

# The Commandant's Introduction

By Michael H. Clemmesen

**T**his issue of the Baltic Defence Review marks a change in the editorial line that is symbolised by the changed cover. The adjustment is not only caused by the fact that the three Baltic states have succeeded in being invited to NATO as well as to the EU and now have to adapt to the new situation. It is also based on the realisation that the two organisations will change their character when the integration of the new members takes place. The implementation of the new editorial line will only come gradually. However, a third of the articles in this issue fit completely within the new framework.

The NATO that the seven newly invited states are about to join in 2004 is either undergoing a fundamental transformation or is heading further towards irrelevance and eventual formal demise.

It seems now to have been generally recognized that the Alliance has to be reformed thoroughly to remain relevant to the leading member state. The U.S.A., involved as she is in the drawn-out “War Against Terror” that was forced upon her by the 11 September 2001 attacks, is not impressed by the contribution from most of the European allies. Only a small progress has been made in the enhancement of the force structures of the European members since the 1999 Kosovo Campaign and the Washington Summit, in spite of the formal political agreement at that time. The fact that states like Germany and the Netherlands have further cut their defence spending makes the requirement for a quick and visible structural reform even more important. The good news is that the new and invited

members seem to have realised this fact.

To succeed, the transformation must take the alliance forward and change it from being a reactive self-defensive alliance. The outlined “new NATO” is a politically much more demanding, divisive, and risky framework for military co-operation. Its missions will include operations of coercion like the one against Yugoslavia with regard to Kosovo as well as pre-emptive Out-of-NATO area crisis response operations – military activism to counter emerging security challenges. This does not mean that the basic mission of the Alliance disappears completely. As long as NATO is seen as relevant to the Americans, Article 5 of the Washington Treaty will still be the foundation of future collective defence against an external threat. However, the members of the Alliance are

presently convinced that it is highly unlikely that a threat of massive invasion against its area can emerge within the next decade. They therefore have the option to change the focus of their armed forces' structure and readiness. They can proceed further away from the former focus: deterrence by territorial defence backed by nuclear weapons - within civilian working hours. The increased participation in peace support operations in the 1990s could take place without fundamental changes. The next step cannot. The more focused and modernised force contributions agreed on at the Prague Summit will, if implemented, be a useful first move, but the first move only.

In relation to the Baltic states one could argue that where the prevailing opinion in the Alliance used to be that it was militarily impossible to defend their territory against an invasion, the present opinion is that defence against invasion of their territory - and the territory of all other member states - is an irrelevant issue.

With such a basic change of the security environment and the framework for the three Baltic states, everything that the Baltic Defence College does must be adapted according to these changes. That, of course, also applies to its academic journal, which has the purpose to reflect and inspire the thoughts and actions in the three states and to increase the knowledge and understanding of the states outside the region.

During its first years of existence the focus of the College's activities was primarily on building and operation of an affordable territorial defence structure, built on mobilisation, mainly using the experience of the Nordic NATO members and neutral states. This was in order to counter the argument against Baltic NATO membership, especially among the Alliance military, that the three states could not be defended, even until NATO forces could come to their assistance. The Baltic Defence Review's editorial line supported that line with articles about territorial defence. We also underlined the significant progress that was made in the Baltic

states' development and their military forces.

The Review will, from now onwards, deal with general issues related to the development of the Alliance, and it will do so from the new member states' point of view.

We will deal with the dilemma facing the Baltic states in the further development of their forces. How do you maintain the capability to participate in international operations with valuable niche contributions, and at the same time continue to develop an officer corps with at least a minimal level of understanding of the various elements of their profession? For army officers this means both a theoretical as well as a practical combined arms background from at least the lowest tactical formation, brigade level. Understanding of the relations between combat, combat support, and combat service support elements can only be developed if, as a minimum, one national brigade structure exists. It is as important as it

is for the developing musician to have other types of musicians to practice with.

How can the balance between immediate and potential contributions be reached in small member states with very limited resources such as the Baltic countries? How much of the combined arms structure needs to be a standing force, on high readiness, and able to contribute quickly in a balanced way to alliance operations? How is it possible to ensure a proper quality of manning for the force, taking into consideration the problems of “military transition” described elsewhere in this issue? What future role, if any, is there for conscription? What are the possible future fields of the Baltic states’ military co-operation within the Alliance? Is specialisation or role sharing an acceptable idea?

Another natural field to deal with is the legal, foreign policy, and domestic politic issues and risks that face the small NATO members if and when they follow and participate in an offensive use of a military action that is necessary to keep the Alliance relevant.

An area that will remain in focus of the Review is the developments in Russia, Belarus and Ukraine, and, from now on, also increasingly the development on the Russian Southern and Eastern borders, that eventually are likely to become the borders of Europe.

Finally will security issues in other than a military context be in focus. How should the Baltic and other Central and Eastern European states proceed with the continuing “state building” and transition process?

# The Responsive State

By Lars Johannsen\*

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## *The goals achieved*

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The political goals set by the Baltic countries at the time of the independence in 1992 have been achieved within a decade. A pluralist democracy has been introduced with the power changing hands peacefully through several free and fair elections. The sought-after independence has been secured by the invitation to join NATO and all three states have a market economy today. The achievement of these goals is not least reflected in the current negotiations to join the European Union.

While there is much to congratulate with, it should be recalled that the political

goals were set by elites who, in splendid isolation, could utilize the 'extra-ordinary political capital'<sup>1</sup> generated through the extrication, to carry out reforms in which the state would retreat from its dominating position and its almost total penetration of the society. While this is understandable given the character of the previous regime with an excessive governance, little possibility for individual choice and alternative views on politics<sup>2</sup>, and a legacy of a flattened civil society,<sup>3</sup> it was almost forgotten that state retrenchment does not need to be the only goal, as the daunting task of change also requires a state that is capable to steer the process.<sup>4</sup>

One aspect of state's capabilities is the balance between state and society and the

autonomy of the state was thus increased at the outset of the transition, making the consolidation of democracy and the state dependent on the resurrection of the civil society as well as a gradual understanding by the elite how to cooperate with emerging interests. Theoretically these lines of questioning follow two trains of thought. First, the work of Linz & Stepan<sup>5</sup> concerning the development of a usable state and Przeworski's<sup>6</sup> focus on the generation of normatively desired policies as requirements of consolidation and sustainability of democracy. Second, the works of Evans,<sup>7</sup> Weiss<sup>8</sup> and Leftwich,<sup>9</sup> who point out that in the West European state type - in contrast to the minimalist

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liberal state - societal actors are involved in the policy process from formulation to implementation. Thus the state becomes embedded in society and thereby a developmental state, in which policy and participation increase the legitimacy and usability of the state, is possible. This corresponds to Bernhard's<sup>10</sup> observation that an effective and consolidated democracy is most likely when a strong state meets a strong civil society. In short, an effective democracy requires a usable state that is responsive and efficient in adopting and implementing political decisions. However, the reverse side of the involvement is that the state is at risk of being captured by specific societal actors. The process of a systemic change with its turbulent legal environment, massive wealth changing hands, and with a poor tradition for making politicians and administrators accountable, has increased these risks.<sup>11</sup> Thus the post-communist state, with the legacies described above, is also vulnerable to the extent that decisions are made to appease specific interests as opposed to the public interests aggregated and mediated

through the democratic processes.<sup>12</sup> In this perspective democracy is undermined not only by the preferential treatment of interests but also by the misuse of office by politicians and officials.

This article is the first in a series of two attempting to compare the responsiveness and the capacity to implement political decisions in the three Baltic countries. The emphasis is more on surveying the present condition of the state(s) rather than explaining it. The focus in the present article is on the first part of the equation, gauging the extent to which the state, in the opinion and experience of top decision makers<sup>13</sup>, involves social forces in decision-making and implementation. Specifically, the present article has a twofold objective: (1) to discuss the expressed desirability among the executives to involve the public and interest organizations in the policy process and compare the intent with the actual level of involvement and (2) to survey the perceived extent of misuse of positions in the three Baltic countries.

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### *The value of involving interests*

The majority of the present and former ministers surveyed express opinions concurrent with participatory democracy. A democracy in which the citizens influence politics by means of political parties and associations (see table 1). It is important to make a distinction between electoral participation and participation between elections. Thus while the electorate is to a fairly high degree active in Estonia and Latvia, Lithuanian parliamentary elections seem to have become an outing for about half the electorate. In theory, the state is far more anchored in society in a participatory than in an electoral democracy, in which the public only exercises the right to express preferences at the election day. In the West European participatory democracy the citizens thus exercise influence both at elections and between elections through parties and organized interests, whether those are classical organizations like trade unions or single issues organizations like

environmental organizations. However, given the weak political parties with few members, the high degree of electoral volatility, and the importance of recognizable candidates that are connected to a political party, this is more common in Estonia and Latvia than in Lithuania<sup>14</sup>, and the emphasis therefore is that the public *should* become engaged in these countries. Thus more than evaluating a factual state of affairs it is rather an invitation and a preference for a model of democracy.

To the individual politician the involvement of an organization into the policy process can also be said to have a specific cost-benefit function. In the first instance it could be that the interest organizations can provide critical information improving the basis upon which a political decision is made. Furthermore, it is also likely that the participation of interest organizations in the implementation can be of value, in particular where it is the interest organization that possesses the infrastructure to reach the tar-

get group. One example is the advantage of letting agricultural organizations participate in the formulation and the implementation of agricultural policy and services, given that these already have established ties with the practitioners of the trade. Such involvement by interest organizations does naturally also benefit the organizations themselves as it provides individuals with incentives to join the organizations.<sup>15</sup> Second, the involvement of interest organization in the policy process is an exchange of support or at least a possibility to lessen the severity of criticism. A feature that is important for any politician that has an interest in reelection. The problem then becomes of mediating and assigning value to the support of the different interests. However, besides the possibility of capturing, all politicians are interested in retaining a degree of autonomy vis-à-vis interest organizations. Probably one of the worst accusations that can be made against a politician is the claim that the politician is in the pocket of some interests and has lost his executive capability.

**Table 1. Preference for public involvement in politics (pct.)**

	Estonia	Latvia	Lithuania
The public should become actively engaged in parties, associations, local government, etc. in order to gain greater influence on politics.	74.0	75.5	67.9
The public should take an interest in politics and communicate their views to the representatives.	20.0	18.4	17.0
The public should elect representatives and let them run the country.	6.0	6.1	15.1
Total (percent)	100.0	100.0	100.0
Total (N)	50	49	53

*Responses to question 45: 'What role should the public primarily play in politics and government?'*

**Table 2. Decisions are improved by involving interests. (pct.)**

	<b>Estonia</b>	<b>Latvia</b>	<b>Lithuania</b>
Yes, mostly	84.0	81.3	94.2
Yes, sometimes	14.0	16.7	5.8
No, worse	2.0	2.1	–
<b>Total (percent)</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>
<b>Total (N)</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>52</b>

*Responses to question 28: ‘Do you believe that decisions are improved when concerned interests are incorporated or heard in the process of formulation?’*

The ministers of the three Baltic countries clearly see the advantage of involving interests to improve the political decisions (Table 2). In our sample only two ministers, one in Estonia and one in Latvia, believe that the participation of interests organizations makes the decisions worse. A majority of the ministers also believe that compliance will enhance by involving concerned interest in the implementation design (Table 3). This indicates that the ministers clearly see a value by giving influence on the policy to interest organizations at stake through co-optation.

However, a majority of the ministers in Lithuania and Latvia do not see

lobbyism as a political function, in which political support can be raised. Only in Estonia the ministers see this form of petition as a possibility to raise political support (Table 4). Lobbying has, also to

some politicians in the Baltic countries, a negative nuance that is detected in our questionnaire. When the ministers were asked whether lobbyism is positive because it provides information<sup>16</sup>, a majority of the ministers’ answers is in accordance with the structure in table 2, but fewer ministers indicate the benefits of petition when this is coined as lobbyism. With this in mind, the structure of the responses concerning the cost-benefit function relating to interest organizations in the policy process indicates that Estonian and Latvian ministers are more ready than their Lithuanian colleagues to acknowledge the value of such involvement.

**Table 3. Improving implementation by involving interests**

	<b>Estonia</b>	<b>Latvia</b>	<b>Lithuania</b>
Strongly agree/agree	85.4	61.2	82.7
Disagree/strongly disagree	14.6	38.8	17.3
<b>Total (percent)</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>
<b>Total (N)</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>52</b>

*Responses to question 41: ‘To what extent do you agree with the following proposition?: To ensure compliance in the process of implementation, it is better when organizations, private business or other concerned interests assist in formulating the implementation design.’*

**Table 4. Lobbyism provides political support. (pct.)**

	<b>Estonia</b>	<b>Latvia</b>	<b>Lithuania</b>
Agree	70.0	46.5	27.5
Disagree	30.0	53.5	72.5
Total (percent)	50	43	40
Total (N)	100.0	100.0	100.0

*Responses to question 27.3: 'Lobbying is positive because you get support from the concerned groupings.'*

The recognition of the cost-benefit function of involving interest organizations in the policy process is not only important because it itself is an indicator of the openness of the political system, that is the responsiveness of the state, but also because the nature of such association is a mutual exchange where the acknowledgment of the function can become an awareness about the possibility of the state to provide incentives that foster the expansion of a mature civil society with a stake in development. However, it is also a possibility that the Lithuanian ministers (and Latvians, particularly with respect to implementation) place a negative emphasis on the calculus because of the factual experience of association

with interest organizations either in the open or behind closed doors. It is possible that the flip side of the coin, with capture by sector interest or illicit interest making their stamp on the policy, is the reality in which Lithuanian and Latvian ministers live. We shall return to the issue of the nature of the association following a closer look upon the practical experience with interest organizations.

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***A real experience?***

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Even if the state can do a lot to foster a civil society by adopting a responsive stance, this development is preceded by the emergence of differentiated attitudes that are rooted in a pluralistic economy.

The caveat is that communist politicians did their best not only to destroy the civil society but also to stamp out socio-economic differences. Previous research have repeatedly found that attitude differences in the post-communist societies are more of an ideological nature and linked to the agenda of the transition rather than reflecting deep social structures.<sup>17</sup> Where evidence of cleavages exists as a result of differences in the social structure, these cleavages are rooted in historical developments and specific cultural traits, such as nationality rather than in a socio-economic differentiation.<sup>18</sup> We have no reason to expect that the difficulties in developing a strong civil society by the gradual emergence of differentiated interests that are rooted in the outcome of the economic and political transition should be more different in the Baltic countries than in other Central and East European countries. Thus when asking ministers about the experience and the practice they have with the involving societal interests, their responses have to be evaluated against this background.



**Table 5. Reliance on information from? (pct. multiple marking allowed)**

	Estonia	Latvia	Lithuania
Political advisors	26.0	38.0	28.3
Political Parties	44.0	24.0	7.5
NGO specialists (Employed by NGO's )	44.0	40.0	49.1
Academic Specialists	72.0	72.0	86.8
Others	14.0	41.7	22.6

*Question: 'On which external actors have you relied upon/prefer to rely upon for information?'*

In our questionnaire we asked the ministers to identify the most important political actors in general as well as in relation to the ministers' portfolio. Only a handful of ministers in the three countries place interest organizations on the top three of influential actors, and that implies that interest organizations do not have a role. When asked whom they rely upon for external advice, NGO (Non-Governmental Organization) specialists are more important than government employed political advisors, and there is also a preference for NGOs over political parties in Latvia and Lithuania (Table 5). Political parties are in general better organized and developed in Lithuania

than in the two other countries but it seems that they are less heard in the ministries. This should be explained by the stronger tradition for single majority governments in Lithuania than in the two other countries. Thus for the individual Lithuanian minister, in our sample, the need to broker political decisions among coalition partners is less prevalent. In turn ministers prefer to rely upon academic specialist for information and advice. Perhaps both because of the requirement for specific know-how and the neutrality associated with academia.

The participation of the NGOs that have information in the policy process does also seem quite intense. A majority

of those who ask the NGOs for advice does it often or always and other ministers recall that they do it when important issues are at stake (Table 6). However, in Estonia and in contrast to the recognition of the of the cost-benefit structure, less than a half of the respondents have close working relationships with business, NGOs or other state agencies at the level of officials (Table 7). Thus it seems that the high degree of awareness and the principled support for participatory democracy in Estonia have so far not been translated into routine relationships at shop-level. This situation can partly be explained by the development and establishment of tripartite negotiations in Latvia and Lithuania - leaving aside political importance of these structures - and partly by the fact that the first Estonian governments came to be dominated by the 'Tartu Student Club'. As young neo-liberals these politicians did also have less developed ties to other structures in society whether that be emerging business interests, old state business interests or various forms of labour movements.

**Table 6. Frequency of reliance. (pct. among those who mention type of actor)<sup>19</sup>**

	Always	Often	Sometimes, concerning important issues	Rarely	Total
Political Advisors	10.7	35.7	50.0	3.6	100.0
Political Parties	11.5	42.3	46.2	0.0	100.0
NGO specialists (Employed by NGO's)	6.4	48.9	38.3	6.4	100.0
Academic Specialists	7.5	43.8	42.5	6.3	100.0
Others	5.6	50.0	44.4	0.0	100.0

Only a few of the ministers in the sample have not experienced pressure from the outside in the form of petition for new legislation. The Estonian ministers more frequently report that they are under pressure than their southern colleagues (see table 8). This can on the one hand indicate that Estonian

NGOs may be more aggressive in pursuing their interests, and that they take their role as interest organization seriously or, on the other hand, may be the effect of having fewer routine ties with the administration.

It is, however, not only domestic interests that seek influence. Small coun-

tries like the Baltic states often find themselves under pressure from foreign interests, whether that be governments, organizations, or business. In our survey, half of the Estonians and above 80 percent of the Lithuanian ministers report that foreign actors have tried to influence policy and regulation. When they were asked who the foreign actors were, the structure of the responses clearly differentiates between the economic transitions, the EU accession processes, and, with respect to Estonia and Latvia, the naturalization process of the non-citizens. In particular, it is interesting to note that Lithuanian ministers to a higher degree report attempts of foreign influence than their Estonian colleagues. It calls for fur-

**Table 7. Actual working relationships**

	Estonia	Latvia	Lithuania
Yes	44.9	80.0	90.2
No	55.1	20.0	9.8
Total (percent)	100.0	100.0	100.0
Total (N)	49	50	51

*Question: 'In your own ministry, is/was it common practice that ministerial officials have close working relationships with significant organizations (business, NGO, or state) within the field of the ministry?'*

ther research, but a promising hypothesis - judging from the comments - could be that a higher degree of responsiveness from the Lithuanian government towards domestic business interests for protection from international market forces and the prolonged implementation of economic reforms have developed into more contact points with international organizations like the IMF, EU and the World Bank. As such these relations can be considered as natural and not as evidence that foreign interests have captured the governments but rather that it reflects the

complex connection between negotiations and advices.

The analysis of the present link between interest organizations and the administration suggests that these are more developed in Lithuania and Latvia, despite the Estonian adherence to participatory democracy and an understanding of the game of cooptation. Thus the Estonian ministers' support for a development-focused West Europe state type is principled whereas the Latvian and Lithuanian, for better and for worse, have more factual experience in involving social interests.

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***The nature of involvement:  
capture, corruption  
and co-optation***

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We have to recall that the process of systematic change not only increased the opportunities for illicit interests to gain influence through bribery but also reduced the likelihood of getting caught, and we have already noted a question mark concerning the higher emphasis of the cost of including societal interest in Lithuanian and Latvia, suggesting that it could be the result of a factual learning process either because of capture or because of bribery. Judging by the ministers' answers to whether misuse of position is common and whether they personally have experienced attempts of bribery, the influence of illicit interests is paramount in Latvia and Lithuania. Around two thirds of the Latvian and Lithuanian ministers believe that misuse is common, and close to half have personally experienced attempts to buy them off (Tables 9 & 10). Thus it seems that "for better and

**Table 8. Pressure to initiate legislation**

	<b>Estonia</b>	<b>Latvia</b>	<b>Lithuania</b>
Often	30.0	19.6	13.2
Often, but not concerning really important issues	10.0	3.9	9.4
Sometimes	48.0	43.1	41.5
Rarely	8.0	13.7	22.6
Never	4.0	19.6	13.2
<b>Total (percent)</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>
<b>Total (N)</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>51</b>	<b>53</b>

*Question: 'Have you ever felt under pressure from outside actors to initiate new legislation?'*

**Table 9. Misuse of position**

	Estonia	Latvia	Lithuania
Strongly agree/agree	28.0	72.6	79.6
Disagree/strongly disagree	70.0	25.5	16.3
Do not know	2.0	2.0	4.1
Total (percent)	100.0	100.0	100.0
Total (N)	50	51	49

Responses to question 49: 'Do you agree that misuse of status positions is common in the politics of your country?'

**Table 10. Attempts of bribery, common**

	Estonia	Latvia	Lithuania
Yes, did experience*	34.7	44.0	48.1
Never	65.3	56.0	51.9
Total (percent)	100.0	100.0	100.0
Total (N)	49	50	52

Responses to question 46: 'During your time as minister, did you experience attempts to bribe you into favoring specific groups or individuals?'

\* This category covers the responses "Often", "Sometimes" and "A few times".

for worse" is the right phrase as the Estonian ministers believe misuse to be less common and fewer have experience with attempts of bribery.

The data presented in tables 9 & 10 illustrate highly penetrated states. The

ministers' evaluation and the differences in severity of corruption among the countries correspond to other internationally recognized surveys regarding the level of corruption.<sup>20</sup> While these data indicate corruption to be a lesser problem in

Estonia than in the two other countries it will still be fair to characterize the situation as severe. Furthermore, mistrust about the intentions, even of colleagues, is widespread in all three countries. It should be considered that not all influence is direct. There exists a web of contacts between ministries, which can be utilized to advance interests. Thus an interest organization or interests outside the realm of politics might prefer to go through another ministry to advance its influence.

From table 11 it is evident that ministers see illicit interests that are not organized politically behind many of the contacts they receive through other ministries. As expected from the patterns of corruption, Latvians and Lithuanians are more distrustful than the Estonians. However, with a question intentionally designed to capture the loosely defined feeling 'that a Grey Cardinal or at least shady forces exist', the question not only taps awareness among the ministers that there are more to the story than official policy and arguments, but also carry evidence

**Table 11. The influence of parties outside the realm of politics.**

	Estonia	Latvia	Lithuania
Agree	58.0	80.0	69.6
Disagree	22.0	18.0	17.4
Do not know	20.0	2.0	13.0
Total (percent)	100.0	100.0	100.0
Total (N)	50	51	53

*Question: From your point of view, when other ministries or parties interfered in your business, could it be that a third party outside the realm of politics has interfered in the decision-making?*

that little social capital<sup>21</sup> is present. This will have ramifications for the extent of inter-ministerial coordination,<sup>22</sup> but is also evidence that with respect to the development of an open, responsive, and embedded state the mature civil society has not yet emerged.

Explanations as to the pattern that emerges have, besides the argument concerning the structure and attachment of elite advanced above, touched upon the structure of the economy and the relative size of the shadow economy. With estimates that the shadow economy amount to about 11.8, 35.3 and 21.6 percent of GDP in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania respectively<sup>23</sup>, part of the story can be

told. Furthermore, the transactions costs in building peak interest organizations is by far greater in economies dominated by small and medium sized enterprises than in societies where industrial locomotives and/or sectors of the economy generate a relatively large share of revenues. This can help explain why Latvia (and to some extent Lithuania) differs from Estonia to the extent that the Latvian economy in the outset, in addition to the huge rents generated by the oil transit, was more dominated by large industrial conglomerates.<sup>24</sup> Thus the economic structure of Estonia with small and medium sized enterprises contribute to the explanation of the delay in

developing close networks and the windfall of rents in the transit trade (in Latvia) to the widespread misuse of office.

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***The principles and the present state of the state(s)***

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The ministers of all three Baltic countries do support the principles of participatory democracy and a majority recognizes that political decisions can be improved by developing a responsive state. However, only among the Estonian ministers there is widespread appreciation of the possibility that such an involvement also can cause positive political gains in the form of support. Latvian and Lithuanian ministers are sceptical about the political benefits of working together with interest organizations, as they do not experience support in political terms. The early rise of state autonomy in these countries, i.e. the heralded window of opportunity, has rather led to a situation in which the state has lost autonomy and become penetrated and captured by illicit interests through corruption and misuse.

The seclusion of the Estonian elite and the more gradual emergence of interests have properly shielded the state far more than in the two other countries

While the comparison of three countries reveals that Lithuania and Latvia exhibit more evidence of capture and corruption than Estonia this does not imply that the pattern with respect to Estonia is without problems. Today, none of the countries fall within the range of the West European state type but face distinct challenges in the consolidation of democracy. In Estonia the problem is more of giving voice to interests whereas the two other countries suffer from particular interests dominating the state, through illicit means, at the expense of other interests in society.

<sup>1</sup> Balcerowicz, Leszek (1995). "Understanding Postcommunist Transitions" pp. 86-100 in Larry Diamond & Marc F. Plattner (eds.), *Economic Reform and Democracy*, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press

<sup>2</sup> Peters, B. Guy (1995). "The civil service in consolidation of democracy", *International Social Science Journal*, pp. 127-140.

<sup>3</sup> Linz, Juan J. & Alfred Stepan (1996). *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe*, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

<sup>4</sup> Suleiman, Ezra (1999). "Bureaucracy and Democratic Consolidation: Lessons from Eastern Europe" pp. 141-167 in Lisa Anderson (editor), *Transitions to Democracy*, New York: Columbia University Press.

<sup>5</sup> Op.cit

<sup>6</sup> Przeworski, Adam (1995). *Sustainable Democracy*, with Pranab Bardham, Luiz Carlos Bresser Pereira, László Bruszt, Jang Jip Choi, Ellen Turkish Comisso, Zhiyuan Cui, Torcunato di Tella, Elemer Hankiss, Lena Kolarska-Bobińska, David Laitin, José María Marawall, Andranik Migranyan, Guillermo O'Donnell, Ergun Ozbudun, John E. Roemer, Philippe C. Schmitter, Barbara Stallings, Alfred Stepan, Francisco Weffort & Jerzy J. Wiatr, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

<sup>7</sup> Evans, Peter (1995), *Embedded Autonomy*, Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press

<sup>8</sup> Weiss, Linda (1998). *The Myth of the Powerless State*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press

<sup>9</sup> Leftwich, Adrian (1995) 'Bringing Politics Back in: Towards a Model of the Developmental State', *The Journal of Developmental Studies*, vol. 31, no. 3, pp. 400-427

<sup>10</sup> Bernhard, Michael (1996). "Civil society after the First Transition: Dilemmas of Post-Communist Democratization in Poland and Beyond", *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, 29, 3, pp. 309-330.

<sup>11</sup> Johannsen, Lars & Ole Nørgaard, (2001). Governance and State Capacity in Post-communist States, paper prepared for the workshop on 'Political transformation in Soviet successor states: the politics of the CIS States in comparative and theoretical perspective', ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, 5-11 April 2001, Grenoble. Aarhus: Department of Political Science, University of Aarhus. 25 pp.

<sup>12</sup> Hellman, Joel S., Geraint Jones and Daniel Kaufmann (2000), 'Seize the State, Seize the Day: State Capture, Corruption and Influence in Transition', Policy Research Working Paper 2444, Washington D.C.: The World Bank Institute.

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# Conscription Debate in Lithuania: How to Approach the Issue?<sup>1</sup>

By Tomas Jermalavičius\*

## Introduction

As always at times of change and turbulence in the international system, the armed services are forced to review the premises upon which their development and functioning are built. Sweeping changes in the nature of threats and security environment after the end of the Cold War, accentuated by the atrocities of 11 September 2001, have challenged traditional roles of the military and the conventional notions of military capabilities in the West.

The order of the day, underlined by the Prague summit of NATO, has long

been a nimble expeditionary force capable of responding quickly to the threats emanating from outside the traditionally defined and anticipated theatre of war – Europe. The range of contingencies and threats requiring military response has expanded over the last decade or so, necessitating the readiness of the armed forces to act across a broader spectrum of missions, and thus forcing them to reconsider their fixation upon war fighting as the ‘core business’ of the military.

One of the key facets of the debate on how to better re-organise the armed forces to make them more relevant and effective in dealing with contemporary threats and

accommodating the accelerated pace of change in their environment has been the choice of their format or, basically, the type of manpower employed in the military. The contemporary discourse is essentially concerned with identifying whether modern and effective military force implies doing away with conscription and switching to a full-time all-volunteer force.<sup>2</sup>

Obviously, having become a part of a Western security and defence community and system, Lithuania is entering this debate and, sooner or later, will have to articulate its own answer to this dilemma. Some internal debate has already been tak-

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ing place for a while, and it intensified after the official invitation to join NATO was received in November 2002. It remains to be seen whether the issue comes to dominate the defence policy agenda in the forthcoming years as much as in other Western countries, as its current priorities lie elsewhere. On the other hand, the pressure to address the matter is mounting, which suggests that it is worthwhile defining its scope and parameters. The purpose of this paper is to set the main landmarks and framework for the further effort of identifying whether it is reasonable to phase out conscription in Lithuania.

The problem of choosing an adequate format of the armed forces is not a simple one. We have to recognise which factors and processes can direct us one way or another, and how. This article will not pursue the pros and cons of military draft specifically relevant to Lithuania, but will rather provide a basis for such assessments by casting some light on what has been happening in Western military establishments and why. The main argument espoused here is that sheer strategic and

military considerations cannot be the sole determining factor in arriving at the decision. To avoid shallow and one-sided conclusions, we have to look into other facets of conscription as well as how those facets interact with strategic-military imperatives.

In adopting this comprehensive approach, the article will firstly dwell shortly on the origins of conscription, which are informing our debate and underlying general understanding of the role and utility of military draft. Then it will move on to outline the trends in the West, which admittedly stand as an influencing factor to Lithuania on its own right, to see which imperatives and their configurations underlie those trends. In doing this, the factors serving either as drivers or inhibitors of a complete move to a full-time all-volunteer force format will be examined. In many respects, this article is a broad overview with the aim of distilling the most important issues. Therefore the reader should not expect much attention given to specific details and hard data.

## **1. The origins of conscription**

The origins of conscription and the ideas that it encapsulated can be traced back to the processes and developments set in motion across Europe by the French Revolution and Napoleonic wars. Without going much into historical details, the record can be set straight by observing that recruitment of all eligible male population within certain age bracket to do military service was prompted and sustained as much by military necessity as by the socio-political processes.

Certainly, putting large numbers of people under arms always creates the competitive advantage over the opponent as long as numbers matter on equal measure with tactical proficiency and strategic genius. It goes without saying that the ability of Napoleon to fall back upon a mass army provoked symmetric responses by its opponents. The very nature of war articulated an imperative to broaden the basis of recruitment beyond social groups which held monopoly over the military

establishments. However, *levee en masse*, conscription being its pivotal element, was enabled primarily by the change of relationship between the state and society prompted by the French Revolution.

Military draft came to symbolise and cement such new features of this relationship as mass participation in the political processes of the state, the people becoming the ultimate source of sovereign authority, as well as national citizenship (confined only to male population at that time). Military service became an incarnation of citizen's status and rights, and this link between conscription and citizenship turned into one of the most powerful sustaining factors.

Conscription was further legitimised and reinforced by the rise of nationalism as a defining ideology at the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> – start of the 20<sup>th</sup> centuries, when 'peoples wars' finally replaced 'cabinet wars', waged by the aristocratic elites of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. So, regardless of the effort by the Vienna congress powers and their ruling classes to undo the far-reaching effects of the French Revolution

and the Napoleonic wars, with dismantling the mass armies being one of its thrusts, conscription bounced back and remained a predominant format across much of continental Europe well into the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Essentially, it underpinned the concept of a modern nation-state.

In addition, the industrial revolution of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, which has altered profoundly the character of war, further necessitated reliance on manpower intensive format to offset the increased destructive power of weapons and even facilitated its use through such new measures as railways and telegraph communications.

The bottom line of this short excursion into history is that the origins of conscription lie at a confluence of socio-political, economic, technological and military-strategic factors, which enabled, facilitated and sustained this format.

Therefore, when looking into contemporary trends, one has to identify how the same factors converge these days in the specific setting of a particular country and what it spells for conscription as a manpower procurement technique in

that country. But in general terms, for instance, Catherine M. Kelleher reckons that 'the political, economic and technological environments which sustained the *levee en masse*, which both made possible and dictated the needs for large standing armies dependent on conscript numbers, seemed to be passing or to have already passed.'<sup>3</sup>

Arguably, strong parallels can be drawn between the trends in Lithuania, which rightfully claims to be a part of the West in social, cultural, economic and political terms, and the trends in other Western countries which have been emerging over the last decades. Certainly, analysis and adjudication of drivers and inhibitors of change need to be highly customised to take into account the peculiarities of an individual country. However, although being mindful of the need to look into specific cases, the next chapter will unpack the main general trends in the West, and offer an in-depth account of how those trends can be explained. The latter will essentially constitute the analytical framework to be applied when embark-

ing on the evaluation of the Lithuanian case – an endeavour this article will not make.

## **2. A Trend in the West and its causes**

### ***2.1 Erosion of Conscription***

It is already conventional wisdom that the end of the Cold War has prompted the reductions of the armed forces both in the West and in the countries of the former Warsaw Pact. Jan van der Meulen and Philippe Manigart note that the downsizing of the military, viewed as an expression of a so-called ‘peace dividend’, became one of the most important aspects of defence policies in the post-Cold War period.<sup>4</sup> The process, however, started long before the end of the Cold War. Jacques Van Doorn, for instance, provided statistics on how the manpower was decreasing from 1964 to 1973 in six Western states (Belgium, the UK, Denmark, France, the Netherlands and Norway).<sup>5</sup>

Furthermore, there has been a clear trend towards the growing division of labour within the armed forces, which stimulated decreasing reliance upon manpower and the need for a wider spectrum of skills within the armies to operate highly sophisticated weapon systems. James Burk reckons that ‘the military division of labor has grown more complex, encouraging reliance on highly-trained professional soldiers who serve for long term and discouraging reliance on conscripts and reservists...’<sup>6</sup>

Increasing technological sophistication of Western armed forces led to a shift from a labour-intensive to capital-intensive organisation. This naturally precipitated the reductions in conscripted manpower and duration of obligatory service, if not abolishment of draft altogether. Even a rather formal and quick assessment suggests that the full-time all-volunteer format has been emerging as more attractive alternative in an increasing number of countries. While during the Cold War a complete shift to this format occurred only in the USA and the UK (or, rather, a return to it, since

conscription was introduced only as a measure of national emergency there), the decade after the end of the Cold War marked several complete (or near-complete) transitions to a full-time all-volunteer force (the Netherlands, Belgium, Spain, France), several declared intentions with a definite deadline (Czech Republic, Portugal) and a number of cases where the debate has started in earnest (Germany, for instance).

Even in the countries with traditional attachment to conscription such as Sweden or Denmark, the Conscript Ratio – the proportion of conscripted personnel in the total manpower – has been steadily diminishing. Decreasing numbers of conscripts in the military organisations led to a precipitous fall in the Military Participation Ratio (a share of country’s population registered by the military as actives and reserve) and Military Participation Ratio of the Military Age Cohorts (percentage of drafted individuals in a particular age group) – two important indicators which have direct implications in a socio-political dimension: they re-

veal diminished pervasiveness of the societies by the military and increased burden inequality of the military service with repercussions to the legitimacy of conscription.<sup>7</sup>

Various researches showed that the process was uneven and had different departure points in different countries, as the degree of reliance on conscription varied. However, a trend is quite clear even with the individual peculiarities in mind – the conscript format is in decline. Having occupied a central position in defence policies for decades, conscription seems to have been pushed to the fringes in terms of building and maintaining military capabilities. Subsequently, there should be general drivers catalysing the decline as well as inhibiting it across the whole spectrum of the countries. The next part will be devoted to the discussion of such common denominators.

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## ***2.2 Factors of decline***

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In explaining the decline of conscription, two theoretical approaches should

be born in mind. James Burk elaborates on political realist and social dominance perspectives. Within his account:

Political realists contend that decisions about the military obligation of citizens reflect considerations of cost and technical efficiency. Social dominance theorists focus instead on whether citizens accept compulsory military service as a legitimate value worth supporting.<sup>8</sup>

These are the top-down and bottom-up explanations of the choices for a particular organisational format of the armed forces and its transformations. It can be argued, that both approaches, while possessing insufficient explanatory power alone, carry a measure of truth, and it is their combination (or interaction), which helps to produce an acceptable account of the decline. The top-down approach will be scrutinised first.

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### ***2.2.1 Military-strategic factors as ‘melters’ of conscription***

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From the political realist perspective decisions on whether the conscription

format should be retained or abolished are made on a basis of strategic calculations, encompassing assessments of the international environment, the security situation of an individual country and requirements of warfare (missions of the armed forces, technological innovations etc.), as well as cost analysis. In this view such developments as nuclear weapons, increasing reliance upon technology in warfare and changes in the international environment after the end of the Cold War would occupy a central position in elucidating the erosion of conscription. Most of the literature makes a strong emphasis on these factors as both sustaining this format and triggering its change.

For instance, Morris Janowitz points to an important factor of the arrival of nuclear weapons. He asserts that ‘...the advent of nuclear weapons is crucial since it altered the strategic role of the military and called into question the validity of the mass armed force’.<sup>9</sup> The scenarios of a nuclear stand-off between the Cold War adversaries left little room for the employment of large standing armies and time

consuming mobilisation of reserves, which relegated conscription and mobilisation reserves to a secondary role. On the other hand, this effect of nuclear weapons was far from universal. Van der Meulen and Manigart reckon that ‘...the strategic realities of the Cold War...help to explain why political and military elites looked upon the draft as indispensable.’<sup>10</sup> A number of nations were still preparing for a prolonged non-nuclear military confrontation, which made sense given a strategic imperative to push the nuclear threshold as high up the ladder of escalation as possible. Nonetheless, a large part of van der Meulen’s and Manigart’s argument talks about ‘how the change of size and mission of the military, generated by new international relations [end of the Cold War-T.J.], structurally hampered a continuation of conscription.’<sup>11</sup> This underscores the importance of an international and strategic environment as a driver or inhibitor of change.

Without a doubt, the geopolitical situation and threat environment of each country stands as an important factor in

functional considerations. The first countries to abolish draft (USA, UK) did not feel a residual threat to their homeland from the conventional forces of the Soviet Union and its satellites and focused their military policies on expeditionary tasks. At the same time, conscription dominated continental Europe, because its nations had to plan for territorial defence due to the threat of ground invasion. In addition, most of the countries, which moved to the format of a full-time all-volunteer force or contemplate such a step in a post-Cold War setting, belong to NATO and can fall back on collective defence provisions to fill in the gaps in capabilities, including the ones which emerge as a result of ditching the military draft. Furthermore, a new threat environment in the wake of the Cold War stipulates the need for a smaller, rapidly deployable force, manned by full-time career soldiers and officers, to conduct missions overseas. This new understanding of missions of the armed forces in a new international environment also renders the conscript format ineffective

and inadequate in the eyes of the decision-makers.

Growing heterogeneity and internal division of labour of the forces, downsizing and structural adaptation stem directly from these perceptions of the new strategic realities and preoccupation with military effectiveness. It is generally acknowledged, for instance, that a conscript force cannot be trained properly for the expeditionary missions and act effectively once deployed. Karl Haltiner sums it up this way: ‘It may therefore be concluded that the combination of being a member of a defence alliance *and* being far from a direct national military threat *and* participating frequently in international missions facilitates the abolishment of conscription and the change of the army format...’<sup>12</sup>

On the other hand, one has to be mindful that different military-strategic factors can be in conflict with each other as far as conscription is concerned. For instance, while the transfer and application of the results of the information revolution in the military forces necessi-

tates the presence of long-serving and well-trained professionals to operate various systems, sometimes the only cost-effective way to access those with adequate skills might be through draft only. In general terms, even reliance on contract personnel to accomplish the mission may require conscription as a pool, from which such manpower can be drawn, especially if we talk about small states. On the other hand, all this does not invalidate the assertion that conscription has become of secondary importance and plays an auxiliary role only.

The latter issue encapsulates the debate over the economic and demographic factors as underlying the military rationale for either abolishing or retaining conscription. The states which completed a shift towards a full-time all-volunteer format often find it difficult to recruit and retain personnel in booming economies and amongst ageing populations. Fiscal costs of such a format may also be considered prohibitively high. However, despite these pitfalls of adopting a full-time all-volunteer force format, evidently those

drawbacks stand as a short-term impediment, rather than an intractable obstacle. It is because there is more to the choice of the format than the availability of financial resources.

Many authors stress that considering only the top-down arguments for the decline is insufficient. Tremendous socio-political developments have to be included if a reasonable explanation is to be attained.

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### ***2.2.2 Socio-political dimension of conscription***

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The socio-political (social dominance) perspective draws upon the transformation of social values and its impact upon public attitudes towards military service and the role of the military in social life in general, which have been produced by industrialisation, further democratisation, penetration of market economy and creation of the welfare state.

First of all, detachment of military service from national self-identification and civic rights occurred. As Jürgen Kuhlmann and Ekkehard Lippert put it, 'today, the

armed forces are neither the only nor the most important means to embody a nation's will of self-assertion.'<sup>13</sup> The fact that women, who are not under obligation to do military service, obtained equal civic rights with men during the 20<sup>th</sup> century accentuated this disconnection very much. Janowitz also points to the erosion of nationalism as a process which, in turn, undermines popular support to the conscription format.<sup>14</sup> Given that many diverse avenues for self-expression and self-identification are available, nationalism came to be often regarded as a liability rather than virtue, especially with a rather destructive historical record in mind. The nationalist zeal, which is so easily convertible into militarism, although still lurking in the margins of Western societies and sometimes even mustering threatening comebacks to the centre stage of politics, fails to capture the hearts and minds. The ideological ingredient, which kept military draft alive and popular, has largely expended itself.

Secondly, a shift in perspectives on the relationship between the state and the citi-

zens took place. Burk writes about 'the progress from a militant society, in which individual lives for the state, to an industrial society, in which state exists to support the individual.'<sup>15</sup> This observation reflects substantial deterioration of collective consciousness and the rise of individualism in post-modern societies, in the context of which military draft is being increasingly interpreted as an unacceptable coercion by the state towards its citizens rather than a tenacious and venerable duty. These days an individual, shaped by consumerist and pragmatic societies, increasingly asks what the state can do for him or her (in return to the taxes levied on him/her), instead of what he or she can do for the state. Compulsory military service does not fit into this new equation.

Disapproval of obligatory military service is further stimulated by a substantial change of the dominant social values from being congruent with military culture to conflicting with it. According to Kuhlmann & Lippert, 'military-related characteristics, the so-called values of duty and acceptance, namely obedience, love

of order, sense of duty, subordination... have lost their attractiveness...'<sup>16</sup> As a result, according to Janowitz, 'hedonism and the importance of self-expression supply a new basis for resistance to military authority among young people.'<sup>17</sup> Burk adds that 'high levels of education and material affluence increased the antipathy of young people for military service and supported criticisms of the goals and style of military institutions...'<sup>18</sup> This aspect is reinforced by the fact that, by and large, a so-called 'threat-free' generation came to dominate Western societies during the last decades. Without a pervasive perception of an overwhelming threat to the survival of the state by the general public, it is an arduous task to motivate its members to spend some of their time for military preparations.

Finally, one direct consequence of the post-Cold War restructuring and downsizing (prompted by strategic considerations) – selective and arbitrary conscription – has raised moral questions of social equality, further undermining legitimacy of draft. It has become very difficult to justify why only a small propor-

tion of those eligible are called to do their military service, while the rest further enjoy the benefits of civilian life. Essentially, those not lucky enough to avoid the service are placed in a disadvantageous position once they return to a highly competitive labour market where they have to compete both with men who stayed in this market and women who did not have the obligation to serve. A substantially increased female participation in labour market is further highlighting the dangers of being drafted to military service. In many countries the argument that the state should either call all eligible men, and even women, to do military service, or abolish the draft altogether, is very powerful, especially if the state and society are dedicated to nurturing egalitarian principles.

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***2.2.3 A combination of both approaches and the inhibitors of change***

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As we can see, strategic considerations and the security environment, which led

to a lesser emphasis on conscription, stimulated the erosion of social legitimacy of conscription. So it is obvious, that neither a top-down nor a bottom-up approach can work alone. Strategic, economic and technological factors, dominating the calculations of the decision-makers, and socio-political factors reinforce each other and create the full set of circumstances under which decisions to move away from conscription, or retain it, can be made. This is because, as Martin Shaw puts it, 'military institutions never reflect only the political system of society: they are at the intersection between this society and the international system of states.'<sup>19</sup> Samuel Huntington captured this chief principle underlying the interaction between the military and society very well and, therefore, deserves to be cited in full:

*The military institutions of any society are shaped by two forces: a functional imperative stemming from the threats to the society's security and societal imperative arising from the social forces, ideologies and institutions dominant within the society. Military institutions which*

*reflect only social values may be incapable of performing effectively their military function. On the other hand, it may be impossible to contain within society military institutions shaped purely by functional imperatives.*<sup>20</sup>

Take, for instance, the earlier mentioned strategic impact of nuclear weapons, and specifically the presence of the US nuclear umbrella over Western Europe. This impact has also reverberated in a socio-political dimension by accelerating the process of demilitarisation of the societies, which, in turn, placed conscription under even more societal pressure. In a similar vein, strategic ineptness of conscript forces in the expeditionary missions is underlined by the societal disapproval of deploying the conscripts to such missions, which is directly proportionate to the risk of exposure to real combat. One of the greatest shocks to the states which ditched military draft very early came with heavy casualties among conscripts in the overseas combat operations. So, the more the force is oriented towards expeditionary missions, the less the strategic rationale for sticking

to a conscription format and also the greater social pressure to fall back on the full-time contract soldiers to do the job are.

Speaking in more general terms about how the interaction of various factors dictate the organisational format, it can be concluded that absence of a favourable strategic, geo-political environment will probably preclude a shift from the conscript force even at the presence of favourable socio-political conditions for doing so, and vice versa. This logic underpins the way the inhibitors preventing or slowing down the change work. Strategic rationale and threat environment during the Cold War served as a major inhibitor preventing the shift to a full-time all-volunteers format in continental Europe. Its removal (the end of the Cold War) opened the avenues for the restructuring in most of the countries. Concurrently, the already ripe social conditions have facilitated this restructuring immensely.

As it has been noted, however, the trend of decline is uneven in terms of the



geographical scope, as not all of the western countries have announced their plans to abolish conscription. Although their reliance on conscripted manpower is decreasing, as evidence shows, there are certain factors which do not allow a complete shift to a professional force, even though strategic rationale recommends exactly that. Shaw suggests that persistent preservation of conscription is determined mainly by tradition and history (Sweden, Finland, Norway or Denmark) as well as by regional geopolitics (e.g. tensions between Greece and Turkey).<sup>21</sup> So, if the society has favourable experience with military draft and attaches high social value to it, survival of this format is likely even in the absence of strategic imperatives.

In building such positive experience, which translates into prestige of service and a sustained tradition, not the least role is played by the way that conscripts are treated in the service. It goes without saying that *dedovshchina* – the Soviet-style practice of hazing newcomers – undermines any willingness to join the military. However, even ‘softer motiva-

tion killers’ can be singled out. As long as the conscript feels that his time is being wasted and he serves as a cheap labour force, the institution of draft is challenged even in a benign social environment.

The experience of Denmark reveals that this may even lead to an open revolt against conscription. However, a profound reform of draft service has reversed the sentiment in this country. Basically it was designed to keeping a conscript only as long as necessary to train him and motivating him by the service being an enriching experience, almost fun, rather than boredom or serfdom to the state. This strikes a chord with a new generation, which is always bored and keen to go at great lengths to keep themselves entertained.

Catherine Kelleher also adds that domestic political requirements such as preventing political intervention by the military may also sustain the institution of draft.<sup>22</sup> It is often regarded that because of conscription the military establishment is more exposed to democratic civil val-

ues and is also better held accountable to a society. As a result, for instance, the conscript-heavy military format may act as a safeguard against military adventurism of the governments which are less constrained in their use of the military instrument when the armed forces are manned by full-time career personnel. The governments decision to go to war is more likely to receive a widespread public scrutiny if a considerable number of men under arms are conscripts.

On the other hand, such socio-political roles of military draft are a function of public perceptions and experiences rather than an objective and universal effect of conscription. It would be difficult to contend that the British, Australian or U.S. military are less democratic, less accountable and less controlled than their counterparts in the countries with compulsory military service. Conversely, conscription in Turkey or Russia is apparently void of such positive effects. By the same token, military adventurism of the government does not beset mature democracies, which possess various mechanisms

other than conscription to keep it in check, to the extent as to require societal burden in the form of a military draft.

Therefore, such socio-political aspects of conscription which inhibit its abolition should be carefully assessed against the aforementioned negative aspects of selective and arbitrary draft as well as societal values and perceptions in each individual case, as history and development of each political system or civil society inevitably leaves a print. It is clear, however, that just as in the case of strategic-military factors the socio-political factors alone can be pushing the issue in completely different directions.

## Conclusions

The decision of transforming the force is not a simple and easy one. It rests on a multifaceted and comprehensive analysis, which should not be confined to assessing security environment and the missions that it dictates to the armed forces. Social environment is equally important in this respect, even though functional impera-

tive can be strong enough to override the societal pressure for change. Trends in the West clearly show that conscription is dwindling, as historical conditions which brought it about do not exist anymore. However, we can arrive at a reasonable and sensible decision about conscription in Lithuania only by putting the drivers and inhibitors of change into the local setting. Knowing what factors and their combinations affect the format in general, and how, is a prerequisite, but it is not sufficient to get a full and clear picture about where we stand in Lithuania and where we should be heading.

In this respect, a number of questions need to be answered, before we proceed to discuss the feasibility of a full-time all-volunteer force in Lithuania. Starting with a top-down approach, we have to look into the security environment and answer the questions – what are the main threats to our security and what kind of military response do they require? Will our Armed Forces have to focus more and more on expeditionary missions as the main way of dealing with the threats? How is the

pending NATO membership (and the allied commitments it entails) affecting the issue? Will we be able to recruit and retain sufficient numbers of contracted personnel in our economic environment without using military draft? Would our state be able to bankroll a full-time all-volunteer service and how large can it be?

From a social dominance perspective, the key questions are: is our society undergoing the change of values which erode the willingness of military participation? Is the relationship between the state and society in transformation, which turns the state merely into a supplier of services and pushes the boundaries of the state back? What are the public threat perceptions and how does this translate into their thinking about the necessity of military draft? What are the historical and contemporary experiences of society with the institution of conscription in Lithuania? How strong is its legitimacy and what are the prospects, given that conscription in Lithuania is becoming more and more selective? Is it being increasingly regarded as a state coercion or a waste of time

among the young people? What motivates those who do their military service: a fear of state persecution, patriotism or purely enthusiasm about military life? Did conscription become indispensable in controlling the Lithuanian military establishment and keeping it transparent and accountable?

Even if we discover at some juncture that functional imperatives for retaining conscription are still at play, we should seriously consider whether conscription is sustainable and justifiable in its current shape. A serious reform of this institution might be required to accommodate the societal imperatives. In the end of the day we may turn to the armed forces format which, though still using conscription, is a very different concept from what a traditional military draft is.

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<sup>1</sup> The article was first delivered as a conference paper at a workshop 'New Threats and Security: New Missions of the Armed Forces and Prospects for Professionalization' (Vilnius, 5-6 December 2002), organised jointly by the Lithuanian War Academy, the Baltic Defence College and the Centre of Civic Initiatives. The author is grateful to Brg. Gen. Michael H. Clemmesen and Lt. Col. Andrew Parrott for their valuable comments and remarks.

<sup>2</sup> There is still much disagreement over the use of terms to define the armed forces format, since 'a professional force' - the term most frequently invoked to describe the employment of full-time contract personnel - may have additional connotations by implying the degree of professional aptitude achieved by the personnel, including the conscripts. The conscript-heavy Israeli force, for instance, may be deemed more professional than certain armed forces without any conscripted soldiers at all. To avoid such connotations, the author of this article prefers using the term 'a full-time all-volunteer force', which brings together two most important aspects of the described format - the personnel operating under the employment contract with the career prospects for the enlisted individuals and the principle of a voluntary entry into the ranks and file.

<sup>3</sup> Kelleher, C. M. (1978), p. 26.

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<sup>18</sup> Burk, J. (1990), p. 9.

<sup>19</sup> Shaw, M. (1990), p. 163.

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# Defining Terrorism in the Political and Academic Discourse

By Asta Maskaliūnaite\*

## Introduction

In the end of 1970s terrorism appeared in the considerations of politicians and social scientists as one of the global problems. The events of September 11, 2001 made it an even more important phenomenon, the eradication of which became one of the purposes of the strongest state of the world. The United States has hence given a new sense of purpose for its lead of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and has adopted a concept according to which friends and enemies are decided upon. Now everybody seems to agree that terrorism is one of the greatest

problems of post-Cold War international politics. However, the agreement on what exactly this problem entails, on what terrorism actually is, is much more difficult to reach. While lengthy books have been concentrated on the discussion of the problem of its definition<sup>1</sup>, these efforts did not result in any substantial advances in the resolution of this issue.

The purpose of this article is not to create a different definition of terrorism, to add it to the stockpile of the existing products of the scientific efforts, but to highlight the main ideas and problems in the attempts to defining terrorism on the side of both representatives of the state – politi-

cians, lawmakers, administrators, etc. – and on the side of social scientists. Hence, in the first part of the article some of the definition problems as they appear in the political milieu will be presented. The second, lengthier part of the article, will deal with the definition of terrorism in a scientific discourse, trying to assess critically the various elements associated with terrorism and their possible usage in the definitions.

## Defining terrorism in the political discourse

The increased importance of terrorism for the policy stance of the governments

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as well as the need to legally pursue the perpetrators of the alleged terrorist acts resulted in quite a few official definitions of terrorism. The recent change in the structure and purpose of the American foreign policy, aimed at wiping out terrorism from the face of the earth, has made this problem even more important. If friends and foes are distinguished according to their stance vis-à-vis terrorism (as opponents or supporters of the terrorist groups), the definition of terrorism is the crucial ingredient of the formation of policy directions towards the countries of the world. The ethics of politics would require that a neutral description of the phenomenon would apply, and according to that description the division would be made. However, as it is rather obvious, this is rarely the case in the real world. The issue of defining terrorism is one of the best examples of the tendency to include particular interests in seemingly neutral descriptions of what is acceptable or not in politics.

Relating the concept itself to the specific interest of defining parties is probably the main reason why a comprehen-

sive definition of the phenomenon cannot be reached. Two examples of concrete definitions influenced by conflicting interests are the descriptions of the actions of the Palestinians and those of Israel. While in the West there was a great controversy about how to call the actions of Ariel Sharon, the Israeli Prime Minister, and Palestinian suicide bombers, to the leaders of Islamic nations who gathered in Kuala Lumpur at the beginning of April, 2002, Israel is clearly a terrorist state. The view on Palestinian actions, however, is more ambiguous. On the one hand, it is stated that all the attacks against civilians should be considered terrorism. As Mohamad Mahathir, the Malaysian Prime Minister, stated: "Whether the attackers are acting on their own or on the orders of their government; whether they are regulars or irregulars, if the attack is against civilians then they must be considered terrorists."

On the other hand, another statement, that of Kamal Kharrazi, the Iranian Foreign Minister, implies that the Palestinians are fighting for the right cause: "The

Palestinians are resisting the occupation of their land. It is quite different from the terror attacks that were carried out in New York, which the Organization of the Islamic Conference and most of Muslim countries in the world condemned."

These two statements are a good example of how violence tends to appear more legitimate if its ultimate goals are emphasized, while it seems to be less legitimate when only used as means to attract attention. The different ways of emphasising can be very well used for both trying to justify some people in their attacks and to condemn others.

This particular example is not intended to show that the policy of Islamic countries towards terrorism and that their assessment of the phenomenon is exceptionally ambiguous and somewhat hypocritical. In the West one can also find a great variety of such examples. The same conflict between Israelis and Palestinians is viewed pretty one-sidedly in this part of the world; only the angle of this view is the opposite of that expressed by the Conference of Islamic Nations.

The ongoing war on terrorism and the importance the United States put on the eradication of this phenomenon led some countries to present their struggle with internal problems as a fight against terrorism. As Sonika Gupta writes, “the Chinese have successfully renegotiated the US definition of terrorism to include movements for self-determination”<sup>2</sup>. Such a definition, according to the author, may affect not only the country’s stance towards violent East Turkestan Islamic Militants but can have a very harmful effect on the peaceful Tibetan self-rule movement as well. Having in mind such examples, it seems that William Connolly has grasped the relations between the states and the terrorists the best, when writing that:

*Terrorism allows, as the state system is constituted, the state and the interstate system to protect the logic of sovereignty in the international sphere while veiling their inability to modify systemic conditions that generate violence by non-state agents; it also provides domestic constituencies with agents of evil to explain the vague experiences of danger, frustration, and ineffectiveness in taming global contingency.*<sup>3</sup>

Some states devise a list of organizations, which they consider being terrorist organisations, trying to avoid the problem of definition, but even here the interests of the state and their appraisal of allies and foes sneak in. Brian Whitaker gives some examples of such a “double-standard” game from the British anti-terrorism law, which lists the organisations considered to be terrorist and thus illegal in Britain:

*... the Kurdistan Workers Party - active in Turkey - is banned, but not the KDP or PUK, which are Kurdish organizations active in Iraq. Among opposition groups, the Iranian People’s Mujabedeen is banned, but not its Iraqi equivalent, the INC, which happens to be financed by the United States.*<sup>4</sup>

According to some observers the same problem could be noticed in the United States’ treatment of Afghanistan. Dennis Hans, for example, argued that the Bush administration was using terrorists to win over other terrorists in the recent Afghanistan war. The author quotes a Human Rights Watch report stating that in ten years since 1992 various factions

of the Northern Alliance killed tens of thousands of civilians, engaged in rape, torture, summary executions, etc.<sup>5</sup>. Thus, in the political context saying that there are no “good” or “bad” terrorists (all of them are bad) makes perfect sense. People employing violence would not be called “terrorists”, if their aims were approved.

In the official definitions, even if one looks only at the “technical” aspects of terrorism, i.e. ignores the motives of its perpetrators, the motives which are not always clear (when, for example, no one claimed the responsibility for the attacks) or hard to classify (for example, whether the act is committed because of political, religious or, actually, economic considerations), the decision of what to include into a definition and what to leave aside is influenced strongly by the interests of the states. Brian Whitaker, by analysing the US government report on terrorism writes that:

*Another essential ingredient [of terrorism] (you might think) is that terrorism is calculated to terrorise the public or a particular section of it. The American definition does not mention*

*spreading terror at all, because that would exclude attacks against property. It is, after all, impossible to frighten inanimate object. Among last year's [1999] attacks, 152 were directed against a pipeline in Colombia, which is owned by multinational oil companies. Such attacks are of concern to the United States and so a definition is required which allows them to be counted.*<sup>6</sup>

Such factors cause many authors to be very sceptical about the possibilities to define the terrorist phenomenon in a neutral manner, especially in political context. As Richard Drake puts it: "As a rule, terrorism is the name we give to the violence of people we do not like or support; for the violence of people we do like or support, we find other names."<sup>7</sup>

### **Defining terrorism in social sciences**

The scientific discourse did not escape the problems associated with essentially biased definitions of terrorism either. According to Schmid and Jongman the "authors have spilled almost as much ink

as the actors of terrorism have spilled blood"<sup>8</sup> in trying to assess different features of the phenomenon and of the state's response to it since the 1970s, when the problem of terrorism became pretty acute.<sup>9</sup> However, as the term became used for a wide range of spheres of activities confusion over the question of what terrorism really is increased substantially. And such confusion was sometimes affecting research as well, a situation that could not be seen favourably. To quote Schmid again: "While the language has political legitimacy functions – and legal and official definitions of terrorism as well as public discourse reflect this – social science analysts in academia should attempt to create and project their own terminology."<sup>10</sup>

As could be seen in the previous part, the definition of terrorism in the political discourse is greatly influenced by the interests of the states. These problems tend to influence the scientific discourse as well. Some authors argue that "... no commonly agreed definition can in principle be reached, because the very

process of definition is in itself part of a wider contestation over ideologies or political objectives."<sup>11</sup>

Such a statement is a weighty one and it is proven by the fact that even though there are constant attempts to create a comprehensive definition of terrorism, such an enterprise was not completely successful.

However, there is an argument in literature that, while it is hardly possible to get rid of the normative connotations of the term in everyday language, in the scientific discourse it might be possible to create a certain definition of the notion using more or less technical terms. This is what distinguishes scientific language from that of everyday life – it is a language through which one can dispassionately describe the most passionate events of human life. Thus, an election campaign may acquire the meaning of life-and-death struggle for their participants, the same as football matches seem highly emotionally charged for the fans of the teams, but it is possible to narrate these events without such passions, using rather neutral



ideas. Terrorism itself is, of course, a more problematic concept. Contrary to the phenomena mentioned above, terrorism actually is connected to life-and-death struggle, it actually implies the creation of deepest fears in the minds of the ones who encounter it. Therefore the need of a dispassionate conceptualisation of terrorism is even more acute.

Hence, in this part of the article, the problem of conceptualising the phenomenon will be presented. For this reason, firstly the historical understanding of the term “terrorism” will be shortly presented. Next, I will analyse the main elements of a possible definition of terrorism and finally, some “normative” questions of the definition of terrorism will be addressed.

## History of the term

Some authors trace the appearance of terrorism back to Jewish Zealot’s movement (66-73 AD) when the *sicarii*, in their attempt to drive the Romans out of Palestine, were using rather unorthodox means of violence for those times (like murders in the midst of the crowds), while

trying to force the moderate Jews into a fiercer opposition against occupation and the Romans themselves to leave.<sup>12</sup> Later the phenomenon is said to have occurred in another sect – the Assassins (11<sup>th</sup>-13<sup>th</sup> c.) – who were also using many techniques similar to those of contemporary terrorists, and who were attempting to reach their goals by a long campaign of intimidation.

However, these situations describe a so-called pre-history of the idea of terror, while the roots of modern terrorism and the appearance of the concept itself into the political lexicon lie in the events of the French Revolution. Like the revolution itself, the concept of terror gained a very controversial assessment from the very beginning of its application. For the adherents of revolution it was an unfortunate, but necessary part of a revolutionary struggle. For its adversaries it was a brutality, as unnecessary as the revolution itself.

Nevertheless, it should be emphasized that the primary conceptualisation of terror came from the revolutionaries themselves. Considering intimidation and vio-

lence to be a neutral weapon, in the sense that it could be used against the “enemies of freedom”, but also by them to suppress its advances<sup>13</sup>, Robespierrists sought to give a specific meaning to their terror. Out of this came the emphasis on the aims of this strategy as opposed to the means, and the emphasis on its virtue, as the true strategy of revolution with terror only as its emanation employed by necessity. As Robespierre put it:

*Terror is nothing else than swift, severe, inflexible justice, hence, it is an emanation of virtue, it is not a particular principle, but a consequence of a general principle of democracy applied for the most pressing needs of the country.*<sup>14</sup> (my translation)

Jacobins proudly called their rule “reign of terror” and themselves – terrorists. Their actions were meant to intimidate all the enemies of the revolution, to put fear into their hearts and minds. This aspect of the Jacobin terror made it intimately related to the generations of terrorists that were yet to come.

In addition, terror, as the revolution itself, had to stand the test of legality that

the adversaries of revolutionaries both inside and outside the country were putting forward. A solution to this problem was found through envisioning terror as an extra-legal endeavour. As David Rapoport writes:

*The Revolution established a new principle of legitimacy ("The Will of the People") which did not simply absolved its agents from adhering to existing moral and legal rules, even those authorized by the People; it also obligated them sometimes to do so. ... History sometimes supplants the People as the legitimising source; in either case, the idea of a transcendent entity that cannot be subjected to the rules in the ordinary sense of the term, even rules that the entity supposedly creates, remains the same.<sup>15</sup>*

This new principle of legitimacy, together with the idea of general will, which is not the will of all people taken together but something permanent and objective as it appears in the writings of Rousseau, shapes many of the ideas of terrorists today as well. The idea that the general will is not graspable by everyone but can be apprehended by some people who then

become real prophets, allows a rather easy legitimisation of the terrorist activities. Like the French revolutionaries in the 18<sup>th</sup> century, many contemporary terrorists see themselves as carrying out the will of God or the prescription of History and this is supposed to legitimise their activities.

Furthermore, belonging to the realm of "historical necessity", to use a Marxist term, any revolution (terrorism itself is "commonly, but not invariably revolutionary"<sup>16</sup>) comes from outside the legal system existing in any particular country. It is most commonly perceived as a non-legal act, with its opponents calling it illegal while its adherents perceive it as *extra-legal*, beyond the legality of old codes of laws. It cannot be put into the brackets of the system it opposes, because its legitimacy or illegitimacy comes from a very different level of justification. The same circumstances that make terror necessary give it this kind of legitimacy, not that of laws, but a legitimacy of the will of the People. Terror, thus, appears in the beginning as an emanation of virtue, a certain expression of the

working of general will and an extra-legal phenomenon. It is to preserve these features in the minds of consecutive generations of terrorists as well.

Not taking into much consideration the subtleties of the Jacobin philosophy of terror, the dictionaries of the time gave a definition of terrorism as a "système, régime de terreur".<sup>17</sup> Consequently, a terrorist was seen as "anyone who attempted to further his views by a system of coercive intimidation".<sup>18</sup>

Unfortunately, the whole perception of terrorism was substantially clouded by the political struggles both before and after the Thermidorian coup, which put an end to the so-called Robespierre's dictatorship and to the reign of terror itself. This discussion about the term followed the concept along the lines of time, making it rather ambivalent at present. For it seems to raise the obvious question about whose definition we are to take as our guidance. Is it to be a robespierrist understanding of terror being intimately related to virtue, an emanation of highest principles of democracy, justice, and

freedom, an extra-legal activity, to be judged by different standards of legality as well as morality than the actions of the established authorities? Or is it to be an anti-robepierrist conceptualisation of the notion as an illegal, unnecessary brutality and a systematic use of violence to spread someone's views? Thus, while some authors are proposing to use the historical development of the concept for the guide in deciding what terrorism is, this endeavour may not be very successful. Furthermore, the structure as well as the rhetoric of terrorism has changed significantly over time, so that the usage of its historical understanding may not be a good guidance for analysis.

Hence, in defining terrorism we should concern ourselves more with the possibility of depicting the contemporary phenomenon, instead of its historical provenance. The historicity of the concept remains important and informative for the overall analysis of the phenomenon, but in definitions themselves a different strategy of assessment should be used. Therefore, in the next section the

main elements of the concept of terrorism in the social sciences will be critically examined.

### Main elements of the definition of terrorism

While conducting his most comprehensive study so far on terrorism, Alex Schmid paid considerable attention to the problem of defining the phenomenon. He made a summary of the twenty-two main elements appearing in 109 scholarly definitions. There is no need to discuss all the elements of these definitions in this article, for some

of them are pretty closely related to each other and do not bring essential insights into the problem, and others are rarely mentioned in the works. Therefore, only seven most commonly used ones will be discussed, assessing the problems related to their inclusion into the definition. These elements are presented in Table 1 together with the frequency of their use in different definitions.

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#### *Violence or force*

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Violence is the most often used element and the one that is most clearly associated

**Table 1. Seven main elements used in the definitions of terrorism**

Element	Frequency
1. Violence, force	83.5%
2. Political	65%
3. Fear, terror emphasized	51%
4. Threat	47%
5. (Psych.) effects and (anticipated) reactions	41.5%
6. Victim-target differentiation	37.5%
7. Purposive, planned, systematic, organized action	32%

*From: Schmid, Jongman et al. Political terrorism: a new guide to actors, authors, concepts, databases, theories, and literature. Amsterdam: North Holland, Transaction Books, 1988, p.5.*

with terrorism. Most of the definitions use this concept in their depictions of terrorists. However, not all definitions mention it, and not all those which do mention it use it in the same way. The first question that arises from a characterisation as the one used by Schmid is whether violence and force can be equated. If one goes deeper into the meaning of those two words, it becomes quite obvious that such an equation is hardly possible. The connotations of these two words are different. While force designates something which is in a sense approved, the usage of a term “violence” gives a very different normative suggestion. Violence by definition is illegal or unjust.<sup>19</sup> As Adrian Guelke writes in this respect, “...characterisation of an action as violent also usually entails disapproval and implies that it is illegitimate. Legitimate violence, if not quite an oxymoron, is usually described by another word, such as ‘force’.”<sup>20</sup>

Thus, it could be said that the relationship between the two terms is hardly synonymous. One of them has to be cho-

sen to describe the phenomenon of terrorism. The choice between the two elements depends, of course, on the researcher’s opinion. However, considering the combinations of words that appear in this context, it should be possible to say which word would be preferable to another. In many definitions the terms “violence” or “force” are combined with “illegitimate”, “unorthodox”, etc. These words say what the essence of the term “violence” already implies. Therefore, it could be said that the usage of the word “violence” could be preferred in the definition of terrorism, as it describes in one word what would otherwise have to be said in a combination of at least two.

The other question that arises in relation to this element of the definition is whether it is a necessary element. There seems to be little disagreement about that. Terrorism is seen as a form of violence, while the other characteristics of it are used essentially to distinguish it from other forms of violence. However, as mentioned before, it does not appear in all the definitions. As one researcher on terrorism

emphasised, “terrorists want many people watching, not many people dead.” Therefore, it seems that violence is not a necessary ingredient of the terrorist strategy.

For example, in a definition of R.P. Hoffman, one finds neither violence nor force. He defines terrorism as:

*... a purposeful human political activity which is directed towards the creation of a general climate of fear, and is designed to influence, in ways desired by the protagonist, other human beings and, through them, some course of events.*<sup>21</sup>

According to this definition fear (from which the word “terrorism” itself derives its meaning) can be created also through other types of actions, not only through violent ones. Threats, which appear as the fourth most often mentioned element in the definitions of terrorism, can be given as an example here. Engagement in violent activities themselves is not necessary for the creation of a climate of fear, if the threat of violence is evident enough and is regarded as such by those the terrorists want to terrorise. However, it could also be claimed that the credibility of such

threats is more often than not based on the previous actions, which in this case would be violent. Therefore, a certain agreement can be reached: that violence is indeed a necessary ingredient in the definition of terrorism.

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### ***“Political” violence***

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The element of “political” appears quite often in the definitions of terrorism. There are, however, certain problems arising from the use of this term as well. Some authors argue that stating that terrorism is only “political” is not enough. They claim that there is also religious terrorism, which has different aims and reasons that are not political and therefore should be distinguished from the so-called “old”, ideological terrorism of the 1970s. Steven Lukes and Nadia Urbinati in their article “Words matter” claim that “[t]he new terrorism is completely different because of its religious character”. They also add that:

*[t]hey [the al Qaeda] are unlike the terrorists of the past, such as the Red Brigades or the IRA (or even Hezbollah), who speak the*

*language of their victims and use violent means to achieve political ends that are contestable but not obscure.*<sup>22</sup> (Lukes, Urbinati, 2001)

It is also claimed that there can be “criminal” terrorism, which is closely related to ordinary criminal activities. For instance, the idea of “narcoterrorism” could be related to such a notion. As David Campbell writes, this concept entails two things:

*The power of ‘narcoterrorism’ as a concept is that it subsumes under one banner a number of ideas, including the assertion that guerrilla movements finance their operations largely through drug trafficking, and the more believable argument that the principals in the drug industry employ extreme violence.*<sup>23</sup>

In this sense terrorism is not political but just criminal, e.g. a part of the drug trafficking industry. Having in mind such examples of the usage of the term, some authors claim that one needs to add “criminal” to the definition of terrorism.

The argument that one has to include the epithets of “religious” or “criminal”

in the definition of terrorism, however, can be rather easily refuted. First of all, the so-called “new”, religious terrorists also have very clear political goals (e.g. creation of the Palestinian state and removal of the US troops from Saudi Arabia). Secondly, it could be also said that terrorists belonging to the category of “old” terrorism develop something like a religious zeal in their struggles against the state. Therefore, the whole difference between the two types of terrorists, perceived by Lukes and Urbinati, lays not so much in the religious wrapping of their perception, but in their cultural background, which is outside Western value system.

Secondly, the emphasis on “criminal” reasons can also be seen as rather exaggerated. It could be claimed that all violence is shocking and all violence is producing a certain climate of anxiety. However, the difference between the action and its effects of “mere criminals” and those of the terrorists lies elsewhere. As Loren Lomasky writes:

*Criminal activity operates within the interstices of the political order and is parasitic*

*upon it. ... Terrorism is different. ... Terrorists do not aim to free ride but rather to destroy.*<sup>24</sup>

Thus, including such elements into a definition could just create more confusion. They are often added in more comprehensive definitions, but actually, do not bring more clarity to the concept and can easily be subsumed under the “political” element.

***Fear and terror, psychological effects and anticipated reactions***

51% of the definitions emphasize creation of the atmosphere of fear as an important element of terrorism. Along with violence, this is probably one of the most important notions connected to the phenomenon. Even though not all the definitions mention this element, its relevance for the concept of terrorism and subsequently the need to include it into a definition is considerable. In addition to that, the fifth element in the Schmid’s listing – that of psychological effects and reactions – can also be included in the analysis of this

element, as they all relate to certain psychological aspects of the phenomenon. As was mentioned before, violence is important for the whole terrorist enterprise only in so far as it provokes certain reactions.

However, some objections are made to the inclusion of this element or at least with the understanding of terror as such. For instance, F. Ochberg writes:

*The equation of terror with a state of chronic fear is permissible in lay language, but in psychiatry terror is an extreme form of anxiety, often accompanied by aggression, denial, constricted affect, and followed by frightening imagery and intrusive, repetitive recollection. I would consider a person a terrorist if he attempted [certain] methods ... even if the targets did not experience terror, as long as they were imperilled or victimized.*<sup>25</sup>

As it was mentioned in the first section of this article, fear and terror may not be included into the definition also because of the fact that such an insertion would leave out the attacks on property.

These objections notwithstanding, it could be strongly argued that there is a strong need to include the “terrorizing” aspect of terrorism into a definition. Terrorism without terror as a strong emotional reaction to the events is actually a contradiction in terms. Even though terrorist groups rarely manage to create a sustainable atmosphere of fear, only the most spectacular attacks such as that of September 11, 2001, achieve such results, the aim of the terrorists is to produce fear.

As Schmid argues:

*There is ... a solid conceptual core of terrorism, differentiating it from ordinary violence. It consists in the calculated production of a state of extreme fear of injury and death and, secondarily, the exploitation of this emotional reaction to manipulate behaviour.*<sup>26</sup>

Even though such an emotional reaction is rather hard to operationalize, it is still to be considered one of the main elements of terrorism, distinguishing it from the other forms of political violence and allowing it to be seen as a distinct phenomenon.

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### ***Victim-target differentiation***

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Victim-target differentiation is an abbreviation of the significant element of the notion of terrorism, which emphasizes that the immediate victims of terrorism are not the main targets of the actions. This element, in contrast to most of the above-mentioned ones, is not considered to be very controversial. It actually allows distinguishing terrorism from other forms of political violence, such as assassination. While in case of a murder, committed for political reasons or not, the goal is death of a person, terrorism “does not care about the victim itself.”<sup>27</sup> It is not what happens to the victim that is important, but how the fact of what happens to it will affect the target audience and, through it, the authorities of the state. This factor is closely related to creating the atmosphere of fear. Murder, having as its target a certain concrete person can rarely ignite a sense of anxiety and fear in the target group. Anger or its equivalent is a more likely reaction. In

this sense as well, the terrorist violence can be considered symbolic violence.<sup>28</sup> Attacking a somewhat symbolic victim, it aims at producing the aforementioned atmosphere of fear, as a part of population identifies itself with the victim and sees itself in its place.

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### ***Organized, systematic actions***

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This element of a definition is again closely related to producing an environment of fear. Singular actions, it is claimed, do not have a strong terrorizing effect. What is important, again, is not that somebody would die in the attacks, but that the rest of the target population would feel threatened and could perceive itself in the shoes of the victim. Furthermore, “organized” actions appear in a definition in order to distinguish terrorism from instantaneous psychopathic behaviour and from natural calamity-like events or from more spontaneous forms of political violence as the ones encountered in street violence, etc.

What could be problematic in this part of a definition is the notion of “systematic” actions. On the one hand, it might be reasonable to agree with the point that sporadic events do not have the same effect as do systematic attacks or a perceived danger of further attacks. On the other hand, what is meant by a “singular action” or “systematic actions” in this context is not always completely clear. Both these characterizations refer more to the groups and individuals engaged in terrorist activities, but can hardly be used in general. For example, it could be claimed that a singular act by a certain group cannot create an atmosphere of fear, which the terrorists want to attain, but a singular act committed by a group in the environment of the terrorist acts may have a significant effect. Furthermore, as it could well be seen, one spectacular attack as the one we witnessed on September 11, 2001 can have a more significant impact than a long and systematic campaign.

Such objections, even though they problematize significantly this specific

element of a definition, do not actually make it less important. "Systematic" as well as "organized" are the labels used to distinguish the phenomenon of terrorism from spontaneous violence and to emphasize again the importance of generating a terror atmosphere in the populace. The possibility of distinguishing this phenomenon from other types of political violence through adding this element makes it an important ingredient in any definition of terrorism.

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After having discussed seven elements most often found in the definitions of terrorism, it is now time to summarize the findings. From what was said above, it becomes clear that a definition of terrorism should include at least four elements: violence, political motives, an attempt to create a general atmosphere of fear and a systematic, organized character of actions. For the purposes of a clearer and more encompassing understanding of the phenomenon a more detailed definition may also be useful. So far, the most

accepted definition in the milieu of social sciences was proposed by Alex Schmid, who sees terror as:

*An anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-) clandestine individual, group or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons, whereby - in contrast to assassination - the direct targets of violence are not the main targets. The immediate human victims of violence are generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from the target population, and serve as message generators. Threat- and violence-based communication processes between terrorist (organization), (imperilled) victims, and main targets are used to manipulate the main target (audience(s)), turning it into a target of terror, a target of demands, or a target of attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion or propaganda is primarily sought.<sup>29</sup>*

As it can be noticed, this definition is pretty long and contains elements which might not be absolutely necessary. However, it has the advantage of trying to deal with the most varied aspects of the

phenomenon, which make it distinct from the other types of activities, and also of dealing with both state and insurgent types of terrorism. For the purposes of most scientific inquiries a less encompassing and, therefore, sometimes more operational definition can also come in handy. However, keeping in mind the lack of agreement in the sphere, such a definition could be left for the choice of a researcher.

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### ***Normative elements in definitions of terrorism***

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The definition elements analysed above, as well as Schmid's definition itself, exclude a certain type of elements used in some scientific inquiries. These elements could be seen as more or less "neutral" analytic concepts. However, there is another set of elements that has not been analysed so far. Some of the definitions used in analytical works on terrorism and especially in the speeches and articles concerning the figures of anti-terrorist campaigns all over the world could be called "normative". They



include not only an impassionate description of the phenomenon at hand, but also an evaluation on moral grounds. The most common feature of these definitions is the emphasis on the victims of terrorism, on the innocence of the targets of the terrorist attacks. It is now time to look at these definitions and to examine their advantages and disadvantages compared to the analytical ones.<sup>30</sup>

For the authors using such definitions, the conceptualisation itself serves as a tool for strong condemnation of terrorist actors. Alfred J. Fortin in his article "Notes on a Terrorist Text: A Critical Use of Roland Barthes' Textual Analysis in the Interpretation of Political Meaning" analyses a text of Jeane Kirkpatrick, a political scientist and former representative of the US to the United Nations, as an example of what he calls a "terrorist text".<sup>31</sup> In her article in Harpers (October 1984), Kirkpatrick sees terrorists as the ones who "kill, maim, kidnap, torture", who "chooses violence as the instrument of first resort" whose victims can be "schoolchildren, travellers, indus-

trialists returning home from work, political leaders or diplomats". Additionally, terrorism is seen as "a form of political war", but it "should also be distinguished from conventional war, and terrorists from soldiers" as "a soldier uses violence in accordance with the legally constituted authorities of his society against the enemies designated by those authorities", while a terrorist "engages in violence in violation of law against people who do not understand themselves to be at war".<sup>32</sup>

According to Fortin, such construction of the argument has several important implications for the analysis. First of all, it is not so much a "building or structuration of the terrorist, than it is a structuration of the terrorist-victim relation"<sup>33</sup> in which the reader is encouraged to "identify with the victim status" and thereupon to adhere to the political agenda proposed by the authorities. Furthermore, opposition to this agenda, as well as a neutral analysis, becomes basically impossible and:

*[w]e see this constraint in the rigidities of the dramatic oppositions created, in the marginal and covert status of the hermeneutical code, in*

*the incessant drive of the moral claim to trivialize contending discourses, in the choice of a non-interpretive epistemology with its dogmatic sense of real, and in the performative nature of the text itself.*<sup>34</sup>

The argument is constructed in such a way that it is impossible not to take sides in the eternal fight between the good and the evil, and those sides are clearly indicated. Showing a reader as a potential victim, the text is paternalistic; it does not ask for the evaluation of its ideas. The evaluation is pre-given in the definition and, consequently, the article itself appears to be not so much the analysis of terrorism but a condemnatory artefact and a tool of political struggle. This type of definition exhibits the same problems as political definitions presented in the first section; they are influenced significantly by a certain stand that a researcher wants to take, not only as a researcher, but as a defender of the policies and ideas of the government. As Martha Crenshaw emphasizes:

*The danger inherent in the normative definition is that it verges on the polemical. If*

*“terrorist” is what one calls one’s opponent (regardless of whether or not one’s friend is a freedom fighter), then the word is more of an epithet or a debating stratagem than a label that enables all who read it, whatever their ideological affiliation, to know what terrorism is and what it is not.*<sup>35</sup>

## Conclusions

The aim of this article was to present the problems regarding the concept of terrorism and various attempts to define it. Two areas in which such attempts take place were taken into consideration: the political and the academic arena. From what was said above it could be argued that the failure of overarching definitions in the political sphere is related to the strong play of interests in presenting the concept. The states are trying to define the phenomenon in their laws and reports in such a way that would allow them to include certain types of attacks and to exclude others, according to their needs. The neutrality of such definitions is rather dubious.

Attempted conceptualisations of the notion of terrorism in the social sciences

have often failed as well, because of the variable nature of the phenomenon and the diversity of approaches. As with most of the notions of social sciences, it is difficult to define anything using the usual methods. Even more so as the term “terrorism”, in contrast to other phenomena, carries in itself a strong emotional component, making a neutral scientific definition of the concept very difficult to attain. Yet, the objective remains, as Laqueur argues, “... a comprehensive, generally accepted definition of terrorism does not exist and is unlikely to come into existence, if only because terrorists and their victims will not agree on the matter. But a working definition is certainly not beyond our reach.”<sup>36</sup>

<sup>1</sup> “A recent book discussing attempts by the UN and other international bodies to define terrorism runs to three volumes and 1866 pages without reaching any firm conclusion” (Brian Whitaker. *The definition of Terrorism*. Guardian, May 7, 2001. In <http://www.guardian.co.uk/elsewhere/journalist/story/0,7792,487098,00.html> )

<sup>2</sup> Sonika Gupta. “September 11 and Definitions of Terrorism” in <http://www.ipcs.org/issues/800/871-ter-sonika.html>

<sup>3</sup> Connolly, William. *Identity/Difference. Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 1991, p.207.

<sup>4</sup> Brian Whitaker. *The definition of Terrorism*.

<sup>5</sup> See Dennis Hans. Bush’s Definition of Terrorism Fits Northern Alliance Like a Glove; TV Interviewers Don’t Notice. In <http://www.commondreams.org/views/01/1123-05.htm> And <http://www.hrw.org/backgrounders/asia/afghan-bck1005.htm> for Human Rights Watch assessment of the situation in Afghanistan.

<sup>6</sup> Brian Whitaker. *The definition of Terrorism*.

<sup>7</sup> Drake, Richard. *Revolutionary Mystique and Terror in Contemporary Italy*. - Blymington: Indiana University Press, 1989. - p.xv

<sup>8</sup> Schmid, Jongman et al. *Political terrorism: a new guide to actors, authors, concepts, data bases, theories, and literature*. Amsterdam: North Holland, Transaction Books, 1988. - p.xiii

<sup>9</sup> Although the tactics resembling terrorism is traced as far back as the Jewish struggle against the Roman empire, it is the end of the 1960s that marks the beginning of the contemporary terrorist activities, an era of what has been called “age of terrorism” (see Laqueur, Walter. *The Age of Terrorism*, Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1987). Several events of that time influenced both the increasing usage of terrorist tactics to influence the political agenda and the appearance of the word “terrorism” in everyday language, especially in the media. These events include death of Che Guevara in 1967, which revealed the shortcomings of guerrilla warfare, student uprisings of 1968, which had a similar influence on shaping the view of impact of revolts, and the Six Day

War of June 1967, which gave an impetus for an increasing use of the term "terrorism" by Western media (See, for example, Guelke, Adrian, *The age of terrorism and the international political system*. London: I.B.Tauris, 1995, - p.2-3).

<sup>10</sup> Schmid, Jongman et al. *Political terrorism: a new guide to actors, authors, concepts, data bases, theories, and literature*. - p.27

<sup>11</sup> Quoted in Schmid, Jongman et al. *Political terrorism: a new guide to actors, authors, concepts, data bases, theories, and literature*. - p.27.

<sup>12</sup> See, for example, Laqueur, Walter. *The Age of Terrorism*. - p.12-13.

<sup>13</sup> "Que le despote gouverne par la terreur ses sujets abrutis ; il a raison, comme despote : domptez par la terreur les ennemis de la liberté ; et vous aurez raison, comme fondateurs de la République" (When a despot governs by terror his stupefied subjects, he is right as a despot; overcome by terror enemies of freedom and you will be right as the founders of the Republic) from Robespierre, Maximilien. *Pour le bonheur et pour la liberté*. Discours. - Paris: La fabrique editions, 2000 - p.297.

<sup>14</sup> La terreur n'est que la justice prompte, sévère, inflexible; elle est donc une émanation de la vertu; elle est moins un principe particulier qu'une conséquence du principe général de la démocratie appliqué aux plus pressants besoins de la patrie. (Quoted from *ibid.*, p.296-297)

<sup>15</sup> Rapoport, David. *Introduction* // Rapoport, D. and Alexander Y. *The Morality of Terrorism: Religious and Secular Justifications*. - New York: Pergamo Press, 1982. - p.xiv)

<sup>16</sup> Gilbert, Paul. *Terrorism, Security and Nationality. An Introductory Study in Applied Political Philosophy*. London: Routledge, 1994. - p.26.

<sup>17</sup> Dictionnaire de l'Académie Française de 1798. Quoted in Laqueur, Walter. *The Age of Terrorism*. - p.11

<sup>18</sup> James Murray' *New English Dictionary on Historical Principles*, published in 1919 in Oxford. Quoted in Laqueur, Walter. *The Age of Terrorism*. - p.11.

<sup>19</sup> For example, the third understanding of "violence" in the Webster dictionary reads that violence is an "unjust or callous use of force or power, as in violating another's rights, sensibilities, etc" (Webster's *New World College Dictionary*, 3rd Edition. NY: Macmillan, 1996. - p.1490).

<sup>20</sup> Guelke, Adrian, *The age of terrorism and the international political system*. London. - p.20.

<sup>21</sup> Quoted in Schmid, Jongman et al. *Political terrorism: a new guide to actors, authors, concepts, data bases, theories, and literature*. - p.4.

<sup>22</sup> Lukes, Steven and Urbinati, Nadia (2001) "Words matter" in [http://www.opendemocracy.net/document\\_store/Doc862-5.pdf](http://www.opendemocracy.net/document_store/Doc862-5.pdf)

<sup>23</sup> Campbell, David. *Writing Security. United States foreign policy and the politics of identity*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992. - p.212.

<sup>24</sup> Lomasky, Loren. *The political significance of terrorism* // Frey, Morris eds. *Violence, Terrorism and Justice*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991. - p. 100.

<sup>25</sup> Quoted in Schmid, Jongman et al. *Political terrorism: a new guide to actors, authors, con-*

*cepts, data bases, theories, and literature*. - p.19.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.* p.21

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, p.8

<sup>28</sup> Notion of terrorism as a symbolic violence was introduced in 1964 by Th. P. Thornton

<sup>29</sup> Schmid, Jongman. *Political terrorism: a new guide to actors, authors, concepts, data bases, theories, and literature*. - p.28.

<sup>30</sup> The distinction between normative and analytical definitions of terrorism was proposed by Martha Crenshaw (see Crenshaw, Martha. *Reflections on the Effects of Terrorism* // Martha Crenshaw ed. *Terrorism, Legitimacy and Power. Consequences of Political Violence*. Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1983. - p.1)

<sup>31</sup> "The text is not a quest, but an act of combat. And to the extent that it strikes without notice, trades on fear, and is impatient with process, it is a terrorist text" See Fortin, Alfred. *Notes on a Terrorist Text: A Critical Use of Roland Barthes' Textual Analysis in the Interpretation of Political Meaning* // Der Derian, Shapiro, eds. *International/Intertextual Relations. Postmodern Readings of World Politics*. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1989. - p.203

<sup>32</sup> The text is taken from Fortin, Alfred. *Notes on a Terrorist Text: A Critical Use of Roland Barthes' Textual Analysis in the Interpretation of Political Meaning* - p.205-206.

<sup>33</sup> *ibid.*, p.203.

<sup>34</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>35</sup> Crenshaw, Martha. *Reflections on the Effects of Terrorism* - p.2

<sup>36</sup> Laqueur, Walter. *The Age of Terrorism*. - p.149.

# Lithuanian Airspace Management In Times of Crisis and War

By Antanas Jucius\*

## I. Introduction

Since 1991 Lithuania has moved rapidly to modernise and improve civil and military communications, navigation, surveillance, and Air Traffic Management (ATM) equipment and systems. On the military side, progress has been significantly slower, constrained by limited budgets and deliberations over ATM alternatives and their impacts on cockpit equipment. An important problem is the incompatibility between civil and military systems, which restricts military operations and impacts training. Another significant problem that must be ad-

ressed is compatibility with ICAO<sup>1</sup>, and NATO systems and procedures.

In October 2000 a new Law on Aviation was adopted in Lithuania. According to it, “the Government is responsible for efficient organisation, assignment and management of Lithuanian airspace, in order to achieve effective use of airspace by civilian aircraft considering airspace needs for national security of Lithuania.”<sup>2</sup> However, the responsibilities concerning development of communications, navigation, surveillance, and ATM equipment and systems, have to be assigned for both the Civil Aviation Administration (CAA) as a civil authority and the Ministry of

Defence as a military authority as well. Such an idea brings in the requirements for interdependence and close co-operation between these two authorities in regard to airspace management in peacetime and especially in times of crisis and war.

The purpose of this article is to analyse the Lithuanian Airspace Management system in order to determine its adequacy in time of crisis and war and to recommend its further development.

The increased demand for airspace use from all airspace user groups<sup>3</sup> is expected to continue. The existing ATM system in Lithuania is unlikely to cope with this demand. One of the main areas for change

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concerns the organization and use of airspace. A major obstacle to produce more airspace capacity is that the effective use of Lithuanian airspace has not been optimised to date. The requirements of all airspace user groups and ATM providers are the main driving forces in further development of airspace management strategy, which shall be oriented towards optimizing and simplifying the airspace structure. Furthermore, future national ATM strategies cannot realistically be developed in isolation, as each individual state is an integral element of the European ATM system.

From the ICAO approach, ATM consists of three functions:

- Air Traffic Control (ATC), which is responsible for sufficient separation between aircraft in the air and between aircraft and the ground, to avoid collisions, while ensuring a proper flow of traffic.

- Air Traffic Flow Management (ATFM), which regulates the flow of aircraft as efficiently as possible to avoid the congestion at certain control sectors.

- Airspace Management (ASM), which assigns airspace efficiently to its main users (civil and military).

Thus, in order to analyse Lithuanian Airspace Management we have to answer the question what Airspace Management System has to be developed to ensure a proper flow of traffic and national security in Lithuanian airspace in times of crisis and war.

This article does not explain the ICAO or NATO requirements, standards and procedures in detail because of limitations in size of the article. However, all necessary references to original documents are provided. Moreover, this article does not include any assessments in terms of the financial costs required, as it suggests possible solutions but not an implementation plan.

## **II. Legislation and responsibilities of the authorities**

The objective of ASM is to achieve the most efficient use of airspace based on actual needs. A proper design of airspace

structures and assignment of airspace requires close co-operation between all airspace users. From the military point of view, the efficient design, assignment and control of airspace have a decisive impact on airspace surveillance, detection of aircraft and defence of sovereignty of the country. In order to fulfil this mission, military forces require freedom of action for their assets in the air to conduct proper training in peacetime. This freedom is especially essential in time of crisis and war.

This chapter provides general information about the airspace use concept implemented by most of the European countries, including the current Lithuania's airspace design and the ASM system. Furthermore, it provides an analysis of what authority shall have responsibility for the air traffic control in Lithuania in time of peace, crisis and war, and what are the Lithuanian Armed Forces' demands on ATC.

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### ***Flexible use of airspace***

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The document "The Concept of the Flexible Use of Airspace" (the FUA Con-

cept) has been developed by the EUROCONTROL<sup>4</sup> for the European Air Traffic Control Harmonisation and Integration Programme (EATCHIP) Project Board and the NATO Committee for European Airspace Co-ordination (CEAC). In June 1994 the FUA document was endorsed by the 4<sup>th</sup> Meeting of the European Ministers of Transport.

The basis for the FUA Concept is that “airspace should no longer be designated as either military or civil airspace but should be considered as one continuum and used flexibly on a day-to-day basis. Consequently, any necessary airspace segregation should be only of a temporary nature...”<sup>5</sup> It is of importance that the application of the FUA Concept is advantageous for both civil and military airspace users, because it will lead to an increase in ATC capacity, more efficient ways to separate Operational and General Air Traffic (OAT/GAT), improved real-time civil-military co-ordination and a significant reduction in airspace segregation needs as well as the use of Temporary Segregated Areas (TSA) being brought

more closely into line with the military operational requirements.

#### *Airspace structure*

According to the ICAO definition, controlled airspace is divided into four different parts: Control Zone (CTR), Terminal Area (TMA), Control Area (CTA) and Temporary Segregated Area (TSA).

The FUA Concept provides that normally both the civil and military airspace users have access to CTR, TMA and CTA. In principle the ICAO standards, such as separation minima, required equipment, flight safety requirements etc., apply to all traffic. Any other national standards can be established via the Law on Aviation and published in the Aeronautical Information Publication (AIP). Furthermore, in the integrated ASM system the Regulator of military aviation can, through the Regulator of civil aviation, establish national standards for military ATC.

TSA's are established for activities of a temporary nature, which need specific protection. Normally they are used for

military air combat exercises and military flight training. The military Regulator is responsible for establishing the rules and standards for military flights within a TSA. Officers in the Air Force (Fighter Controllers) normally control flights within a TSA. An important consideration has to be given to flight safety standards on separation between flights within and flights outside a TSA.

#### *Assigning airspace*

According to the FUA Concept, a national order for assigning airspace has to be established. This order must be in accordance with law (Law on Aviation). In order to reassess a national airspace, to establish new flexible airspace structures and to introduce the procedures for the allocation of these airspace structures on day-by-day basis, a high-level National Airspace Policy Body with representatives from the civil and military authorities should be established. The high-level civil/military national body “formulates the national ASM policy and carries out the necessary strategic planning work, taking

into account national and international airspace users requirements...”<sup>6</sup> Other airspace users (e.g. firing ranges) must have guaranteed influence on the airspace structure. For that purpose they shall be called as members of the national airspace policy body when issues within their field of interests are decided.

For the daily allocation and promulgation of the flexible airspace structures and for communication of the airspace status to the EUROCONTROL (a so-called Centralised Airspace Data Function (CADF)), a national Airspace Management Cell (AMC) should be established. Authorisation, responsibilities for manning and relevant instructions must be issued and described in such a manner, that the decision-making levels can be identified easily by every responsible authority, and in a manner, that can guarantee levels of influence for both the military and civil airspace users.

#### ***Fighter control***

Not being part of the ATM system, a fighter control system normally is estab-

lished for controlling military aircraft during the intercept missions and tactical training flight exercises in peacetime and for the air combat missions in wartime.

A typical scenario for a military training flight in the integrated ATM system can be described as follows: a military aircraft is departing from a military airbase for a mission and is first handled by the ATC of this particular airbase. When leaving the Terminal Area (TMA), the flight is handed over to the Area Control Centre (ACC) for the en-route phase of the flight. When the flight reaches the TSA allocated for the mission, the aircraft is handed over to a fighter controller (located in the Combined Air Operations Centre (CAOC)) who will be controlling the exercise within the TSA. During this phase of the mission there is a close co-operation between the ACC and the fighter controller in the CAOC regarding information on flight safety issues. Finally, when the exercise is completed, the aircraft is handed over to the ACC for the flight back to a base and, having

reached the TMA, handed over to the ATC of that specific airbase for landing.

In air policing scenario, when a military aircraft is conducting the mission to identify and/or take other actions towards an unknown aircraft, the flight can be handed over to the fighter controller at an earlier stage in order to conduct the interception in an optimal way. By close co-operation between the ACC and/or the ATC of the airbase and the fighter controller in the CAOC, flight safety standards will be maintained during all phases of the flight.

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#### ***Current situation in Lithuania***

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The present Lithuanian ASM system is designed in accordance with two main legal acts – The Law on Aviation of Lithuania from 17 October 2000 and The Decree of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania on the approval of the Air Space Structure of the Republic of Lithuania from 22 January 1997. All relevant information as well as other regulations and requirements of air navigation are

published in AIP of the Republic of Lithuania issued by the Civil Aviation Administration (CAA). "The Rules of the Air and procedures applicable to air traffic in the territory of the Republic of Lithuania conform to Annex 2 - Rules of the Air and Annex 11 - Air Traffic Service to the Convention of International Civil Aviation and to the Regional Supplementary Procedures applicable to the European Region."<sup>7</sup>

According to the Aeronautical Information Publication, the Lithuanian Airspace Structure includes Controlled Airspace, Air Traffic Services (ATS) Route, Danger Area (D), Restricted Area (R) and Prohibited Area (P). The Controlled Airspace or ATS Airspace, respectively, includes CTA, TMA and CTR. ATS airspaces are classified as Class A to G.

Airspace restrictions - D, R, and P Areas - are mainly related to various military activities in peacetime, therefore a proper design and use of them are very important. However, there are some inaccuracies and areas to be changed in the structure. For example, the military air-

field in Kazlu Rūda was closed in 2001, but restricted areas (R) related to it still exist, as well as several D areas above the firing grounds, which are not in use anymore. At the same time, the main Air Force base in Šiauliai has only one small R area to conduct military flight training. These simple examples show that the Airspace Structure has to be reviewed and all necessary changes have to be done in co-operation between civil and military airspace users.

Concerning responsibilities of the authorities for ASM, which are stated in the above-mentioned legal acts as well, the Lithuanian aviation sector system is based on the conceptual structure of a Regulator, Provider and Supervisor. In such a structure the Regulator is responsible for setting standards and regulations, the Provider's task is to serve the customer in accordance with standards and regulations set by the Regulator and the Supervisor has to monitor that the Provider applies standards and regulations set by the Regulator. According to the Law on Aviation of Lithuania, the CAA under the Minis-

try of Transport is the Regulator and Supervisor for civil aviation, while the governmental enterprise "Air Navigation Services" is the Provider. The Ministry of National Defence plays the role of a Regulator, Provider and Supervisor for military aviation, however the "Air Navigation Services" usually provide support for the military users in peacetime as well. The main problem to be solved is that at present time, due to the Lithuanian aviation sector's size and available resources as well as the already established structure, the involved authorities are not able to fully carry out their responsibilities.

Regarding the above-mentioned problem, there is a need for improvements and reorganisations in the Lithuanian ASM system. It is necessary to mention here that in order to achieve the more efficient use of airspace by both the civil and military users and to increase the capacity of the air traffic, the Lithuanian ASM system is under continuous development and modernization in close co-operation between responsible civil and military authorities. The latest results of the co-



operation show that one of solutions is a development of an Integrated Civil/Military Airspace Management System in Lithuania. The integrated system shall, wherever relevant, be based on the EATCHIP "Concept of the Flexible Use of Airspace".

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***A responsible air traffic control (ATC) authority in Lithuania in peacetime, crisis and war***

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Efficient Airspace Management (ASM) is essential for successful and safe tactical missions during different levels of raised alert or war situations. For that reason it is necessary to decide how the overall responsibility for providing ATC shall be distributed during various alert or war situations. It is of importance that a transfer point is defined and stated in a law similar to other laws entering into force under such circumstances. The responsibilities should be regulated via legislation and agreements through the high-level civil/military national airspace policy body. By doing so, the transfer is auto-

matic and guarantees the uninterrupted functioning of the ASM system during all the above-mentioned phases. Preparation and planning must be made by the Airspace Management Cell (AMC) and other responsible authorities in peacetime to ensure that ASM continues during crises and can be adapted to a possible war situation. Good examples for such a preparation are military war planning, training for special war tasks and development of special equipment and procedures for military purposes. The Lithuanian Armed Forces would set the tactical demands, however the CAA shall conduct some of these preparation tasks, the remaining tasks being responsibility of the Lithuanian Air Force. A system, which ensures necessary military influence and division of responsibilities between the authorities, should be established via agreements at different levels.

***Responsibility transfer system***

In order to achieve the above-mentioned objective, a system, in which the responsibility during crisis and war is transferred to the Lithuanian Armed

Forces, has to be established. This approach will ensure a strong influence by the Lithuanian Armed Forces upon ASM, thus meeting all requirements for national security. The Government should define subordination structure during raised alert or under war conditions through its decrees. Any other details of such situations should be regulated by various inter-agency agreements.

The effect of transferring responsibility is that the Air Traffic Management (ATM) elements and services would cease to exist as a part of the civil structure. Equipment and facilities would be transferred to the military structure, and civilian employees would become subordinated to the military staff. ATM would continue uninterruptedly in the same manner as before the transfer and there would be no necessity to replace either the employees or equipment. The ATC's function at military airbases would continue providing services to both the military and civil customers under control of the Lithuanian Armed Forces, while concurrently the ATC units not located at

the military airbases would continue providing services to all aviation under subordination of the Lithuanian Armed Forces as well.

Since the system of transferring responsibility is usually prepared in advance and interacts with similar laws for war situations, the transfer would be automatic and not affecting the services provided to either military or civil aviation.

#### ***Areas for agreements and contracts***

With the system of transferring responsibility the ATM elements, such as equipment and facilities, and service providing employees would become a part of the Lithuanian Armed Forces after the transfer and would be subordinated to the Lithuanian Air Force. In this case there are a number of areas, which need to be regulated through different agreements and contracts between the above-mentioned parties.

Examples of such areas are:

- Financial agreements between the Ministry of National Defence and the

Ministry of Transport for distribution of costs for investments in training, necessary infrastructure and procurement of equipment according to the special demands set by the Lithuanian Armed Forces. Those agreements will be based on the principle that the Ministry of National Defence accepts to share or compensate costs for the special services, equipment, buildings and facilities necessary for the military purposes.

- Establishment of a system where the air traffic controllers at military facilities can fulfil specific military duties. If the air traffic controllers are to be transferred to serve in the Lithuanian Armed Forces, probably a reservists system should be established for that purpose. Additional costs for exercise and training of the reservists should be part of the financial agreements between the Ministry of National Defence and the Ministry of Transport.

- Establishment of working procedures between different relevant organisations to ensure an uninterrupted transition from peacetime to a war situation.

- Establishment of an organisation, or assigning of a part of an already existing organisation within the Lithuanian Armed Forces, to hold responsibility of preparing for the wartime ATM duties.

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#### ***Demands of the Lithuanian Armed Forces on air traffic management***

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An integrated ATM system is designed to give civil and military aviation an integrated access to controlled airspace during raised alert and war. At the same time, it ensures tactical freedom for defence aviation flights during exercises, for incident readiness flights and in wartime. Different parts of the aviation sector interact with each other in accordance with the same principles in peacetime as well as during raised alert and war. To ensure an uninterrupted and well-functioning ATM system during raised alert, when the CAA is maintaining responsibility, as well as during war, when responsibility is transferred to the Lithuanian Armed Forces, a Regulation on ATM for war should be

established. This regulation should cover a number of different areas during the two different phases and include items such as readiness, airspace organization and classification, and ATM organization.

It is important that the Lithuanian Air Force should have an incident readiness at all times. Moreover, the ATM personnel at airbases have to be a part of this readiness as well. If the Government raises alert for whatever the reason, the ATM personnel shall remain employees of the CAA until the transferring point. During this phase, orders concerning ATM should be passed from the Lithuanian Armed Forces to them for execution. After the transferring point the ATM personnel will become employees of the Lithuanian Armed Forces or conscripts. The important consideration here is that the CAA has to be ready to take back the responsibility when alert level is decreased or war is terminated. If the State authorities have not declared a state of war, but there is war de facto, it should be considered as an automatic state of war. In such a situation, the responsibility for ATM

has to be immediately transferred to the Lithuanian Armed Forces, and the ATM personnel shall act in accordance with what has been planned in advance.

The airspace organisation has to ensure the priority to and safety of combat flights. In wartime, a priority to combat flights is an imperative, however it can also be given to important civil transportation flights on defence missions. Airspace classification definitions in accordance with the AIP are valid through all phases of raised alert and war, therefore any changes of airspace classification have to be planned by the Airspace Management Cell, in close co-operation between the Lithuanian Armed Forces and the CAA. The planning and implementation of changes to airspace classification has to be done taking into account the Land Force and Navy air defence assets as well.

The ATM organisation has to be able to provide professional services adapted to the requirements of the Lithuanian Armed Forces for civil and military aviation as well as a number of special tasks. Those tasks mean duties of partly or to-

tally different nature where special skills of the ATM personnel are useful to the defence. The purpose is to ensure required quality, flexibility and continuity of command and control at fighter control units, airbases, headquarters, Area Control Centre (ACC) and Combined Air Operations Centre (CAOC). Another important task is a co-ordination with air defence units to ensure their ability to perform their duties and prevent accidental fire at friendly aircraft. Those tasks require an ATM organisation that is properly equipped and trained. At wartime all flights shall have the best possible service as long as possible. Therefore peacetime investments have to be adapted whenever possible to wartime demands as well as planning and development have to secure the ability to adapt to war. Moreover, recruitment and training of personnel have to meet the necessary military requirements and, in order to have an efficient military organisation, the ATM personnel shall be prepared to fulfil not only their professional duties but also other, defence related ones, as well.

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***Wartime airspace management considerations***

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Modern warfare is characterised by the fact that all military forces become airspace users either to a full or certain extent. This leads to high level of complexity of ASM not only in peacetime but also especially in times of crisis and war. The examples of combat operations when aircraft are engaged by their own air defences or inadvertently damaged by friendly fire prove this fact. In order to minimise the risks of losing air assets being engaged by friendly fire on the one hand and to maximise their freedom of action in combat on the other hand, special measures have to be taken. These measures are known as Airspace Control (ASC). "The objective of ASC is to maximise the effectiveness of military operations by promoting the ability of air, land, and maritime forces to operate in efficient, integrated and flexible manner with minimum mutual interference and without undue restraint and risk to friendly forces and

neutral air. ASC provides a commander with the operational flexibility to effectively employ forces..."<sup>8</sup>.

The keystone document for ASC is NATO ATP-40(B) "Doctrine for Airspace Control in Times of Crisis and War". The doctrine is designed for all NATO forces as well as PfP nation's forces. Therefore, the suggested Lithuanian regulation on wartime ATM, which was discussed in the previous chapter, should be designed in accordance with the requirements of this doctrine. The following is not a detailed description of the doctrine, but a summary of the main principles and areas covered by the document.

***Airspace control authority***

The doctrine provides a command structure for all kind of military operations, chain of command as well as clear responsibilities of each commander. The most important principle for command and control is that one commander - Airspace Control Authority (ACA) should be designated for each area of operations and should assume overall responsibility

for ASC in the area. The ACA is to plan, coordinate and organise the Airspace Control System (ACS) and to be responsible for its operation in order to support the higher commander's campaign objectives. All other commanders are to integrate all their weapon systems within the Airspace Control Plan (ACP), which has to be approved by ACA.

***Planning of the airspace control system***

In order to reach the effective ASC during the military operations the requirements of all commanders should be considered during the ASC planning process. Therefore, "each commander who operates aerial vehicles, weapons systems or electronic means to perform his assigned mission within the ASC-Area, must participate in planning the use of that airspace..."<sup>9</sup>. Furthermore, the requirements for civilian aircraft flights and any other host nation military and civil aviation impacts must be taken into account. The results of the ASC planning must be implemented into ACP. The ACP will list

the responsibilities of the authorities, rules of engagement (ROE), instructions and any specified procedures for ASC, and will detail the boundaries of the ASC-Area and any sub-areas. Finally, the ACA will implement the ACP by issuing the Airspace Control Orders (ACO), which by their character may be standing or based on the threat, operations tempo or other planning factors.

#### *Structure and methods of the airspace control*

All airspace users and their controlling elements should possess interoperable communications, information systems and equipment to fulfil their duties in the ACS. The whole of airspace control facilities, communications and automation capabilities, surveillance and identification resources, and procedures is known as Airspace Control Means (ACM). The ACA is responsible to select, in coordination with subordinate commanders, those ACM, which are most suitable for the ASC-Area and accomplishment of the mission. He may,

where necessary, identify additional means as well.

As mentioned before, in order to maximise operational effectiveness, friendly air assets must be able to operate with a minimum risk of engagement by own air defences. Furthermore, those air defences must be able to identify friendly air assets in order to engage the hostile ones. To achieve these aims, the operational commander must ensure that an appropriate system of ASC exists. Two main methods are used for exercising ASC – positive ASC and procedural ASC. The positive method relies on positive identification and control of an aircraft by electronic means, while procedural relies on a combination of previously agreed orders and procedures. Operational situations, however, in general could demand a mixture of those two methods. It is of importance that, when the control of an aircraft is transferred between two control authorities in combat, the responsibility assuming authority must positively identify the aircraft as friendly.

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#### *Conclusion*

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As it is mentioned in this chapter there are some indicators that the present Lithuanian ASM system has to be modernised and developed in order to achieve more efficient use of airspace by both civilian and military users. The most adequate solution is to develop an integrated civil/military ASM system. This system shall, wherever relevant, be based on the EATCHIP “Concept of the Flexible Use of Airspace”.

In accordance with the FUA Concept, entire airspace is considered to be one continuum and is designated as both military and civil airspace. This approach is advantageous for both types of users, because the airspace is used flexibly on a day-by-day basis with necessary airspace segregation being of temporary nature only. Establishment of the TSAs, which should replace or modify, wherever possible, the D, P and R areas currently used in Lithuania, would bring the ASM system more closely into line with the mili-

tary operational requirements. Therefore a high-level national airspace policy body with representatives from the civil and military airspace authorities needs to be established. Furthermore, a National Airspace Management Cell needs to be set up to serve all users in the daily allocation of the airspace structures.

The main principle of an integrated ASM system is that the provider's responsibility is given to one authority. This has to be regulated through the high-level civil/military national airspace policy body at different levels of raised alert and in war situations. Because responsible authorities are different in peacetime and wartime, it is of importance to establish a system of transferring the responsibility of ATM, which guarantees the uninterrupted provision of services during crisis and war. A transfer point has to be clearly defined by the Government and stated in a law coming into force under such a situation. The successful transfer requires close co-operation between civil and military authorities through agreements and contracts in legal, financial ar-

reas, areas of personnel training, establishment of facilities, procurement of systems and equipment, establishment of common regulations and procedures. Therefore, a regulation on wartime ATM, which shall cover readiness, airspace and ATM organization and other military demands, has to be produced.

In wartime, Lithuania must combine defence resources and means from various levels - national, regional, and multinational. That requires a close co-operation between all the participants. Thus the Lithuanian ASM system in times of crisis and war has to be developed in accordance with the NATO requirements for ASC, which are prescribed in NATO ATP-40 (B) "Doctrine for Airspace Control in Times of Crisis and War".

### **III. Air surveillance**

One of the top priorities for the Lithuanian Air Force is exercising control over Lithuanian airspace. Efficient air surveillance above all territory, territorial waters and at all altitudes of flights as well

as military defence of the airspace have to be developed to fulfil this mission. The Air Surveillance is purely a military function and, as such, is not part of ATM. This function normally does not imply controlling air traffic but rather deals with identification and tracking of aircraft within the Area of Operations (AOO). The air surveillance in crisis or wartime is a mission for detection and identification of the aircraft, particularly the Identification of Friend or Foe (IFF).

The following chapter provides a general description of the requirements for the identification systems, which are used by the ICAO and NATO countries, as well as interrelations between them. The proper development of the identification capabilities of air defence assets and air surveillance systems is a crucial issue in terms of risk to friendly forces and neutral aircraft being engaged by own air defences or damaged by friendly fire.

Furthermore, this chapter provides a description of capabilities of the current Lithuanian Air Surveillance System and introduces a so far quite well developed

and still ongoing co-operation between all three Baltic countries in regional air-space surveillance – the BALTNET<sup>10</sup>. The areas for improvement of the Air Surveillance System and the BALTNET are discussed in this chapter as well.

### ***The ICAO and NATO requirements for identification***

#### ***ICAO Mode S***

The latest development and the ICAO requirement for identification systems is a Mode S capability. Mode S is a beacon system used for aircraft surveillance in terminal areas as well as for en-route traffic. It has several features that represent significant capability improvements (e.g. azimuth accuracy, separation of responses from two very close aircraft) over the current system. As it is a beacon system, there is a ground sensor transmitting interrogations to a special transponder, carried on an aircraft. The transponders formulate replies that are transmitted to the ground sensor. The Mode S system is compatible with the current Air Traffic Con-

trol Radar Beacon System (ATCRBS). The Mode S ground sensors periodically transmit ATCRBS Mode A identity and Mode C altitude interrogations and, vice versa, the Mode S transponders will respond to interrogations from the ATCRBS ground sensors. Mode C is a common civil/military mode that allows an aircraft to report its altimeter-reported altitude.

In previous years NATO saw no military requirement for Mode S procurement as a military IFF system. This view was taken, because Mode S is a civil ATS system that would not meet the military operational requirement for a question and answer component of the NATO Identification System. Specifically, Mode S is neither secure nor jam-resistant.

Nevertheless, NATO recognises that military aircraft and authorities will have to make use of Mode S for the following reasons: to enable the military to access/penetrate the civilian route structure or terminal control areas; to facilitate the safe coordination of military/civilian air traffic; to facilitate the use of civil airfields by military aircraft; to provide informa-

tion to NATO Air Defence authorities that will aid compilation of the Recognised Air Picture (RAP); to be able to assume management and control of the civil ATM system in times of crisis.

NATO Mode S requirements are defined by STANAG<sup>11</sup> 4193 “Technical Characteristics of IFF Mk XA and Mk XII Interrogators and Transponders” Part IV – Technical Characteristics of Mode S in Military Interrogators and Transponders. NATO recommendations can be summarised as follows:

- Tactical fixed and rotary wing aircraft that do not make regular use of controlled airspace are to be fitted to Mode S level 2 (Basic Surveillance functionality).
- Fixed and rotary wing aircraft that are regular users of the civil route structure are to be fitted to meet the requirements of ICAO Europe; these have yet to be finalized.
- Aircraft addresses should be easily changeable by ground crews prior to flight.
- Mode S transponders must be at least on-off selectable from the cockpit or ap-

propriate aircrew station while in flight. Where technically feasible, aircrew should be able to control the Level of Mode S being transmitted from their aircraft to Level 2 Basic Surveillance functionality.

### ***NATO IFF***

NATO requires the use of compatible IFF systems in support of ATC and NATO Integrated Air Defence (NATINADS) operations. All aircraft participating in NATO operations and/or flying in NATO member airspace must be equipped with NATO-compatible IFF equipment. National air defence elements of NATINADS and military ATC systems must be equipped with appropriate IFF interrogator sets to interact with the airborne elements.

NATO requires IFF systems to support operations in modes 1, 2, 3 and 4. Technical characteristics of these modes are defined in STANAG 4193, Part I – General Description of the System. Modes 1 and 2 provide a non-encrypted, military-only identification of aircraft. Mode 3 corresponds to the civilian Mode A and

is used in support of both military and civil ATC. Mode 4 is a crypto-secure mode of Mk XII IFF that is used to provide a high confidence, beyond visual range, identification of friendly aircraft to avoid misidentification. IFF systems may also support Mode C operations.

Mode 4 transponders can provide a valid reply only if they and the interrogator are properly keyed. Interrogator systems interface with a KIR-1C cryptographic computer. Transponder systems interface with a KIT-1C cryptographic computer. To insure the security of the encryption, the variables (keys) that are used in the encryption and decryption processes are changed daily.

For ATC purposes, the non-secure aircraft identification codes (modes 1, 2 and/or 3) should be included in the flight plan information (route, height, speed, time of arrival, etc.) provided to military and/or civilian ATC centres located across flight information region (FIR) boundaries. All ATC centres that will have responsibility for the flight need to know the relevant identity code. As the aircraft

progresses along its journey, this information will allow the ATC centres to follow its flight through the FIR for which they are responsible and to hand it over to its neighbouring FIR.

NATO is developing a new IFF system, known as IFF Mode 5. All Mode 4 avionics will be updated when IFF Mode 5 is fielded. STANAG 4193 Mk XIIA Parts V and VI define Mode 5 and the document has been released for ratification so far.

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### ***Lithuanian air surveillance system and the BALTNET***

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#### ***Lithuanian air surveillance system***

Together with the development of the airborne part of identification capabilities, the ground-based part of the system has to be taken into account as well. The first step of such development is to reach the proper and efficient coverage of area by air surveillance sensors (radars). Currently, the military radars used are the radar types P-18, P-37, P-40, “Jawor” and “Korenj” as well as altimeters PRV-11 and PRV-16. These radars are deployed



throughout the country. The P-18 and P-37 medium range radars are used for medium and high altitude air surveillance. The P-18 radars have an extractor fitted that digitises the signal, while the P-37 radars have major system upgrades planned. As a result their digitised signals can be used within the BALTNET.

Against low (300 m above the ground level, AGL) flying aircraft the military radar sites in Lithuania provide good coverage over the western half of the country, but limited coverage in the east.

Lithuania has 3 primary civilian radars that are integrated with the military radars. At higher altitudes the radars provide continuous radar coverage over the entire country, but have limited radar coverage beyond the south-eastern border.

Information from the radars flows into the Airspace Control Centre (ACC) of the Lithuanian Airspace Surveillance and Control Command (ASCC) and the Regional Air Surveillance Coordination Centre (RASCC) of the BALTNET through a microwave communication and information network in real time.

### ***BALTNET***

The BALTNET project was conceived from the U.S. sponsored Regional Airspace Initiative (RAI) to the Central European countries. Officially, the RASCC was inaugurated on June 1, 2000. Since then, it has been serving the airspace surveillance for 24 hours per day. The BALTNET objective is to produce a Recognized Air Picture (RAP) over the Baltic states and their approaches and to communicate it to the national air surveillance centres in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, and, if needed, also to other states as may be agreed. It will allow the Baltic states to survey effectively and co-ordinate their sovereign air space and to ensure safety of the air traffic.

The BALTNET system consists of national air surveillance centres in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, an internationally staffed RASCC (the core of the system) in Karmėlava, near Kaunas, Lithuania as well as communication lines and air surveillance radars.

The BALTNET has been designed as a NATO-interoperable system. In the future

it should be connected to the NATINADS as well as other early warning systems. The USA, Denmark, Norway and Poland have been actively supporting the project.

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### ***Conclusion***

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In order to reach control over Lithuanian airspace, an efficient air surveillance and defence systems have to be developed. ICAO and NATO requirements clearly outline the common civil/military interest in this area. NATO requires the use of compatible IFF systems in support of ATC and NATINADS operations. All aircraft participating in NATO-led operations must be equipped with NATO-compatible IFF equipment while air defence elements and military ATC systems must be equipped with appropriate IFF interrogators to interact with the airborne elements. The goal of taking such measures is to minimise the risks to the air assets from friendly fire while at the same time maximising freedom of action.

The current Lithuanian Air Surveillance and Control System provides a complete

coverage over Lithuania against aircraft flying at high altitudes, however significant parts of eastern Lithuania are left without coverage against aircraft at low-level altitude. Therefore further development of the system is required. An efficient system might be reached through modernisation of existing assets, procurement of new ones, as well as through enhanced cooperation with the civil ATM and the Navy by using their air surveillance assets as well.

Regional cooperation between the three Baltic states in order to improve air surveillance capability is extremely important to Lithuania. The BALTNET is a tool for developing regional security and national defence capability. The project is an example of a successful implementation of foreign military assistance and co-operation between the Baltic states, between the civil and military ASM, and between the Baltic states and NATO.

#### **IV. Air defence**

Air defence (AD) is defined by NATO as “all measures designed to nullify or re-

duce the effectiveness of hostile air action”<sup>12</sup>. As it was already mentioned, all military forces in modern warfare become airspace users either to a full or certain extent, which leads to high level of complexity of above-mentioned measures. Development and implementation of more sophisticated AD weapons is aimed at increasing defence effectiveness on the one hand, but, on the other hand, has raised the risk to neutral or friendly forces being engaged by their own air defences. Furthermore, air assets, both fixed and rotary wing, manned and unmanned, are not only at risk from the AD weapons aimed at them, but also from inadvertent contact with rounds from surface-to-surface weapons. Therefore, these systems should be regarded as additional users of airspace and should also be considered during airspace planning. It is essential that all users of the airspace are aware of these problems. As for the Lithuanian Armed Forces, which are at the very beginning of the development of its AD capability, it is of importance to consider proper design and management of the AD system.

The following chapter provides a description of active and passive AD methods as well as NATO requirements for the AD planning, employment of the AD assets, co-ordination and control of the AD missions in times of crisis and war. This chapter also covers several issues, which should be taken into consideration by the Lithuanian Armed Forces’ authorities, in order to develop the appropriate regulations for integrating current and planned air, naval and land AD assets.

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#### ***Air defence methods***

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There are two main methods of air defence: active AD and passive AD. Active AD operations are conducted to detect, identify, intercept and destroy hostile airborne vehicles, which threaten friendly forces or installations. Passive AD includes all measures, other than active AD, taken to minimise the effectiveness of hostile air action.

#### ***Active air defence***

Active AD is direct defensive action taken to nullify or reduce the effective-

ness of hostile air action. It is conducted using aircraft, AD weapons and missile systems, electronic warfare, ground-based or airborne surveillance systems, supported by secure and highly responsive communications. In peacetime, active AD involves continuous surveillance of country's airspace and its approaches, lines of sea communications and hostile forces in order to provide early warning of attack and to deny enemy's freedom to conduct reconnaissance and harassment missions over the sovereign territory. In wartime, active AD operations are conducted, together with offensive counter air operations, to achieve air superiority.

#### *Passive air defence*

During the war it is seldom possible to stop hostile air actions completely, but passive defence measures taken by all military forces will lessen the impact of such actions. These measures include dispersal, the use of protective constructions for personnel and material, Airfield Damage Repair (ADR) capability, tone-down and camouflage, physical and electronic decep-

tion, mobility of forces, emission control, monitoring for nuclear, biological, chemical (NBC) contamination and decontamination. All above-mentioned and any other possible measures are taken to provide the maximum protection for friendly assets and to complicate the enemy's targeting process.

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#### *Air defence planning, co-ordination and control*

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It is of importance for all commanders of all forces to understand the complexity of the AD operations. "Air defence is conducted through the whole depth of airspace, within which other types of aircraft operate and missiles and guns are fired"<sup>13</sup>. Thus, in order to maximise efficiency and safety, the various AD weapon systems must not only be integrated with each other, but must also be fully co-ordinated with all other airspace users. The main principles and procedures are prescribed at NATO ATP-40(B) "Doctrine for Airspace Control in Times of Crisis and War". The following is a gen-

eral summary of NATO requirements for the AD operational considerations.

#### *Air defence planning*

Although the AD planning process is conducted in accordance with standard planning procedures at all levels of command, there are several specific areas to be taken into consideration. On the basis of air threat analysis, the adversary's offensive capabilities as well as own resources and the geographical characteristics of the area, a commander should decide the structure and the type (area, point or self-defence) of AD. Here an early warning capability plays a vital role, because it defines reaction time available for own forces. The enemy should be detected as early as possible and engaged as far forward as possible. Therefore characteristics of the own AD weapons have to be taken into account. Hostile air targets may be engaged by aircraft or surface-to-air weapons (missiles or guns).

Aircraft, because of their flexibility and high mobility, can be used to protect very large areas or they can be concentrated

rapidly for point defence if required. On the other hand, aircraft may have limited employment since they cannot be re-armed, re-crewed or serviced in the air, except of an air-to-air refuelling (AAR) possibility. However, “no single weapons system can fulfil effectively all the requirements of air defence. Therefore, to meet the full range of the enemy air threat a balance of weapon types must be deployed”<sup>14</sup>.

Consequently, the commander makes a decision on AD and integrates it into the Airspace Control Plan (ACP), which has to be approved by a higher authority – the Airspace Control Authority (ACA) in the airspace control area.

#### *Air defence assets employment*

It is obvious, that different AD assets can be employed in different ways. Normally, an air defence weapon system will consist of two components: fighter aircraft and surface-to-air defences. AD fighters basically can be employed from ground or deck alert as well as for the Combat Air Patrol (CAP) missions. Ground/deck

alert is “that status in which aircraft on the ground/deck are fully serviced and armed, with combat crews in readiness to take off within a specified short period of time (usually 15 minutes) after receipt of a mission order”<sup>15</sup>. CAP is “an aircraft patrol provided over an objective area, over the force protected, over the critical area of a combat zone, or over an air defence area, for the purpose of intercepting and destroying hostile aircraft before they reach their target”<sup>16</sup>. CAP may be the best way of using fighters when there is no early warning.

Another task for interceptors can be an air escort for offensive air missions, air reconnaissance, evacuation, and combat search and rescue (CSAR).

Surface-to-air defences consist of surface-to-air missiles (SAM) and anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) and may be used for the AD missions as the assets at a very high state of readiness with a quick response capability to the whole spectrum of the air threat. However, in comparison with fighter aircraft, they have limited range and often low mobility, therefore the best

way of using them is point air defence. In wartime, in order to exploit the capabilities of ground-based air defence systems to the maximum possible extent, the decisions about their employment and command and control should normally be delegated to the levels as close as possible to the commanders of fire units.

#### *Control and co-ordination*

In order to ensure the optimum use of resources available against the air threat, all the various elements of the weapons and detection systems should be integrated into a co-ordinated entity by a proper control and co-ordination system. Usually, the Joint Force Commander (JFC) designates one commander - the Air Defence Commander (ADC) - responsible for integrating all available assets. If the area for defence is large, a number of defence sectors can be established. In this case a Sector Commander may be designated for each sector. He is responsible for sector AD and reports to the ADC. Where applicable, co-ordination with the NATINADS and the Regional Air Defence

Commander (RADC) may be required as well.

All levels of commanders should be provided with suitable command and control systems to enable them to exercise the AD. Normally the composition of the system includes control agencies and components with appropriate staff. It will include a communications and information processing equipment as well as situation display facilities. If it is required functionally, it may also include active and passive sensors for identification, air surveillance and weapons control. The number and size of the systems may be different for different areas and depends on the nature of the task and number of force components involved in the AD.

In times of crisis or war, in order to provide control of the weapon systems, the Weapons Control Order (WCO) has to be issued. The WCO promulgates the Weapons Control Status (WCS). The following WCS' are used to communicate the criteria an AD unit must use to engage a target: "Weapons Hold" - weapon

systems may only be fired in self defence or in response to a formal order; "Weapons Tight" - weapon systems may be fired only at targets recognised as hostile; and "Weapons Free" - weapon systems may be fired at any target not positively recognised as friendly. It is of importance to exercise WCS between every air, land and maritime user of airspace.

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***Air defence development  
considerations for Lithuania***

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Although in accordance with the target force structure<sup>17</sup> the Lithuanian Armed Forces possess a quite well developed AD capability, it is necessary here to discuss several practical issues, which the Lithuanian Armed Forces are facing in reality at present time.

The air surveillance and identification requirements and functions were already discussed in the previous chapter. Moreover, the Lithuanian Air Force currently is carrying two missions related to AD - a limited air policing function using light attack aircraft and a function of point

defence of strategically important object by using AAA guns. The Lithuanian Navy has ships with the AD capability (SAM and AAA) as well.

Certainly, all the necessary regulations for airspace management, Rules of Engagement (ROE), command and control relations regarding these missions are made and approved by respective authorities. However, so far there is no common policy or doctrine covering the principles, requirements and regulations for the AD missions when several forces are involved. That becomes a vital issue in times of crisis or war as soon as, on the one hand, several services employ the AD assets and, on the other hand, the international forces are involved.

Development of the AD capability of the Reaction Brigade of the Lithuanian Land Forces, which is a top priority at present time, definitely requires an establishment of appropriate regulations for employment of the procured AD assets. Therefore, the regulations on wartime ATM should cover all demands on integrating the air, naval and land AD assets,

air surveillance as well as command and control systems into a co-ordinated entity.

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### ***Conclusion***

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Air defence consists of important measures taken by all forces to certain extent, in order to protect themselves or others against any kind of an air threat. The aim of developing more efficient AD weapon systems is to increase the effectiveness of this protection. Such development, however, has raised the risk for own air assets being engaged by friendly air defences. This ambivalent situation requires proper planning, employment, co-ordination and control of the AD assets.

NATO has issued publications, which define basic characteristics, principles, requirements and procedures for the AD operations conducted by NATO forces. Every commander who is involved in an AD operation should be familiar with the requirements of these documents and to follow them when integrating the AD assets of his unit into the Airspace Control Plan (ACP) of a higher authority.

Complexity of the AD operations requires efficient allocation of the AD weapon systems, which normally consist of two complementary components - fighter aircraft and surface-to-air defences. The designated ADC is responsible for prioritising and integrating all of the assets available for a particular AD operation as well as co-ordinating them within the ACP.

Since the Lithuanian Armed Forces have moved rapidly to develop their AD capability, it is of great importance that all units involved in the AD operations are aware of the requirements and regulations for these operations. Therefore, the regulations on wartime ATM should be developed as well as respective education and training should be done prior to procuring any modern AD weapon systems.

## **V. Summary and Way Ahead**

The purpose of this article is to analyse Lithuanian ASM system in order to determine its conformability for times of

crisis and war and to recommend further development of the system. Therefore, the number of relevant factors such as legislation and responsibility of authorities for airspace management, potential threats for Lithuania's sovereignty, air surveillance and air defence were analysed. The following is a summary and final conclusion of this analysis as well as recommendations for development of ASM system for Lithuania in times of crisis and war.

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### ***Summary***

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Analysis of the present Lithuanian ASM system shows that there is a need to establish a more efficient and flexible ASM system in the country. The principal recommendations for a design of such a system can be summarised as follows:

- Establish an integrated civil/military ASM system with divided areas of responsibilities according to the conceptual principles of "Regulator, Provider and Supervisor". One authority (the CAA of the Republic of Lithuania) shall fulfil the mission of providing ATM for all the

users in peacetime. Responsibility for providing ATM during crisis or war, however, shall be transferred from the CAA to the Lithuanian Armed Forces (Air Force) at a specific time point defined by the Government.

- The organisation and use of airspace shall, wherever relevant, be based on the European Air Traffic Control Harmonisation and Integration Programme (EATCHIP) “Concept of Flexible Use of Airspace” (FUA Concept), which has been supported by the EUROCONTROL and NATO Committee for European Airspace Co-ordination and implemented in European countries. The implementation of the FUA Concept should start with the establishment of a national high-level airspace policy body. This body should be tasked with the reassessment of national airspace, the progressive establishment of new flexible airspace structures and the introduction of procedures for the allocation of these airspace structures on a day-by-day basis. Furthermore, for the daily allocation of the airspace structures and real-time civil/military co-ordination,

a national Airspace Management Cell should be established.

- Develop a regulation on ATM for war, which would cover legal aspects of the airspace organisation, ASM, readiness, air surveillance and defence, command and control, co-ordination between the defence forces’ components, and co-operation with international forces.

- The Airspace Control (ASC) shall be based on NATO ATP-40 (B) “Doctrine for Airspace Control in Times of Crisis and War”. Development of the Lithuanian Airspace Control Means (ACM) in accordance with above-mentioned document is a keystone of success on the way of developing NATO compatible and interoperable communications, information systems and equipment for ASM in times of crisis and war, especially when defence of country’s sovereignty requires involvement of international forces.

- Improve surveillance of Lithuanian airspace, especially the low-level coverage. The Air Surveillance System shall continue developing through modernisation of air surveillance assets, procurement and inte-

gration of new ones, and co-operation with the Navy and civil ATC.

- Develop the Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) capability of both ground sensors and flying assets in order to fulfil an air surveillance mission in times of crisis and war. The IFF system should be compatible with the ICAO standards and interoperable with NATO to be able to interact with ATC and the NATINADS.

- Improve regional security and national air defence capability through co-operation with the Baltic states and internationally. The BALTNET should remain the chief tool for this development, and it should be integrated into the NATINADS and other early warning systems in the future.

- Establish a common AD policy and relevant doctrines. These regulations should meet the requirements for ASM, AD planning, employment of the AD assets, co-ordination and control of air defence set by NATO air doctrines. All defence forces’ components should integrate their weapons and detection systems into a co-ordinated entity. Therefore, a proper

command and control system should be developed.

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***Recommendations for implementation***

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The suggested Lithuanian ASM system development covers quite wide areas of influence and responsibility of different authorities within the Lithuanian Armed Forces and outside them domestically and even internationally. This fact makes the system implementation relatively complex. Therefore, during the implementation process different levels of authority and means of their execution should be applied. Certainly, all levels are coherent and shall interact with each other.

The highest authority of the State, the Seimas of Lithuania, legislates internally and ratifies international agreements if required. The Government sets regulations following from laws, approves State authorities, delegates power or responsibility to States authorities, and approves their decisions and agreements between them.

The main players in the implementation process, however, are the governmental agencies, particularly the Ministry of National Defence and the Ministry of Transport, and the appropriate Departments of under these authorities. Their responsibility should be the development of requirements and implementation plans, agreements between different authorities, and internal regulations and instructions within the areas of their responsibilities. Therefore, in order to achieve the above-mentioned objectives, the suitable committees and working groups, consisting of representatives of the parties concerned as well as independent experts, should be established.

Furthermore, NATO membership will have a huge, if not a decisive, impact on the implementation process. As soon as Lithuania becomes a member of NATO, new tasks or responsibilities may emerge, consequently necessitating a review of priorities and development plans. On the other hand, the membership will certainly simplify many areas for decisions, actions and developments to be implemented.

In order to start and effectively run the implementation process, the first immediate step should be an assignment of personnel from the concerned state authorities for the establishment of a national high-level airspace policy body. This organisation should investigate what decisions to take in the main areas of the implementation process as well as what resources to allocate. The following is a suggested summary of the areas for the short-term actions:

- Reassessment of national airspace and the design of the Airspace Structure.
- Review of both military and civil aviation structures concerning ASM.
- Review of laws and regulations related to ASM and development of necessary changes.
- Development of international co-operation plans in the ASM area.
- Assignment of responsibilities and areas to be developed by state authorities and their departments.
- Preparation of agreements between the state authorities.
- Development of an implementation plan.



Actions recommended in a long-term perspective should cover identification of long-term political decisions, areas related to international co-operation, and long term plans and financial agreements between the governmental agencies on modernisation and procurement of efficient airspace control means.

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<sup>1</sup> ICAO - International Civil Aviation Organisation

<sup>2</sup> Law on Aviation of Lithuania, No VII-2066, 17 Oct, 2000

<sup>3</sup> "Airspace user group" is used to denote ALL users of airspace, including military air, sea and ground forces, airlines, civil aviation organisations and sport aviation.

EUROCONTROL - European Organization for the Safety of Air Navigation

<sup>5</sup> EACHIP ASM Handbook, 1996, EUROCONTROL, Page 2-1

<sup>6</sup> EACHIP ASM Handbook, 1996, EUROCONTROL, Page 2-3

<sup>7</sup> Aeronautical Information Publication, *Republic of Lithuania*, General Rules, ENR 1.1.

<sup>8</sup> ATP-40(B), 1998, *Doctrine for Airspace Control in Times of Crisis and War*, NATO MAS, Page1-1.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid, Page 3-1.

<sup>10</sup> BALTNET - Baltic Air Surveillance Network.

<sup>11</sup> STANAG - NATO Standardization Agreement

<sup>12</sup> Allied Administrative Publication APP-6 (V), 1998, *Glossary of Terms and Definitions Used in NATO Documents and Publications*, NATO MAS, Page 2-A-5.

<sup>13</sup> Allied Tactical Publication ATP-33 (B), 1986, *NATO Tactical Air Doctrine*, NATO MAS, Page 4-10.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid, Page 4-7.

<sup>15</sup> Allied Administrative Publication APP-6 (V), 1998, *Glossary of Terms and Definitions Used in NATO Documents and Publications*, NATO MAS, Page 2-G-2.

<sup>16</sup> Allied Administrative Publication APP-6 (V), 1998, *Glossary of Terms and Definitions Used in NATO Documents and Publications*, NATO MAS, Page 2-C-6.

<sup>17</sup> Target force structure of the Lithuanian Armed Forces is not presented in this article.

# Leadership in the Polish Armed Forces From Idea to Practice

By **Captain (Navy) Piotr Gawliczek** and **Lieutenant Colonel Leszek Kanarski**\*

**I**n the past, the Polish Armed Forces have not focused on how a leader should behave. The leaders were often created by stereotypes and were associated with autocratic activities of superiors, and leadership was also based on the principles of one-way communication aimed at maximizing profits. The leaders didn't care about the social losses of their subordinates. Such an image of leadership is for many people, especially today, not encouraging and not worthy of following, even in situations where it is possible to choose one's followers. Furthermore, it is not the desired model of

leadership for a modern force that is struggling for its proper place in the structures of a democratic state, and at the same time is trying to optimise its own possibilities for collective activities and coalition cooperation, for example during joint operations.

The Polish Leadership Concept touches upon the basic foundations of, and tendencies in the shaping of modern educational and training forms, and a practice of command. It is also the synthesis of our national approaches, designed with the military leader in mind.

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## *Areas of interest for leadership in the Polish Armed Forces*

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We are convinced that the necessity of having a modern leadership, as far as NATO is concerned, does not have its only source in the offices of superiors, lecture rooms or in the minds of theorists and researchers. It also appears in the practice of training and military activities - in circumstances of enlarged risks and in situations in which usual rules of formal subordination are not sufficient.

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It is the result of searching for more socially effective forms of influence on subordinates, and simultaneously ensuring the highest reliability.<sup>1</sup> Current interest in leadership in the Armed Forces is also due to other developments, including:

- Changes of the present world and changed tasks for the national Armed Forces. Recent experiences – over the last decade – show that if the Armed Forces are deployed to support political aims, then the only effective and coherent way is through the joint forces,

- A wider range of tasks for the Armed Forces, especially tasks connected to the aspect of MOOTW (Military Operations Other Than War),

- Predictions related to the character of and vision on future conflicts and subsequent operations, as well as the expectations regarding competence of the future commanders. In future operations the Armed Forces are not supposed to be gathered along the lines, operations will have a “non-linear” dimension, and missions will be executed simultaneously in all areas of operations (the theatre of war),

- Emerging signs, from the middle of the 1970s, confirming the crisis within the command system, which is historically based on formalization and autocratic procedures of relations between the leader and the subordinate,

- A current need for “step by step” reduction of the Armed Forces, and the need for efficient re-conversion of personnel being retired,

- Creation of an attractive military image of contemporary commanders (leaders), not only efficient, but also effective from the social point of view.

One can say, that these points constitute a wide framework of efforts in the field of redefining leadership, which started a few years ago in the Polish Armed Forces.

Ever since, the *heart of leadership* in our Armed Forces gains more and more interest of the practitioners.<sup>2</sup> Research concerning the educational concept for the military system of different levels and programs of instruction are taking place.<sup>3</sup>

As far as the first phase of this research, at the beginning of the 1990s, is concerned, the special value of developing an interest in this problem was shown by the visits of our representatives to the training centres, schools and academies of other NATO member-states (among others, the United States, Germany, the Netherlands, and France). This was especially interesting for officers from the highest organizational levels of schools, academies, staffs, and the Ministry of Defence.<sup>1</sup> We had the opportunity to join and assess educational and training programs that were implemented at the institutions, and as a result we were able to prepare analyses on how we should educate and train our Armed Forces, especially at the National Defence University. The institutions that we visited were situated in Europe as well as in the U.S.A.

Furthermore, professional soldiers (mostly officers) had the possibility to participate in various leadership courses organized by the educational and training centres of the Armed Forces of the

NATO member-countries. The experience they gained, supported by analyses of educational and training programmes, manuals, and periodicals proved our conviction regarding several aspects:

1. Acquiring leadership has become a very important undertaking in many Armed Forces, mostly in the West. It requires intensive education and training specifically aimed at increasing the competence of commanders beyond their known boundaries.

2. The concept of leadership is very similar in most of western Armed Forces, even though each country has specific approaches due to its national traditions and experiences.

3. Implementation of the leadership concept takes place at every level of the educational and training process; however, the impact of this implementation on the lower levels of the chain of command can be identified as the most direct.

4. In many countries, special education and training structures were prepared for the implementation of leadership programmes either for the entire Armed

Forces (e.g. Denmark and Germany), for components of the Armed Forces (e.g. the United States and the Netherlands), for a specific level of military education (e.g. officers, non-commissioned officers), or for specific types of education (in many Armed Forces, as separate courses, programmes, and profiles).

Based on the assumptions mentioned above and the gained experience we managed to develop a basic foundation for the concept of leadership in the Polish Armed Forces. We have to mention that the Armed Forces have been dealing with the problems of leadership for several years. At that time Poland was not a member of NATO. A special interest in developing the concept of leadership stemmed from the on-going developments mentioned above. In searching (mainly in the NDU<sup>5</sup>) for the Polish concept we identified, among other things:

- Examples of leadership from the history of the Polish Armed Forces,
- Our comprehension and essence of leadership, also theoretical foundations,

- Necessary leadership traits on each level of the organizational structure of the Armed Forces,

- Leadership qualities of commanders and possibilities for developments,

- Stages of implementation of the leadership concept in the Polish Armed Forces.

These aspects will be discussed later in this article.

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***Basic assumptions of the leadership concept in the Polish Armed Forces***

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Leadership and each of its components are expressed by the deeds of many national heroes that are more or less known. Addressing the glorious tradition, famous acts, and examples enables us to prepare an education that is not just an empty shell, a theoretical set of leadership traits, and procedures of efficient activities. It is a lively and dynamic set of examples of leadership.

We assume that the tradition of the Polish Armed Forces of its historical fig-

ures, description of historical context, features and personal values, and facts could testify the dimension of leadership. This aspect also includes the legacy of the military institutions and units of the Polish Armed Forces,<sup>6</sup> named after national heroes, mostly qualified for the leaders.<sup>7</sup>

Leadership as a notion in the context of the Polish Armed Forces has a long and fruitful tradition, including in the fights for independence, not only in Poland but also in foreign countries. This is illustrated by a famous proverb in Poland: "For your and our freedom".

Now let us explain what our present perception of leadership is. We define it as the ability to get subordinates to accomplish a specified mission (goal). Until recently leadership was associated with domination in spontaneous (non-formal) groups, whereas the command was connected with a position in the institutional (formal) structure. For many years the leadership in Poland was identified as the same concept as command. One used them as synonyms, or at least it was assumed

that the concept of command also dealt with leadership. In both cases, one associated them with rank and social position.

The notion of organizational leadership within groups is determined especially by two elements: the ability for efficient and common realization of tasks and the gift of gaining followers. We can state that the notion of leadership is transforming from being a synonym of command to the characteristic of the command's efficiency and its social effectiveness. It becomes one of the most important skills, predisposition, or features, which are perceived and desired in the sphere of command. The essence of leadership can be described as follows:

- It is a distinguishing combination of skills of every person in the Armed Forces,
- It can be both of formal character, while connected with the activities of commanders, and of informal character, when characterizing abilities of each person to get support by exerting the leadership skills,

- It facilitates command, when it is connected to the character and competence of the leader, but on the other hand, it can impede command when applied to certain relations outside the formal structure of organization,

- It is dynamic and can be measured by the number of real or potential supporters.

As far as a better understanding of the notion of leadership in the Armed Forces is concerned, we can address two approaches dealing with organizational leadership: the transactional theory and the transformational theory.<sup>8</sup> The first approach can serve as a preliminary base that we have to "keep in mind", whereas second approach can be the standard determinant of the relations between the superiors and their subordinates, or the leader and his followers.

In the Polish Armed Forces, in spite of increased awareness of a necessity to develop the leaders' competence, we are aware that leadership differs at each level of the organizational structure of the

Armed Forces. We assume that leadership takes place on three levels (Figure 1):

- Level one – direct leadership (influence towards individuals),
- Level two – leadership in small groups (direct and indirect influences),
- Level three – organizational leadership (direct, indirect and structural influence).

As far as the lowest level of command is concerned (level 1), this deals with leadership towards the individuals, “face to face” relations, joint realization of missions, and burden sharing. At this level

of leadership, skills and experiences are more important than theoretical knowledge. It is characterized by: skilfully concentrating subordinates around a common goal, providing a vision of success, instructing, coaching, and helping. It also embraces the necessity of joint work and the ability of an optimal utilization of individual’s possibilities.


As far as the middle level of command is concerned (level 2), we have to deal with leadership towards small groups or teams where indirect and direct influences take

place. It is focused, on the one hand, on a creation of common vision of the coordinated activities and, on the other hand, on making efficient working groups (task teams).

The upper level of organizational leadership (level 3), contains both macro and micro dimensions: it has both a direct, an indirect, and an organizational influence. Its highest goal is based on the development and presentation of an organizational vision. It is also creation of a value system, modelling and adapting of structures, co-ordination of activities, and cooperation of structures.

For the commander, the interaction of leadership competences on each level is the reason for a steady development. Simultaneously, it is also the source of necessity to develop specific programmes for applying the leadership at each level of the organizational structure of the Armed Forces. It also gives a chance for preparing an efficient selection mechanism for prospective commanders and it facilitates the estimations of leadership competence on each level.

**Figure 1 – Three levels of leadership**



***Characterization of selected  
elements of leadership  
competence of commanders and  
possibilities for development***

Leadership requires a combination of experience, knowledge, and skills, accompanied by the commander's own competence, to improve efficiency and effectiveness.

As far as the important aspects of dealing with the development of leadership are concerned, we can enumerate, for example, the following: knowledge, skills, predispositions and some indispensable abilities: to get followers, to understand their characters and needs, to influence individuals and groups, to communicate verbal and non verbal, to create and develop teams, to work jointly and cooperate, to solve individual and joint problems, to develop and communicate visions, and to behave properly in crisis situations.

Leadership is also a combination of predisposition, knowledge, skills and ex-

perience, which can be applied to the principles of teaching, and also to other practices. It is possible to develop, to modify and to shape leadership. The inborn talent is, just like in case of other capabilities, an important asset, but not a singular determinant of what we call the process "to get the followers".

A search for and the development of the leadership predisposition of the commanders and of the educational-training system should be extended according to the needs stemming from each organizational level of the Armed Forces. Leadership cannot be learned and developed only by using traditional form of lectures or seminars. In such case we are talking only "about leadership", which is important only from the perspective of preliminary touching the idea, but is of no value for practicing command. The only solution is to meet the expectations of the patricians as well as to educate and train "towards leadership". They should be based upon acquiring, confirming and developing experiences, and the procedures of activities and skills.

As means to achieve these objectives, and the number of implied tasks with regard to leadership in the Polish Armed Forces, we can address among other things: popularisation of the idea of leadership, agreement on the principles and definitions, development of a detailed education and training concept for the Polish Armed Forces and institutions.

We are convinced that there is a need for joint discussion and especially cooperation related to the concepts and experiences from the different NATO countries. From our perspective such cooperation is important, because it would give us the possibility to discuss and exchange experiences with other countries which have greater traditions. But we must be aware that we are having a common future while working together in the NATO or EU framework. Cooperation is also important because it could refer to:

- Activities in an international framework (the examples are: the Gulf War, situation in Bosnia, in Kosovo);
- Activities in multinational task groups and forces (from the Polish perspective:

Multinational Corps North East MC NE in Szczecin, also multinational brigades and battalions);

- Needs that are connected with the future staff structures dealing with joint operations (Combined Joint Task Force) including aspects of Civil Military Co-operation - CIMIC.

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***Implementation of the leadership idea at the NDU***

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Above all, as far as the implementation of the leadership idea in the Polish Armed Forces is concerned, we must underline the activities that are taking place at the National Defence University, Warsaw<sup>9</sup>. We could divide our considerations into three groups: 1) objectives connected with the background of educational system, 2) current activities, and 3) intentions for the future.

In spite of the increased conviction of the necessity of developing leadership competence, we are aware that the leadership differs at each level of organizational structure. This is of special importance for us, because we are able to formulate

our intentions towards specific educational groups. For example, as far as academic personnel and students are concerned, we want to teach them and stress the essence of leadership. However, only using traditional forms of lectures or seminars is not adequate to develop this process. If this is the case our considerations are focused only on talking “about leadership”, what is important from the perspective of preliminary touching the idea, but not very important for practising the command. We would like to train and educate all of our officers “towards leadership”, and this area should be based on acquiring, confirming and developing experiences, and the procedures of activities and skills.

We are fully aware that in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the principles of “education towards leadership” are of special importance, and it is not only the set of functions or principles. On the contrary, the future battlefield commanders should be able to respond actively to the emerging threats while adjusting their leadership skills to a given situation.

As far as the students of various forms of education are concerned, we want them to develop the knowledge of leadership, skills and abilities especially by carefully preparing training and exercises.

A special task for so called “senior” officers (but not only!) is to arm them with the ability to spot the leaders among a group or a team. On the other hand, such activities also deal with the understanding of leadership predispositions of the students.

Reaching this point of the article, we would like to ask an important question, often raised by the NDU personnel: “Is it possible to teach leadership”? We, however, have the opinion that it would be better to ask the question “How is it possible to teach leadership”? The answer is not easily found because of many prejudices related to commanders-posts and charisma stemming from them.

Let us proceed to the second part of the considerations that are related to our current activities. First of all we must admit, that the *heart of leadership* in our military environment gains more and more



interest of the ones who practise leadership. In order to achieve these objectives and number of implied tasks, as far as leadership in the National Defence University is concerned, we can address the popularisation of the leadership idea and the development of a detailed education and training concept for the Polish Armed Forces and its institutions. It is also a review of the structure of the programmes for shaping leadership on each level, group and structure. It is important to add that in November 2001, the NDU hosted a two-day conference "Theory and practice of leadership at the scope of educational system". Military and civilian experts discussed many problems related to the field of management and leadership.

Research and projects concerning the educational concept are also taking place. At the moment a dissertation thesis is being prepared at the NDU, and it relates directly to the problems of developing a leadership education, especially in the context of combined and joint operations. Probably next year, it will be

possible to present preliminary results of this scientific approach to leadership.

As far as the third item - the intentions - is concerned, we can mention a few examples. The base for searching and developing the leadership predisposition of commanders, educational-training system will be extended, due to the needs stemming from each organizational level of the armed forces. It will be based on such forms of joint activities as: seminars, conferences, lectures, workshops, commanding exercises, and simulations. Also intellectual and physical training should facilitate the recognition of personal possibilities and limitations.

It is the idea to establish, within the NDU structure, a Centre of Leadership, as the leading institution regarding the development of leadership in the Polish Armed Forces. The aim is to give the personnel and students a possibility for better knowledge of educational and training processes in the armed forces, service components, centres and schools.

Starting with the current academic year we are going to introduce specialized

courses in leadership, for the duration of 20 lessons, for the students of Masters' studies and the most important postgraduate course for Polish officers at the Operational-Strategic level. It is also worth mentioning that in the nearest future we are going to inaugurate, after a few years break, specialized courses in pedagogy for commanders of a battalion, regiment and brigade level. The important part of the educational programme deals with the development of leadership skills and social competences.

The National Defence University is, at present, an important educational centre in the field of Polish military science and is a leading force behind the development of leadership. We are convinced that in the near future it will become the main centre to provide education and training on leadership from the Polish (or common) perspective.

Summing up the considerations we would like to underline that in the Polish considerations in relation to the problem of leadership we must also take into account the fact that at present the condi-

tions connected with NATO and future EU membership will determine that we in principle will act in a multinational dimension. Analyses concerning the achievements in current conflicts confirm that they have never been realized exclusively by one actor, for example by the Polish Armed Forces. In different phases and different range, the organizations and non-military institutions also participated. Therefore the problem of leadership exceeds the issue of leadership of the Armed Forces and the ethos of "leadership" expands beyond the pure military realm.

<sup>1</sup> See i.e.: P. E. Blockwell, G. J. Bozek, Leadership for the New Millennium, /in/ Military Review, May - June 1998; W. Kaczmarek and Z. Scibiorek, "Future war - which one?" Warsaw 1995. (Przyszła wojna - jaka?, Warszawa 1995); L. Kanarski and J. Swiniarski, „Changes in the way of thinking in the armed forces”, Warsaw 1997. (Przemiany myślenia w wojsku, Warszawa 1997; M. Wiatr, „Between strategy and tactics”, Torun 1999. (Miedzy strategia a taktyka, Torun 1999)

<sup>2</sup> For example, in 1997 the international seminar was organized. It touched upon selected problems of the prospective Polish accession to NATO,

among other things the aspects of leadership in the armed forces. See: "Citizen's education and information activity in the Polish Armed Forces in face of the integration with NATO", Warsaw, 1997. (Edukacja obywatelska i dzialalnosc informacyjna w wojsku wobec perspektyw integracji z NATO, Warszawa 1997)

<sup>3</sup> A. Balasiewicz and W. Chojnacki, „The fundamentals of preparations of the educational programs in the face of integration with NATO”, Warsaw 1997. (Podstawy projektowania programow ksztalcenia w perspektywie integracji z NATO, Warszawa, 1997).

<sup>4</sup> L. Kanarski and B. Rokicki and J. Swiniarski, „Personal and structural security in the face of challenges posed by contemporary world”, Warsaw, 2000. (Bezpieczenstwo personalne i strukturalne wobec wyzwan wspolczesnego swiata, Warszawa 2000).

<sup>5</sup> B. Szulc, "Possibilities of the implementation of NATO leadership concept in the Polish Army", Warsaw, 2000, (Mozliwosci zastosowania koncepcji przywodztwa NATO w Wojskach Ladowych RP, Warszawa 2000).

<sup>6</sup> See: "Outstanding commanders. Famous citizens", special edition of *Military and education*, Warsaw 1993. (Wybitni dowodcy. Slawni obywatele, „Wojsko i wychowanie”, dodatek specjalny, Warszawa 1993).

<sup>7</sup> See: J. Cieciera and D. Radziwillowicz and J. Slipiec and W. J. Wysocki, A. Cz. Zak „Patrons of contemporary military units of the Polish Armed Forces”, Warsaw 1998. (Patroni wspolczesnych jednostek Wojska Polskiego, Warszawa, 1998)

<sup>8</sup> L. Kanarski and R. Peksa and A. Zak, „Military leadership”, Warsaw 1997 (Przywodztwo wojskowe, Warszawa 1997)

<sup>9</sup> See: L. Balcerowicz, P. Gawliczek, L. Kanarski, "The perspective of the leadership education at the National Defence University", presentation delivered by Major General Boleslaw Balcerowicz (Commandant-Rector of the NDU, Warsaw) during Conference of Commandants held at NATO Defence College Rome on the 21st of June 2002

## Executive Summary of the Military Transition Seminar, Baltic Defence College, Tartu, Estonia, 18 Oct 2002

By Marc Remillard\*

**T**he Baltic Defence College held a research seminar on the issues of military transition on 18 October 2002. The following executive summary presents an outline of the various contributions and findings of this seminar.

Brigadier General Michael H. Clemmesen, the Commandant of the Baltic Defence College (BDCOL), gave the welcome address to the participants of the Military Transition Seminar. In his speech, he stressed the importance of NATO membership as an objective of defence reform, and argued that such a goal makes it imperative that politicians work closely with the military, given that the former are elected, and are answerable to the domestic population. For

military officers themselves, BG Clemmesen believed that they should demonstrate their professionalism, and be able to think “outside the box”.

The first presentation was given by **Major General Andrzej Tyszkiewicz**, the title being “The development of effective central staffs – focus, ethos, organisation, procedures, links between the units and central staffs”. Drawing on his experience at NATO’s HQ, the “kitchen of NATO’s strategic planning”, Major General Tyszkiewicz described the process of transition, as it has occurred in Poland. Reform has been in the direction of NATO’s basic standards, but implementation has not been easy. A problem in the case of

Poland, for instance, was the length of time it took to create a new constitution (five years). Only by 2001 was the General Staff fully adopted into G1, G2, and G3 NATO structures. In his conclusion, Major General Tyszkiewicz provided an evaluation of the Polish experience, elaborating on a number of “lessons learned”, which included the importance of stable budgets, realistic goals and timelines, and the need to establish training links.

Commenting on this first presentation, **Ambassador Jüri Luik**, former Estonian Defence Minister, pointed out the parallels between the Polish and the Estonian experiences. Following independence, Estonia created what Ambassador Luik

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called a “small replica of the Warsaw Pact”, which had to be changed once NATO membership became the country’s goal.

The subject of the next presentation was “Reforming the Body of the Army: a Perspective from Russia”, which was delivered by **Robert Nurick**, the Director of the Carnegie Moscow Centre. In his outline of the state of military reform in Russia, Mr Nurick noted that there has been little real progress. Attempts have been made by past defence ministers, but with only very limited success: for example, poor attendance remains a problem, with approximately 1/3 of junior officers’ positions currently vacant. In spite of events such as the sinking of the Kursk, and the renewed military engagements in Chechnya, nothing has managed to galvanize military reform in Russia. As key factors explaining this failure, Mr Nurick pointed to over-sized requirements (“Too big a bite, all at once”), and perception that events in Kosovo indicated the strength of the threat still posed by the West. Also cited was the lack of political support for reform, and a conscript prob-

lem tied to demographic trends in Russia.

In his comments on Dr Nurick’s presentation, retired **Brigadier General Janis Kazocins**, former UK advisor to the Slovak CHOD, quoted the *Wall Street Journal* as saying that “the problem behind the Russia-West tension is the military”. This he felt was a little exaggerated, but to be taken into account nonetheless. On the difficulties of reform, BG Kazocins pointed out that the military is conservative by nature, and tends to favour existing structures and resource planning. Such an outlook should be replaced with the recognition that plans and structures tend not to “survive contact with the enemy”. For this reason, they must be able to adapt to changing situations.

Following presentations on the Polish and Russian experiences, **Colonel Klara Siposne Kecskemethy**, of the Hungarian Ministry of Defence, spoke about “The Creation of an effective cadre development and management system”, in the context of Hungary’s experience of defence reform. Setting out the reform

process schematically, Col. Siposne Kecskemethy defined the needs of military reform in terms of “concept, resources, and willingness”. For Hungary, the concept developed has been that of “lean, light and lethal” armed forces. Human resources have been the focus of reform in Hungary (“the main reform resource in Hungary is the human resource”), and have been organised in line with a new career management system. This system has involved the attachment of rank to positions and making progress based on regular evaluations.

Representing the Czech Ministry of Defence, and in particular its human resource division, **Mr Zdenek Dvorak** concurred with the Hungarian focus on human resource management as the key to defence reform. In his own words, “the devil is indeed hidden in the details”.

Continuing with this focus on human resource management, **BG Michael H. Clemmesen** gave a presentation on “Officer Cadre Education Reform”. Building on the comments of BG Kazocins, BG Clemmesen emphasized the centrality

of change to military education. Rather than focus on doctrinal issues, and fitting the theory onto the practice, education and training systems must be given by leaders and managers, who can themselves stand as professional role models. In addition to ordinary officers, military academics must also think “out of the box”.

This stress on adapting training and education to changing rather than static security environments was present in **Colonel Algis Vaičeliūnas**’ response to the presentation by BG Clemmesen. As Commandant of the Lithuanian Military Academy, Col. Vaičeliūnas spoke about Lithuania’s approach to reform, which involves always thinking about the future. Thinking “out of the box” should make the soldier to consider “non-military scenarios”, and orienting education to the consideration of changing environments should imply a break with the old heritage. According to Col. Vaičeliūnas, this can only be done with a group of newly trained instructors.

In the last presentation before the break for lunch, **Ambassador Jūri Luik** spoke on “Political-Military Cooperation at the

central executive structures”. Accepting that politicians and the military do not always “speak the same language”, Ambassador Luik argued for active interaction between the two spheres, notably in the form of strategic guidance documents and the educating of politicians in military affairs. Essential also is a proper dialogue with the public, one that would inform the public of what demands are necessary, and what hurdles are to be overcome. Reform planning is driven by a correct assessment of threat perceptions, and the public must be informed of what threats the government is focusing its efforts on.

In addition to public understanding, there is a need for the military to understand exactly what demands are to be made of it by governments. Any misunderstandings are likely to lead to objections on the side of the military. In the light of clarifying objectives and demands, Ambassador Luik cited PFP and NATO documents as particularly informative, and he suggested that as international activities increase, the success of cooperative efforts would depend upon different

armed forces being able to understand each other. Such is the lesson to be learnt from events such as General Jackson’s refusal of General Clark’s order to retake Pristina Airport (Kosovo) in 1999.

As respondent, **Commander David Clarke** pointed out that problems of civil-military relations are not particular to the East, but exist in the West also. Examples given included the U.S., where Donald Rumsfeld recently over-ruled, as Secretary of Defence, a decision made by the Joint Chief of Staff on the identity of the next Chief of Operations. Commander Clarke also made the points that Ministry of Defence activities today are about planning, programming and budgeting, and that contemporary security is less about soldiering, and more about National Security. By that, Commander Clarke indicated that issues to be addressed are those of Law Enforcement, Finance, Border Security and Asymmetric threats, all of which demand inter-operability, international coordination, and the increasing contributions of “other” armed forces, notably the police and other non-military structures.

# The Path of Transition: from the Past towards Efficient Armed Forces

By Michael H. Clemmesen BG

**L**ithuania, Latvia and Estonia have now succeeded in their security policy aspirations. All three have been invited to join NATO at the November Prague Summit.

The mature political and economic development in the three, very different, states has made this step natural. During the last 5 years or so the three have also gradually accelerated their efforts to prepare their developing armed forces for a role in the Alliance. This task has not been and will not be easy. One of the reasons is that this task included both a build-up from the scratch and thereafter a total reform of the first new structures. The latter challenge is

similar to that required everywhere in the Central and Eastern European armed forces to make them focused and cost-effective.

This article will cover different key aspects of the reform needs in all these states thereby, indirectly, covering the situation in the Baltic states since 1991 and the coming years. It is built on 8 years of observations, studies, conversations and work in the three states as an insider with the perspective of an outsider. In the last 3 years the regional perspective has been supplemented and enriched with observations and conversations in several other Central and Eastern European countries.

## The initial building-up of the Baltic states' armed forces

The build-up of the armed forces was seen as urgent. During the first few years, there was an acute perception of the threat. The Russian occupation troops were still around, and statements from a variety of sources in the Russian Federation reinforced the inherent problem of their presence. Something had to be done, quickly, to develop the ability to fight back.

This was not easy. Cadres for the armed forces had to be recruited. Some were found among the limited number of rela-

tively untainted professionals from the Soviet Armed Forces. Others came from the volunteer cadres of the home guard forces created or recreated in 1990-91. The latter group was supplemented with officers, normally retired, from the Baltic Diaspora in the U.S. and elsewhere. A strained relationship between these two groups and their political friends added to the problems on several occasions. None had any experience of how to build and operate armed forces in small democracies.

The forces had to be armed and equipped. The withdrawing colonial forces took everything with them, and initially no states dared to donate and few were willing to sell armaments, concerned as all were with the possible response of Russia.

The military infrastructure was deliberately destroyed by the departing Russians and thereafter used as quarries by the local population. What was destroyed and what was left was of very low quality. What had initially been well constructed in the Russian Empire or dur-

ing the Independence Period had been undermined by bad maintenance, and what had been built in the last Soviet decades was in an even worse shape.

Parallel to the armed forces build-up, the national economy had to be reformed and revitalised, and the state had to justify taxing it for common projects by developing a new “social contract”, the legitimacy of the political system and trust in its leadership. This is still an unfinished process, and it was and remains far from obvious that a significant part of the limited available state resources should go to the development of the armed forces. Both a majority of the population and most politicians considered it futile to attempt to create independent self-defence forces. The maximum that most considered possible and desirable was the marking of the national will to exist by a fight at the border followed by guerrilla actions in the forests. Only a potential NATO-framework for the armed forces could justify giving a high priority to their development beyond that basic level.

## **The reform requirements needed everywhere in Central and Eastern Europe**

It is important to understand, and accept, that the transition outlined in the rest of the article is necessary for the creation of “best practice” Western type armed forces for the Post Cold War variety of missions. The process is likely to be protracted before completed, spanning a couple of decades in most cases. It is relevant not only for the CEE states that aspire and prepare for NATO membership, but also for new NATO member states that want to develop effective contributions to the alliance and to international operations in other frameworks. It is, however, also relevant for the states with a Soviet or Yugoslav heritage that only want to create effective, future-oriented armed forces. The reforms described are relevant no matter what main tasks the forces are given, the degree of specialisation, and the level of resources made available for the creation and maintenance of the structures.

The Baltic states and nearly all other CEE states are on some path towards the outlined situation. However, the CEE countries have much work to do before they reach a “best practice” level. They are not alone. Several Western European states have apparently found it difficult to adjust their militaries and the political-military co-operation pattern away from the Cold War optimisation, aiming at meeting the one and only threat.

The required reforms go far beyond the creation of basic interoperability to ensure a reasonable level of English language understanding in the cadre, effective technical communications interfaces, as well as common communication, reporting and command formats. They even go beyond creating the “human interoperability” that comes from the ability to accept and understand different national and organisational cultures well enough to co-operate with a minimum of friction. What is required is a deep transformation of structures that ensures the largest and most effective force contribution that can be created on the basis of the available limited resources.

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***At the political-military  
co-operation level***

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A focused development and use of the armed forces of a state depends on an effective and trustful dialogue between the elected state politicians and the formally appointed, senior officers. In a reformed situation, the following relationship has been established.

The directly responsible politician, normally the defence minister, will in an open and effective way communicate the political priorities and limitations. He understands that he is totally dependent on the advice from and effective implementation of decisions by the armed forces represented by their senior representative, the chief of defence.

The latter understands and accepts that his role is limited to the subordinate one of advice and implementation. He will, to be efficient, have a deep professional understanding of the capabilities and limitations of the existing armed forces and the potential of any planned or possible devel-

opments. This understanding will only be developed by a combination of gaining professional and personal maturity during a protracted and varied service. It needs to be created and maintained by actively seeking to be updated about the condition of the forces, and by having developed a positive empathy with both the role and situation of the politicians he is serving, and the situation in the different armed services under his command. The chief and his associates must accept deep in their hearts that they have to serve the elected politicians in the government loyally, no matter what they think of them or their policies. In a mature democracy military leaders have no formal or informal direct responsibilities to the nation.

This - reformed - situation is not easy to generate. A legacy of the past was that the new post-1989 politicians deeply mistrusted the leading military, and tended to seek the advice they wanted to hear by bypassing the formal leaders, or by getting it from foreign advisors. In some cases the advice, if any, from the existing professional military was so remote from



the requirements, and so irrelevant, that no advice was sought thereafter. The reason for not seeking an advice could, in some instances, be that the politician simply did not think that he needed it.

The professional military on their side were normally unsuited to play their role in the new relationship. Very few accepted that the government, made up of “amateurs” who served a party group rather than the nation, could have any real authority over national security matters. Subordination to the state president might be accepted, but not to a “politician” from the parliament. Having developed professionally in a dictatorship, where the armed forces had to worry only about the preparation for total war, senior officers found it close to impossible to understand more limited roles for the armed forces and accept that a dialogue with the “amateurs” was necessary. The smaller the state, the more difficult it was for ex-Soviet officers to adjust. Nearly all senior army and many air force officers simply lacked the professional depth to create other types of forces than those they had been programmed to

operate. They were also handicapped by a dictatorial and centralistic management style that hindered effective interaction with talented subordinates.

A precondition for the easy creation of a dialogue based on trust is, however, that the politicians chosen, as defence ministers, are eager to develop the co-operation, and that they understand the need for good interaction. Another obvious requirement is that they, and the civil servants that assist them, are trustworthy, honest, decent, capable, and mature persons. It would be very difficult for a senior, grizzled professional, who, by definition, is willing to lay down his life for the nation, to respect a corrupt, self-serving character as his boss. It does not help co-operation either, if he routinely transmits his decisions indirectly, via unjustifiably self-confident, newly employed, young civil servants.

In the Baltic states the situation was often even more complex. As mentioned above, persons from the volunteer and paramilitary forces without regular officer education gained a key role in the devel-

opment of the armed forces. Thus there were two groups of senior military personnel, none of them with a background that prepared them very well for their part in the political-military dialogue in a small democratic state. In these three states the transition depends on the leading professional positions being filled by officers with most of their service experience and education from the post-1991 period. A full generation change must take place within the next few years to ensure the proper use of state resources and an effective integration in NATO.

In all CEE countries successful transition requires an accelerated generation change in the leadership from colonel level upwards combined with a drastic slimming of the bloated number of officers of high rank. A well organised and supported retirement scheme is thus a precondition for reform.

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### *The unit level*

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The problems of the unreformed armed force structure are clearly visible

at the bottom of the structure, the unit level.

The key purpose of a peacetime military structure is to develop and maintain high-quality units (battalions, ships, air force squadrons) at various states of readiness. The first step in fulfilling that purpose is to ensure high-quality, professionally and personally mature unit leadership. The structure must ensure that the very best mid-career officers are rotated out of the central staff and training elements into command units. This is necessary to ensure that the units have the best leadership possible and to create a professional foundation for later work in senior staff, military education, and command positions. The personnel management system should make certain that the very best compete hard to get unit command, knowing that without a successful period as a commander, their career will be limited to specialist fields, and they will not reach high command posts. The system, however, should also ensure that rotation between posts in different parts of the country is supported economically and

by common-sense regulations so that the families of the best officers feel reasonably well supported.

The unit should have a very high and demanding activity level in order to ensure that the officer develops and is tested as unit commander. The commander should have considerable freedom of action, even if his performance in all fields is evaluated continuously. In good Western armies, a senior officer with recent, very successful unit command experience, in the army normally a brigade commander, carries out the key role in the evaluation. As the future leadership is serving as unit commanders, the central staffs keep in close contact with the units to ensure that their administration is supporting unit effectiveness.

This situation is very far from the unreformed situation in the Central and Eastern European armed forces. The units were commanded by very young officers in the army, normally captains. They had little or no freedom of action. The “centre” inspected their work, but they had absolutely no influence on developments

and decisions at that centre. Their life and that of their officers mirrored the provincial garrison life of Chekov’s plays, just without the more charming fin-de-siecle elements. If they were lucky or well connected they escaped early to a position in the “centre” and to higher military education. Most stayed in the centre, quickly becoming bureaucrats or teachers with only a faint, very theoretical link to the reality in the units, abhorring the very idea of ever returning to these units.

Creating a well-functioning rotation system in the CEE armed forces is very often undermined by the following four factors:

- The officers see no reason why they and their families should suffer, when the politicians, civil servants, and senior officers above and around them act with little or no public or professional spirit.
- The politicians and senior commanders do not want to let their best and most intelligent military assistants depart for the provinces.
- There is little or no understanding of the fact that practice is more impor-

tant than theory in creating military effectiveness.

- In a world where the Potemkin facade is much more important than the reality, the units do not count.

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***At the basic combined arms formation level***

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Western armies have found that the existence of the basic combined arms formation headquarters level, normally the brigade, is necessary for the development of an officer corps in the units with a practical, professional understanding of combined armed tactics.

The unit, the battalion, will, in its training programme, have to concentrate on the training of the sub-units, the companies, specialising in developing effective handling of the “tools” organic to the unit. Therefore it is nearly impossible for the unit itself to create and conduct realistic training, developing the ability of the reinforced unit staff to operate effectively together with other combat, combat support and combat service support units

or elements. On the other hand, it is also close to impossible for a central joint planning and administrative staff to develop and conduct a realistic field-training programme, because the focus and main activities of such a staff makes it unsuitable. A special central service training staff – an Army Training Command – may be used, but it is likely to lack that organic communication framework and relevant professional mix of expertise and direct unit focus that is inherent to tactical level formation headquarters.

Most CEE armed forces had tactical formation HQs; they only needed to be reformed in focus and activities. However, that was not the case with the Baltic states. This was due to the fact that they started force development from scratch and did not consider combined armed tactics relevant. The maximum the initially created forces would be able to do against the overwhelming Russian threat was a marking of the national sovereignty at the border – followed by guerrilla actions with light infantry and engineers in the forests. Only the new NATO mission frame-

work for operations inside and outside the region now creates new professional requirements.

The training of the unit level officers in the Baltic states has so far suffered from the lack of formation level training activities. The Lithuanian “Iron Wolf” Brigade Staff is only now developing into a tactical formation HQ. The Latvian Motorised Brigade HQ existed only in name and was abolished thereafter. The Estonian General Staff did not realise the need for mid-level tactical HQs until recently, under political pressure.

All CEE armed forces should in fact understand that a tactical formation staff should be seen and built as a small team of flexible professional generalists that operates with the support of a few watchkeepers, communicators, as well as security and transport personnel, unlike now when such a headquarters is merely perceived as a bureaucracy of specialists that support the commander when ordered to do so.

The effectiveness of a tactical HQ does not depend on the size of the peacetime

manning, but rather on the quality and relevant practical professional experience - and ability to work as a team - of its core personnel. There is an unfortunate tendency to create a staff by the immediate filling of office space with officers (defined as persons in uniform carrying officer's rank), rather than the gradual building-up of staff as experience is gained and real workload is increasing.

A fully manned basic tactical formation HQ is organised as a pool of small functional teams, each of a couple of planners and a few assistants. The teams either conduct current operations or they reconnoitre and plan future operations, the immediately following operation or possible contingencies. In order to reduce vulnerability and plan simultaneously conducting current operations, the fully manned staff should be large enough to establish two to three command posts manned by a combination of these small functional teams. The manning should also ensure that there are enough assistant watch keepers to control intensive operations for 24 hours a day for an ex-

tended period without rest. However, keeping such a large fully manned tactical staff during normal peacetime training conditions makes certain that the staff "rot" due to lack of meaningful work. This is what happened in the past.

In the West, only formations like the U.S. immediate reaction formations that combine an intensive exercise level (both by higher headquarters of the formation and the formation conducting training with its subordinate units) with constant contingency planning for possible worldwide deployments may avoid bureaucratic rot of the staff. In all other cases, a fully wartime manned staff will quickly deteriorate through formalism and laziness. Therefore the only solution is to limit the daily manning to those who can be properly occupied at the defined activity and readiness level. In a British mechanised or the armoured brigade staff, the peacetime manning is limited to 9 officers and 27 other ranks. The staff will, however, need to exercise regularly with the augmentation of watch keepers and liaison officers to properly practice opera-

tional procedures. These augmentation staff officers may come from the reserve cadre or from the regular training structure cadre. In the British case, the augmentation consists of 14 officers (1 senior liaison officer and 13 watch keepers) plus 6 officers attached from the combat support units.

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### ***The Central Staff level***

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Another side of the problem was the situation in the central ("General") staffs.

The Soviet/Warsaw Treaty Organisation experience led to the creation/maintenance of structures that saw their role as both narrow and total.

The staff should control the preparation of the forces (land forces and supporting air force elements) for war, a total war that justified high priority access to all resources of society. The role of the politicians was to make sure that the resources would be made available, as the only role of the armed forces was to defend the future existence of the nation. Within that mission framework, the only

military-political dialogue necessary was the military answering questions from the political side about how the defence requirements could be met in the best possible way.

The staffs tried to cover all aspects of defence related planning and administration, but the focus was on the creation of army units, rather unrelated to the available resources, and the theoretical concepts for their use in war. There was very little interest in the more mundane administrative work of developing effective use of finances, accounting, materiel and personnel, and the development of proper, supporting logistic structures. The other services - air force and any navy - were formally under the central staff, but in reality left to develop as separate entities.

The Soviet bureaucratic tradition - at the same time - led to these staffs being bloated in personnel, unfocused, totally centralised, decision and responsibility averse, with activities unrelated to the reality in the units, interested in planning and concepts rather than in learning through implementation. Relations within

the staff and with other authorities and staffs at the state centre were often hampered by a lack of clear lines of responsibility, detracting from the creation and maintenance of a quality product.

Seen from the outside, and from the units, the central staff was a very large group of inert, ineffective, self-serving bureaucrats, selected on the basis of rather empty "high education" diplomas rather than proven professional, analytical and administrative ability.

In order to lead and implement reforms effectively, these central staffs have to be transformed in every sense. The end-state of the reconstruction should be a flat hierarchical network of co-operating small teams, each team with a well-defined responsibility and delegated authority. These should be joint service, and the main function should be planning of development, general administration, and control of implementation at the highest policy level, in direct support of the chief of defence and in close interaction with the MoD. Collocation with the MoD will ease

co-operation and make continued duplication of effort less likely. At the same time, collocation will underline the requirement for strict discipline in the maintenance of good staff procedures and clear responsibilities on both sides. The central staffs should be drastically reduced in size, emphasising quality of personnel rather than number, in order to become focused and effective.

Control of operational planning and control of operations is to be done by a commander with a small joint service operations staff. To minimise duplication of effort and reduce the size (and increase the effectiveness) of the central staff, the operations staff may only be a partly separate organisation, in a location close to the central staff, supporting the joint planning and administrative staff with staff work in the purely operational field.

Both these two joint central staffs will keep a close link with reality in the units by regular rotation of key personnel and by a new organisational ethos emphasising humility to the two level of clients: the political masters and the units.

Such much smaller staff elements will be much more able to deliver high quality, realistic “products” on time.

Presently very few CEE armed forces have come close to having such small and focused central staff structures. It seems to be very difficult to get rid of the idea that bigger is better and that keeping all responsibilities and functions directly under control of one person and in one staff is the right solution. The users, the politicians and units, are suffering as a result.

One problem has been the uncertainty about the roles of the service staffs. The central “General” Staff was also the army staff – as that staff was mainly seen as an operational staff concentrating on using the main armed service, the army. If an air force with a fighting capability existed, it might be partly integrated and given a reasonable priority. Otherwise, the air force as well as the navy would be seen as fairly irrelevant to the defence effort, and therefore left as orphans to develop on their own, fighting their own, successful

or unsuccessful, political battle for resources.

With a combination of a joint central staff and a joint operational staff the remaining very important task of the individual services (commander/inspector with staff) is to maintain and develop the training and readiness of the units, as well as being a centre of service-related professional understanding that can be used as a platform for the development of tactical structure and procedures. In order not to have overlap with the work of the joint staff structure planning elements, the service staffs should be closely collocated with that central staff. Such a development of small focused service staffs would be hindered by the creation of an independent *joint* Training Command.

If a joint Training Command is made responsible to the chief of defence and operational commander for the delivery of unit quality and readiness, this then takes away that core responsibility from the senior officer of each service, and removes accountability for quality from expertise. It is not safe to sail in a ship

or fly in an aircraft where the training directives and standards do not reflect a combination of a high level of service professionalism and a clear and acute feeling of responsibility by the issuing authority. The development of joint Training Commands is a result of an inappropriate imitation of a successful U. S. service institution: the U.S. Army TRADOC.

A special problem in the central staff structures has been the establishment of a proper logistic system. When the logistic system has been both reformed and developed, it will ensure effective, timely, and sufficient support to the units in both peacetime garrisons and on international operations or after mobilisation. The service will be given by a transparent system that ensures honesty and minimises waste by constant outside scrutiny.

This is a long way from the chaotic and sometimes corrupt logistic systems that were left as part of the Soviet legacy of wasteful managerial methods and normally self-serving attitude among officials.

***The approach to the manning  
of the armed forces***

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In Soviet style armed forces, manpower was recruited by conscription of, in principle, all young men for a long period of service in the military. In those forces the individual was deliberately suppressed through a combination of collective pressure and punishment as well as a brutal formal discipline. Service of the private soldiers had the character of time-limited slavery. Sons of the privileged classes would normally stay separate from the serving majority, only participating in “reserve officer” training and camps, linked to their diploma studies in universities or other “high schools”.

A gradual development away from that system started early in many CEE countries. However, even if the treatment of the soldiers improved in many states, armed forces manning was still dominated by the group of draftees from the less privileged part of the male society in the nation. The relatively low cost of the sys-

tem was supporting its continuation, even if the changing spectrum of missions and readiness requirements underlined the need for change.

In an effective, reformed armed force, able to conduct a variety of operations rather than the large scale war that the mass conscription based forces prepared for, the manning strategy must be very different. This does not necessarily mean that conscription should be completely abandoned in favour of a contract soldier system. However, a reformed structure must have a very strong presence of regular NCOs and technical specialists, and elite units on high deployment readiness must be fully manned by regulars.

The possibilities for recruiting a sufficient number of high quality young men, and women, to man and sustain the necessary force structure at home and on deployment may rule out a straightforward solution. A high youth employment rate makes a situation with serious recruiting problems likely. A reformed manning structure could – as in some Nordic States – consist of a mixture of a strong cadre

of regular long contract NCOs, regular contract soldiers on high readiness, and in technically very demanding jobs, some of these volunteering for contract service during their training as conscripts. Units may have a strong component of regular reserve personnel with a high readiness force contract, personnel that normally has a full conscript training plus the experience from six months or more service on international operations. Only the parts of the armed forces needed for the purely territorial self-defence mission will have a strong component of conscript reserve personnel. In order to make such a “professionals via conscript training” system workable, the conscript training should be thoroughly reformed so that regular service and a high readiness force contract is seen as an attractive option, creating a high number of qualified volunteers.

One benefit of a mixed system is the ability to sustain long deployments of a relatively large number of personnel. In such a system it can be done without having to increase the size of the standing

force or wearing the existing force down by too frequent absence from the families. This burden on the families of regular military personnel has been a major issue in several European armies during the last decade.

However, the key is also a high percentage of good regulars who can absorb and train the gradual influx to the required high level. Therefore it is important that the “net” for recruiting quality regulars is cast as wide as possible, including deliberate attempts to attract national minorities, in Latvia and Estonia the Russian-speaking non-citizens.

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***In the officer education system***

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The typical officer education institution of the Soviet tradition had two types of faculty members, whether it was a military academy or a general staff academy. The leading group consisted of ageing professors of military science, colonels or generals who had been conducting post-graduate and doctoral studies in this or similarly organised institutions and who

had served there 15-20 years. They were supplemented by a group of civilian academics, totally dominated by natural scientists. The study programme of the full officer education system had many levels: company-battalion, regiment, division, army, front, staff, general staff, the purpose of each was to ensure the mastering of the scientifically correct command or staff procedures of that level. The education, even the highest, focused on purely military matters, related to preparing for and winning a major war and then handing that successful result back to the politicians. The purpose of the education was not so much that of learning to think and work professionally in a general sense, but that of ensuring that the officer would be well drilled and indoctrinated to fit well into the next higher position. The post-graduate study programmes had either a natural science or a military science focus, the latter preparing the future professors that could sustain the institutions.

This system is totally different from the military education system of Western type armed forces. The faculty will also be

a mix of officers and academics. However, the officers must be persons with recent practical experience in the units or staffs, who can pass on updated knowledge and skills from these. They should come from the best end of their class, relatively close to the cadets or students in terms of age, able to act effectively as professional role models, and after their 2-4 years period as teachers, rotated back into the forces to an enhanced career. Career persons should likewise dominate the group of civilian academic faculty members, some university academics on a part-time contract with the school, others on time-limited contracts with the institutions. Some may have natural science backgrounds, but academics with a background in political or social sciences and humanities should form the largest part of the group. The education system will tend to have three or four levels: the basic officer education, a short “junior staff course” and a “command and staff course”. The first level will prepare the young officer generally and for their first practical assignment. The second will sup-



plement the basic education and be given to all regular officers. The third level will only be relevant for the best 10-30 percent. It will build on the professional understanding generated by around 10 years of practical service and will encourage and assist the officers in developing themselves during the rest of their career. The course will endeavour to deepen the understanding and acceptance of the way that the armed forces of a democracy must interact with the civilian structures, subordinated to political control. Any fourth-level education will normally concentrate on that specific issue as it is seen at the time of the course to prepare the course members for high command. In their attitude to the general and academic civilian education of the officers, the societies and the elected politicians must develop to understand the rather limited relevance of civilian academic “credits” to the quality and loyalty of the officer corps. A good democratically oriented officer corps is developed by its constant interaction – during education and service – with the civilian society that it serves.

The very close links and constant interaction between the military and the civilian and political sides make the field of an exclusive “military science” – other than professional understanding – meaningless.

The two structures, their purpose, and their products could not be more different, and the Soviet type indoctrination structures must be thoroughly changed and reformed to help other development.

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***In relation to general staff officers:***

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The system for developing, educating, and training officers reflects basic differences in how an ideal general staff officer is seen, what profile a representative of the intellectual elite of the service has. In a thinking armed force, the ideal is an officer with a thorough practical service background. That background interacts with theoretical schooling and a developed character to create a holistic thinking generalist with a deep sense of responsibility towards the defence mission. He/she has a well-developed tendency and ability to seek and analyse “outside the

box” and to present the findings in spite of these being less than popular, at the same time as he remains a loyal and effective implementer of any decision taken by the commander. He/she will actively seek development and results rather than privilege. He/she will interact closely with the units as he also sees himself as their servant.

The personality profile and education is fundamentally different from that of a Soviet type general staff officer who is seen as a long serving specialist, awaiting orders to act, even if the results are clearly “inside the box”. He/she is not supposed to think or act without authority. He/she is basically a “staff technician”.

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***In the personnel management system:***

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In a normal good quality armed force, there is a clear and generally accepted connection between rank and position on one side and ability on the other.

The foundation of the personnel management system is based on a clear defini-

tion of the education, practical experience, age, and personality requirement of each cadre and specialist position in the peacetime structure and fully mobilised force. Recruiting and formal training take place and individuals are rotated between different positions and practical experiences to fulfil the requirements. Independent selection boards that must insure against favouritism administer a personnel evaluation system that endeavours to give an objective picture of the development of each member of the cadre or specialist. The salary and social system must make certain that the rotation between jobs, necessary to create practical professionalism in the cadre, can take place without undermining the welfare and cohesion of the families. The retirement system ensures that the armed forces avoid carrying a burden of persons who do not fit into the current and foreseen requirements for cadre and specialists.

Such a system may have existed in the CEE armed forces a generation or two ago. However, the general development in society has probably been the reason

why that focus was lost. Therefore a proper system has to be developed from scratch, including a focused and Western type understanding of the education and service background as well as personality requirement of each position.

The evaluation and selection system must be reformed completely to remove favouritism and clientism. Selection must be based on demonstrated high quality. Rotation must be enforced and supported, as must early retirement. The system must ensure the right combination of relative youth and practical professional experience throughout the structure. There must be a balance between the number of officers graduated from the basic officer education and the positions, mainly platoon leader and other subaltern officer positions where they can get practical experience.

Without a system that bases promotion and employment on proven quality, the officer corps will remain a “battlefield”, dominated by loyalty and favouritism linked to persons, and political manoeuvring among cliques.

## Conclusion

The transition to effective, “best-practice” Western type armed forces will achieve the following results:

- Military-political co-operation with a military leadership that combines a deep and updated professional foundation with an acceptance and understanding of its role in relation to the political leadership of their country.
- A generation change in the now very reduced group of senior officers.
- The existence of a truly professional officer corps managed by a personnel management system that aims at absolute fairness, give high priority to service in units, and demands and supports rotation of key officer cadre personnel every 2-3 years.
- A firmly rooted understanding in the central staff structures that their main task is to develop and maintain effective units, within the important context of the tactical formation level in the army.
- Drastically slimmed and task-oriented central staff structures.

- The existence of service chiefs/inspectors who have a clear responsibility to the joint operational commander and via him to the chief of defence for unit quality.

- A reformed manning system, adjusted to the size and mission of the armed forces.

- A reformed, pragmatic and practical officer education structure.

- A dynamic general staff officer corps with sizable group of members with the ability and moral courage to think and debate “outside the box” – with the understanding of the political and professional leadership which is crucial in a democracy.

### **Finally: a look at the West**

Some elements of the development challenges discussed above are also relevant for many Continental Western European states. During the last half-century, their armed forces have developed strictly within the tight framework of the East-

West confrontation. It dominated all structures, all thinking, all education and training.

As the task of the armed forces became clear during the 1950s, the actual organisation of defence could be and was delegated by the politicians to the professional military led by the defence chiefs. There was no need for a constant and close interaction between the defence minister and the chief of defence except in matters of the future budget, relations to the alliance partners (for the NATO members), length of conscript service and the role of the national defence industries.

Thus there was no need to collocate and integrate the ministry and the defence staff, and the minister of defence was normally considered as one of the junior cabinet posts. The need for close interaction between the political leaders and defence agencies in crisis and war was, however, realised as a result of the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. It was exercised in special inter-ministry and department contact groups. However, the daily interaction was weak.

The armed forces were specialised for the foreseen missions of “the big war”: territorial self-defence and reinforcement of the territorial defence of the front-line states. The forces depended on the deep mobilisation of civilian resources, including reserve cadres and other manpower, and the effectiveness of the expanded forces depended on the thorough, common tactical indoctrination of both regular and reserve cadre. The mission, the actual terrain where the defence would be conducted, and the available forces were all known in advance. Even the enemy was thought to be well-known, including his standard tactical and operational drill.

As the Cold War became a routine in the early 1970s, preparations to fight for freedom and survival became less urgent. The mission of the armed forces became first and foremost to contribute to the deterrence of an attack. In many Western European armed forces this led to the stagnation of professional studies and debate, and then of force structure and doctrinal development. The regular cadre obtained rights and service conditions that mir-

rored those of the civilian environment rather than the requirements of their chosen profession. The requirement for independent professional thinking was understated in both the professional education and in the service of regular officers.

UN-mission service was the only source of “out-of-the box” operational experience. However, as these operations often took place in low-intensity, stable confrontations, had a low prestige and were guided by well-established Standard Operating Procedures (SOP), service here did not inspire professional development.

**This has led to a situation where many Western European military structures face challenges; which are similar in some areas to those of the CEE states:**

- Relations between the political and professional leadership must be adapted to mirror the requirements of conducting and managing current and (militarily as well as politically) risky operations. A combination of the amalgamation of the

Ministry and the Defence Staff and the creation of a national joint operations HQ has demonstrated its potential for the co-ordination of the political and military leadership at the same time allowing for the integration of all relevant joint expertise in a professional environment.

- The operational forces must be organised as flexible “tool boxes”, where the elements are equipped for and well exercised in co-operation between themselves and with forces from other states.

- Even the mission of defending the state territory against threats is seen as a complex task, calling for flexibility in both direct response and in force expansion as well as the ability to co-operate effectively with other national and other states’ agencies.

- The education of the regular cadre needs to develop the will and ability to adapt the use of the available personnel and equipment to the actual task and situation, if necessary without guidance from above. The requirement is as relevant for a platoon leader, at his level, commanding a detachment in a Crisis Response

Operation as it is for the designated task force commander interacting with the political leadership in the preparation of a new mission. Education and training must develop the understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of the different military tools under various conditions rather than supply a ready made set of doctrinally correct responses.

# From *Hardware to Software Reforms* in Romania's Civil-Military Relations

## The Policies of Personnel Management

By George Christian Maior and Sebastian Huluban\*

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### *Introduction*

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One of the successful ways in assuring a strong democratic consolidation is to find an appropriate democratic institutional balance between the civilian and security sectors, especially between the legislative and executive bodies on the one hand, and the armed forces the other hand. This article is an attempt to offer an insight into one of the debates re-

garding the reformation in Romania of civil-military relations based on democratic principles. Its main goal is to set the theoretical context in order to understand the general issues in the Romanian civil-military relations after 1989, and additionally, to draw the lines for the main feature of the military transformation, namely the personnel management.

The management of personnel constitutes the basis of any reform in the military domain. The way that the issue of

human resources is managed will determine, in great measure, the success of the reform and the achievements of its objectives, namely a modern army that is truly capable of fulfilling its traditional missions and assuming new ones, as a consequence of its adaptation to a profoundly changed security environment. The management of personnel thus represents both an instrument and a vehicle of reform. In addition, the personnel policies are one of the reform's most important final

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products and indispensable for creating a system that is functioning.

This multiple significance of the issue at stake requires a special responsibility upon the political-military leadership in the army. Leadership must not only treat this issue as a priority, but also approach it with special care, in order to avoid dysfunctional experiments within an area so critical to the substance of reform and the civil-military relations.

We will evaluate the basic tenets of the academic literature related to civil-military relations, and the literature related to the post-communist military transformation and achievement of democratic oversight over the military during the main stages of the process, *the hardware*, and *the software periods*, in particular. Then we will assess the way that the military transformation occurred in Romania after 1989. A special attention will be given to the peculiarities that the communist period created in the Romanian civil-military relations, in contrast with other Warsaw Pact countries. Finally, we will present the main stages in the Roma-

nian civil-military relations with a particular emphasis on the policies of personnel management implemented until now.

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***Civil versus democratic control  
over the military***

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Regarding the theoretical models of civil-military relations Samuel Huntington, in his already classical work, *The Soldier and the State*, argues that there are two main types of the civilian control over the military branch: *the subjective* and *the objective*. Thus, he argues that the subjective way of control over the military is based on maximizing the civilian influence with the risk of diluting the cohesion and professionalism of the armed forces: "The simplest way of minimizing military power would appear to be the maximizing of the power of civilian groups in relation to the military... consequently the maximizing of civilian power always means the maximizing of the power of some particular civilian group or groups" (Huntington 1957, 80).

In contrast, the objective model is based on maximizing military professionalism: "More precisely, it is that distribution of political power between the military and civilian groups which is most conducive to the emergence of professional attitudes and behaviour among the members of the officer corps" (Huntington 1957, 83). The objective model reflects a situation in which the officer's body is "politically sterile and neutral", prepared to carry out whatever orders it receives, regardless of who is in charge of the government. Furthermore, in contrast to the subjective model, this approach asserts that civilian control is assured through the recognition of military professionalism rather than civilian interference.

But Huntington (1968) also describes another situation relative to the relations between civilians and the military. Hence, *praetorianism*<sup>1</sup> refers to situations of military involvement in political affairs (a kind of converse situation of subjective control), either using the classical means of overthrowing the civilian government

through a coup d'état, or through the permanent involvement in a political decision-making process behind the scenes (Herspring 1992, 100). As the argument has been put forward by another scholar: "An authoritarian military regime may be composed of civilian and military officers and may be even headed by a civilian who does not possess military skills" (Perlmutter 1989, 97). In short, the appearance of a praetorian regime is determined mainly by two factors: a weakening of the political and institutional structure of the society, and, a cohesive and autonomous military (Huntington 1968, Perlmutter 1989).

From a pure theoretical standpoint, Peter Feaver argues that the balance<sup>2</sup> between the civilian and the military influence is based on a paradox and two general principles. The paradox refers to the fact that because we fear others we create an institution of violence to protect us, but then we fear the very institution that we created for protection. Additionally, the first principle refers to the fact that the need, "or perceived need", for establish-

ing the military is based on the idea to use military force either to attack others or just to "ward off attacks by others". The second principle is both logically related and in tension with the first: "...just as the military must protect the polity from enemies, so must it conduct its own affairs in order not to destroy the society it is intended to protect" (Feaver 1996, 152).

On the other hand, Douglas Bland (1999) maintains that the changes of the regimes and the advance towards democratisation in the late twentieth century requires a re-evaluation of the theory and models of civil-military relations. The author identifies at least four possible models developed in the literature: the *mission* model (more compliance in the case of militaries facing external threats rather than internal), the *institutional* model (strong civilian-led institutions as the receipt for the best civilian control), the *civilian supremacy* (active civilian involvement at every level of the military decision-making process), and the *humanitarian* model (harmony among civilian and military elites). Beyond these, Bland sug-

gests "*a unified theory*" of civil-military relations based on the idea of "*shared responsibility*", derived mainly from the assumptions of the theory of regimes. Thus, instead of the concept of "control" the author advances the concept of "sharing": "...Experience shows that civil authorities depend on military experts not only to provide technical advice and to direct operations, but also to assist in the civil control of the armed forces. Even in mature democracies, there is an expectation that military leaders will share in decision-making regarding the national defense and the employment of the armed forces with their civilian superiors" (Bland 1999, 10).

Once we move beyond the classical concepts and models of civil-military relations, such as objective, subjective or praetorian, the legitimate question may be: What do we mean by civilian when we refer to "civil-military relations"? What does "civilian control over the military" (security sector) mean in the context of democratisation? What about civil-military relations within regimes rather than

democracy, authoritarianism or non-Western settings? For instance, Huntington's theoretical models have been accepted as describing the civil-military relations within the communist regimes best (Herspring 1992). However, others have argued that the models developed by Samuel Huntington are not appropriate at all for analysing the communist type of civil-military relations: "Throughout his writings, Huntington tended to dismiss the role of civil-military relations in communist states by arguing that relations in such states were always in crisis" (Herspring 1999, 560). The author argues that Huntington's models are too static, whereas reality proves that there are evident shifts from subjective to objective and vice versa, especially in the case of some of the communist countries (Soviet Union, East Germany) where the 1980's, for instance, signified important autonomy for the military branch without an obvious involvement of the civilians (the party) in military politics.

The lack of a precise definition of what "civilian control" means<sup>3</sup> may lead us not

to detect, for instance, the difference between the Communist Party's control over the armies in Eastern Europe and the combined legislative, executive and judicial control over the militaries in the countries of the European Union or the United States. All these instances denote civilian control of the military (security sector), even if one is subjective and the other objective (Huntington 1957). But between these two extreme instances of civilian control, we have to understand how the civilian control over the military is exercised in situations of transition from one form of control to the other (Coughlan 1998). Thus, it becomes relevant to make the point that regarding transition, setting the concept of civilian control over the military should be understood as *the achievement of democratic oversight over the security sector*.

From another standpoint, this dynamic refers to the stages that should be reached for a sound democratic oversight. A basic assumption is that democratic control over the security sector has a strong institutional dimension. Thus,

constitutional and other legal provisions regarding the non-involvement of military in domestic politics do not represent the achievement of full democratic control. As Douglas Bland (1999) asserts, there is a difference between the *democratic institutional* model, which means "strong civilian-led institutions as the path to assured civilian control" and the *civilian supremacy* that "reflects the ideas of those who believe that control demands the active intervention of political leaders at every level of the process" (7). In addition Bland (2001) maintains that:

*Although in most cases the hardware is at least adequate, problems emerge because the civil-military relations software has not been installed in the new structures for the civil control of the military. That is to say, the framework of ideas, principles and norms that shape civil-military behavior in liberal democracies has not been adequately explained or incorporated into the officer corps, the political culture, and the defense establishments of new democracies. There are reasons, particular to states, why this is so. But generally, the sources of the problem is the absence of a clear model of the software... (525).*



Instead of “*hardware*” and “*software*”, Forster (2000) identifies the dynamics of democratic control of the security sector, in the case of transition of post-communist countries, in terms of *first generation* and *second-generation* reforms. Thus, the first generation issues encompass the basic institutional provisions such as the drafting and approval of the new constitutional structures and the allocation of clear lines of responsibility. The *second-generation* set of issues “is emerging as being central to the on-going reform process” (Forster 2000, 7), and refers to the effective operation of institutions and procedures, change in attitudes, and democratic shared norms and values. The difference between these two stages is enormous: “Whilst institutional structure have changed rather rapidly created on paper, attitudinal change appears to be taking place over a longer time horizon than institutional or structural change” (7).

It is beyond the scope of this article to analyse the attitudes’ change and democratic norms and values (Fitch 2001). Instead of issues of military professional-

ism from a cultural perspective, the social origins of the officers and other variables of this type, we will deal with the distinction between “hardware” and “software” only from an institutional point of view. Thus, the main question is how it is possible to structure and delineate the main stages of the democratic oversight? What makes democratic control different from the classical “civilian” control? Whereas the “hardware” is relatively simply evaluated in terms of constitutional and main legal provisions, the other part of the institutional stage, the “software” or “second generation” reforms, are more complex because they encompass the implementation of sound procedures, institutional reflexes, and mainly interest and knowledge. A strategic community cannot be constructed only on empty constitutional and legal provisions.

Regarding the executive branch relations with the military under the auspices of democratisation, three main points should be emphasized. Firstly, democratic constitutions enforce the principle of civilian supremacy by naming the head of

state or government (the President, the Prime Minister, rarely the monarch) as the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. Although as a necessary condition for implementing civilian-democratic control over the security sector it is rather insufficient. The head of state (government) lacks usually the time and the expertise to direct the enforcement of the defence policy personally. As a result, he/she will delegate responsibility and authority to civilian ministers of defence, interior, and intelligence and law enforcement agencies who, advised by ministries and staffed with both civilian and military experts, should oversee the defence and national security policies.

Secondly, considering that democratic control of the security sector implies a balanced share and expertise among military and civilians, democratic reforms (especially in the case of countries that are undergoing a transition from totalitarian regimes) are aimed at strengthening the civilian capacity of expertise. One way to tackle this issue would be to ensure that the collective bodies with strong

military representation should be relegated to advisory roles with reduced command or policy authority, such was the case with the U.S. Chiefs of Staff.

Thirdly, as a consequence of the second issue, within the security sector ministries (agencies), the responsibilities accorded to civilians should be specifically defined. The so-called division of labour between the military and civilian personnel within these ministries and agencies on issues like policy, administration and human resources may vary, but it is generally assumed that the more civilians are placed in top policy-making posts, the more effective civilian control is likely to be (Bland 2001, Kohn 1997).

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***The intricacies of the communist past***

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After the *annus mirabilis* 1989, there was a relatively shared concern that the sudden collapse of the Leninist regimes, the economic problems, the intensified ethnic unrest, and a weak emerging political center would lead to the resurgence of new

authoritarianism (Tismaneanu 1998), and the praetorian military might become a dominant force in the countries of Eastern and Central Europe (Nelson 1991, Snyder 1990). As one of the early articles written on the civil-military relations in post-communist Europe emphasized, “a close inspection of developments in the region suggests that while the fear of praetorianism may be valid in some cases, it is very unlikely in the majority of instances” (Herspring 1992, 99). One of the cited exceptions was Romania. Thus, despite of the fact that some of the Eastern European countries experienced military rule (Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria) before the “totalitarian winter”, after 1989 none of the East European countries has experienced military coups or a dangerous ascension of the military’s influence within politics.

In an attempt to overview the successful receipt for such a performance, given the difficult economic, social and political conditions, Anton Bebler asserted the followings changes implemented by post-communist governments: severing the link between the Communist party and the

armed forces, dissolving the main political departments and corresponding bodies, radically changing or eliminating the responsibilities of military political officers, cutting the links between political (party) military officials, military security, military prosecutors and the military judiciary, establishing clear rules for the armed forces’ disengagement as an institution from political competition for power, clear subordination of the military to effective parliamentary control, and redefining the understanding of military professionalism (Bebler 1994, 28-29).

On the other hand, the success of the transfer of civilian control over the security sector was possible due to the special type of communist civil-military relations. As Perlmutter and LeoGrande show: “The Leninist party is anchored in the Clausewitzian dictum that politics is supreme to military action, and communist states have ideological proscriptions against military interference in civil politics, which are as strong as those in Western pluralist systems” (1982, 778). Thus, some of the authors consider

communist civil-military relations were best described by the total control of the military through the subjective tools of the Party and ideology (Herspring and Volgyes 1980). Others consider the ideological dimensions of the system (Kolkowicz 1978). Thus it has been assumed that there was not necessarily a strong control of the military because the two branches were united by their elitist and nationalist feelings, and in addition, the military accepted benevolent the primacy of ideology and, consequently, of the Communist Party. Beyond these approaches, the conclusion was that the party-dominant authority structure, a high level of elite integration, and a complex institutional relation that combined elements of both subordination and autonomy, and the details of this relationship depend upon the specific historical circumstances under which the revolutionary elite seizes power (Perlmutter and LeoGrande 1982, Odom 1973).

But despite the violent way of imposing its own political model (mainly with

the help of the armed forces), the Soviet Union did not keep a tight control over the relations between civilian and some of the military branches<sup>4</sup>. Thus, Zoltan Barany argues that, like the political regimes, civil-military relations varied considerably among Eastern European countries and, furthermore, these differences have tended to persist in the first stages of political transformation. In addition, the peculiarities among the Eastern European countries in terms of the degree of the repression that was practiced by the Communist regime, influenced not only the type of extrication from totalitarian, or post-totalitarian rule, but also the degree of the military involvement in the process of the transfer of power. Thus, it is assumed that the armed forces played the least active role in the transition in Hungary and Poland, where the liberalisation process was gradual, civil-military relations were 'professionalised', and communist elites gave up their power voluntarily. In contrast, the armed forces played an active role in the transition in Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania, where conservative

Communist elites were unprepared for the revolutionary uproar of citizens and the 'politicised' type of civil-military relations prevailed (Barany 1997, 25-26). Barany also considers that Hungary and Romania appear to have the most dissimilar patterns of civil-military relations.

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***From whence we came: political control over the army under communism***

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Before 1989, the Romanian Armed Forces (RAF) presented a somewhat extraordinary paradox. Although a member of the Warsaw Pact Alliance, the RAF did not share the Pact's warfare doctrine. On the contrary, the RAF had characteristics generated from Romania's national defence doctrine - "War of the Entire People" - with all the consequences regarding military organisation and the exercise of military functions that flowed from it. The substance of military professionalism also found a greater expression in the RAF for a variety of reasons. Among the most relevant fields, were the military inde-

pendence gained from the Soviet Union during the 1960's, is the large degree of military autonomy, granted by the Romanian communist authorities, necessary for it to become a fully field-capable and credible force, and the rather different manner in which the purely military dimension of the RAF interacted with the political-ideological dimension. Paradoxically, this created an isolationist mentality centered on the idea of professionalism and an attitude of "how it must be done", which later generated certain difficulties for the re-integration of the system and for the implementation of civilian control.

Initial conditions, however, had been quite similar. By the end of the 1940's, a Communist government aligned and subjected to the policies of Moscow sought to politicise the entire social system along parameters required for the creation of the "*New Man*" or "*Homo Sovieticus*" (Zinoviev 1986). In order to achieve the combined purposes of political control and ideological indoctrination, Soviet authorities imposed a process of institutional duplication upon the countries on

their side of the Iron Curtain. Consequently, the model of Communist party control by cells and committees as practiced in the USSR was extended to all institutions, at all levels, including military commands and units. The officer corps was purged of the Royal Romanian Army and mass promotions were made in the officer corps directly from the "working class"<sup>5</sup>. This resulted in a counter-selection of weakly qualified personnel from a "class" that was proved as being incapable of producing its own elites<sup>6</sup>. Along with these measures, during 1945-1947, many propagandistic military-cultural institutions were introduced in the armed forces, and some of them remained until the December 1989 revolution.

The separation from the Soviet policies, especially regarding economy, foreign relations, and military spheres, and the independent policies promoted within the Communist Bloc by Romania in the beginning of 1960s, generated a number of transformations in the military system. Officers were no longer trained in the Soviet Union nor was Moscow permitted to vet

Romanian officers before their promotion to a senior rank. A series of officers who had studied in Moscow were marginalised, and there was even an attempt to partially recuperate the interwar officer corps by selecting and recruiting personnel from the traditional military families<sup>7</sup>.

Likewise, although the party committees were maintained down to the basic units, the effective components of those committees were entirely made up of professional officers from different service branches in order to ensure that there was no significant perception internally that committees represented a foreign body, exogenous to military functions, within the armed forces. This was underscored by the organisation of the Main Political Administration, into the Higher Political Directorate, abolishing career political officers (Alexiev 1979, 21-23). Even the Higher Political Council was composed exclusively of professional military officers. With certain notable exceptions, one could no longer speak of the existence of a significant category of military "politruks".

This allowed the RAF to maintain a form of internal cohesion that later was reinforced, because the army as an institution was marginalised by the Romanian communist authorities that were in favour of the Ministry of the Interior and the secret police forces (*Securitate*). The principal impact of party policies on the military was essentially limited to a degree of control over the social origins of the officer corps and to the direct employment of the army in supporting the national economy. There was no control over the composition and the dimension of the military structures and forces, since these were considered as being strictly military problems.

Regarding the impact of the pure *politruk* variable in its traditional sense, it was to a lesser degree present in the RAF than elsewhere in the Pact, because of the professional autonomy requirements of an independent military. What remained of that influence was confronted by a natural professional resistance; unorganised, but nonetheless powerful. Paradoxically, this rather healthy resistance, through

its inertial elements, became problematic for the relations between the army and the political leadership in the beginning of the 1990s, as the RAF continued to view any non-professional military involvement in its affairs akin to party political intrusion.

Of course, the intrusion of politics in military affairs during the communist period was felt in many areas. However, in spite of constant pressure, the communist networks could not systematically penetrate the generic concept of the military career, in which the RAF, with considerable self-sacrifice, was able to preserve important elements of autonomy and insulation. The end result of these evolutionary differences was demonstrated clearly and unambiguously in the position adopted by the army during the anti-Communist Revolution of December 1989.

These relative advantages notwithstanding, the military system in Romania was also infected with a significant degree of nepotism and corruption, inner characteristics of the communist administration as manifested in the conception and ap-

plication of cadre policies. Additionally, before 1989, the military retained all the standard characteristics of a mass army, including the wasteful consumption of resources. The RAF numbered well over 300,000 soldiers, in spite of significantly lower manning tables, including over 40,000 manual labourers pressed into service and put in a uniform solely because of Ceaucescu's prestige projects (as well as the foreign and domestic intelligence organisations that were subordinated to the military at the height of the revolution and for several months thereafter)<sup>8</sup>.

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***Early stages of reform:  
two steps forward, one step back***

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The reform of the Romanian Armed Forces was launched already in the beginning of the 1990s. Its first goal, besides from clearing the non-military dross from the RAF, was the "depoliticisation of military structures", even though in Romania's case this phenomenon lacked the drama that it created among the rest of the members of the Warsaw Pact, due

to mentioned considerations<sup>9</sup>. A number of measures taken with a remedial intent had unintended negative consequences. For instance, a number of officers that were previously frozen in rank during the Communist regime were rapidly promoted. Likewise, the minimum stage in grade was reduced, further accelerating promotion. At the beginning, however, there was no clear concept of the reform and the mentioned promotions were aimed solely at discretely eliminating injustices within the officer corps rather than to correct evident systemic dysfunctions.

The process of depoliticisation that was supposed to transform the previous political, subjective control into a democratic one, was based on a clear separation between the political and the military field of responsibilities. In Samuel Huntington's terms, we were beginning to implement "*objective civilian control*" by "militarising the military, and making them the tool of the state", rather than *subjective control*, which "achieves its end by civilianising the military, making them the mirror of the state" (Huntington

1957). This process of professionalising the RAF and implementing objective control (understood as the democratic-institutional control) still continues – although in a different dimensions and aspects – up to the present.

An important, but costly lesson was learned in this process. The appointment of officers was based on their "healthy" social background, and it could not have been corrected simply by promoting officers whose careers had previously suffered because of their "unhealthy" social background. It has been assumed from the start that the character and professional skills that are necessary for good officers are individual attributes, which are not dependent on *class* or status.

The lack of an articulated personnel management concept and procedures, together with the post-revolutionary exuberance generated a number of contradictions in the personnel domain. Moreover, phenomena and tendencies from the past continued to influence the trajectory of attempts to outline useful concepts of human resource management. Thus, a

number of promotions were made on the basis of improved criteria, higher ranks were unnecessarily required for a variety of functions, and the number of posts was increased rather arbitrarily, mainly in the organisational charts of the central structures.

Partly, these counterproductive developments can be attributed to the accumulation of an important number of the officers' functions that were subordinate to their rank during the Communist regime. These officers were frozen at this level by the military hierarchy, which blocked their normal resignation from the system. This process, in turn, generated an evolution that was difficult to control. At one point, the rapid and aggressive promotion of officers to a higher rank, particularly to the rank of colonel, became a generalised pattern. Obviously, this "*colonelisation*" of the officer corps produced serious distortions in what should have been the construction of a rank pyramid and a modern system of command.

Together, these processes generated an increase in the bureaucratic structures of

the ministry while accentuating the disequilibria of the rank pyramid, which was rapidly transformed into a series of “rank cylinders” and even an inverse pyramid with higher ranks outnumbering the subordinates. By the beginning of 2000 it was generally recognized that the elimination of “exceptional” promotions had become an imperious necessity, but political considerations permitted this dysfunctional practices to continue until 2001, when exceptional promotion were eliminated *in extenso* throughout the military.

During 1998-1999 a number of concepts were elaborated at the ministerial level with the assistance of specialists from NATO, but the process was hindered by the lack of concrete plans and an inability to implement policies. Although the need for a fundamental reform was generally recognised, restructuring the personnel was limited to reducing – or rather incorporating fewer – conscripts. While this permitted a degree of financial economy, it did not contribute to the construction of viable military system. The statements of the Chief of the Direc-

torate for Human Resource Management in 1999, clearly illustrate that the failure to act was not due to any lack of understanding of the problem:

*“If we connect the number of 112,000 with the structure laws that provide a pyramid configuration you will see that we will have to get to a number of 15,000 officers – this means that an equal number of them has to leave within a certain period of time. The military category surplus in the Romanian Army does not start with generals, it does not even get there. Let us go further, we now have 2,300 colonels ... and there needs to be 630. You can see how drastic the cuts are... (Bălan 1999, 85)”.*

The counterproductive nature of these tendencies was exacerbated by the essentially quantitative method through which the Soviet-inspired triad of *regiment-division-army* had been replaced by the Western-style organizational structures of *battalion-brigade-army* and *corps-army* in 1991-1992. Although absolutely necessary, this was accomplished not on the basis of a well-grounded planning vision but rather through the gross transformation

of regiments into brigades, and divisions into army corps, respectively. Proceeding in this manner led inexorably to a dramatic growth of military cadre in the senior ranks that damaged the primary combat levels – the *officerisation* of the army.

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### ***The empirical approach to personnel management***

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Concurrent with these suboptimal reform efforts, modern approaches to the professionalisation of the army were also present in this early transformations concept. For example beginning in 1993, the first military personnel were hired on a contract basis. This was quite remarkable in Romania at that time, where conscription had important symbolic roots in the collective mentality stretching back beyond the Communist period and into the pre-national past.

The process of attracting civilian specialists was also initiated during this period. From at least one perspective, that of legitimacy, civil-military relations in Romania were significantly advantaged by

the traditionally supportive relationship between the society and the military that also existed during the Communist period (Watts forthcoming). Because of that Romania differed from the other states of Central and Eastern Europe that were still in the early stages of constructing this basic relationship. As noted above, however, the exercise of civilian-democratic control was influenced by a series of issues. Paradoxically, these issues derived not only from the lack of real civilian expertise in the military domain at the beginning of the reform process – a universal problem in the post-communist space – but also from the two advantages of Romania’s military independence within the Warsaw Pact: The resistance to politicisation during the Communist period and the relegation of military affairs to the exclusive sphere of specialists.

On the other hand, an important number of civilians were hired in the armed forces since the early 1960s. Prior to 1989, however, the relative quota of those with higher studies was insignificant (approximately 8.5%) compared to

the total of the civilian personnel. Civilian specialists were confined in their activities to military projections, the medical field, and scientific research. They were not placed in functions that were related to leadership but in functions that were related to implementation.

Civilian control made its debut through the use of existing “reigns of power” in the higher structures of the army by personalities from the scientific community, academia, and diplomacy. These personalities were generally chosen on the combined basis of their acquaintance with defence issues and their likelihood of being accepted by the military community. In the beginning of 1993, the first civilian – a professor of national security and international relations – was appointed to a leadership position as state secretary (deputy minister) for defence policy<sup>10</sup>. Approximately one year later, the first civilian defence minister since the Second World War – a diplomat who had a background in arms control negotiations – was appointed<sup>11</sup>. Once this process had been started, the model of appoint-

ing civilian personnel in all leadership positions that did not require strict military expertise were employed within a “top-down” framework extending over a period of many years.

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***The modern system of human resources management***

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At the same time as the maturation of the Romanian democracy and the effective institutionalisation of democratic control over the armed forces, and faced with extremely limited resources and the pressure to use them effectively, a number of modern personnel management concepts were introduced in departmental personnel management policies. This process was greatly supported by the decision to seek NATO membership in 1993, and the signing of the Partnership for Peace agreement in 1994, both of which accelerated the first conceptual reform, and then the organizational and operative reforms in the military domain.

“Rationalizing” the management of human resources was an immediate pri-



ority given that the system in its entirety was evolving under the auspices of decisions and policies that were essentially unsystematic, and in a manner that continued to require an extremely wasteful consumption of resources. After a period of experimentation and transition, the clarification, crystallization, and assimilation of some reform concepts regarding the system of human resource management were adopted as a priority by the leadership of the Ministry of Defence. An important role in the assessment of these concepts regarding a new system of human resource management has been adopted as a priority by the leadership of the Ministry of Defence. An important role in the elaboration of these concepts was played by the direct support received from the USA, Great Britain, France, and other states. For the first time, all of the activities related to the management of professional personnel were based upon rigorous adherence to a coherent theory of human resource management, including the complete personnel cycle from *procurement* (recruitment and selec-

tion), initial formation, employment and development, to subsequent specialization, reconversion, and retirement or departure from the system. The theory takes into account both the current practices of NATO member states and the traditions of the Romanian Army in this area.

It is worth repeating that the major breakthrough in this process was possible because of the necessity of achieving the full compatibility of the RAF with the NATO forces. Initially received with scepticism and followed by Romania's failure to gain an invitation to the Alliance in Madrid in 1997, the NATO membership Action Plan (MAP) process and the system of consultations with NATO that was developed in order to implement this process, have played a critical role in distinguishing priorities of personnel management. When, in February 2001, a profound and pragmatic review of the national accession plan was completed, personnel management reform constituted, either directly or indirectly, three of the twelve priorities considered vital for reestablishing the credibility of

Romania's NATO candidacy, including the adoption of the *Military Career Guide*.

Parallel with the assessment of this conception, traditional personnel structures were replaced with a newly constituted Directorate of Human Resources Management - the central Ministry of Defence structure authorized to elaborate the strategy, policies, and procedures regarding the restructuring and the modernizing of the management of professional human resources. This Directorate maintains control over the entrance-exit flux of the system, including advances in the rank, promotions in position, education statistics, transfer to reserve status, retirement, etc. In this respect, a clear separation within the system was established between the level of conception and that of execution and, not less important, between the beneficiary - the army as a whole, with specific application to the general staff - and the planner - the Directorate of Human Resources Management in cooperation with specialized military structures.

The restructuring of human resources was carried out quite quickly. It has from

the beginning been defined as a systemic reform with a direct impact on the entire military sphere in regards to its capacity for action and its professional preparation. In this manner, the entire system has been re-projected on the new principles where the place and role of every category of personnel has been redefined.

An important feature of this strategy is the definition of the officer as being a military leader, and that the officer corps are the functional centre of the entire military organism. The preparation of this professional officer corps primarily concern the management of military organization and action in times of peace, crisis, and war, and the capacity for utilizing resources for attaining the objectives of the military organization. The strategy's implementation will also lead to the elimination of the (ab)use of officers in the bureaucratic sense; which creates the risk of de-professionalising the officer corps up to the level of central structures over time.

Non-commissioned officers (NCO) are assigned an important role under the new

human resources management system, as specialists in military actions, at the planning level, in training, and in the execution of military tasks. Within the new concept, the corps of the NCOs represent the backbone of the army. According to a pre-established model, NCOs will be experts in various military domains, commanders of the structures at the base of the military hierarchy (teams, groups, platoons), instructors, workers in the general staff, administrators, and managers of material resources. There is also a need for intelligent action in this area in order to change the attitudes of the officer corps regarding the role of the NCOs, and break down the clichés rooted in the past regarding the military status of NCOs and warrant officers.

Whether the military professional is hired on a contract basis or have to do obligatory military service<sup>12</sup>, he is the executor of military actions, and the one who fulfils the tasks and carry out both experience and personal initiatives into practice. Given the aim of achieving a 90% professional soldiers in the armed forces

by 2007, special attention will be given to the management of departures and entrances into the system and that must be managed appropriately and in respect to the planning cycles.

The main objectives of the concept regarding the management of human resources in the Romanian Army include the following: the rehabilitation of the military career; increased transparency and equal opportunity in the promotion of military cadres through the use of the *Military Career Guide* (enacted since 2001) and by optimising the performance of the selection committee; the definition of posts according to military rank as required in a pyramidal system and the implementation of a system of personnel data management.

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***The structure of functions  
in the pyramidal system and  
the military career***

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The pyramidal system is a method of structuring functions by category of professional personnel such that the ratio of

officers to NCOs tends toward its optimum value according to the model used by the NATO member states. The system is also a method for organizing officers, NCOs, and professional grades according to military ranks and types of career. The Programme Force 2003 concept adopted in 1998 foresaw the structuring of armed forces personnel into 112,000 military positions, including 18,000 officers, 40,200 NCOs and warrant officers, 22,300 professional grades, and 31,500 conscripts. In 2001, a strategic review of missions and force requirements was initiated. According to the preliminary results of that review, the new *Objective Force* to be achieved by 2007 will maintain the same relationship of ranks and functions based on a predicted uniformed military personnel level of 75,000. The *Objective Force* will be composed of at least 90% professional military personnel.

Until 2001, there were no normative acts that established the career evolutionary principles for military cadres in a coherent and unitary manner. Nor was there any theoretical model for determin-

ing the rank structure of functions. These combined shortcomings led to the accumulation over time of structural and functional deficiencies in the management of the officer corps, and to the depreciation of the military career in general. Officers were used in every domain of military activity, not only in the quality of military leader but also in execution (subordinate) functions. Consequently, year after year, pressure was built up and pushed the officers toward the top of the hierarchy. This resulted in a surplus of superior officers - majors, lieutenant colonels, and colonels - and a concurrently increasing deficit of second lieutenants, lieutenants, and captains. Together with the inefficient use of these junior officers this led to the superior ranks being regarded as demonic.

On the one hand the lack of transparency in the management of both posts and officers illustrated the absence of a basic document setting out all of the posts that could be occupied by officers - a chart of positions - and, on the other hand, the lack of a document describing the

regulations and conditions for filling in these positions - an officer career guide. In order to improve the deficiency, the *Military Career Guide* was adopted in the spring of 2001. The adoption of this fundamental document that defines the evolutionary parameters of military personnel management constituted one of the most significant achievements in military reform since 1989. The experience of NATO states, and especially of those recently invited into the Alliance, shows how difficult it is to develop a precise terminology, time scales, and legal regulations within this vital domain. Without any exaggeration, the adoption of the Guide immediately created a shock wave that echoed throughout the system's structures, and whose consequences and effects will continue to mark the modern evolution of the RAF over the long term.

The Guide defines the military career as a succession of functions (positions) that an officer could fulfil, beginning with the first function of a second lieutenant and terminating with the functions of a general at the highest rank in the military

hierarchy. Similarly, the officer's career was delineated according to the natural requirements of the various posts, the levels of competences that was necessary for each one, and by the existence of obligatory postings in the *junior career* - corresponding to the second lieutenant - captain ranks; in the *mid-level career* - corresponding to the major - lieutenant colonel ranks; and in the *senior career* - corresponding to the colonel - general ranks.

The military careers that are different in length was also introduced and adopted. Thus officers may pursue a long-term career at the end of which the officer benefits from a military service pension, or a short-term career that is followed by a second career in the civil service.

In order to manage entrance into the system, two channels of access to the military career already operate. The direct channel assumes graduation from a military institution of higher learning. The indirect channel, on the other hand, is open to graduates from civil institutions of higher learning and to the active service of NCO cadres.

Summing up, professional preparation and promotion are governed on the basis of the two instruments mentioned above: the *Military Career Guide*, and the *Selection Committees*. The Military Career Guide imposes regulations that ensure:

- The direct correlation between the rank of the post and the rank of the officer who will be appointed,
- A promotion after the minimum time in grade, and after the graduation from the career course ensuring the necessary competence for the new function.

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***Improving civilian defence  
management specialists***

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At the beginning of 2002, a process was initiated in order to design a system of civilian careers within the RAF. This initiative was driven by the necessity of managing the careers of both a uniformed and civilian personnel in an integrated manner. The fundamental principles of this conception, currently in the incipient stages of the development, will be similar to those expressed in the Military Ca-

reer Guide, with the goal of obtaining a higher level of professionalism and a transparent system for the advancement of civilian personnel.

Concurrently, a series of concrete measures have been taken regarding the conceptual integration of the preparedness and employment of civilian personnel with those of other ministries, such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with which an efficient exchange of experts and senior civil servants has already taken place. These efforts are being made in order to achieve a more coherent and effective development of basic military missions, especially military diplomacy, its coordination with the security policy-making, and more generally, with the Romanian foreign policy.

The conceptualisation of the role of civil servants within the military system also seeks to generate a positive trend for the further development and empowerment of a civilian *defence community*. As part of its effort to attract students from different domains into the military, the Ministry of National Defence recently launched a program

providing flexible internships within the Ministry to students.

Once a “pool” of security experts is consolidated, whether they are graduates from specialized Romanian or NATO member states schools and institutions, the premise will exist for the application for long-term civilian career management, and a network of institutions and NGOs will offer both expertise and qualified personnel in this domain. An important role will also be played by the new approach to training and education courses offered by NATO members that have changed the focus from quantity to quality, and who also have added a system of monitoring the subsequent careers of their graduates.

This model presupposes both a conceptual transformation (at the level of Romania’s defence policies) and a legislative transition, as well as the implementation of the macro-level (*hardware*) framework for democratic control to the much more detailed focus on the development of permanent cooperation between political elites, civilian experts, and military professionals (*software*). Or as Douglas

Bland (1999), in his attempt to develop a unified theory of civil-military relations, calls “the shared responsibility” model between civilians and the military. In this respect, “the principal purpose of civilian oversight would be to develop standards and criteria for evaluating military performance” (Larson 1974), which assumes the development of civil personnel careers, together with education and training programs<sup>13</sup> with an emphasis on communication and evaluation abilities suited to the military system.

Similar forms of coordination are being developed with the forces of the Ministry of the Interior (Gendarmes, Police, Border Police) in order to connect personnel reform to the larger process of reforming the security sector. In this respect, the training centres of the army were recently opened up to a number of senior public servants, uniformed and civilian, from the Ministry of the Interior, and a special emphasis is put on the transfer of “know how” in areas of common interest such as resource planning, crisis management (including

anti-terrorism) and even NATO and UN procedures and terminology.

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### **Conclusion**

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The reform of human resources management in the Romanian Armed Forces is an integral part of the process of transformation and democratisation of civil-military relations. The most important goals that remain to be achieved in the nearest future are the development of programs to attract civilian experts toward a defence system and a military career, and the creation of a rotation system of personnel at the central level in order to improve the individual level of expertise, and the consolidation of a group of NATO personnel<sup>14</sup>.

Two of the most important objectives of human resources management - increasing transparency and ensuring equal opportunities in the promotion of military cadres - can only be comprehended through the full application of the *Military Career Guide*. As long as the provisions of the Guide are rigorously imple-

mented, the modern system of human resource management will continue to be a success, and so will Romanian military reform. The application of the Guide's rules and criteria - individual performance, professional competence, experience, and potential for development - determines whether we successfully negotiate the transition period, where shortcomings and internal convulsions are easily generated and the probability for losing valuable resources are high, or whether we become mired in that transition. It is thus imperative that we develop the monitoring mechanisms that will permit the identification and application of viable solutions to dysfunctions as they arise.

As noted above, preparation for NATO proved to be an important catalyst for the personnel reform process. No less important was the dedication of resources and greater sophistication regarding the need to use them wisely. Although the defence budget has increased in the last two fiscal years, this period also witnessed a broader understanding of the financial limits and the necessity for low-

ering the cost of personnel (which account for more than a half of the defence budget).

The next stage of transformation will involve the adaptation of the system as a whole to the educational and operational requirements, moving to certain standard of operating procedures for the preparation of various categories of personnel, ensuring the functional entrance and exit flow in the military system and the management of larger problems connected to the role and motivation of the professional soldier in ensuring national and collective defence. Once the software reforms are implemented, there is hope that the organizational culture it will create, together with the general attitudes already influenced by the implementation of the hardware reforms, will finally draw the framework of the "shared responsibility" model in Romanian civil-military relations.

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<sup>1</sup> During the 60's some of the studies assumed that praetorian regimes might be factors that accelerate the process of modernization. As Chris Smith (2001) shows, "The role of the military institutions was the original focus of the analysts who set out to comprehend the dynamics of the Third World ... An emerging consensus, especially in Washington, on the role of the military in development was largely positive. It was always thought that the army could play a part in the development, although, increasingly, it was tacitly accepted - yet never fully admitted - that political institutions might have to be sacrificed for the

sake of national security and stability. It was even argued that military skills (notably discipline) could be utilized for the wider national benefit".

<sup>2</sup> As Sigmund argues: "Rather than overarching theories, a careful analysis of the bargaining relationship between the military and the civilians will be the appropriate focus of the analysis, accompanied by an awareness that the civil-military relationship is dynamic and is affected by societal consensus on democratic legitimacy as well as by the varying effectiveness, not least in the area of economics, of the elected governments" (Sigmund 1993, 122).

<sup>3</sup> Michael Desch points out that civil-military relations represent a complicated issue to deal with: "Analysts disagree about how to define and measure civil-military relations as the dependent variable. These disagreements have two causes. First, it is not always clear when issues involve civil-military conflict rather than intracivilian struggles, intramilitary fights, or civil-military coalitional wars...A second cause of disagreement in analyses of relations between civil and military establishments is that even when we are sure the issue is one of civil-military relations, it is often not clear whether these relations are good or bad. There is a remarkably broad range of ideas on what constitutes 'good' or 'bad' civil-military relations." (Desch 1998, 3).

<sup>4</sup> A special case was constituted by the intelligence services, which, in countries like Romania, East Germany or USSR enjoyed large privileges.

<sup>5</sup> For instance, in August 1946 alone, 9,000 officers and 5,000 NCOs were purged for disloyalty

while, by mid 1946, almost 16,000 officers and NCOs were promoted (Ghermani, 1964, 1976).

<sup>6</sup> A statistic from 1955 notes that: "90% of the officers come from the ranks of the working class".

<sup>7</sup> This process actually began shortly after Stalin's death, indicating that military independence was a goal in and of itself, in parallel with the push for economic independence that first caused an open break between Bucharest and Moscow in 1964 (de Sola Poole 1955, 94 -100).

<sup>8</sup> There were only 220,000 personnel according to the official manning tables: 38,045 officers, 36,747 NCOs, 115,837 conscripts, and 31,879 civilians (*Rebuilding the Armed Forces* 1999, 85).

<sup>9</sup> Ironically, there was a drama connected with the de-politicization of the Romanian army in 1990-1991, but not because of the need to free the army of the Communist party's influence. Rather, the appointment of General Nicolae Militaru - an officer cashiered by Ceausescu in 1978 - in the midst of the revolution, and his reactivation of 20 retired generals into senior military leadership positions, signaled a different sort of politicization. This determined a reaction within the military in the form of the Committee for the Democratization of the Army, the CADA (Watts 1992).

<sup>10</sup> The professor, current Defence Minister Ioan Mircea Pascu, had also served as the President's Foreign Affairs Advisor in 1990-1993 and was a founder of the National Defense College in 1991-1992.

<sup>11</sup> The diplomat, Ghoerghe Tinca, has represented Romania in arms control, negotiations at the United Nations in the 1970s and 1980s.



<sup>12</sup> As of 2002, Romania still had universal male conscription. However, there is broad institutional and public support for a professional military and, in March 2002, the Ministry of Defence proposed an amendment to the Romanian Constitution that would phase out conscription beginning in 2003.

<sup>13</sup> In the immediate future (probably next academic year) the National Defence University in Bucharest will be opened where, following the successful experience of the National Defense College, the future Romanian civilian and military personnel will be trained together.

<sup>14</sup> Starting with January 2003, the National School for Political and Administrative Studies in Bucharest, the NSPAS, a civilian academic institution, will open, under the assistance of NATO Headquarters in Bruxelles, NATO Defense College in Rome, and George C. Marshall Center for European Security Studies in Germany, the *NATO Senior Executive Master*. The main goal of the program is to develop a professional group of personnel for NATO related problems.

# The Military Reform Process: Recommendations Based on the Lessons Learned from Central, Eastern and Western Europe, and the United States

By Marc Remillard\*

**T**he first step in the military reform process is the needs assessment. On the political side, agreement must be reached on the reform's principles and on the necessary laws and institutions to enact those principles. In the case of the military itself, the needs' assessment means determination of what are the roles which the country's political elites expect the military to play.

Therefore it is necessary to build a broad consensus on basic principles and key elements of reform: consensus is in-

dispensable, because the reform process is a lengthy one - usually lasting as long as eight to ten years. If there is no consensus, the reform will almost certainly be reviewed and modified with each change of the government, thus ensuring the reform's failure. But there are additional reasons why strong political and public support is essential: the reform will at some points alienate certain groups of the society, it will cost taxpayers' money, and it will require that men and women find attractive and necessary to serve in the

military. These challenges cannot be overcome without broad political and public support.

After starting with basic principles, reform process should continue with translating these into legislation and institutions: in order to lay the foundations for a successful reform process, agreement must be established on the basic principles of reform, such as:

- The military must not be given an internal role, except in extreme cases and upon the decision of the Parliament only

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and in case of natural or man-made disasters, when the military acts in civilian functions of disaster relief; military and police functions must be clearly separated.

- The military must be placed under strong democratic civilian control, and effective oversight by parliament.
- The military must become transparent to the public, including the planning and the use of its budget.
- The rule of law must apply to the military as well.
- The military should be open to international cooperation, especially with neighbouring countries.

Next step is to determine the roles of the military in the context of an overall national security strategy: the executive branch must lead the efforts to introduce legislation ensuring that these principles are enshrined in the constitution and the laws of the country, and that the necessary institutions of the parliament and the government, such as parliamentary oversight committee(s) and the inter-agency coordination body(ies) are created

and adequately staffed by a mix of civilian and military personnel.

The most important legislation includes:

- The relevant parts of the constitution and
- Laws on national defence and the status of military personnel, including professionals and conscripts.

The institutions needed include:

- Parliamentary oversight committees for defence, intelligence, foreign affairs, etc.
- Relevant institutions of the executive branch ensuring the smooth integration of the military in the governmental structures within the military to manage cooperation of the military with Parliamentary committees and other non-military structures.

This should lead to developing a National Security Strategy: the starting point in thinking about reform of the military itself must be the determination of the role the military will be expected to play in the security equation of any given country. These roles can only be determined on the basis of a realistic threat

assessment, which in turn, must be based on the evaluation of the country's security situation, the region and the trans-Atlantic region, as in the case of a European country.

The conclusion is that any reform process must start with the elaboration of a National Security Strategy (or Policy) for the country. The National Security Strategy, in simple terms, determines the security situation of the country, against the background of the security situation in the immediate neighbourhood and broader region where the country is situated. In elaborating such a strategy, the notion of security must be based on a modern understanding of security, which is comprehensive, cooperative, coherent, common, collective and/or indivisible.

Seven key elements of a military reform, include:

- Establishing a comprehensive and appropriate legal framework,
- Creating a modern and flexible command structure,
- Developing an efficient defence planning system,

- Creating a new system of human resources management,
- Matching resources to missions and ensuring transparency of the military budget,
- Pursuing technical modernisation and at the right time,
- Making a careful decision regarding conscription vs. all-volunteer forces.

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### ***1. Establishing a comprehensive and appropriate legal framework***

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An adequate legal framework is indispensable for the reform. First, effective democratic political and civilian control must be established, including the introduction of the concept of „citizen in uniform”, which ensures that the human rights of every soldier are protected and ensured without endangering the effective functioning of the force – a huge task in itself. Next comes the necessary legislation regarding the peacetime functioning of the force, mobilisation and wartime use. This is a vital and, at the same time, daunting task, which covers close to all aspects of legisla-

tion, since the armed forces are decisively different from the rest of the society. The necessary legislation should cover, in addition to the “logical” ones, major areas of law: policing (for the military police), the judiciary system (for the court-martial system), healthcare and pensions (for the specific needs of the military in military healthcare and the special retirement rules for the military), education (for military training schools), etc.

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### ***2. Creating a modern and flexible command structure***

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It is essential to create a modern and flexible command structure, paying special attention to maintain the unity of command, which will make it possible to command the forces in peacetime and, with few changes, in wartime. The command structure must take into account the perspective of an eventual international cooperation both in peacetime and in time of conflicts and will make it possible, easy and effective. Creation of a civilian Ministry of Defence is important,

which does not mean that all employees of the Ministry must be civilians from the very beginning. However, the institution itself and its legal status must be civilian, and a significant number of its employees should also be civilians. The command, planning and organisational functions should be separated and should be reflected institutionally as well.

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### ***3. Developing an efficient defence planning system***

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There is a need for a serious defence planning system, which should be created under the leadership of the Ministry of Defence. The former monopoly of the General Staff in planning must be replaced by a cooperative effort, in which the civilian element takes the lead in determining the capabilities needed and cooperates with the military element in translating these capabilities into forces, as well as determining the price tag for all projects.

The defence planning process starts with the needs’ determination. These needs must then be translated into specific pro-

grams, with a rigorous determination of the amount of resources necessary to implement these programs. The results of this process must be compared and harmonised with the budgetary and other resources available. Such a process provides a clear picture of the costs of certain capabilities, and this information enables the Parliament to make informed decisions on which capabilities will eventually be sacrificed, if budgetary constraints have to be imposed. The budget itself should be centred on these needs and programs and must be transparent.

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#### ***4. Creating a new system of human resources management***

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An essential element of any reform is the reform of the human resource management system. The heritage of Communist human resource management is usually an army, which is top-heavy, meaning that it is overburdened by high-ranking officers (generals, colonels and lieutenant-colonels) and lacks junior officers and especially non-commissioned officers.

The role of NGOs in this system is limited to auxiliary roles; they are not part of the real command structures at all.

The new human resources management system must provide for a sound and predictable career model with enough incentives to attract the quality of people needed for the modern military. It must also be flexible enough to provide the necessary mix of long-term commanders and experts and shorter-term foot soldiers. All of this must be achieved in strong competition with other employers in a competitive labour market.

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#### ***5. The military budget: matching resources to missions and ensuring transparency***

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The military budget is an essential element of reform: budgetary means available must be sufficient or otherwise the reform will fail. A failed reform produces worse results than no reform, therefore it must be approached with extreme care. This is not to suggest that all requirements, expectations, demands, and wishes

of the military must be fulfilled. Sufficiency of means, in this context, means that only those objectives can be set which are supported by budgetary means. Should the budget be limited, the objectives should also be limited: balance is essential.

It is also important to ensure that the budget is transparent. The budget is one of the most important means in the hands of the political leadership, including the executive and the legislative, to exercise control over the military. It is also essential in terms of establishing and maintaining public support, which is indispensable for the reform and the long-term maintenance of defence forces in any country.

As mentioned above, the budgetary system should provide clear information about what different military capabilities cost in reality and in their entirety. This will make budgetary decisions easier to make, since decision-makers and the public will know what are the real consequences of cuts or increases. Not only does transparency enable the political leadership to make decisions based on more complete information, it also places the

responsibility for these decisions where it belongs: on elected politicians. This relieves the military of taking decisions, which must be reserved for the political leadership and Parliament.

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***6. Pursue technical modernisation, but at the right time***

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Technical modernisation is an important element of reform, but it is not the reform itself. The military tends to equate modernisation with the acquisition of new weapons and other systems: this is simply not true. Technical modernisation, of course, is an important pre-requisite for establishing and maintaining modern armed forces. Technology, however, can only work if the environment is capable of using it properly. This means that reforms aimed at the “software” of the military (training, doctrine, etc.) must precede technical modernisation, otherwise the old structures will never be able to make use of new technology. Pursuing technological modernisation too early is counterproductive: on the one hand it

diverts financial resources from other areas, like personnel; on the other hand, it creates the impression that reform is indeed happening and thus provides an excuse not to do anything else.

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***7. Make a careful decision regarding conscription vs. all-volunteer forces***

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The decision between conscription or all-volunteer armed forces is an important one: public pressure will mount in every democracy to get rid of conscription. This is also supported by the technical argument that modern armed forces hardly can rely on short-term conscripts. An all-volunteer force is, however, very difficult to establish and maintain. Moving to an all-volunteer force cannot be seen as a way to save money! A real sense of the force’s purpose is required for recruiting the necessary quality and quantity of personnel. Finally, strong political control is necessary to ensure that the forces would act loyally. This decision should not be taken hastily. All of the pros and

cons must be considered, including the budgetary implications.

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***Conclusion***

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The overview demonstrates that the time-demanding process of military reform requires persistence and a penetration into the entire system. The energy of the whole society is needed to make the transformation successful. A broad discussion on the needs of the military and necessity of reshaping its legislation and institutions will ensure transparency, civilian control and rule of law. The reform has to be backed with sufficient financial means in order to meet the challenges of technical modernisation, which includes not only high-tech equipment but also clear role determination, defence planning, and command structure. On the other hand, the public has to be kept regularly informed about military spending. The main purpose and guideline is that the military should be fully integrated within the society when developing human resources management and international cooperation.

# The Baltic States from 1914 to 1923: The First World War and the Wars of Independence

By LtCol Andrew Parrott\*

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## *Introduction*

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In the aftermath of the First World War five new states were created out of what had been Tsarist Russia on the shores of the Baltic Sea. In the north the Republic of Finland emerged as an independent state after just over a century as the Grand Duchy of Finland. South of the Gulf of Finland the northern parts of the Governorate of Livonia and the Governorate of Estonia became the Republic of Estonia. Combining former Swedish, Polish and Russian

lands the Republic of Latvia was created from the southern parts of the Governorate of Livonia, the Governorate of Kurland and the western parts of the Governorate of Vitebsk. Further south the Republic of Lithuania, formed from the Governorates of Vilnius, Kaunas and Suwalki, recreated a separate Lithuanian state for the first time in over five hundred years. The Republic of Poland also came into being at this time, more than a century after its earlier final division between Russia, Prussia and Austria. Poland, though, is not considered further here other than in the context of

relations with Lithuania. This article aims to describe the events of the First World War in the Baltic region and the Wars of Independence in each of the Baltic states.

The routes to independence for the four Baltic states that will be considered here were all similar to the extent that the same factors were involved for each state. Where their routes to independence differ is in the relative importance of the various factors. The first factor is the impact of Russian political control. At the start of the period in question all of the Baltic states were part of Tsarist Russia and the "His-

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torical Background” section below relates how that came to be. The second factor is the impact of the First World War and German influences in the Baltic area. The “First World War” section examines the political and military impact of that war. A section entitled “The Treaties” looks at the treaties that concluded the First World War and notes how the Baltic states were excluded from consideration in these various treaties. The third factor is Baltic nationalism and identity and sections for each of the Baltic states consider the struggle for national independence. There is a general pattern of cultural nationalism centred on language, giving way to a more assertive political nationalism in each state, but the details of the development of national identity vary from state to state. Finally the impact of other actors, notably those allied against Germany in the First World War, must be considered and this is done in the section entitled “Intervention”.

That the Baltic states were able to assert their national identities and achieve statehood is a product of the overall balance of the factors described above. Fundamentally Russia was weak. The collapse of the

Tsarist regime and the rise of the Bolsheviks provided a narrow window of opportunity for those wishing to escape from Russian domination. In the context of Eastern Europe at the time Russia was weak but Germany was militarily strong. In a wider context though Germany was politically, militarily and economically weak and the Allies were strong. At the end of the First World War the Allies had no wish to allow the Germans, defeated in the west, to profit from their success in the east. Again German weakness offered opportunities to the Baltic states. The growth of national identity in the Baltic states might be seen not so much as a strength but as a source of determination for exploiting the weaknesses and opportunities that arose. There is no doubt that the intervention of the Allies gave strength to the Baltic states but this was essentially a by-product of other concerns. The Allies concerns in respect of Germany have already been mentioned but the Allies had no wish either to see the Russian Bolsheviks prosper. Generally it can be said that, exhausted after the First World War, the Allies had no wish to fight the Bolsheviks. They did however support the

White Russians and others opposed to the Bolsheviks and in this circuitous way gave strength to the Baltic states.

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### ***Background***

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Throughout history the lands of the Baltic states have been much fought over. Until the twentieth century the Finns, Estonians and Latvians were never masters in their own lands. Previously the Russians, Swedes, Danes, Poles and Germans had continuously contested control of the area. The situation for the Lithuanians was somewhat different. Lithuania had previously been an independent state and then a part of the Polish-Lithuanian Union.

The power of Sweden waned during the Great Northern War after 1700 and in 1721 peace was made between Russia and Sweden at the Treaty of Nystad. This treaty incorporated the former Swedish possessions on the Eastern coast of the Baltic Sea into the Russian Empire as the provinces of Estonia and Livonia. Estonia, with its capital at Tallinn, consisted of what is now the northern half of Estonia and the island of Hiiumaa. Livonia, with its capital



at Riga, consisted of what is now the southern half of Estonia and the island of Saaremaa and southeastern Latvia.

The Polish-Lithuanian Union was divided between Russia, Prussia and Austria in three stages starting in 1772. At the first division Latgale, now eastern Latvia, was absorbed into Russia, ultimately as part of the Vitebsk province. The second division in 1793 did not affect lands now part of the Baltic states but at the third and final division in 1795 what is now southern and western Latvia and nearly all of modern Lithuania became part of the Russian Empire. The parts that are now Latvia were incorporated into the province of Kurland with its capital at Jelgava. The parts that are now Lithuania were divided between the provinces of Vilnius and Kaunas with their capitals in the cities of the same name.

Russia was defeated by Napoleon in 1807 but then at the Treaty of Tilsit entered into an alliance with France. Russia recognised French supremacy in western and central Europe but was given a free hand in the Baltic area and it was the Treaty of Tilsit that caused the pre-emptive strike by the British Navy on Copenhagen in

order to seize the Danish fleet. Tsar Alexander I also agreed to attempt to mediate a peace with Britain but when these attempts failed Russia, seeking to exclude the British Navy from the Baltic Sea demanded of Sweden the closure of Swedish ports to the British Navy. The Swedes refused to comply with the Russian demands and this led to the invasion by Russia of Finland, then part of Sweden, in February 1808. By November 1808 Russia had occupied Finland and in return for certain assurances the Finns agreed to annexation by Russia at Porvoo in March 1809. At the Treaty of Hamina in September 1809 Swedish sovereignty over Finland was surrendered, and the Grand Duchy of Finland, with the Russian Tsar as Grand Duke, was established. In 1812 the Tsar restored to Finland certain Finnish territories that had been ceded by Sweden to Russia at the Treaty of Nystad in 1721 and the Treaty of Turku in 1743.

On 24 June 1812 Napoleon invaded Russia capturing Vilnius before the end of June. Moscow was occupied on 14 September but abandoned on 19 October at the start of the long retreat. By early De-

cember what remained of the French Army was back in Vilnius and here Napoleon left his army to return to Paris. Mass graves recently discovered in Vilnius emphasise the total defeat of the French Army on this ill-fated Russian campaign.

At the Congress of Vienna in 1815, following the Napoleonic Wars, certain parts of Prussia, which are now in modern Lithuania, were awarded to Russia.<sup>1</sup> These areas became part of the province of Suwalki. At this point, with one exception, all the lands that now make up the Baltic states had become a part of the Russian Empire. The one exception is the Klaipeda area of Lithuania, which remained part of Prussia, as the better-known Memel Territory<sup>2</sup>, and only became part of Lithuania at the very end of the period being discussed in 1923.

The provisions of the Treaty of Nystad ensured that, even though they were incorporated into the Russian Empire, the provinces of Estonia and Livonia retained distinctive systems of local administration, related to those of the previous Swedish administration and different from those in other parts of the Russian Empire.

When Kurland became a part of the Russian Empire this province, too, obtained essentially the same status as Estonia and Livonia. The provinces of Vilnius and Kaunas also initially retained distinct systems of local government related to those of the former Polish-Lithuanian Union. The highest representative of Tsarist power was the Governor-General. The Governor-General of the Baltic area comprising Estonia, Livonia and Kurland resided in Riga. The Governor-General of Lithuania, including Vilnius and Kaunas, was based in Vilnius. Suwalki was subordinate to the Governor-General in Warsaw in the Russian controlled Kingdom of Poland. The area that was subject to the most Russification was the Latgale area of Latvia that was incorporated into Vitebsk province as a part of Russia with no distinct local status. As a Grand Duchy and not part of Russia proper, Finland enjoyed considerable autonomy, including the maintenance of its own military units, although as Finnish nationalism developed the Tsar sought to increasingly weaken Finnish autonomy and assert Russian control.

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### *The First World War*

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As the First World War progressed the Baltic area was by degrees involved in the conflict between Russian and German forces. As the Russian position weakened, so the Germans came to occupy and dominate the entire Baltic area. In the first year of the war the Germans occupied all of Lithuania and half of Latvia. For the next two years the situation in the Baltic area was almost static, but then in the last six months of the war in the east the Germans completed their occupation of Latvia and Estonia before the signing of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. The fighting in the Baltic area was rarely if at all central to events on the Eastern Front. The description that follows aims to put events in the Baltic area into the context of military operations on the Eastern Front and the development of the political situation in Russia more generally. Understanding the development of the situation on the Eastern Front will hopefully aid an understanding of the events in Lithuania,

Latvia, Estonia and Finland that are described later.

Germany declared war on Russia on 1 August 1914 but then, in accordance with the Schlieffen plan, declared war on France two days later and commenced the invasion of that country via neutral Belgium. The German declaration of war on Russia was the result of the Russian mobilisation designed to discourage the Austro-Hungarian Empire from taking action against Serbia. In Sarajevo on 28 Jun 1914, Serbian-backed Bosnian nationalists opposed to Habsburg rule had murdered the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne, the Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife.

The idea of the German Schlieffen plan was to avoid fighting on two fronts by achieving a rapid victory against France before turning against Russia, where it was thought mobilisation would be slow and ponderous. In fact Russian mobilisation allowed the Russians, responding to French pleas for assistance, to invade East Prussia on 12 August 1914. However initial Russian success against both the Germans and the Austro-Hungarians was not followed

up. Against the Germans in East Prussia, Russian success at the Battle of Gumbinnen on 20 August 1914 was quickly followed by defeat at the Battle of Tannenberg, ending on 31 August 1914. The Germans followed up their victory at Tannenberg with victory at the Battle of the Masurian Lakes some two weeks later. Against the Austro-Hungarians the Russians achieved somewhat greater success in Galicia in September 1914. After their victory in East Prussia though, the Germans were able to come to the assistance of their Austro-Hungarian allies, and in fighting around Warsaw and Lodz in October and November 1914 the Russians were stopped. The Russians, when it comes to tactical victories, successfully defended both Warsaw and Lodz but strategically victory belonged to the Germans. In December the Russians resumed their offensive against Krakow but were outflanked by the Austro-Hungarians attacking from the Carpathian Mountains in the south, and forced to give up much of the ground gained earlier in the autumn. The Russians planned to renew the offensive against the Germans in East Prussia with an attack scheduled for 20 February 1915,

but were pre-empted by the Germans who attacked in the area of the Masurian Lakes on 7 February 1915. The Germans achieved considerable tactical success but two things denied them strategic success. Firstly considerable Russian forces preparing for their offensive in East Prussia were able to act as reserves, and secondly simultaneous Austro-Hungarian attacks in the south, designed to relieve the garrison of Przemysl besieged since the Russian offensive of September 1914, failed. Przemysl surrendered on 22 March 1915.

By the end of the first seven months of the war on the Eastern Front, therefore, the Russians were very firmly on the defensive. Interestingly, poor Russian radio security is known to have given the Central Powers advance notice of Russian plans and intentions on a number of occasions. The German High Command's priority for 1915 became the provision of such assistance to the Austro-Hungarians as was needed to knock Russia out of the war, before Italy entered the war against the Austro-Hungarians, while containing the situation in the west. To divert attention from preparations for the forthcoming

offensive in Galicia the Germans launched a successful diversionary operation with twelve divisions towards Riga on 26 April 1915. By the start of May 1915 in the Baltic area the German front line ran from the sea between Liepāja and Ventspils east to the line of the River Venta. The line then ran southeast along the line of the River Venta and the River Dubysa to the confluence of the River Dubysa with the River Nemunas. South of here the Russians retained a frontline on the west bank of the River Nemunas to the west of Kaunas, Alytus and Grodno. In these first few months of the war in the east the Baltic area was very much on the periphery with the focus of events further to the south and west.

On the night of 1 May 1915 a joint German – Austro-Hungarian offensive was launched in Galicia between Tarnow and Gorlice and fourteen days later the attack had reached the line of the River San over 130 kilometres (80 miles) from the start line. The Italians entered the war on 25 May 1915 and, although some of the Austro-Hungarian forces had to be redeployed to meet the new threat, further gains

were made against the Russians. On 4 June 1915 the fortress of Przemyśl was recaptured from the Russians. On 17 June 1915 the Russian High Command ordered a general retreat, which became known as the "Great Retreat", and in the south the fortress of Lviv (Lemberg), abandoned by the Austro-Hungarians in September 1914, was retaken on 22 June 1915.

Further north the Germans resumed the offensive on 13 July 1915 in the Battle of the River Narev and the Russians abandoned Warsaw on 4 August 1915. The important Russian fortress of Novogeorgievsk on the River Vistula 30 kilometres (20 miles) northwest of Warsaw was surrounded by the Germans in early August 1915, and surrendered on 19 August 1915. Kaunas, heavily fortified and considered the key to Russian defences on the northern sector of the front, was first attacked on 8 August 1915. The Russians repelled a major infantry attack the next day but after their own artillery, some thirteen hundred guns in all, inadvertently destroyed some of the outer defences the garrison surrendered on 17 August 1915 giving up huge stocks of ammunition and

all the guns. The Germans captured Brest Litovsk on 25 August 1915, and continuing their advance they took Grodno on 2 September 1915 and Vilnius on 19 September 1915. Now, however, the German offensive ran out of steam, and Russian counterattacks in the vicinity of Švenčionėliai midway between Vilnius and Daugavpils helped to restore the Russian position. By 26 September 1915, when the German offensive halted, the German front line in the Baltic area ran from Riga, where the Russians still retained positions on the west bank of the River Daugava, along the line of the River Daugava to Daugavpils and then roughly due south to Pinsk.

Whereas in the spring of 1915 the Germans had occupied only a small corner of southwest Latvia and parts of western Lithuania, by the end of September they had taken control of all of Lithuania and about half of Latvia. Vilnius, the focus of Lithuanian nationalism, was in German hands and Riga, a similar focus for the Latvians, was in the front line with the Russian forward positions in the western suburbs of the city. The front lines in the

Baltic area were now to remain almost static until January 1917.

On 22 October 1915, the Russians mounted an amphibious attack involving over 500 troops behind German lines west of the Bay of Riga at Pitrags. The raid was a success causing German withdrawal in the area but the landing force was withdrawn later the same day in the absence of reinforcements to support the landing. The raid caused the Germans to devote additional troops to coastal defence and perhaps influenced their thinking for Operation Albion in October 1917.

While the scale of the Russian defeat in 1915 was huge with over one million casualties, the Russian command performed well in keeping their armies from disintegrating, and through the winter of 1915 and spring of 1916 the Russian forces staged a remarkable recovery. A Russian attack to coincide with British and French summer offensives in the west was being planned, when the Germans struck at Verdun on 21 February 1916. Coming to the aid of the French an ill conceived, hastily prepared, and poorly executed attack was launched by the Russians in the area of Lake Naroch,

some 100 kilometres (60 miles) north east of Vilnius, on 18 March 1916. Attacking on a narrow front, and after an ineffective artillery preparation the Russians suffered 15,000 casualties in the first few hours. Further assaults in the Lake Naroch area were made on 19 and 21 March 1916, in the mud of the spring thaw, and supporting attacks in the area of Riga were abandoned after 10,000 casualties on the first day.

These attacks achieved very little success and certainly did not divert German forces from the west. The Russians suffered 100,000 casualties, and within a month the Germans had recaptured the little ground they had given up. Despite its unfamiliarity in the west, it has been suggested that this was one of the decisive battles of the First World War. Their failure in an area where they had built up a considerable superiority over the Germans convinced many in the Russian high command of their inability to defeat the Germans.

Once again the Russians began planning a summer offensive but once again felt obliged to bring their plans forward to come to the aid of western allies, this time

the Italians. On 15 May 1916 the Austro-Hungarians launched their Trentino offensive. On 4 June 1916 the commander of the Russian South Western Front, Brusilov, launched the offensive that now normally bears his name. Attacking, after a short but intense artillery bombardment of selected points, with all four of his armies simultaneously on a 480 kilometres (300 miles) long front Brusilov made considerable gains during June. The Austro-Hungarians were driven back some 100 kilometres (60 miles) all along the front, a number of strategically important towns were captured and the Russians took some 350,000 prisoners and 400 artillery pieces.

The Russians were as surprised by their success as the Central Powers were dismayed. Russian plans to renew the offensive in the Lake Naroch area towards Vilnius were dropped, and instead reinforcements were directed towards Brusilov, but the Russians were hampered in their efforts by the inadequacy of the railway and road systems. To stabilise the situation the Austro-Hungarians had no option but to halt their offensive against the Italians and return troops to the Eastern Front. The

Germans too brought reinforcements from the west but the Central Powers benefited from a better railway network than was available to the Russians, and by mid-July the balance of forces had shifted in favour of the Central Powers. Urged on by the high command Brusilov persisted with his offensive until the end of August 1916, by which time further Russian progress had become impossible.

The Brusilov offensive achieved a considerable measure of success, but it was bought at a very high price, a price that the Russians could not afford. By the time the offensive was over the Russians had suffered over one million casualties to add to the five million they had already suffered during the war. These losses seriously damaged the morale of the Russian Army, and in the absence of a strategic breakthrough it can be argued, that while the Brusilov offensive did not cause the Russian Revolution it did much to make it possible.

On 7 January 1917 the Russian Twelfth Army launched an offensive, known as the Battle of the River Aa, west from the vicinity of Riga. In a surprise attack, without a

preliminary bombardment, the Russians achieved some success and by 9 January 1917 both Jelgava and Tukums had been recaptured. German counterattacks from 22 January 1917 lasted until the end of the month, but the Russians retained the ground they had gained. Although this limited attack improved the Russian position in the vicinity of Riga it had and achieved no strategic objective.

In Russia a strike call on 22 January 1917 led to the events of the February Revolution. Troops refused orders to fire on demonstrators on 11 March 1917, and by 13 March 1917 most of the Petrograd garrison had joined forces with the rebel workers. The Imperial Government resigned en masse on 12 March 1917, and Tsar Nicholas II of Russia abdicated on 15 March 1917. The Russian monarchy ended the next day when his brother, Grand Duke Michael, declined the crown. A Provisional Government headed nominally by Prince Lvov, including Kerensky as Justice Minister, was formed, partly in response to the perceived challenge from the newly formed Petrograd Soviet. The government of Russia re-

mained unstable, and never in full control of the country, while still attempting to continue the war against the Central Powers, until the Bolshevik October Revolution.

Following the February Revolution the Central Powers ceased offensive action on the Eastern Front and took advantage of the turmoil in Russia to transfer troops to the west. Kerensky, though, sought to keep faith with Russia's western allies and having taken over the War Ministry on 16 May 1917, attempted to renew the offensive against the Central Powers. On 1 July 1917 Brusilov's South Western Front attacked, with two of its four armies, the Austro-Hungarian forces east of Lviv (Lemberg). Again considerable initial success was achieved and gains of 50 kilometres (30 miles) were made on a 160 kilometres (100 miles) front, but Russian resolve weakened as their supply lines broke down and enemy resistance stiffened. On 19 July 1917 the Germans launched a powerful counterattack that broke the Russians, and brought about their withdrawal in panic and disorder. By the start of September

the Central Powers had gained over 160 kilometres (100 miles) in the south, their advance halted more by supply difficulties than by Russian resistance. At the height of this offensive Kerensky formally replaced Prince Lvov as head of the Provisional Government in a move that underlined the instability of the Russian Government and its weakening position.

During the "July Days" in 1917 a Machine Gun Regiment based in Petrograd started an uprising on 16 July 1917 in protest at the failure of the Kerensky Offensive. The uprising attracted support from the Anti-War Bolsheviks, spread to sailors at the Kronstadt naval base, and to civilians in major cities and towns all over Russia. Although the Provisional Government was able to restore order within a few days, the incident improved the standing of the Bolsheviks with an increasingly pacifist population, and undermined the credibility of the Provisional Government and the moderate socialists in control of the Petrograd Soviet. Lenin fled to Finland where he remained until the October Revolution.

The Battle of Riga was the final full-scale battle between Russian and German forces on the Eastern Front. The German attack was launched on 1 September 1917 to clear the Russian salient west of Riga, and by suggesting a German drive towards Petrograd encouraged the collapse of the faltering Russian war effort. German forces quickly established a bridgehead over the River Daugava south of Riga on the first day of the operation, and quickly followed up the Russian retreat from the city on 2 September 1917. The Russian forces, though, were not pursued more than about 30 kilometres (20 miles) beyond the city.

On 11 October 1917 the Germans, following up the success of their Riga operation, launched Operation Albion. In an amphibious assault involving some 20,000 troops the Estonian islands of Saaremaa, Hiiumaa and Muhu were attacked. The 13,000 Russian defenders put up little serious resistance, and by 20 Oct 1917 all three islands were in German hands. A simultaneous naval operation, led by ten battle-ships of the German High Seas Fleet, aimed

to force the Irben Straits and trap the Russian fleet in the Bay of Riga. Although the German fleet successfully forced its way into the Bay of Riga, the Russian fleet was able to escape through the Muhu Strait to the north and the Gulf of Finland, before the Germans completed their occupation of the islands to dominate the Muhu Strait.

Starting on 5 November 1917<sup>3</sup> and over the next three days, the Bolsheviks led by Lenin and Trotsky in what became known as the October Revolution, seized power in Petrograd from the Provisional Government of Kerensky. On 29 October 1917 the Petrograd Soviet had created a Military Revolutionary Committee, effectively headed by Trotsky. This rapidly gained the allegiance of the Petrograd garrison, workers militias, and naval personnel. Loyal troops, summoned by Kerensky to arrest leading Bolsheviks, were unable to dislodge the revolutionary forces that had occupied key strategic points. On 8 November 1917 members of the Provisional Government were arrested in the Tsar's Winter Palace. The Bolsheviks, seeking peace, eventually agreed terms with the Central Powers at

the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk on 3 March 1918, but it was to be another three years before the end of the Russian Civil War and the consolidation of communist power in Russia.

Operation Faustschlag was launched on 18 February 1918 in response to the halting of the Brest-Litovsk peace talks, by the Russian Bolsheviks. Against minimal Russian opposition the Germans quickly occupied considerable areas of territory, and advanced 240 kilometres (150 miles) on some fronts. Tallinn was occupied on 25 February 1918, and by 3 March 1918 when the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was signed the Germans had taken control of all parts of Latvia and Estonia that they had not already occupied. The passage of the First World War in the east saw Russian political authority replaced by German military authority. The Baltic economies, damaged though they were, still remained largely in German hands but, still fighting in the west, the Germans faced a rising tide of Baltic nationalism. In all of the Baltic states a growing sense of national identity underpinned movements seeking independence.

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*The Treaties*

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The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was signed on 3 March 1918 between the Central Powers and the Russian Bolshevik Government. After the October Revolution in 1917 the new Bolshevik Government in Russia had no wish to continue the war and the Central Powers were keen to transfer troops to the west. Armistice negotiations began on 3 December 1917 and a ceasefire was announced on 16 December 1917. The peace talks began in Brest-Litovsk on 22 December 1917. The Russian Bolshevik Foreign Minister, Trotsky, took charge of the Russian delegation on 9 January 1918 and, hoping for an early socialist revolution in Europe to strengthen his negotiating position, employed delaying tactics. Following a separate treaty, the "Brotfrieden" agreement signed between the Central Powers and Ukraine on 9 February 1918, the Russians halted talks the following day. The Germans responded with a rapid resumption of hostilities in Operation Faustschlag on 18 February 1918. The Bolsheviks ac-

cepted the original German terms on 19 February 1918 and new German terms on 24 February 1918 the day after they were presented. The Treaty extended German influence over Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine. The Russians also had to accept Turkish control over the Caucasus Provinces and undertook not to interfere in the internal affairs of the lost territories. The Treaty was denounced by the Allies, ignored at every opportunity by the Bolsheviks, and formally annulled as part of the 11 November 1918 Armistice agreement. Eager to maintain political and economic control in Eastern Europe, the Brest-Litovsk Treaty did not give the Germans the opportunity to withdraw as many troops from the east as they had hoped. In the "Brotfrieden" agreement, with the newly independent but German-supported Ukrainian government, the Germans were eager to secure supplies of Ukrainian grain and agreed readily to the inclusion of certain Polish areas under Ukrainian administration.

In late September 1918 the Central Powers approached President Wilson of the

USA seeking peace talks and made a formal request for a cease-fire on 4 October 1918. Cease-fires with Turkey and the Austro-Hungarian Empire came into effect on 30 October 1918 and 3 November 1918 respectively. The final cease-fire with Germany came into effect on 11 November 1918. Wilson insisted that his "Fourteen Points" serve as the basis for Armistice discussions, although Point Ten was modified to provide full independence for the subject peoples of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and Point One was interpreted to allow secret negotiations at the Paris Peace Conference. The "Fourteen Points" had originally been presented to Congress in the USA on 8 January 1918, as an outline statement of American war aims. The points were accepted by the Allies with certain accepted reservations on 4 November 1918, and finally agreed to by the Germans on 10 November 1918, although they still contained many ambiguities.<sup>4</sup>

The Paris Peace Conference opened on 12 January 1919 to formulate a peace settlement following the armistice. Although thirty-two allied countries took part, the



interests of the USA, United Kingdom, France, Italy and Japan dominated the proceedings. No representatives of the Central Powers were invited, and the Russian Bolshevik Government refused to attend. In March 1919 a Council of Four was established to enable the USA, British, French, and Italian leaders to deliberate in private. These deliberations saw confrontation between the liberal American President Wilson and the nationalist French Prime Minister Clemenceau with mediation attempted by the British Prime Minister Lloyd George, the Italian Prime Minister Orlando involving himself only in matters of direct Italian interest. Although five treaties, the Treaties of Versailles, St Germain, Trianon, Neuilly, and Sèvres, emerged from the Paris Peace Conference, the conference closed in an atmosphere of failure and the US Congress refused to ratify the Versailles Treaty in November 1919.

The Treaty of Versailles was signed between Germany and the Allies on 28 June 1919. In the west, Germany lost territory to France and Belgium, and the Saarland

and Rhineland were placed under allied control. In the north territory was ceded to Denmark, and in the east former German territory was given up to Poland, Lithuania, and Czechoslovakia. The treaty became a focus for discontent in Germany that was fully exploited by the national socialists.

The Treaty of Neuilly was signed on 27 Nov 1919 between the Allied Powers and Bulgaria. Bulgaria lost territory to all of Romania, Yugoslavia, and Greece, as the price for siding with the Central Powers in the First World War.

The Treaty of Trianon was signed on 4 June 1920 between the Allied Powers and Hungary. This treaty confirmed the break up of the Hungarian parts of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and caused long-term resentment, which dominated the foreign policy of the new Hungarian republic.

The Treaty of Sèvres between Turkey and the Allies was signed on 10 August 1920. It placed the Bosphorus and Dardanelles under international control, placed Smyrna under Greek control, and confirmed the independence of former Otto-

man possessions in the Middle East. The treaty was rejected by republican Turks and substantially revised at the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923.

The Treaty of St Germain was signed between the Allies and the new Austrian Republic on 10 September 1920. The treaty confirmed the break up of the Austrian parts of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and banned political union with Germany.

The various treaties dealt only with the Central Powers and their allies. Russia was an ally of the Western Allies, and the break away from Russia of the four Baltic states and Poland was essentially a matter for Russia, despite the opposition of the Western Allies to the Bolshevik regime, which came to power following the collapse of the Tsarist Russian Empire. All of the Baltic states achieved independence as a result of the turmoil of the First World War. It might be said, though, that the treaties that concluded the First World War not only ignored the Baltic states, but also gave rise to the stresses and strains that led to the Second World War. These treaties, therefore, set the scene for the loss of independ-

ence suffered by three of the Baltic states at the time of the Second World War.

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***Finland***

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The territory of the Grand Duchy of Finland was not directly involved in fighting during the First World War, and the impact of the war was mainly an economic one. Of course Finland had no option but to follow Russia into the war and while some areas of the economy suffered badly others prospered. The forestry industry with export markets in the United Kingdom and Western Europe was badly hit but the metalworking, chemical, and textile industries all prospered in satisfying the demands of the Russian war effort. Thousands of Finns too were in the Russian armies, involved in the defence of Finland as well as more distant operations.

The February 1917 revolution in Russia caused the collapse of the Russian war effort, leading to economic hardship for many in Finland, and fuelled the process of progress towards independence. The Russian Provisional Government believed

they assumed the Tsar's rights in respect of Finland, but a majority in Finland believed that with the abdication of the Tsar the Russian Provisional Government could make no claim to being the supreme authority in Finland.

On 20 March 1917 the Russian Provisional Government proclaimed the restoration of Finland's constitutional rights, rights that over a long period of years had been increasingly ignored by an ever more authoritarian Tsarist regime. The more liberal Mikhail Stakhovich replaced Von Seyn, the much-disliked Russian Governor General, and many political exiles were allowed to return. Elections for the Finnish parliament, the Eduskunta, had taken place in 1916, but parliament was not allowed to meet until March 1917, when a new Social Democrat government was formed and took office on 27 March 1917.

The new government was immediately confronted with both internal law and order problems and external problems regarding its relationship with the Russian Provisional Government. With regard to the internal problems in a number of towns

worker's militias had formed and these sometimes found themselves confronted by civil guards recruited from among the bourgeoisie and often supported from Germany. In 1914 some in Finland had looked to Germany for support in the struggle for independence and significant numbers of Finns had received military training in Germany during the course of the war.

On 18 July 1917 the Eduskunta approved an act making Finland independent in all respects except foreign affairs and defence. The Finnish cabinet was evenly divided on the issue but controversially Stakhovich on the instructions of Kerensky, head of the Russian Provisional Government, voted against the measure, dissolved the Eduskunta, and called new elections for October. The Social Democrats lost their overall majority in the October elections but did not accept the validity of the elections, regarding the Russian Provisional Government as having no right to dissolve the parliament. In the turmoil, exacerbated by the events of the October Revolution in Russia, a Central Revolutionary Council was

formed on 8 November 1917 and called a general strike for 14 November 1917.

The strike and the violence that accompanied this strike alienated many Social Democrats. In the absence of any clear lead from Russia, the Eduskunta voted in a government headed by the champion of Finnish rights P. Svinhufvud, who presented to the Eduskunta a declaration of Finnish independence on 6 December 1917. Svinhufvud met Lenin in Petrograd on 31 December, and was told that Russia would recognise Finnish independence and the right wing government in Helsinki.

Finland slid towards civil war in January 1919. On 18 January, General Mannerheim, charged by the government with establishing a military headquarters, left Helsinki for Vaasa to establish such a headquarters, since both Helsinki and Tampere were largely under the control of the Red Guards, as the worker's militias had become. On 19 January the Government asked Germany to return to Finland the Finnish Jaeger battalion that had been fighting for Germany. Five days later they demanded the removal of the 40,000 Rus-

sian troops on Finnish territory, and requested help from those countries that had recognised Finland. The next day the Government formally constituted the Civil Guards as the state force responsible for law and order. The civil war started on the night of 27 January when Red Guards formally took control of Helsinki and established a revolutionary government. By the beginning of February a front line ran north of Pori, Tampere, Lahti and Lappeenranta with the Red Guards in control of all the major urban centres. The "Whites", however, were better organised and equipped and more united. The Whites received significant reinforcement when the Finnish Jaeger battalion arrived back in Finland on 25 February 1918. The Germans also provided very significant assistance to the Whites. In March German naval units landed on and occupied the Aaland Islands. On 3 April a German expeditionary force commanded by General Count von der Goltz landed at Hanko on the southwest coast, and started to advance on Helsinki. A few days later another German force landed at Loviisa, and advanced

north towards Lahti to cut the railway line between Helsinki and Petrograd. At around the same time White forces advancing from the north captured Tampere. Helsinki fell to the German forces of General von der Goltz on 13 April 1918 and two weeks later prominent members of the Red Guards and leaders of the Revolutionary Government fled to Russia. On 16 May Mannerheim led a victory parade through Helsinki.

On 18 May the Eduskunta met and appointed Svinhufvud as Regent with the same powers as those previously vested in the Tsar. Still expecting a German victory, Svinhufvud sought to create a monarchy for Finland from within Germany. These plans came to nought with the collapse of Germany and the withdrawal of German troops from Finland, and Svinhufvud resigned being replaced by Mannerheim as Regent in late 1918. Mannerheim had resigned in May in protest at the degree of influence being allowed to the Germans, and on being appointed Regent had to be recalled from London where he had been engaged on an unofficial mission to im-

prove relations between Finland and the Western Allies.

New elections to the Eduskunta were held in March 1919 and the Eduskunta elected Professor K. Stahlberg as first president of the Republic of Finland on 25 July 1919. In July 1920 Finland started peace negotiations with the Bolsheviks, once it was clear that the White Russians, who were opposed to Finnish independence, had been defeated. Agreement was reached at the Treaty of Tartu signed on 14 October 1920, and by the terms of this treaty the Petsamo district, giving Finland access to the Arctic Ocean, was ceded to Finland. Tsar Alexander II had promised this area to Finland in 1864, in exchange for two districts in the Karelian Isthmus that Finland had ceded to Russia. The Tsar had not kept his word though and it was left to the Bolsheviks to honour the promise made by the Tsar over half a century later.

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### *Estonia*

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While Estonian territory was not involved in the fighting of the First World

War until 1918, Estonia was obviously affected by the conflict from an early stage. While it was feared that German victory would involve a process of “Germanification”, there was no enthusiasm for fighting for the Tsar, if “Russification” was to be the result of Russian victory. The Estonian economy was disrupted, Estonia became a base area for operations in Latvia and many refugees from Latvia arrived in Estonia. About 100,000 Estonians were conscripted into the Tsarist Army and about 10,000 were killed. The Russians moved quickly to limit the influence of the Baltic Germans but as before, it was Russians that replaced Germans in the administration not Estonians. German ideas for a joint Estonian-German provincial council involving concessions to the Estonians were not widely supported. The Northern Baltic Committee based in Tartu, but with branches all over Estonia, was formed as a voluntary organisation. It sought to help refugees, support the Russian Army and help meet the economic needs of Estonia but it was also active in spreading Estonian nationalist ideas.

In February 1917 revolution in Russia resulted in the abdication of Tsar Nicholas II and the formation of the Provisional Government. The unrest in Russia was mirrored by unrest in Estonia particularly amongst the Russian population. The Provisional Government appointed Jaan Poska, an Estonian lawyer and Mayor of Tallinn, as their Governor General in Tallinn. Demands for Estonian autonomy within Russia reached a climax with a demonstration by 40,000 Estonians, 12,000 of them armed soldiers, in Petrograd on 26 March 1917. At the end of March the Provisional Government granted autonomy within a new Estonian province, including Estonian speaking northern Livonia but excluding both the Narva and Setu areas. Elections to a new provincial council were held in May 1917, and the council assembled for the first time in July when a government was elected. Tensions between Tallinn and Petrograd grew. The replacement of Russians and the Russian language by Estonians and the Estonian language in the new administration was much resented by the previous office-holders. The attempts of the

new administration to limit the influence of the Bolshevik Soviets that had formed in Estonia were opposed by many workers. Finally the formation of all Estonian military units, amidst the turmoil of the collapse of the Tsarist Russian Army, although supported by the Provisional Government, was opposed within the Army itself. Essentially the Provisional Government in Petrograd was powerless to control events, and the main opposition to the new Estonian provincial government came from the Estonian Bolsheviks.

In Tallinn the Bolsheviks seized power on 27 October 1917 as soon as they had news of the success of the revolution in Petrograd. Viktor Kingisepp, the Vice-Chairman of the Bolshevik Estonian Revolutionary War Committee, replaced Jaan Poska. The ousted Provincial Government continued to meet illegally and at the end of 1917 decided to seek independence for Estonia and recognition from western countries. Bolshevik elections, planned for January 1918, were cancelled when it became clear that the Bolsheviks would not achieve an absolute majority, and Bolshe-

vik rule became increasingly dictatorial. The Estonian national army units posed a problem for the Bolsheviks. They were combined into an Estonian Division, commanded by Johan Laidoner, after the October Revolution, but it was not until January 1918 that their replacement by Estonian Red Guards began.

After the Bolshevik revolution the Baltic Germans sought assistance from Germany. The Bolsheviks, in response, began to deport the Baltic Germans. This programme of deportations lent weight to the German decision to resume their offensive against Russia following the breakdown of the negotiations at Brest-Litovsk. As has already been related the Germans occupied Estonia during Operation Faustschlag from 18 February 1918 to 4 March 1918. The Germans occupied Tallinn on 25 Feb 1918 but on the previous day the Provisional Government had declared Estonia independent. In the days before with the help of national armed units the Provisional Government had taken power from the Bolsheviks. The United Kingdom, France and Italy gave de facto recognition

to Estonia in May 1918. In accordance with the terms of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk while the Bolsheviks ceded sovereignty of the Estonian islands they retained jurisdiction in Livonia and Estonia although German troops were to be stationed here for security.

The Germans had no wish to encourage independence in the form desired by the Estonians. Konstantin Päts, who had been declared Prime Minister, was imprisoned, Germans were reinstated in all positions of high office, political parties were banned, and strict censorship was instituted. On 5 November 1918 the Baltic Dukedom was proclaimed in Riga. Formally independent the Baltic Dukedom included both Estonia and Latvia, and was intended to perpetuate German economic domination of the area in a close political relationship with Germany.

On 11 November 1918 the Armistice brought the First World War to an end in the west, at the same time as economic collapse and social turmoil swept Germany. The Provisional Government of Estonia resumed its activities on the same day. On

13 November 1918 Soviet Russia annulled the Treaty of Brest Litovsk and prepared for offensive action in the Baltic region. On 22 November 1918 Soviet forces attacked Narva but met stiff German resistance and withdrew. However on 25 November 1918 the Germans withdrew from Pskov, and the Soviet forces followed in their wake quickly capturing Võru, Valga and Tartu, and most of southern Estonia. 28 November 1918 is formally regarded as the start of the Estonian War of Independence when Soviet forces resumed their attack on Narva, this time against Estonian opposition. The Bolshevik Estonian Worker's Commune was declared in Narva on 29 November 1918. By the end of December Tapa had fallen to the Soviets, whose forces were only twenty miles east of Tallinn. To the southeast and south Paide, Viljandi, and Pärnu were all threatened with capture.

On 6 January 1919 the Estonians counterattacked, reinforced by a British naval presence and Finnish volunteers. In the north on 12 January 1919 Rakvere was recaptured, and on 19 January 1919 Narva

fell to forces that had been landed on the coast. In the southeast Tartu was recaptured on 14 January 1919, Valga and Võru were both retaken on 1 February 1919, and three days later Petseri was secured, leaving Estonia free of Soviet forces. Throughout this period the Estonian Bolsheviks continued to make trouble. An attempted uprising in Tallinn in December 1918 was successfully countered, and a rebellion on the island of Saaremaa in February 1919 was put down. From February to May 1919 the situation on the Narva front remained static although Soviet artillery fire destroyed much of Narva. To the southeast the Soviets launched a major counterattack and recaptured Petseri on 11 March 1919. The Estonians, however, fought successful defensive battles south and east of Võru in the second half of March, and Petseri fell again to the Estonians on 29 March 1919. By mid-May the Estonians had completely regained the initiative.

In May 1919 the Estonian army command decided to advance into Russia to secure the frontiers of Estonia. This move required an uneasy alliance with the local

White Russian forces, the North-Western Army. While the White Russians were opposed to the Soviets, they were also opposed to Estonian independence. Initially the offensive fared well. Pskov in the south was captured, as were Jamburg, Gdov, and Luga to the north. The White Russian forces, supported by small British detachments, advanced to within a few miles of Petrograd.

To the south in Latvia, Estonian forces secured Alūksne on 28 May 1919, and Jekabpils on the River Daugava in early June. Cēsis on the road to Riga was taken on 31 May 1919, but retaken by the Baltic German Landeswehr on 6 June 1919. In April 1919 the Latvian Provisional Government had been ousted in a coup d'état by a pro-German Government, backed by the Landeswehr that preferred to turn north against the Estonians rather than east against the Soviet forces. In a fierce battle lasting four days the Estonians defeated the Landeswehr, and the date on which Cēsis was recaptured, 23 June 1919, has since been celebrated in Estonia as Victory Day. Once again in October 1919 the Latvians sought

Estonian help for the defence of Riga.

In late August the Estonians were offered peace talks by the Soviets and these took place in September in Pskov, which had been retaken by the Soviets at the end of August. No agreement was reached, partly as a result of Allied pressure to continue fighting the Soviets, but the talks did demonstrate that the Russians no longer regarded the conflict as a civil war, but as one between two sovereign states. In October the White Russian North Western Army launched an attack on Petrograd. This failed and the North Western Army collapsed. By mid-November Soviet forces were once again threatening Narva. The Estonians disarmed the North Western Army as it retreated into Estonia, but many of its members joined the Estonian forces defending Narva.

At the start of December peace talks recommenced in Tartu. To strengthen their negotiating position, the Soviets mounted heavy attacks on Narva. In the middle of the month the Soviet forces managed to create a bridgehead over the Narva River to the southwest of Narva at Krivasoo and

Vääska, and threatened to surround Narva. In very heavy fighting the Estonians managed to restore the situation. With the defeat of the attack on Petrograd the Allies had lost hope of defeating the Soviets and no longer opposed peace talks. On 31 December 1919 an armistice was agreed which came into effect on 3 January 1920. During January 1920 talks agreed the border between Russia and Estonia, and the Treaty of Tartu was signed on 2 February 1920.

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### *Latvia*

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The First World War had a very severe impact on Latvia, as the front line between German and Russian forces bisected Latvia for most of the duration of the war. By May 1915 the Germans had captured the southwestern corner of Latvia, including the port of Liepāja. By September 1915 the Germans had advanced to the line of the River Daugava, occupying all of Latvia south and west of the river, except for a Russian held salient on the west bank of the river at Riga. In January 1917 a Russian offensive from this salient ended with

the recapture of the towns of Tukums and Jelgava, which were held by the Russians through the summer of 1917. On 1 September 1917 the Germans launched an offensive against Riga, very quickly capturing the city and a considerable salient to the east of the city on the east bank of the River Daugava. The front line then remained static, until in February 1918 the Germans advanced against minimal opposition to occupy all of the rest of Latvia. The presence of the German front line in Latvia, and the perceived unwillingness of Russian soldiers to defend what many of them considered a German province, led to the creation of local Latvian Regiments authorised by the Russian government. By November 1915 eight Latvian battalions had been formed, and during the course of the war a total of over 130,000 men joined these local Latvian forces. In May 1917 the Latvian Regiments transferred their loyalty to the Bolsheviks, partly through a sense of having been betrayed by the Tsarist forces in the fight against the Germans.

In March 1917 the Provisional Livonian Council was formed at Valmiera with au-

thority over the Latvian parts of Livonia, the Estonian parts having been absorbed into the new autonomous Estonia. In May 1917 a provisional council for Latgale was formed at Rezekne. In the same month a provisional council was formed for Kurland in Tartu, as at that time the Germans occupied Kurland. On 5 July 1917 the Provisional Livonian Council was declared the regional government by the Provisional Government of Russia, which at the same time strongly opposed the unification of Latgale with the other regions of Latvia. On 12 August the Latvian authorities demanded total self-determination, and those closest to power decided that if the Germans occupied Riga independence from Russia would be sought.

The first democratic elections to the Livonian Council were held in August 1917, when the Bolsheviks gained a majority. After the October revolution in Russia the position of the Bolsheviks was much strengthened, and the Executive Committee of Latvian Soviets wielded absolute power. In the areas not occupied by Germany, essentially northern and eastern

Latvia excluding Riga after early September 1917, banks and businesses were nationalised, land was confiscated, civil rights and press freedom were restricted, political activity was banned, nationalists were arrested, and religious freedom was not respected. The Bolshevik policies soon caused unrest amongst the majority of the population and brought about renewed support for independence. In Valka on 16 November 1917 nationalist Latvian politicians formed a Provisional National Council, which began to make preparations for forming a constituent assembly and sending representatives to gather support in the west. A second sitting of the council in January 1918 confirmed the intention of separating Latvia from Russia and creating an independent state but, at this time, the council had no power to act.

By the end of February 1918 the Germans occupied all of Latvia. In accordance with the terms of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk while the Bolsheviks ceded sovereignty of Kurland they retained jurisdiction in Livonia, although German troops were to be stationed here for security. Regardless

of the treaty the Germans continued to occupy adjacent parts of Russia in the Governorates of Pskov and Vitebsk. As has been related in the section on Estonia the Germans had no desire to see the creation of genuinely independent Baltic states and instead created a Baltic Dukedom, dominated by the Baltic Germans, incorporating Estonia and Latvia whose "independence" was proclaimed in Riga on 5 November 1918. Acting illegally during the German occupation the Provisional National Council united with the Democratic Bloc functioning in Riga to form the Latvian People's Council.

The armistice signed by Germany on 11 November 1918 at Compiègne in France annulled the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and on 13 November the Bolsheviks started preparations for an offensive against the Germans in the east. The United Kingdom gave de facto recognition to Latvia on 11 November 1918 but it was not until 17 November 1918 that the first sitting of the Latvian People's Council, presided over by J. Cakste, took place. The People's Council appointed the Latvian Provisional Gov-



ernment headed by K. Ulmanis and the declaration of independence of the Republic of Latvia was made in Riga Theatre on 18 November 1918.

The Latvian Provisional Government had no armed forces at its disposal with which to defend Latvia, and as the German forces withdrew the Bolsheviks occupied Latvia. The Germans were willing to give up Latvia east of a line from Riga to Bauska, and the Bolsheviks progressively occupied eastern Latvia without opposition. In the north Alūksne was taken on 7 December, Valka on 18 December, and Cēsis on 23 December 1918. In the south Daugavpils was taken on 9 December, Plavinas on 17 December, and Skrīveri on 27 December 1918. Riga fell to the Bolsheviks on 3 January 1919, and the Latvian Provisional Government moved to Liepāja. The Bolsheviks now engaged the Germans on the line they had chosen for their defence. On 7 January Bauska fell to the Bolsheviks followed by Tukums and Jelgava on 10 January 1919. The Bolshevik advance was only halted at the end of January 1919 on the line of the River Venta from the

sea at Ventspils to the Lithuanian border. With the advance of the Bolshevik forces came the restoration of Bolshevik government, with the Latvian Soviet Republic being declared in Valka shortly after its capture. The situation was complicated by the fact that the Bolshevik forces included amongst their numbers the Latvian Regiments, who now found themselves fighting for the Bolsheviks against not just German forces, but also the forces of the Latvian Provisional Government.

In January 1919 the Landeswehr, formed from the local Baltic Germans and the Iron Division, formed from German volunteers, were placed under the command of the German General Count von der Goltz. In January also the Latvian Provisional Government was able to form the South Latvian Brigade commanded by Colonel Balodis, and by agreement with the Estonians was able to start forming the North Latvian Brigade, commanded by Colonel Zemītais in southern Estonia. Estonian forces recaptured Valka and Rūjiena from the Bolsheviks on 1 February 1919, gaining a foothold in northern Latvia. At the beginning

of March 1919 the German forces of Count von der Goltz with the South Latvian Brigade were able to resume the offensive from the line of the River Venta. Tukums was recaptured from the Bolsheviks on 15 March, and Jelgava on 18 March 1919 and by 26 March 1919 the German and Latvian forces had closed on Riga, which remained, though, for the time being in Bolshevik hands.

Count von der Goltz, however, harboured aspirations still for the restoration of Baltic German dominance in the Baltic area. On 16 April 1919 a coup backed by German units ousted the Latvian Provisional Government and the regime of K. Ulmanis in Liepāja. While the Germans were able to arrest some ministers the majority and the leadership, including Ulmanis, found refuge on the Latvian freighter "Saratov" under British protection in Liepāja harbour. On 10 May a puppet German-Latvian regime under the leadership of A. Niedra was formed, but this regime was recognised neither by the Western Allies nor by the majority of the people of Latvia. In the areas under their

control the Landeswehr and the Iron Division took part in repressive measures to force acceptance of the new regime. The South Latvian Brigade did not accept the new regime either but continued to co-operate with the German forces, in opposing the Bolshevik forces and continuing the liberation of Latvia from the Bolsheviks.

On 22 May Riga was liberated from the Bolsheviks by the German forces of Count von der Goltz, which then continued their advance northeast towards Cēsis. The South Latvian Brigade was denied a major role in the recapture of Riga, and was then directed to the southeast to pursue the Bolsheviks along the banks of the River Daugava. By ensuring that the German forces recaptured Riga Count von der Goltz was able to ensure the re-establishment of German authority in Riga. By his subsequent dispositions he was able to ensure that the German forces were so positioned that they were able to engage the Estonian backed Latvian forces to the north.

In the north of Latvia Limbaži was captured by forces advancing from Estonia

on 27 May 1919, further east Alūksne was retaken by forces advancing from Valka on 29 May 1919, and on 31 May 1919 Cēsis was retaken by forces advancing from Rūjiena. In a very rapid advance south, forces from Alūksne reached Jekabpils on 5 June 1919, linking up shortly afterwards with the South Latvian Brigade advancing from Riga. By the middle of June the Bolsheviks retained control only of Latgale east of a line from Subate on the Lithuanian border to Alūksne in the north. However, there remained to be resolved the conflict between the largely German forces of Count von der Goltz loyal to the puppet Niedra regime and the Latvian and Estonian forces loyal to and supporting the legitimate Ulmanis regime.

On 19 June 1919 the German Landeswehr and Iron Division opened the attack on the Latvian and Estonian forces around Cēsis. By 21 June 1919 the Germans had achieved considerable success, but the timely arrival of reinforcements enabled the Latvians and Estonians to counter-attack and regain the initiative on 22 June 1919. Shortly afterwards the German

forces began to retreat and were pursued to Riga where they prepared to defend the city on 26 June. Under pressure though from the Allies an armistice was agreed at Strazdumuiža on 3 July 1919. By its terms the legitimate government of Ulmanis was to be restored, the Baltic German Landeswehr was to be placed under the command of the British officer, Lt Col Alexander (later Field Marshal Lord Alexander of Tunis), and the Volunteer German Iron Division was to leave Latvia. The government of K. Ulmanis returned to Riga on 8 July 1919 and the Landeswehr, under British command, became a component of the Latvian National Army. The Iron Division, however, did not leave Latvia, despite a meeting between General Gough of the Allied Military Mission and Count von der Goltz on 19 July, remaining instead at Jelgava. Allied pressure however did ensure that Count von der Goltz was recalled to Germany by the German government on 3 October 1919.

Allied support for the Baltic states was not motivated by any particular wish to see the Baltic states gain independence.

Instead allied support was motivated more by a wish to see that the Germans did not win territory in the east, having lost in the west, and a wish to see the Russian Bolsheviks defeated and the Tsarist regime, their ally in the war, restored to power. For this reason the Allies supported the raising of the White Russian Western Army under the command of Colonel Bermond-Avalov at Jelgava in late summer and early autumn 1919, for operations against the Bolsheviks. The White Russians, however, were no supporters of the idea of independence for the Baltic states, and Germans who had previously served in the Iron Division of German volunteers made more than three-quarters of Bermond-Avalov's force up. It should perhaps then have come as no surprise when on 8 October 1919 the Russian Western Army commenced operations against the Republic of Latvia.

Bermond-Avalov's forces marched on Riga from Jelgava but the Latvian National Army, helped by volunteers from the population of Riga, was able to prevent the White Russians from crossing the River

Daugava. In fighting between 16 and 19 October at Jaunjelgava the Latvian National Army defeated White Russian forces moving east along the line of the River Daugava. Only in Kurland did the White Russians achieve any great success. The Latvians were able only to hold the ports of Liepaja and Ventspils and a narrow strip of the coastline east of Ventspils. The counter-attack of the Latvian National Army started on 11 October, and on 15 October the fortress of Daugagriva at the mouth of the River Daugava was captured. With Allied naval gunfire support, the Latvians started to clear the parts of Riga on the west bank of the River Daugava on 3 November, and the whole of the city was back in Latvian hands by 10 November 1919. On the night of 19 November Colonel Bermond-Avalov placed his forces under the protection of General Eberhardt, the successor to Count von der Goltz, who sought an early truce. On 21 November the Latvians recaptured Jelgava. On the orders of the Allied Military Commission the whole of Latvia was cleared of Bermond-Avalov's forces by 29 November 1919.

With the threat posed by the White Russian forces extinguished and the departure of the last German forces on Latvian territory, the Latvians could now look to the liberation of Latgale where the situation had remained largely static since the summer. Plans were made in co-operation with the Lithuanians and the Poles and an offensive was launched on 3 January 1920, the same day as the Estonians agreed an armistice with the Bolsheviks. The Lithuanians and the Poles advanced on Daugavpils from the south, and after the capture of the city the Poles advanced east to and beyond Krāslava. To the north the Latvians advanced east on a broad front. Rezekne was captured on 21 January 1920 and on 1 February 1920 an armistice was agreed with the Bolsheviks. By this time, with the exception of one small area in the north-east, all Latvian speaking areas had been freed from Bolshevik control and, although sporadic fighting took place for some time after the agreement of the armistice the war of independence was over. A Peace Treaty was finally agreed with Moscow on 11 August 1920.

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*Lithuania*

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The Germans occupied the area of modern Lithuania in three stages during World War One. Some seven months after the start of the war the Germans had regained the initiative on their eastern front and, advancing from Prussia, had occupied the border regions of the Russian Empire to a maximum depth of some thirty miles in the areas west of Kaunas and Alytus.

In April 1915 the Germans launched an offensive in Lithuania to draw attention away from their offensive being planned in Galicia. By the end of April 1915 all of western Lithuania had been occupied, and the front line ran from north-west to south-east along the line of the Venta and Dubysa rivers, and then south just to the west of Kaunas, Alytus, and Grodno. In August 1915 the Germans resumed their offensive in Lithuania following up the success they had achieved further to the south. Kaunas was attacked on 8 August 1915 and was captured nine days later. Vilnius fell to the Germans on 19 September 1915.

By the end of September the German front line had stabilised along the line of the River Daugava in Latvia and south from Daugavpils to Pinsk. All of modern Lithuania was now in German hands and would remain so for the rest of World War One. In spring 1916 the Russians mounted an offensive northeast of Vilnius in the vicinity of Lake Naroch but achieved no success, and thereafter the German occupation of Lithuania went unchallenged.

As early as 1915 the political leadership in Vilnius began to discuss the restoration of Lithuanian independence. In Switzerland in 1916 the idea was first openly discussed, and the desire for independence was stressed in an appeal to the American President Wilson. Lithuanians were encouraged during the spring of 1916 after the declaration of the formation of a Polish Republic under German and Austro-Hungarian protection, although there were fears that the Poles might lay claim to Lithuanian territory. The Germans postponed any decision on the status of Lithuania until after the end of the war.

Entirely occupied by Germany the February and October revolutions in Rus-

sia in 1917 did not directly affect Lithuania although as a result the Germans reviewed their policy with regard to Lithuania forming a Lithuanian council with limited powers. On 18 September 1917 a Lithuanian conference assembled in Vilnius with J. Basanavičius as its elected Chairman. This conference stated the determination of the Lithuanian people to achieve independence, and elected a 20 member Taryba or council chaired by A. Smetona to draw up a constitution. Germany proposed a conference of Lithuanian politicians and this took place in Bern in November 1917, where agreement was reached on an independent Lithuanian state under German protection. The Taryba presented a document to the Germans on 11 December 1917 proclaiming the restoration of an independent Lithuanian state, but Germany did not react to this document.

The Taryba, losing popularity, decided to act decisively, and on 16 February 1918 the Independence Manifesto was signed and Lithuania was declared independent. This time the Germans did react and recognised the Independence Manifesto on 23 March

1918, but only on the basis of the document of 11 December 1917. On 13 July 1918 the Taryba elected the German Duke Wilhelm von Urach as the King of Lithuania, in accordance with wishes expressed in Berlin to link Lithuania to Germany as closely as possible.

Following the German armistice with the Allies on 11 November 1918 and the annulling of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk the Bolsheviks resumed their offensive against the Germans in the east. The Germans fell back from the forward positions they had occupied in February 1918, but were determined to hold positions in Lithuania to the east of their frontiers. The Lithuanian government started to organise a Lithuanian Army on 23 November 1918, but in early December 1918 the Bolsheviks invaded Lithuania. On 8 December the Provisional Lithuanian Government of Workers and Peasants was proclaimed. On 16 January 1919 it was decided in Moscow to abolish the Belarussian Soviet Republic, absorb most of it into Russia, and amalgamate the rest with Lithuania as the Lithuanian-Belarussian Soviet Republic.

The Bolsheviks captured Vilnius on 6 January 1919, and by the end of the same month only western Lithuania remained in Lithuanian and German hands. The front line ran west and south of Telšiai, south of Šiauliai and curved south east of Kaunas and just east of Alytus. On 5 March 1919 the Lithuanian government resorted to compulsory conscription to sustain their army. In April 1919 Polish forces liberated Vilnius from the Bolsheviks, and Lithuanian and German forces went onto the offensive against the Bolsheviks elsewhere in Lithuania, soon liberating Panevėžys and Ukmergė. By the end of June 1919 all of Lithuania had been cleared of Bolshevik forces, and in August 1919 a ceasefire with the Bolsheviks took effect although this had not been formally agreed and much of eastern Lithuania remained in Polish hands. A Polish backed coup to unite Lithuania with Poland was discovered and foiled in Kaunas in August 1919. A demarcation line had been established with the Poles in July 1919 but border clashes continued for the next year.

At the same time as the White Russian forces of Colonel Bermont-Avalov marched on Riga in October 1919, they invaded northwestern Lithuania and marched towards Vilnius. The Lithuanians decisively defeated the Bermont-Avalov forces at Radviliškis on 21 November 1919. Many of Bermont-Avalov's forces were German volunteers, and as a result of his actions the Western Allies demanded the withdrawal of all remaining German forces from the Baltic States and the last German troops left Lithuania on 15 December 1919.

During July 1920 the Bolsheviks mounted a major offensive during which the Poles were driven from eastern Lithuania, and Vilnius was captured on 14 July 1920. The Lithuanians concluded a peace treaty with the Bolsheviks on 12 July 1920 that established eastern and southern borders for Lithuania. (These borders were further east and further south than those given to the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic in 1944 and accepted today.) Vilnius was handed back to the Lithuanians by the Bolsheviks on 27 August 1920.

At the gates of Warsaw, with Warsaw already reported as having fallen to the Bolsheviks in some newspapers, the Poles inflicted a massive defeat on the Bolsheviks, who started to retreat in disorder with the Poles advancing close behind them. On 7 October 1920, with the Western Allies participating in the negotiations, an agreement was signed between Lithuania and Poland that, although it left certain issues unresolved, left Vilnius in Lithuanian hands. Two days later Polish forces led by General Zeligowski re-occupied Vilnius and the surrounding areas. The Polish government accepted no responsibility for the actions of General Zeligowski who, they claimed, was leading a force of local inhabitants. In November 1920 the Lithuanians inflicted a defeat on the forces of General Zeligowski at Širvintos north of Vilnius and started to advance towards Vilnius, but agreed to a League of Nations brokered ceasefire before having retaken Vilnius. A neutral zone was established between Lithuania and Poland on 29 November 1920. After a plebiscite Vilnius and the surrounding area was incorporated into

Poland on 8 April 1922 and remained in Polish hands until 1939, causing continuing ill feeling between Lithuania and Poland.

Settling the borders of Germany following the end of the First World War the territory of Memel (Klaipėda), that part of Prussia north of the River Nemunas, was detached from Germany as a Free City. French forces occupied the area but civil administration remained in German hands. The local German population, just under half of the total, aimed for reunion with Germany and the Poles also made claims to the territory. In January 1923 Lithuanian troops occupied Klaipėda in support of an uprising by the local Lithuanian inhabitants. At first the French occupation forces resisted the Lithuanian occupation but soon gave way and were returned to France. On 8 May 1924 the League of Nations in Paris formally agreed to the incorporation of Klaipėda into Lithuania. The status of Klaipėda soured Lithuania's relations with Germany, and on 22 March 1939 Lithuania gave in to German demands that Memel be returned to them.

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### *Intervention*

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The intervention of the Western Allies in the Baltic area at the end of the First World War was not motivated by any particular policy to assist the Baltic states achieve independence. Instead the allies did not wish to see the Germans profit in the east when they had lost in the west, and sought to support the White Russians in the Russian Civil War. The Russian Tsarist Regime had been a good ally and the western powers had no wish to see the Bolsheviks become established in Russia. However following the losses of the First World War the western allies had no wish to become involved in an expensive conflict in Russia. Support for the White Russians went as far as the provision of materiel support and volunteers, and the securing of base areas for them but not as far, except on isolated occasions, as actually taking part in fighting against the Bolshevik forces.

Allied forces supported the White Russians from all points of the compass. In

the north, from the Arctic Ocean, British, American, Italian, and Serbian forces operated from Moermansk and Archangel. In the south, in the Black Sea area, French and Rumanian forces operated from Odessa, and British forces operated from Batumi. In the east American, British, Czech, and Japanese forces were present in Siberia. These land forces numbered in excess of 100,000 men. In the west mainly naval forces lent assistance to the anti-Bolshevik forces, including the forces of the emerging Baltic nations. In the first half of 1919 the British Royal Navy had an average of just fewer than thirty ships committed to operations in the Baltic Sea, in the second half of the year this figure increased threefold. The French Navy, which worked in close co-operation with the Royal Navy, had twenty-six ships involved in Baltic operations. The Americans had fourteen ships present, and the Italians contributed two ships. Direct assistance, both in terms of volunteer personnel and materiel, was also given to the Baltic states in limited amounts by a number of other states, in particular the Scandinavians.

Although the task of the British and French naval forces was essentially to blockade the Bolshevik forces they maintained an offensive posture and provided considerable support to the authorities and forces of the Baltic states. (By contrast the allied land forces committed in other parts of Russia maintained an essentially defensive posture.) The British Royal Navy, commanded by Rear-Admiral Sinclair arrived in Estonian waters in the early days of December 1918. One early act of support involved the bombardment of the only bridge across the Narva River, destroying it and creating severe difficulties for the Bolshevik forces to the west of it in Estonia. The Royal Navy also acted as a covering force to a small Estonian amphibious assault to the rear of the Bolshevik front line, and provided over 5,000 rifles and other stores to the Estonian forces. Before the end of December 1918 the Royal Navy had captured two Bolshevik destroyers, which were handed over to the Estonian Navy and assisted in the transport of over 500 Finnish volunteers from Helsinki to Tallinn. Early in January 1919 the Royal

Navy supported the Estonians, who had gone over to the offensive, with naval gunfire against the Bolshevik forces.

Vessels of the Royal Navy arrived in Riga on 19 December 1918. Stores were landed, training was provided to Latvian volunteers, and naval gunfire was provided in support of the forces of the Ulmanis government. However the Royal Navy could not by itself prevent the fall of Riga to the Bolsheviks, it withdrew carrying refugees on 3 January 1919 and Sinclair's force withdrew from the Baltic Sea.

Sinclair was replaced by a force under the command of Rear-Admiral Cowan. This force, in February 1919, was able to provide additional materiel support to the Latvians at Liepaja, and with the use of naval gunfire support the Latvians in the defence of Ventspils. In April additional support in the shape of artillery guns and transport was provided to the Latvians at Liepaja, and the Royal Navy played an active part in preventing the capture of Ulmanis and the Latvian Government at the time of the German backed coup.

May 1919 found the Royal Navy in Estonian waters where cover was once again provided for Estonian amphibious operations and a close watch was kept on the Bolshevik fleet at Kronstadt. Operations against Kronstadt involved elements of the recently formed Royal Air Force. May 1919 also saw the establishment of a British Military Mission in the Baltic Region headquartered at Helsinki.

Following the defeat of the German Landeswehr at Cēsis, the Royal Navy played an important role in the negotiations at Riga that led to the restoration in Latvia of the government of Ulmanis. It was at this time that an officer from the British Mission, Lt Col Alexander, was appointed to command the Landeswehr in support of Latvian objectives. Later, at the start of 1920, the Landeswehr were to play a major role in the liberation of Latgale that concluded the Latvian War of Independence.

October 1919 saw the White Russian forces of Bermond-Avalov, with considerable German support, commence their operations against the Latvian government forces. Again the British Royal Navy and

the French Navy gave significant support to the Latvian forces. Both at Riga and at Liepaja naval gunfire supported the efforts of the Latvian government forces opposing the White Russian forces of Bermond-Avalov.

British operations in the Baltic Region were not carried out without losses. A total of 17 ships were sunk, with mines claiming a large number, and 37 aircraft were also lost. 123 Royal Navy and 5 Royal Air Force personnel were killed.

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### *Conclusion*

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In the introduction four factors were identified as being relevant to the route to independence for all of the Baltic states, their relative importance being different for each of the four states.

In Finland the war of independence was more of a civil war than in the other states. The Russian Bolsheviks recognised Finnish independence at an early stage and did not openly play an active role in events in Finland. It was therefore left to Finnish Bolsheviks, who might or might not have

sought a renewal of union with Russia, to dispute the style of government of Finland with the “White” Finns. Without doubt the Germans contributed in large measure to the victory of the “White” Finns. Since the civil war in Finland took place before the end of the First World War the Western Allies played, essentially, no role in the independence of Finland.

In Estonia the decisive events leading to independence started some months later than in Finland. In essence the Germans played no military role in the independence of Estonia and left the field early. In large measure the Estonians achieved independence by themselves in opposition to the Bolsheviks. The Western Allies, mainly the British and in particular the Royal Navy, did play a role in the independence of Estonia. It is easy to overestimate that role if only because the assistance given was just enough at a crucial time, rather than sustained and substantial assistance over a period of time.

It is in Latvia that the situation is most complex. But for German assistance and resistance in the early stages Latvia might



have succumbed to the Bolsheviks. It was, though, allied intervention, without a doubt, that thereafter thwarted German intentions in favour of Latvian aspirations. Beyond that, allied intervention played a role in defeating Russian aspirations, both Bolshevik and White. The Estonians too played a part in Latvia, playing a considerable role in the defeat of the Bolsheviks in northern Latvia, a decisive role in the defeat of Baltic German aspirations, and giving assistance to the Latvians in the defeat of the White Russians.

As in Latvia, in Lithuania too the Germans played a role in keeping the Lithuanians in the field against the Bolsheviks in the early stages. The western allies played a minimal role in Lithuania, and indeed later, in the case of Memel (Klaipėda), the Lithuanians found themselves opposed to the French. Ultimately in Lithuania, where the struggle for independence lasted longest, the Lithuanians, having played their part in defeating the White Russian forces, found themselves sharing cause with the Russian Bolsheviks against a common enemy, the Poles.

And so for some twenty years the Baltic states enjoyed independence until the onset of the Second World War, a war with its origins in the imperfections of the treaties that concluded the First World War. Finland resisted the Soviet Union fighting later with, but not for, Germany. Finland retained her sovereignty, although she lost much in terms of territory and limitations on her freedom of action. The governments of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania chose not to resist the Soviet Union, although later many of their people did, and sovereignty was lost. What might have been the ultimate outcome if Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania had resisted in 1939? It is, at this stage of history, of course impossible to say. Perhaps occupation and incorporation into the Soviet Union would have happened anyway, but there has to be a chance that their fate would have mirrored that of Finland, and there is perhaps a bigger chance that their fate would have mirrored that of Poland. Perhaps the 1990s could have seen democratic government restored instead of sovereignty.

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*Annex*

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President Wilson's "Fourteen Points":

1. Point One renounced secret treaties demanding, "open covenants openly arrived at".
2. Point Two required freedom of the seas outside territorial waters and an end to "blockade" tactics.
3. Point Three called for the removal, wherever possible, of trade barriers.
4. Point Four called for arms reductions
5. Point Five called for impartial arbitration of all colonial disputes
6. Point Six called for the evacuation, by the Central Powers, of all former Russian territory.
7. Point Seven dealt with the restoration of Belgium.
8. Point Eight admitted French claims to Alsace and Lorraine.
9. Point Nine gave some recognition to Italian territorial claims.
10. Point Ten provided "autonomous development" for the various nationalities within the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

11. Point Eleven demanded the evacuation of occupied Romania, Montenegro and Serbia with the latter having access to the Adriatic Coast.

12. Point Twelve guaranteed Turkish sovereignty over its heartlands but demanded autonomy for subject peoples and the opening of the Dardanelles to international traffic.

13. Point Thirteen recognized an independent Poland with access to the sea.

14. Point Fourteen recommended a “general association” of nations.

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1 After the Napoleonic War representatives of all the European powers, except the Ottoman Empire, gathered in September 1815 at Vienna. They had the imposing task of building a new political and diplomatic structure for Europe after a quarter century of wars and revolutions. Work went slowly during the ten-month span of the Congress of Vienna. The leaders who gathered at Vienna - Lord Castlereagh of Great Britain, Count von Hardenberg of Prussia, Prince Klemens von Metternich of Austria, Tsar Alexander I of Russia, and Prince Charles Maurice de Talleyrand of France - met in small secret conferences to decide the future of Europe. In an attempt to restore some balance, the Congress followed four principles: legitimacy, encirclement of France, compensation,

and balance of power. The desire to construct an effective balance of power remained at the centre of the Congress’ attention. Each power, however, had its own idea of what constituted a proper balance. Russia’s ambitions in Poland almost broke up the conference: Britain believed that an enlarged Russia threatened peace. Prussia wanted all of Saxony: Austria feared a growing Prussia. While the four wartime allies split, the clever French representative, Talleyrand, negotiated a secret treaty among the French, Austrians, and British that pledged mutual assistance to restrain the Russians and Prussians. Russia and Prussia eventually reduced their demands for land in Poland and Saxony, and the sought-after balance of power was achieved.

2 The city and region of Memel lies on the Baltic at the mouth of the River Niemen. The region came under Swedish control and, following the Napoleonic wars under Prussia. It remained within the German Reich until the end of World War I. Germans constituted a majority of the city’s population while Lithuanians predominated in the surrounding countryside. The Treaty of Versailles severed Memel and the surrounding district from Germany. Lithuanian representatives to the Paris Peace Conference had asked the Allied Powers to grant them possession of the Memel area, but instead it was placed under a French administration that governed under a League of Nations mandate. An Allied commission recommended establishing a “Free City” under League of Nations supervision in the fall of 1922. Memel’s German and Polish communities favoured the proposal

but local Lithuanians responded by forming a Committee for the Salvation of Lithuania Minor. Lithuanian sovereignty over Memel (Lithuanian Klaipeda) was internationally recognized when France, Britain, Italy, and Japan signed the Memel Statute in December 1923. Memel was formally incorporated as an autonomous region of Lithuania on March 8, 1924. The local assembly (Landtag) was given extensive power over internal affairs subject to the approval of a governor appointed by the President of Lithuania. Memel was returned to the Germans on March 23, 1939. The Lithuanians had bowed to Hitler’s inevitable demands and turned the region over without a fight. Memel was heavily defended throughout the Second World War. The Red Army captured the heavily damaged city on January 28, 1945. Memel was renamed Klaipeda and incorporated into the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic in 1947.

3 At the time of the October Revolution Russia still used the Julian calendar, so to find the Gregorian date we use the “rule of thumb” that after February 1900 the Julian calendar was 13 days behind the Gregorian Calendar. This means that on 5 November 1917 Gregorian calendar, it was 23 October 1917 according to the Julian calendar. Different parts of Russia changed from the *Julian* (JU) to the *Gregorian calendar* (GR) on different times during and after the revolution. Most sources refer to the change in February 1918 where 31 January 1918 JU, was succeeded by 14 February 1918 GR. This law was signed on 26 January 1918 JU.

4 Please find the full text of the “Fourteen Points” in the annex to this article.