	Estonia	Lithuania
Yes (percent)	94.0	96.2
No (percent)	6.0	3.8
Total (N)	50	52
Total (percent)	100.0	100.0

Question: Did you take personal responsibility in cases where the implementation or a policy program faced difficulties?"

Table 9. Frequency of encountered implementation problems

Problems encountered	Estonia	Lithuania
Lack of resources	76.0	96.2
Lack of understanding and agreement	66.0	52.8
Poor policy design	42.0	22.6
Lack of coordination and information	58.0	62.3
Lack of monitoring and evaluation	40.0	50.9
Insufficiently specified tasks	26.0	35.8
Interference from outside	26.0	43.4
Insufficient staff motivation	46.0	47.2

Question: Which of the following problems have you encountered during policy implementation? - Percent answering "Yes"

of a politician when questioned about policy failure. On top of the list we also find the lack of understanding and agreement on objectives by involved agencies and partners with, respectively, 66.0 and 52.8 percent in Estonia and Lithuania. Furthermore and perhaps more surprisingly given the strong status of the MOF's, we also find that the lack of coordination and information is on top of list, being second in Lithuanian and third in Estonia. This suggests that the MOF's coordination is restricted to budgetary regulation and that the capacity to coordinate

among other agencies and departments is not sufficiently developed. With respect to the lack of understanding and agreement on objectives it is less of a surprise in Estonia than in Lithuania. As previously discussed¹³ ties with civil society are less developed in Estonia than in Lithuania. However, distinguishing be-

tween policy making and policy implementation King offers an explanation by arguing that there is little communication between policy makers and those affected by the policy, before a policy is implemented.¹⁴ This problem is recognized and reported upon in the first article as a majority of our respondents thought that implementation could be improved by co-opting societal interests in the policy process.

The braveness of the ministers in taking personal responsibility for policy failures is further highlighted by table 10, where the combined number of problems each minister have encountered is reported upon. With an average of respectively 3.8 and 4.1 experienced problems in Estonia and Lithuania the mean difference is not statistically significant. From this it should thus not be concluded that there is less

Table 10. Number and mean of problems experienced

Number of problems	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	Mean
Estonia	0	3	13	12	6	5	4	4	3	3.8
Lithuania	0	4	7	9	12	9	7	2	3	4.1
Total	0	7	20	21	18	14	11	6	6	4.0

implementation capacity in Lithuania than in Estonia. Furthermore, the problems appear to be general across all types of ministries and the functions they have. Even if expected differences appear between ministries these are not statistically significant.¹⁵ However, a number of ministers are frankly in deep trouble as no less than 37 of 103 ministers have experienced a combination of 5 or more problems. 6 ministers report all 8 implementation problems. Even if we discount the resource problem we find that 96 ministers at least confront an extra problem in addition to the lack of resources.

In the responses, however, also lie clues as to how the implementation capacity can be strengthened. 'Give us more money', will be the typical answer from the ministers, and a correlation analysis show that allocating more resources to the public sector would assist in reducing problems stemming from coordination, monitoring and not least an unmotivated (and underpaid) staff.¹⁶ However, abundance of resources is not the solution to foster agreement on objec-

tives. In this respect the correlation analysis point to the influence from outside, which in the gravest of cases equals misuse or capture, but more generally confirms the necessity to involve partners at an earlier stage in the policy process. Furthermore, even if more resources, especially in the form of wages, can increase staff motivation and help to attract the best and the brightest candidates for positions it is not only wages that are of concern. Staff motivation, in the minds of the ministers, is thus correlated with classical soviet bureaucratic traits of control, monitoring and a higher degree of specification of tasks. To some extent the responses here are at odds with the development of a professional civil service, and the ministers do underestimate the motives of recruitment and 'staying on board' in civil service. Zealots, who wanted the opportunity to do good for the country, were attracted in the early days of transition. Nowadays favourable job-training and educational schemes, like in Estonia, matter more. Schemes that, at a later stage, may become entry to other

sectors are in demand but long-term career prospect are certainly also a key motivator. However, as this is at odds with the patronage and politicization of the civil service discussed above it only serves to underline the necessity not only to introduce but to also strengthen the professionalization of the public administration.

***Developing effective states:
a reform agenda***

It is promising that the state elites interviewed in the DEMSTAR surveys express values consistent with the development of democracy and a modern state. However, as demonstrated by the surveys there is still a need to develop and strengthen the states in the three countries. Furthermore, it is also demonstrated that treating the three countries as being similar is a gross underestimation of reality on the ground. This was, however, more the case with the responsiveness of the state (argued in the first article in the BDR no. 8) than with the implementa-

tion capacity examined in this article. The relative unresponsiveness of the Estonian state versus the captured cum more corrupted nature of the Latvian and Lithuanian states only serve to highlight that the latter two, penetrated as they are, need to combine the reform agenda discussed below with stringent measures to increase state autonomy.

Resources will naturally assist in strengthening of the capacity to implement policies but the central governments are, in terms of employment, already relatively large, and the development of an effective state is not merely a question of resources and increasing personnel. The interviewed decision makers do, in fact, pinpoint two areas that can only be resolved with targeted administrative reforms.

First, in terms of personnel policy the patronage-cum-politicization pattern needs to be rooted out. Against the backdrop and residues of soviet administrative culture and in combination with patronage and politicization, a barrier for the professionalization of the national ad-

ministrations is created. Properly the most difficult part of creating a higher degree of professionalization may, however, be the empowerment of the civil servant as it runs against the prevailing administrative culture.¹⁷ Increasing opportunities for whistleblowers, suggestive rewards, tightening the legislative framework and supporting professional organizations is an obvious solution for the short run but a reform of the personnel management departments strengthening their functions and responsibilities, i.e. developing catalogues of competence for positions, a roster for high grade personnel, training and competence centres, in conjunction with open competition may in the long run assist in ingraining Weberian principles in the administrations.

Second, besides increasing the civil servants motivation and interest in competence building such a reform may also be a first step towards increasing administrative oversight and policy coordination. Even if budgetary oversight is seemingly in place with the MOF's in the form of the coordinating centres, the lack of co-

ordination among various units participating in the planning and execution of policies suggests that divisions of responsibilities should be cleared and supported by the development of policy centres accumulating know-how. With the collaboration of academic specialists such centres can also improve evaluation processes allowing those responsible for the policy to react to problems before they turn into failures.

¹ Johannsen, Lars (2002), 'The Responsive State', *Baltic Defence Review*, Vol. 2, No. 8, pp. 9-20

² The wording 'effective' is chosen deliberately as 'strong' give a connotation that can be misinterpreted, especially in a post communist community, where the memory, of a state penetrating and controlling almost all aspect of life, is still alive.

³ Johannsen, Lars (2002), 'The Responsive State', *Baltic Defence Review*, Vol. 2, No. 8, pp. 9-20

⁴ The elite surveys are part of the DEMSTAR program (www.demstar.dk) and have so far been carried out among top-level governmental executives in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, The Kyrgyz Republic, Kazakhstan, Poland, the Czech Republic, Mongolia, Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Slovenia, Moldova and a survey is at present underway in Bulgaria. More informa-

tion about the Baltic surveys can be found at the website.

⁵ For a discussion concerning ongoing reforms with respect to the Weberian principles in the EU applicant states see: Nunberg, Barbara: "Ready for Europe: Public Administration Reform and European Union Accession in Central and Eastern Europe", World Bank Technical Paper no. 466; The World Bank Washington D.C., 2000.

⁶ Verheijen, Tony (1999), *Civil Service Systems in Central and Eastern Europe*, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK

⁷ Nørgaard, Ole and Lars Johannsen with Mette Skak and Rene H. Sørensen (1999), *The Baltic states after Independence*, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar

⁸ King, Roswitha M. ("Vita"), 'CONVERSATIONS WITH CIVIL SERVANTS: Interview Results from Estonia, Lithuania, Czech Republic and Poland', at <http://www.nispa.sk/news/papers/main/King.rtf>

⁹ Nørgaard, Ole and Lars Johannsen with Mette Skak and Rene H. Sørensen (1999), *The Baltic states after Independence*, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar

¹⁰ Schiavo-Campo, Salvatore (1996), Reforming the Civil Service, Finance & Development Vol. 33, No. 3, September 1996: pages 10-13

¹¹ Unfortunately the following question was not asked in Latvia. The Latvian survey was a pilot programme testing survey methodology. For more information on the Latvian survey see www.demstar.dk.

¹² Hogwood, Brian W. & Lewis A. Gunn (1984), *Policy analysis for the real world*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

¹³ Johannsen, Lars (2002), 'The Responsive State', *Baltic Defence Review*, Vol. 2, No. 8, pp. 9-20

¹⁴ King, Roswitha M. ("Vita"), 'CONVERSATIONS WITH CIVIL SERVANTS: Interview Results from Estonia, Lithuania, Czech Republic and Poland', at <http://www.nispa.sk/news/papers/main/King.rtf>

¹⁵ However, when test upon the larger set of surveys differences appear robust with members of presidential administrations (separate survey in presidential systems) reporting fewer problems compared to ministries with sectoral regulatory function or ministries with general coordination regulatory functions both reporting the highest number of problems.

¹⁶ Preliminary analyses show that resources are in fact uncorrelated with all other problems when applied to a larger set of countries.

¹⁷ Rosen, Ellen Doree (1993), *Improving Public Sector Productivity: Concepts and Practice*, London: SAGE

Is the Russo-phone Minority a Structural Security Threat to the Estonian State?

By Maibritt Lind*

I. Introduction

One could argue that with the closure of the OSCE mission in Tallinn at the end of 2001 was the end of the initial problems between the Russo-phone minority and the Estonians. The question is whether the problems are solved or was it more a question of sending the signal to the surrounding world that Estonia is master in its own house. Thus, the purpose of this article is to analyse whether, and if so, to which extent the Russo-phone minority¹ in Estonia can be seen as a structural security threat to

the consolidation of Estonia as a strong democratic state. In other words my intention is to reach a clearer understanding of the scope of the problematic fact that about 20% of the population does not have Estonian citizenship, and to get an idea of the consequences and the dimensions of this problem. I will investigate the problem by analysing whether legal, socio-economic and identity cleavages in the Estonian society correspond with the ethnic cleavage between the Estonians and the Russo-phone minority. If the cleavages correspond and overlap the ethnic, linguistic cleavage then Esto-

nia is faced with a serious structural security threat that can obstruct the consolidation of Estonia as a strong democratic state.

In order to analyse this it is necessary first to elaborate on Barry Buzan's state model comprising *the idea of the state, the physical base of the state and the institutional expression of the state*. It is the analysis of the coherence between the three components that enables a conclusion of whether the Russo-phone minority constitute a structural security threat to the consolidation of the Estonian state and democracy.

* Maibritt Lind is MPhil of political science and is a former research assistant at the Baltic Defence College Institute for Defence Studies. The article is based on a research project by Ms. Lind, which was published in its entirety in February 2003.

II. Buzan's state model and the concept of security

A structural security threat exists due to more or less arbitrary circumstances, not as a result of an intention. Whether a threat becomes a national security threat depends on the type of threat, how the state perceives it and on its intensity. The Russo-phone minority accounting for one third of the Estonian population can be characterised as a structural security threat if the Russo-phone minority is not integrated into the society; if there is systematic political, legal and economic imbalance between the Estonians and the Russo-phone minority; if the Russo-phone minority does not see the same purpose with the Estonian state as the Estonians do.

In order to analyse structural security threats to the consolidation of the Estonian state, I need to clarify what a state actually is. Here the state will be defined, according to Buzan's definition, in terms of a political, territorial and societal unit that consists of three components: *the idea*


of the state, the institutional expression of the state and the physical base of the state.

The idea of the state

This is the most central part of the state but also the most abstract and difficult to investigate. A state is based on an idea, which lies at the heart of the political identity of the state, that is, the purpose of the state. The idea of the state defines the character of the state and power in the international system. The idea binds the territorial, political and societal elements together in a whole like an organic entity. The idea establishes legitimacy in the minds of its people. The two main sources

for the idea of the state are the nation and organising ideologies (Buzan, 1991). *The nation* can be characterised as a large group of people sharing the same cultural and possibly the same ethnic or racial heritage. If the purpose of the state is to protect and express a cultural group, then life and culture must come high on the list of national security priorities. Furthermore, national identity is a central component of the security problem whether or not it is the foundation of the state. *Organising ideologies* are a higher idea of the state, and are often closely connected to the institutional structures of the state. An example of an organising ideology is racial preservation or com-

Figure 1: The components of the state (Buzan, 1991)



munism. The organising ideologies will be an integrative part of the entire structure of the state and closely connected to the institutional structures as a guideline or a higher principle. This is, for instance, the case in the United States, where pluralist democracy and market economy are inseparable parts of the foundation of the state (Buzan, 1991).

This abstract term is indeed difficult to measure and understand at the same time, which is why I in concordance with Constitution of the Republic of Estonia operationalise the idea of the state as *the preservation of the Estonian nation and culture over time* and the organising principle of Estonia is *liberal democracy founded on liberty, justice and law*.

The physical base of the state

The physical base of the state comprises its population and territory, including all of the natural resources and man-made wealth contained inside the border, which for instance is technology and education (Buzan, 1991). The physical base of the

state is the most concrete component of the state, and border disputes still play a role in international relations even though the number is limited. Another situation where the state's territory can give rise to insecurities is when a state defines its national interests and security in terms of territory and population which are not under the control of the state. This can happen if a state considers the safety of its diaspora living in e.g. the neighbouring state, as a part of national security.

Estonia still has border disputes with Russia but an agreement has been reached after Estonia denounced all demands of the territory of the First Republic, although Russia has not yet ratified this agreement.

The institutional expression of the state

The institutional expression of the state comprises the entire machinery of the government, including its executive, legislative and judicial institutions. The in-

stitutional expression of the state has, in the course of time, been growing, in order to meet the demand for services from the modern welfare state. There is a close connection between the institutional expression of the state and the organising ideology of the state. It is the institutions that put the organising ideologies into action, since the institutions have to be organised in a specific way in order to express the ideology. The state institutions can to a varying degree compensate for weakness in the idea of the state. A good example of this is a totalitarian state where the coherence of the state would be maintained by extreme use of force. In a state where the coherence to a large extent is determined by negative and forceful means, the citizens cannot be characterised as loyal citizens, but instead the leaders demand obedience to a varying degree.

The coherence between the three components

The coherence between the three components determines how strong the state

is (Buzan, 1991). The question is what does the coherence between the three components of the state consist of? Is it popular acceptance of the system, legitimacy or something else?

It is necessary to consider if there is a common factor(s), which can characterise all the connections among the three components. If we first look into the connection between the idea of the state and the institutional expression of the state, then we know from Buzan that they are highly intertwined. Say, the higher idea of the state is pursuing democracy, and in order to pursue democracy one needs institutions to secure, among other things, civil liberties and political rights. In the end, this implies that the institutions through the organising ideology gain legitimacy because the institutions and the idea of the state are in coherence with each other. The second connection between the idea of the state and the physical base can also be narrowed down to acceptance and legitimacy, because the population or the territory of the state accepts the purpose of the state.

Say, that the idea of the state is the preservation of the nation then there will be a strong coherence between the idea of the state and the physical base in a homogeneous state with no large diaspora outside the borders of the state. The third connection between the physical base and the institutional expression of the state is strong if the institutions are structured according to the size of the territory and the population. It is not possible to gain acceptance for the state institutions if they are not able to deliver the expected services to the whole population because the institutions have limited capacity. The population will not accept the institutional expression of the state if they have to pay a vast amount in taxes without gaining proper roads, medical services etc. in return. To sum up, the coherence between the three components of the state consists of acceptance and legitimacy.

Does this then imply that a state can only be strong if it has a consolidated liberal democracy? No, it is theoretically possible to find strong states which are not liberal democracies. Whether a state

is strong or weak depends on the coherence between the three components and not the organising ideology. If the physical base accepts that the idea of the state is, say, economic growth and prosperity but no political liberties, then it is certainly possible that the state can and will be strong if the institutions are organised according to that purpose. Having said that, it is obvious, though, that the potential of finding this in real life is relatively small, but the possibility cannot be eliminated. On the other hand, in states where the organising ideology is liberal democracy the coherence can be characterised as not only acceptance and legitimacy but also as democratic legitimacy. In this respect a state with a consolidated democracy is a strong state.

In analysing whether the Russo-phone minority in Estonia is a structural security threat to the consolidation of democracy, this theoretical tool – the coherence between the three components of the state – is of utmost relevance. If the Russo-phone minority is alienated and disloyal to the Estonian state, then they will not

accept the idea of the state and the institutional expression of the state. If a minority group is alienated, then democratic legitimacy cannot be obtained.

III. Estonian legal frame and integration policy

The creation of the legal fundament in a newly re-established state is an important tool to shape the structures of the new state. It is not within the scope of the article to investigate every aspect of the Estonian legislation. Instead I have chosen to shortly state some of the fundamental problems in the Estonian legislation concerning the legal rights for the population of Estonia – the citizens and non-citizens.

Law on Citizenship

Citizenship is fundamental to the establishment of a democratic state and society. The political rights, such as the right to stand for election, to vote in parliamentary elections, and the right to

become member of a political party, are fundamental to a democratic system, and these political rights are achieved through citizenship. A systematic exclusion of some groups from gaining citizenship has consequences, e.g. a division of the population that can hamper consolidation of a strong democratic state.

By restoring the Citizenship Law of 1938, the body of citizens was determined as the citizens of the First Republic before the Soviet occupation in 1940 and their descendants, while about half a million people, who had immigrated to Estonia during the Soviet occupation were declared non-citizens (Semjonov, 1998). Estonian citizenship can be acquired in two ways, by birth or through a naturalisation process. The naturalisation requirements are stated in Article 6 of the 1995 Citizenship Act. The language requirements, which the applicant must fulfil before acquiring Estonian citizenship, are quite harsh, especially when taken into account that Estonian is a Finno-Ugric language with few similarities to either Russian or the

Germanic languages. Requiring knowledge of the Constitution of the Republic of Estonia and the Citizenship Act also puts severe demands on the applicant to be able to understand difficult legal documents. In short, the requirements in the naturalisation process are in no way simple demands.

Despite some liberalisation of the Citizenship Act, the nature of the act is exclusive towards the inhabitants who were not citizens in the First republic or their descendants. Thus limiting the possibility for primarily Russo-phones, who have moved to Estonia during the Soviet occupation, to acquire political rights in the country they reside. The number of inhabitants who have acquired Estonian citizenship through naturalisation speaks its own clear language of how difficult it is to acquire it. By 13 January 2001 only 113,764 individuals had acquired Estonian citizenship through naturalisation, or about 29.6% of the group who did not automatically acquire Estonian citizenship in 1992 with the Citizenship Act (CMB, 2001).

Aliens Act

The purpose of the Aliens Act is to guarantee aliens residing in Estonia an internationally recognised status and to determine the duties of the aliens. An alien is defined in Article 3 as a person without Estonian citizenship, and it regulates entry, stay, residence and employment in Estonia and the bases for legal liability of aliens (Article 1). Identification papers and passports are documents which a stateless person does not possess, and an urgent need for these papers arose after declaring half a million people stateless in 1992. But not until 1994 did the Estonian government decide on a permanent solution, the Alien's Passport, which could be used both domestically and internationally (RT, 64, 1993 & RT, 46, 1994). The process of applying for and acquiring the Alien's passport took until 1997 to be almost completed and implied that the Russo-phone minority from 1992 till 1997 was in a stage of uncertainty about their legal status in Estonia (Laitin, 1998). As

an indication of the consequences of this, a survey has asked both Estonians and Russo-phones if they think the government treats the Russians living in this country fairly. It is striking that among the Estonians 72% answer 'yes' while only 17% answer 'no'. The Russo-phones perceive the treatment of them very different because only 29% think they are treated fairly while 61% think the treatment is unfair (Rose, 1997).

The Language Law

The language has been, and is, one of the most important factors for the identification as an Estonian, and the Estonian language policy has played a major role in the liberation process from the Soviet Union. During the Soviet occupation poor skills in Russian meant exclusion from public employment (Jonsson, 1999). A language policy was needed in order to give Estonian an official status, but in a state with about 32% having Russian as their mother tongue, a strict language policy can cause

systematic discrimination of the Russo-phone minority. The language policy has developed in two stages in Estonia. During the first stage, which began during the end of the Soviet Union, the aim was for Estonian to obtain an equal status to Russian – bilingualism was the aim. After regaining independence, the focus changed in the sense that Estonian was given a supreme status and all other languages were considered as foreign languages. The second stage of Estonian language policy resulted in the adoption of the Language Law of 1995. This implies that Russian is a foreign language, despite the fact that about 32% of the Estonian inhabitants have Russian as their mother tongue, and more than 75% of the whole population is said to have good or sufficient knowledge of Russian (Semjonov, 1998). Some limited language rights to national minorities are recognised, through Article 51 of the Constitution and in Article 10 of the Language Law, but the status of the Estonian language is different from the status of the national minority languages.

Estonian is a basic right, while the minority language (e.g. Russian) *may* be used (and it may not be used).

Language has been and is a particularly sensitive issue, and has, in the Estonian state and nation building process, been an effective political resource in uniting the Estonians behind the system. The consequence of the adoption of the strict Language Law is that the Estonian political society has alienated itself from a significant part of the physical base of the state – the Russo-phone minority.

***Law on Cultural Minority Rights
and Cultural Autonomy***

The purpose of having cultural minority rights is to preserve the minority cultures as a vital part of the society and ensure to, in theory, the right to preserve one's ethnicity, language and religion. Protection of minorities exists in Estonia but it is only Estonian citizens, who can obtain the protection, which the Law on Cultural Autonomy provides.

Normally protection of minorities focuses on the protection of the minority language. In the Estonian case the minority language is Russian. But the Language Law prevents the use of other languages than Estonian and, furthermore, even in a cultural autonomous body, they have to communicate in Estonian if asked by *one* person. The legislation in general, and especially the Law on Cultural Autonomy, creates a divided Russo-phone minority. The elite Russo-phones, who have the abilities and dedication to pass the strict naturalisation requirements, have protected minority rights, which provide the space under which it is easier to adapt to the new Estonian conditions. The rest with poor Estonian language proficiency are in the Estonian Constitution guaranteed the same rights, freedoms and duties as Estonian citizens, but they cannot enjoy political and cultural minority rights, because they have not acquired Estonian citizenship. The risk of alienation of the poorly adapted group of Russo-phones is therefore high, and the division

within the Russo-phone minority is a potential source of conflict.

As of today no cultural body has been established, and no minority group has even tried to establish one (Government Integration Report 2001). This probably has to do with the fact that only Estonian citizens can enjoy these rights. Non-citizens are allowed to take part in the activities of the cultural institution, but they may not vote, be elected or appointed to the leadership of the institution (Article 6). Paradoxically, this implies that non-citizens have fewer rights in a cultural autonomy institution than permanent residents, who can participate in the local elections. The second reason is the very vague and unclear terminology used in the law and the lack of definition of the role of autonomous cultural institutions. Thirdly, it is easier to establish an NGO, which has the same right to request financial help from official and public foundations and organisations, as an autonomous cultural institution has (Semjonov, 1998). The role of an NGO is clear, and the proce-

dures for establishing one are less complex and expensive, than the procedures set out by the Cultural Autonomy Law².

IV. The integration policy in Estonia

Characteristic for the Estonian legal framework is its systematic division between Estonian citizens and non-Estonian citizens. This legislation and the political discourse of protection of the Estonian nation can create a problem for the Estonian state and society. However, a change in the radical discourse can, combined with a genuine goal of integration as opposed to assimilation of the Russo-phone minority, help to solve the structural security threat inherent in the legislative organisation of the Estonian state. It is therefore important to analyse the Estonian integration policy, in order to reach an understanding of whether the Estonian state institutions do try to change the exclusive character of the legislation into a search for integration, or whether the state policy seeks linguistic assimilation.

Integration or assimilation of the Russo-phone minority?

An analysis of the Presidential Roundtable, which is an advisory body and a permanent conference of representatives of ethnic minorities, stateless persons and political parties, reveals that it played a successful role as mediator in 1993 between the Estonian state and the successive forces in North East Estonia. But it has lost its importance and impact on the political decisions because of its strictly advisory character.

The Ombudsman function has been established, and this could have been a vital institution helping to protect minority rights in Estonia, but unfortunately this has not yet been the case. Limited information about the jurisdiction as well as the lack of consistency in protecting the minority rights makes the institution of little value to the Russo-phone minority at this point. Yet, with improvements in these defaults, the ombudsman institution could in the future be of vital im-

portance in the protection of minority rights in Estonia (OSI, 2001).

An analysis of the State Integration Programme³ enables me to conclude that although the programme is in no way blind to the minority problems in the Estonian society the focus on only linguistic integration is not enough to solve the structural cleavages between Estonians and the Russo-phone minority. Furthermore, the Programme reinforced the institutionalisation of the Estonian nation as the basis of the state, and it gives no concessions to the legal and political exclusion of the Russo-phone minority. The programme only seeks integration through delivering the possibilities for the Russo-phone minority to live up to the naturalisation requirements for Estonian citizenship. Inherent in the State Integration Programme is a future risk of instability, which is a characteristic of a deeply divided society that cannot guarantee equal opportunities for all its inhabitants. The current integration programme is suitable for integration of immigrants or guest workers but not for

a national minority constituting 31% of the Estonian population. The fact that such a large part of the Estonian population does not have Estonian citizenship and that some of these even are stateless is a major obstacle for the democratic process in Estonia. Here it should in fairness be mentioned that Estonia does not pretend to be ethno-culturally neutral, but is actively engaged in the project of building up the Estonian nation as the core of the state

On the basis of the analysis of the Estonian legal frame and Integration Policy I am now able to conclude that the Estonian nation building strategy is primordial where blood ties are important and that the state building project is exclusive. Membership of the nation can happen not only through linguistic assimilation but also cultural assimilation in the sense that the new members must have a clear understanding of the Estonian traditions and customs. It will take generations before the Russo-phone minority is considered equal to the ethnic Estonians and the nationality legislation has only

increased the time span considerably. On the basis of the analysis of the legislation and the integration policy the Estonian democracy can be termed as exclusive nation building and ethnic state building.

Socio-economic conditions and political participation

Here the purpose is to analyse whether there are systematic and significant differences between the Russo-phone minority and the Estonians regarding socio-economic conditions. If there is a systematic difference between the two groups that corresponds to the cleavage found inherent in the legal framework, then there is a solid foundation for saying that Estonia is a divided society, which can influence the extent of the structural security threat. There are generally no differences between the Russo-phone minority and the Estonians on background variables such as life expectancy, birth rate and infant mortality. Thus the intention is to analyse whether there are differences in the educational level, the position in the labour

market, unemployment rate, income, and living conditions.

Education level

Reforming the Estonian educational system has in recent years been discussed intensively and has resulted in concrete reform initiatives during the first part of 2001. Unfortunately, these reforms do not come up with a solid solution to the question of language of instruction. The amendment of the Law on Basic and Upper Secondary Schools in April 2001 implies that from 2007 the Russo-phone minority is no longer guaranteed education in their mother tongue, Russian. The quality of education in the Russo-phone schools is not as good as in the Estonian schools due to the lack of qualified teachers and poor translations of Estonian terms and textbooks (OSI, 2001). There are no initiatives from the Estonian state to re-train Russo-phone teachers to teach in Estonian, and thus the lack of qualified teachers in Estonian instruction does not seem to be eliminated by 2007.

Table 1: The educational structure of groups with different citizenship (%)

Nationality/Citizenship	Basic education	Secondary education	Higher education	Total
Estonian citizen Estonians	36	47	16	100
Estonian citizens Russo-phones	34	45	21	100
Stateless Russo-phones	35	58	8	100
Russian citizens	29	57	14	100

Source: Pavelson, 2001:4

The statistics show that there is no significant difference in the educational level between the Estonians and Russo-phone minority except that more Russo-phones have a higher vocational training. An explanation can be the naturalisation requirements because only persons with a large social and educational capability and who are in an economically viable situation have the possibility to live up to the requirements. The group of Russo-phones with Estonian citizenship has the skills to pass the language and civic exam as well as the dedication for it. It is therefore very likely that this group will have a large interest in getting a higher education. But one must also keep in mind that a large number of the Russian citizens are of an

older generation, who opted for the easy solution of acquiring Russian citizenship, which were given to all former Soviet citizens. This can therefore explain why a significantly low percentage of the Russian citizens have higher education as well as a high proportion has only basic education.

The labour market and employment

There is a market difference between the occupational structure of the Estonians and the Russo-phones. The service and agricultural sectors are dominated by the Estonians, while those employed in the industry are three to one in favour of non-Estonians.

It is prohibited to discriminate or give preference in employment on the grounds of e.g. sex, nationality, colour, race, native language, religion, and political or other opinion (RT 1992, 15/16, 241, Article 10). The Labour Inspectorate has found no discrimination but the Russo-phone minority claim that the language requirements restrict their access to public and private employment (OSI, 2001). Linguistic requirements in the public as well as in the private sector are prevalent, which limits the geographical area where the Russo-phones with poor Estonian language skills can apply for work.

The difference between the Estonians and the Russo-phone minority increases according to the educational level for the occupation structure (see table 2). Firstly, the Estonian “blue collar workers” have a lower educational level compared to the non-Estonians. Furthermore, there are a larger number of non-Estonians (40%) with a higher level of education who work as office workers compared to the Estonians (17%). Among the specialists and the directors the Estonians

Table 2: The educational structure of occupation groups of employed Estonians and non-Estonians (%)

Occupational group	ESTONIANS			NON-ESTONIANS		
	Basic	Secondary Education	Higher	Basic	Secondary Education	Higher
Auxiliary worker, unskilled labour	44	52	4	47	45	8
Skilled labour	39	60	1	16	77	7
Service Personnel	20	74	6	20	73	7
Office worker	8	75	17	-	60	40
Mid-level specialist	6	83	11	12	71	17
Specialist (without subordinates)	3	35	62	-	39	61
Specialist (with subordinates)	9	39	52	-	35	65
Director of institution or unit	7	45	48	-	44	56
Total	20	57	23	16	62	22

Source: Table 4 in Government Report on State Integration Programme in 2000⁴.

get employment as managers and experts with a lower educational level more often than non-Estonians. Despite the insignificant differences in the educational level, the non-Estonians are more often than Estonians employed in a position in which they are over-qualified. This can help explain why you find more those unsatisfied with their job among the Russo-phone minority (39%) than among the Estonians (20%) (Rose, 2000).

Again, proficiency in Estonian language can account for some of this difference, because lack of language skills prevents the part of the Russo-phone minority with limited social capability from seeking employment in other regions than North-Eastern Estonia. Thus, it seems that the claim of the Russo-phone minority that the Language Law discriminates in employment is right.

Unemployment and social exclusion

Estonia has experienced tremendous progress but one of the downsides is the emerging poverty and unemployment and the risk of social exclusion and alienation. Of interest here is whether the risk of poverty, alienation and social exclusion is higher for the Russo-phone minority than for the Estonians.

Table 3: Poverty Indicators

To do without the past 12 months?	ESTONIANS		RUSSIAN-SPEAKERS	
	1995	2000	1995	2000
Food				
-Often	8	7	26	24
-Sometimes	15	16	28	21
-Rarely	14	18	14	15
-Never	62	59	31	40
Heating, electricity				
-Often	2	2	6	8
-Sometimes	4	6	12	13
-Rarely	7	12	10	14
-Never	86	80	72	66
Clothes you really need				
-Often	17	16	34	32
-Sometimes	21	20	26	22
-Rarely	16	22	15	21
-Never	45	42	25	24

Source: Rose (1995 @ 2000), New Baltic Barometer II and IV.

As can be seen from table 3 there have not been any dramatic improvements or worsening from 1995 to 2000. The poverty indicators show that a larger number of Russo-phones have to do without food, clothes, electricity and heating compared to the Estonians. The difference is systematic, and it makes the Russo-phone minority more at risk of poverty than

the Estonians. Furthermore, members of the Russo-phone minority are generally more afraid of losing their job as 60% of the Russo-phone minority believe their job is in danger, while the same is true for just 35% of the ethnic Estonians (Norbalt, 2000).

There are significant differences in the unemployment rate, where the Russo-

phone unemployment is significantly and systematically higher than unemployment among the Estonians (*Statistical Office of Estonia*). According to the Estonian Human Development Report, integration of the Russo-phone minority into the labour market is stranded on the language barrier and on the low rate of economic development in Ida-Virumaa, where about 98% of the population have Russian as their mother tongue.

The analysis does not provide an insight into whether the Russo-phone minority is socially excluded from the Estonian society but it is striking that the Russo-phone minority is, according to the UN Committee Against Torture on Estonia, over-represented in the prison population (Press Release Geneva, 22 November 2002). Higher education is indicative of active participation in the society, which is a normal tendency to find. Yet, as we already know, the educational structure of the Russo-phone minority and the Estonians is quite similar. Thus, the Russo-phones should participate just as much as the Estonians do, but this has not been

the case. First, the unemployment rate is systematically higher for the Russo-phone minority. It is true that the higher unemployment rate is a structural phenomenon, but whatever the reason, it is still a fact that the Russo-phone minority to a higher degree is excluded from the labour force than the Estonians. Secondly, the political exclusion cannot be debated. It is primarily the persons without both the financial and the social capabilities for learning Estonian that are excluded from political participation in Estonia. Thirdly, the Russo-phone minority has a higher percentage that “often” has to do without food and clothes even though they constitute a smaller portion of the entire population.

Income

The Estonian Human Development Report has analysed adaptation as an indicator for integration in the market economy (1998:65-67).

The report divides the Estonian population into three strata. The first one,

Table 4: The proportion of Estonians and non-Estonians in the three strata.

	% of population	Estonians	Non-Estonians
First strata	23%	80%	20%
Second strata	33%	64%	36%
Third strata	44%	48%	52%

Source EHDR, 1998, 65.

which comprises 23% of the population, consists of the successfully adapted elite and higher middle stratum, which are characterised by having a higher education level, being well informed, very active and young. The first stratum receives almost half of the population’s total income. 33% of the population constitute the second stratum and is characterised by having adapted with some effort and about 30% of the total income in Estonia goes to this group. The educational level is relatively low and they occupy the jobs left over from the first stratum. The third and lower stratum that comprises 44% has severe difficulties adapting, and every fourth person is chronically unemployed. They have only a minimal and indirect effect on the developments in Estonia, and

the main part feels excluded from the Estonian society.

It is striking that only 20% of the first strata is Russo-phones and in the second strata the Russo-phone minority is slightly over-represented according to the population share (31%). In the third strata the Russo-phones are clearly over-represented with 52% as opposed to their share in the population. The new structure of the Estonian society has by 1998 stabilised, which implies that the Russo-phone minority is vastly under-represented in the higher social strata and over-represented among those who feel excluded and have adapted poorly to the new conditions. The 25-34 year old generation has adapted well, and this applies for both Estonians and Russo-phones that have a higher share

of Estonian citizenship than other age groups (EHDR, 1998).

Furthermore, the research conducted in 1999 has shown that the economic position and financial security of the non-Estonians has deteriorated over the last decade, compared with the Estonian position. "Thus, in 1999, non-Estonians spent approximately 31% of their total income on food as against 25% among Estonians" (OSI, 2001). This corresponds with my analysis of poverty, where it in the majority of cases is the Russo-phone minority that has to do without food, clothes and heating.

That is, the income differences in Estonia are large, with 23% of the population earning half of the total income, and only 20% of the first, highly adapted, stratum are Russo-phones. On several characteristics, such as education, capital residency, citizenship, and ethnicity, income differences can be found (Norbalt, 2000). The Russo-phone minority is under-represented in the high-income group.

The analysis of the socio-economic conditions has shown that inequality be-

tween the Russo-phone minority and the Estonians does exist, but the picture is not clear. Not all Russo-phones are poor and not all Estonians rich, but every time I have tried to compare the Russo-phones, share to their share of the population, they are under-represented among the higher income groups, while over-represented among the unemployed and the lower social strata. The only category investigated, where the Estonians and the Russo-phone minority are roughly equal is education. Thus, it is no wonder that "the Russo-phone minority is more likely than the Estonians to define themselves as poor" (Norbalt, 2000).

Participation in civil society

The civil society in Estonia can be characterised as free and consisting of both relatively autonomous groups and individuals, but the civil society does not constitute a counterbalance to the state because the civil society has limited effect on the political society, and it is mainly international organisations such as the

OSCE, the Council of Europe, the EU and UNDP that have an effect on the policy formulation. This implies that there is a lack of continued dialogue between the state and the civil society, thus the development of a cohesive social capability of the civil society will be reduced. The Soviet educational system is not known for fostering critical sense because the communist ideology told the truth even in the area of political science. This legacy is still hampering the development of the Estonian society, and there is a clear lack of people with ideas for civil society projects. The EU Commission has criticised the limited involvement of outside organisations in the policy planning and legislative drafting and has, through the Phare and ACCESS programmes, given financial support to the development of the civil society and individual initiatives (SEC, 2001). Foreign donations and funding are crucial for the development of NGOs and their continuation. Thus, one of the biggest problems with democracy in Estonia lies in the civil society – in its weakness and low level of participation

in shaping the development of the state (EHDR, 2000), but also the fact that the Russo-phones and the Estonians participate in separate civil societies, and that dialogue between these two communities has been difficult to establish constitute a problem for the development of Estonia as a strong democratic state.

***Participation
in the political society***

Only Estonian citizens can enjoy full access to political participation (Riigikogu Election Act), while non-citizens, who have resided in Estonia for the past five years can vote in local government elections, but not run for office (Local Government Council Election Act). This implies that 62% of the Russo-phone minority (some 20% of the total population) cannot participate in the political society at the national level.

The turn-out in the elections both for national parliament and local government has generally been low, between 52% and 69%, compared to developed democracies

within the European Union, which have an election turn-out around 75-80%. Reasons cited for the low turn-out are the problems with distinguishing the political platforms of the parties from each other, and the belief that voters are unable to influence the political system (FHCR, 2001).

The Norbalt Survey from 1999 clearly shows that the Russo-phone minority to a larger extent than the Estonians has not participated in any kind of political activity or event during the past 5 years. Thus, it can be fair to say that the Russo-phone minority is less interested in politics, they participate in the political society less than Estonians and do not want citizenship to acquire political rights. The obvious question now is why the Russo-phones are less active when it comes to participation in the political society? The survey results I have had access to do not provide an answer directly, but after having studied the socio-economic differences between the Russo-phone minority and the Estonians a qualified guess is that the Russo-phone minority is very occupied in living up to the legislative demands

put on them and improve their economic situation at the local rather than the national level. The reasons for wanting Estonian citizenship were predominantly economic and pragmatic; thus the Russo-phones need to feel as a part of Estonia and must rebuild their political and national identity, which collapsed together with the Soviet Union. This, furthermore, corresponds with my previous argument that it is the Russo-phone elite who takes active part and is very interested in politics, because the elite has been able to adapt to both the changing political and economic conditions in Estonia. In short, I think the Russo-phones are less interested in politics because there is an over-representation of Russo-phones who belong to the lowest stratum, who feel excluded and have adapted poorly to the market economy.

Thus, the legislative cleavage and the nationality policy have created a dividing line among the Russo-phones between the well adapted, successful elite and the rest, who are over-represented among the poorly adapted and to a large degree feel

excluded from society. This gives grim signals for the future, because this will deepen and strengthen the linguistic division in the Estonian society. Participation and competition in national elections is restricted to ethnic Estonians and Russo-phones who have lived up to the legal requirements for obtaining Estonian citizenship. The Estonian democracy can in other words be characterised, according to Smith, as an “Ethnic Democracy”.

Integration or assimilation

From the analysis of the Estonian legal frame and the integration policy I am able to conclude that both the Estonian nation and state building project is exclusive in character. On the basis of the analysis of the socio-economic differences and the participation in the civil and political society I am able to evaluate whether the exclusive nationality policy has implied integration or assimilation of the Russo-phone minority.

The analysis of the socio-economic conditions and the participation in both

the civil and the political society has shown systematic differences between the Estonians and the Russo-phone minority. On the basis of this analysis it is fair to conclude that the Estonians and Russo-phones form two fairly separate communities with limited communication between themselves (Vetik, 2000a:). The two groups go to different schools (though an increasing number of Russo-phone parents are beginning to put their children in Estonian schools), they have different language and thus different media, and there is a lack of interest for the other group in the media. They work and live in different places and have different legal status. Thus, the relationship between the Russo-phone minority and the Estonians can be characterised as separation (Vetik, 2000a:), which was also the case during the Soviet Union just reversed with Estonians under-represented in the higher social strata etc.

The question is then whether it is possible to determine if the Russo-phone minority is being integrated or assimilated. Unfortunately, the answer is not

straightforward because several elements have to be taken into account. The first element is the integration policy, which I have argued is exclusive, because it established the Estonian language and nation as the enforced common core of the society. There is no intention in the future to acknowledge the Russian language as an element in the public sphere of the Estonian state and the recognition of Russian will, from 2007, diminish even further. The second element is the discrimination in the labour market on the basis of language, which freezes the Russo-phones in a state of unemployment because they are not able to find employment outside the Russo-phone populated areas. The third element is the fairly systematic difference between the Russo-phone minority and the Estonians on socio-economic conditions, which to some extent can be explained by the poor socio-economic conditions in North-Eastern Estonia.

On the basis of these three elements I can conclude that the Russo-phone minority is not being integrated into the

Estonian society neither in political, social or economic terms. The Russian language does not have the same status as Estonian, and the new integration policy puts an emphasis on the preservation of Estonian language. The Russo-phones have to prove their loyalty (proficiency in Estonian) in order to participate in the political society. Thus “integration for participation” is dominant in Estonia. This would therefore lead to the conclusion that the Russo-phone minority as a consequence of the nationality policy is being integrated only by accepting that the Estonian nation and language is the foundation of Estonia. However, my analysis also indicates that the Russo-phones who have adapted well to the new political and economic conditions in Estonia are able to be a part of the higher social strata. Acquiring Estonian citizenship and having proficiency in Estonian are preconditions for participation in the Estonian state and society. This leaves us with the conclusion that the Estonian nationality policy and integration policy encourages assimilation, but it is not en-

forced (implying that the stateless and Russian citizens have to leave Estonia).

V. Political and national identity

Crucial for determining whether the Russo-phone minority constitutes a structural security threat to the consolidation of Estonia as a strong democratic state are not only socio-economic differences and differences in political participation, but also political and national identity. Differences in political identity between Estonians and Russo-phones can give an actual indication of whether the Russo-phone minority is alienated from the Estonian society and has another idea of the state than the Estonians.

The primordial approach will first be used to analyse whether there are any differences between the strength of the ethnic foundation of the Russo-phone minority and the Estonians by analysing if they possess the characteristics of an *ethnie*⁵. According to the instrumental approach, national identity is always un-

der construction and re-construction influenced by factors. I will investigate whether the factors point in the same direction and compare it to the perception of the Russo-phone minority of their situation and possibilities in Estonia. This will make it possible for me to conclude if the identity of the Russo-phone minority is in concordance with the idea of the state.

The Estonian nation

Analysing the ethnic foundation of the Estonian nation, the five characteristics that Smith lists must be investigated. First, the Estonians share a common proper name. Second, the Estonians have a rich collection of folk songs and fairytales dating back to the end of the 19th century in which the common myths and memories are an integrated part (Lieven, 1993:110ff). The third characteristic of an ethnic community are historical memories, and in the case of Estonia the experience and memories of the First Republic are often used in political rhetoric (Berg, 2002 &

Jonsson, 1999). The Estonian language is an important denominator for the Estonian culture, which is the fourth characteristic Smith lists, and I would even characterise it as the basis of the Estonian nation. The fifth characteristic of an ethnic demands that the Estonians have a special relationship with the Estonian territory, which the Estonians have inhabited since the 12th century as a coherent group, and this is used in political rhetoric as evidence of a primordial right to the Estonian territory (Berg, 2002:111). The final content of an ethnic is a sense of social solidarity, which is not easy to analyse, but a survey show that 85% of the Estonians have a great deal in common with the state nationality and 12% have something in common (Rose & Maley, 1994:54f). Furthermore, the low rate of social relations with other ethnic groups indicates that a sense of social solidarity exists.

On this background it is possible to conclude that the Estonians have a strong ethnic base since they share all the characteristics Smith has listed. Moreover, the Estonian *ethnie* had developed into a na-

tional identity by the time the First Republic was established.

The Russo-phone nation

It is immediately clear that the Russo-phone minority lacks the ethnic base and a national identity. To some extent they have a common name but some term them “Russian diaspora”, others “non-Estonians” or “Russo-phone minority”. The majority has immigrated during the Soviet Union era and do not have any association to the Estonian territory. The historical memories and myths they have in common are from the Soviet Union, which has seized to exist. Instead, the Russo-phone minority can be said to have a conglomerate identity put together by their common Russian language and diasporic social identity, which is characterised by the loss of identity as Soviet citizens (Laitin, 1998:363). Diasporic memories of a Russian-speaking Soviet world are distinct from the rest of the Estonian population, who only have more or less bad memories from the Soviet Union.

Factors influencing the identity formation

Several factors have influence on whether it is more likely that the Russo-phone minority culturally will choose an identity associated with the natural homeland, Russia, develop their own distinctive Russian identity or identify with the Estonian culture. Furthermore these factors have influence on the political identity choice, which determines whom the Russo-phone minority will choose to be loyal towards.

The first factor is whether and to what extent the national minority constitutes a regional community, and the second perspective is if the national minority has a natural homeland. Russia can be considered as a natural homeland, and the Russo-phone minority constitutes about 31% of the Estonian inhabitants and have a tight-knit community in North-Eastern Estonia on the border with Russia. Especially, in the early 1990s did a secessionist potential exist, because the Soviet City

Council deputies threatened with secession (Semjonov, 1998). Compared to the Estonians, the Russo-phone minority to a larger extent has relatives, friends or business partners in Russia (82%), and in general the Russo-phones have more contacts outside Estonia than the Estonians do (Rose, 2000). Furthermore, the Russo-phone minority is known for a low degree of rootedness, as many moved from republic to republic in the Soviet Union, but the rate of Russo-phones born in Estonia is increasing. The rate of inter-ethnic marriages between Estonians and Russo-phones is low. These factors favour retention of a traditional Russian identity, because they are not much exposed to Estonians and links with Russia have continued. On the other hand, the Estonian immigration quota limits the number of Russians arriving, thus no re-enforcement of a traditional Russian culture can take place.

The policy of the nationalising state

The analysis of the legal frame and the integration policy tells that the main fo-

cus in the state building process is securing the Estonian language and nation. The nation and state building processes are deeply intermixed and the aim of the state building process is consolidation of the nation in the institutional expression of the state. Thus, the Estonian policy towards the Russo-phone minority can be characterised as nationalising. The Estonian nation has primacy in the public sphere of Estonia, and thus the Russo-phone minority has to accept the rules the Estonian state has established, or leave. The tone is no longer as harsh as it was in the beginning of the state formation, but the underlying message is still the same. It is my clear impression that the Estonian state authorities, who strive towards membership of the EU and NATO, have learned to conceal the exclusive character of the policy⁶.

The Estonian understanding of national identity is primordial because descent determines whether you are part of the Estonian nation or not. Yet, at the same time the Estonian politicians and the public have realised that the Russo-phone minority has no intention of leav-

ing Estonia. Here the instrumental approach comes into action, because the naturalisation requirements and the integration policy try to win the political loyalty of the Russo-phone minority, and the symbol of political loyalty to the Estonian state is basically speaking Estonian. Thus, the Estonian policy aims to reconstruct the identity of the Russo-phone minority.

***Russian policy towards
the Russian diaspora
in the near abroad***

The policy of the external homeland towards the Russian diaspora is a factor that has influence on the identity choice of the Russo-phone minority. Total lack of interest from the Russian Federation will make the Russo-phone minority less inclined to choose loyalty towards Russia, while the possibility of military intervention in the course of protecting their rights will reinforce the possibility for a choice of loyalty towards the external homeland.

Russia's policy towards the Russian diaspora is difficult to get a grip of because the Russian statements are sporadic, and often they have the character of political rhetoric and not real policy statements. However two documents, the New Russian Military Doctrine adopted in October 1999 and the Russian National Security Concept adopted in January 2000, can give an insight into the Russian attitudes and interests in the Russo-phone minority in Estonia. Both the National Security Concept and the Military Doctrine state that among Russia's national security interests are "protection of the lawful rights and interests of Russian citizens abroad with the use of political, economic and other measures". Furthermore, one of the basic external threats to Russia's security is "discrimination against and suppression of rights, freedoms and lawful interests of Russian Federation citizens in foreign states" (Military Doctrine, 1999). These two Russian documents clearly indicate that Russia does take a firm interest in the protection of its citizens outside its border and if necessary, the possi-

bility of a military intervention cannot be ruled out (Vining, 2002).

The Russian President Vladimir Putin has furthermore, in connection to the Macedonian crisis, used the claim for making Albanian an official language to demand that Russian should obtain an official status in the Baltic states (RFE/RL Baltic States Report, 2001:16/10). On the other hand, the friendly winds between Russia and the USA indicate that the potential of a military intervention to protect Russian citizens is rather unlikely. Russia might continue to interfere, but the political demands from Russia normally only appear in the media and not as official demands, which could be interpreted that Russia can no longer use the Russian citizens as a political platform for their interests in the Baltic states (Aareng, 05-04-02). Thus, the analysis of the Russian policy towards the Russo-phone minority shows that Russia does take an interest in the rights of the Russo-phone minority, but actual actions behind the policy are not likely to occur in the near future.

***The Russo-phone minority's
perception of their possibilities
in Estonia***

Perceived political, economic, or cultural deprivation is of vital importance for the development of national identity. The Estonians perceived themselves to be politically, economically, linguistically, and culturally deprived in the Soviet Union, even though Estonia was one of the net contributors to the Soviet budget. This perceived deprivation had a large impact on the Estonian national revival in the late 1980s (Bollerup & Christensen, 1997). It is therefore, interesting to investigate how the Russo-phone minority perceives the economic positions and possibilities in Estonia, because this can indicate whether the Russo-phone minority is developing an identity as a deprived national minority.

A clear majority of the Russo-phone minority (68%) finds the economic inequality very large or fairly large, while the Estonian majority (79%) finds it fairly

small or non-existent. It is therefore fair to conclude that the Russo-phones perceive themselves deprived of economic possibilities in Estonia. When asked about the possibilities of the Estonians and the Russo-phones, who are equal in citizenship, age, education, language fluency and experience, the same picture appears. The Russo-phone minority generally thinks that it is easier for Estonians, while about half of the Estonians agree that the Estonians will often or sometimes have better possibilities than the Russo-phone minority.

This could be a factor that will provide the foundation for the rising of a national minority identity, as it was for

the Estonians during the Soviet Union. However, it should be noted that compared to the possibilities in Russia the Russo-phones agree or somewhat agree that “the conditions are worse in Russia for people like me” (67%) and that “Estonia offers better changes for improving the living standards in the future than Russia does” (67%) (Rose, 2000).

The perception of the integration policy

The Monitoring survey of integration has found differences in how the Estonians and the Russo-phone minority evaluate the integration process in Estonia. The

two groups find different things important in the integration. The most important issues for the Estonians are that the Russo-phone minority acquires proficiency of the Estonian language and is loyal to the Estonian state. Second, that the growth of mutual acceptance and readiness to co-operate and the number of non-Estonians applying for Estonian citizenship increases. This could indicate that the Estonians are beginning to believe that the development of a common state identity is possible, because they emphasise that the Russo-phone minority must be loyal towards the Estonian state and that the achievement of tolerance is a mutual project for Estonians and Russo-phones. The Russo-phones in general find the integration process more important than the Estonians, and they see the growth of mutual tolerance as the way for them to feel as part of Estonia. This presupposes, according to the Russo-phones, that the Estonians must be ready to co-operate and interact as well as create a clear integration strategy, where the nationality legislation will be amended in concordance

Table 5: Perceiving economic inequalities between the Estonian and non-Estonian people (%)

	Estonians	Russo-phones
Very large	5	22
Fairly large	17	46
Fairly small	49	25
Very small	13	4
No inequality	17	3

Source: New Baltic Barometer IV. Question asked spring 2000.

with European norms⁷. The way to enhance the loyalty of the Russo-phone minority towards the Estonian state is a process that enables individual and collective self-realisation through citizenship and participation in the political society, equal possibilities in the labour market and the development of a culture in their own language.

***The likely direction
of the Russo-phone minority's
identity choice***

The analysis of the different factors influencing the identity formation, the nationalising policy, the Russian policy towards the diaspora and the perception of the possibilities in Estonia enables me to discuss the direction of the Russo-phone minority's identity formation. Thus, it is possible to evaluate whether the Russo-phones are loyal towards the Soviet Union, are loyal towards the new Russian Federation, have aspirations for creating a new nation-state or are loyal towards the Estonian state. But it is also

possible to see the tendencies in the formation of the Russo-phone minority's cultural identity. The tendency can be that they identify culturally with the external homeland Russia, or that they obtain a new Russian identity that differs from the cultural traditions of the Russian Federation, or that they are beginning to assimilate into the Estonian culture.

Political loyalty is a fundamental element in the consolidation of democracy and of the state. Some of the political identity choices can be eliminated easily. The Russo-phone minority has accepted that the Soviet Union has collapsed, and as 62% of the Russo-phones do not wish to re-establish communist rule, they have no intention of reconstituting the Soviet Union (Rose, 2000). The likelihood that the Russo-phone minority will be loyal towards the Russian Federation is equally unlikely, because they have seen only political rhetoric and no actions to secure their rights. They furthermore see themselves as different from Russians and as strangers in Russia.

This leaves two possible political identity choices for the Russo-phone minority, first the aspirations for their own nation-state and, second, being loyal towards the Estonian state. Considering the close-knit Russo-phone community in North-Eastern Estonia and the autonomy referendum, the aspirations for secession and the creation of a new nation-state is clearly a possible option, but since the middle of the 1990s it has only been a rhetorical possibility. The Russo-phones are well aware that secession will not render an economically viable situation, but this does not exclude the possibility that the Russo-phone minority has aspirations for cultural autonomy with Russian as an official language within the frame of the Estonian state.

The Russo-phone minority would like to choose the second option, being loyal towards the Estonian state, but the Estonian nationalising policy prevents it. The majority of the Russo-phones want to become Estonian citizens, but at the same time they find the naturalisation requirements far too harsh. The Russo-phones

accept that they should learn Estonian (Monitoring) but at the same time they seek the possibility to develop their own culture based on the Russian language, and they do not believe this to be possible within the present legal frame of the Estonian state. Thus, the Estonian state and the Russo-phone minority have very different understandings of how to obtain loyalty, and as long as this difference prevails, the possibility for the Russo-phones to become an equal and integrated part in the Estonian society is not likely. The political identity of the Russo-phone minority can be characterised as placed between loyalty towards Estonia and aspiration for autonomy within the frame of the Estonian state.

The cultural identity determines the collective self-understanding of the Russo-phone minority, and it is now possible to see the tendencies. There is no indication of the Russo-phones internalising the official nationality from the Soviet Union. Thus, the majority of the Russo-phone minority should choose a traditional Russian identity, but others a Ukrainian

and yet others a Belorussian identity. However, members of the Russo-phone minority think of themselves as different from the traditional Russians and have to a large degree adapted the Estonian working morale.

The option of adopting the culture of the dominant nation, the Estonian, is another possible identity choice for the Russo-phone minority. Usually the change of mother tongue will be the most important ingredient in an assimilation process (Kolströ, 1996), and this is the option the Estonian nationalising policy is trying to encourage. More and more Russo-phones learn Estonian in order to pass the citizenship requirements, and more parents are beginning to send their children to an Estonian language school, but does this imply that the Russo-phone minority in the future will be monolingual in Estonian, or will they be bilingual in Estonian and Russian? At the moment the answer is clear. The Russo-phone minority has accepted that they have to learn Estonian if they want to have the possibility to prosper in Esto-

nia, but they have not accepted that Estonian will be their mother tongue. In the Monitoring Survey the Russo-phones expressed their intention to search for their own cultural identity based on the Russian language. Thus, developing a new Russian self-understanding is more likely, especially when the feeling of being deprived of possibilities and unfairly treated is taken into account. The likely scenario is not assimilation, but that the Russo-phone minority will develop a distinct cultural identity based on the Russian language and bilingualism.

***The political or national identity
in formation***

The character of the identity of the Russo-phone minority is in many ways very different from the Estonian. The Russo-phones do not have a strong common ethnic foundation, and they were in a state of identity crisis when the Soviet Union collapsed because they to a large degree had a Soviet identity. Thus, different factors have influenced the iden-

tity of the Russo-phone minority, and the tendency is that the Russo-phone minority will develop a culture distinct from the Estonian and from the traditional Russian culture, thus, seeing themselves as Russian-Estonians. Politically, the Russo-phone minority wants to be loyal to the Estonian state but the nationalising policy prevents it.

The important question is whether the Russo-phone minority is alienated and has another idea of the state than the one in the Estonian Constitution. The analysis of the identity formation as well as the socio-economic conditions can help to answer this question. As we know by now, the Russo-phone minority is over-represented in the third strata, which is characterised by social stigmatisation and alienation from the Estonian society, and furthermore, the analysis has shown that the Russo-phone minority generally feels deprived of possibilities to prosper politically and economical. Socially, the Estonians and Russo-phones live in separate communities. The Russo-phone minority has expressed the lack of cultural possi-

bilities to develop their own Russian language-based identity, because the Estonian nationalising policy does not provide the public space for this. The nationalising policy of Estonia has, as a mean to reach the goal of a pure Estonian nation-state, tried to influence and force the Russo-phone minority to live up to the naturalisation demands and through that gain political loyalty, but as we know the naturalisation process has been very slow and only about 113,000 people out of half a million have acquired Estonian citizenship. Thus, in this sense the nationalising policy has failed, because about 39% of the Russo-phones are stateless and another 19,4% took Russian citizenship instead.

The nationalising policy can be judged as mistaken, and the only wanted result the policy has reached is the Russo-phone's acceptance of learning Estonian. The unwanted results are the consolidation of the divided societies inherited from the Soviet Union and the stigmatisation of the majority of the Russo-phone minority, which has resulted in perceived dep-

rivation that can fuel the formation of a national minority identity. Thus, the continuation of the nationalising policy can lead to the consolidation of a new Russo-phone self-understanding, while a more integrative policy that gives concessions towards the naturalisation requirements and where the Estonian state shows trust in the Russo-phone minority could lead to assimilation on a voluntary basis. The Russo-phone minority would have to live up to the trust given to them from the Estonian state. It is therefore possible to conclude that the Russo-phone minority to a large extent feels alienated from the Estonian state and society and that they do not share the Estonian idea of the state.

VI. The Russo-phone minority, a structural security threat?

It is now time to analyse the consequences of the corresponding cleavages between the Estonians and the Russo-phone minority for the coherence be-

tween the three components of the state. I will analyse if, despite the cleavages between the majority and the minority, there can be a strong coherence between the three components in the Estonian state.

The coherence between the idea of the state and the institutional expression of the state

The institutional expression of the state gains legitimacy when the institutions are constructed according to, first, the organising principle and, second, to the purpose of the state. First, considering the organising principle of liberal democracy, the Estonian constitution secures equal civil rights to all inhabitants of Estonia including the right to, for instance, unemployment benefits and social security. Furthermore, all Estonian citizens, as opposed to all inhabitants, are guaranteed full political rights.

Second, there is a strong coherence between the Estonian idea of the state and the institutional expression of the

state. The purpose to “preserve the Estonian nation and culture over time” is also saturated to a very strong degree at several layers of the Estonian institutions, as the analysis of the Estonian legal frame showed. The Citizenship Law and the naturalisation requirements have different consequences for the Russo-phone minority and the Estonians. Thus, the Estonian nation is the core element in the law, and persons who are not members of the Estonian nation must accept the Estonian language and the values of the Estonian nation in order to be included. The Language Law protects and defends the public sphere as an Estonian language sphere at the expense of the Russian language. The Cultural Autonomy of National Minorities Act is also in coherence with the Estonian idea of the state, because only naturalised Russo-phones are entitled to protection of minority rights. By only granting cultural autonomy for Estonian citizens the institutional expression of the state secures that the Estonian idea of the state

will not be threatened, because naturalised Russo-phones have proven loyalty and do no longer pose a threat to the Estonian state.

Fundamental for the legal frame as an institutional expression of the state is the demand of proving loyalty towards the Estonian state in its present form. The integration policy, which emphasises the difference between the Estonians and the Russo-phone minority, is also strongly coherent with the Estonian idea of the state. The integration policy focuses on the development of a strong common core, which is based on the Estonian territory and the Estonian language. Thus, the purpose of the integration policy is to enhance the Estonian nation and enforce it as the basis of relations between the majority and the minority. The analysis of the legal frame and the integration policy enables me to conclude that there is a very strong coherence between the idea of the state, which is found in the Estonian constitution, and the institutional expression of the state.

***The coherence between the idea
of the state and the physical
base of the state***

The coherence between the physical base of the state and the idea of the state is strong when the idea does not have aspirations of territory outside the state borders and when the idea of the state is widely held among the inhabitants of the physical base. First, considering the territory, Russia has not yet ratified the border agreement signed in 1994, while Estonia has accepted the Soviet borderlines and does not have any aspirations of regaining its lost territory. Therefore, the idea of the state can be considered to be in coherence with the territory.

Concerning the Estonians the coherence is strong because the Estonians agree with the idea of the state. A strong element in their national identity is the fear of assimilation and extinction, and the idea of the state is the protector of their identity from outside threats. The Estonian national identity is, in other

words, consolidated in the idea of the state.

It is the Russo-phone minority that creates instability and lack of coherence between the Estonian idea of the state and the Russo-phone part of the physical base. The first problem is the idea itself, which does not consider the Russo-phones as an integral part of the state. The Language Law symbolises this weak coherence between the institutional expression of the state and one third of the population because they speak Russian, instead of the Estonian, as their mother tongue. The Russo-phone minority can accept the naturalisation requirements, which over time will assimilate them, and become a part of the Estonian society, or they can leave Estonia. This is the basic issue in the integration policy even though it is disguised in wordings as 'the enabling of maintenance of ethnic difference' and 'multicultural society'. The idea of the state has not changed, and the Estonian nation and language is the fundament of the Estonian state. Thus the Russo-phone minority can only be of second rank in the Estonian public sphere.

Furthermore, the analysis of how the Russo-phone minority perceives its possibilities and the integration policy reveals that the Russo-phone minority does not share the Estonian idea of the state. The Russo-phones believe that the only way to obtain their loyalty towards the Estonian state is by the Estonian authorities showing them trust. The symbol of this trust is easier access to Estonian citizenship and elimination of the nationality legislation that marks the Russo-phone minority as second rank, and not fully worthy of trust. This is completely unacceptable for the Estonians, because they have been treated unfairly during the Soviet Union and exposed to Russification. This is one of the fundamental problems in Estonia and it is so difficult to solve, because the fear of obliteration is so deeply felt in the Estonian national identity. The Russo-phone minority has accepted that they have to learn Estonian, and the Russo-phone elite is a good example of that. The rest is not against learning Estonian, they just do not have the social capability for it, and the

majority of the Russo-phone minority wants their children to learn Estonian. Yet, the Russo-phone minority does not want to assimilate as the Estonians wish them to do. They are a group with distinct social character and the actual and perceived unfair treatment of them has strengthened their need for a common national identity based on the Russian language.

Thus the nationality policy, which has created unequal socio-economic conditions for the Estonians and the Russo-phone minority and tried to assimilate the Russo-phones into the Estonian nation, has actually reinforced the need for developing a national minority identity among the Russo-phone minority. This seems as a deadlock, and only when the Estonians do no longer fear for their future as Estonians can they begin to accept that Estonia is not only for Estonians. The first steps are already taken because the Estonians are changing their attitude towards the Russo-phones from “a problem to a potential”, and they believe that different ethnical groups can get along,

though still stressing the Estonian language as the core element.

The coherence between the idea of the state and the physical base of the state can be characterised as strong for the Estonians, while it is non-existent for the Russo-phone minority, who feel alienated and excluded from the Estonian society.

The coherence between the physical base of the state and the institutional expression of the state

A strong coherence between the physical base of the state and the institutional expression of the state depends on whether the institutions can deliver the expected service to the whole population and secure the territorial base. In Estonia the institutions correspond to the physical base of the state and there is a widespread acceptance among the Estonians and the Russo-phones of the system, which has delivered economic growth and promise a prosperous future (Rose, 2000:22ff). This strengthens the coherence between the physical base and the institutional expression of the state.

Yet, the Russo-phone minority feels unfairly treated by the Estonian institutions. Again the naturalisation requirements are harsh and, on top of them, many find themselves waiting for a long time before acquiring Estonian citizenship. The analysis of the nationality legislation and integration policy demonstrated that the Estonians are in a favourable position and their concerns are appreciated more than the concerns of the Russo-phones. I will, therefore, characterise the coherence between the physical base and the institutional expression of the state as weak but existent, because the entire population has secured civil rights including unemployment benefits and other social services.

To what extent is the Russo-phone minority a structural security threat?


The analysis of the coherence between the three components has demonstrated some weak and strong points in the Estonian state. The core problem is the Esto-

nian idea of the state, which the Russo-phone minority does not share and cannot share, even though they really want to become a part of the Estonian political and civil society. The analysis demonstrated that the Estonians and the Russo-phones do not have the same status in the institutional expression of the state. The institutions are organised to serve the needs of the Estonian citizens, and the rest of the Estonian inhabitants come in second place, though still guaranteeing the basic civil liberties.

Thus, the physical base is divided into the Estonians and the Russo-phone minority, and there are two ideas of the state, the Estonian one, which is the idea the state works according to, and the Russo-phone idea of the state that stresses the need for multiculturalism. The multicultural idea as a core element in the idea of the state in Estonia would enable the Russo-phone minority to be loyal towards Estonia, because the Russian language would be an accepted part. This can be seen in figure 2.

As the figure clearly shows, a strong coherence between the three components of Estonia is indeed very difficult to ob-

Figure 2. The three components of the Estonian state



tain under the present conditions. The interesting thing then is, what creates this instability in Estonia? Is it the presence of the Russo-phone minority in Estonia or is it the idea of the state and the nationalising policy as the institutional expression of the state? The Russo-phone minority can be considered as a structural security threat for Estonia when the idea of the state is the preservation of the Estonian nation and culture. The core of the Estonian nationalising policy is to

assimilate the Russo-phone minority into the Estonian nation, but the East-European and post-Soviet understanding of national identity is primordial and ethnic; you are either born into a nation or you are not. Thus, the present Russo-phone minority will be considered second rank even though they have lived up to the naturalisation requirements, but the Russo-phones that are still in Estonia have no intention of leaving Estonia and consider Estonia as their country. In this situ-

ation the only way to solve the inherent instability is to organise the state and the idea of the state so that the Russo-phone minority is no structural security threat to the Estonian state. The solution that will solve the fundamental problem is to change the idea of the state and the nationality policy. But this is not a way Estonians can accept because of the deep fear of obliteration.

The important thing is to help the Russo-phone minority to acquire Estonian citizenship, let them really know that Estonia wants them to be a part of the Estonian state and society. At the moment the Russo-phone minority sees the naturalisation requirements as a means to prevent them from becoming Estonian citizens. Furthermore, there is a strong need to improve the socio-economic conditions of the Russo-phone minority. This will not eliminate the structural security threat but it will slowly make the Russo-phone minority feel as part of the Estonian state and with time, the deeply felt fear of obliteration will evaporate as will the emphasis on Estonia for Estonians.

This is the positive scenario for the development of Estonia and can be constituted in two different state formations. The first one is within the frame of the *federal multinational state*, where the Russo-phone minority is granted extensive cultural autonomy and where the Russian language has an official status as the second language of Estonia. This state model will be met with fierce opposition among the Estonians and is therefore not that likely an outcome of the state building project. The second state model that is possible is the *state-nation*, where the state tries to create a nation that coincides with the physical base of the state, but this demands that the strong emphasis on the Estonian nation must be lessened, so that the Russo-phone minority can have the room to give input to the Estonian culture. The Estonian identity would be a mix of the Estonians and the Russo-phones on equal terms, where the ethnic nation comes in second place and only has a status in the private sphere. This model is only likely in a long-term perspective, when the Estonians feel more secure and

where the Russo-phone minority is provided with equal opportunities. Thus if an economic crisis hits Estonia it is not likely that a state-nation can develop.

The more negative scenario is based on the continuation of the present policy and idea of the state, which will alienate the Russo-phone minority even further and strengthen the Russo-phone national identity. The consequence will be complete separation between the Russo-phones and the Estonians, with the Estonians being in the dominant position and using their dominant position to gain control of the distribution of the resources and to ensure that the advantages remain within the nation. Buzan (1991) has labelled this kind of state a *primal multinational state*, and Estonia will therefore be vulnerable towards political threats aimed at changing the fragile balance between the dominant nation, the Estonians, and the minority. Thus, instability and insecurity will characterise the Estonian state.

The integration policy did not foresee any changes to the nationality legislation; thus the Estonian nation is in the near

future still the core of the Estonian state, with a few expressions stating the multicultural society of Estonia. Depending on how well the Estonians can conceal the continuation of the nationalistic focus, the state will be characterised by vulnerability towards political demands from the Russo-phone minority. Thus, the Russo-phone minority will continue to constitute a structural security threat, and the strength of the threat will depend on how the Russo-phone minority is treated and if they get the same possibilities as the Estonians.

Bibliography

Andersen, Erik André (1999), "An Ethnic Perspective on Economic Reform: the case of Estonia", Aldershot Ashgate.

Buzan, Barry (1991), "People, States and Fear", 2nd edition, Harvester Wheatsheaf, Great Britain.

Jonsson, Anna (1999), "Nationalising State-Building and Language, The Case of Estonia", *Uppsala Universitet, department of East European Studies, Working Papers 50, ISSN 1103-3541*.

Kolströ, Pål (1995), "Russians in the Former Soviet Republics", Indiana University Press.

Kolströ, Pål (1999), "Nasjonsbygging. Russland og de nye statene i øst", Universitetsforlaget Oslo.

Kolströ, Pål (1996), "The New Russian Diaspora – An Identity of its Own?", *Ethnical and Racial Studies, Vol.19, No. 3, p. 609-639*.

Laitin, David D. (1998), "Identity in Formation. The Russian-Speaking Populations in the Near Abroad", Cornell University Press, United States

Lieven, Anatol (1993), "The Baltic Revolution. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania and the Path to Independence", Yale University Press, New Haven and London.

Rose, Richard (1997b), "Baltic Trends: Studies in Co-operation, Conflict, Rights and Obligations", University of Strathclyde, Glasgow (SPP 288)

Rose, Richard & William Maley (1994), "Nationalities in the Baltic States: A Survey Study", University of Strathclyde, Glasgow (SPP 222)

Rose, Richard (1995, 1997a, 2000), "New Baltic Barometer II, III, IV: A Sur-

vey Study", University of Strathclyde, Glasgow (SPP 251, 284, 338)

Semijonov, Aleksei (2000), "Estonia: Nation Building and integration. Political and Legal Aspects, COPRI Working Papers No. 8

Smith, Anthony D (1992), "Ethnic Identity and Territorial Nationalism in Comparative Perspective" in Alexander J. Motyl (ed) (1992), "Thinking Theoretical About Soviet Nationalities", Columbia University Press, New York.

Vetik, Raivo (2000a), "Democratic Multiculturalism: A New Model of National Integration", *Aland Islands Peace Institute* (http://www.ut.ee/abvkeskus/cesti/democratic_multiculturalism.html - 09-05-02).

Legal documents are found on <http://www.legaltext.ee>, which is the homepage of official translations in Estonia.

Monitoring integration Report (2000): <http://www.meis.ee/eng/monitoring> (20-03-02)

Norbalt II Baseline Report (2000), "Living Conditions Study in Estonia 1999", <http://www.faf0.no/norbalt/> (30-09-01)

Report of the Government of Estonia, Implementation of State Programme “Integration in Estonian society 2000-2007” in May 2001. <http://www.riik.ee/saks.htm> (20-03-02) (referred to as “Government Integration Report”).

Open Society Institute (2001), “Monitoring the EU Accession Process: Minority Protection”, <http://www.riga.lv/minelres/count/estonia.htm> (01-04-02)

State Programme “Integration in Estonian Society 200-2007”, <http://www.riik.ee/saks/ikomisjon/programme.htm> (15-03-02) (referred to as State Integration Programme)

¹ The Russo-phone minority is the group of non-Estonians with Russian as their common language and not necessarily ethnic Russians.

² It should be noted that the Estonian State has in the State Integration Programme recognised the need to re-examine the Cultural Autonomy Law including defining the role of cultural self-government in the advancement of the culture and education of ethnic minorities.

³ State Integration Programme refers to “Integration in Estonian Society 2000-2007” adopted by the Estonian Government June 1998. See <http://www.riik.ee>

⁴ The use of the term “non-Estonians” corresponds with my use of “Russo-phone minority”.

⁵ Ethnic is defined according to Smith as a unit of population sharing: A common proper name; Myths and common ancestry; Historical memories; One or more distinctive elements of culture; An association with a given territory; A sense of social solidarity (1992:50).

⁶ The State Integration Programme is in this connection a prime example, with wordings as the *harmonisation of society*. A thorough analysis of the State Integration Programme can be found in Lind, 2002.

⁷ For instance, that the status of national minority is not limited to citizens only.

Belarus - A Unique Case in the European Context?

By Peter Kim Laustsen*

Introduction

Since the end of the Cold War and the break-up of the Soviet Union, a guiding paradigm in the discussions concerning political changes in Central and Eastern Europe has been a positive and optimistic believe in progress towards the victory of a liberal democracy. This view was clearly expressed by Francis Fukuyama in his widely discussed book *"The End of History and the Last Man"*¹. The optimistic view of the political changes was however challenged by Samuel P. Huntington in his book *"The Clash of Civilizations and the*

*Remaking of World Order"*², where he expressed a more pessimistic view. It was claimed that the spreading of liberal democracy had reached its limits and that outside its present boundaries (primarily Western Europe) this form of government would not be able to take root.

The political development that took place in the years after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the birth and rebirth of the successor states of the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia did not however support Fukuyama's claim. On the contrary, the political upheaval in, for instance, Slovakia, Belarus, the Russian

Federation, Ukraine, Romania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) did support Huntington's theory.

The development in the latest years has shown progress in all but a few of the above mentioned states. Reading Freedom House's surveys on the level of political rights and civil liberties gives hope. Widely across Europe these rights and liberties have been and are still expanding and deepening. One state does clearly separate itself from the trends in Eastern and Central Europe: Belarus. According to

* Mr. Peter Kim Laustsen is a Master student of Political Science at the Department of Political Science at the University of Aarhus, Denmark, and is a former Academic Assistant in the Baltic Defence College Institute for Defence Studies. The article is based on a paper from January 2003.

Freedom House, the political and civil rights and liberties have worsened since 1994/1995 and continue to do so. The purpose of this article is an attempt to explain the causes to the specific political developments in Belarus and to characterize the political regime.

The starting point of Belarus

Two critical factors can be said to have existed in Belarus: modern internal structures and an existing state structure. According to a survey conducted by Deutsche Bank in 1990 and repeated by Kuzio & Nordberg³, Belarus had a high score on the scales of the survey concerning industrialization, infrastructure, and level of education in the population. Among the republics in the former Soviet Union, Belarus was clearly positioned as number five, while Ukraine was positioned as number one. This evaluation of Belarus is also supported by the United Nations Development Programme's (UNDP) yearly development reports that

describe Belarus as one of the wealthier republics socially as well as economically.

Belarus went through a massive economic and industrial modernization after the end of the Second World War. The developments in the political sphere could only take place after the death of Josef Stalin, after which the political elite obtained a certain degree of autonomy in relation to Moscow and because of that a relatively high degree of internal self-rule.

Another characteristic feature of the Belarusian case is the presence of a crisis of sovereignty. Compared to, for instance, the three Baltic states history shows that there *de facto* has not existed a Belarusian state before. The first possible state that can be said to have existed is the Grand Duchy of Lithuania due to the fact that a large part of the present Belarusian territory was a part of the state formation, a predominant part of the population was of Slavic decent and the language used in the state administration was Belarusian, while the other possible state formation can be said to have been the short lived

Belarusian National Republic created after German Kaiser's protection under the First World War.

The commonality between these two units is the absence of an effect on the Belarusian consciousness today. Both Poland and Lithuania largely possess monopoly on the state continuity from the Lithuanian Grand Duchy. The end of the state was that it was split between the major powers of the time. The Belarusian part ended up under Russian control, and the period was characterized by a cultural, religious, and political repression with Russian attempts to erase all traces of a Belarusian identity. This co-optation of the Belarusian nation David Riach described as *de facto* destruction of the Belarusian state and nation. The short time the National Republic existed, its establishment under the German Kaiser's protection and the lack of popular support has had an almost negative effect on the feeling of a state among the population. The perception had been that the republic was an attempt to incorporate the Belarusian territory and population under German rule.

The establishment of Belarus as a Socialist Soviet Republic in 1919 exists strongly in the minds of the Belarusian population. The strongest memories for Belarusians are of the time under Soviet rule with the fighting and resistance during the Second World War, the rebuilding, modernization and industrialization after the war, and the rising standards of living that followed these developments. Another important element was the fact that Belarus was accepted as a founding member of the United Nations. These positive elements of the incorporation of Belarus in the Soviet Union led the population to see itself as Soviet Belarusians rather than Belarusians. This problem has probably been further advanced by the fact that Belarus as well as other republics in the Soviet Union experienced state building before its nation building, the opposite of the development that took place in most of the West, Central and East European states. The consequence has been that it has not been possible to build the national identity within the framework of a state.

In contrast to Belarus, the three Baltic states succeeded in maintaining their independence from the end of the First World War until the beginning of the 1940s. In this period the populations of the Baltic states built a strong consciousness about their independence, the state, the nation, and their cultural heritage. The Soviet Union's annexation of the Baltic states, the deportations and the armed struggle against the occupation until the middle of the 1950s, all contributed to strengthen the consciousness. The population of Belarus stood in an almost opposite situation at the Independence in 1991. In the three Baltic states the population's memory of the statehood and nationhood was a positive heritage that had positive effects during their battle for independence and nation building.

Another relevant comparison is in relation to Ukraine which experienced a longer period as an independent state. Despite the heavy Russian and Soviet suppression, a national consciousness did survive. This was partly the effect of the fact that a part of the state came under Aus-

tria-Hungarian rule, where the government pursued a more liberal policy towards ethnic groups within the state's borders. Despite the fact that the sovereignty was challenged, the populations in the Baltic states as well as in western part of Ukraine managed to preserve the memory of a sovereign statehood, and because of that the states were more prepared for state and nation building project by the time of independence in 1991.

Politico-institutional factors

Another critical factor was the collapse of the totalitarian rule imposed by the Soviet Union. The collapse became clear in the late 1980s and in the beginning of the 1990s. Two elements strongly contributed to undermining the totalitarian rule. It was the meltdown of the nuclear reactor in Chernobyl, Ukraine, in 1986 and the discovery of the mass graves from the 1930s and 1940s in the Kuropaty Forests north of Minsk in 1988. These events had massive consequences for the rule from Moscow.

The Chernobyl nuclear disaster

The meltdown of the nuclear reactor in Chernobyl occurred on the 26th of April 1986, where the explosion caused an immense leak of airborne nuclear material. The consequences of this pollution were a vast relocation of population and a large portion of the Belarusian land kept in quarantine (and therefore it cannot be used to produce agricultural products). The accident had large economic and human costs as well as consequences for the legitimacy of the Soviet Union.

One reason for this event having such a deteriorating effect on the rule from Moscow was the reluctance of the authorities to reveal the existence of the catastrophe and, later, also the extent of it. Not until 40 hours after the accident did the evacuation begin, and not until two days after did Moscow recognize that an accident actually had happened. In fact, Moscow until that time deliberately tried to stop any public mentioning of the event.

The catastrophe revealed the inefficiency and the lack of action from the totalitarian state - at the regional level as well as at the state level. Both Ukraine and Belarus abstained from taking action independently of the centre in Moscow. The meltdown had a considerable psychological as well as physical effect on the population of Belarus, which was caused by the lack of information, help, and action from the local as well as the national government. This became obvious in relation to the evacuations, which were only partial and did not evacuate all the persons to safe and clean areas. This passive behaviour led the population to re-evaluate its attitude towards the state and caused a fall in confidence.

The Kuropaty Graves

The other event that contributed to undermining the Soviet state was the discovery of the mass graves in the Kuropaty Forests north of the Belarusian capital Minsk. The discoveries were published in two articles, where eye witnesses' accounts

concerning the events were reported to the public and where the findings in relation to the excavations were described. David Marples estimates that the discovery of the mass graves had a decisive effect on the possibilities for political changes in Belarus.

The reaction from the local government in Minsk was moderate. It was decided to establish a commission which had to go deeply into the matter. The result of the commission's work was, for large parts of the population, another piece of evidence of the regime's character in Belarus. Despite the fact that overwhelming evidence pointed in the direction of Stalin's secret police as being the perpetrators behind the massacres that were conducted in the period between 1930 and 1950, the most conservative elements of the communist party denied that these claims were true. The old communist *nomenklatura* tried instead to blame the invasion forces from Nazi Germany. The whole matter did however further undermine the population's trust in the regime and eroded the legitimacy

of the Soviet Union. The mistrust was clear and it was further encouraged by the regime's aversion against recognizing the horrors and crimes committed under Stalin's rule and its attempt to conceal the clues.

This degree of loyalty to Moscow has been unique for Belarus compared to the other republics in the Soviet Union, and it stands in strong contrast to the development in the Baltic states. The loyal leadership in Minsk and the massive russification of the Communist Party had the effect that a local communist elite was not developed, which could have headed a democratic development as it happened in Estonia. In the Baltic states the local communist elites in fact led the liberalization of the totalitarian systems in contrast to the development in Belarus.

The revelation of the mass graves in the Kuropaty Forest initiated popular protests and the establishment of the Belarus Popular Front. The destiny of the Front was however radically different from what happened to the similar organizations in the other republics in the

Soviet Union. After the euphoria around the establishment, the Front tried to obtain representation in the Belarusian parliament during the parliamentary election in 1990. The result was only a marginal success, which was better than expected beforehand. The consequence was that the old political regime continued to dominate the political sphere. Weak support behind the Front was further underlined during the following parliamentary and presidential elections. The opposite development could be observed in the Baltic states and Ukraine. Regarding the elections in Ukraine, the popular movement succeeded in obtaining over one third of the seats in the parliament, and also in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania the popular fronts succeeded in winning the elections.

The national identity

There is no doubt that the national identity is decisive for understanding the political change. This can also be seen from the massive amount of literature on

the importance of the Belarusian national identity to the nature of the transition. This literature is almost concurrently stating that the national identity and nationalism have been very weak. This weakness contributed to creating the base for a strong ruler taking over the power in Belarus.

The history of the Belarusian state can, as mentioned earlier, only be characterized as being very limited. The same seems to be the case with the Belarusian nation building. This is a distinct feature for the long history, but it is much easier to identify when looking more closely at the short history, that is the history after Belarus was incorporated in the Soviet Union.

The Belarusian language has throughout history been under a strong pressure. After having been used as the official state language in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, the Belarusian co-optation in the Russian Empire put a strong pressure on the Belarusian language in a very negative direction. The reason was a very suppressing policy towards the national lan-

guages, which led to the name “Belarus” and the prevailing religion - the Uniate Church - being forbidden. The pressure on the national language continued under the Soviet Union - though interrupted by a period of relaxation from the co-optation in 1919 until Josef Stalin’s takeover and power consolidation in the late 1920s, where the liberal policy towards the different nationalities inside the Soviet Union ended very abruptly and dramatically. The population in Belarus did, in the 1920s, experience a national reawakening where the national values and symbols were allowed to bloom and grow. The Belarusian language was introduced at the educational institutions and the intellectual elite was allowed a voice. The immediate impression was that the national communist elite could function as the basis for the development and consolidation of the national identity and also as a basis for the creation of a national elite. With Stalin’s final and total takeover in Moscow a massive purge of political allies as well as opponents, intellectuals, and cultural elite followed. The

Belarusian language was driven out of the educational institutions, from the media, and the public space and its use was confined to the countryside. Only among a limited number of academics that wished to preserve the Belarusian national identity was the language still used. Because of that the new generations of Belarusians were influenced by the Russian language and culture, and the national language was looked upon as an obstacle to social mobility. Stalin’s goal was to eradicate all possible alternatives to and all opposition against the centre in Moscow and Stalin’s position as the uncontested leader of the Soviet Union. This eradication of alternative elites had serious long term consequences for the course of political changes in a non-democratic direction.

Perhaps the most important cause for the absence of national consciousness can be said to be the integration in the Soviet Union. Belarus was, during that time, exposed to a massive and all-embracing *sovjetization* and *russification*. The goal was to create the Soviet Man - *homo sovieticus* -

with a common identity for all inhabitants from Estonia to Kazakhstan, from Vladivostok to Kaliningrad. The consequences of this policy were the installation of Russian public servants in the central administration in Minsk. At the same time a massive influx of Russian workers took place. The reason was an increasing need for workers to man the positions in the Belarusian industry because of the republic’s industrialization and the rebuilding, which took place after the enormous destructions during the Second World War.

Another consequence of Stalin’s takeover was re-drawing of the inter-republican borders, now inside the Soviet Union. These border changes meant that Latvia lost the Abrene area and that Estonia lost the Narva area in the north and the Pskov/Petseri area in the south - all areas that were added to the Russian Socialist Federative Republic. Opposite these losses Lithuania gained a significant area, the north eastern part of Poland as it looked like before the Second World War. Included in this area was

Vilnius, which was looked upon by some Belarusians as the cultural capital for Belarus. It has been pointed out that with the loss of this significant cultural, intellectual, and national centre, Belarus lost its possibility for a national reawakening. That is why Stalin's revision of the borders had major effects on the nation building in Belarus. Minsk became the new capital of Belarus as a consequence of the loss of Vilnius and became the centre for the Russian influence, but Minsk never became such a powerful centre for Belarus which Vilnius had been for the state previously.

Another relevant development in this context is the growth of the cities after the end of the Second World War. This growth was significant in Belarus, and the main reason behind it was partly migration from the countryside to the cities and partly the inflow of individuals from other republics, who mainly settled in the cities where the industry and the employment were to be found.

Urbanization could seem like a possibility of strengthening the Belarusian

national consciousness because the cities were natural centres for culture, politics, and education. But the truth is that the Belarusians have never constituted a majority in their own capital. The opposite was the case in the Ukrainian capital, Kyiv, which was dominated by the Ukrainians. Extensive urbanization, weak national consciousness, large Russian population, continuing inflow of workers from other republics, and strong influence from Moscow exposed the Belarusian population to a strong influence from Russian language, culture, and it further weakened Belarusian consciousness.

Another aspect of nationalism is the "rallying point" that the national symbols - like the coat of arms and the state flag - provide. There are two historical groups of national symbols for the Belarusians: a flag and a coat of arms from either the short-lived republic from the end of the 1910s, or the Belarusian Soviet-republic from the beginning of the 1920s. A possible national rallying point was the coat of arms called the *Pahonyia*. It was deeply problematic if it was to be used as a na-

tional symbol. The symbol had been adopted as the national symbol of the Republic of Lithuania at its declaration of independence in 1918 and stayed as such until the Soviet Union occupied Lithuania in 1940. It was kept as the national symbol when Lithuania declared re-establishment of its independence in 1991. The coat of arms had also been used by the Poles during their rebellion against Russia in 1863-1864. The symbols were also inextricably linked with the events that happened during the German occupation during the Second World War. A puppet-regime was established under Nazi-German protection, and the symbols from the national republic from the 1910s were adopted by these collaborators. That is why this symbol was looked upon very negatively. It was linked to the suffering and destruction that occurred during the Second World War. Because of the use of the symbol by other states, by the short-lived state in 1918, and by the Nazi-German friendly collaborators it was all but impossible to use it as a national rallying point.

There are major differences between the developments in Ukraine and in Belarus on this subject. Ukraine experienced cultural re-awakening in its period of independence after the Russian revolution, re-awakening that left permanent traces. Also the fact that the historically cultural and political centre of Ukraine, Kyiv, remained the capital for the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and remained populated mainly by the Ukrainians contributed to a preservation and strengthening of the Ukrainian national consciousness. The development in Ukraine and in Kyiv was very different from what happened in Minsk, because the Ukrainian capital became centre of the Ukrainian nationalism and not of the Russian influence. There were also major differences in the linguistic area. The population as well as the media continued to use Ukrainian, contrary to the situation in Belarus.

So, all in all, it looked like both Ukraine and the three Baltic states had much stronger national identities and consciousness than Belarus, and because

of that they were in a much stronger position to build a nation and an independent state.

On the basis of the discussion above it must be concluded that a number of factors have been contributing to the developments in Belarus in a negative direction. Modernization of Belarus after massive destructions during the Second World War, formidable challenges to the sovereignty of the state and the nation, absence of national identity, suppression of language and culture, doubtful national symbols, and unclear geography. Other factors have been collapse of the totalitarian rule as well as the gradual pullback leaving an intact, strong state administration ready to be taken over.

The lack of recent experience with democratic governance during the Soviet rule and the social and economic crisis in Central and Eastern Europe can also be identified as factors contributing to the birth and consolidation of the present rule in Belarus.

Tendencies in Belarus

The state

As all former Soviet republics Belarus faced the challenge of independence after the Soviet Union collapsed. Despite the fact that Belarus *de jure* did exist as an independent state, realities were quite different. The extent of autonomy under Moscow's rule was very limited and restricted to some areas, and it was further decreased by the fact that the regime in Minsk was considered to be one of the most Moscow-loyal regimes of the Soviet republics as well as the fact that heavy dominance of the Communist Party undermined functioning of the state. This abnormal state structure has not been radically changed under the rule of Lukashenka. Almost unanimously the analyses of the Belarusian regime show that the merger of Lukashenka's regime and the state is almost total. Lukashenka has in several cases personally interfered in the daily management and functioning of the state's administration and has, via his position as

a president, directly as well as indirectly, via his presidential administration, administered the state as his personal domain and attempted to form the state after his desire. This has been made clear through his involvement in the abolishment of the local administrations.

Another clear example of the concentration of power and the attempt to gain full control over the state is the voter's rejection of a proposal for a direct election of the regional leaders - a rejection that followed the president's recommendation. As a consequence the right to appoint these regional leaders still rests with the president. Lukashenka's fear has been to experience a development similar to what has happened in the Russian Federation where the opposition against the regime had its basis in the local administrations. Lukashenka's actions are very much alike the actions of Putin to strengthen the central government vis-à-vis the federal subjects (regions, regional parliaments and governors). Putin's actions can be said to be a preventive move against potential disintegration of the fed-

eration, and the centralization and increased power of the presidency have been achieved at the expense of the regional self-governance.

It is also characteristic that Lukashenka tries to appoint loyal persons for important positions in the Belarusian administration. These persons are old friends from his childhood, from the area where he was born and from the area where his political career started. Another example of Lukashenka's expansion of his power and influence is that the number of positions directly responsible to the president has increased.

All these factors contribute to Lukashenka's construction of a state administration where all individuals owe their position to him, but developments in Belarus also show that no one is safe. It is clearly demonstrated by the events concerning the former president of the Belarusian National Bank, Ms. Tarawa Vinnikava, who used to be one of Lukashenka's closest political allies. She was appointed by Lukashenka, but subsequently lost his confidence and trust and

was placed under arrest - a clear example of the gratitude that subordinates must show towards Lukashenka.

Another example of Lukashenka's behaviour is almost total nationalization of the industry in Belarus. All privatization and liberalization initiatives have been cancelled, and the development has in fact moved in the opposite direction - in the direction of a total state control of business and trade. That makes it difficult for private corporations to operate. The President has clearly managed to place the economic sphere under strict control.

In these areas it is clear that there exists a merger of the state and the regime. It is also possible to observe strong relations between the president and his subordinates, namely dependence of the latter on the president, and his unpredictable behaviour. Also weak state institutions can be identified in Belarus. It was exemplified by the constitution that collapsed under the pressure created by Lukashenka. He managed to arrange the existing power structures according to his

wishes. Because of that many of the political structures collapsed under the pressure of political infighting.

The personality

Lukashenka tries to go out to the public and present himself as a plain and simple person, and he has successfully achieved this by communicating to the population clear and distinct messages and visions. On the other hand, there has been no active attempt at building an image of Lukashenka as a statesman. He has tried to keep his image as a head of a collective farm, an administrator. To show his presence, concern, and worries he uses radio and television broadcasts to transmit his speeches to the population. He argues that there is a need for a strong man to take control, to steer the state through the difficult times and to manage the problems facing the state. Lukashenka has thus succeeded in establishing an intimate relation with the Belarusian population. The relationship is based on Lukashenka's creation of a myth about himself as a plain

man fighting for justice and for the well-being of the population. He legitimizes his decisions on the basis of the support he won during his election to the presidency as well as on the support that his proposals received when they were sent to referendum.

Lukashenka's electoral victory during the 1994 presidential election was not based on a solid and thoroughly prepared political platform that appealed to certain social groups in the population. Instead Lukashenka appealed to the resistance in the population against the elite which ruled Belarus during and immediately after independence and to the nostalgic feelings many Belarusians had towards the times during the Soviet Union, where large parts of the population enjoyed a much better living standard compared to the present state. Lukashenka succeeded in distancing himself from the politicians who led Belarus before, during, and after the independence and also from the problems that were a consequence of the upheavals. The nostalgic feelings about the Soviet Union and the Belarusian nation-

alism were also means used by Lukashenka. However, Lukashenka did not at all use the Belarusian nationalism as a part of his political project. He did, on the contrary, try to de-nationalize Belarus, and there are many examples showing this.

The population was, in 1995, asked to vote in a referendum concerning three themes converging around the president's de-nationalization project. The first theme was whether Russian should be an official state language on the same terms as Belarusian. The second theme concerned the introduction of new state colours and a new state coat of arms, while the third theme concerned economic integration with the Russian Federation. All three proposals were approved in the referendum with 83,1%, 75,0% and 82,4% of the votes cast. The adoption of all three proposals supported the president's political project and has actively contributed to de-nationalization of Belarus, closer ties with the Russian Federation, and nostalgic praising of the Soviet Union. Belarus has, as mentioned earlier, all throughout history been char-

acterized by a very weak national identity. This identity has further been weakened during Lukashenka's regime, and the period under the Soviet Union has instead actively been used as a reference. That is also one of the reasons why the regime has been trying to rewrite the history behind the Kuropaty Graves, which is widely perceived as a legacy of Josef Stalin's regime of terror. The official policy of the regime is to blame the invasion forces from Nazi Germany. Another aspect of the strategy is to strengthen the Slavic community between the Russian Federation, Ukraine, and Belarus and tie the three states close together. The most clear attempt that has been made since 1994 is the signing of several political, economic, and military agreements between the Russian Federation and Belarus linking the two states together.

A part of Lukashenka's strategy is also to use his charisma in order to create a charismatic rule to legitimize his control over the state. A survey conducted by Gille-Belova⁴ presents the relationship

between the electorate and the president as charismatic. There exists a widespread and general perception of Lukashenka as a competent and understanding ruler. The electorate does not consider Lukashenka as being the cause of the problems. On the contrary, the perception is that the bureaucrats and the politicians that are responsible for the dissolution of the Soviet Union are the main cause of the problems. There is also a widespread accept of the need for a total delegation of power to the president and a non-compromise seeking approach to the governing of the state. It is however worth noting that Lukashenka does not exclusively use his charisma as a legitimizing element. He has also tried to derive legitimacy for the concentration of power from the argument of necessity - that it is necessary for an effective implementation of political decisions. Thus the arguments are based on rationality and bureaucratic efficiency.

The characteristics described above show the extent of the delegation of power to Lukashenka. He is considered to be the best person capable of solving the

problems and thereby saving the state. That was also what Lukashenka showed to the population as a head of the parliamentary investigations into corruption. But an interesting fact about Belarus is that Lukashenka is not directly accountable to the electorate. The government, the parliament and the bureaucracy are instead used as "lightning rod" against attacks on the regime. That has manifested itself through the stable support Lukashenka has received over time.

The constitutional hypocrisy

Belarus' first democratic constitution of March 1994 did in fact create the possibility for a positive political development in Belarus. A presidency was created, and an independent Constitutional Court became the supreme judicial power. These institutions created the basis for a democratic, presidential republic. The president and the parliament were to be elected directly by the population. The Constitutional Court was created to ensure "checks and balances" *vis-à-vis* the

president. Its members were to be elected by the parliament, while its functions were to be independent of both the legislative and executive powers.

The presidency was, according to the 1994 Constitution, ascribed significant powers. In a comparative analysis of the presidential systems of Europe and Central Asia, Frye describes the presidential systems of Ukraine and Belarus as having some of the most powerful presidencies in the post-Soviet area after the Russian Federation and Georgia. Since that analysis, the developments in Belarus have further increased the president's power, so the Belarusian office today is one of the most powerful offices. This claim is further supported by an account by Lars Johannsen⁵, who in a similar analysis reaches the same conclusion.

The first "shots" against the democratic constitution came from Lukashenka in 1995, when he suggested adding further powers to the presidency. According to the 1994 Constitution it was not within the president's power to dissolve the parliament. Lukashenka succeeded in winning

a referendum with 77,6% in favour of the question regarding the president's right to dissolve the parliament in case of continued and gross violations of the constitution. This strengthening of the presidency lent Lukashenka a tougher grip on power by giving him further control over the legislative branch, but the purging of democratic elements was not over.

1995 parliamentary elections

The event with the greatest impact on Lukashenka assuming full control in Belarus was the parliamentary election in 1995. The course of the election as well as the result was contributing to Lukashenka obtaining the position as an unchallenged ruler. The election was scheduled to take place in 1996, but because of political pressure from the Belarusian Popular Front, it was hastened.

From the start Lukashenka did everything in his power to prevent that the election was carried through. Lukashenka encouraged the population to stay at

home, and he tore his ballot apart in public in front of the television cameras and tried in every way to discredit the parliament and its members. The strategy of Lukashenka was clear: with the massive backing he had received during the presidential election and the continuing support he enjoyed in the population, a showdown with the parliament and the Constitutional Court was a step towards total control, total consolidation and concentration of power. If Lukashenka succeeded in obstructing a new election and at the same time, managed to marginalize the old parliament, he would be unchallenged.

An important factor in this uncompleted parliamentary election was the Electoral Law, which stated that only election results from constituencies where the turn-out was over 50% could be declared valid. If the turn-out was below this threshold, the result was to be declared invalid.

The election resulted in a clash between Lukashenka and the old parliament. Lukashenka was of the opinion that the

mandate of the incumbent parliament had expired with the calling of the election, while the parliament was of the opinion that it had to carry on until a new parliament was elected - an opinion that was supported by the Constitutional Court.

The first electoral round was held in May, and the result was that only 18 Members of Parliament were elected out of 260 seats to be filled. The second round later in May resulted in the election of further 102 members - a total of 120, but still not enough of the required 174 seats (2/3 of the total number of seats as quorum). Because of that the Belarusians had to participate in a by-election. The first round of the by-election was held in November, and 20 seats were filled, while the second round which was conducted in December led to the election of further 59 Members of Parliament. With this fourth election the required number of Members of Parliament was achieved, and the new parliament formed a quorum. Thereby the new parliament could assume powers. Until that time the old parliament had been unable to carry out its func-

tions, and Lukashenka used the situation to rule Belarus by decrees from July 1994 to January 1996. This meant no checks and balances existing whatsoever.

The constitutional changes in 1996

Lukashenka was elected as president under the 1994 constitution, and he accepted the constitution in the beginning of his term. But from his election and until 1996 Lukashenka's rule frequently clashed with the provisions of the constitution. These clashes culminated when Lukashenka introduced a draft for a new constitution to eliminate any political opposition and to ease his centralization of power. The draft was sent to referendum and was passed by 70,5% of the participating electorate.

The changes included in Lukashenka's draft constitution concerned a) the presidency, b) the parliament and c) the courts. The main themes were that Lukashenka's term was extended by two years, that the president was given the right to appoint a number of members of the Constitu-

tional Court and the Electoral Commission as well as a number of members of the new upper chamber, the Council of the Republic of the parliament, the National Assembly.

a)

According to the 1994 constitution, the Belarusian presidency was already one of the strongest executive offices in Europe. But with the adoption of the 1996 constitution it was further strengthened. The new constitution gave the president further authority over both the legislative and the judicial branches of government. It became a right for the president to appoint six of the twelve members of the Constitutional Court. Thereby the external and independent control of the president disappeared. The Constitutional Court had overruled Lukashenka's decisions several times and declared his decrees as unconstitutional and invalid. Lukashenka, however, started to ignore these rulings. The rulings caused several conflicts between the Court and the parliament on one side and the president on

the other. These conflicts were stopped when Lukashenka brought the Court under his control.

The power that was vested with the parliament was also diminished when significant legislative powers were given to the president. Article 85 in the new constitution gave the president the right to issue decrees corresponding to and on the same level as laws passed by the parliament. This new power and the control of the Constitutional Court altogether produced massive distortion of the democratic institutions. The president further got the power to appoint persons to several powerful offices, a right that was a move in the same direction. The appointments could be used by the president to pay loyal individuals for their support.

b)

A part of the democratic facade in Belarus was to carry out multi-party elections. The first elections were conducted under Lukashenka. As mentioned earlier, Lukashenka hoped that the mandate of the parliament in session would

expire before a new parliament could be elected. This would have created a situation where the president would be able to get full control of the state. The move did not succeed, and because of that the conflict between the two parties started.

The constitutional changes divided the legislative power between two chambers in the parliament. It lies within the power of the president to appoint one eighth of the members of the upper chamber. That corresponds to eight members. The president is also empowered to dissolve the parliament and has been given legislative powers. Lukashenka also used his power to influence the establishment and composition of the lower chamber, the House of Representatives. He picked 110 loyal members of the outgoing parliament to fill the seats in the new lower chamber and succeeded in creating a loyal parliament. The reality was that Belarus *de facto* was without an elected parliament in the period from 1996 to 2000.

The legislative procedures have also been subject to presidential intervention

so that in reality these are under the president's control. The consequence of these realities is that parliamentarism in Belarus is an empty shell. This trend is enforced by the fact that the president also has the power to appoint half of the members of the Electoral Commission. The Commission has great influence on approval of parties and candidates in the elections and on the certification of the results. With that influence the president and his administration gained the possibility to prevent potentially dangerous candidates from running. The president's increased powers were visible in relation to the second parliamentary election in Belarus, which produced an ever more pro-presidential parliament. In reality this means that the parliament works as a rubber stamp on the president's proposals. Evaluations from the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) of the parliamentary elections have been severely critical, and the elections have been characterized as neither free, nor fair.

c)

With the constitutional changes Lukashenka succeeded in taking control over parts of the judiciary, namely the judgement of the legality of the decision taken by the government. Likewise, the presidential administration has great influence on the appointment of judges at local as well as national levels. The president is also entitled to dismissing judges serving in the Constitutional Court as well as in the Supreme Court. This means that the judicial power *de facto* remains under Lukashenka's control.

Another consequence is that it has become impossible to remove the president. Although there is a *de jure* possibility, the demands for removing the president are impossible to fulfil. During less than one month the parliament must complete the consideration regarding a removal and adopt a decision to remove the president with a two-third majority of all members of parliament, and in both chambers.

There were also areas unrelated to the division of power that were affected by the referendum, which Lukashenka held

in 1995. The last referendum themes concerned i) changing the Day of Independence from the day that independence was declared after the break up of the Soviet Union to the day where the Red Army liberated Minsk during the Second World War, ii) liberalization of land market, iii) abolishment of the death penalty, iv) direct election of regional leaders and v) financing state institutions via the central government budget or via a fund controlled by the president outside parliamentary supervision. The first and last proposals were adopted with a large majority of votes (88,2%), while the rest of the proposals were rejected, as the president recommended prior to the referendum. All the proposals mentioned above have contributed to the continued consolidation of Lukashenka's power and position. They also strengthened denationalization of Belarus and the praising of the years under the Soviet rule, both a part of Lukashenka's political project. The proposals concerning regional leaders and financing also contributed to Lukashenka's concentration of power.

It is clear that the referenda have been used to legitimize Lukashenka's initiatives and to demonstrate the support his actions enjoy among the population. Several themes have been put to referendum, and the result has been clear every time - support behind the president and his recommendations. This backing has given the president a credible and clear mandate from the population. Lukashenka has also used these referenda to create an image of himself as a person in close contact with the electorate and as a person who listens to the voice of the people. The president's direct contact with the society is used by Lukashenka to distance himself from the old power elite.

This can be explained by the weakness of institutions in Belarus. The constitution, the electoral law, the parliament and the court system were all weak when created or were weakened over time, which paved the way for a non-democratic regime. Contributing to the collapse was also the political message Lukashenka presented to the population and the socio-economic crisis in the state, which all in

all led to the popular support of the total delegation of power to Lukashenka.

The social base

Lukashenka does not have a long record inside the communist *nomenklatura*. He was born in a small village in the Vitebsk Oblast in the north eastern part of Belarus, and he created his political base in the Mogilev Oblast in the eastern part of the country. Lukashenka's past career is not the "traditional" way up through the ranks in the Communist Party. Instead he entered the political stage at a rather late point in his life, when he was elected to the Supreme Soviet in 1990. Until that time he headed a collective farm.

Lukashenka has been able to use the same approach as other rulers throughout history by creating a picture of his childhood as the poor and humble. His career and promotion inside the party happened without the help of others and solely by own means. In the presidential election in 1994 he was not the Communist Party's candidate and he did not en-

joy a widespread support in the parliament. Lukashenka created his platform by using his position as chairman of the parliamentary committee investigating corruption in the government and in the parliament. Using that position he succeeded in creating an image of himself as a fair and honest person. The position also gave Lukashenka a huge advantage because the committee could be used to discredit his political opponents by accusing them of being involved in corruption. Such accusations contributed to turning the population against these candidates.

During Lukashenka's candidacy the inner circle around him were democratically minded persons, who wished to gain political power in the aftermath of the political upheaval in the Soviet Union. They wished to use Lukashenka's charisma to reach that end. But the alliance did not last, and after Lukashenka took office he installed loyal persons in key positions. These persons were either friends from his native area or friends from his childhood - all loyal and faithful towards

Lukashenka. Thereby Lukashenka pushed away his old allies and succeeded in creating a loyal circle of persons around him.

Lukashenka also uses rhetorical means to maintain his support in the population. He pointed out several times that he was the only Member of Parliament voting against the dissolution of the Soviet Union and tries to blame the old elite for the problems of today.

It cannot be ruled out that Lukashenka in fact enjoys a widespread popular support despite the fact that most statistics from Belarus is probably fake. Examining the numbers from the 1994 presidential election one will find a massive support to Lukashenka and, despite a negative and critical evaluation of the 2001 presidential election from the OSCE, it seems to remain unchanged. In the first presidential election Lukashenka received 44,8% of the votes cast in the first round, while he received 80,1% of the votes cast in the second round, securing a landslide victory. OSCE's comments on the election were that they only observed minor errors and difficulties. The second presi-

dential election showed stable support for Lukashenka. The opposition did succeed in nominating a single candidate, but Lukashenka still won the election by securing 75,7% of the votes cast in the first round. His main opponent only managed to secure 15,7% of the votes cast. Lukashenka's popularity has also been described in a statistical analysis by Korosteleva⁶, where the findings showed a relatively stable support to him.

The distorted capitalism

During the existence of the Soviet Union, Belarus was one of the wealthiest republics apart from the three Baltic states. Massive industrialization was the main reason of that as described earlier. But the collapse of the Soviet Union and the independence of Belarus meant a formidable economic challenge. In the Soviet Union, the system of planned economy was centred on an inter-republican "division of labour". Belarus' industry delivered the finished products while raw materials and energy poured into the republic

from e.g. Russia. The system collapsed with the Soviet Union, and Belarus had to make radical reordering of its priorities due to its heavy dependence on imports of raw materials and energy.

All economies in transition experienced fluctuations and downward trends. The Belarusian politicians chose gradualism as the means to handle the pressure from the market. However, the reforms carried out were half-hearted and ineffective. A negative consequence of these reforms was the old *nomenklatura* attempt to seize assets in order to obtain personal gains during the transition. This behaviour only worsened the economic situation in Belarus.

As a result, the population faced rising inflation, devaluation of the savings and a rising unemployment rate. The periods between 1991 and 1994 and 1994 to 2002 are very interesting to observe with regard to total Gross National Product and Gross National Product per Capita adjusted to Purchasing Power Parity. It is possible to identify that the population in 1990-1991 to 1994-1995 experienced a

clear fall in their economic position and prosperity. Inflation peaked in 1994, and the unemployment rate was increasing until 1996, according to numbers from the World Bank⁷. Despite the fact that the statistical numbers look much better today, there are some who claim that the numbers are hiding the truth about the real economic situation in Belarus. It is important for the regime to present a picture of healthy and growing economy to keep the support of the population. Such numbers increase the likelihood of the survival of the regime despite other political challenges. An illusion of economic stability is created by presenting healthy numbers to the population. Despite the fact that the Belarusian economy is experiencing vast problems, a total collapse has probably been avoided due to cheap oil and loans provided by Russia.

Haggard & Kaufman⁸ have argued that economic crisis and challenges not only facilitate political change in a democratic direction but also the breakdown of democracy. It has also been argued that the economic heritage from the former non-

democratic regime to a large extent determined the possible actions that successor states had to take. Both claims seem to carry some weight in the case of Belarus. The politicians governing the state during the transition had to face the problems of transition, and the consequences of hard political choices pushed the population into Lukashenka's arms.

In a normal democracy and parliamentarism, the parliament passes the state budget, but since Lukashenka's take-over, large parts of the public finances have been moved beyond legislative scrutiny and revision. In 1996 Lukashenka managed to win the referendum concerning the establishment of a separate budget without parliamentary control. Thus Belarus has two budgets, the official one, adopted by the parliament, and the unofficial one, controlled solely by the president. It has been claimed that the latter has been and is being financed through the sales of military equipment and that one of its purposes is to pay subjects for their loyalty and support. There is however no evidence showing that Lukashenka is us-

ing the presidency to enrich himself, which points in the direction of separation between his personal finances and the states finances even though public funds probably are used to pay off supporters and allies.

It is also characteristic for the Belarusian economy that Lukashenka tries to gain full control of all economic activities. It has been exemplified through the fact that all economic transactions in Belarus are subject to the president's approval. This massive control can be seen as an attempt to secure revenues to the unofficial budget as well as an attempt to shield the regime against the establishment of alternative centres of power.

A threat that Lukashenka is trying to avoid could be one similar to what has been happening in the Russian Federation, where economically strong *oligarchs* were positioning themselves under the Yeltsin administration. They were allied with the president and had considerable economic as well as political resources, which they were able to expand during Yeltsin's presidency. The developments

under Putin have showed how these *oligarchs* can pose a threat to the centre of power - the presidency and the state administration. The frightening example for Lukashenka is Putin's showdown with two oligarchs, Berezovsky and Gusinskij, both forced into exile abroad.

Concluding Remarks

The main focus of this article has been on the political changes that took place after Belarus gained her independence. The main emphasis has been on the period after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. It has been necessary to include historical elements to illustrate significant influence these elements have had on the developments in Belarus.

In the first part of the article some critical elements were presented in the Belarusian case that advanced a radically different political development compared with states in a similar situation following the fall of the Berlin Wall.

Very weak national consciousness can be identified as the most important fac-

tor contributing to the particular undemocratic development in Belarus. The consequence of this weakness is an unsuccessful nation and state building, which is a very critical factor. Such a situation stands in stark contrast with the situation in other states in Central and Eastern Europe. The absence of national feelings meant the absence of a rallying point for the democratic movement, which weakened the possibility for a democratic development in Belarus significantly.

Another factor which contributed to the developments was the functioning of the institutions. The parliament's adoption of the constitution and the creation of a strong presidency created the institutional framework for Lukashenka's takeover. It supports the claim about the constitution being a decisive factor when the result of political struggle has to be evaluated. It is however important to underline that the constitution alone does not constitute the complete constitutional framework. The electoral law is another important element. But in the Belarusian case it can be observed that Lukashenka

primarily used the constitution as a weapon in his clashes with the parliament and the Constitutional Court. Persistent constitutional changes introduced by Lukashenka stand as a further evidence to such a claim.

Lukashenka's entry into the political scene and his behaviour has underlined the fact that an institutional focus alone is an inadequate analytical approach. The president's personality and his charismatic appeal to the population have also been decisive factors in securing a widespread support to Lukashenka in the population. Another important factor is the political economy. The transition from plan to market economy caused major economic problems and, in conjunction with Lukashenka's economic and fiscal policy, produced a nostalgic feeling towards the situation under the Soviet rule. These feelings have further bolstered Lukashenka's powers and advanced a non-democratic development.

Undoubtedly Belarus is a unique case in the European context. It questions the widespread perception of an almost uni-

versal and pre-determined development in the former communist states towards democracy - a perception further justified by the developments in e.g. Slovakia, Serbia and Montenegro and Croatia. But the recent developments in the Russian Federation and Ukraine can contribute to challenging this perception. It is worth considering if a relapse in the democratizing states is a real danger that must be addressed politically and, if this is the case, which factors are behind this development.

¹ Fukuyama, Francis (1992), "The End of History and the Last Man", London: Hamish Hamilton.

² Huntington, Samuel P. (1991), "The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order", Norman: Oklahoma University Press.

³ Kuzio, Taras & Marc Nordberg (1999), "Nation and State Building, Historical Legacies and National Identities in Belarus and Ukraine: A Comparative Analysis", *Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism*, Volume 26, No. 1-2, pp. 69-90.

⁴ Gille-Belova, Olga (2002), "The Nature of Relations between Political Leaders and their Supporters - The Case of Russia, Belarus and Ukraine", Paper for the International Conference "Russia, Ukraine and Belarus: Political Leadership, Inter-

national Society and Public Order”, July 1st 2002, CERI, Paris, France.

⁵ Johannsen, Lars (2000), “The Constitutions and Democracy: The Choice and Consequences of the Constitution in Post-Communist Countries”, PhD Dissertation, Aarhus: Forlaget Politica.

⁶ Korosteleva, Elena A. (2002), “What Lies Behind the Public Support of Leading Politicians in Belarus? Elaborations from Opinion Polls and Focus Groups”, Paper for the International Conference “Russia, Ukraine and Belarus: Political Leadership, International Society and Public Order”, July 1st 2002, CERI, Paris, France.

⁷ World Development Indicators 2002. CD-ROM Query Database, World Bank Group / International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. The conclusions based on these numbers should be read with some reservations.

⁸ Haggard, Stephen & Robert R. Kaufman (1997), “The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions”, *Comparative Politics*, Volume 29, No. 3, April, pp. 263-283.

Between Chirac, Bush and Putin: The Baltic States, From Factors to Actors in the New Europe

By Susanne Nies*

***Introduction: 2003:
Half a Year of European Turmoil***

2003. Half a year of turmoil: the war in Iraq and its diplomatic aftermath seem to divide Europe as never before. Germany, the most loyal and pro-American country in Europe since WW II, cedes its position to Poland. France, more or less absent in Eastern Europe since Napoleon and perceived by many Eastern Europeans through the lens of stared and striped glasses, confirms all prejudices with

Chirac's rude statement, in February 2003: "Eastern Europeans missed an opportunity to shut up". This statement is a response to the Eastern European pro-American stance, understood in France (as elsewhere)¹ to be a lack of commitment to Europe. Meanwhile, Berlin and Paris celebrate the 40th anniversary of the famous Elysée-Treaty.² For the first time, German-French cooperation raises anxieties in all capitals of the so-called small European states from Vilnius to Lisbon. The German-French motor is the very reason for British-Spanish cooperation.

There is a widespread perception of a divide between big and small states in Europe, 21 against 6, especially in the wake of the European convention and governance reform in the EU.

There is, in fact, no such thing as an old or a new Europe. Europe is an approach, an impressive diversity, an opportunity, a commitment. There is no choice to be made between the US and Europe. European states, stretching from the Atlantic to the Urals - though an everlasting question mark rests on Turkey and Russia (or at least parts of these coun-

* Susanne Nies is research fellow at Center for International Studies and Research in Paris, and Free University in Berlin.

tries) – are undoubtedly as much European as California or New Mexico are American. Europe is more than the Commission in Brussels, the Council, France, or Germany. The anxiety of accession candidates is comprehensible, just as the disappointment of some founding members, idealists about the European idea. Nevertheless, not that much has been added to the existing debate over Europe, aside from the Eastern European actors. Not only is Europe expanding, but so are its discourses: the eternal Franco-German-British debate about “how much of America” and “how much of integration” should accompany the admission of new member states into the Union. This is in fact a proof of a normalization of relations, and, for that matter, of European integration.

This contribution focuses on the particular development of the Baltic states in their international and European environment, their transition from factors to actors, and their perspectives in the enlarged EU and NATO.

The contribution is based on a series of interviews taken with the political elites of the three Baltic states in 2002 and 2003. The constructivist approach, threat perception, and the study in discourse stand at the centre of this paper’s approach.

It is organized as follows. Part I introduces conceptual definitions of the terms “region”, “security”, and “desecuritization” and is also devoted to a discussion of the maintenance of security measures in the aftermath of the Cold War. Part II presents threat perceptions since 2001. Finally, part III assesses the major changes in orientations and perceptions in and of the three Baltic states, from NATO enlargement to the Chirac speech, and provides an outlook on future developments.

Up to the middle of 2001, the admission of Baltic states into NATO was a highly controversial issue. Unexpected political change has since occurred. The Baltic Sea region, a highly securitized area since World War II, shifted towards desecuritization. This is all the more sur-

prising as the quarrels surrounding post-cold war settings were articulated in various contentious discussions throughout the nineties i.e. on the retreat of the Red Army and the abandonment of its bases, the status of the Slavic population, in particular in Estonia and Latvia, and, in recent times, NATO enlargement and the CFE-Treaty as well as the issue of visas for inhabitants of Kaliningrad. A new consensus between Russia and the West, which emerged in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 2001, opened the door for change. In winter 2002, the three Baltic states received the western placet to join NATO and the EU in 2004.³ As this author’s interview-series proves, the vast majority of Baltic leaders no longer consider Russia to be a threat to their nations.⁴ Thus, the international relations of Baltic states are shaped today by a divided loyalty between Europe and the US (NATO). The question therefore arises what threat perceptions do guide these international relations and how the Baltic states now assess their own perspectives and Euro-Atlantic affiliations.

I. Concepts

The Baltic Space

European dividing lines are multiple and relative.⁵ This was demonstrated once again at the end of the Cold War: the boundaries of the area connoted by the term “East” shifted due to the political and economic integration of former parts of the Soviet bloc into the “West”. Since 1991 new transitory terms have emerged in Europe, such as Central Europe or the Baltic Sea Region. The latter is composed of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Russia, Poland, Germany and the Scandinavian countries and constitutes a highly clustered space, both in political and economic terms.

Changes in the region, formerly divided by the iron curtain, have been threefold: new borders were drawn, former states emerged with the reestablishment of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, and Kaliningrad became an enclave. As a result, former Soviet republics from East to North and West have

adopted a new political orientation, leading to quarrels and negotiations over post-Cold War arrangements with Moscow. New regional and international affiliations have arisen. The Warsaw Pact disappeared, and NATO and the EU will soon be enlarged.

Since the three new Baltic states have been the most concerned with change and security challenges, this paper will be limited to the consideration of these as well as the issue of Kaliningrad.

Security

In the conceptualisation of security, traditional approaches assign primacy to state actors and their military capabilities.

For both traditionalists and wideners, security is about survival and existential threat. The difference between the two approaches lies in the perception of threat and thus the very nature of existential threats. For traditionalists, they are mostly military. For wideners they can be military, political, societal, environmental, and other.

Both approaches agree nevertheless that the use of extraordinary measures is justified in case of an existential threat.

This paper adopts the widener approach to security, which has become nearly “traditionalist” in recent times. It insists on the desecuritization approach.

Securitization/ Desecuritization

Waever locates all public issues on a spectrum ranging from non-politicized (meaning the state does not deal with it and it is not in any other way made an issue of public debate and decision) to politicized (meaning the issue is part of public policy, requiring government decision and resource allocation, or, more rarely, some other form of communal governance), to securitized (meaning the issue is presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure). The placement of issues is open, according to Waever. Any issue can be placed on any part of the spectrum, depending on circumstances.

The placement varies from state to state and across time.⁶

Securitization means that the common rules of political games are abandoned for the sake of homeland defence. Extraordinary measures are thus justified.

Desecuritization is to be understood as the shift back to the normal political game and bargaining. How to assess securitization shifts? Perceptions are essential. The study of discourse, through interview series and media-analysis reveal changes. The decision over desecuritization or securitization is based on threat perception, which varies tremendously from state to state, and regime to regime. If culture or religion is securitized in some states, in others it is not.

II. Quarrels over post-Cold War settings: maintained securitization in the aftermath of the Soviet collapse (1991-2001)

The Baltic Sea Region: bridge or battlefield?

For centuries the strategic position of the Baltic Sea Region has contributed to its role as an economic and political interface between the East and West, North and South, as well as its role as a battlefield between neighbouring civilizations and states. The Westphalian order was unaccomplished in the Baltic provinces of the Tsarist Empire. Up to the end of World War I a curious medieval order, represented by a domineering German nobility, coexisted with Russian central rule.

Nationalist revival, the end of the German-Russian medieval entente in the region, and the collapse of the Tsarist Empire led to the emergence of three independent Baltic states in 1918.

The Western allies were hesitant in recognizing the new states due to the unclear fate of Russia during its civil war: only after the defeat of the Whites the split-offs of the defunct Empire were recognized and admitted to the League of Nations. This linkage between Russia and its periphery was repeated in 1991: Western states recognized the new situation in the Baltics only after the August 1991 putsch, during the course of which Gorbachev was replaced by Yeltsin, who happened to support Baltic independence.

The fate of the Baltic interface has thus always been determined by the state of Big Power relations, in particular East-Westrelations.

The region has been securitized since the Hitler-Stalin Pact in 1939 and underwent three successive Soviet-German governments during World War II.

The most obvious expression of post-war securitization was the extreme Soviet

militarization of the front, especially Latvia, and the transformation of Kaliningrad into a closed military zone.

Polemics in the 1990s

Surprisingly, the Baltic issue remained securitized until 2001, even after the end of East-West confrontation.

The most important confrontations and polemics concerned:

- The conflict over independence, in particular between Moscow and Vilnius, which lasted until the Moscow putsch in August 1991. The Soviet Union tried to put pressure on its republics by reducing the supply of energy during 1988 to 1991.

- The quarrel over citizenship and the status of the Slavic population in Estonia and Latvia, which first arose in 1991. This conflict, even if it still re-emerges from time to time, is more or less settled, as manifested by the departure of the OSCE mission from Latvia and Estonia in late 2001.

- Polemics over the retreat of the Red Army and its installations.⁷ The disman-

ting of the Russian radar station in Skrunda in 1999 brought the Red and Russian Army retreat to a close. In the early 1990s the Baltic states considered the Red Army retreat from other parts of Europe through Kaliningrad and Latvia (1991-4) particularly frightening.

- The conflict over NATO enlargement. This conflict emerged with Baltic independence in 1991, but became virulent after the adoption of the Membership Action Plan (MAP) in 1998. The Russian government tried to influence the progress of integration by strengthening its ties with the Baltic states, for instance by means of the CFE treaty, the border treaty, or also by staging open protests to Western integration.

- The dispute over the Schengen regime and its implication for the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad (since 2001). This item concerned first of all the neighbouring countries, Poland and Lithuania.

All these conflicts have been settled: the first two during the 1990s, and the two others recently, in 2001 and 2002.

III. The shift towards desecuritization

1. Factors

Introduction

The following four factors have had a major impact on the geopolitics of the Baltic Sea region: the change in domestic elite, the American-Russian relationship, NATO enlargement, and EU enlargement. If the NATO debate has been strongly affected by the September 11th attacks, the philosophy and course of the EU enlargement, on the contrary, remains unchanged. While NATO agreed to invite Romania and Bulgaria, and Russia ceased rejecting this idea, the EU has a lot more narrow-minded approach, putting the two Balkan states, Romania and Bulgaria, in a third class waiting room, till 2007. Turkey, interested in the EU membership since 1963, has an option to negotiate, if, by the end of 2004, Ankara fulfils the *Acquis Communautaire*. Until the war in Iraq, Russian-Western confrontation

shifted from strategic to the EU issues, with Kaliningrad as the most important battlefield. In the last month, a new coalition emerged, with Russia, Germany and France taking an aggressive stance toward the Anglo-Saxon Alliance in the war in Iraq and frightening the small European countries in the Convention debate of new governance in Europe.

After long intra-institutional debates on future candidates, both the EU and NATO have committed themselves to a "Big Bang" scenario:

In November 2002, the Transatlantic Alliance invited seven candidates to join: Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia.⁸

The EU Commission has announced that it will invite eight, mostly Central and Eastern European candidates to join in 2004: Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, and the Czech Republic, as well as the two Mediterranean countries, Cyprus and Malta.⁹

***The domestic factor:
elite turnover***

The idea that it takes time and a new generation for mentalities to change is applicable to developments in the Baltic states. In less than four years the perception of Russia has already changed considerably. What was considered to be a military threat in the early nineties is now seen as a rational actor. Two reasons for this 180-degree turn should be mentioned:

- The generational change in the elite, from old to young people;
- Recent developments in East-West relations.

***The international environment (1):
the regional impact of the new
American-Russian partnership***

The Russian commitment to the Western Alliance and the common strategy against terrorism has resulted in important and immediate pay-offs for Moscow:

- Russia has been recognized as a market-economy, first by the US, second by the EU, with World Trade Organization (WTO) admission now scheduled for 2006.¹⁰

- After exclusion from the G7 after the August 1998 crisis, Russia was reintegrated into the now G8.

- The immediate end of negative and critical Western media reports on Russian brutalities in Chechnya.

- The NATO-Russia rapprochement and Russia's integration as a special ally, with the formula "Council of 20" in Rome, May 2002.

These advantages have been obtained in exchange for

- Immediate Russian alignment in the "War against Terror";¹¹

- American access to Russian intelligence data, especially that concerning Afghanistan;

- The opening up of Russian aerospace for American airlifts;

- Tolerance of the American presence in Central Asia.¹²

This new international deal introduced harsh shifts in the relations between Russia and the former Soviet republics: if Putin reneged on opposing NATO enlargement, his stance towards Georgia became aggressive in 2002. In recent times, i.e. since the Iraq divide in international public opinion, Moscow became much more reserved towards the US, without, for the moment at least, any worsening in its relationship with the former Soviet periphery. NATO and EU integration became an *acquis international* since 2001.

***The international environment (2):
NATO enlargement***

The Warsaw Summit on September 25/26th 2002 amounted to informal consent on the upcoming “Big-Bang” enlargement.¹³ The central issue at the November Summit, some two months later, was no longer enlargement, but the reform of the organisation both in structure and doctrine.

Does this mean that the controversies over Baltic admission belong to the past,

and that the Russian government welcomes this step now?

In fact, the Bush speech at Warsaw University in June 2001 was already a sign that Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania would be included, whatever the Russian position. Aside from the rhetoric, Russia had and has no means to prevent NATO enlargement. Moscow has tried to make influence by suggesting a linkage between NATO admission and the CFE Treaty. Yet this linkage was refuted once again by American Secretary of Defence, Donald Rumsfeld, in Warsaw.¹⁴ Russia has yet to sign the bilateral border treaties with the former Soviet republics¹⁵. These territorial regulations are normally required for any NATO admission, but, as put by Christoph Bertram, Director of the SWP Berlin, NATO does not accept this kind of linkage and expression of power politics. Thus, a precedent will be created with the admission of states without ratified border treaties.¹⁶

Russia has not been able to exercise even a symbolic influence on the issue of NATO enlargement.

In public declarations, especially since the Council of 20 Declaration, Russia has not recently opposed NATO enlargement. Accordingly, two myths exist on Russia’s attitude towards the Baltic region:

a. Russia is not worried about the Baltic states’ integration in NATO and the EU

b. Russia is worried about the Baltic states’ integration in NATO and the EU.

Both patterns are wrong. Russia is concerned, but due to limited means, and to a shift of priorities, this concern does not determine Russian politics towards the region any more.

Desecuritization and NATO enlargement do not, for sure, coincide automatically. If desecuritization goes hand in hand with the enlargement, the following reasons are to be mentioned as well:

- The Russian demilitarisation of the region, especially Kaliningrad, and the borders, but not the Leningrad District..

-Finland and Sweden are most likely to join the Alliance in the near future, since the Baltic enlargement isolates them from Western standards and intelligence.

***The international environment (3):
EU enlargement and the
troublesome Kaliningrad case***

Russia and the US share certain distrust for the hybrid structure of the EU, expressed over and over again through the famous question “Mr. CSFP - what is your telephone number?”, or in Mr. Rogozin’s question about his homologue EU negotiator with regards to the Kaliningrad matter. Both countries are more familiar with traditional bilateral or multilateral diplomacy (under one or the other lead) than with dealing with supranational organisations.¹⁷

The Kaliningrad issue was put on the European and international agenda suddenly and at a surprisingly late point in time. The problem existed throughout the 1990s, but the perception of a problem did not.

Since the end of the closed military zone in 1991 and the attainment of enclave status due to Lithuanian and Belarusian independence, the former Ger-

man Königsberg is at the centre of a complex cluster of problems, both domestic (Russian) and international:

- the reorganisation of the post-Soviet space; Russian-style federalism applied to the specific situation of an enclave; the economic survival of the enclave in a better-off regional context;¹⁸ the establishment of a special economic zone; rumours, fears and misperceptions, such as Kaliningrad separatism, the return of German rule, the loss of a war trophy, etc.

- bilateral agreements between the enclave and its immediate neighbours Lithuania, Poland, and Belarus; the Russian military presence as a European and international problem; the specific implications of the future EU membership of bordering countries for the 15.000 square kilometres territory and its one million Russian-speaking inhabitants, who originate from all parts of the former Soviet union.

The polemics over Kaliningrad has repeatedly been subject to serve as a litmus-test of current East-West-relations. The

most outstanding examples are rumours about an impending German-Russian deal to exchange Kaliningrad in return for the annulment of Russia’s foreign debt or about intelligence data on the presence of Soviet nuclear weapons in the region.¹⁹

A liberal visa regime has been maintained between Poland, Lithuania, Belarus, and Kaliningrad since 1991. Latvia did not participate. This regime will now come to an end, with the progressive integration of Poland and Lithuania into the Schengen regime.

If the military issue has nearly been resolved thanks to the reduction of Russian military forces in the region,²⁰ the movement of people to and from Kaliningrad has become a highly contentious issue.

Approximately 120.000 people cross the Kaliningrad borders every day, a total of nine million times each year. They run small cross-border businesses, which is a typical expression of the difference in the standard of living in the region. These crossings have been facilitated by the current liberal visa regime between Lithuania,

Poland, Belarus, and Kaliningrad, which is intended to stabilize the weak border regions.²¹ Curiously, the travels to and from the Russian mainland have been less important, due, last but not least, to the costs of travelling: to date it is less expensive for a Kaliningrader to travel to Berlin (a distance of 600km), to Warsaw (400 km), or to Vilnius than it is to travel to St. Petersburg or Moscow.²²

A problem that should have been anticipated became controversial only in the summer of 2002. Lithuania and Poland, who will enter the EU some time in 2004, are obliged to adopt the so-called Schengen Acquis, which was integrated into the Acquis Communautaire in 1999, chapter Justice and Home Affairs. An opting out is no longer possible, as practiced by Denmark and the UK in the past.

The integration into the regime will begin early next year, delayed perhaps until the summer, with full integration after successful implementation some six years later.

Thus, the liberal post-Cold War border regime will disappear, although some

exceptions and special regimes may be allowed, as the French and Greek examples prove.²³

Unfortunately and for specific reasons on both sides, Kaliningrad became the centre of an EU-Russian confrontation:

- Since both sides had disorganized views on the issue, different and contradictory opinions started to circulate at various levels;

- Russia benefited from the issue and put all of the blame for its former disinterest and domestic failure in the enclave on the EU;

- playing upon populist opinion, the Russian media hyped up the issue; claims were raised there would be no visa for Russians to travel from one part of Russia to another, as Dmitry Rogozin, special envoy of the President and Chair of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Duma put it;²⁴

- the beginning of the quarrel coincided with EU hesitation in recognizing Russia as a market economy. Kaliningrad negotiations failed twice during EU-Russia summits in May and June 2002.

A multitude of proposals have been presented, such as a special regime based on a cheap visa, a tunnel from Kaliningrad to Belarus, or a corridor through Poland and Lithuania, the last of which conjuring up bad memories in Warsaw, as the Gdansk corridor connecting the city to the German Reich had served to prepare the German invasion in 1939.

Visas are highly symbolic in nature and they function to express either mutual trust or distrust. In an era of new technologies, visas, which are still delivered in the 19th century manner, prove to be inefficient and costly.²⁵ The current visa regime does not fulfil the aim of controlling the flow of persons while at the same time opening borders for trade.

According to the realists and political negotiators involved in the debate, several short, medium, and long-term solutions have to be distinguished.

For example, Vytautas Zalys, Lithuanian consul in Kaliningrad, proposed a multiple visa regime, under which visas would be offered at low prices. Furthermore, he

suggested that consular points should be reinforced, in particular at border crossings. The idea was simple. Once the debate dies down, this short-term scenario will likely be introduced.

The idea of a non-stop train link has also been debated.

Negotiating all of the possible exemptions from the severe Schengen regime for a short-term compromise presupposes that Russia reforms its system of controls, produces passports, and starts to cooperate with the Schengen Information System in the medium term.

For the time being and for the sake of cost reduction, Moscow has abolished a large number of border controls, thus leaving its Western neighbours with the task of guarding borders. The Finnish experience with the long Russian border has been very costly and negative in that respect.

2. Perceptions: a study in discourse

This chapter summarizes the main changes in politics and perception the

three Baltic states went through during the last year. The thesis is based on a series of interviews conducted by the author of this paper in Moscow, Berlin, and Kaliningrad during the summer of 2002.

Threat perception and motivation for NATO membership

If Russia is not considered to be an immediate danger any longer, why then joining a defence alliance as NATO? The answers of the author's interview partners were the following:

- joining NATO and the EU is considered to be an attestation of normality, of a stable market economy, and of democracy. Membership enhances foreign direct investment and international trust.

- The three Baltic states have strong Trans-Atlantic affinities. These will be reinforced by NATO membership.

- For the younger generation, and today's elite, the Western way of life is "fun". As a Lithuanian journalist explained to the author, participation in the Alliance is part of this fun.

- Perceived threats in the three states are located less in the military domain, than in the soft-security sector: ecology, especially due to the contamination of the Baltic Sea, the Russian military, and nuclear waste; political instability in Belarus and Kaliningrad; terrorism in the sense that the Baltic states could serve as a basis for preparing attacks. One of the most important issues facing all Baltic Sea states jointly will be border control – a project for the future, since today's situation is more than dysfunctional, even between the Baltic states themselves.

IV. From factors to actors: The Baltic states in the New Europe

Changed patterns: the desecuritization shift

One decade after the collapse of the Soviet Empire, the Baltic Sea Region does

not constitute a major East-West-North security concern anymore.

A securitization shift has taken place, from the East to the South, and, with some interruptions, along the new borderline from the Baltic to the Black Sea.

Rationality, scarcity of means, as well as strategic considerations prompted the former opponents to adopt a cooperative stance in the Baltic Cold War contact zone. For the moment, this approach corresponds to a win-win constellation for both sides. The present situation at the southern border of Russia is more likely to deteriorate than is the new pattern of cooperation in the Baltic region.

Three theoretical options exist for the future of the Baltic Sea region:

Option 1: There will be a new shift in the region towards securitization.

Option 2: The region will become a kind of Baltic Benelux, and the former conflicts an anachronism. The region will serve as a bridge and transit line between East and West. The politically and economically clustered space will integrate via

harmonization, adhesion to European, and international structures. Securitisation will be difficult in that context. NATO and EU accession has a different meaning today than it did in Cold War times or even with the first NATO enlargement round in 1997. Adhesion is to be considered as a certificate of good governance, stability, and reliability.

Option 3: The region will oscillate between option 1 and 2, as it did in the history of the 20th century.

To date only the second option seems to be realistic, for the following reasons. First, members of the Russian elite with a traditional and anti-Western approach in this respect have no decisive influence and are not likely to get it very soon: their basis is mostly the military, which itself is in a deep crisis, due to failed reforms and the heavy Soviet heritage. Second, cooperation with the Western capitals and in the Baltic Sea Region will have more pay-offs for Russia than confrontation. Third, just as the Baltic Germans have been an interface between continental Europe and Russia, the Baltic states could serve as an

economic bridge: the energy supply channelled through Klaipeda and Ventspils are outstanding examples for an already existing situation. Finally, in a medium term the post-Cold War setting in the south of the former Soviet Union will be a greater foreign policy priority both for Russia and for the US.

Remaining security issues

Despite this, security concerns remain in the Baltic Sea region. Security concerns must be perceived as potential threats, such as the unclear fate of the Lukashenka regime in Belarus and ecological problems. According to an interview partner at the Estonian Embassy in Berlin, one of the most frightening scenarios for Tallinn is the explosion of Sosnovy Bor Nuclear Power Plant near St. Petersburg, which could lead to the flow of millions of refugees to Estonia. The most important security issue for the time being, and in the context of the war on terrorism, is certainly the anachronistic border control in the countries of the region, and

the total lack of cooperation in this respect. Kaliningrad is only one expression of this more general problem. Thus, a solution has to be found not only in terms of access to the enclave, but also the transparency of the circulation of goods and people in the region as a whole. The Baltic region's bridge function between East, North, and West, and the prestige of this role will depend on a successful and common establishment of control mechanisms.

From factors to actors: new opportunities for new actors

The defreezing of the Cold War in the Baltics ten years after the Soviet implosion means a resurging opportunity of normal political bargaining. After a decade of introverted behaviour, typical of transition countries between Germany and Russia, the Baltic states transformed into active subjects in regional relations. Especially Lithuania and Poland aspire to an active role in political and economic East-East rapprochement, thus the transmission of their own experience to countries such

as Georgia. Belarus is considered to be a nightmare in terms of unforeseeable regime changes, refugees etc. Being normal actors and the international recognition of this fact constitutes one of the most important aims of all the CEE countries at the moment.

The European battlefield

The Baltic states will join NATO and the EU at the very moment of a renewed identity crisis. The reassessment of European and international institutions has not come to an end yet, some 15 years after the fall of the Berlin wall. NATO has to worry about its first or second class status in the resolution of international conflicts, reach a more definitive stance on its pre-emptive strikes doctrine, and reassess the concepts of a defence alliance, member state military spending, the need for a rapid reaction force, adequate means to confront asymmetric risks, and decision making. It cannot be ruled out that NATO's role will be reduced to something of a second OSCE and that unilateralism

or bilateralism will be the decisive international relations pattern in the future.

The EU has to come to terms with the largest and most expensive enlargement in history at a moment of economic crisis in its motor-economies Germany and (to a lesser degree) France due, not least, to the introduction of the Euro. Unequal commitment to political integration and fed-up member states are perceived as an obstacle to the requirements of European governance. The big-against-small quarrels, as well as the implicit argument on variable geometry, has accompanied the decade.

The American position hostile to the political integration of Europe will be strengthened in the short run with the inclusion of the CEE candidates. It risks exacerbating interior dividing lines of the Union for the next two years. A more pro-European commitment together with a trans-Atlantic orientation, very much like West Germany's position of the 1970s, should be expected in the medium term. Meanwhile, and to reinforce this commitment, a surplus of sensitivity is required

on both sides of the former iron curtain. Western European states must recognize the Eastern transition from Phare-assisted countries to policy makers, from objects to subjects, from factors to actors. And CEE states should admit that European integration needs not to proceed from scratch, and does not begin with their entrance, but has been the result of a difficult battle over all the decades since World War II. The EU is not a Citroen 2CV, as a Polish diplomat put it, but has proven able to deal with extremely difficult historical challenges: the place of Europe in the era of superpowers, the collapse of Breton Woods, and the unification of post wall Europe.

EU enlargement will imply the easternisation and even a certain russification of the organization: 1.4 million of so-called Euro-Russians from Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania will become inhabitants of the EU. The border between the EU and Russia will be extended to some 1,300 kilometres. Baltic NATO membership concerns the larger region: the Swedish non-participation in NATO be-

comes more and more problematic. Most likely, the integration of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania into NATO will lead to the integration of Sweden sooner or later. In the East, Europe in 2004 will have to find mechanisms how to build up an East-East interface, without, however, increasing insecurity and instability. CEE countries, and in particular the Baltic states, will become important actors in this redesign.

The new European lines

The upcoming enlargement will decisively draw a new border from the Baltic to the Black Sea. This border risks to be securitized at least partly, since economic, military, and political differences are very important on both sides of the dividing line. Moreover, the political evolution of countries like Belarus, Ukraine, and Moldova is difficult to anticipate. For the time being they belong neither to the West nor to the East in any clear manner.

The concerned countries of the border line have a common interest in keep-

ing this border politicized and avoiding its securitization. Since a lot of actors are implicated and a regional structure for handling conflicts is missing, a constant long-term tension in the border region could have devastating effects on the prosperity and political stability of this part of Europe. The Baltic states have a very important place to take in bridging the gap.

Bibliography

Davies, Norman: *Europe A History*. Oxford University Press 1998.

European Comm. Report Kaliningrad 2000.

Föhrenbach, Gerd: *Die Westbindung der Baltischen Staaten*. Nomos Baden-Baden 2000.

Kirby, David: *The Baltic World 1772-1993: Europe's Northern Periphery in an Age of Change*. Longman Publishing Group 1995.

Nies, Susanne: *Les pays baltes dans leur environnement : enjeux et perspectives stratégiques*, Etude DAS/ CERi, Paris 2002, <http://www.defense.gouv.fr/das>.

Norgaard, Ole: *The Baltic States after Independence. Studies of Communism in Transition*. Cheltenham 1996.

Vardys, Vytautas: *The Rebel Nation*. Westview Series on the Post-Soviet Republics. Westview Press 1996.

NATO-enlargement Daily Brief. NEBD. NEBD@Latvia-USA.org (daily mailing list, compiled by the Latvian Embassy in Washington, on NATO-enlargement and security issues)

-<http://www.securities.co.uk> (media-service on emerging economies)

¹ Le Figaro February 19th, 2003, Les pays candidats au centre de la bataille, p. 2 The Eastern European governments, from Prague to Vilnius, had signed a Washington (Bruce Jackson) –prepared letter, the Vilnius 10 declaration, in support of the Anglo-Saxon position on Iraq.

² The Elysée Treaty has been signed in January 1963 between France and Germany and stipulates a preferential relationship between the two countries within Europe. If General de Gaulle aimed at European and French reinforcement, the German Bundestag counteracted any anti-American ambition while including the famous Preamble in the Treaty. The latter stresses the importance of the transatlantic link.

³ NATO summit Prague, 21-22 November 2002, EU council in Copenhagen, December 2002

⁴ cf. Nies (2002)

⁵ Cf.: Dacic, Norman 1998:18.

⁶ Buzan, Waever 1998:23

⁷ The retreat of the Red Army from Eastern Europe started in 1991, short after the dissolution of the Warsaw-Pact. The retreat from Lithuania was accomplished in September 1993, from Estonia and Latvia 1994, while, on the basis of a bilateral agreement, the radar station in Skrunda, Latvia, has been maintained by Moscow till 1999. Now, Russians are unhappy to learn that Skrunda will be used for NATO intelligence gathering purposes.

⁸ NATO announcement at the Warsaw-summit, end of September 2002: Kaiser, Robert G., NATO ready to admit Seven Eastern Bloc Countries. Washington Post, 26 Septembre 02.

⁹ European Commission, 9th of October 2002. Reuters 04.02.02, <http://groups.yahoo.com/group/nedb>. NATO Enlargement Daily Brief, 04.10.02: European Union to Recommend 10 Candidate Countries for Admission.

¹⁰ Important divergences remain on this issue, most notably the Russian energy market, both in prices and in terms of state or private property.

¹¹ Putin's speech on September 11th 2001.

¹² Cf. Roger Kanet, Terrorism and the US-Russian Relationship, <http://www.apsanet.org>, presentation of August 24, 2002.

¹³ Kaiser, Robert G., NATO Ready to Admit Seven Eastern Bloc Members. Washington Post, 26 September 2002

¹⁴ Robert Kaiser, Washington Post, 26.9.2002.

¹⁵ At the time of editing this issue of the BDR, the Russian Parliament has finally ratified a border treaty with Lithuania, signed by two countries in 1997.

¹⁶ Interview with Christoph Bertram, former Director of IISS, Berlin June 24, 2002

¹⁷ This preference for bilateralism is even reflected in the Russian style federalism, which is bilateral (and asymmetric): Moscow negotiates issues case by case with its subjects.

¹⁸ The region is economically highly dispersed: poor Polish border regions, Belarus etc. Curious phenomena occurred, such as Lithuanian pensioners living in neighbouring Belarus to make better use of their pensions in a country with lower price level.

¹⁹ Daily Telegraph, January 2001.

²⁰ The decrease of military presence in the region has been tremendous: from 100.000 troops in 1991 to 14.000 today, with cuts announced for a new decrease to 9.000 this year. Cf. Facon, Adomeit, Mironov report. Kaliningrad is one of the most concerned regions with military cuts, and even the military itself doesn't see any sense to maintain strong presence in the specific situation of a far away enclave. In the same time, FSB activities in the region have been reinforced, and a special envoy of the governor of the strong North-West District has been nominated. Representatives from the Baltic ministries and governments don't consider Kaliningrad any more as a military threat. See the interview series of the au-

thor, published in December 2002 in a study for the French Ministry of Defence (DAS).

²¹ For the moment Poles, Lithuanians and Kaliningraders buy vouchers for travelling. Due to the Russian-Byelorussian treaty both countries renounced on visa. Only Latvia refused to participate in any liberal regime with Kaliningrad: the transit to and from the homeland has thus to be diverted through Belarus.

²² The Soros Foundation initiated a “Russians to Russia” programme in summer 2002, to enhance contacts between the enclave and mainland. This is exactly what was done by West Germany to run isolated West Berlin. For more details on transport issues, mentality etc. see the report of the EU Commission 2001, Fairlie, Nies <http://www.oci.fu-berlin.de> (Kaliningrad report, February 2002).

²³ France has a special bilateral regime with Morocco and Greece with foreign workers from Ukraine and Moldova. Both regimes limit access to the concerned Schengen country and prohibit border crossings to the others.

²⁴ cf. Vinogradov, Michail, The Duma protects Kaliningrad, *Izvestija* 20.6.02, p.2.

²⁵ Interview with a representative of the German MFA, Ulrich Bethkenhagen, summer 2002: according to him the procedure with Russia is long and costly, the refusal rate low, the criminals still cross the borders and are not refused.

Life After Enlargement

By Ambassador Linas Linkevicius*

Although the topic of this paper is very broad, its message will be rather straightforward. To set the ground and to some extent provoke further discussions, it will be attempted to go through the main issues that the Northeastern Europe faces today and will be facing in the years to come.

Let me start with a few words on the general outlook of the region after NATO and EU enlargement takes place. Although predictions are usually risky and difficult to make, our region is as predictable as a region can be in this turbulent era. After all, one does not need to make predictions because for us “Life after Enlarge-

ment” started long ago. It actually started when our first troops landed in Bosnia and Herzegovina alongside NATO forces back in 1996. We have always behaved like true allies committed to the values and spirit of the Alliance. In this sense, the Prague invitation was only recognition of our sustained efforts.

After enlargement, there will be more stability and mutual confidence, as there will be less diversity in the region. Already six nations around the Baltic Sea [the Baltic states, Poland, Germany and Denmark] will be members of both NATO and the EU. In the next 10 years there will be no non-aligned countries left while

Russia will be closely entangled into the activities of both NATO and the EU. On the other hand, less diversity outside means more diversity inside. It is completely different experience to observe a big family gathering from the street and actually be in the club of 25 members with different characters, temper and beliefs. We will have to learn to adjust and reconcile our interests with others. The kind of partnership we have developed in this region throughout the years will be indispensable in this process. The same applies for the old-timers of these clubs – a new member of a family always brings changes.

* Ambassador Linas Linkevicius is a Minister of National Defence of Lithuania. The paper was presented at the roundtable discussion ‘Northeast European Security After the 2004 Dual Enlargement: the End of History?’, held jointly by the Ministry of National Defence, the U.S. Institute for National Strategic Studies, George C. Marshall Centre for Security Studies and Konrad Adenauer Foundation in Vilnius (Lithuania) on 6-7 June 2003.

The Baltic states will bring a rather unique experience and contribution to the dialogue between NATO, the EU and Russia. We have managed to turn our dramatic past under the Soviet Union into a window of opportunity to build a prosperous and peaceful future. Lithuania has an impressive record of dealing with Russia on a number of issues including troops withdrawal, military transit, cross border cooperation etc. Such experience will be extremely valuable for NATO and the EU once we become members. Even more importantly, now we will be taking part in the process of policy formation towards our eastern neighbours and we will be able to shape this policy from within NATO and the EU. The Baltic states have a vital stake in the effort of Euro-Atlantic community to bring Russia as close to NATO and the EU, as Russia wants to come. To my mind, the true success of this NATO enlargement round is not as much the membership of the Baltic states, but the Alliance's rapprochement with Russia. If it were not for our stubbornness to become members of NATO, to-

day Russia would not be a member of NATO 20.

Let me now turn to another related issue – threats in our region and their implications to the military transformation. For a long time the Northeast Europe has been a line of tensions separating the West and the East. Today it serves as a link of trust and stability between the two. The good news is that there are no major military threats in the region. Moreover, this region did not see a single violent spark involving any kind of use or threat to use force from any country for the past decade. Recently resolved transit issue to Kaliningrad is the latest example of how we can peacefully settle even the most difficult disputes. Good neighbourly relations will remain the key to security after enlargement. The fact that the eastern borders of the Baltic states will become eastern borders of NATO and the EU will only add a new quality of credibility and reassurance to the neighbouring countries.

There is bad news too: in a rapidly changing world, no one can be sure when,

where, or what new unforeseen and unpredicted threat may emerge. In this sense, Northeast Europe is no less and no more secure than any other region. We should be honest about the future: we should expect more international terrorism, more proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction (WMD), more regional tensions.

Therefore we must be ready for any scenario in the region, around the region and beyond the region. Due to their history, the Baltic states should feel vulnerable to traditional military threats but instead we are among those who argue that NATO must transform itself from an immobile defence alliance in the heart of Europe into a flexible and rapidly reactive force capable of intervention wherever needed to prevent a conflict rather than to stop one that already started. To match our words with deeds our countries are boldly and rapidly transforming the armed forces, dropping outdated territorial defence posture and acquiring modern military capabilities so as to become trustworthy new allies within a new

alliance ready to meet tomorrow's security challenges. This implies a major shift in our planning assumptions from a reactive Cold-war type defensive posture to a proactive planning that would enable timely action instead of reflection. One might argue that the greatest risk to our security is the environment changing more rapidly than our ability to adapt. Today's threats do not allow for long warning time and prolonged force build-up periods: the armed forces must be capable of reacting in a matter of days and even hours.

There are some questions we still have to answer and better sooner than later. At times, the Alliance may have to take preventive actions. Where do we derive legitimacy for such actions and what is their relationship with the international law? How to define when a threat is big enough to justify a preventive strike?

Second question: When we talk about the new challenges we emphasize their non-military nature. As a Minister of Defence, I ask myself, what is the role of the armed forces in dealing with such challenges? What should be the role of the military

in ensuring homeland security and civil defence? How to strike the right balance between the civilian authorities and police and the armed forces when it comes to, say, countering a terrorist act?

Third question: NATO does not see any military threats in the region. But then we have a regime right next to the centre of Europe, which was ready to host Saddam Hussein. Is it something we do not want to see and hear about or is it so self-evident that we cannot see it anymore? In the first case it is dangerous ignorance, in the second - it is self-deception, which points me to a question whether we truly believe that Europe now is whole and free? We have to find the right answers to all these questions before we start investing our resources in one direction or another.

Let me now turn to another important issue at hand - the future of regional cooperation. There is a wide variety of security and defence-related frameworks, initiatives and mechanisms operating in the Northeast Europe: the Council of Baltic Sea States, Northern Dimension Initiative, Northern European Initiative,

Nordic-Baltic Eight etc. Regardless of the past merits, their future utility will have to be reviewed. Some of them will fade away and some will grow in importance. After enlargement, there will be both continuity and change in our relations with the Nordic countries. It is not to say, that we do not value all the assistance Nordic countries provided to us throughout the years in our efforts to build modern military establishments. To the contrary: NATO and EU membership will give a new quality to this partnership. Nordic-Baltic Eight will be a club of like-minded states cooperating as equal partners on equal basis, coordinating their policies inside NATO and the EU, coordinating participation in the international operations and drafting common strategies and activities towards other regions. As some of the BALTDREAM projects are already completed, we need to move forward and look for new opportunities of cooperation, common projects and niches for specialization. One such opportunity could be transformation and expansion of BALTDREAM into NORDBALTDREAM

projects. The spheres of closer cooperation could encompass science and technology, special operation forces, logistics, eventually even procurement. To go more practical, Nordic-Baltic Eight should consider establishing some regular arrangements at the working level.

Lithuania has always pursued a multi-dimensional approach towards regional cooperation, and we will keep opportunity windows open after enlargement. The merging of two trilateral forums – Danish–German–Polish and Lithuanian–Latvian–Estonian and the eventual launch of the Multinational Baltic Corps seems to be a particularly promising initiative. We also have not exhausted all the potential of the third triangle yet – Poland, Lithuania and Ukraine.

We should also consider launching a concrete practical regional initiative that could involve NATO, Russia and the willing countries in our region. With NATO–Russia relationship advancing to new levels of cooperation, we should think about some common training projects in Kaliningrad. Even a modest project would

boost mil-to-mil dialogue and confidence between NATO and Russia and improve force interoperability for peace support missions.

Finally, ‘Vilnius 10’ will cease to exist but the Vilnius process as a cooperative effort to pursue NATO membership will continue in the same spirit. We must now help to implement NATO’s promise to keep the door open for those willing and ready to join. Vilnius process should now encompass not only the most obvious candidates – Macedonia, Albania and Croatia. We must also assist and encourage Ukraine, Georgia and Azerbaijan in their NATO aspirations.

Whatever the future of regional cooperation is, we must keep the United States involved in the matters of Northeast Europe. It is no secret that in the absence of the Soviet threat the strategic focus of the U.S. has shifted elsewhere in the world than Europe. The U.S. may also lose interest in Northern Europe and the Baltic states as a resolved issue in the context of whole and secure Europe. To prevent this from happening we need an active agenda

to keep the US interested and engaged in Northeast European affairs. The US administration and some American NGOs do indicate willingness to pursue active strategy of cooperation with the Nordic – Baltic countries. Consolidated zone of peace, stability and economic growth in the Northeast Europe is clearly in the U.S. interest at a time when more serious threats rise in the Middle East, Korean Peninsula and South Asia. Strengthening regional security should remain high on the future agenda and include issues like counter-terrorism, control of WMD and border security. A regular 8+1 format at the ministers’ level would greatly enhance this cooperation. This format could also develop and implement a common strategy towards Ukraine, Caucasus and Central Asia as the U.S. itself expresses growing interest in these areas. Finally, an option of establishing an American or NATO military base or a training facility in one of the Baltic states could be considered. It would perfectly make sense and serve the common goals that NATO, the Baltic states and our eastern neighbours share

in terms of dealing with the new challenges.

Turning to the second element of dual enlargement – that of the EU – one cannot speak about its impact on security situation in the region as something separate from that of NATO. It is simply impossible to envisage European defence policy decoupled from the transatlantic security link. From the very launch of the ESDP project we have been monitoring its development. Now we will be full-fledged participants of the whole process and we will take an active stance on defence-related issues, as they will directly affect our own security. The spirit of transatlantic solidarity, which was so full-heartedly displayed after the terrorist attacks of 9/11, has faded, sadly. Europe must now prove its commitment to the transatlantic Alliance to save American commitment in Europe and vice versa. The only way for Europe to be heard in Washington is to speak in one strong voice. While some countries argued what substance and character this voice should carry, the Vilnius group unanimously

supported the US-led coalition to oust Saddam's regime. This is how we think the interests of European security can be served best – by resolve and unity rather than by accusations and distrust. We do support the political will of the EU to assume greater share of burden in maintaining international security. As future members of both organisations we have a stake in success of this cooperation. The outcome of the ESDP project must not in any way compromise the role of NATO as the cornerstone of Euro-Atlantic security but strengthen it.

Finally, let me address last but not the least issue – spreading security to other regions. Before Prague, the Baltic states were part of the problem of divided Europe. Now we must live up to the expectations of our allies to become part of a solution. As Donald Rumsfeld, the U.S. Defence Secretary, has noted during the Prague Summit, new countries bring a “spirit and enthusiasm” to NATO. We already lead the Alliance's efforts in extending zone of security eastward and

redefining Euro-Atlantic community's geopolitical scope to embrace within it Ukraine and South Caucasus countries.

The question whether the Baltic states will be security providers or mere consumers today is completely irrelevant. Lithuania maintains a record number – 13 military commitments and participates in 7 international missions: our troops serve in Afghanistan, Kosovo, and Iraq; military cargo plane is deployed in Italy in support of the KFOR/SFOR missions, we have liaison officers in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia and a military observer in the OSCE mission in Georgia. After our two peacekeeping contingents are deployed in Iraq, by the end of this year we will have almost 300 troops deployed abroad. For a country with three and a half million of inhabitants and a 12,000-strong army, this is far more than symbolic contribution to the international security. While we are stepping up our international involvement and participation in crisis management and peace support operations abroad, some critics maintain that we conduct international in-

volvement at the expense of defence reform at home and that the 2% of GDP are wasted on other things than homeland security. Such thinking is a dangerous misperception of today's reality. Our security is not a national endeavour. Our security starts way beyond our borders: it starts in the Balkans, in the Caucasus, in Central Asia and the Middle East. If these regions are not stable and at peace, we will always feel the ripple effect of insecurity via illegal migration, organized crime, drug trafficking and terrorism. In the same manner, security of our Nordic and Western neighbours starts with security of the Baltic states. Given the geographic location of the Baltic states, it is our destiny to serve as a vital link of trust and security between North America and Western Europe and eastern regions and nations of Eurasia.

We already live in an era after enlargement, which unfortunately coincides with the period of global turmoil. Although today our nations may feel more secure than ever before, in fact we face a whole new era of unforeseen challenges,

unpredicted threats, and unexpected crises. Nobody could ever imagine the Twin Towers collapse, who could tell what can happen tomorrow? Ad hoc coalitions may provide a temporary salvation in an immediate crisis but only such a battle-scarred and storm-beaten organisation as NATO can be a long-term solution. If NATO is to remain successful and effective Alliance it will have to stand up to any kind of challenge and prevail rather than to escape through the back door. If NATO had a will to act, ad hoc coalitions could rest in peace. If NATO is to remain relevant in the 21st century, it has to go global, or go out of business. As the Minister of a future Allied country, I can assure you that Lithuania will do everything it can to keep it in business and profitable.

Northeast European Security After the 2004 Dual Enlargement: The End of History?

A joint Vilnius Roundtable in co-operation with the Institute for National Strategic Studies, George C. Marshall Center for Security Studies, and Konrad Adenauer Foundation *

We hosted a high level expert talks on security policy issues in the Baltic Sea region that were held on 6-7 June 2003 in Vilnius, Lithuania. The event was co-sponsored by the Institute for National Strategic Studies, George C. Marshall Center for Security Studies, and Konrad Adenauer Foundation.

Our intellectual and practical talk's ambitions were fuelled by the tremendous changes in the New World system, which could be better described as an electronic book available to update every day. If the

double breakthrough of the European Union and NATO enlargement goes ahead as planned, the political map of Europe will have changed dramatically. The majority of countries in the Baltic Sea region will then become members, giving both the EU and NATO a rather pan-European character as well as underlining new security challenges for the region and for its neighbours. Top experts, academics, politicians, and diplomats were doing their best to explain the impact of dual enlargement on the Baltic security.

We took a chance to look profoundly at the EU at 25 and NATO at 26 formulas, the EU and NATO cooperation vs. competition process while finding compatible roles and tasks for the countries in the Baltic Sea region. The starting point of our discussion was the possible applicability to other regions of the Baltic cooperation model and the experiences gained. This would help us in finding an answer to whether dual enlargement would be the end of history or a new start in the Baltic Sea region.

* An executive summary by the International Relations Department of the Ministry of National Defence of the Republic of Lithuania.

Our talks were launched by two keynote-speakers, H.E. Mr. Linas Linkevičius and Mr. Robert Nurick who set the scene for the ensuing debate. First, we were provided with a general overview of the influence on the Baltic security of double enlargement in general and then the main issues this region face in particular. The Copenhagen and Prague Summits opened up possibilities for new practical instruments, which will contribute to strengthening and consolidating the region. After a decade of transition following the end of the Cold War, the Baltic states will take a chance to outline the multi-vector policy within the Euro-Atlantic institutions. First, special military and political relations with the Nordic countries should be established in order for the Baltic states to become more visible and reliable partners. A long chain of regional organizations and initiatives such as the Northern Dimension initiative, Nordic-Baltic Eight, and the Council of Baltic Sea States are already used. Secondly, predictable relations with the neighbours and Russia's inclusion in Euro-Atlantic affairs serve as

the basis of implementing mutual confidence and fully obliterate the Yalta's wall in the Baltic Sea region.

We agreed that there is no major military threat, and the solution of the Kaliningrad problem proved that diplomatic means prevail. Nevertheless, the realistic world is fraught not only with direct military threats but also with other problems such as illegal trafficking in weapons of mass destruction, international terrorism, regional tensions, economic depression, and disrespect for international law, and this should keep us awake and prepared for any scenario in the region. In this sense, the EU and NATO should be used to overcome these problems. On the one hand, a pro-active U.S. engagement in Baltic-Nordic affairs is desirable at practical and military levels, and, on the other hand, much attention should be given to a common NATO-Russian agenda.

Keeping this framework in mind, we started with a discussion of NATO at 26 and a new U.S. footprint in the Baltic Security Agenda. The outcome of the

Prague Summit led to three subjects of discussion: the quantitative and qualitative changes caused by expansion of NATO, the creation of a NATO Response Force, and strengthening of NATO's capabilities.

NATO decided upon the largest expansion of the alliance in history - seven countries were invited to join the Alliance, among them the Baltic states. The participants agreed that the expansion reflects a vital contribution to strengthening the stability and values in the Euro-Atlantic community, which is based on democracy, freedom and the rule of law. However, this added many questions to our agenda. NATO enlargement has a direct impact on geo-strategic stability in the Baltic Sea region and leads to questions about Russian security. We noticed that Russia has a new relationship with NATO. This rapprochement was stipulated by a necessity to counter terrorist attacks wherever it might appear. From different perspectives possible negative trends in the relations between NATO and Russia were evaluated. Russian military still

identifies NATO along with the U.S. as the main threat to Russia's security. This was not said straightforward though. This emanates, according to the Russian representatives, from the Agreement on the Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces (A-CFE) in Europe of 1999 and its implications for the relations between NATO and Russia. The A-CFE, a cornerstone in European security leading to greater conventional stability on the continent, has not entered into force for political and geo-strategic reasons. A-CFE aimed at establishing a stable and balanced level of conventional armed forces between NATO and Russia in Europe, thus solving NATO enlargement and security dilemmas has become a bone of contention between NATO and Russia. The first wave of NATO enlargement was set in a frame of arms control thus solving the security dilemma of Russia, whereas the second wave diverted the distribution of power and required a new response for arms control. In Russia's view, with the second wave including the Baltic states, NATO has significantly improved its geo-strate-

gic position as a result of the possibility of establishing an offensive front against Russia from the Baltic states in which conventional arms control does not apply. Additional problems are also related to unpredictable states' behaviour and offensive motivations of great powers, which does not consider arms control as an appropriate mechanism for maintaining stability in the world. The U.S., indeed, was seen as one of the most serious potential threats not just in Russia but also in Europe. On the other hand, the problem was to large extent related to the old thinking and threat perceptions. Stronger proponents noted that dividing lines between NATO and Russia created not by the Alliance's policy but by weak democracy and civil society in Russia. We have argued that Russia should forget conventional perception of threats although the on-going conflicts might block it. Transformation of the old thinking would be very helpful in this case. Co-operative activities between NATO and Russia could make sense, and it could be implemented through joint military exercises under the

umbrella of NATO. NATO should ensure that Russia follows arms control treaties. The Lithuanian representative added that the Baltic states would seriously consider their acceding to the A-CFE Treaty which could make the region more predictable and transparent. As a framework for co-operation, our Belarusian colleague proposed to form a common airspace control network covering Commonwealth of Independent States and NATO.

In this context, we came up with a concept for a U.S. footprint on the Baltic security agenda, which could be used with both negative and positive connotations. Some representatives argued enthusiastically that we have to keep the U.S. involved in affairs of the Baltic Sea region. At present time, the U.S. may loose her interest as a result of success stories in the Baltic states and an absence of direct military threat. The Baltic states seeking to strengthen military co-operation with the U.S. would like to establish a multi-national military base or training centre where Americans along with other part-

ners can improve their military skills and mutual interaction. Together with shared Euro-Atlantic cultural values this would help to maintain the U.S. involvement. Thereby the U.S. would be interested in this prosperous and growing region, which could help in countering terrorism or providing support for international peace operations. Our co-operation can also develop and implement a common strategy towards Ukraine, Caucasus, and Central Asia as the U.S. expresses growing interest in these areas. Such ideas nevertheless inspired some scepticism expressed by our participants. They mentioned that the U.S. was planning to withdraw all her troops and bases from Germany. Under these plans, the U.S. would move her troops in Europe eastwards to countries such as Poland, the Czech Republic and the Baltic states. It is likely that the overall size of the deployment would be reduced, as the U.S. military changes priorities to a long-term engagement against international terrorism. Russian representatives reiterated that this might be legally done only in accordance

with the A-CFE Treaty's provisions. We therefore concluded that the U.S. role in the Baltic Sea region may be misunderstood or misinterpreted and no magic formula can be found.

To our mind, NATO enlargement includes a broader context and we even discussed the credibility of the Alliance. NATO must adapt itself to changes in the global security. We agreed that new threats largely posed by non-state actors are unpredictable and require global response. It was intended to set out priorities for developing the military capabilities of NATO's member states. These include protection against weapons of mass destruction, improvement of management skills, and the ability to transfer and mobilize forces. This means that NATO should include the forces required, suitable planning and appropriate procedures that will allow the efficient and decisive military presence at the right time. How can the small countries contribute? How should new members be encouraged to reform their armed forces in order to

address their national defence and contribute to collective operations? One of the solutions we came up with and which was attractive to the small countries was niche capabilities. For example the Baltic states together with the Nordic countries could be working together on creating small Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) or de-mining units. Namely, joint companies or rapid reaction platoons as well as conceptual expertise of military management would be very helpful to meet new requirements. However, the participants did not agree on what NATO needs to improve. Although, deployable forces should be a top priority of NATO as well as niche capabilities should be more suitable to the small countries, we had some striking points that NATO would need only well-equipped soldiers and the Baltic states would be ready to provide them very soon.

Taking into account new threats and a need to respond globally, we talked about the U.S. proposed plan to create a NATO Response Force. The plan, according to

some of our colleagues, must be compatible with the development of European crisis response forces within the scope of European security and defence policy. This generated an interesting discussion. What we discussed was the general function of both organizations in the security field and in particular the relationship between the EU and U.S. NATO still struggles to find its role in the post-Cold War environment as well as the EU is developing a defence dimension of its own with the intention to have military forces. We admitted that the EU has been able to develop its capabilities in the soft security field. This indicates specific strengths of the EU in the defence sphere, something that NATO lacks to a large extent. NATO's rapid reaction force would clearly introduce an element of disturbance in the duplication process between the EU and NATO. Conversely, the EU decision to extend the defence dimension may put stumbling blocks on the Trans-Atlantic way of co-operation. The dispute over Iraq and the International Criminal Court add some spokes in the transatlantic wheels.

The question raised whether it would be profitable for us if these organizations were going to work together? We agreed that the EU and NATO should act in a co-operative way rather than in a competitive one. However, some of us pointed out that the duplication would be unavoidable. Since we focused on the Baltic Sea region, the EU and NATO are quite different organizations in nature, and the Baltic states should exploit comparative advantages of both of them.

An important item we had on the agenda was related to the ripple effect of dual enlargement. The EU and NATO are distinct organizations in political and legal terms and pursue different objectives. Their enlargement can be regarded as the same process: it overcomes the dividing lines and unites countries sharing same values. Even though the enlargement process was mainly evaluated positive it might have negative consequences. The representative from Belarus explained to us that the EU and NATO enlargement was perceived as a deadlock creating a belt around

Belarus. Kaliningrad became a pilot project between the EU and Russia, excluding Belarus from negotiation despite it having been the main partner of the district.

The enlargement process naturally will include new regional co-operation initiatives and models. We vividly discussed the applicability of Baltic co-operation experiences and models to other regions, primarily to the South Caucasus and Ukraine. Trilateral co-operation among Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia in the field of defence has been an important factor in developing the Baltic states' defence capabilities within the framework of their preparation for NATO membership and strengthening the security in the Baltic Sea region. Our experience may be transferred to the other regions. Many participants agreed that the Baltic co-operation experience in itself was unique and valuable which could be well implemented and acceptable in the countries seeking to join the EU or NATO. Some participants estimated it with unconcealed reluctance. They argued that there were a lot of social prob-

lems to be solved in the regions that we would like to act upon. Will Georgia remain a single country after Shevardnadze? This is a highly important question. The elites of these countries have no vision to build a European Ukraine or Belarus. The role of the EU in the South Caucasus would not be successful because it normally works from the “outside” in order to prevent the crisis. In this case, we need a more American approach – to get into and stop the crisis from inside. This showed us that diversity of opinions could further initiate and produce new ideas that can help to export security to the other regions.

In the end of our roundtable, we discussed what has been said. Some of us pointed out that Russia remains in the same global boat and it could be a security donor as well as a tool solving the North-South dilemma. The problem in the relations between the EU and NATO is basically a misperception of threat. As the U.S. is seeking to get an equal partner in Europe she should emphasize co-op-

eration in order to dispel current distrust as well as European countries have to optimize the potential in the EU and NATO to become more reliable co-workers. With the enlargement of NATO at 26 and the EU at 25 we will get structural changes in the Baltic Sea region, which might be the end of the history of misperception. We still lack a strategy of co-operation, which will solve many problems. We came to the conclusion that the Baltic Sea region will remain important because it will co-operate from the inside, provide co-operation between Euro-Atlantic institutions, and pursue common strategies towards South Caucasus and other regions.

Lithuania's Foreign and Security Policy Agenda Beyond 2004: Challenges and Opportunities

by **Renatas Norkus***

An upcoming membership in the North Atlantic Alliance and European Union is about to bring an important qualitative change to foreign and security policies of Lithuania and the other Baltic states. This change is by no means unexpected, neither is it unplanned. It was enshrined into their policies from the very first years of re-established independence of the Baltic States in the early 1990s when all three countries clearly set their foreign and security policy agenda towards integration into the Western political economic and defence

institutions. This ultimate and long awaited goal will be met with formal membership in these two organizations in spring 2004.

This will be a truly historical achievement for the peoples of the three countries, and not the least for their young diplomacies. As much as there is plenty of reasons to celebrate a diplomatic victory, it is nonetheless important to realize (the earlier the better) that membership in the Euro-Atlantic institutions is going to require a substantially new quality from our countries, both in terms of

institutional and human capacities to perform the role of credible members, but most importantly, in terms of adapting our foreign and security policy postures to be able to grasp the opportunities and deal with challenges that membership of the EU and NATO is likely to present.

In this article I will attempt to present some sketchy thoughts and observations on the subject from an insider that has been involved in Lithuania's foreign and security policy formulation and implementation efforts during the last ten years. Given my rather limited insight in the

* Renatas Norkus is a Minister-Counselor of the Lithuanian Embassy in Washington.

institutional matters of the European Union, for most part my thoughts will centre on Lithuania's multilateral and bilateral security policy agenda in the context of upcoming NATO membership. The views expressed in this article are the author's and do not represent an official position of the Lithuanian government.

Realizing the change

For more than ten years, membership in NATO and the EU, as two predominant and equally important major objectives, have been naturally limiting Lithuania's foreign and security policy to be exercised largely by a single goal-oriented agenda. This is not to suggest, that other important foreign policy areas, such as bilateral relations with Poland, Russia, the United States, sub-regional Baltic and Nordic cooperation, or multilateral fora within the OSCE, Council of Europe and the UN have been neglected. Moreover, Lithuania has been active in promoting a so-called "good example policy" *vis-à-vis* Belarus, and for that matter trying to reach

out with experience sharing projects to countries like Georgia in Caucasus. Yet, despite our rightfully stated principle that "the goal of NATO membership is not an end in itself", it was the so called membership requirements, initially declared by the Alliance in NATO Enlargement Study of 1995, and later specified in the Membership Action Plan, that in many respects provided most of the incentives to Lithuania's foreign policy direction.

Obviously, it was a very prudent approach from the Alliance's perspective that has served NATO to earn a label of an institution with implicit conflict prevention and reform generating instruments in addition to its explicit function of collective defence. Such an approach has been useful to the membership seeking countries as well. The Alliance's exercised leverage helped Lithuania and other applicant countries to adopt and implement rather demanding defence reforms, support them with adequate human and financial resources, develop responsible bilateral agendas with its neighbours, and proceed with building free market

economy at home. The matter of the fact is that firstly, lacking that same leverage after joining NATO, Lithuania will have committed to carry out these policies and reforms with the same pace and dedication. This represents a serious responsibility which is well understood and accepted by the government in the spirit of overall progress and further development of the institutional capacities of the country. There has to be no doubt that Lithuania sees itself and wants to be seen by allies as a credible and trustworthy partner in the Alliance.

The second challenge, however, has to do with a nature of accustomed policy posture that is bound to change with a formal membership in the Alliance. The essence of that qualitative change is that the former objective, task and goal, namely membership of the Alliance (and obviously the EU), shall have become one of the means to help ensure its national security and economic welfare interests as well as determine Lithuania's place in international politics. This change is not going to affect the direction of our for-

eign and security policy. But I tend to argue that the ways and patterns of the conduct of our policy and its agenda will more than likely be modified.

Without the goal of membership (as the primary mission will be achieved) and having obtained a new status and quality in the international community, Lithuania is likely to face an increasing demand of a much broader focus on the world affairs. This will require a much more deliberate and sophisticated analysis and development of a national position on the issues that Alliance as a whole and its members individually are concerned with. On the other hand, as a new member, Lithuania will unquestionably have to deal with enormous institutional novelties and peculiarities that are going to demand a huge amount of human resources. It would be self-righteous to state that such a change is not going to be a challenge.

Importance of Trans-Atlantic link

Lithuania is formally joining the Trans-Atlantic partnership that has been

generally viewed by many observers as lately experiencing a rather visible crisis. It is not an exaggeration to say that differences between the U.S.-led coalition and some European nations over how to deal with Iraq's non-compliance with the UN resolutions have had some serious repercussions to the relations across the Atlantic, within Europe and NATO.

In February the allies had a tough debate in NATO about providing assistance to Turkey. In the end, support for Turkey's defence was provided. Most of the members would have preferred to make that decision at 19, instead of 18, but one country would not permit it. The disagreement was serious, and a delay to Turkey's request damaged the credibility of the Alliance.

Outside the Alliance, the US, UK, Germany, France, and Spain have come through another bruising battle in the UN Security Council concerning Iraq. These differences and policy disagreements, however, have sparked some unnecessary comments about perceived dis-

unity not only across the Atlantic, but also within Europe itself.

Various theories and images have been used to underline the perceived transatlantic rivalry, such as most widely commented Robert Kagan's statements that Americans are from Mars and Europeans from Venus and that the United States live in a Hobbesian world and Europe in a Kantian one. Others have spoken of a U.S. persistence on uni-polarity contrasted with a European preference for multipolarity, of the "continental drift" of societal values that will force the two sides of the Atlantic further apart, of separation and divorce, and so on.

Though admittedly many of these images and analyses contain a grain of truth, they just very little account for the ambiguous, complex and multilayered reality of the relationship between America and Europe as it is today and will remain in the future. Now, that the military phase of the war in Iraq is over and the defensive measures taken in Turkey have ended, America and Europe can look back at these disagreements and de-

bates against the backdrop of almost half a century of solid cooperation.

When it comes to core values and common goals, Europe and the United States have not parted ways. The Atlantic alliance is not at its end, and European and American security remains indivisible. While the approaches and strategies needed to accomplish common or individual national agendas have been the subject of much discussion and varying degrees of disagreement, I certainly do not believe that Americans and Europeans are, in effect, from two different and distinct planets.

Lithuania has always seen membership in NATO and the EU as complementary and never through an “either, or” formula. It is going to be our primary national interest, as a member of both organizations, to work with other members to make sure that the partnership between the United States and Europe remains strong and relevant. Most allies agree that a strong Trans-Atlantic link is more necessary than ever in a world as uncertain as ours is today. The driving principle for Lithuania and its allies indeed is that the

common values and interests which unite Europe and the United States are infinitely deeper than the differences that separate them. Lithuania’s objective is not to choose between Europe and America but to help protect Europe and project stability beyond Europe by keeping America engaged in the “old continent”.

Therefore, repairing and renewing Trans-Atlantic relations is not an impossible and rather a desirable task. To that end, the Euro-Atlantic community is bound to focus its immediate attention on forging joint strategies with respect to post-war Iraq reconstruction, the Israel-Palestine conflict and more generally the Greater Middle East, antiterrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. These are the agenda items that Lithuania and other Baltic states will have to devote much more attention to than they used to do before.

Perhaps one should be clear, however. It seems that one of the challenges Europe and America face is ‘understanding’ the threat. Every American who watched the World Trade Towers burn, crumble

and disintegrate, with thousands of people inside, and who watched the Pentagon in flames, knows what terrorism can bring to their home. This emotional reality leads Americans to conclude that terrorism must be eradicated – especially terrorism that seeks to exploit nuclear weapons, and other means of mass destruction.

Some in Europe see it differently. Some see terrorism as a regrettable but inevitable part of society and want to keep it at arms length and as low key as possible. However, this is a threat that Europe and America share and can only combat together.

The US Secretary of State Colin Powell said the following when testifying at the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee on NATO, on April 29, 2003:

“But we must not forget also that we are democracies in NATO. None of us follows blindly. We debate. We disagree. On those occasions when we disagree, we roll up our sleeves, put our heads together, and find the way to work things out. At the end of the day, that is our great strength. And that is why the trans-Atlantic link will not break. The glue of NATO is too strong and holds us too fast to let it break”.

The US engagement in the Baltic region: why and how?

Important part of Lithuania's priorities in the context of transatlantic cooperation will most obviously centre on how to keep the US engaged in the Baltic region, and specifically maintain its interest in continuous bilateral relations with Lithuania.

Lithuania has been traditionally regarded as one of the most pro-Atlantic countries in Central and Eastern Europe. Indeed, there are many historical and cultural ties that bond the US and Lithuania, not the least almost one million Lithuanian-Americans who have been active in the US both culturally and politically. Washington has never recognized Lithuania's incorporation into the Soviet Union. Lithuania has supported the US-led fight against global terrorism both diplomatically and in practical terms, including by joining the coalition for the war in Iraq. The United States were the leader of the NATO enlarge-

ment process to include the Baltic states and other new members last year. Decisions on enlargement, its smooth ratification in the US Senate, and the antiterrorist campaign have added impetus to the Lithuanian – US agenda.

But above all, one has to face the fact that in today's world, one power alone has a total and global reach and thus may play a global and leading role in ensuring peace and stability. The US have been willing to play that role. Moreover, after 9/11 terrorist attacks, the US undertook the responsibility to lead the fight against international terrorism. But for this mission to be successful, the US need allies and the cooperation of the international community. The challenge for America is to use its power so that it safeguards its interests and promotes its values for years and decades to come.

There is a growing concern that once the Baltic states are members of NATO, the US may essentially regard the Baltic issue as „fixed“ and disengage from the region. Indeed, there are signs of this already happening. The momentum behind

the Northern European Initiative has begun to wane in the last several years; the US-Baltic Charter, which served not only as an excellent framework to help Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania to prepare and join the Alliance, but also provided a good practical mechanism to conduct the Baltic – US bilateral military and economic cooperation on a daily basis, has been quietly declared as „mission accomplished“. Thus the challenge is to develop a new strategic agenda which can keep the US engaged in the Baltic region.

The new agenda might include two parallel tracks: 1) continue and enhance Lithuania's contribution to the war on terrorism, and 2) stabilize the immediate neighbourhood.

With regard to the first task, Lithuania will have to be proactive and try to find its role in the US broader foreign security policy agenda. It will be an imperative to continue active involvement in the antiterrorist coalition, including its military and civilian contribution to security forces in Afghanistan, reconstruction and stabilization efforts of Iraq, and eventu-

ally in other places where the US- or NATO-led operations might unfold in the future.

There might not be sufficient capacity and resources for a small country to sustain its military involvement in every future mission. However, it would clearly be in the interests of Lithuania, especially in terms of its efforts to pursue and maintain enduring partnership with the US, to have so called specific „niche“, be it military or civilian, in those activities.

By being a committed and credible ally sharing a burden of building stability and democracy in the Greater Middle East, Lithuania would most definitely also advance its bilateral agenda with the US. One may observe a common interest here, since the United States need allies supporting their agenda and (however modestly) helping in their efforts to fight terrorism.

Obviously, NATO is likely to further evolve so it can be a natural and most useful instrument, especially for Lithuania's military involvement in various operations. However, given its size and limited resources, Lithuania will also

need to explore regional and bilateral frameworks within and outside the Alliance. Working together with partners will increase Lithuania's weight both in NATO and in Washington.

In this context, Poland and the Nordic-Baltic Eight format will be the most logical partners to Lithuania for at least several major reasons. First, the latter group is one of the most pro-Atlantic countries in continental Europe. Secondly, all of them share largely the same or similar foreign and security policy agenda. Thirdly, after the NATO and EU enlargements in 2004, this regional group will represent an area of greater institutional geometric congruence in Europe's north. Fourthly, the Nordic countries are better organized than any other part of Europe. Fifthly, Poland is increasingly becoming a center of Washington's European link, at least from the US perspective. Given the latter, if the US military footprint shifts from Germany to include Poland, it will likely have a substantial new impact on political and military cooperation in the region. All these

factors will play as potential force multiplier that in turn is likely to make the region strategically more attractive to the United States.

Projecting stability to the East

This leads me to the second track of Lithuania's new agenda, namely projecting stability and assistance cooperation to the East.

A few words need to be said about Lithuania's relations with Russia. Some observers have been worried that NATO membership would make the task of improving cooperation between Lithuania and Russia harder. The dynamics of the relations between the two countries over the last five years, however, has been nothing but positive. Vilnius has stable political and good economic relations with Moscow. There are no issues as far as minorities are concerned. The recent accord on the travel arrangements for Russians travelling to and from Kaliningrad reached between Russia, Lithuania, and the EU, and the most recent ratification

by the Duma of the bilateral border agreement (both have taken place after the Prague decisions), are telling examples that Lithuanian – Russian relations have advanced in a positive and pragmatic manner, despite of, or even maybe because of, Lithuania's Trans-Atlantic integration.

Now, that Lithuania's long-term institutional security status has been resolved, Moscow is likely to show greater interest in strengthening its ties with Lithuania – just as it happened with Poland after it joined the Alliance. At the same time, NATO membership will solidify the self-confidence of the Lithuanian government and enable it to further explore bilateral ties.

Looking from a practical perspective, at least a good number of issues related to Russia will now be dealt with within the context of the NATO-Russia Council (or in case of some soft security questions – within the EU). This will provide Lithuania with an opportunity to bring its expertise and experience of its relations with Russia to the NATO table. Such a development should be favoured both by Russia and the old and new Allies.

An important change could also be expected in the area of military cooperation, possibly involving Kaliningrad. As Russia improves its relations with the US/NATO/Lithuania, some possible new military initiatives in the context of the EAPC and the NATO-Russia Council, as well as within the German-Danish-Polish-Baltic group, involving Russian forces could be developed in the future.

Lithuania's role and participation in projecting stability to the East is most likely to take different forms and objectives depending on the countries that Lithuania with its partners will be reaching out to.

There is no question that democratization of Belarus is likely to constitute a very important part of Lithuania's new foreign policy of good neighbourhood. It is likely to be in the primary interests of Lithuania to encourage the US Administration and the EU to make reform in Belarus among their top priority agenda items. Membership in both the EU and NATO will provide Lithuania with better means to address the issue of

Belarus and internationalize it more effectively.

On the other hand, most of the initiatives that Lithuania has begun in recent years vis-à-vis Belarus, such as youth seminars and lectures on economic and political reform, expanding human contacts with democratic opposition and support to civil society in Belarus will have to continue with a purpose of also providing a framework for an increasing involvement of the US, EU and Russia in those initiatives.

It is also in the interests of Lithuania to help Ukraine develop closer ties with NATO. Ukraine's closer integration with the West would undoubtedly influence reforms and changes in Belarus. Given the existence of a framework where Ukraine is involved in bilateral consultations with NATO, Lithuania will be in a position to take active part in the NATO-Ukraine commission, in addition developing some specific areas where the experience and expertise could be shared.

Lithuania has begun to take lead in developing a so-called Caucasus initiative.

Started as expanding Lithuania's bilateral agenda with Georgia, the initiative has a good potential to develop into a 3 (Baltic) + 3 (Caucasus) cooperation. The goals of the initiative could be to help Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan develop stronger market economies and stable democracies, and help them develop closer ties to NATO and the EU.

The main challenge for success of the Caucasus as a test for Baltic cooperation lies in the lack of political will among the three Caucasus countries to cooperate among themselves. On the other hand, the type of Baltic cooperation might serve as a good start to the healing of the wounds of somewhat uneven and at times rivalling relationships, especially between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Last, but not least, we still have the Vilnius-10 Group that has been extraordinarily successful in bringing seven new members to the Alliance. The V-10 had its common objective and a common goal-oriented agenda. It worked as a well-orchestrated mechanism, which helped coordinate joint action, develop a critical

mass and make the case of ten nations loud and clear.

The group will be a useful consultation instrument for the three Adriatic countries of Macedonia, Albania and Croatia as they proceed with up-coming membership preparations. Georgia and Ukraine have both shown interest in closer cooperation within the group as well. In this sense, the "grand mission" of the V-10 has not yet been accomplished. But the reality is that the long-term sustainability of the V-10 is less than obvious. The countries have quite different priorities. Without the common objective of membership, they do not share one another's foreign policy concerns to the same degree, and, as a group, it lacks significant resources.

All in all, it is obvious, that projecting stability and security to its neighbourhood – both immediate and more distant – will increasingly become Lithuania's foreign and security policy priority. The timing of and/or need for various previously discussed initiatives is likely to depend on two factors.

Firstly, it depends on the interest of the recipients and the dynamics of their internal readiness to accept such cooperation. The spread of experience, such as privatization, integration of national minorities, democratic control of the military forces, the fight against corruption and organized crime, legal and institutional mechanisms for the protection of human and civil rights and freedoms, etc. will be most effective when it is streamlined according to the interest of the receiving individual states and when it is coordinated with similar efforts of the nations providing such assistance.

Secondly, and not least importantly, it will depend on the readiness of Lithuania itself to extend the right type of outreach (not merely what is available, but what is exactly needed), and do it at the right time. This precondition is not to be underestimated for one important reason: Lithuania is going to be rather engaged in completing its own reforms – that work will be continuously requiring substantial human and financial resources. Therefore, the foreign and defence establish-

ments will have to balance their outreach intentions against the resources available.

Joining a New Old NATO

Lithuania is joining a long established Alliance which is being tested by international events and, most importantly, by the changing nature of threats. Like the end of the Cold War and the end of the World War II, September 11th was one of the relatively rare earthquakes that is likely to cause lasting tectonic shifts in international politics. The Alliance is known to have been rather adaptive to the changes since 1990s. At the same time, however, its *raison d'être* has been evolving to the point that Lithuania and other incoming members today are joining a much different organization compared to the one they applied for almost ten years ago.

Emphasis on „Out-of-Area“

The Alliance's concept of out-of-area operations, somewhat cautiously applied in the past, now clearly stands at the top of NATO's agenda. Indeed, with global

terrorism being the main threat today, there is no such thing as “out of area”. Until recently, the notion of NATO taking on a security role in Afghanistan would have been rejected by most as both unrealistic and undesirable. Yet the allies disproved doubts about relevance of NATO in the new security environment by acting recently to expand NATO's role in Afghanistan and by agreeing to provide support for Poland in the stabilization force in Iraq. Future similar roles for the Alliance might possibly be considered in the Middle East.

NATO members will increasingly have to be prepared to focus their energies beyond Europe – a reality that will require that member nations possess military forces with the capability to go and fight beyond Europe. These requirements equally apply to the new members as to the old. In fact, there is a notion that NATO's incoming members should plan to join „the Alliance of 10 years from now“, not today's NATO.

NATO's Prague summit in November 2002 represented a major step forward in

the transformation of the Alliance into one that is able to deal with the strategic challenges of the 21st century, including those that arise outside the traditional NATO area .

The decision to establish a NATO Response Force (NRF) promises to provide the Alliance the ability to quickly deploy a force capable of executing the full range of missions NATO may be called upon to undertake. If implemented to the standards proposed, the NRF will be lethal, technically superior to any envisioned threat, and readily deployable on short notice. The goal for initial operational capability for training is October 2004, with full operational capability proposed by October 2006.

In Prague, Heads of State and Government also approved the Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC) as part of an effort to create minimal necessary capabilities to deal with a high threat environment. Individual allies have made firm commitments to improve capabilities in the areas of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear technologies (CBNR);

intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition; air-to-ground surveillance; C3; combat effectiveness; strategic air and sea lift; air-to-air re-fuelling; and deployable combat support and combat service support elements.

The PCC and NRF will allow Lithuania to focus on “niche” specialization as a way to extend national and multinational capabilities and fill a certain gap. This translates into a practical aim for Lithuania’s defence establishment, namely to develop more capable, deployable and sustainable forces that can contribute to the full range of Alliance missions. When put in perspective, the plans are to:

- achieve an initial operational capability, a fully capable battalion prepared to deploy in support of NATO operations, by the time of accession to the Alliance;
- develop an interim operational capability, the ability to rotate deployed battalions to support longer term commitments, by the end of 2008;
- and reach full operational capability, the entire structure manned, equipped and operational, by the end of 2014.

Recently, 44 Lithuanian infantry servicemen started their mission under command of the Danish Forces in the UK-controlled sector to the North - East of Basra. The unit’s mission includes a number of tasks ranging from keeping the public order, patrolling and protection to service at checkpoints.

Preparations for another Lithuanian contingent of 45 troops to be deployed to Iraq to act in the sector under the Polish Armed Forces control are well underway as well. A few months earlier, Lithuania also provided a special forces unit in support of the United States forces in Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan.

Lithuanian contributions to operations in and around the former Yugoslavia include one motorized infantry company (95 personnel) on a rotational basis with Estonia and Latvia (previously in SFOR but next Lithuanian rotation will be in KFOR in August 2003), one infantry platoon (30 personnel) as part of the Ukrainian-Polish Battalion in KFOR, and one An-26 light transport aircraft (seven

personnel) operating from Naples in support of SFOR/KFOR. Lithuania also provides one military observer for the OSCE mission in Georgia, and plans to contribute one officer to the EU-led mission in FYROM.

This is by no means an unimpressive pool of active forces in operations given Lithuania’s size and resources. All the missions that the country is currently involved in serve important Lithuanian interests and help the efforts of the US-led coalition to confront the threat of terrorism. But with only few exceptions most Lithuanian units lack national logistic support. Lithuanian soldiers in the Persian Gulf have their personal equipment and NBC protection kits, but they had to fully rely on the APCs and vehicles from Denmark, which is also rendering medical assistance and treatment.

There is no question that for our participation in international missions to be more effective, Lithuania needs to focus on the development of a streamlined and highly responsive logistics system that supports not only in-place but also de-

ployed forces. This might come at the expense of the quantity of Lithuania's engagements overseas, but on balance it might be the price worth paying.

In practical terms, and based on its experience, Lithuania is committed, by 2004, to be able to effectively deploy and sustain an infantry battalion and offer a special operation forces squadron, an engineer platoon and a team of medical personnel as special capabilities to the Alliance missions. Taking into account future NATO requirements through the NATO Force Planning Process, Lithuania will have to further consider its contribution to the NRF.

International contingents such as Lithuanian - Polish battalion (LITPOLBAT) as well as BALTBAT, BALTRON and BALTNET will have to be utilized in the context of membership in the Alliance. As an example, BALTRON could naturally become a part of the NATO Mine Counter Measures (MCM) Force North. Similarly, BALTNET will be integrated into the NATO Integrated Enhanced Air Defence System. BALTDEFCOL will con-

tinue to be the valuable institution helping prepare Lithuania's senior staff officers for national and, now, NATO positions.

Article 5

Despite the changing emphasis in the priorities of the Alliance, its core mission remains collective defence. Therefore, it is both NATO's and Lithuania's responsibility to ensure that Article 5 is not just a "hollow" paper commitment.

It is not the purpose of this paper to go into the debate on NATO's options for defending Lithuania and the other Baltic states, for it is too significant to be dealt with in just a paragraph or two. A couple of observations, however, would be appropriate.

Firstly, understanding that although, due to the factors described earlier, the Alliance's attention is likely to focus on 'out of area' activities, it is Lithuania's interest to develop an allied consensus on Baltic defence plans. It is important also in terms of timing, as NATO's decisions on defence plans will have to precede

Lithuania's becoming party to the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE). Indeed, the Baltic states cannot be expected to define their CFE levels until they know how NATO's collective defence arrangement is going to work and how much Treaty Limited Equipment they will need.

Secondly, any collective defence arrangements vis-à-vis Lithuania are going to relate to the changes that are being implemented with regard to NATO's command structure. At Prague, important decisions have been taken that will allow to reduce operational commands from 23 to 16. It will provide NATO commanders with headquarters that are more mobile, joint and interoperable.

Internally, Lithuania is set to move away from the concept of territorial defence. There is a plan to reassign the territorial units from their current territorial defence tasks and missions in order to ensure that these elements, albeit reduced in size, are more capable and able to contribute to the overall strength of the Lithuanian Armed Forces. Their role will

be to facilitate the reception and onward movement of Allied reinforcements to Lithuania, protect the key points/objects and assist the civil authorities as and when requested. It is likely that Lithuania will be moving in the direction of a more professional force. By the end of 2008 the number of conscripts will be reduced to some 2000 to meet the requirements of the new force structure.

An important priority in terms of practical preparation for collective defence, as Lithuania begins to operate within the Alliance, will be to establish necessary Host Nation Support arrangements. This task will certainly require some substantial investments and proactive co-operation in dealing with the NATO Security and Infrastructure Programme (NSIP).

To effectively continue its international military engagements as part of NATO or within the coalitions of the willing Lithuania will be required to maintain such level of defence expenditures that is sufficient, but, more importantly, rightly invested to support the defence reform,

restructuring and modernization of the armed forces.

There is a solid political and public support in Lithuania that the defence sector's budget shall not be less than 2% of GDP. It is the opinion of this author, however, that Lithuanian people still lack the understanding that allocating resources for defence is an investment into Lithuania's national security. The largely predominant view that a "2 percent" was a requirement by NATO for Lithuania to be admitted will have to change if we want to win a genuine public support for Lithuania's pro-active foreign and security policy.

The Driving Logic Behind the Defence Reform in Lithuania: Building the Future Military

By Kestutis Paulauskas*

Any reform is a painful, costly and challenging endeavour, particularly in the defence sector. Defence reform encompasses strategic review, force restructuring and task rescheduling. For the military personnel it means irregular rotation, reassignments, closure or redeployment of military bases, sometimes dismissal and the end of career. Military are for this reason usually inclined to resist changes guided by civilian leadership, and reform initiative rarely occurs from within the military

establishment. At the same time defence reform is an inevitable, necessary and continuous process. In an ever-changing security environment a country can maintain an efficient military capability and adequate level of combat readiness only if it is responsive and flexible enough to quickly adapt its military establishment to new conditions. Otherwise a country may find itself less than ready in the wake of new severe security threats. This assumption can be substantiated by many historical examples: the Roman empire was

not ready for the invasion of the barbarians, kingdoms of Europe were not ready to deal with the mass army of Napoleon, European democracies failed to contain modern military power of Nazi Germany, the Baltic states were helpless in the face of Soviet aggression and, likewise, even the United States were not ready for September 11th despite heavy investment in their defence. And still the environment changes more often and faster than the states' ability to adjust their policies. Although there is always a certain

* Mr. Kestutis Paulauskas is a desk officer at the Defence Policy Division, Defence Policy and Planning Department, Ministry of National Defence of Lithuania.

likelihood of unexpected outbreak of some new unforeseen contingency, lessons learned from the past mistakes reduce this kind of risk.

Invitation of seven Central and Eastern European states to join NATO during the Prague summit greatly affected the overall strategic landscape of Europe and the defence and security policy of the new invitees. Lithuania, as well as other countries, got new impetus to restructure and modernize its armed forces. In parallel with the accession negotiations between the Alliance and Lithuania, which were concluded with the signature of Accession protocols in March 2003, the defence reform in Lithuania acquired a rather rapid pace. By the end of 2003, Lithuania expects to complete an extensive force structure review and to identify defence planning assumptions and guidelines up to 2014.

This article discusses the reasons, principles and objectives of the ongoing transformation of the Lithuanian Armed Forces. The article also tackles the changing nature of security threats and the

missions that the military must be enabled to assume in the 21st century. It attempts to explain the logic behind the bold decisions Lithuania took following the Prague summit on abandoning its decade-old territorial defence posture and reviewing its total defence concept.

Reform background

Defence planning in Lithuania has undergone four modes. The initial period saw the creation of the armed forces “from scratch”. The first conscripts of the Lithuanian National Defence Volunteer Force (NDVF) and the former officers of the Soviet army became the backbone, which constituted the nascent Lithuanian Armed Forces. Defence planning at this stage was rather eclectic. The NDVF structure was highly politicized, some elements among the officer corps were heavily engrained with Soviet military doctrine, and equipment and weapons came mostly from donations. During this period the top priorities of defence policy agenda were establishing the basics of the demo-

cratic control and depolitization of the armed forces. At the same time, an all pervasive fear of recuperation of Soviet expansionism still persisted in the public. However, this fear started to fade with the failed coup in Russia and was further diminished with the withdrawal of Russian troops by the end of August, 1993. In 1994 Lithuania officially applied to join NATO and signed up to the Partnership for Peace programme. In 1996 Lithuania sent its troops to Bosnia and Herzegovina under the flag of NATO. In the same year the Law on the Basics of National Security was adopted. The Law set national security objectives and the basic principles of military defence. The concepts of total and unconditional self-defence and civil resistance were explicitly established as the main defence planning principles. These concepts signified a threat-based approach to the planning of the force structure. In other words, the Lithuanian armed forces and civil society had to be prepared for the worst-case scenario – a massive territorial aggression against the sovereignty of the Re-

public of Lithuania. With NATO membership being a rather distant prospect and security environment far from stable and predictable, this territorial, unconditional self-defence posture perfectly made sense.

The first round of NATO enlargement and the adoption of the Membership Action Plan for other prospective candidates including Lithuania, triggered another shift in planning assumptions. Although total self-defence and civil resistance remained at the core of defence planning, a directed and consistent guidance from NATO did encourage certain reforms of the defence establishment. With anticipation of NATO membership and related collective defence guarantees, the rationale for a threat-based approach was not so obvious anymore. Therefore Lithuania had to turn towards a capabilities-based defence planning approach in looking for ways of the most efficient utilization of limited resources. In practice it meant focusing on specific most necessary capabilities rather than developing all-around military. For example,

Lithuania started to procure anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons instead of wasting resources on a few costly battle tanks or fighters as did some other Central European countries. Actually Lithuania has never fully implemented a threat-based defence planning approach due to objective constraints of resources.

Finally, a sequence of very significant events - the tragedy of 9/11, rapprochement between Russia and NATO, and the NATO transformation summit in Prague, as well as the invitation to join the Alliance - has led to another major breakthrough in defence planning of Lithuania. After adoption of the National Security Strategy in May 2001 Lithuania commenced a review of its National Military Strategy. This strategy due to be adopted in 2003, reassesses the strategic environment of Lithuania and the threats to security. Building on a threat assessment, the missions and tasks of the Lithuanian Armed Forces are also outlined in the strategy. In parallel with the review of the military strategy, Lithuanian MND with the assistance of an American team of ex-

perts from the CUBIC Applications Inc. launched an extensive force structure review and assumed a scenario-based approach. This approach aims at identifying the most probable threat development scenarios and the capabilities Lithuania needs to counter these threats. Having defined the objective force necessary, the most glaring shortfalls are singled out and subsequent defence planning is directed towards closing those gaps as much as possible.

To sum up, NATO invitation, reassessment of threats and a new approach to defence planning has prompted abandoning the territorial defence posture that Lithuania has been nurturing throughout the years of independence, and restructuring of the armed forces to carry out new missions.

***Total self-defence vs.
collective defence***

During his visit to Vilnius after the Prague summit, the US President G. W. Bush declared that “in the face of aggression, the brave people of Lithuania, Latvia

and Estonia will never again stand alone". It is difficult to overestimate the importance of these words to the overall security perspective of Lithuania. Collective defence guarantees constitute an essential difference between the Lithuanian defence policy prior to Prague and after Prague.

Taking into account this new reality, Lithuania has undertaken the review of total and unconditional self-defence concept, upon which the whole strategy of deterrence and credible defence was built. It is not to say that the Lithuanian Armed Forces from now on will not be credible or that defence will not be unconditional. Quite the contrary, the Lithuanian Armed Forces will be more capable than ever before. In the case of aggression the role of the Armed Forces will be reinforcement of NATO's collective defence operations rather than defence of the whole territory. Therefore, territorial units must be restructured, reserve forces significantly reduced, and the total mobilization concept revised.

It is a piece of self-evident truth that Lithuania with its limited resources can-

not be a full-fledged member actively taking part in most of the Alliance's operations and at the same time maintaining numerous immobile territorial defence forces. When a man has a big umbrella, he does not need a smaller one beneath it. It is more efficient to reinforce the strings of the big umbrella. Ultimately it is a matter of trust in the Alliance and in the allies. If Lithuania entered a collective defence treaty but continued the build up of its forces as if it had to defend alone, the membership quite simply would not make sense. In that case one would have to ask if deterrence by Lithuania as a non-aligned country is more persuasive than the deterrence by Lithuania as a NATO Ally? For 40 years NATO has been a successful deterrent of the Soviet Union. Is it possible that NATO could not deter any hypothetical aggressor who can by no standards be seen as equal to the military power that the Soviet Union enjoyed?

However, it is also symptomatic that NATO evoked both Article 4 (on request from Turkey) and Article 5 (in reaction to September 11th) after the end of the

Cold War. The nature of threats is changing, and so is the Alliance. The Prague summit, which was destined to be an enlargement summit, turned out to be the Alliance's transformation summit. The new members are not joining the same Alliance they aspired to join 10 years ago. The Alliance transformation formula presented by Secretary General Lord Robertson is leaner, more mobile, more capable and responsive NATO forces of tomorrow. Although Article 5 remains intact, with the creation of NATO Response Force the Alliance has undertaken an "out of area" posture, which embodies the common sense that NATO must have a role in anti-terrorism to remain relevant in the contemporary world. The NATO Response Force is expected to be a technologically advanced, flexible, deployable, interoperable, and sustainable force, including land, sea and air elements, ready to move quickly wherever needed.

After all, NATO enlargement is indeed a certain mechanism for defence reform in Lithuania rather than its cause. The underlying causes of the defence reform

rest with the overall strategic landscape around Lithuania and assessments of the threats posed.

***Peculiarities and ambiguities
of threat assessment***

There is a recurring misperception in the public and the media that reform of the Lithuanian Armed Forces is pursued as a NATO requirement. Moreover, some critics argue that the two percent of GDP assigned to the defence budget is wasted to satisfy some mystical NATO standards or pay for costly international operations in remote regions that have little to do with Lithuanian security. As discussed in the previous paragraph, collective defence guarantees undoubtedly affect defence planning assumptions, however, in practice defence planning first and foremost rests on threat assessment.

As the widely used cliché reads: following the collapse of the Soviet Union, a threat of a major conventional war withered away. The Baltic Sea area does seem to be as peaceful and stable as never be-

fore. According to NATO a possibility of an incidence of a military conflict in our region is very low to non-existent. Although there are some possible sources for regional tension, only some unimaginable political earthquake in the region or fundamental tectonic shifts in the international security system could lead to an escalation of a major crisis. Even in this case there would be a long warning time and a lot of indications of irregular military activity in the region, which would allow a timely start of NATO's operational planning and actual defence.

However, the controversy that surrounded the issue of Turkey's defence does provide some ground for concern. Yet Turkey's case clearly indicated the need to improve NATO's decision making process, and certain moves in this direction are very likely, especially given the expansion to 26 members. At the end of the day, Turkey's defence was planned and started despite all the controversies.

Another major question is how quickly NATO would be able to respond to a major military threat in the region. The

answer to this simple question is vital to the defence policy of Lithuania and the other Baltic states. The vision of a new NATO most insistently pursued by the United States sees the Alliance willing and capable to take pre-emptive and preventive actions against any potential threat. Many in Europe are rather cautious about this approach and doubt the legitimacy of preventive military engagement. They would prefer to stick with the old reactive rather than proactive NATO. Restructuring and modernization of the Lithuanian Armed Forces fall perfectly in line with the vision of the new transformed NATO. If the vision of the old NATO prevailed, Lithuania and other Baltic states would need to have initial self-defence capabilities. Meanwhile, the current force structure review of Lithuania is not projecting self-defence against a major aggression in the absence of NATO reinforcement.

Up till now, the "old" approach was predominant within NATO and prevented its involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq at an early stage (not to mention political

disagreements between the allies in the latter case). Coalitions of the willing may provide a temporary salvation in an immediate crisis but only such permanent collective defence or even security arrangements as NATO can be a long-term solution. Both the US and its European allies seem to understand this and the new NATO Response Force appears to embody this understanding.

After all, major conventional conflict in the Baltic Sea region is a very remote and highly unlikely possibility, which in a scenario-based planning approach can be excluded to divert resources to more likely scenarios. This assumption alerts to such challenges as terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, natural or industrial disasters, illegal migration etc. It would be dangerous to dismiss these challenges assuming that the countries around the Baltic Sea are unlikely targets of, for example, international terrorism, especially given their active participation in the US-led global campaign against terrorism. Although this region is more stable than the Balkans or the Middle East,

isolation and disregard of pending international security issues elsewhere would only decrease the regional security of the Baltic Sea area as there is always a potential conflict “spill-over” effect from the troubled regions. Ultimately, it is a matter of Euro-Atlantic solidarity: countries that do not assist their allies in cases of need should not expect assistance when they get into trouble.

Most of the “new” challenges are not military in a traditional sense. What should the role of the Armed Forces be in dealing with them?

***The new role and missions
of the Armed Forces***

In the past century the main mission of the military was deterrence and defence of the territory against potential enemies. Although deterrence remains an important function of the armed forces, the face of the enemy is changing: the main source of the potential threat is no longer the armed forces of another state, but non-state actors, supported and hosted by au-

thoritarian regimes, that use non-conventional forms of warfare and are hardly deterred by traditional means. These sources do not threaten state’s territory but rather target vulnerable civilian facilities or civilians themselves. By using modern means of information, communication and transportation terrorists can strike anytime without warning and anywhere from Bali to Moscow. It is for this reason that prevention becomes almost the only way to deal with non-state actors and regimes that nurture international terrorism.

The changing face of the enemy raises a double challenge to the armed forces. They need to reorient themselves from the traditional task of Homeland defence to less noble missions like protection of civilian sites or assistance to civilian authorities and police. On the other hand, terrorism, proliferation of the WMD, spots of ethnic or religious tension and violence raise far more demanding tasks to the military high intensity crisis response and peace operations. To fulfill these missions, the armed forces must be ready:

1) Inside the country to work closely with civilian authorities and police in cases of terrorist attack and other emergencies that may require military response;

2) Smoothly to carry out crisis response operations within multinational forces;

3) In peace operations, to deal with a foreign civilian society that sometimes might be hostile.

New missions of the Armed Forces imply a new image of a soldier who must not only be well-trained in military terms, but also well educated (e.g. be aware of international relations), know foreign languages, and be an expert of civil-military relations – in other words versatile. Large conscript armies were well suited for a long front line, while when faced with the current threats small multi-role highly capable and mobile units are indispensable. Modern armed forces do cost money. The main financial sources for modernization within the budgetary constraints are reductions of unneeded territorial forces and reserves with low level of readi-

ness, disposal of unnecessary infrastructure and outdated weaponry and technology but, above all, rational and efficient resource management.

New missions raise new operational requirements. The future military of NATO must be interoperable and credible forces capable of executing collective defence and crisis response operations. The forces must be able to deploy whenever and wherever needed to prevent a crisis and sustain themselves in the area of operation with or without host nation support. They must be able to apply decisive force in combat, based on timely intelligence and have adequate force protection capabilities, including protection against NBC weapons. Last but not least, interoperability is crucial in order to operate smoothly in a combined manner and to prevent the losses caused by “friendly fire”.

***Main principles and guidelines
of defence reform in Lithuania***

The changing security landscape around Lithuania, new perceptions of the

role and missions of the military and highly demanding operational requirements are the main catalysts of the modernization of the Lithuanian Armed Forces. The future military means modern command, control and communication systems, modern intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities, modern equipment and weaponry, and joint rapid reaction forces.

The basic principles of the defence reform in Lithuania are the following:

- Improving capabilities and quality rather than building new territorial structures and increasing quantity;
- Creating smaller but more capable and rapidly deployable units;
- Improving the capabilities necessary to carry out collective defence and other missions together with NATO forces;
- Keeping the balance between the defence plans and resources available to implement them.

In line with these principles, the main guidelines of the defence reform implementation encompass:

➤ *Downsizing the overall structure of the Armed Forces*¹ in the following way:

	2003	2008
Professionals	8100	8311
Conscripts	4500	2000
Active reserve	9000	6500
Cadets	430	250

¹ Structure approved by the Parliament of Lithuania in June 2003. See the Law on the Principal Structure of the Armed Forces for 2003-2008, available on-line: <http://www3.lrs.lt/cgi-bin/preps2?Condition1=212547&Condition2=>

➤ *Development of one reaction brigade* with all supporting elements (by 2008). Until Prague Lithuania was planning to maintain three brigades: one reaction brigade and two military districts with one brigade each. The plan was ridiculed by NATO as unrealistic and not based on resources. NATO officials repeatedly insisted that the Alliance does not need territorial forces for collective defence operations. Therefore Lithuania made a move to reorganize the two military districts into one Homeland security command (KASP) to save scarce resources for the reaction brigade and deployable battalions. The Reaction Brigade structure encompasses the Headquarters with sup-

port and combat support companies, two mechanized infantry battalions, two motorized infantry battalions, and an Artillery battalion.

➤ *Development of one deployable and sustainable infantry battalion* (Rukla battalion) for the full spectrum of Alliance's missions together with niche capabilities – special operation forces, engineers and medics (by the end of 2004). The Rukla battalion will be fully professional due to its potential deployment missions.

➤ *Relieving territorial units from territorial defence mission* to provide host nation support for Allied forces, carry out protection of strategic facilities and key sites and assist the civilian authorities in disaster

relief and facilitate individual and sub-unit deployment. The proposed structure of the Homeland Security Command includes two Security battalions, a Transportation Support battalion, an Engineer battalion, a Signal company and a Medical company.

➤ *Creation of a highly responsive logistics system* that could support all services in any operation in and outside the country. Improving logistics is absolutely essential for Lithuania to be a full-fledged ally capable of contributing to any NATO mission. The Logistic Support Command will encompass Headquarters, a main support battalion (for all services), a forward support battalion for the Reaction brigade, military police and cartographic services.

➤ *Restructuring of the basic training system* to adjust to the requirements of the new force structure. The Training and Doctrine Command will consist of the Headquarters, Training Regiment with two battalions, and training schools, centers and polygons.

➤ *Improving counter-terrorist capabilities.* This task is assigned to the newly estab-

lished Special Operations Command, which consists of the Jaeger battalion and a Special Operations unit.

➤ *Ensuring sea and air surveillance and control.* Lithuania will maintain small but efficient Navy and the Air Force. Navy will be centred around high readiness mine counter-measures and patrol crafts capable of participating in Article 5 and crisis response operations. The Air Force will carry out search and rescue operations, tactical airlift, and ground-based air defence of key sites. However, air policing and air defence remain a problem that Lithuania will have to address in the future.

➤ *Procurement of cutting-edge weapons and technologies* that meet NATO requirements. Procurement priorities include anti-tank, anti-aircraft weapons, tactical communications, transport vehicles etc. 20-25 % of the defence budget is earmarked for arms procurement and upgrading in the future.

The ultimate vision of the Lithuanian Armed Forces after the restructuring and modernization is a small, modern, well-

equipped, well-trained, mobile, deployable and sustainable force, able to participate in the full spectrum of Alliance's operations.

Conclusion

The effect of NATO membership on Lithuanian defence policy is indeed profound as it constitutes a fundamental qualitative change in the overall security situation of Lithuania. However one should not be misled in that the decision taken by Lithuania to abandon territorial defence posture is a reckless implementation of NATO orders. NATO did encourage Lithuania as well as other candidate countries and current members themselves to move away from territorial defence concept and structures. This article reinforced the case for a clear rationale behind this decision: the first reason being major offensive military operations against NATO having become highly unlikely; the second being NATO's collective defence posture as an efficient deterrent to any potential adversary; the third being - if

attack on a NATO country did occur, NATO would react as a collective defence alliance under the Article 5 commitment (regardless of the format used - NAC or DPC - to make the political decision).

After all, the debate on total self-defence vs. collective defence is only partly relevant to the future NATO and the future Armed Forces of Lithuania. NATO and Lithuania as a soon-to-be ally of NATO must shake off the shadows of the past and get ready to meet the unpredictable future, which calls for combined joint multi-role rapid reaction forces highly capable to counter any contingency anywhere in the world where international peace and security is at stake and NATO security interests are threatened.

Security Options of the Baltic States After the Gulf War II

By Erik Männik*

Introduction

After I was offered to make a short contribution to the Baltic Defence Review regarding the latest developments in the European, transatlantic and global security, I did what researchers usually do when they are asked to present their opinion on future developments – I looked at the ranges of possible developments defined by various international relation theories. The outcome, I must admit, was a bit confusing. In brief it can be expressed by these quotations:

‘...Adherents and critics of the two leading paradigms of international relations, realism and liberalism, did not succeed in explaining adequately, let alone predicting, the peaceful end of Cold War and the breakup of the Soviet Union’

(Katzenstein 1996: 499)

‘...One can almost always identify post hoc, a norm to explain given behaviour’

(Kowert & Legro 1996: 486)

The latter approach is aimed at social constructivism that is the theory flourishing in the post-Cold War period.

These statements may look even more depressing in the light of finding that

the system level’s variables play a key role in explaining the foreign policies of small states, in other words, small state policies are first of all influenced and determined by their external environments (Hey 2003: 186-187).

Thus, while in need of some sort of understanding of the latest international developments at the systemic level, we seem to have only limited theoretical tools to do that. One way out of this situation is to infer trends in international politics on the basis of the latest developments and hereafter evaluate the policy options of the Baltic states.

* Erik Männik came to the Centre for Research in International Security at Manchester Metropolitan University as a visiting researcher in early 2001. He was previously Head of the Defence Policy Planning Bureau in the Estonian Ministry of Defence. From the end of 2001 he has been undertaking doctoral research on Estonia and NATO.

What have we seen?

The political reason for asking questions about one's viewpoint is based on the dynamics and outcome of the bargaining process in the United Nations' Security Council (UNSC) that led to the adoption of Resolution No 1441, preceding the military campaign.

There are many related issues to that bargaining. The first is about motives. What were the actual motivations behind the opposition against military actions by the US-led coalition and what reasons exactly led to the use of force? Was it about war against terrorism, self-defence against weapons of mass destruction (WMD), oil and a potential general reshuffling of the oil market, geopolitics and spheres of influence, enforcing international law, protecting human rights or following the will of growing Muslim communities in different countries? The official (that is, declared) reason for the military campaign was insufficient Iraqi cooperation with the UN weapons inspectors who searched for WMD, and it remains to

be shown by the coalition's inspectors that there actually were serious substantiated reasons to accuse Iraq for not cooperating with the UN and for hiding WMD.

The second important issue related to bargaining was its dynamics. The way it was conducted – quick changes in situation, new initiatives emerging on almost a daily basis, the US activities aimed at getting information before the other members of the UNSC, and quick alternating seizures of initiative – has potentially very serious ramifications for small states. Interestingly, even after the end of the active military campaign, the global political situation is still potentially volatile – depending on whether the coalition's experts actually find WMD in Iraq.

In general, we already witnessed the second major armed conflict without the UNSC's sanction/resolution. The great power's votes in the UNSC were cast differently this time (in comparison to the situation in Kosovo in 1999) – a majority of them opposed the action, France being the one who decisively tilted the balance. The destiny of the UN as a whole is also becom-

ing less certain – the continuing problems with the export of Iraqi oil and legitimizing the intermediate Iraqi administration have potential to deepen the existing gap.

According to the statement of the US Secretary of State, the “coalition of the willing” (45 states) was larger than the one, which fought in the first Gulf War. However, it contained fewer major powers and more small states. Is this such a straightforward Realpolitik as it looks at first glance? That is, a security-autonomy trade-off between supporting small states and the only remaining superpower in the world? This question will probably be exhaustively answered in due time when more evidence has been accumulated regarding the respective political decisions.

Another crucial bargaining process took place in NATO. The Belgian position blocked initially the deployment of “Patriot” missiles to Turkey, and it may be very important in showing that (at least some) “older” small states have evolved to the point where they make an absolute adherence to international law the foundation of their policies. Belgium may be

an example of such a small state having no particular security concerns any more and thus engaging herself increasingly in the promotion of international law (e.g. by attempting to legally prosecute the Israeli Prime Minister and some heads of the Israeli governmental agencies).

The other important aspect of bargaining in NATO was Turkey's rejection of providing her territory for the US forces for launching an attack on Iraq from the North. Does it show that NATO is at best becoming a pool of potential members for the future "coalitions of the willing"? What sort of political unity is there within NATO? This question becomes even more important considering that the values of NATO members have not (at least visibly) changed – they are still democratic countries with ostensibly very similar sets of values.

The question about the observed developments could be even more relevant from the military perspective. The speed of advance, the corresponding logistics' miracles, the precision and lethality of used weapon systems leave the representative of a small state simply wondering what

might be the latest meaning of the term "capability gap". It is not only a huge gap between the US and her current NATO allies, but it looks simply immeasurable and totally beyond bridging in regards to the states that were invited to join NATO in Prague in November 2002.

Another aspect related to military action is about planning. Was the conflict predetermined? The concentration of forces was initiated long before the bargaining in the UNSC reached the decisive stages and the coalition members' political leaders assured the public right up to the twelfth hour that the conflict was not inevitable. Does it indicate that until the end of the bargaining in the UNSC there was a true willingness to cancel an invasion? If so, what levels of readiness, deployability, and mobility are required from the forces of future members of the "coalitions of the willing"? How were military planning and other military activities related to the bargaining process in the UNSC? This question has actually a great importance for invited small states, because under similar circumstances they would have to make

hard decisions about committing their troops to possible operations with problematic legitimacy (that is, adopting an aggressive/assertive foreign policy in the frameworks of "coalitions of the willing").

Presented list of different features of the latest developments is sketchy and it shows that, as of now, there are by far more questions than answers. With regard to possible evolving trends in international politics, I would like to outline the following:

1) This was the second consecutive failure of the UN to reach consensus on the large-scale use of military force against a sovereign state; in addition, the full range of motives that influenced different countries to support or oppose the use of force remains unclear;

2) There is a continuously growing gap between military capabilities of the US and the rest of the world;

3) There is a potential long-term loss of unity in NATO whereas the values of different members of the Alliance remain unchanged (although this loss might not be so permanent);

4) Acceleration: the speed and intensity of bargaining processes and war fighting seem to be ever-growing in the information society;

5) Small states' support provided considerable legitimacy for the US-led action.

“A brave new world”?

To establish the implications of the outlined trends for small states, one must determine how they shape the international system, because the latter is the main variable influencing the policies of the small states.

The trends outlined above point in the direction of an increasingly “realist” world where states prefer to follow their own interests and where they are not afraid of confronting each other and the remaining superpower at the political level. Such fearlessness is probably based on the common belief in “democratic peace” and economic interdependence. Will these beliefs, shared values, and economic factors exclude the possibility of a (accidental or intentional) military conflict or coercive use of force between democratic states?

That is not at all clear in view of evolving threats to security and existing different views on how to deal with them.

The ever-increasing speed of developments leaves the political initiative in the hands of the remaining superpower (the country able to apply more resources than any other to achieve her politico-military goals). The ongoing “war against terrorism” is likely to amplify the global influence of the US.

With the background of that strategic trend, it is possible to discern smaller developments like the Gulf War II. In fact, would it not be justified to say that the “coalition of the willing” had had any political importance only for six to eight weeks, and now, as it has done its job, it may dissolve in peace leaving first of all the US to deal with the Iraqi problems? Thus, I would suggest that future developments will be likely evolving as rapidly or even faster, considering the development of various capabilities.

The growing international weight of the US is likely to transform NATO from an alliance based on shared values and aimed at collective defence/security into one that rather serves the task of promot-

ing mainly the interests of the US. The respective theoretical model has been outlined by James Morrow who proposed that great powers use alliances to pursue their interests and change or preserve the status quo in international politics. Weaker alliance members can offer to great powers concessions (military bases, coordination of foreign and domestic policies, etc) for increased security. Therefore, in Morrow's words: ‘...alliances can advance diverse, but compatible, interests.’ (Morrow 1991: 905)

It is highly likely that some larger European powers will oppose such a transformation, and therefore NATO's Article 5 commitment could be transformed into looser commitment in order to provide assistance on the basis of a member's request.

What is it there for the small states?

Having drawn a fairly grim realist picture of the transformation of international system one can ask whether the “way of life” of the small states will again be described as follows:

'Small Powers threatened by neighbouring Great Powers, or intent on securing benefits for themselves in the course of Great Power conflicts, were forced to play a perilous game: moving quickly from the lighter to the heavier side of the balance as soon as an apparent victor could be discerned'

(Rothstein 1968: 11)

It needs not necessarily to be so. The analysis performed above was fairly superficial and based mainly on evaluating systemic variables. It did not consider the strong anti-war sentiments in Europe as well as in non-European countries. Nor did it consider the domestic political constraints (e.g. elections, etc.) on governments.

Instead, the current analysis took the ongoing "war against terrorism" as the key variable and assumed that once the words "combat", "warning", "threat level", "casualties", "enemy", "weapons of mass destruction", etc. appear in the daily briefs of heads of governments (especially in the US) the way that these states behave will switch into the realist one. Thus, the underlying assumption of this paper is that for the

foreseeable future international politics will be dominated by realist considerations.

How long is that "foreseeable future" is another question. Considering the difficulties facing the superpower conducting global urban-rural counterinsurgency campaign, one may conclude that such a campaign cannot be won even theoretically, or, if it by any chance could be won, then it would probably take a very long time. Therefore, it seems to be justified to assume that for the time being the small states would have to operate in generally rapidly fluctuating, unstable environment.

The small states in relatively stable security environments and with low threat perceptions (e.g. Belgium) are likely to have more freedom of action and will be able to pursue fairly independent policies (e.g. conflicting with larger states on important political issues). The small states with intensive perception of threats or recent extremely negative historical experience (both descriptions fit the Baltic states well) will be playing a risky game, although not as perilous as described above. The rules of that game will require balancing policies

defined by simultaneous memberships in the EU and NATO. The Baltic states are likely to seek position in the limelight of the US attention to deter potential "hard" threats from Russia, and they will also seek support from the EU and European NATO members against threats from the lower part of a threat spectrum (such as potential destabilisation of Russia, different kinds of disasters, etc.). The hardness of the game lies in the danger that such a balancing act could take the Baltic states right between conflicting larger powers.

Other circumstances/conditions further complicating the balancing act arise from the description of the system given above.

The first condition is acceleration. The difficulties that the small states naturally have in crafting proactive policies due to their limited resources and small administrations will be further aggravated by the more frequent and rapid changes, developments, and events.

The second problem lies in the global scale of the developments. The small states have only a limited capability to gather information necessary for decision-making, which, for example, in the case of the EU

has led to the reliance of the small EU members on information received from the EU Commission. Being a participant in the global “war on terror” poses in this sense a huge challenge – the Baltic states have to be informed about geographically distant and complicated situations and issues.

The third problem lies in striking the balance between security gains and autonomy losses. Bargaining power of the small states that is generally connected to the strategic location, strategic resources or providing political legitimacy is, in fact, fairly limited. In the era of dramatic increase of mobility and reach of the US forces these elements of the bargaining power may lose or change their value quite unexpectedly. A small state might be slow to perceive these changes in time and react adequately.

Any ideas, Sherlock?

Having done all this deductive thinking the only question left to answer is: what could analysts involved in policy formulation or capability development in the Baltic states learn from this? Instead of clear-

cut and concrete policy recommendations, I would like to suggest the following as at least worth thinking through:

1) Since we live in the information society, the ability to gather, systematise, evaluate and analyse information is crucial for state security, thus respective governmental or nongovernmental capabilities (think-tanks) are worth developing;

2) The real-time decision-making/bargaining in the information society could lend itself for modelling on the basis of game-theoretical approaches; that is an area/capability having the potential to mitigate to a certain extent the small state limitations in that area;

3) The reaction times are shortening – the different capabilities of the small states such as defence, crisis management, decision-support, etc. must be available at short notice or not at all;

4) The small states could, to a certain extent, mitigate their limitations by intensive cooperation with each other; this is valid especially for the Baltic states having similar political aspirations and position in international system.

References

Hey, J.A.K. (2003) “Refining Our Understanding of Small State Foreign Policy” in Hey, J.A.K. (ed) *Small States in World Politics: Explaining Foreign Policy Behaviour*, Boulder, London, Lynne Rienner Publishers

Katzenstein, P.J. (1996) “Conclusion: National Security in a Changing World” in Katzenstein, P.J. (ed) *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, New York, Columbia University Press

Kowert, P., Legro, J. (1996) “Norms, Identity, and Their Limits: A Theoretical Reprise” in Katzenstein, P.J. (ed) *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, New York, Columbia University Press

Morrow, J.D. (1991) “Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model of Alliances”, *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 35, No 4, p904-933, University of Wisconsin Press

Rothstein, R.L. (1968) *Alliances and Small Powers*, New York and London: Columbia University Press

The Democratic Warrior: The Future for the Bosnian Military*

By Peter C. Alexa and Michael Metzsch**

Introduction

The aim of this article is to investigate the possibilities and requirements for using military co-operation to strengthen stability in Bosnia-Herzegovina.¹ The focus is mainly on the possibility of establishing a PfP co-operation with Bosnia since this forum has proven to be useful and effective, for instance, in the Baltic states. The argument is that one common professionally based² military in Bosnia will remove

many of the concerns that are prevalent in the West when it comes to the future of Bosnia after SFOR. Bosnian military that only obeys orders from a legally elected government will decrease the risk of war that is caused by disputes between the ethnic groups. Therefore, this kind of military could - in the long term - operate as an integrating factor in Bosnia. Hereby you avoid military which is closely related with nationalistic opinion in the three ethnic groups as has been the case until now.

The country is still suffering from the war which has lasted for three years and caused death of about 250.000 people. Furthermore, the country is still divided, and the geographical division into two entities including three large ethnic communities leads to many problems in Bosnian society: the economy is poor, there is extensive corruption in the public administration, and hate still prevails between the ethnic groups. The country's policy on stability is furthermore dependent on the presence of the international commu-

* This report has previously been published in Institute for International Studies 2003. The research behind the article is financed by the defence and security political studies at the Institute for International Studies. The report was translated into English by the editors of the Baltic Defence Review.

** Peter C. Alexa is a member of the scientific staff at the Danish Institute for International Studies. Michael Metzsch is a former intern at the Danish Institute for International Studies.

nity and NATO's peacekeeping forces, particularly SFOR.

In the article the empirical data is gathered from three different sources: 1) literature about Bosnian history, 2) facts gathered from the internet, 3) interviews made in Bosnia. With regard to the latter there is a considerable difference between official and unofficial stances amongst the international community in Bosnia. Thus the information from the interviews cannot be accredited to one single respondent and hence the interviews will also serve as background information.

The theoretical frame of the report is Samuel Huntington's theory on civil and military relations. This frame is chosen because the theory illustrates quite simply some problems regarding civilian control of the military.

The report comprises five chapters. In chapter 1, the latest developments in Bosnia are taken into account. In chapter 2, the theoretical approach is set out with emphasis on the relationship between civil and military authorities according to Huntington's theory. In chapter 3, it is

analysed to what extent there is a need for changes in Bosnia's officer corps, and in chapter 4, two suggestions on how to implement the changes.

1. NATO's role in Bosnia

Since 1995 NATO has had between 12,000 and 60,000 troops stationed in Bosnia-Herzegovina (in the remainder of the article Bosnia-Herzegovina will be referred to as Bosnia only). These forces had been the international community's guarantee for avoiding a repetition of the civil war that in the beginning of the 1990's led the country into chaos.

After 11 September 2001, NATO's focus is no longer on the Balkans but on the international fight against terrorism. This is one of the reasons why NATO has an interest to end - or at least to reduce - SFOR's mission in Bosnia so the forces can be used elsewhere and with other objectives. Winding up SFOR is also in line with the general aim of the international community to gradually hand over responsibility for Bosnia's fate to the

Bosnian people.³ However, no one believes that NATO will leave the country in the foreseeable future, and therefore the question arises as to whether it is possible that NATO's involvement in Bosnia can take another form. The obvious answer would be Partnership for Peace (PfP) which has developed an even stronger role within the activities of NATO.⁴

The purpose with the PfP is, among other things, to increase the transparency in national defence planning and budgets, to secure democratic control over the armed forces and to develop the members' forces so that they can cooperate with NATO forces (for instance in peace support operations). However, such cooperation is not possible at the moment since Bosnia - together with Serbia and Montenegro⁵ - is the only country in Europe that is not a member of either the PfP or NATO.⁶

So why is Bosnia not a member of the PfP? The answer to this question is partly to be found in the country's constitution, which is a part of the Dayton agreement. The agreement's distribution of

competences between the entities and the government meant that the entities were entitled to – but not committed to – creating their own military structures. This means that since the end of the war Bosnia has had two ministries of defence and three armed forces, which in relation to the PpF is unacceptable for NATO. NATO only wants to cooperate with military forces that are assigned to sovereign states and not with different local military factions. NATO's Secretary General George Robertson has often said that the primary condition for a Bosnian membership of the PpF is the establishment of one governmental ministry of defence and one common structure of command for the armed forces in the country (NATO, 2002a). The development towards this has so far been slow but during the last year pressure from the international society has increased.

Probably as an attempt to satisfy the international community, the Bosnian presidency decided on 4 September 2002 to reorganise and strengthen the Standing Committee for Military Matters

(SCMM). Earlier SCMM consisted among others of the entities' defence ministers and chiefs of defence, but these are now in a sub-committee. Today it is the Bosnian presidency (one from each ethnic group), the presidents of the two entities, Bosnia's minister of finance, and the chairman of the Bosnian council of ministers that are members of the committee. With the increased decision-making powers in the SCMM the move can be viewed as the first step towards a joint ministry of defence. It is still uncertain, however, to what extent the three ethnic groups really want this development since they have widely different interests that have to be safeguarded in relation to a potential PpF-membership. Furthermore it is difficult to get an overview of the interests because the UN High Representative (UNHR) and SFOR possess the real power in the country. Statements from the Bosnian leaders have to be taken with certain reservations. For instance the leaders will often protest against the UNHR's decisions although they actually agree. They do so because in that way they can

demonstrate courage to their respective ethnic groups at the same time as unpopular, but necessary, initiatives can be carried out. Moreover, there are reports saying that the ethnic groups unofficially have asked the UNHR to force through requests while they officially dissociate themselves from these requests. Conversely, the extensive powers of the UNHR mean that the leaders at other times express themselves more positively than they are in reality in order to avoid the UNHR setting them aside or even removing them⁷. In other cases the leaders seek confrontation with the UNHR, which in 1999 led to the UNHR removing the president of the Republika Srpska (RS), Nikola Poplasen (Chandler, 2000: 201)

From statements it can be noted that representatives from the Federation have not said anything pronounced about the SCMM as a forerunner for a unified ministry of defence. The Bosnian-Serbs in the beginning expressed considerable scepticism towards the idea. Zivko Radisic – who at that time was the Bosnian-Serbian member of the presidency – stated on 21

August 2002 that if one defence ministry was set up it would favour the Bosniacs and the Bosnian-Croats who preferred a single state rather than two entities (Radio Free Europe, 2002a). The day after, the Bosnian-Serbian president Mirko Sarovic followed up on this remark by stating that Bosnia ought to become a member of the PfP but that the RS rejected the idea of a unified ministry of defence (Radio Free Europe, 2002b). Therefore some of the Bosnian leaders' final goals are still that the RS can secede from the Federation and instead be integrated with Serbia. Because of this they still fight against initiatives that lead to the present autonomy of the RS being decreased.⁸ For example, prior to the election campaign in 1998 the Bosnian-Serbian party SRS cooperated with its sister party in Serbia, a party that published the magazine "Greater Serbia", which was distributed in all RS (OSCO, 1998). The question is if this resistance will be maintained - two arguments favour a possible change in the Bosnian-Serbian stance.

The Orao case

The situation changed after it was revealed - with huge media coverage - that the Bosnian-Serbs have secretly sold parts of weapons and provided services for Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq. It is, among others, Yugoslav dealers who have sold the materiel, and it includes a long list of military equipment such as small arms and aircrafts - also from the Orao factory in the RS.

The interest from the international press is probably due to the focus on a possible war against Iraq* but for Bosnia the case might have consequences for people who have not been removed from their position (for example, the depositing of the Bosnian-Serbian defence minister and the chief of defence) (Radio Free Europe, 2002d). Many observers in Bosnia are of the opinion that both the UNHR and SFOR will use the case as an example to demonstrate that at least the Bosnian-

Serbs have not managed to ensure satisfactory control over the military and its authorities. Therefore the case could be used to strengthen the government's control over the military, and it could be a forerunner for a governmental ministry of defence. Two facts, in particular, should be taken into account.

Firstly, the case is very clear. The sale of weapons from Bosnia to Iraq is a violation of the Dayton agreement which contains a passage saying that each weapon sale has to be approved by SFOR. Moreover the sale is also against the UN-sanctioned embargo towards Iraq. In addition, the Bosnian-Serbs were also caught in the act and did not even try to conceal their guilt.

Secondly, the time will come where the international community with the UNHR in the leading role will launch a plan to strengthen Bosnia's bid for the PfP. The plan contains among other things an establishment of the three "task forces" - each being led by different international

* At the time of writing this article the hostilities in Iraq had not broken out yet (editor's note).

institutions. Thus the UNHR will be responsible for a task force concerning the establishment of democratic control of the armed forces. The OSCE will lead work to ensure transparent budgets and increasing economic control in the country, and SFOR will guarantee that uniform and NATO/PfP compatible doctrines and regulations are established for the armed forces. It could have been expected that the RS especially would resist - questioning whether the Dayton agreement makes defence matters a case for the entities. But since the Orao case has demonstrated that the government of the RS has not been able to or wished to execute effective control over the actions of the army, it has become difficult for the RS to lay down arguments against the plan set forth by the UNHR.

The chief of SFOR has furthermore declined a request from the RS that SFOR should lead the investigation with regard to the sales of the weapons. He said that the results from RS's own investigation will be checked, and only if SFOR is not satisfied with the results, will it intervene

(Radio Free Europe, 2002e). In this way the RS is pressured to carry out a thorough investigation, since SFOR has not laid down criteria beforehand for the measures that the RS has to take.

Economy

The other main argument for a possible change of stance is the economic burden in relation to the maintenance of the three military structures in Bosnia⁹. Because of the lack of transparency in the budgets and the accounts, it is difficult to decide how much of the country's GDP is actually spent on the armed forces. The OSCE estimates that the figure is about 8-10%. In comparison, Denmark spends 1,4%, USA 3,1%, and the Czech Republic - a country that is restructuring from Warsaw Pact standards to NATO standards - 2,2% (IISS, 2001: 19, 50-51). The vast expenses for the armed forces seem to be out of proportion with needs, since the country in reality is under "protection" (or occupation) by SFOR. One can argue that SFOR at some stage will be with-

drawn. However, even then it is difficult to see the need for an expensive territorial defence. It is only Croatia and Yugoslavia that geographically and historically could appear as potential aggressors against Bosnia. Croatia is, however, a member of the PfP, although Yugoslavia has only just applied for membership. Besides, both countries have expressed the wish for future membership of the EU, previously hampered by the domestic resistance of the former nationalist leaders Franjo Tudjman in Croatia and Slobodan Milosevic in Yugoslavia¹⁰. Neither NATO nor the EU will accept aggression from the two countries against Bosnia thereby risking a new outbreak of conflicts in the Balkans.

Of course, the three groups in Bosnia realise this, and the question is whether they do not primarily look at their military forces as protection against the other entities.

Since economic assistance to Bosnia cannot be continued infinitely the three ethnic groups seem to have realized that there is a need to reduce the expense of

the military forces. So far some cuts have already been made so that the armed forces in Bosnia were reduced from an estimated 430,000 in 1995 to about 34,000 in 2001.¹¹ It is also possible to make reductions by giving up some of the double functions that exist today due to the two (three) military structures.

Areas such as management of the budget and administration of the infrastructure could most likely be more cost effective in a common structure. That is why economic realities could push forward the idea of a unified ministry of defence in Bosnia. An establishment that within the foreseeable future could lead to Bosnian membership of the PfP.

2. The role of the military

Whereas most countries have single military with a monopoly on the legitimate use of force¹², two defence ministries in Bosnia, three armies, and SFOR's presence demand considerable resources and cause an untenable security architecture. Even though the armed forces have

been more than decimated from about 430,000 men at the end of the war, the military's role in society has still not been definitively clarified. If SFOR is going to be withdrawn from Bosnia and replaced with a PfP-cooperation, it has to be guaranteed that a reliable civilian control over the armed forces has been established. How do you secure civilian control over the armed forces? In order to answer this question you have to define *what* civilian control over the military forces is. In *The Soldier and the State*, Samuel Huntington equates civilian control over the military with minimizing military "power", in other words the officer corps' ability to possess authority and influence the society (Huntington, 1957: 80,86). Huntington describes two principal forms regarding civilian control of the armed forces: subjective and objective control. *Subjective* control is an expression of different civilian groups exerting direct influence on the decision-making process in the military. However, since different civilian groups have different interests – and thereby influence the military in different ways – control over

the military is dependent on which civilian group is most powerful.

Objective control is derived from a professionally based officer corps which only deals with military questions and does not have its own economic and political interests.¹³ The aim of objective control is to get the military to act unconditionally as a tool of the state (Huntington, 1957: 83). Subsequently it will be argued that a professionally based officer corps can play an important role in the establishment of such a new state as Bosnia. Since the Second World War there has been a close connection between the politics and the military in the former Yugoslavia. A connection that was clearly demonstrated in 1974, when the officer corps possessed 10.8% of the seats in the central committee of the Communist Party (Allcock, 2000: 270,387). This inevitably influenced the states that followed Yugoslavia's dissolution. Since the start of the war there has been a mix of military and political – primarily nationalistic – interests, and it has been difficult to distinguish between political and military issues in Bosnia. Thus, if you

apply Huntington's terminology there has been a form of subjective control over the military with the nationalists having the control. But subjective control has, especially in a country like Bosnia, had serious disadvantages.

Firstly, civilian control over the forces resulted in several atrocities during the war¹⁴, and, secondly, there have been several examples of corruption, misguided control of the economy and absence of cooperation across ethnic borders.¹⁵ Since subjective control – seen from a democratic western stance – has not been effective in Bosnia, it will be natural to consider the establishment of objective control over the military. The problem is though, that objective control – besides a professional officer corps – requires that a state exists to which the officer corps can be loyal. This precondition is not present in Bosnia. The question is, if it ever will.

The Military as an Integrator

Huntington sees the state as the precondition for the establishment of a pro-

fessionally based officer corps. But, on the other hand, how can the establishment support the creation of a new state in Bosnia? The main argument is that joint professionally based military in Bosnia will remove many of the concerns that people in the West especially have for Bosnia's future after SFOR. Bosnian military that only obeys orders from a legally elected government will decrease the risk of conflicts developing into war. Thus, in the long term, the military will work as an integrator in Bosnia instead of being connected to the nationalist circles in the three communities, as has been the case so far.

Secondly, the military can work as a forerunner for other areas that could be transferred from the entities to the governmental level. The decentralized health and social security system and the educational system constitute – as the entities' military forces do – a heavy strain on the Bosnian economy, and probably a considerable amount of money could be saved in these areas. So far the Bosnian-Serbs particularly opposed a transfer of these

areas to the government, but a successful integration of the defence area will increase the chance of reducing the public expenses – also in other areas – in a country that spends 64% of its GDP on the public sector (The World Bank, 2002a).

Professionalization of the military

So what is characteristic for a professionally based military? According to Huntington it has two characteristics in particular. Firstly, it is politically sterile and neutral to the extent that it only obeys orders from the government (Huntington, 1957: 84). Secondly, it has a high professional standard. This combination will ensure that the military can solve its primary task: to protect the nation against external threats. When it comes to gaining a high professional standard, this can typically be achieved through developing each officer's skills with regard to carrying out still more complex military operations in line with their career advancement. In this aspect, an officer can be compared with a surgeon whose pro-

fessional competence gradually increases through his career. However it has become more difficult to achieve a high professional standard today, since the officer beyond his competence as a warrior also has to attend to the role as a leader in peacetime. It can be difficult to achieve professionalization when it comes to political neutrality.

The military's role as the society's protector can lead the officer corps to see itself as serving their own understanding of national interests instead of serving the government. Therefore it must be a requirement for professional military that an attitude adaptation is made in order to ensure real acceptance of a legitimate government's right to define the interests of the society.

Thus, a high professional standard combined with political neutrality will only be achieved through a goal-oriented education and a change in attitude so that one not only focuses on purely military conditions but also on the officer corps' attitude to the surrounding environment. Seen from the perspective of the objective control of Bosnia's armed forces the

education should be targeted at developing the Bosnian officer corps to be

- skilful warriors who are capable of planning and carrying out effective - seen from the perspective of NATO - military operations in the whole spectrum from supporting civilian society, participating in peace support operations to participating in war and

- democratic leaders who accept the legitimacy and authority that civilian society exercises over the military forces in a democracy.

3. The two roles

Future military cooperation can thus focus on the two roles that the officer corps can play in Bosnia (the role of the warrior and the democratic leader). The two roles will be elaborated below. Thereafter it will be discussed which problems such a process may face.

The Warrior

The role of the warrior is the traditional function of an officer. At the same

time it is the role that justifies the officer's duty as an independent profession. Huntington, for instance, writes: "It must be remembered that the peculiar skill of the officer is the management of violence, not the act of violence itself" (Huntington, 1957: 13). To describe this role the focus will be placed on three factors in the cycle of warfare: doctrine, technology, and organization.¹⁶

Doctrines can shortly be described as the thoughts behind military operations, and so far they have been aimed at traditional territorial defence. Naturally, this has partly stemmed from the Yugoslav experiences from the Second World War and partly from the civil war that shaped the present Bosnia. From a PfP perspective the Bosnian doctrines should be developed in order to meet "softer" purposes since she does not face any direct external threat. This could, for instance, be participation in international operations and support to civilian society. In this way, the Bosnian military can be employed in peace support operations and thereby contribute to creating security

elsewhere in the world – and maybe gain a better understanding of the conflicts in Bosnia. But the doctrines in the Bosnian armies are very centralized. The army in the RS is still marked by the doctrines that were applied in the former Yugoslav federal army (JNA). Those were similar to the doctrines in many of the former members of the Warsaw Pact and caused consequently the same weaknesses. The different services operate mainly independently and because of this the possibilities of utilizing possible synergy-effects in the operations of common services are limited. Furthermore, a high degree of centralization means that each leader has the possibility to act autonomously to a certain extent. On a few occasions centralization can be appropriate but often an effective decision-making process is hindered because information has to pass many layers in the command structure before a decision can be taken. The decision can thus be seen as limiting the initiative and responsibility of the younger officers, and this is a problem in missions such as peace support operations. In a tense situation

it is the sense of occasion and the ability to use your own judgement that are two of the most important qualities. The problem is also pervasive in the Federation since many of the officers in the Federation – especially the older ones – also received their military training in the JNA. However, the problem is alleviated a little by the US-controlled “train and equip” programme which after the war introduced the Federation’s army to western – especially NATO – doctrines and forms of operations (Boucher, 2002). Due to the war many – particularly Bosniacs – became officers without having any formal background in the military and therefore they are not influenced to the same extent by their time in the former Yugoslav army. It will probably be easier to influence those officers since they do not need to be “de-programmed” from the JNA thinking. In the technological area there is a similar difference between the RS and the Federation. The army in the RS is still equipped with weapons from the JNA time, but they are outdated from a NATO perspective. It is not a vast prob-

lem concerning small arms but when it comes to more complicated weapons they are only interoperable to a small extent with the weapon systems in NATO – and that hampers PfP cooperation.

On the other hand, the Federation has received a large number of American weapons including tanks, antitank missiles and M-16 rifles. They received the weapons as a part of the “train and equip programme”(Jane’s, 2002). With regard to materiel, the Federation is therefore better equipped to participate in future peace support operations but at the same time the armament also reinforces the Bosnian-Serbian perception of a threat from the Federation’s army.

Both entities have vast stockpiles of small arms. These are designated to mobilization units in case of a crisis, conflict, or war. But it can be disputed how necessary it is to retain these stockpiles. The reductions of the armed forces that have already been undertaken and the limited external threat make territorial defence unlikely. Therefore there is a possibility that the real purpose of these stocks is “to

be ready” in case the conflicts between the ethnic groups once again flare up, and it would probably suit the international community if the weapon stocks are destroyed before SFOR leaves the country definitively. Since the beginning of the 1990s there has been a considerable illegal market for weapons, and therefore one can argue that there is a danger that the weapons will be used to arm criminals and rebels, which of course does not help to stabilize the country. In worst case scenario the situation in Bosnia can develop into the same situation as was the case in Albania after the “Pyramid Scandal” in 1997 where people broke into stockpiles of weapons and stole hundreds of thousands of small arms weapons (Hansen and Metzch, 2002: 10). It not only destabilized Albania but also spread a huge amount of weapons to other unstable regions in the Balkans such as Kosovo.

The organisation of the armed forces in Bosnia still reflects the situation immediately after the war’s ending. Besides the aforementioned division of the armed forces between two entities, the Federa-

tion and the RS both employ a corps structure with four corps each. It is notable that the structures have “survived” the intensive reductions in the armed forces in Bosnia: when one takes into account that the total military force is going to be reduced to about 13,200 (the Federation) and 6,600 (RS), the structures seem to be out of proportion with the realities on the ground (Fitzgerald, 2001). As was also the case for the depots of weapons it is very likely that the structures primarily are kept as defence against the other ethnic groups. Thus, the two entities have theoretically an opportunity to mobilize 250,000 men in total (IIIS, 2002: 67). Besides establishing a governmental ministry of defence it is likely that it will be necessary to break up the corps structures in order to adjust the military structures for the PpP membership.

To sum up, the Bosnian forces – especially the Bosnian-Serbian force – face many military challenges in relation to adjustment for PpP co-operation. The adoption of and the adjustment to NATO/PpP doctrines ought to be combined with

the acquisition of weapon systems that are compatible with NATO. In addition to this, an attitudinal change of the former/present image of an enemy should result in a break up of the existing corps structures plus destruction of the depots of small arms. In the case the weapons in the depots are destroyed it will probably not be possible to equip all 230,000 men in the respective military structures’ reserves. Therefore the internal threat connected with total mobilization will decrease considerably.

The Democrat

A democratic officer corps is a corps that accepts the authority and legitimacy that underlie civilian control over the military as an institution. It is both the most difficult role to define unambiguously and the most difficult to measure, but at the same time it is also the most important military parameter for a future Bosnian PpP membership. The problem with “democratization” of the officer corps is that it requires corresponding

democratization concurrently taking place in the Bosnian society.

Huntington's perception of the military that is isolated from civilian society (Huntington, 1957: 16) does not apply to Bosnia, where officers – as in Denmark – do not live in the barracks. The officers are thus a part of the civilian Bosnian society, too. It is difficult to imagine that the officer can understand, accept and implement democratic initiatives in his military unit in the case where the rest of the society does not develop in the same direction. This applies especially after a war – a period where the military's role changes from being perhaps most important component of society to being in line with other public institutions. Below, three factors will be looked upon with regard to “democratization” of the officer corps.

Firstly, the officer corps has to exercise general respect for human rights. The war in Bosnia was marked by units being involved in some of the most brutal outrages against prisoners of war as well as against the civilian population. Some of

the outrages were committed by more or less self-appointed militias whose personnel typically is no longer on active service in the Bosnian armed forces.

But other outrages – such as the massacres in Srebrenica – were allegedly committed by regular army units which were under command at the time of the crime (Sell, 2002: 232). The International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia in the Hague ought to be a visible proof that crimes of war are not accepted by international community. It has therefore considerable significance when high-ranking officers from one of the three ethnic groups are convicted of war crimes – General Radislav Krstic who was charged with being one of the leaders responsible for the Srebrenica massacre (Guardian, 2001). However, the strongest signal will be sent if the two main suspects, the Bosnian-Serbs Radovan Karadzic and Radko Mladic are prosecuted in the Hague. This will indicate that in the long term no Bosnian war criminals can escape prosecution. It is also important that none of the ethnic

groups gets the impression that it is only their country-men who are being prosecuted. Therefore it had an immense symbolic significance when the first trial for war crimes committed against Serbs was concluded in November 1998¹⁷. Similarly, it will be of vast significance if Croatia decides to extradite General Janko Bobetko¹⁸.

Besides the deterrent effect that the International Tribunal has, it is also necessary to provide the officer corps with basic education in the laws of war and international law in order to ensure democratic development. The mentioned topics not only increase the officers' knowledge but also change the behaviour that officers show in the daily life. Thus, the teaching should not only be theoretical but also be a part of the daily service as well as supplemented by exercises. It is central to the extent that it is possible for the respective ethnic groups to work together at different levels in the military. Thus procedures and rules must be established to ensure that promotions and ca-

reer management are entirely based on professional qualifications and not on ethnical affiliations.

Secondly, the Bosnian officer corps has to be taught to manage. Even though the expense of the military will properly decrease in the future, the armed forces will still be responsible for the employment of vast resources. To avoid repetition of the situation in March 2002, where representatives from the OSCE's mission in Bosnia had to put pressure on the RS's government to limit defence expenses, it is necessary that the leading officials – both military as well as civilian – show responsibility toward the limited resources in Bosnia (OSCE 2002a). This can be problematic. More than one source in Bosnia mentioned that a noticeable “kleptocracy” exists where powerful persons misuse public funds for their own benefit.¹⁹ Corruption is therefore considered as one of the main problems in Bosnia. The World Bank made a survey which documented that more than half of the respondents (from the ethnic groups) had the view that corruption is

widely spread (The World Bank, 2000). Another survey from July 2002 showed that one fourth of the respondents within the last year bribed both a doctor and a policeman (Transparency International).

The OSCE has tightened up the requirements regarding transparent accounts due to the carelessness with trusted funds but it is estimated that management of the resources will still be problematic in the armed forces. Since officers in general are badly paid (NATO, 2001) it is difficult to imagine that they will voluntarily give up the benefits which they traditionally have had unless such a renunciation is followed by a similar rise in salaries. The problem is that rises in salary either require more resources – which is unrealistic in a period when the defence budget is going to be reduced or a heavy reduction in the number of officers, which of course the officers are not interested in either. Thus, since bigger increases in salaries are not realistic there is no big incitement to economic integrity. At the same

time, the older officer's almost unrestricted power over their subordinates should be limited. In the former members of the Warsaw Pact – plus the former Yugoslavia – the leaders could treat subordinates in the way they wanted, a problem that still exists in Russia, for example. This is an impediment for the development of responsibility and initiative of the younger officers and at the same time it means that counselling and reporting is controlled by what you *think* that the chief would like to hear instead of what you think yourself.

Finally, the connection between the military and the nationalist parties should be removed. Since the war, close ties have existed between the nationalists – on all three sides – and the respective armed forces because nationalists as well as the military have seen themselves as protectors of their respective ethnic groups. Whereas such an association was natural under wartime conditions, it is, during peacetime, an impediment to effective control of the military. If the officer corps is to be loyal towards the government it should not at the same time have com-

mitments towards various parties or groups.

The question is how you break the bonds that among other things are created by war with great sacrifices such as the Bosnian are. There is no clear-cut answer, but basically the self-perception of the officer corps needs to be changed so that the officers no longer see themselves as protectors of their own ethnic group. In the current situation the guarantee is given by SFOR but the officer corps is more worried about the time *after* SFOR, where the security guarantees are unclear. It is therefore of utmost importance that the international community develops a security system which protects all ethnic groups against military outrages. Thus criteria should be made with regard to SFOR's withdrawal for when and how NATO can intervene in Bosnia to prevent possible acts of war in the country. The end is, of course, that the inclusion in western structures will contribute to creating an internal stability in the country thus making NATO intervention needless.

4. Socialization and integration

A broad and intensive process of education can thus strengthen the integration and democratization of the Bosnian military. In this process it is not enough to improve the existing officer corps' knowledge concerning the issues discussed in chapter 3. In reality a change in the behaviour has to be forced – a change of the skills and the stances that exist at the moment.

In connection with the Baltic states' preparation to join NATO a lot of initiatives were taken in facilitating the process, a process that the Bosnian officer corps also faces. It is problematic though, to apply the experiences from the Baltic states because three important differences separate the two situations:

- The Baltic states really wanted PfP cooperation while Bosnia is more or less pressured into the PfP.
- The Baltic states did not agree on everything – and the projects were used as a means to establish the national de-

fence structures - but they did not feel the same hatred as certain elements in the three ethnic groups in Bosnia do.

- The Baltic states had (or perceived) an external threat from Russia. In Bosnia the threat is instead internal.

The following paragraphs will focus on two initiatives that seem particularly interesting for Bosnia: a joint defence college and a joint peace support force.

A Joint Defence College

Establishing a joint defence college in Bosnia, similar to the Baltic Defence College (BALTDEFCOL) established in Tartu in Estonia, would promote some opportunities to integrate the three ethnic groups. Below, three possibilities will be underlined.

Firstly, it will give the officers from the three groups an opportunity to make contacts and friendships across ethnic affiliations. Since classes and groups etc. would be mixed across ethnic affiliation the students will quite quickly be depen-

dent on each others' assistance and help. This can be encouraged by emphasizing project-oriented education where no one can gain success without everyone having contributed to some extent.

Secondly, similar education of a year's duration can in reality change ways of thinking, particularly among the younger officers, if the officers are removed from their respective units. The students should be forced to be proactive and, among other things, be evaluated on their ability to take the initiative. In this way they will be encouraged to be critical and take part in discussions, which will improve their ability to formulate independent solutions to complex problems. Furthermore, they will learn that one single solution to a military strategic problem does not exist. In the countries that were members of the Warsaw Pact mathematical calculations were emphasized, and these calculations could determine future battles. This way of thinking is one of the first things that the BALTDEFCOL seeks to change. (Kværnø, 2003).

Thirdly, the officers who take a course at the joint defence college should be re-

warded financially as well as in respect of their careers. In this way it becomes attractive to apply for the education, and the best young officers are attracted to apply for the course.

However, there are also problems with such an establishment. If you strengthen the younger officers' career it will undeniably be at the expense of the elder officers, who possess the most influential positions. Most likely they will – consciously as well as unconsciously – be in opposition to such a threat against their own positions and argue that the young officers do not have an understanding of the war's causes and consequences as they do themselves.

At the same time there will be a lot of practical problems such as the geographical position of the college and decisions concerning the distribution of the key positions. Probably one will have to distribute the most important posts between groups so that the interests of all groups will be considered. Such a system already exists in other places in the administration in Bosnia. When it comes to the po-

sitioning of the college it will not be possible to continuously change the position since a duplication of the facilities would be impractical and economically unsuitable. However, the college could be placed on "neutral ground" near one of the international organizations' establishments in the country such as the SFOR headquarters.

In connection with the establishment of such a college, Bosnia can learn from the experiences that the BALTDEFCOL has had, for instance, with having experienced officers and instructors from the West to introduce the officers from the Baltic states to western military ways of thinking.²⁰ In the same way, a joint defence college in Bosnia could be manned by western instructors in the beginning, and thereafter the responsibility could be gradually handed over to local officers as they become educated. In this way Bosnian officers would be urged to involve themselves in the project, in contrast to a situation where only foreigners run the college. The BALTDEFCOL is furthermore already educating Bosnian of-

ficers who could form the core staffing in such a college. The advantage among other things is that the BALTDEFCOL has the experience in educating officers who have a “Warsaw Pact way of thinking”.

A Joint Peace Support Force

To build up a joint Bosnian force that can be deployed on peace support operations will have three advantages.

Firstly, it will help to integrate the different Bosnian forces and thereby further contribute to the socialization of these forces. Secondly, Bosnia will in this way contribute in a positive way to maintaining international peace and security. Participation in peace support operations will also give Bosnian officers the possibility to experience other areas of conflict in the world. This will give the officers another perspective on conflict resolution; a perspective that they might use to gain a more objective understanding of conflict resolution in their own country.

At the end of 2002 Bosnian participation in peace support operations was lim-

ited to the posting of the UN observers to the UNMEE (Ethiopia and Eritrea) plus the preparation for posting observers to the MONUC (Congo). It is positive that there is an equal representation from each of the ethnic groups in the country. This indicates that the three military groups actually are able to cooperate.

One can argue though that it is a weak sign as it is only a few observes and all are posted as individuals, and therefore there has not been a need for cooperation between the ethnic groups. Normally, the observers from the same country are separated to ensure multinationality in the area, and therefore the officers only cooperate to a limited extent. Furthermore, personnel who are qualified for service as UN observers are perhaps not typical of the Bosnian military. Among other things, the requirement for English skills means that it will primarily be only younger and well educated officers who will be employed. According to representatives from the international society as well as the Federation, young officers are more positive

towards cooperation across the entities than older officers are, but individual service as an UN observer does not require cooperation between the different ethnic groups.

It has thus been more difficult for Bosnia to set up a real military unit that can be deployed on peace support operations. The build up of a logistics company with about 60 persons has been on its way for two years, and no unit has been deployed yet. According to several representatives from international community, the problems have mainly been focused on ethnical balance as to numbers and on conditions concerning command. The latter is made especially visible as the unit will have an international chief, which can be interpreted as an expression of the groups not wanting to be under command from one of the other groups.

With the UNMIBH (UN's mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina) as a mediator, an acceptable structure for the organisation has been found, and the need for such a unit in one of the UN peace support operations is awaited (NATO, 2002b). The prob-

lems with setting up the logistics company might indicate the problems which might arise when the entities will be forced to increase cooperation. The problems can be expected to increase along with the demands for operational complexity where the establishment of a transport company, seen in a military context, can be said to be at the easy end of the scale.

The deployment of the logistics unit will contribute in a positive way to making the Bosnian military interoperable with NATO's forces and improving cooperation between the different military structures. It will thus support the development of one Bosnian military when soldiers with different ethnic background gain experience in practical cooperation. The project will also legitimize and make the Bosnian effort in living up to the international obligations visible in the same way that has been the case with the Baltic states' build up of the combined Baltic battalion BALTBAT (Brett and Metzsch, 2002: 3). Additionally, the experiences from the BALTBAT shows that the administration of the project helped the

Baltic states to establish new defence bureaucracies and encouraged the development of a culture of democratic control within defence structures (Brett, 2001: 5).

Because of the experiences from the Baltic states it is worth underlining the time perspective of the project. An important element in the project is to ensure that Bosnia, independently of partners, can take over all functions in the peace support units and that the expertise will be transferred to the remainder of the Bosnian military. The equivalent process has shown to be prolonged in the Baltic states, and there is no reason to expect that it will be shorter in Bosnia where the conflict of interests between the different groups is more tense. A further development of the concept towards a build up of larger multiethnic entities will probably have a long term planning timeframe.

5. Conclusion

It can be argued that the creation of objective control over the Bosnian armed

forces will contribute to stability in the country. The establishment of such control is estimated to take place in the form of three initiatives.

Firstly, the existing military structures should be changed. The corps structure as well as the big weapon depots are estimated to be simply destabilising the Bosnian society as they lack an external threat that justifies a mobilisation based defence role.

Secondly, smaller, but well educated and well equipped units should be established. These units ought to be capable of participating in peace support operations and supporting civil society. The units will thus be able to make a positive contribution to NATO/PfP involvement in areas of conflict.

Finally, there ought to be established a joint defence college that can provide the Bosnian officers with a common professional frame of reference across ethnic affiliation. By establishing a joint defence college and peace support units the experience from the Baltic states will probably be used. It will be beneficial to estab-

lish cooperation between a joint Bosnian defence college and the BALTDEFCOL - a cooperation where the BALTDEFCOL could function as a base of experience.

None of the above initiatives can be carried through either quickly or without problems. Problems with doctrine, technology, organisation, education and other issues should be solved assuming that the will is there. With Croatia's and Yugoslavia's eyes focused on the EU, one of the most considerable hindrances for integration in Bosnia is reduced, namely support from the two countries to their ethnic fellows.

The decisive factor is whether the young and progressive officers succeed in taking the leading posts in the armed forces. If not, the process of reform will be particularly difficult.

One can make a comparison with the chicken and the egg: reforms will require that younger and dynamic officers take the lead, but this is only possible when the process has already started. Therefore it must be the international community in Bosnia that acts as a promoter and catalyst for the process.

Bibliography

Allcock, John B. (2000), *Explaining Yugoslavia*, New York: Columbia University Press.

BALTDEFCOL [Baltic Defence College] (2001), "Report by the Joint Services Command and Staff College Validation Team", 15. juni 2001, [http://www.bdcol.ee/bdcol/pdf_files/whitebook/12wb2001.pdf].

BBC (2000), "Srebrenica Timeline", March 14, 2000, [<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/675945.stm>].

BBC (2002), "Kostunica Pushes for EU Membership", November 15, 2002, [<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/1024790.stm>].

Boucher, Richard (2002), "Bosnia and Herzegovina - Successful Completion of Military Train and Equip Program", pressekonference, Washington D.C., October 30, 2002, [<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/14799.htm>].

Brett, Julian Elgaard (2001), *Lessons Learned from the BALTBAT Project*, København: Forsvarsministeriet.

Brett, Julian Elgaard & Michael Metzsch (2002), *Dansk militærstøtte til Baltikum*, DUPI Research Brief, nr. 17.

Chandler, David (2000), *Bosnia: Faking Democracy After Dayton*, London: Pluto Press.

Fitzgerald, Sgt. Peter (2001), "The Armed Forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina", *SFOR Informer*, 127, 28. november 2001, [<http://www.nato.int/sfor/indexinf/127/p03a/chapter4.htm>].

The Guardian (2001), "Serb General Convicted of Genocide", August 2, 2001.

The Guardian, (2002), "General Hypocrisy", September 27, 2002.

Hansen, Kenneth Schmidt og Metzsch Michael (2002), *Et nyt albansk spørgsmål*, DUPI Report 2002/14, København.

Huntington, Samuel P. (1957), *The Soldier and the State*, Cambridge, Mass: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

IISS [The International Institute for Strategic Studies] (2001), *The Military Balance 2001/2002*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

IISS [The International Institute for Strategic Studies] (2002), *The Military Bal-*

ance 2002/2003, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Jane's (2002), "The Balkans", *Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment*, 10, Mai 2, 2002.

Kværnø (2003), Interview med Professor Ole Kværnø, Institute for Defence Studies, Baltic Defence College, februar 2003.

NATO (2001), "Transcript: Joint Press Conference", Brigadegeneral Tom Strik på SFOR pressekonference, October 11, 2001, [<http://www.nato.int/sfor/trans/2001/t011011a.htm>].

NATO (2002a), "Questions & Answers during the Press Conference by Lord Robertson, NATO Secretary General following the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council at the Level of Heads of State and Government", NATO's secretary general George Robertson after the North Atlantic Councils meeting at the level of heads of governments in Prague, November 21, 2002, [<http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2002/s021121r.htm>].

NATO (2002b), "Transcript: Press Conference", press conference in "Coalition Press Information Center" in Tito Barracks with the spokesman for OHR Oleg

Milisic, Mai 21, 2002, [<http://www.nato.int/sfor/trans/2002/t020521a.htm>].

Nielsen, K.V. (1986), "Krigsfilosofi og militærteorier" i Niels Berg (red.), *Carl von Clausewitz, Om krig*, København: Rhodos.

OECD (2002), "Stability Pact Anticorruption Initiative", December 12, 2002, [<http://www1.oecd.org/daf/SPALcom/.htm>].

OHR (2002), "Speech by the High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina Paddy Ashdown to the United Nations Security Council", October 23, 2002, [http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/presso/presssp/default.asp?content_id=28226].

OSCE (2002a), "OSCE Reiterates the Call for Affordable Armed Forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina", March 4, 2002. [http://www.osce.org/news/generate.php3?news_id=2325].

OSCE (2002b), "Military Expenditures Reduction Initiative" November 11, 2002, [<http://www.oscebih.org/military/eng/military.htm>].

Racan, Ivica (2000), "Making Up for Lost Time", *NATO Review*, 48:2, Summer-Autumn, pp. 8-9.

Radio Free Europe (2002a), "Bosnian Serb Leaders Rebuff NATO", August 22, 2002, [<http://www.rferl.org/newsline/2002/08/220802.asp>].

Radio Free Europe (2002b), "Bosnian Serb Leader Says Yes to NATO, No to Ministry", August 23, 2002, [<http://www.rferl.org/newsline/2002/08/230802.asp>].

Radio Free Europe (2002c), "Kostunica's Party Defends His Remarks on Republika Srpska", September 12, 2002, [<http://www.rferl.org/newsline/2002/08/120902.asp>].

Radio Free Europe (2002d), "Top Bosnian Serb Defence Officials Ousted over Iraq Arms Scandal...", October 29, 2002, [<http://www.rferl.org/newsline/2002/10/291002.asp>].

Radio Free Europe (2002e), "...and SFOR Commander Says the Same for Bosnia...", October 30, 2002, [<http://www.rferl.org/newsline/2002/10/301002.asp>].

Ritzaus Bureau (1998), "Domstol dømmer tre bosniere for krigsforbrydelser", November 16, 1998.

Sell, Louis (2002), *Slobodan Milosovic and*

the Destruction of Yugoslavia, London: Duke University Press.

Transparency International (2002), "Widespread Corruption Persists at all Levels in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Banja Luka/Mostar", July 9, 2002, [http://www.transparency.org/pressreleases_archive/nat_chaps_press/2002.07.09.bih_widespread.html].

Udenrigsministeriet (2002), "Landeinfo om Forbundsrepublikken Jugoslavien", November 22, 2002, [<http://www.um.dk/cgi-bin/dyn3nt/dyn3.exe?prog=show&pageid=96&land=108>].

The World Bank (2000), "Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Diagnostic Survey of Corruption", November 17, 2002, [<http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/anticorrupt/Bosnianticorruption.pdf>].

The World Bank (2002a), "State Apparatus Spending 64 Percent of GDP In BiH",

Speech by the manager for the Word Bank, Joseph Ingram, in Sarajevo, November 17, 2002, [<http://www.worldbank.org/ba/ECA/Bosnia&Herzegovina.nsf/ECADocByLink/A26FE8668D3997C3C1256C750033301F?Opendocument>].

The Word Bank (2002b), "Memorandum of the President of the International Development Association to the Executive Directors on a Country Assistance Strategy Progress Report of the World Bank Group for Bosnia and Herzegovina", Report nr. 24978, October 15, 2002, [[http://www.worldbank.org/SAR/sa.nsf/Attachments/CAS_INT/\\$File/WB-1-8_Page.pdf](http://www.worldbank.org/SAR/sa.nsf/Attachments/CAS_INT/$File/WB-1-8_Page.pdf)].

Weber, Max (1971), *Makt og byråkrati*, Oslo: Gyldendal.

¹ We would like to thank the people who helped us to compose this publication. This applies to all the employees at the Nytorv-department for the Institute of International Studies (formerly DUPI), particularly Kenneth Schmidt Hansen and Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen for their advice and guidance. In relation with a study trip to Bosnia, we would like to thank Carsten Svensson and Georg Güntelberg for invaluable and professional assistance. We would also like to thank Ole Kværnø for a constructive and positive review reading as well as for input regarding the Baltic Defence College. In addition to this, Bent Hansen has done a tremendous work in proofreading. Also, we would like to thank Anni Kistensen for the printing ect. All have contributed to improve this paper. The responsibility for arguments and the remaining mistakes and flaws is solely the responsibility of the authors.

² The concept "professionally based military" is applied as a term for an officer corps that has a professional and social sense of responsibility. The term is not the same as "professional military" which just express that the military use permanently employed personnel such as conscripts.

³ For instance, expressed by Lord Paddy Ashdown, UN High Representative for Bosnia-Herzegovina in a speech to the Security Council in UN 23/10 2002 (OHR, 2002).

⁴ In the Alliance's strategic concept from 1999, PfP is thus one of the five core functions of NATO.

⁵ Yugoslavia has applied for a membership of the PfP on the 24th of April 2002 (Udenrigsministeriet, 2002).

⁶ Besides the microstates Andorra, Liechtenstein, San Marino, Monaco, the Holy See plus the islands of Malta and Cyprus.

⁷ This is the way that statements which are in favour of independence or territorial separation of the country or are referring to provinces as sovereign territories as unconstitutional are looked upon (Chandler, 2000: 120-21).

⁸ That some Serbs still sympathize with those goals the second round in the Serbian election campaign in September 2002 showed, where the Yugoslav president Vojislav Kostunica during an election meeting in the Serbian city Mali Zvornik - apparently to please the nationalistic voters - described the RS as a part of the family that was temporarily separated from its Serbian motherland. Subsequently members of the party of Kostunica defended the statement by saying that they did not view the statement as controversial

but rather as a goal that they strived for (Radio Free Europe, 2002c).

⁹ According to the OSCE Bosnia can only finance the maintenance of about half of the present forces (OSCE, 2002b).

¹⁰ The Yugoslav President Vojislav Kostunica and the Croatian Prime Minister Ivica Raca stated in the autumn 2000 that their states would apply for membership in the EU (BBC, 2000: Raca: 8-9).

¹¹ In 2002 there have been made further reductions cf. page 17 (OSCE, 2000b).

¹² According to Weber, the modern state is an organised power that within an area can claim monopoly of the legitimate use of violence as a political means and therefore has gathered the material machinery in the leaders' hand (Weber 1971:8).

¹³ The article will only focus on the officer corps and not on the non-commissioned officers and on privates, because partly it is officers who take the most important decisions in the military, and partly Huntington sees the privates and non-commissioned officers as practitioners of violence and not as officers who control violence (Huntington, 1957: 13).

¹⁴ The most mentioned of these is the massacre in Srebrenica, where Serbian militias attacked and killed about 7000 Muslims in an area which was under the UN protection (BBC, 2000).

¹⁵ It is, among other things, claimed that it is some of the main problems for the implementation of economic reforms in Bosnia (the World Bank, 2002).

¹⁶ A model to describe the coherence between the military organisation, technology (such as

weapons and materiel) plus the doctrines employed. It is assumed that the circulation is dynamic and therefore a change of one factor will cause changes of the other two as well (Nielsen, 1986: 959).

¹⁷ Two Bosnian-Muslims and a Bosnian-Croat were thus sentenced to many years of imprisonment for their role in a terror regime in the Celebici camp in central Bosnia in 1992 (Ritzaus Bureau, 1998).

¹⁸ The now pensioned general was, during the Yugoslav civil war, at the top of the Croatian military command and is charged with having committed war crimes against civilian Serbs in the Krajina province in Croatia in September 1993 (Guardian, 2002).

¹⁹ That is, among other things, the reason why many initiatives have been taken to fight corruption in Bosnia, such as the Stability Pact's anti corruptions initiative. Latest, the Bosnian minister for foreign trade and economic relations Azra Hadzialmetovic, together with the World Bank and the UNHR, introduced a plan for fighting corruption involving the civilian Bosnian population (OECD, 2002).

²⁰ The first officers were fully trained in 2002, and the College has been evaluated by the UK Joint Services Command and Staff College with a positive result (BALTDEFCOL, 2001).

Tartu in the 1941 Summer War

By Major Riho Rõngelep and Brigadier General Michael Hesselholt Clemmesen *

The centre of Tartu city was heavily damaged in July 1941 in a few days of combat. The fighting took place because the momentum of the German invasion of the northern part of the Soviet Union lapsed after the first couple of weeks of rapid advance, making it possible for the Soviet forces to stabilise the front temporarily in central Estonia, and thereby gaining more time to prepare the defences of Leningrad.

The fighting in and around the town was a tactical sideshow in an operational sideshow of a strategic sideshow. The German Army Group North offensive was secondary to the main German effort, the strategic offensive of Army Group Centre against Moscow. The operational main

effort of the Army Group North was in the axis east of the Lake Peipsi.

Only weak forces were initially detached for operations against Estonia. These German forces had their objectives in North and Northwest Estonia, including the islands. That part of the country was used for bases by the Soviet air force and naval aviation bomber forces. An Army Corps of two infantry divisions attacked towards Pärnu and Viljandi respectively, when determined Soviet resistance stopped their lead elements.

The fighting in Tartu took place because an Estonian armed rebellion had liberated the Southeastern part of the country, making it logical for the German forces to test the possibilities of the

land bridge between the Võrts Lake and the Lake Peipsi.

It also took place because the Emajõgi River connecting the two lakes and dividing the town gave support to the hastily improvised Soviet defence. The fighting had three phases:

- *Initially* the Estonian liberation and defence of the southern part of Tartu and Tartu county south of the Emajõgi.

- *Thereafter* the German-Soviet fight for control of the river line, both sides reinforcing their initially deployed forces, the engagements gradually moving away from the town.

- *Finally* the isolation and defeat of the Soviet forces north of the river, between the two large lakes.

* Brigadier General Michael Hesselholt Clemmesen is the Commandant of the Baltic Defence College. Major Riho Rõngelep is a Directing Staff member at the Baltic Defence College.



Map of Tartu 1927

Courtesy of Tartu City Museum Archive

It is no longer easy to uncover what actually happened that July in and around Tartu. To the Soviet and German military historians it was an insignificant episode in the fighting, preceding the Siege of Leningrad. To the Estonians it was much more; it was an important manifestation of their will to regain independence. However, from the return of the Russians in 1944 and until the late 1980s, the anti-Soviet rising of 1941 could not be researched. After Independence in 1991, the reconstruction has been severely hampered by the very limited amount of sources left in Estonia. The main basis of the sources was the original interviews with surviving witnesses.

This is the first attempt to place the Estonian popular rising in South Estonia and Liberation of Tartu in early July 1941 within the framework of the German operations, giving a more complete picture of the "Summer War".

Prologue

Since the late 1920s Stalin had brutally mobilised and enslaved the Soviet society

to build a heavy industry that could support a massive, modern military machine. By the mid-1930s he had succeeded in creating a huge and well-officered force, in some conceptual and equipment areas leading in the world. However, in his general campaign to destroy all other centres of independent power, the Soviet dictator turned against the Red Army's leadership and destroyed it in 1937-38, leaving the force without its professional brain and having lost the will to show initiative and independent action on a battlefield, which is the core of military effectiveness.

When it became clear in spring 1939 that a general

European war was close, Stalin realised that he had to do everything possible to compensate for his self-inflicted military weakness. He needed time to re-stabilise the army. He also decided that he needed geographical buffer space to reduce the strategic vulnerability which was the result of the 1920 borders. The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact gave him both.



The cornerstone of the Defence League building at the meeting of Võru and Riia Streets was laid 3rd September.

Four weeks later the first Soviet troops had entered Estonia.

Courtesy of Tartu City Museum Archive

Late September the eastern half of Poland was absorbed, and when demands for bases in the Baltic states were backed by a massive deployment of troops towards their borders, the three governments gave in to the pressure. By 28 September, Estonia entered a Pact of Mutual Assistance with the Soviet Union, accompanied by the deployment of 30.000 Soviet troops on its national territory (twice the Estonian Defence Force total). The Soviet Union had gained rights to create naval and air bases on the Saaremaa, the Hiiumaa and at Paldiski as well as the right to use Tallinn Port for two years. However, the arriving generals also demanded air bases inland, and the Estonian government was in no position to reject that demand. Where the Red forces established their bases, Estonia lost all control. Thus, when the Soviet demands for bases in Finland were rejected by the Finns, and the Winter War followed, the air bases in “independent” and “neutral” Estonia were used by the Soviet bomber forces.

In the early summer of 1940 it became clear to Stalin that his partner, Germany,

was winning the European war, and that he could ignore any – sentimental – French and British support to the Baltic states’ independence. The three states were invaded mid June following an ultimatum to each country and annexed into the Soviet Union after rigged elections. Estonia was invaded by 80.000 troops on 17 June. According to the Swedish intelligence, Tartu became the garrison of the 90th Rifle Division.

The Estonian military leadership disappeared as a result of deportations and death in prisons or camps. The army was transformed to form the main part of the 22nd Territorial Rifle Corps of the Red Army (with the 180th, 181st and 182nd Rifle Divisions, the first and last with headquarters in Estonia). The surviving cadre was exposed to pressure and brainwashing. The voluntary defence force, Kaitseliit (Defence League) was disbanded and disarmed. The Baltic Sea Fleet moved its headquarters to Tallinn, and the 8th Army established itself in Rakvere.

In the late spring of 1941, the number of Soviet troops in the Baltic states had

risen to more than 500.000, increasingly concentrated in the South, close to the German border. Thus the 11th Rifle Division, which arrived at Tartu in February from Kuressaare, moved on to Vilnius in May (again according to the Swedish intelligence).

The situation in Estonia had become disastrous. The Soviet Union controlled all the institutions of the state, all areas of life. During that spring the pressure against the Baltic peoples grew dramatically, with its peak in massive and well-prepared deportations on 14 June. Around 10.000 persons were picked up in Estonia alone, including the families of those already deported or killed during the previous months. The pressure and the risk of deportations led many to hide in the woods to avoid being picked-up, becoming “Forest Brothers”.

The Baltic peoples had had their experience of what Soviet rule under Stalin meant. The naivety about what could be expected which had contributed to the decisions not to resist had gone. It was concluded that only Germany could help.

22 June to 9 July – the framework

The German invasion came as a surprise to Stalin, but his subordinates had continued and intensified preparations for war in the weeks of May and June. Even if the 14 June deportations may have been unconnected to the defence preparations, they added to the pressure on the Baltic populations and removed potentially disloyal elements.

On 20 June followed the announcement of General Mobilisation in Estonia, including both the former national army, now the 22nd Territorial Rifle Corps, and young conscripts. The invasion of the Soviet Union followed two days later.

Army Group North attacked into Lithuania from East Prussia with the main effort in the direction via Kaunas and onwards to the River Daugava. Kaunas was liberated by the Lithuanians ahead of the arrival of the Germans, and the leading elements of the Panzergruppe 4 under General Erich von Manstein succeeded in capturing bridges at Daugavpils on 26

June, splitting the defending Soviet 8th and 11th Armies. The Baltic Sea Navy started to evacuate its bases in Latvia on 29 June. On that day Manstein broke out of the Daugavpils bridgehead in spite of hard and aggressive resistance by the Soviet forces, and continued towards Ostrov. Other German forces captured Riga on 1 July.

The 18th German Army¹ that followed the Panzer Group and covered its Western flank, also attacked with its main effort East of the Lake Peipsi via Pskov. The Germans – correctly – did not expect the Soviets to deploy large forces in defence of Estonia, and the 18th Army only sent the XXVI Army Corps² with the 217th and 61st Infantry Divisions up the coast of the Riga Gulf, crossing into Estonia at Ikla on 7 July. Forces of the defending Soviet 8th Army met the German advance. The 10th Rifle Corps was used to delay and stop the German corps.

The threat to Leningrad was already clear one week into the war. The defence preparations became desperate. A line 100 kilometres southwest of Leningrad from

the Finnish Gulf along the Luga river ending at the Ilmen lake was now selected as the main forward defence of the city. All construction work in the city stopped and 30,000 workers were sent to develop the defences in a special Rear Lines Construction Administration created for that purpose on 29 July. A special operational group for the control of the defence line was established one week later. On 30 June the decision was taken to raise a locally drafted militia army. Without training this loose mob was sent to man the Luga line, only armed with light weapons – and slaughtered by the advancing Germans on their arrival. Everything had to be done to gain time and weaken the German offensive.

The Soviets also attempted to stabilise the situation by shuffling the commanders. On 4 July Lieutenant General P.P. Sobennikov, the commander of the 8th Army responsible for the defence of the Baltic coast – and Estonia – was moved up to command the Front. Lieutenant General F.S. Ivanov became the 8th Army commander.

Beyond the mobilisation of the former Estonian army that was going to be used in the defence of the Soviet Union, the authorities established "Destruction Battalions" to remove or destroy everything that could be used by the advancing Germans: assets that could not be moved such as infrastructure and industry. Estonian communists and everyone whom the Soviet authorities had succeeded in attracting during the year of occupation manned these units.

The mobilising Estonians realised that their units would be used outside the country and against what most saw as their national interests. They were to be sent to Leningrad, Pskov and Ostrov, and many fled and joined the "Forest Brothers", including a significant number of regular officers who had not been removed by the initial purges and the deportations.

The number of persons willing to risk and able to participate in an armed rebellion had thus been rising at the same time where possibilities of success grew day by day. Thus during the first ten days of July practically all South Estonia was lib-

erated by Estonians before the arrival of the German units. In the Southwest, the rebellions gained control up to the line over Viljandi-Pärnu, where the 8th Soviet Army was deployed in an attempt to stop the German onrush.

From the first contacts, the relations between the Estonians and German soldiers were good. The invader was seen as a partner in the fight against a common enemy. The German High Command was approached several times with the requests for additional weapons and the Germans responded positively to those requests even before their main units actually arrived.

Events up to 9 July preparing the rebellion in Tartu

Organised resistance in Tartu had already started in mid March 1941. One of the student groups took the initiative to co-ordinate its actions with other similar groups known to be active at the time. Like in most early resistance movements, the initial aim was to collect and spread information.

In early summer of 1941 the young resistance movement gathered information about the communists and their movements, established contacts with the now growing number of "Forests Brothers" and investigated the possibilities to get weapons. Some members of the organisation infiltrated Soviet organisations and thereafter served as information sources. The resistance meeting place was in the previous Estonian Healthcare Museum just opposite of the NKVD (National Committee of Internal Affairs/Narodnij Kommissariat Vnutrennih Del) building in Kindral Põdra Street³.

During early July of 1941 the activities of the organisation intensified further, inspired by news from the Finnish radio about the approaching German troops. The group decided to liberate the town and developed plans of action. It was understood that in order to avoid Soviet destruction of key infrastructure, the liberation should take place prior to the arrival of the German units.

Different groups were tasked to prepare taking control over key objects: telephone relay stations, postal offices etc. As it was foreseen that the Soviets would destroy the bridges over Emajõgi, it was decided to concentrate all action and all forces in the parts of Tartu, south of the river. The start of the operations against the different objects would be coordinated. In June, agreement had been reached between the resistance and Tartu University Hospital about the treatment of casualties.

On 6 July a squadron of German fighter aircraft attacked Raadi air base North of the river. That day the last members of the communist party left the town followed by the NKVD and the remaining Red Army units. The pontoon bridge near the Market Hall was also demolished on that day.

On 8 July preparations started to blow-up the Stone Bridge at the North end of the City Hall Square. At 0637 the following morning a 1-ton charge was detonated, destroying the northern end of the 157 years old bridge, and at the same time

severely damaging buildings in the old town centre with the falling large granite stones. On that day, 9 July, the only Soviet armed elements remaining in Tartu were a destruction battalion and some of the NKVD special groups that had to destroy the town immediately prior to the arrival of the Germans.

Liaison was established to the “Forest Brothers” to ensure their support for uprising. Ensign Olev Reintalu was appointed as overall leader of the resistance, and during a meeting in Estonian Healthcare Museum on 09th of July it was decided to start open operations to liberate Tartu the next morning, 10 July, at 0730.



The Stone Bridge in 1939 seen from the South




... from the same place after the demolition.

Both photos are from Välter Haamer and Rudolf Pangsepp: Tartu Kivisild/Dorpatser Steinbrücke 1784-1941; Tallinn 1997



Ensign Olev Reintalu

*Photo from Koguteos Eesti Riik ja Rahvas
II Maailmasõjas IV: Stockholm 1957*



Tartu City Centre 1938. Map: courtesy of Tartu City Museum Archive.

On 9 July, the 61st German Infantry Division attempted an attack to the north close to Viljandi from Western side of the Võrts lake in order to reach Tartu with a reconnaissance patrol, but failed.

**10 July –
the Estonian liberation of Tartu**

At the time agreed, the activists gathered at the museum. Shortly thereafter the first prisoner was taken, who was a member of a destruction battalion. Then the situation got more difficult, as a combined Soviet force of around 300 took up a position close to the railway line on Riga Street, one of the most likely access routes into the town for the Germans. In addition to this force, a number of NKVD and destruction battalion members moved across the remaining Western-most “Liberty” Bridge” to the southern part of Tartu. Thus by early afternoon the Soviets had re-established control over the town.

The situation developed further, when during afternoon a Soviet truck met three German armoured cars, commanded by

Captain Glasenapp, in Võru Street close to the down town. The German armoured cars were part of the reconnaissance unit that reached Võru⁴. There was a short engagement and this event triggered the actual fighting for Tartu.



Captain Kurt von Glasenapp
*Photo from Koguteos Eesti Riik ja Rahvas
II Maailmasõjas IV: Stockholm 1957*

The information about German units in town caused the Soviets to withdraw hastily across the river. Some of the Soviets tried to hide in buildings to attempt an escape later.

Without meeting further resistance the German reconnaissance element continued to the centre of town, where one of the armoured cars continued along the Emajõgi river, firing at the Soviet trenches across the river.

As the Germans moved deeper into the town, an increasing number of the Estonian resistance fighters joined them. The appearance of the armoured cars was a great moral support for the members of resistance. The fact that German forces had arrived to Tartu made the initially weak Soviet forces cautious. They did not cross the river, therefore they could not implement the destruction of Tartu. However, the small unit left the town again the same evening, around 1800. It had only lasted long enough to make the Soviets react and encourage the resistance.

Thereafter the members of the resistance discussed the implications of the

event during the meeting on Riga Hill. The situation was critical. The Soviet troops were still just across the river, and as the Liberty Bridge was still intact, nothing kept them from returning. As the number of organised resistance members was still far too small to defend the town, recruiting amongst the remaining male population started immediately. At the same time messengers were sent to Võru where German units were stationed with requests for weapons.

Then information spread that a Soviet attempt the night before had failed to destroy the armoury of the former 2nd Estonian Division completely. It had been abandoned, and the local population had succeeded in salvaging 300 rifles with ammunition. The leader of the resistance made sure that the weapons were collected, and that stroke of luck saved the situation.

The now better-armed members of the resistance were organised close to the newly built, former Defence League building on Riga Hill (where the Baltic Defence College is today). Groups were dispatched to

sectors along the river to stop possible Soviet attempts to cross. Others were used to “clean” the southern part of the town, getting rid of the small groups or single persons that had been left behind when the appearance of the German troops caused panic among the Soviets. This took the character of individual resistance members going hunting with pistols or rifles and delaying the proper organisation in units of many of the potential fighters.

In order to make it possible to distinguish friend from foe (and as a result also to form the members of the resistance into combatants under international law) they were issued with white emblems with the crest of the Estonian Republic or an armband with the Estonian national colours.

The evening on 10 July brought the first phase of the battle and the first elements of the second to an end. At 2040 the Soviets blew up the remaining Liberty Bridge to avoid it being taken by the Germans or the Estonian resistance.

However, shortly thereafter the start of artillery fire against the southern part

of the town announced the return of regular troops of the Red Army. What probably had happened was that the news of the German arrival had prompted the Soviet 8th Army send the 16th Rifle Division, the only available formation, to Tartu to meet the threat. That division was the first element of the 11th Rifle Corps, which later got responsibility for holding the area between the lakes of Peipsi and Võrts. Together with the 10th Rifle Corps of the 8th Army it defended the approaches to Leningrad via Narva.

This Soviet reaction was matched by a parallel German decision. On that evening the 18th German Army placed the I Army Corps Reconnaissance Task Force “Burdach”⁵ under command of the XXVI Corps for use in the axis via Tartu. Why that decision was taken is not completely clear. The most likely causes are the reports of the armoured car patrol from Võru and the contact thereafter made by the Estonian Resistance groups from Tartu.

The liberation of Tartu was meant to protect the town against destruction by

demolition. However, now the southern part of town centre along the river became exposed to an increasingly intense artillery barrage, as well as to the Soviet efforts to clear fields of fire by torching buildings on the northern side of the river. During this first night, the artillery fire was relatively light. It was probably only meant to harass the deployment of German troops.

During the evening and night the Resistance deployed its forces in defensive groups along the river. Armed groups, which arrived from the surrounding counties reinforced the defence. The first regular Estonian Army officers arrived to Tartu with their armed groups. Among first of them was captain Karl Talpak.

The arrival of experienced officers increased the morale significantly. The night was relatively quiet. The Soviets tried once to cross the river in the new workers residential area of Karlova around one kilometre southeast of the town centre. Captain Talpak's group forced the attempt, probably a combat patrol, to retreat.



Captain Karl Talpak

*Photo from Koguteos Eesti Riik ja Rahvas
II Maailmasõjas IV: Stockholm 1957*

During 11 June the Estonian effort took an increasingly organised form. The members of Women Defence League organised field kitchens and prepared

medical kit for the fighters. The defence was continuously reinforced with the partisan groups arriving from all over South Estonia. On that day Major Kurg, another regular officer, arrived to town with his group. He thereafter, as the senior military officer in Tartu, took over command of the resistance forces. His command post with security elements was established next to the Defence League Building. Contact was established with other resistance groups East and West, thereafter forming an Estonian armed presence all along the river line. The forces in Tartu, a mix of the town resistance and arrived "Forests Brothers", were now organised as the "Tartu Partisan Battalion" with four normal and one "Guard" company. The strength increased gradually to around 700. The total strength of the Resistance in the Tartu area is estimated to have been around 1000. The companies were assigned the following tasks: the 1st and the 3rd Companies were deployed to defend the South river bank in the town; the 4th Company took positions in Western Tartu where the North bank dominates the South bank

making the risk of crossing significant; the 2nd Company took positions 10 km southeast to Tartu (probably covering the area at Luunja and towards the East). The Guard Company was responsible for guarding stocks and emerging town institutions.

The effort to “clean” the town of the remaining Soviet elements continued, when they made movement on the streets dangerous by sniping at the members of the Resistance. Now the incidents were taken care of by reaction groups commanded by an officer or a non-commissioned officer (NCO). This was, as always, a very time consuming activity as buildings had to be searched completely.

During the day the artillery barrage intensified, resulting in some serious damage. Soviet agents contributed to the destruction by setting fire to a large number of buildings with Molotov cocktails. Other Soviet agents were found controlling the artillery fire, hiding on high ground or in church towers.

According to the German narrative, elements of the Task Force “Burdach” ar-

rived in Tartu on the morning of 11 July, capturing the town in a “daring raid”. The Estonian Resistance is not mentioned. According to the Estonian sources, the Germans only arrived on the next day⁶.

The liberation and defence of southern Tartu is one of the most important achievements of the 1941 “Summer War”. It advanced and eased the German capture of Estonia, and her oppressed people hoped, in vain, that it would lead to a renewed independence. It was initiated by a small group of patriotic students without military expertise. Their action became an issue of national pride in the long dark decades ahead.

From 12 July – the escalation to larger scale German-Soviet fighting

On 12 July the first stronger German elements from the Task Force “Burdach” came to the support of the Tartu Partisan Battalion. It consisted of anti-tank gun platoons⁷. German speaking students and Estonian army officers were assigned to anti-tank guns crews as liaison officers and

interpreters. The German units took positions close to the Tähtvere manor house and park in the north western part of the town.



Major Friedrich Kurg

Photo from Koguteos Eesti Riik ja Rahvas II Maailmasõjas IV: Stockholm 1957

On the arrival, the German units were met by accurate artillery fire, an indication of the effectiveness of the Soviet ar-

tillery observers who stayed behind. Heavy artillery fire against the area around the Riga Hill forced Major Kurg to move his command post to the south eastern part of the town, close to an exhibition ground here. Even if neither the Esto-

nian nor German narratives mention this - they both ignore the effort of the other - there probably was division of responsibility leaving the Estonian Resistance to defend the central and eastern parts of the town⁸.



The damaged town centre south of the river.

Courtesy of the Tartu City Museum Archive.

Effective artillery fire led to a hunt for the observers, and a vast number was found and killed that day. Thereafter the bombardment became less well-directed, still, however, destroying a large number of buildings. The destruction of Tartu was also continued in the northern part of the town, which was controlled by the Soviets. Buildings were burned down systematically, street by street. The German narrative mentions that the Soviet air force bombed their positions in the Tartu area on that day.

During the following days, the Task Force "Burdach" carried the main burden of fighting the 16th Soviet Rifle Division. The Estonian narrative mentions a "stabilisation" of the situation, whereas the German narrative underlined how difficult it became to contain the Soviet formation's aggressive forays across the river.

On 12 July Army Group North acknowledged that the Soviets would fight hard for Estonia, not withdraw quickly as they had from Lithuania and Latvia. The German 18th Army realised now that

the 8th Soviet Army in Rakvere was deploying two Rifle Corps in the defence of North Estonia, and the 254th Infantry Division was sent from Võru to join the 61st Division near Viljandi. The 291st Infantry Division was given orders to move from Kurzeme (Kurland) to join the 217th Division North of Pärnu.

Two more Soviet rifle divisions, the 48th and 125th were assembled by the 11th Rifle Corps in North Estonia on 14 July, and two days later they appeared on the northern side of the Emajõgi⁹, relieving the 16th Division. The 48th Division had deployed to the West and the 125th had deployed to the East of Tartu. On that day the good summer weather was replaced by rain and thunderstorms, worsening the road conditions and hampering operations. On 16 July, the 18th Army also decided to employ its last reserve, the 93rd Infantry Division, in Estonia.

XXVI Corps now resumed its offensive operations in Western Estonia on 17 July, but no significant progress was possible until significant parts of the two additional divisions became available.

From 18 to 20 July the pressure of the 11th Rifle Corps' two divisions against the Task Force "Burdach" developed into a critical situation, and the 18th Army was forced to send the 93rd Infantry Division to the Tartu front. Seconded elements from that division doubled the strength

of Burdach's force on their arrival on 21 July¹⁰.

From 20 July, the 18th Army concentrated its attention in Estonia. The mission was to keep the Soviet forces in Estonia from reinforcing the defence of Leningrad. Its headquarter (HQ) was now in Võru.



The view of Soola Street towards the river.

Courtesy of the Tartu City Museum Archive.

The last phase of the Tartu fighting, the destruction of the 11th Rifle Corps

On 21 July, the 18 Army decided to accomplish its mission by an operation from the Viljandi area, *initially* cutting off the 11th Rifle Corps by an advance in its back to the Peipsi Lake, *thereafter* cutting of the rest of the 8th Army in North-west Estonia by an advance to the Finnish Gulf.


Early next morning the offensive started with the 61st, 217th and 254th Divisions. The 61st Division captured two bridges in Põltsamaa intact at noon and continued towards Jõgeva, where Soviet forces on 23 July fought to avoid the Germans cutting the main road out of Tartu to the North. The 11th Rifle Corps had realised the threat to the 125th and 48th Rifle Divisions. The Task Force "Burdach" and the 93rd Division found that the resistance of the forces in front of them lessened. During the night 23-24 July, the bulk of the Soviet forces with

the artillery left, leaving only a couple of rifle battalions as a screen.

The 93rd Division had created a small flotilla of fishing boats and combat engineer assault boats. It was now used to occupy the island of Piirisaar in the Lake Peipsi and to land forces on the coast North of the Emajõgi, and during the next days elements of the division advanced up the shore of the lake.

Forward elements of the 61st Division reached the lake 7 kilometres south of Mustvee on the night 24-25 July, and on the following day the 254th Division occupied the town. Parts of the 11th Rifle Corps that had not escaped were surrounded, and the following days the German forces had to meet several attempts to break out. On 25 July, the 93rd Division got command of all forces advancing north from Tartu.

On 29 July, the 18th Army started the next part of the offensive, the advance to the Finnish



Gulf to cut off and destroy the Soviet forces in Northwestern Estonia. The XXVI Army Corps commanded the 254th, 93rd, 61st and later the 291st Division in the offensive towards the Finnish Gulf. The newly arrived XXXXII Corps would later command the offensive to capture Northwestern Estonia and the islands.

Destruction of the surrounded remnants of the 11th Rifle Corps was left to the 93rd Division and a task force from the 61st Division. That mission was accomplished four days later, on 31 July, bagging 8.794 prisoners, 68 artillery pieces, 5 anti-tank guns, 5 tanks and 3 armoured cars captured. Thus the 1941 fighting in the Tartu area ended, three weeks after it was started by a small group of Estonian students.

Aftermath

In the offensive towards the coast, on 5 August, the 61st Division at Järva-Jaani destroyed the 16th Rifle Division that had fought the first days in Tartu. As a result of a successful advance towards Narva by

58th Infantry Division east of Lake Peipsi, the XXVI Corps offensive could swing Northeast, after reaching Tapa and Rakvere on the same day. The 254th Division reached Kunda and the coast two days later. The continued offensive by the Corps met hard resistance that involved the survivors of the 125th and 48th Rifle Divisions. It took 12 days of intense fighting to capture Narva, and the XXVI Corps only crossed the 1920-1940 Estonian-Soviet border on 20 August.

The XXXXII Corps with the 61st, 217th, and 254th Divisions remained in Estonia. On 27 August, Tallinn was surrounded, and the following day the Soviets in the town gave up and surrendered, even if evacuation of the communists and others from the port was still ongoing. Haapsalu was captured on 31 August. The German invasion of the Estonian Islands started 14 September and ended on 27 September.

In Tartu 1007 buildings had been destroyed. Purely Estonian part of the fighting had been intense, but short. Only 19 resistance fighters had been killed and 23 wounded. The number of civilians killed

is estimated to have been around 100, mainly as a result of artillery fire.



Tartu south of the Emajõgi after the fighting (a view along Aleksandri Street).

Courtesy of the Tartu City Museum Archive.

The reason why the Estonian human losses were relatively limited seems to be that after 10-12 July the fighting moved away from the town centre toward the river east and west of the town. That would also explain the very different German and Estonian impressions of the events. That the Estonian picture of the period 12-24 July is less than complete is confirmed by the interacting Soviet-German escalation in force build-up during that second phase, making it possible for

the Germans to bag most of two rifle divisions in the third phase.

The Soviet choice to fight for Estonia that led to the fighting in Tartu did not change anything. The terrain in the main Army Group North axis did not allow much additional deployment of German forces, so the use of 5 infantry divisions in Estonia rather than in the main effort made no difference. Leningrad would have survived anyway.

For the Estonians, however, that choice led to tragedies, far beyond the destruction and losses of the "Summer War". The Soviets used the time to "evacuate" machinery, cattle, and vehicles as well as 25.000 Estonians to the East. On top of that, 33.000 young Estonian men were mobilised and transported to Russia. The mobilised 22nd Estonian Territorial Rifle Corps of about 7.000 Estonians was destroyed while fighting for the Soviets in 1941: 2.000 were killed, and 4.500 taken prisoner by the Germans. The rest, the recruits, were initially used in the "Construction Battalions", which were really mobile forced labour camps. Then the

evacuated Estonian communist leadership succeeded in getting permission to use the members of the construction battalions to form the 8th Estonian Rifle Corps. It came to consist of 27.000, including around 23.000 Estonians. The Corps was used in the fighting of 1942 and 1943 and suffered massive losses, due to unprofessional leadership. Between 1.200 and 2.000 succeeded in surrendering to the Germans. The Corps was used in 1944 in Estonia, especially in the hard fighting at the Saaremaa at the foot of the Sörve peninsula in the end of November. Here the soldiers of the Corps fought against their countrymen in German uniform - none of them with a chance to escape. Thereafter more Estonians were mobilised into the Corps before it was sent to Kurzeme (Kurland), ending the German-Soviet fighting for the reoccupation of Latvia.

Bibliography

• John Erickson: *The Road to Stalingrad. Stalin's War with Germany. Volume 1*. London 1975.

• Lars Ericson: "Buffert eller hot? De baltiska staterna i svensk militär planering år 1941" in Bo Hugemark (ed.): *I Orkanens öga. 1941 - osäker neutralitet*; Stockholm 1992.

• *Germany and the Second World War. Volume IV. The Attack on the Soviet Union*. Oxford 1998.

• *Germany and the Second World War. Volume IV. Maps*. Stuttgart 1983.

• Valter Haamer and Rudolf Pangsepp: *Tartu Kirvisild/Dorpater Steinbrücke 1784-1941*; Tallinn 1997.

• Werner Haupt: *Baltikum 1941. Die Geschichte eines ungelösten Problems*; Neckargemünd 1963.

• Vello Helk: *Estlands Historie - kort fortalt*. Odense 1993.

• Koguteos: *Eesti Riik ja Rahvas Teises Maailmasõjas IV*; Stockholm 1957.

• Herbert Lindmäe: *Suvesõda Tartumaal*; Tartu 1999.

• Tiit Noormets: "The summer War: the 1941 Armed Resistance in Estonia" in *The Anti-Soviet Resistance in the Baltic States*; Vilnius 1999.

• Erik Norberg: "Sjökrig i Östersjön. Sovjetiske planer och tysk aktivitet inför

uppgörelsen 1941” in Bo Hugemark (ed.): *I Orkanens öga. 1941 – osäker neutralitet*; Stockholm 1992.

• Romuald Misiunas and Rein Taagepera: *The Baltic States. Years of Dependence 1940-1990. Expanded and Updated Edition*. London 1993.

• “Estonia in World War II”, part of Tõnu Tannberg, Ain Mäesalu, Tõnis Lukas, Mati Laur and Ago Pajur: *History of Estonia*; Tallinn 2000.

• Third Reich Factbook (www.skalmannu/third-reich).

¹ Commanded by General Georg von Kuchler (1881-1968)

² Commanded by General Albert Wodrig

³ Named after General Ernst Pödder (1879-1932), one of the War of Liberation commanders. Now “Pepleri Street”.

⁴ This was probably a forward patrol from the later arriving I Army Corps Reconnaissance Task Force “Burdach”. On the 10th it was still employed as a screen, linking the main force of the 18th Army attacking east of the Peipsi, to its XXVI Corps, attacking in Western Estonia.

⁵ The task force under Major General Karl Burdach (1891-1976) thereafter consisted of the Reconnaissance Battalions 1 and 11, as well as the First Battalion of Infantry Regiment 2. The low

numbers of the units indicate that they were some of the original and thus best manned and equipped of the German army units.

⁶ The Estonian sources identify the Germans as troops from the 93rd Infantry Division. This is a mistake. That division was still in Latvia, on the way forward. It had been freed from the pool of reserve formations of the German Army and was now the last reserve of the 18th Army. It was released for deployment to Estonia on 16 July. The decision to use it in the Tartu area followed a couple of days later, probably on 20th July, at the same time as the 18th Army established its HQ to Võru to concentrate its operations in Estonia. On 21 July the division detached units to the Task Force “Burdach” that doubled its strength. But the 93rd Division did not get command over the German forces in the Tartu sector until 25 July.

⁷ The two Reconnaissance Battalions of the Task Force consisted each of a horse cavalry squadron, a bicycle squadron, and a heavy squadron with one troop with three 37 mm anti-tank guns, a troop with two 75 mm infantry guns and a troop with two armoured cars. There is no information that the infantry battalion from Infantry Regiment 2 was reinforced with anti-tank guns.

⁸ The map of the official German history indicates that the German line initially was extended from the town towards the West along the river, and only later to the East.

⁹ Both divisions had originally been based in Riga, had apparently been withdrawn via Pskov, and were returning to the front via Narva.

¹⁰ The 93rd Division (commanded by General Otto Tiemann), detached an infantry battalion (II/ Infantry Regiment 270), one anti-tank battalion (number 193), one combat engineer company and one bicycle company to the task force.

Subscribe to the Baltic Defence Review

Please send this order form to: Baltic Defence College (reg. No. 24065211)

Riia 12, EE 51013 Tartu, Estonia

Contact Person: Prof. Elizabeth Tromer

Tel. +372 7 314 000, Fax: +372 7 314 050

Email. BDReview@bdcol.ee.

Name: _____

Title: _____

Company: _____

Address: _____

Post/Zip code: _____

Tel: _____

Fax: _____

Annual rates * 2003

Europe 350 EEK

Rest of the world 450 EEK

Number of copies

Payment options:

Check enclosed for EEK

Payable to the Baltic Security Society

Please charge the amount of EEK

to my Visa

EurocardMastercard

Card Number:

Expiry Date:

Control Code: {3 numbers placed on the back side of the card under your signature line}.

Owner of the card: _____

Signature: _____

Date: _____

* Include two issues of the BDR and shipment by surface mail