AD SECURITATEM

The best essays by course participants
at the Baltic Defence College Academic Year 2019/2020

BALTIC DEFENCE COLLEGE

Contents

Foreword

This collection represents the best course participant works of the academic year 2019-2020. It is the vast array of topics and approaches that makes this edition of *Ad Securitatem* particularly captivating. From future technologies to historic approaches and sociological assessment of the narratives our armed forces are based on – the papers open different national, theoretical and empirical approaches for the reader to ponder about.

It starts with Major Marianne Eidem opening the collection with a thought-provoking essay. She challenges the reader into deeper inspection concerning gender research impact on the integration of women into the armed forces by explaining in detail the societal instruments and constructs around gender and armed forces. This leads her into a paradoxical conclusion whereupon she points to her very own essay to be (to an extent) part of the issue.

Second essay in the collection is by Lieutenant Colonel Alessandro Fabian who presents a first-hand Italian point of view on how immigration affects the national security of Italy. The way he has managed to balance the essays two angles of analysis: the perception of immigration and the socio-economic consequences of it, has made this article a valued addition to the collection.

Following article by Major Karel Kattai locates itself firmly on operational level and is a thorough paper on threats in cyberspace. Not only is it a helpful tool and source for anyone interested to learn more about operational level cyber, the recommendations provided at the end of the essay provide a holistic view on conducting operations, whereupon cyber is an incorporated element and not the add-on as too often is still assumed.

Fourth essay is by Major Georgi Kokošinski, who examines the hostile narratives intended to undermine deterrence and assurance measures. He takes the example of Estonian Enhanced Forward Presence and on this case builds conclusions on information operations and strategic communication.

Major Christopher Mays on the other hand takes a very popular topic of the continuation of Cold War, but argues his case through new angles focusing first on nuclear development only to then move towards geopolitical actions that reflect the Cold War mentality. He finishes by merging the two in his analysis of the background, lifespan and termination of the INF Treaty.

Major Rivo Meimer takes the reader even further into history by describing and then analysing the communist's *coup d'état* of 1 December 1924 (in Estonia) through the principles of Special Operations Direct Action. He engages not only the Estonian audience, but demonstrates by example, how current tools and approaches could be used to look at historical events.

Contrasting two previous is Major Andrius Stuknys looks to the future. His technical knowledge helps the reader to see the role and potential of micro and small UAVs. What is more, he brings out the domains and areas which could and should get more attention by further research.

The last two essays are by the Higher Command Studies Course participants. The essay by Lieutenant Colonel Ričardas Dumbliauskas takes another historical pivot and analyses the 1923 Klaipeda revolt as a possible hybrid operation. It is another example of a creative case study applying modern understanding of a concept to a historical case.

Very suitably, Mr Irakli Marr closes the collection with focusing attention on NATO's South-Eastern flank. While most attention has been focused to the North-East of the NATO considered the more vulnerable, it is argued here that the South-Eastern flank is as important and initiatives to improve its defensive capabilities should not be neglected in the discussion.

We hope that these papers provide food for thought for many readers. We also extend our sincerest congratulations to the course participants whose work is featured here and wish them all the best in their future endeavours.

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BEST ESSAYS OF THE JOINT COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COURSE

(in alphabetical order)

MARIANNE EIDEM, Maj

Challenging the premises of the gender debate: Are we debating gender to maintain status quo?

Introduction

Political aspirations of increased gender integration in the armed forces are a common feature within most western states (Winslow and Dunn, 2002) and most of these states have opened their military services to women. These same states have laws and a functioning legal system intended to ensure equal rights for their citizens. Taking into account that the armed forces in democracies are under civilian control, it could be assumed that there should be little reason to perpetuate a persistent debate over gender integration.

However, the political aspirations of female integration in western armed forces have been, and still are, greatly and frequently challenged. The military gender debate engages a wide range of actors and is characterized by a high degree of emotional involvement. Most opposing arguments towards female integration is provided by non-academic actors. These include, but are not limited to monographs (Browne, 2007; Maginnis, 2013), personal experiences (Mirabile, 2007; Wise and Baron, 2011), posts and remarks written in newspapers and journals (Abels, 2019; Mac Donald, 2019; Bohn, 2011). Some scientific research have correspondingly found support for arguments provided against female integration (Eden, 2015; Chant and Gutmann, 2002).

Robert Egnell identifies two main arguments against female integration in the armed forces. The first is '[…] the idea that women, in general, are not fit for war; that their often lower physical abilities and/or supposed lack of mental toughness put at risk the combat effectiveness of the units.' The second is '[…] the idea that the inclusion of women and gender perspectives will ruin unit cohesion and military culture' (Egnell, 2016, pp 78-79)

Even so, the majority of research on this topic provides solid arguments for gender integration. Scholars explain how gender integration is beneficial, or demonstrate how female inclusion and participation can be realised (Harries-Jenkins, 2002; Iskara, 2007; Obradovic, 2014; Woodward and Duncanson, 2016; Kvarving, 2019). The

fundamental assumption of this research seems founded on a *logical reasoning* that implies that raised awareness and convincing arguments provided to the gender debate will be a helpful and relevant contribution to the integration process.

The assumption is perhaps right. The logic that *more information equals better understanding, which will lead to better decisions* logic is easy to trust. But what if this logic is flawed? What if maintaining a persistent focus on gender issues rather contributes to fortifying the myth of the hegemonic masculine armed forces? What if the fortification of the myth actually hampers gender integration, rather than contributing to change? The purpose of this argumentative essay is to challenge this logic.

This paper argues that the premises of the persistent gender debate reinforce the political myths related to military masculinity, and blur the understanding of important implications of the gender integration process.

The essay is divided into two main sections. The first section seeks to demonstrate how a social construct of masculinity in western societies is linked to the division of responsibility and the persuasion of warriors within society. It will also look into how the concept of femininity and different forms of rewards contribute to establish this social construct. In the second section, the paper seeks to demonstrate how this social construct has established the hegemonic masculine military identity that can be seen within western societies today, and how this masculine military identity is tied to, and dependent on the upholding of socially accepted myths. Subsequently, the paper will show how these myths, as a part of the securitization process of the state, influence the gender debate that can be seen today. The essay concludes by questioning the necessity of upholding the myths in the context of a changing society.

This gender debate raises several other concerns than the male-female scope brought to attention here. The choice of scope does not imply that those issues are considered irrelevant for the debate or the gender integration process. It is rather a matter of scope and focus. It can be argued that an awareness of the effects of a never-ending gender debate should be questioned, regardless of the possible contradiction to the idea that raised awareness of gender issues might be a relevant contribution to the integration process.

The social construction of masculinity and femininity, and its influence on the persuasion of warriors

This chapter argues that the construction of masculinity and femininity is essential for the socializing process constructed to create warriors, willing to risk their lives to protect their society.

This claim will be demonstrated through three stages. First, it will be shown how warfighting is not a natural part of male biology, but rather the output of an intense socializing process conducted to construct warriors. Subsequently, two contributing factors to this social construct are explored: the necessity of the feminine to create a polar opposite relationship to contrast the masculine, and the need for rewards like honour and status to strengthen the construct. The chapter will end with a summary, which will demonstrate how the construction of gender and cultural benefits contributes to this large-scale social construction, providing an explanation for how society constructs warriors of men.

As presented in the introduction, it can be seen that one of the most frequently used statements in debates of female integration into the armed forces tends to be that women are not fit for war due to their statistically lower physical capacity and lack of mental toughness (Egnell, 2013; 2016). Though the argument in itself seems to be simple, several implicit premises can be found when investigating the claim more thoroughly.

The arguments rest on an assumption of gendered differences in biology within the human race, which not only concern physical differences but also differences in mentality and instincts. These differences lead to the argument that men are better warriors since warfighting is a part of their natural instincts, in difference to women, who do not have such innate instincts. When this argument is used in the gender debate, it tends to be supported by statistics of average physical capacity (Browne, 2007; Goodell, 2010; Eden, 2015). There is little reason to question the statistics proving that men on average perform better. The argument can nevertheless hardly belong in a gender debate, as long as the armed forces ultimately recruit individuals, and not categories of people. The average performance of categories of the population can hardly be a reason to ban the categories that statistically perform lower, as long

as individuals from this category meet the required standards. The first part of the arguments will, therefore, not be pursued any further.

The second part of the claim of the *mental toughness and natural warfighter instincts* is however rarely supported by facts or statistics, though frequently used by those who opposes female integration. Several social scientists have challenged the assumption of gendered differences in instincts. Men's numerous attempts to avoid combat throughout history is frequently used as empirical evidence when researchers aim to display the difficulties of persuading men to fight and dispelling the claim (Goldschmidt, 1989; Goldstein, 2001). Enloe (1993), Ehrenreich (1997) and Kovitz (2003) are all pointing to well-known examples of male combat avoidance, ranging from excuses of illness, insanity, and sexual deviance, to more extreme examples like flight or suicide. Cynthia Enloe points to the *necessity of persuasion* argument in support of dispelling the claim of gendered fighter instincts when she claims that if men's nature itself was sufficient, there would not be any need for military basic training to create disciplined warriors (Enloe, 1993).

These findings have led several social scientists to search for an alternative hypothesis of why we traditionally have seen men as warriors. One of the dominant hypotheses in the field is presented by Raewyn Connell, who suggested that gender is a large-scale social structure, and not just a matter of gender or personal identity (Connell, 1987). Other researchers have further developed her findings. Joshua Goldstein, for example, states that killing is not a natural feature for either gender. He claims socially created gender norms often shape humans to the needs of the war system (Goldstein, 2001; 2004). Nina Rones and Kari Fasting's research is similarly supporting these claims as they argue that the creation of warriors is the outcome of an intense socializing process, aimed to construct willing warriors out of civilian men and that this process is necessary to persuade men to fight (Rones and Fasting, 2017).

Research challenges the arguments of men's mental toughness and superior toughness as an explanation of gendered differences. The explanation leans toward an understanding of a social concept created to construct division of responsibility and to persuade men into becoming warriors. The concept of masculinity is a crucial part of the shaping of warriors and soldiers, but we do also find other contributing factors.

The perception of femininity is an important contribution to this socially constructed narrative, by serving as a contrast to masculinity. Ehrenreich finds that this gendered contrasting existed already as a part of the socializing processes constructed to produce warriors in the pre-state era (Ehrenreich, 1997), when emotions like fear were feminized and established as shameful within the warrior culture (Enloe, 1993; Kovitz, 2003). The fear and risks connected to war became displaced by the created social danger of being feminized (Rones and Fasting, 2017), which helped to persuade men to become warriors and fight. We have also seen women contributing to this fear of feminization through the role of shaming individuals who did not participate according to their responsibility within society (Goldstein, 2001).

Joshua Goldstein finds that the concept of femininity served as a purpose for the warriors. The socializing process associated feminine values with being weak, and by putting women into feminine roles they were pictured as weak subjects, which needed to be protected. This gave the warriors a purpose for fighting, and to risk their lives for the good of the collective (Goldstein, 2001).

The findings indicate that the traditional exclusion of feminine values, emotions, and symbolism from the warrior culture served the purpose of establishing a divide between roles and responsibilities within different groups in society. Considering Robert Egnell's second of the two main debated areas related to female integration in the armed forces 'the idea that the inclusion of women and gender perspectives will ruin unit cohesion and military culture' (Egnell, 2016), in light of these theories we can argue that the social construct needed to exclude women. Thus, the construction of femininity can be seen as a contributing factor to the social construct of persuading men to become warriors. The large-scale social process involves all parts of society, where the concept of femininity serves as a purpose and contrast in the social construction of the warriors. This gives us an indication that the female exclusion within the warrior culture seem to have less to do with biological differences in mentality and instincts, like Engels first of the two main debated areas indicates 'the idea that women are not fit for war due to their statistically lower physical abilities and/or supposed lack of mental toughness' (Egnell, 2016). Rather, it seems to be a purposely-established construction needed to assign gender-related division of responsibility within societies.

Moving beyond the polarity of masculine and feminine it is necessary to consider the implications of social benefits connected to the status as a warrior. Some scholars maintain an alternative argumentation for why we traditionally have seen only male warriors. Martin Van Creveld claims that no socializing process has the power to force men to sacrifice their life for society (Van Creveld, 1991). He suggests an understanding of the soldier's motivation as a relation to the comprehensive culture of war, where he identifies cultural benefits created within these cultures as glory, honour, prestige and belonging as important persuading factors for the warriors (Van Creveld, 2008). Van Creveld argues that these findings represent an alternative view to the theory of social construct.

Other researchers implement similar findings into the social construct theory and consider them important contributions to the persuasive effect of the social construct. Manhood rites are identified as a part of the socializing process of shaping warriors through its honour and prestige. Barbara Ehrenreich finds that this process originates from pre-state societies, where rites of passage into the warrior collective held an important position in society (Ehrenreich, 1997). David Gilmore argues that the central position of these manhood rites reflect the necessity of shaping, which shows that men are persuaded into becoming warriors (Gilmore, 1990).

Goldstein identifies the military focus on discipline as a part of the reward and honour of building warriors (Goldstein, 2001). Orna Sasson-Levy has done research directed towards understanding how society can persuade civilians to become soldiers. She supports Goldstein's findings and identifies the challenges soldiers are offered through military service to blur the lines between choice and cohesion, as it makes the soldiers interpret mandatory military service as fulfilling self-actualization rather than a sacrifice (Sasson-Levy, 2008).

Rones and Fasting identify how honour and reward plays a significant role in constituting a connection between warfighting and good citizenship when they point to how society glorifies dead soldiers as heroes. The argument provided states that the process makes participation in the armed forces become a significant and respected contribution to society (Rones and Fasting, 2017). One of those predominant benefits of the social construction of warriors is status. Van Creveld has stated that warriors possess a special and elevated position in the social hierarchy (Van Creveld, 2000).

The social benefits connected to warrior status has given the military masculinity a hegemonic status. This idea has been used by several researchers to explain the social dynamics that lead to legitimization of military masculine domination in society and thereby justifies a subordination of women (Hearn, 1987; Connell, 1995; Connell and Messerschmidt, 2005).

Based on these findings, we can claim that internal cultural dynamics within warrior culture, along with the benefits of glory, honour, prestige and masculine hegemony can be seen as contributing parts of society's socializing process of convincing men to become warriors.

As demonstrated, numerous scholars challenge the claim of biologically gendered differences in warrior mentality. The comprehensive findings presented by these researchers provide us with a theory that explains gender as a key element of the large-scale social structure, constructed to create a division of responsibilities within societies. These theories contribute to substantially weaken the arguments of *women being less mentally fit for fight*.

The polar opposite concepts of masculinity and femininity plays a crucial role in this social construct. The construction of a warrior culture and the masculine soldiers, with the exclusion of elements associated with feminine values, is established to persuade men into becoming warriors, willing to sacrifice their lives to protect society. These findings indicate that the arguments of *female integration ruining cohesion and military culture* is a necessary part of the construct, established in order to persuade men to become warriors.

Furthermore, these theories have become well-known and thoroughly researched within the social sciences in the past decades. At the same time, we find very few scientific attempts to support the arguments of '*women being less mentally fit to fight*' or '*female integration are ruining cohesion and military culture*'.

Despite what can only be described as a multitude of attempts to explain and problematize these social structures, we can still see these arguments frequently used in gender debates. We should, therefore, ask ourselves what can explain this dynamic. The essay will consequently continue by demonstrating how this social construction is

developed and designed in modern societies, in the search for an explanation for why we keep debating.

Female integration as a threat to preserving the myths of the hegemonic masculine military identity

This chapter will argue that female intruders threaten the socially constructed masculine identity of the armed forces, connected to state security and preserved through socially accepted myths and that the ever-lasting gender debate contributes to upholding these myths.

The claim will be demonstrated through three stages of argumentation. First, it will be shown how the social construct has established the hegemonic masculine military identity we see in western armed forces today. Secondly, how the masculine military identity is connected to the question of state security through socially accepted myths will be demonstrated. Thirdly, how female intrusion or gender-equality challenges these essential political myths, and how maintaining a persistent debate contributes to fortifying them.

As demonstrated, the social construct of the dichotomic feminine and masculine, played an important role when persuading men to become fighters already in the pre-state era. In modern times researchers have investigated the concept of masculinity, to explain these social dynamics within our societies. A consistent feature among western capitalist countries is a structural male dominance, identified as patriarchal (Hearn, 1987), with a commonly accepted link between masculinity and militarism. This link can be illustrated through Rones and Fasting's findings of the heroic soldier as a consistent key symbol of masculinity (Rones and Fasting, 2017), found in national studies (Higate and Hopton, 2005; Prividera and Howard, 2006; Duncanson, 2013; Parpart and Partridge, 2014). The link between military and masculinity is strong enough for Woodward and Winter to find the sole act of joining the military to reinforce the masculinity of the individual (Woodward and Winter, 2007).

Despite this socially accepted link, there has been limited focus on militarized masculinity within the social sciences and gender studies (MacKenzie, 2015). The hegemonic position of militarized masculinity was, however, identified in an early stage of gender studies. The term was introduced by Raewyn Connel when she identified a

hierarchy of masculinities through social status (Connell, 1987). Militarized masculinity is in this understanding described as a specific form of masculinity, which holds a hegemonic position in society due to its widely accepted dominance (Parpart and Partridge, 2014). The hegemonic position can be illustrated through Craig Murphy's identification of six masculine roles within world politics. His first role is the *good soldier*. This role holds a specific and dominant position, which is shaping the other five roles (Murphy, 1998).

Even though the hegemonic position of military masculinity is a commonly accepted and consistent feature within all western societies, there are researchers pointing to nuances within the hegemonic status of the military masculinity within western societies. Goldstein's research found that status of the military masculinity is affected and increases with the nation's necessity for military power (Goldstein, 2001), which contributes to explaining nuances in cultural differences within western societies when it comes to the status of masculinity within armed forces. Other studies support Goldstein's finding when their research demonstrates that interventionist states cultivate a more militarized form of masculinity within their societies (Sasson-Levy, 2008; Brown, 2012; Duncanson, 2013).

Despite some nuances in the hegemonic status of military masculinity within the armed forces in western societies, we can nevertheless see a socially accepted connection between masculinity and militarism. We will, therefore, continue by displaying how the status of the armed forces and the militarized masculinity is being maintained and upheld.

The hegemonic status of military masculinity is explained by Belkin when he describes 'military masculinity as a set of beliefs, practices, and attributes that can enable individuals—men and women—to claim authority on the basis of affirmative relationships with the military or with military ideas' (Belkin, 2012, pp. 3). In line with Belkin, Megan MacKenzie identifies this set of *beliefs, practices, and attributes* as myths which are fundamental for the upholding of the hegemonic position of the masculine military. Myths are hereby understood as stories or explicit messages that create narratives that are widely known to the communities and which contribute to explain and legitimize cultural beliefs. The effect of these myths is that they identify

‘[…] appropriate, ideal, acceptable, and legitimate behaviours, identities and practices’ (MacKenzie, 2015, pp. 9).

This understanding of political myths is based on a combination of Christopher Flood’s and Cynthia Weber’s definitions of political myths. Flood labels political myths as *ideologically market narratives* that carry norms, beliefs, ideologies, and identities (Flood, 2001) while Cynthia Weber identifies myths as the stories which is not recognized as ideologies, but rather exist as unstable and constructed truths, which unconsciously are accepted as common sense (Weber, 2005). This gives us an understanding of myths as more comprehensive than narratives, since they provide a higher degree of influence because they not only present us the story but also unconsciously shape our legitimate behaviour and create the understanding of a neutral order.

MacKenzie identifies these myths as a vital part of the state’s securitization process, as they ‘inform our understanding of international and social order, group identity, and appropriate norms and behaviours’ (MacKenzie, 2015, pp.10) and transform our interpretation into socially accepted *facts* or *truths* (Weber, 2005). MacKenzie identifies what she calls the *band of brothers* myth as fundamental for upholding the hegemonic position of the masculine military (MacKenzie, 2015). The myth is complex and can be understood as an umbrella-myth, capturing a set of myths connected to the military, to masculinity as well as to state security. One part of the myth presents war as *natural, honourable and essential for social progress,* while another part justifies the *ruin unit cohesion and military culture* argument, which again sets the conditions for the *women being less mentally fit for fight* argument (MacKenzie, 2015). Merged into the *band of brothers* myth they provide significant legitimacy to state security.

The myth of *warfighting as natural, honourable and essential for state progress* is not one of the central arguments provided against female integration within the gender debate but it has to be examined, as it creates a foundation for the two other myths, which is at the heart of the debate. In the social construction of persuading men to become warriors, the myth contributes to legitimizing and constructing violence as a necessity for social security. When treated as a fact, the myth becomes a premise for the debate in the gender debate. Furthermore, establishing the necessity creates an understanding of the special status for the warriors’ responsibility within society. The

fortification of the myth can be seen in the debate when those who argue against female integration within the gender debate tend to emphasise violence as a necessity for political strategy, and how violence is the most effective political problem-solving tool (MacKenzie, 2015).

Even though the myth is not used directly as an argument against female integration, it contributes to unconsciously shaping our perception of legitimate behaviour and forms the understanding of violence as a necessary political strategy as the neutral order. Furthermore, it creates an important foundation for the *ruin unit cohesion and military culture* myth and the *women being less mentally fit for fight* myth.

The *ruin unit cohesion and military culture* myth is founded on the perception of warfighting as *natural, honourable and essential for state progress,* as it depicts the front line fighting and violence as the crucial part of a war. Moreover, we find the *ruining unit cohesion and military culture* myth associated with a special trust and social bond among soldiers, to become synonymous with combat effectiveness. Researchers have found the myth to be considerably strengthened after the Vietnam War (Solaro, 2006).

The *ruin unit cohesion and military culture* myth rests on the assumption that female integration will reduce combat effectiveness. Even though the argument is most frequently seen in the category of the debate we can label as non-academic, meaning personal experiences, posts, and remarks, it is also present in more official part of the debate, as public documents and political discussion. The UK Governments 'Report on the Review of the Exclusion of Women from Ground Close-Combat Roles' (2010) states that:

> '[…] *exclusion of women from ground close-combat roles was a proportionate means of maintaining the combat effectiveness of the Armed Forces and was not based on stereotypical view of women's abilities but on the potential risks associated with maintaining cohesion in small mixed-gender tactical teams engaged in highly-dangerous close combat operations.* (pp. 4)

The myth is thus presented as a fact despite no indications of decreasing unit cohesion connected to gender integration in the scientific literature (Egnell, 2016). Research conducted on the topic, on the contrary, exclude gender as a relevant factor for unit cohesion and identifies the level of training and competence as determining factors for the level of unit cohesion (King, 2013a; 2013b). Furthermore, the argument rests on an assumption that the unit cohesion that are found in armed forces before female

integration is initiated is the optimal system for combat effectiveness, regardless of the changing security and technology situation, and how that shapes and affects the way we use military force.

When the argument that female integration will *ruin unit cohesion and military culture,* nevertheless is treated as fact in the gender debate, it contributes to the fortification of the myth. The myth creates a fact about women threatening the optimal combat effectiveness currently existing in the armed units. When this myth furthermore is commonly accepted also at a political level that shapes our perception of what is ideal and acceptable, this inevitably and directly contributes to fortifying the hegemonic masculine identity of the armed forces.

Beyond cohesion and culture, we can mainly find two repeated arguments in the myth that *women are less mentally fit to fight*. The first type of argument is the use of historical evidence of women's limited contributions in war to prove the lack of mental abilities. The other argument relies on statistics of increased probability for women to develop post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) for support.

With regard to historical arguments, there tend to be claims that use the reverse burden of proof of effectiveness together with the historical limited contribution. A typical argument is '[…] although there is no question that female Marines have engaged in Iraq and Afghanistan, we lack direct evidence of female Marines closing with the enemy and destroying them by fire, manoeuvre, and close combat' (Amos, 2014, pp 11). Another example can be found in Kvarving's research (2019, pp 145). Allowing the debate to create myths of women's mental capacity to fight, based on historical evidence from a setting that holds both institutional and social limitations to women's contribution, involves ignoring the impact of socially accepted myths and the social construct where gender is shaped. This contributes to a reinforcement of the myth that further fortifies the existing structures. We do also have to take into account that the *mentally fit for fight* myth also rests on an assumption that men are born with these warrior instincts which women do not possess. An assumption examined and problematized by a number of researchers, who further present a vast and comprehensive alternative explanation.

As for the increased probability of women experiencing PTSD, a number of studies present statistics in support of this claim (Goldstein, 2001). The problem is that these

studies have a questionable reliability, as they rely on self-reported emotional problems, which are in turn influenced by a gendered variance in the likelihood of reporting (Kasinof, 2013). This difference in reporting can furthermore be explained by the social construct displayed in chapter one, where weakness is associated with femininity. If we look at research conducted with other data collection methods, we can see the gender difference nearly disappearing (Kasinof, 2013).

By maintaining a debate repeatedly using the myth of *women being less mentally fit for fight,* we ignore how the socially constructed gender norms are shaping our perception of the norm and what is seen as standard. By shaping our norms and values, the debate is fortifying our perception of the hegemonic masculine identity of the armed forces.

There is a universal link between masculinity and military across western societies. We have furthermore seen that the facts and the myths presented in the gender debate contribute to the process of upholding the complex political myths of masculinity, armed forces and state security, which serve the purpose of maintaining a social order where the hegemonic masculine positions are maintained. These findings are in line with Cynthia Enloe's arguments that the armed forces are using their extraordinary status within national security to define a social order where a patriarchist structure is necessary to ensure national security (Enloe, 2000). Therefore, it can be argued that the persistent gender debate contributes to fortifying the myths of the hegemonic masculine armed forces.

Conclusion

An everlasting gender debate could be a contributing factor to preserving the myths of the hegemonic military masculinity.

As presented in the introduction, there can be observed a fundamental *logic* within gender research, that raised awareness and convincing arguments are helpful and relevant contributions to the integration process. This paper asks whether a continuation of the debate might have other consequences, and whether there are other reasons to continue debating?

It has been seen how western societies have created a large-scale social construction with the purpose of persuading men to risk their lives and become warriors. The

construction of polar opposites between masculinity and femininity has a central position in this social construction, as well as the social benefits connected to the status as a warrior. The paper has moreover demonstrated the strong link between masculinity, military, and exposed how the masculine military has a hegemonic position in society. This hegemonic position is being upheld by political myths, shaping our unconscious perception of appropriate, ideal, acceptable, and legitimate behaviours. We have seen how strong political myths of military, masculinity and state security are shaping our perception of the security situation, and that the gender debate seems to contribute to a fortification of these myths, preserving our perception of the armed forces in western societies as hegemonic masculine and violent by necessity.

It is possible to imagine that in a situation where women are a minority, these individuals can be regarded as an exemption, and the political myth can be upheld. The moment female integration in the armed forces constitutes a norm, a situation can be seen where the political myths established to persuade the warriors loses its logic. Therefore, it is plausible to say that the debate exists in order to maintain status quo in the myths of state security.

The general problem with the arguments provided in the gender debate that can be seen today is that the myths rest on an assumption that the current system, seen in societies today, is the optimal system for ensuring stability in the international security environment despite enormous societal changes. This establishes the masculine military identity as the ideal, and the norm, regardless of changes in the use of military force or social structures.

The power of political myths in unconsciously shaping perceptions and makes it difficult to challenge the premises of the gender debate, which might be an explanation for why a debate can be witnessed that tends to be stuck in the same arguments and political leaders failing in reaching their political goals.

Research provides an explanation of the link between gender and securitization, which is making this structural change hard to achieve. With this understanding in mind, it seems like adjusting our political myths of state securitization is a precondition for succeeding with political goals of gender integration. The question is whether political leaders are aware of the power and implications of these political myths when the set

their goals of gender integration? Do they understand that questioning our political myths is a part of the gender debate?

It seems to be time for western states to debate whether maintaining the myth of hegemonic masculine military is required anymore when society has changed so dramatically since the myths were constructed? Is it really the physically strong and masculine warriors that constitutes the key element in state security in a society where technology and powerful weapon systems is stronger than any man can be? There is also reason to be aware that upholding political myths might be affecting our ability to adapt to changes in security situations, as they conserve and affect our perception considerably.

Finally, the irony here is that by arguing that a continuation of the gender debate fortifies the myths that prevents integration, this essay contributes to a prolonged gender debate. As Jeff Hearn points to in *critical studies on men,* an awareness of the danger of the research in itself contributing to the creation of a new power base for men (Hearn, 2013). Similarly, there has to be awareness not to make the gender debate become an arena for fortification of myths that is preventing integration.

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ALESSANDRO FABIAN, LtCol

How does immigration affect the national security of Italy?

Introduction

In recent years, Europe and especially Italy are dealing with immigration flow. Even though this phenomenon is not something new for European countries.

However, it is essential to underline why in recent years have been so many debates in Italy as in Europe. Currently, there is a general feeling of insecurity among the population. To prove this unpleasant situation, it can be effortless to identify statements and bring in references from various Italian politicians. For instance, before the election in 2018, Mr Salvini strongly emphasised that the 'unchecked immigration brings chaos, anger […] drug dealing, thefts, rapes and violence.' (Horowitz, 2018).

The immigration phenomena within Europe and especially Italy is a structural phenomenon since the end of World War II (Colucci, 2018). In particular, Italy has been dealing with the migration phenomena since the mid-1960s. At this time, this issue was managed without any significant impacts because there was an equilibrium between people leaving and people entering Italy. Everything began to change after the Arabic spring. The collapse of Libya and the crisis in Syria exposed the European countries, and especially Greece and Italy have become the new destination progressively for migrants from the Middle East and Africa (Gattinara, 2017). This tremendous wave of immigration started with the economic recession in 2008, and it is still far to finish besides the 'chronical unwillingness of the Italian authorities in trying to cope with immigrants entering and transiting the country' (Gattinara, 2017). These are the main reasons behind the "migration crisis" that everybody is talking today.

Looking at the latest developments, the paper will show how immigration is having a detrimental impact on Italian National Security due to social-economic disruption and the increase of crime rates, which are directly connected with the negative attitude towards immigrants. Thus, talking about immigration and its implications in Italy today is not a simple topic. Among either the population or the political level, this subject is causing much tension. Italy is divided between those who favour helping immigrants and those who wish to limit their access to the country. Therefore, in the recent years in Italy, the immigration dilemma has become a hot issue among ordinary Italians,

political decision-makers and it has also become a topic of debate and part of the agenda of various scholars (Lindley, 2014).

In this context, the media started to outline the debate about immigration more and more during the last years. They approach issues and bring mainly the negative image of immigration. For example, nowadays, it is effortless to identify and read in the newspapers about the “migration crisis” and impacts in Italian society.

Nevertheless, this is a fact and an issue that needs to be addressed. In this case, the essay will analyse several problems and underline effects that influence the internal security of Italy. Is the migration crisis a security issue? Does immigration pose a threat to Italian society? These two questions will be followed by a different analysis of Italian society approaching the problem from two different angles: perception of immigration and socio-economic consequences.
Moreover, some believed that immigration has a positive impact on the country in many ways. In contrast, others argue that immigration poses a threat to the identity and sovereignty of the host state (Njaim, 2018). Looking at recent developments, the first chapter will analyse the immigration crisis and the perception of Italian society and insecurity implications among people. The second chapter will focus on the social-economic repercussions and the impact of immigration on society. Moreover, the focus of the paper is to cover the effect of immigration on the labour market and the level of criminality.

Impacts and Perceptions Of Immigration In Italy

In the latest thirty years, both Europe and Italy have been characterised by the growing presence of immigrants. Frequently, the narrative shows that Italy, after the 90s, has become a country of immigration instead of a nation of emigration like in the past (Gattinara, 2017). Therefore, in recent years with the “migration crisis”, Italy has run into the problem to deal with the considerable amount of people entering the country. Thus, the widespread migration phenomenon has become the most significant concern among not only of the population but also at the political level. These migratory movements ignited sharp divisions and had an impact on society, causing the rise of anxiety and fear about cultural identity and their integration into society (Huysmans, 2006).

As a result of these feelings in Italy, the immigration crisis has become a significant concern in public debate. Although, Italians do believe in the necessity to help immigrants and most of ordinary Italians disagree with an unconditional acceptance due to growing mistrust in the Italian institution to be able to deal with the problem that is fuelling the feeling of insecurity among the population (Dixon, et al., 2018). Furthermore, the toxic narrative around immigration does nothing but increase the dilemma among the people. Indeed, the migration crisis is the mainstream news in most of the Italian media, and ultimately, news coverage on this issue has increased drastically in recent years. For example, in 2005 statistics showed that the immigration topic was brought in 380 times, but these numbers have increased ten times more in 2017 and statistics shows that immigration has made news in the media 4238 times (Caritas and Migrantes, 2018). It is a matter of fact that in recent years most of the press has been about immigrants, criminality and domestic security. Indeed, one can see a treacherous trend following the media's approach to the issue of immigration over the years. During 2013, the press referred to immigration as a humanitarian crisis related to the rise of immigration and humanitarian tragedies in the Mediterranean Sea. The narrative changed in 2015, when the media overwhelmingly introduced the phenomenon of immigration as a political problem. Among this year immigration crisis was highlighted as a European problem with the media focusing on the debate about the redistribution quotes within the European Union. The media trend culminated in 2018 when the issue of immigration became a crisis of values connected with the growth of radicalism during political debates in Italy. Therefore, this continued with the media's "brainwashing" over the years, addressing the immigration crisis with words such as "invasion" and "social emergency". While at the same time, they described difficulties of finding standard solutions with other European countries, which led to increased feelings of suspicion and hostility among the population.

The public debate about immigrants has worsened the attitude towards migrants and refugees. In recent years, the attitude towards migrants has changed, and most Italians 'refer to newcomers merely as migrants, not making distinctions between different migrant categories.' (Dixon, et al., 2018 p. 74). This debate is related to the growing feeling that most of the asylum seekers are nor refugees, but they are economic migrants who want to get a green card faster. This common opinion is supported by the fact that the Italian Government rejected 45,000 asylum applications only during

2017 (UNHCR, 2020) because they did not meet the requirements. Thus, as reported by a 2016 Pew Research Centre survey, 47 per cent of Italians believes the increase of criminality is connected to refugees instead of other groups, while more than 50 per cent believes in the connection between refugees and terrorist problems (Gattinara, 2017).

Hereafter, it is possible to separate Italian society into three different groups regarding debates about the immigration crisis. The first group is probably the most positive group about immigrants, and it presents approximately one-third of society. They do not believe that immigrants can threaten national identity and sovereignty. Based on their human perception and feelings, they would like to help them. Their profound religious beliefs guide this part of society, and they have feelings of solidarity and sympathy towards minorities and refugees. They do oppose xenophobic movements and believe in the need to welcome immigrants entering Italy. Accordingly, they think the European Union should collaborate more with the Italian Government to handle this crisis. This part of society is very much affiliated with Pope Francesco attitude towards immigrants so they would like Italy to be more open and supportive to the immigration crisis (Dixon, et al., 2018).

To further this analysis, the open group is only one-third of Italian society, and it is essential to understand what the rest of the community thinks about immigration. As emphasised before, half of Italians believe that immigration is the first problem that the government has to cope with. Does it mean the majority of society see immigration as a threat? In reality, it is difficult to have a clear answer to this question. In fact, along with the Religious group, the Italian society presents two other subgroups identified as the extremist and the “conflicted” groups. Extremist part believes that Italy should close borders and reject migrants to enter the country. They think that immigrants are benefiting from Italy’s welfare to the detriment of Italians, and they do not believe that immigrants will be able to integrate into society. They represent approximately 20 per cent of Italians, so it means that half of the community belongs to the “conflicted” group (Gonzalez, 2018). This group has neither extreme nor positive attitude towards migrants like the previous two. This part of society is probably the most fragmented; as their feelings about immigration depend on various factors. For example, more than 50 per cent of Italians, in this group, fear the increasing xenophobic behaviours of

different religious groups. At the same time, 60 per cent of them are concerned about the negative impact of the migration crisis on internal security (Dixon, et al., 2018). It is complicated to divide this part of society clearly into specific groups because their approach towards immigration can differ from a positive to extremist attitude depending on matters related to immigration. Moreover, this segment of society perceive Islam and consequentially Muslim refugees as the main risk for the internal security of the Nation. Regrettably, this attitude towards immigrants is strictly connected with the false perception in Italy that all immigrants are coming from the Middle East and for that reason, they have to be Muslims. Therefore, in Italy, like in most European country, due to the terroristic attacks experienced during the last years, there is the growing fear of the unknown. This feeling presents an opening for xenophobic narratives that increase the fear of Muslims not only in the extremist group of the society. 'They believe immigration is dividing the country […] that migrants create a health risk for Italy and that migrants have made it harder for Italians to get jobs.' (Dixon, et al., 2018 p. 44).

Lastly, the political “earthquake” in 2013 and elections in 2018 confirmed a radical breakthrough in Italy (Caiani, 2019). For the first time after the Fascism regime, in 2019 Italy experienced the growing influence of two populist parties: the left-wing party known as Movimento 5 Stele (The Movement of Five Stars) and the right-wing party known as the Lega Nord (North League). The political changes are related to the economic recession and the feeling of insecurity. This attitude has fuelled hostility and xenophobia towards immigrants to the extent that populist parties gained national power (Caiani, 2019). Likewise, the new political trend is also connected with the angriness against the previous Government, which failed, according to the majority of Italians, to serve the nation better. Although, the number of immigrants during 2017 decreased thanks to the agreement with the Libya Government, while most of society still believes that the Italian Government did not manage the crisis professionally. Thus, this belief was one of the reasons behind the failure of previous democratic parties during the 2018 election. Therefore, the right-wing parties, to increase their popularity, took advantages of this situation. Hence, they highlighted arguments such as the inadequacy of the Italian reception system and the incompetence of the previous Government to deal with the humanitarian issue in the Mediterranean Sea. Indeed, they accuse the social parties to have brought the Italian reception system to collapse since they have not been able to reach an agreement with European Union how to

deal with the immigration flow from Africa region. Right-wing parties took this opportunity to blame the previous social Government for the incapacity of stopping the illegal immigration flow through the Mediterranean Sea and consequently to allow more and more immigrants entering Italy. Thus, considering the parameters for asylum seeker have significantly been narrowed during 2017, more refugees means overloading the reception structures. Therefore, since the last years, this trend has made matters worse in the areas around the reception sites either because the numerous immigrants were escaping the structures or the society started showing sign of impatience and intolerance.

Consequently, the media and right-wing political parties are against the immigration phenomenon, and they are pushing society to perceive immigration as a significant problem as it appears in reality. Indeed, Italy in Europe is the country that has the highest difference between perception and reality, resulting in the overestimation of the migration crisis. As shown in research made in 2017, Italians believe that the presence of migrants in the country is approximately 18 per cent higher than in reality (Valbruzzi, 2018). However, it should be emphasised that this analysis considers only the regular immigrants and do not care about the significant amount of irregular immigrants that are slightly visible in society. The research shows that the results are compromised and do not present the reality, as long as they do not consider irregular migrants in the country. For this reason, it is difficult to measure the real gap between perception and reality, and inevitably people maybe not that far from the truth.

Finally, it can be said that due to the toxic narrative of immigration and the political debate in Italy it has caused and increased the negative attitude among the population. Although the attitude towards immigrants and the misperception of the problems are connected, it is problematic to establish which one is the real problem. However, the overestimation of the migration phenomenon is not just about media information or political debate. Still, it is also focused on the fragmentation of Italian society, which inevitably dictates the approach to the immigration crisis.

Immigration in Italy a Value or a Burden?

‘How nations respond to migration processes also affects the negative and positive consequences of immigration’ (Freilich, et al., 2006). Therefore, in recent years

immigration has been associated in terms of National Security, a phenomenon also known as ‘securitisation of immigration’ (Huysmans, 2006). This nexus could be seen as ‘a process through which Western political elites (such as governments, leading political parties, and associated policy networks), public opinion, and the media construct immigration as a security threat’ (d’Appollonia, 2015). Furthermore, this connection is strengthened by the negative attitude of the society towards the immigrants. Generally, in Italy, the majority of community fear the migrants since they believe immigration is the significant threat of the century. As shown in the previous section, Italians are divided between those who fear the immigrants because they bring criminality and those who fear refugees since they believe the most of them are Muslims and consequently they are scared of a possible terrorist attack. To continue with the issue, we have to understand the nexus. Is this one real? Unfortunately, the meaning of security is ambiguous and polysemic. Security frame has changed along with history to our days and only in recent time, it has been associated with the immigration flow. Although its abstract nature and the concept of security has been used in different ways along the last years, it is possible to identify a common base of security meaning. Either talking about social safety or national security, the overall concept of security can be divided into external and internal security. Thus, the traditional concept of security regarding the physical integrity of the state, which is undoubtedly associated with other ideas like war or international relations, is just one part of the new concept of security. Furthermore, once defined “external security” the difficulty lies in what it is intended for internal security.

Thus, ‘the more widely the concept of security is defined, the more state activities fall within its remit’ (Elspeth Guild, 2009). Consequently, considering this modern concept of security, immigration has been considered as a problem of internal security. Moreover, as Elspeth Guild has said, this nexus can include more facet of the issue. Nowadays, most of the debates about immigration in the European Union are related to “border security” issues only, even though these are just one part of the issue. Thus, it is worth talking also about the implication of immigration in the internal security of a Country.

Therefore, to understand the real impact of migration in Italy, it is crucial to analyse the nexus of immigration and security among the following fields: welfare and social security, economic uncertainties and individual security (crime). By analysing these fields, it will make it possible to have a more comprehensive analysis of the nexus of immigration and security implications. Currently, these topics are at the heart of the debate in Italy about the impact of the migration crisis.

At first, it is crucial to analyse whether immigration poses a threat to Italy's security. Although the peoples' movement had characterised the world history, the immigration flows among the last 20 years have pointed out new issues for modern society. Thus, overcome the duality between migrants and natives is mostly of the time complicated with evident consequences on the political and social levels. One facet of the nexus is the level of integration of migrants into society. Thus, the first step is to identify what it is the meaning of integration. Especially in the past, integration had been represented as an adaption process of immigrants to the new society. At the same time, in recent years, as some experts defined it, it is a 'confrontation process and a cultural exchange of values and behaviour patterns between migrants and native society.' (Natale, et al., 1997 p. 252).

Regardless of the debate about immigration and society, it is clear that it is burning and much-debated topic. The concept of integration is multidimensional since it stretches between different spheres of social life, as cultural integration or the access to the welfare system. Mostly of the Government reports on the matter use various indicators as knowledge of the Italian language or relationship between the number of civil registration and residence permits released to indicate the grade of migrants integration into the society. Based on the latest statistics did on the European level as MIPEX 2015 (Pomponi, 2018), Italy received a score of 59 out of 100 points. This score is equivalent to the European average, especially in the field of regarding the nexus immigration and labour market or the number of residence permits. However, those indicators show that Italy has the lowest score regarding both the instruction sector and the anti-discrimination.

Even though, as the latest statistic results show that the integration phenomenon in Italy is in line with other European countries, these data do not clearly describe the

matter. Thus, to have a clear understanding of the immigration and society nexus, it is better to study the urban phenomenon where all the coexistent issues between migrants and “locals” arise. Therefore, it is possible to identify the tendency of immigrants to live in the same district, especially near the central train station or in the suburbs of the city. For example, as shown by the Newspaper “Il Messaggero”, more than 70 per cent of immigrants in Roma are living in only five districts (Roma, raddoppiano gli immigrati: la mappa quartiere per quartiere. [Roma, double the number of immigrants: the map district by district], 2017). Also, especially in the big city, those districts are seen as a different city with its own rules. Usually, those districts became the most degraded part of the city where the living conditions are extreme.

A clear example is “via Padova” in Milano, which is very famous either because it welcome immigrants of more than 50 different nationalities or because it is hazardous especially during the night since murder, theft and robbery are commonplace (Bongiorni, 2016). Generally, this area shows the two face of integration as integrity and interaction. Unfortunately, the lack in Italy of serious integration policy is probably behind most of the problematic cohabitation between immigrants and natives. Thus, the constant division is perhaps the primary cause behind the growing sentiment of disappointment and fear towards immigration in Italian society.

Likewise, another facet of immigration to ponder on is its impact on the labour market. Recently, especially considering the economic crisis that Italy has been going through since 2008, the nexus immigration and the labour market have been at the centre of many debates. While the unemployment rate in Europe has stabilized around 7 per cent, in Italy, it is 4 points more. Thus, after the economic crisis, most people believe the second problems for the labour market in Italy is the immigrants (Gli immigrati "rubano il lavoro agli italiani"? [Does immigrants "steal the work of Italians"?], 2018). For this reason, it will be essential to understand what the role of immigrants in the labour market is. Recent reports of the European Union show a constant stagnation of the population in Europe.

Consequently, many experts believe immigration is the solution either to the demographic problem in Europe or the ageing workforce. Therefore, this is also the position of all “supporters” of immigration. They argue that immigrants do not compete

with natives finding a job. Still, they are an essential complement in the labour market since they usually do specific jobs that Italians do not want to do either because socially unacceptable or because considered not in line with their education. It should also be added that immigrants mostly do seasonal agricultural work, thus allowing meeting the demand for work that otherwise it will be difficult to achieve with the native workers.

Although this may be true, most Italians have a negative attitude towards immigrants since in their opinion immigration has a more negative effect on the labour market than a positive one. After 2008, the labour market in Italy has suffered robust processes of precariousness and consequently, a sharp deterioration of the working conditions. During this period, immigrants have provided the answer to most of the problems in the Italian labour market. Thus, immigrants have replaced the native workers, especially in the home care market and in the unskilled job sector. As of matter of fact, statistics show as 90 per cent of migrants in Italy work as employees and approximately 80 per cent of them work as a workman (Directorate General for immigration and integration policies, 2019). As shown on the statistics (see figure 1), migrants between the age of 15 and 64, out of approximately 40 per cent of workers in the low-skilled sector, only 10 per cent are native-born, demonstrating a significant shift in this sector.

Low- and medium-skilled employment as a percentage of total employment, 2017



Figure 1. Immigrants are concentrated in the low-skill job.
Source: (OECD/European Union, 2018)

Based on these statistics, it seems that the fear of Italian society about the negative impact of immigration on the labour market are well-founded. In reality, the answer is neither white nor black but probably grey. It is true that the large offer of the workforce due to immigrants, lead to the reduction of the wages causing more difficulty for the Italians to find a job, especially as said previously in the tertiary sector (Ambrosini, 2011). At the same time, it is also true that the higher level of education of native workers leads them to find a more skilled job. Looking at the occupation rate in Italy (see figure 2) it is possible to see that the native employment ratio remained constant during the last years while the same ratio rose for the immigrants. All this proves that immigrants are competing more and more with the native in the labour market.

Figure 2. Occupation rate in Italy. Immigrants Vs Native.
Source: (Balduzzi, 2017)

Furthermore, another negative effect of immigration on the labour market is the rising of the black market. The higher number of immigrants willing to find a job to sustain themselves and their family increased the unregistered work since most employers took advantage of the high availability of workers. As reported by the Newspaper "Panorama", it is estimated that in Italy approximately 3.3 million of people work illegally with damage for the country of about EUR 43 billion (Lavoro nero. Ecco quanto è diffuso in Italia. [Illegal work. How widespread this problem is in Italy], 2018).

Hence, this "unfair" competition connected with the general economic crisis that struck the country hurts society. Dealing with the labour market, preventing any discrimination and restoring more stable forms of employment with decent wages, probably it is the only way to avoid this "unfair" competition between immigrants and natives. Immigration is either a mirror of the society or the labour market and, in Italy case, it shows a system which is not able to enhance the human resources.

It has become equally essential to understand immigrants' involvement in crime since this matter is at the centre of the public and political debate (Fasani, et al., 2019). The frequent association between immigration and crime is related, most of the time, to a feeling of fear more than a real reflection on the issue. Indeed, in the majority of Europe countries, as said in the previous section, the perceptions about immigrants usually are over-represented. In fact, numerous press news, for example, the Newspaper "Il Post", did not find a correlation between the increasing number of immigrants and the increase of criminality ratio (Che rapporto c'è tra immigrazione e criminalità. [What is the relationship between immigration and criminality], 2018). Furthermore, statistics

showed that the total number of crime in Italy has decreased in the last years. Thus, it seems to demonstrate the nexus immigration crisis and crime is an overestimation of the problem. In reality, though, Italy has seen a decrease in the overall crime rate, on the other hand, the number of immigrants held in the Italian prison has increased. For instance in Italy, in 2019 immigrants were the 30 per cent of the prison population, considering that they represent approximately 8 per cent of the Italian population (Ministero della Giustizia, 2019), this fact demonstrates the general immigrants are more inclined to commit a crime. This tendency reflects what most theories said about nexus criminal behaviour and social background. All those theories come from the original work of the Nobel Prize winner Mr Gary S. Becker. Based on these theories, immigrants should be more inclined to commit a crime since they have less legal opportunities either because they have difficulties to find a good job or because they are illegal immigrants. Generally, based on the latest data, it could be said that migrants have replaced the Italians in some types of criminal activities. For example, as reported by the Italian Ministry of Interior in 2007, the market of selling drugs nowadays it is mostly controlled by migrants.

Furthermore, all the previous statistics represent only a part of the problem since they lack some information. For example, the statistics about the prison population do not consider either all the criminal prosecution still pending judgment or all the crime reports against unknown. Moreover, since it is hard to include undocumented migrants in them, it is more challenging to have a precise magnitude of the problem. To have an overall idea of the problem it can be considered that at the beginning of 2018 in Italy were estimated approximately 530000 irregular migrants equal to 10 per cent of the total immigrant's population (ISMU Foundation, 2019). There are not enough data to support the idea that the more immigrants in Italy resulted in a proportional increase of criminality. At the same time, it is evident that the new immigrant's population represent a primary component of the criminality in Italy in the last years. Immigrants are incontrovertibly over-represented between the accused and sued for all the different type of crime.

Conclusion

The international flow of people is a distinctive feature of the last decade. However, migrants facet a fierce opposition in the majority of the European country. Indeed, Italian society believes immigration is the biggest problem in the country. Furthermore, as discussed in the first section of this paper, the situation in Italy is hugely connected with the media and political position. The toxic narrative about immigration exacerbates the negative attitude of the society towards immigrants. The phenomenon is represented by most of the media as a “problem” Italy must deal with it.

The majority of the news are regarding illegitimacy, social problems, but above all about the immigration and criminality correlation. Consequently, it is understandable to realize that with this kind of “advertisement” the public image of immigrants is deteriorated. Besides, policymakers, in the deliberate attempt to be more visible and consequently to win more electoral votes, provide more fuel to the “immigration emergency” debate. A policy of fear and the unwavering conviction that solutions like to expel, reject or draw away immigrants will solve the issue are at the centre of right-wing parties. All these factors bring the majority of society to have a negative attitude towards immigration.

Furthermore, as shown in the second part of this paper, the lack of integration and the negative effect of immigration on the labour market and the criminality add fuel to a situation that it is already extremely precarious. As said, the lack of integration amplifies the distance between immigrants and natives with the consequence that every small difference in customs and traditions are seen as a threat to the Italian cultural heritage. Moreover, all this aloofness is establishing more fear in society since the immigrants are seen as the scapegoat for all the problems.

Considering all the impact of immigration on the society, on the labour market and on the criminality activities it shows as, in Italy, the Government strategies have not been able to deal with the immigration crisis. This situation leads the population to start fearing the migrants more and more. It is normal to have a negative attitude towards somebody who competes with you for the same job, and that causes a downward trend in wages. Immigration crisis it is a build-up of tension, and also, dissatisfaction

and frustration in the society. The rising tension between society and migrants is the typical result of a system that identifies in the immigrants the threat of society. Hence, the proof of those sentiments lies in the increasing support for the right-wing parties that have an anti-immigration posture. In the end, it is possible to argue that immigration has a negative impact on the security of Italy since it is the cause of many debates both at the social and political level. Thus, the negative attitude of the society towards the immigrants, the rising of right-wing parties lead to a fragile system. All those piled-up worries and irritations might blow up in the next future destabilising the internal security of the nation. As a conclusion, it could be said that even though most of these situations are connected with the immigration, on the other hand, it is probably true that more careful and accurate management of the matter by the Government should have prevented it.

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KAREL KATTAI, Maj

Possible operational threats caused by adversary cyber activities.

Introduction

'Look at what is happening in China and in Russia. They have units that are specifically targeted cyber warfare. They are carrying it out. Our critical infrastructure is attacked thousands of times a day.' (Blackburn, N.d.)

The development of a cyber-domain that opens up cyberspace has caused a situation, where states and organizations are more and more dependent on cyberspace. Although cyberspace provides huge advantages and makes everything easier, there are two kinds of threats. One is related to technical issues and the other one is related to adversary actions. More dangerous are adversary cyber activities that are used as a weapon to affect NATO or its contributors. According to the assessment by the Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service Russian special services use cyber operations actively, involving cyber criminals and the so-called patriotic hackers (Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service, 2019). If NATO opponents find weak points in NATO's or its member states' cyber defence, they are able to influence NATO activities.

'NATO cyberspace is the most used communication means at the strategic and operational levels and is increasingly important in tactical warfare' (NATO Standardization Office, 2018). The most crucial is to protect NATO's cyber domain on every level. Although NATO takes care of its cyber defence, it might not be enough (NATO, 2019). NATO also depends on its partners and the cybersecurity (CS) of its operational environment's infrastructure. Although NATO uses equipment and networks from trusted companies, its operational environment's infrastructure or partners might use systems and equipment controlled by NATO opponents. There is a concern, that some states have forced their companies to use 'backdoors' (Human Rights Watch, 2017), which is 'a means to access a computer system or encrypted data that bypasses the system's customary security mechanisms' (Rouse, 2017). Furthermore, if there is access to the equipment, then it is possible to control the equipment as well. A good example is China and its telecom company Huawei, which is accused of spying for China (Williams, 2019).

This shows that all states and organizations depend on each other as well as on non-state actors. The biggest challenge for NATO is to control the cyberspace of the area of operation, especially in hostile environments. The only option for NATO as a defensive organization to influence operation's cyberspace is to rely on its members' will to use national offensive cyber activities. A model for other members is the UK, who announced its readiness to provide voluntary national cyber contributions for NATO missions (Ducaru, 2018).

This research paper discusses and explains through the combat functions and CIA (confidentiality, integrity, and availability) triad, why NATO depends on other actors, as well as illustrates different threats and vulnerabilities on an operational level in each combat function, and provides possible solutions. Combat functions are selected in order to divide the research paper into seven clearly understandable paragraphs and to analyse each function through the CIA triad from the perspective of personnel, procedures and technology if possible. Each chapter starts with a short description of the defined and unambiguous combat function, continues with CIA analysis and ends with a short conclusion.

These findings might provide NATO with many advantages in supporting the achievement of their own forces' goals by using cyberspace. It might help to save lives and resources, it might save time for reaction or preparations, and it might help to create suitable conditions for our forces. For example, an unexpected cyber-attack might affect the adversary decision making cycle or force him to use his assets, including reserves somewhere else. Before friendly units can use cyber advantages, they should have a common understanding of cyberspace and the threats in it. Moreover, the most important is to understand how to protect ourselves and how to support commander decisions.

The restrictions for this paper are that most of the cyber activities against NATO operations are not publicly accessible and they are not used to illustrate real threats. All examples are collected from open sources or derived by the author, and should therefore be viewed critically.

The final parts of this paper are conclusions and recommendations. Annex A is summarizing the adversary's possible cyber activities through by combat functions and our own forces' countermeasures.

Command

According to the NATO doctrine,

> *'Command is the authority vested in an individual of the armed forces for the direction, coordination and control of military forces. It is the combat function that integrates all the others in a single concept to create desired effects that support selected objectives. The art of command lies in consciously and skilfully exercising command authority through decision-making, planning and leadership'* (NATO Standardization Office, 2016 pp. 2-15).

Confidentiality and cybersecurity are provided by controlled accessibility, by using high level encryption and by following the procedures. Different nations and organizations use these principles to secure their information, and NATO is not an exception. NATO personnel is trained to use the networks, and there are certain procedures to protect the networks, but technology might be one of the vulnerabilities.

NATO C2 networks are built by using civilian technology and some of them are built using third-party networks, which might decrease security. In order to get easier access to the information, some states force their companies to build 'back doors' into the information and communication technology (ICT) equipment. Typical of this are Chinese companies, especially Huawei which produce cell phones, routers, and other network equipment and is suspected of providing 'backdoors' to China (Finley, 2019).

If the adversary gets access to the network, he is able to break the network and/or system integrity and availability. The possible adversary cyber-attacks against C2 systems might be related to collecting information, forwarding false information about our own or adversary units to manipulate decision-making, or damaging the system. The commander is unable to command and is incapable of controlling the situation if the C2 system malfunctions. The C2 system might have just technical issues or it might be attacked by the adversary. The purpose of that kind of attack is to decrease situational awareness of the area of operations and/or disable command, control, and coordination at critical moments.

The biggest challenge is to realize in which cases the network is broken because of technical issues and when it is manipulated by the adversary, and how to fix the problem. Everything starts with preparations and following the procedures before an attack, including cutting the infected equipment off from the network. It is unpredictable how much time it takes to restore the C2 system, but there are three solutions that help to maintain situational awareness and ensure initial connections between the commander and his/her sub-commanders.

Firstly, headquarters (HQ) at every level should use paper maps to mark the current situation. The update frequency and the scope of information depend on the level of the HQ and the operation. Secondly, signal branches should plan primary, contingency and alternative means of communication to provide channels for critical information exchange. Thirdly, for quick restoration, there should be secured back-up network equipment, such as computers, servers, printers, etc. on every level to provide an initial C2 system for the operational command.

Information

NATO defines information activities as,

> *'actions designed to affect information and or information systems and can be performed by any actor and include protective measures. They affect the character or behaviour of a person or a group as a first-order effect by providing information to help influence perceptions and understanding'* (NATO Standardization Office, 2016 pp. 2-16).

In order to protect its information and information systems through the CIA triad, the main principles are basically the same as when protecting the C2 system. They include trained personnel, encryption, following the procedures and using trusted equipment. As far as availability is concerned, NATO is most through technology. The adversary can use cyber activities to pass on information to the target or to block opponents from sharing their information. The effect of the information depends on the messages and how skilfully cyberspace as an information warfare tool is used.

There were several cyber-attacks against the Estonian governmental organizations in 2007. The biggest effect was through the denial of governmental, social and banking services, but as for information activities, these attacks were not very effective. The

Estonian media was still able to deliver adequate information about the situation (McGuinness, 2017). Nevertheless, if the adversary is able to deliver his messages to its opposition forces or the local populations, it might break the will and motivation of our forces or turn the locals against NATO.

In order to decrease the adversary effect, protection of our own information systems, clear information security (INFOSEC) procedures and requirements, as well as cooperation with local authorities, organizations, and populations is crucial. The biggest challenge is to ensure forwarding our own messages to the local population through the existing information systems in the area of operations. It means cooperation with local authorities and telecom companies, including assistance in protecting their systems and fixing them if necessary.

Intelligence

According to NATO doctrine,

> *'through analysing raw information or data, we create intelligence. This develops knowledge to inform a commander's understanding of the battlefield and the people on it. It is that understanding that is critical to effective decision making. Historically, intelligence has focused on two overlapping and complementary subjects, the adversary (their characteristics, culture, capabilities, locations, intentions, relationships and objectives) and the operational environment within which they operate'* (NATO Standardization Office, 2016 pp. 2-18).

One of the adversary intelligence aim through cyber activities is to get access to NATO information. In order to ensure our own systems and information confidentiality, protection of our own systems and encryption are required. Even more important is that the personnel follows the INFOSEC requirement and procedures, including the requirement of sharing information through different means of communication.

By accessing NATO network and the information in there, the adversary is able to break the integrity of the intelligence system. He may manipulate the data and the already analysed intelligence information to influence planning and decision-making processes. If he knows NATO intelligence procedures and the public sources to collect information, it is even easier to disseminate false information or limit access to these sources.

The adversary cannot only limit the availability of sources, but he also has more direct options to prevent NATO from collecting intelligence information. ISTAR assets collect different kinds of data, and some of the assets are connected to different networks. By using cyber-attack against ISTAR assets, it is possible to destroy these assets or cut off the lines of forwarding information.

Protection of our own systems, including ISTAR assets, and following the procedures are crucial for collecting and analysing information to support the commander's decision making. The preparation phase of an operation should include analysing adversary cyber capabilities to influence our own information collection, as well as influencing ISTAR assets.

Manoeuvre

> *'Manoeuvre is defined as employing forces on the battlefield through movement in combination with fire, or fire potential, to achieve a position of advantage in respect to the enemy to accomplish the mission. Manoeuvre is the means of concentrating land forces at the decisive point to pre-empt, dislocate or disrupt enemy cohesion through surprise, psychological and/or physical momentum and dominance'* (NATO Standardization Office, 2016 pp. 2-20).

It is possible to influence manoeuvre through other combat functions like intelligence, command, force protection, maintenance and information. For example, the adversary might affect planning and decision-making, as well as attract or deceive non-combatants in the area, etc. Although everything might be related to each other, the keywords in this combat function are movement and fire. Fire will be discussed in the next chapter and the focus will be on movement.

The principles of manoeuvre confidentiality are the same as those of other functions. Confidentiality is provided by securing own systems and the information in it through encryption and the procedures being followed. By getting into the system, the adversary may obtain information about the planned manoeuvre, thus ruining the surprise and the achievement of the desired end state. The adversary has an opportunity to support his actions with cyber activities by breaking third party systems integrity and availability.

By controlling the operation environment network, it is possible to use kinetic or non-kinetic cyber activities against the opponent. Depending on the type of operation and environment, it is possible to initiate traffic jams by manipulating traffic lights, start fires or prevent river crossing by controlling the lifting of bridges. A group of computer scientists from the University of Michigan legally tested the network of traffic lights. They were able to control and manipulate traffic lights by using only a laptop and a wireless card, and this shows the ease of affecting everybody in the area (Stromberg, 2014).

While non-kinetic activities might ruin the surprise and slow down the tempo, kinetic activities might cause serious damage to the units. It is possible to carry out explosions, start fires or flooding near the opposition units. In his article, Kevin Coleman explains that when using cyber activities, it is possible to start a fire or explosion by manipulating automation and control systems. These systems are used in power, water, heating and other similar systems as well as in complex processes in chemical and material production (Coleman, 2012).

Although there are kinetic and non-kinetic cyber threats, it is possible to mitigate the risks. The first option is to secure our own systems and information by following the procedures as prescribed in each combat function. The second one is related to the manoeuvre area. During the preparation phase at every level, intelligence must include the analysis of possible infrastructure which might be used by the adversary in cyber activities.

Fires

> *'Fires are defined as the use of weapon systems to create a specific lethal or nonlethal effect on a target. As a combat function, fires provide the targeting, integration and delivery of those weapon effects. Fires may be used to deliver physical effects (such as destruction or attrition) or psychological effects (such as lowering morale) either directly or indirectly. Fires can also generate negative influence – for example, by causing collateral damage to civilian property and infrastructure'* (NATO Standardization Office, 2016).

The confidentiality of fires in cyber activities is ensured by using the same principles as for other functions. In order to break integrity and influence indirect fire weapon systems, the adversary has to get into the fire control systems. When the systems or

the GPS signal have been manipulated and/or the automatic calculation program altered, the weapon systems or missiles will miss the desired targets. That kind of cyber-attack might result in unplanned damages, including lethal damage to our own forces, and lowering our own units' morale.

The adversary might affect the availability of the fire control systems or the means of coordination. All effects delivered by fires are coordinated by different parties. The availability of coordination might be limited by using cyber activities which might be supported by other means of electronic warfare. Without coordination, fire units' ability to support our own units or to affect the adversary is limited or lost.

Possible cyber activities against fires are mostly non-kinetic. Although it might be possible to use kinetic power, it is still difficult to execute. In this case, the weapon systems should be positioned near the infrastructure to be used to cause an explosion, or these systems should be connected to the power grid which the adversary is able to control.

The purpose of affecting fires through cyber activities might be related to gaining advantages on the battlefield or supporting information warfare. If fire units are unable to support our own units or they cause collateral damages, it might affect their morale or turn the local people against NATO. The only countermeasure is to protect our own networks and fire systems. And if something goes wrong, the commanders, as well as public affairs and CIMIC groups should mitigate the consequences.

Protection

> *'Protection is the function that traditionally considers Allied troops under threat – force protection. Force protection is defined as: all measures and means to* ***minimize the vulnerability*** *of personnel, facilities, equipment and operations to* ***any threat*** *and* ***in all situations****, to preserve freedom of action and the operational effectiveness of the force. It is essential for maintaining combat power and freedom of action. As well as protecting our own forces against attack and* ***the environment, we have a moral and legal duty to protect non-combatants****. Most obviously, we need to* ***protect other agencies*** *with whom we operate in the comprehensive approach'* (NATO Standardization Office, 2016 pp. 2-21;2-22).

As far as protection is concerned, Cyber confidentiality is based on the same principles as those of other combat functions. The main difference is that NATO has declared a

moral and legal duty to protect non-combatants and the agencies with whom they operate. Although there are certain procedures, personnel and technology to protect NATO systems, these might not be compatible with those of third parties. One of the biggest NATO threats in cyberspace is the adversary's ability to use third parties' systems.

Kinetic attacks, like explosions through third parties' networks and systems are analysed in the chapter on manoeuvre. In order to minimize the vulnerability of our own forces as well as non-combatants, cooperation with other agencies is needed to ensure the integrity of the systems. The main purpose of this cooperation is not to allow the adversary to control and manipulate the cyber infrastructure in the area of operations.

If the adversary is able to control and manipulate third parties networks and systems, he will be able to limit the availability of services. Cyber activities can be used to harm the normally functioning social environment by cutting off electricity, water supply, banking system, healthcare, etc. Russia used cyber-attacks against Estonian banks, media outlets and government bodies in 2007 (McGuinness, 2017) and hackers hit US power utilities in 2019 (Blake, 2019), which shows how real that kind of threats are and. Depending on the type of operation and environment, cyber activities might be used as a tool of hybrid warfare. Hybrid activities, supported by the denial of services and dissemination of false information, might lead to riots in the area of operation.

Operational planning and preparations should include analyses in order to minimize the vulnerabilities to any threat and in all situations in cyber activities. Although responsibility for the protection of national systems lies on the state itself, NATO should support them at least through counselling. Direct help through cyber and information activities would be even better in restoring the functions of the systems, providing true information to the local population and stabilizing the situation.

Sustainment

> *'Sustainment is the combat function that provides for personnel, logistics and other support required to maintain and prolong operations until successful mission accomplishment. It integrates all aspects of service support to help generate and sustain military capacity. It encompasses not only the obvious logistical items such as supply, maintenance and medical support, but also broader issues like deployment from the home base, relief,*

redeployment and recuperation, and the support roles provided by military engineers such as infrastructure and water supply' (NATO Standardization Office, 2016 pp. 2-23).

The threats and principles of ensuring the protection and use of the systems are described through the confidentiality and availability analyses in previous chapters. There are two options to influence the sustainment through cyber activity and to break integrity. The first one needs access to NATO networks, especially logistic network, and the second way is through national or private companies' networks.

If the adversary is able to access NATO networks, he might manipulate logistical reports and requests to cause mess and confusion into the logistic chain. By changing the quantity of required or requested equipment, the unit might receive less than it is needed to fulfil the task. It is possible to change the type of the required or requested equipment, e.g. a unit may get wrong ammunition, and the effect is similar to the previously described case. By sending too much or wrong equipment, the logistical units will be overloaded with that kind of situation to be solved.

Although adversary electronic warfare might be used to affect deployment by interfering with electronic devices to its full spectrum, cyber activities might be used for the same purposes by using hardware and software vulnerabilities. Russia showed its electronic warfare capabilities when they interrupted the GPS signal in the Black Sea area. This resulted in the GPS indicating the ships' locations on the mainland (Hambling, 2017).

Some possible examples of how to affect movement or deployment have been described previously in the chapter on manoeuvre. All that you need is intelligence information about the deployment routes and access to certain networks, e.g. traffic lights, railway systems or controlling networks for lifting the bridges. NATO or its members often use railways to transport their equipment, especially armoured vehicles. A similar attack was in Poland in 2017 when a 14-year-old boy caused derailing of four trams, and twelve people were injured. The boy used an adapted television remote control to change track points (Baker, 2008).

By accessing railway networks, the adversary is able to cause accidents or just win time by taking trains to the wrong direction. The first options would be more dangerous with the adversary causing real crashes by directing two trains onto the same tracks or moving the tracks when the train's speed is too high for a turn. If the adversary directs the train onto the wrong tracks, getting it back on the right track is not enough. This is because the adversary has already won time and our own units should work with the railway company to get back control over the railway. It is unpredictable how long it might take and whether they really regain control. It means that every spreading point of railway tracks should be controlled manually by a human on the right location.

The adversary is able to use different cyber activities against NATO to influence maintenance. These activities might be arranged directly to NATO systems and networks or through third parties. The adversary might affect harbours, airports, railways and road networks, or just manipulate the logistics. NATO countermeasures are again to protect their own networks by the same principles, as well as to cooperate with third parties and support their protection or help to restore functions if necessary.

Conclusion

There are different operational threats in cyberspace. The principles of how the adversary might use our vulnerabilities, are basically the same in each combat function. Some of them are applicable in each function by harming confidentiality, integrity and availability. For example, if the adversary accesses NATO systems, he might collect information, manipulate with systems, programs and data in there, as well as deny access to the networks, systems and information. Analyses show that there are three possible ways of how the adversary is able to affect NATO operations.

The first one involves getting access to NATO systems or networks and manipulating the information or systems. This option is the most difficult to achieve, but if the adversary manages to get in, then the impact and damage will be the greatest. The most challenging for NATO would be to understand, whether it is just a technical issue or whether the systems are manipulated by someone.

It is vital to protect our own systems by following the two steps. The first step is related to the personnel, who use the systems. The personnel must be trained and they must

follow the procedures and requirements at every level. The second step is related to technology and consists of using equipment as well as their updates and third parties' networks that meet security requirements. Although NATO members use different systems and equipment on a national level, it is necessary that these are compliant with the standards as well.

The second way to affect NATO operation is through partners' networks or systems which are in the operational environment. Depending on the environment, this course of action will be most likely used because these systems and networks might not be protected as well as NATO systems. In a friendly or neutral environment, cooperation to protect the third parties' systems and networks is possible, but in a hostile environment, these systems and networks are controlled by the adversary.

The third option is also related to the third parties systems' and networks in the area of operations, but the purpose is kinetic effects. These effects might damage the forces, make the area of operations unsuitable or cause collateral damages to non-combatants to provoke them against NATO. In order to mitigate the risks of adversary actions through partners, a thorough analysis of the cyber environment is needed during the preparation phase, as well as versatile cooperation with agencies in the area operations.

Recommendations

In order to mitigate the risk of losing situational awareness by crashed C2 systems, the current situations should be marked on paper maps in HQs at every level. The information and the frequency of its update should be analysed depending on the level of the HQ and the type of operations.

In order to speed up establishing secured network, there should be backup equipment in every HQ. The amount of equipment should be analysed to provide minimum C2 systems between HQs at different level.

Cyber analyses should always be an essential part of preparation and planning phase to avoid kinetic and non-kinetic actions against our own troops and partners. A cyber

analyses should consist of adversary capabilities and possible cyber activities by using existing infrastructure in the area of operation.

In this research paper, some cyber threats at the operational level have been brought out and presented in a table (see ANNEX A) which can be used as a part of a planning tool called ‘a pocketbook’. The author recommends that this table should be complemented in more detail, so that it would be useful for planners on operational level.

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Annex A. Example of threats through the combat functions

Combat Function	Threats	Countermeasures[1]
Command	· The collapse of the C2 system; · C2 system availability/access is blocked; · Manipulated information; · Information theft.	· Protection of our own systems; · Following procedures, personnel training; · Equipment and services from the trusted companies; · Paper maps and hard copies to retain situational awareness; · Planned primary, contingency and alternative means of communications; · Minimum secured back-up C2 system.
Information	· Delivering fake or false information to the target; · Blocking delivering own information; · Denial of services.	· Protection of our own systems; · Encryption; · INFOSEC requirements and procedures; · Cooperation with local authorities and organizations (including their systems protection, means of information exchange etc.).
Intelligence	· Information theft; · The tool of information warfare (fake and false information in and outside our own systems); · Direct attacks against ISTAR assets; · Denial of services.	· Protection of our own systems; · Encryption; · INFOSEC requirements and procedures; · Analysis of adversary cyber capabilities and use of own ISTAR assets.
Manoeuvre (movement)	· Non-kinetic: traffic jams by manipulating traffic lights, lifting bridges, fires etc. · Kinetic: explosions, fires, flooding etc; · Collapse of the coordination systems.	· Protection of our own systems; · Following the procedures; · Analysis of infrastructure in the area of operations from the cyber perspective; · Cooperation with local authorities and organizations, including systems protection.
Fires	· Missing the target by ADV manipulated missiles and rockets; · Collapse of the fire coordination systems and/or fire control systems; · Collapsed or manipulated automatic calculation system; · Collateral damage (caused by ADV cyber activities) as a tool of information warfare; · Information theft (fire units/systems locations).	· Protection of our own systems; · Following the procedures; · Alternative communication means of fire coordination; · Avoidance of the use of local networks, including power grids; · Information activities.
Protection	· Kinetic activities through the third	· Protection of own systems;

[1] Countermeasures do not include detailed protection of own systems.

	parties networks and systems (explosions, fires etc.); · Non-kinetic activities in the operation area as denying services, water supply, electricity etc. · Used as a hybrid warfare tool to help organize riots by attacking civil and social environments.	· Operation area infrastructure analyses on cyber perspective; · Cooperation with local authorities and organizations, including systems protection; · Provision of support to restore functioning systems and stability.
Sustainment (Logistic)	· Manipulated logistic data (in NATO and partners systems), · Manipulated logistic systems (availability, integrity); · Manipulated supply/maintenance systems (electricity, water, heating, fuelling, etc.) · Influencing deployment routes (traffic lights, railway, harbours, airfield and their systems). · Information theft (LOG situation).	· Protection of our own systems; · Following the procedures; · Analysis of infrastructure in the area of operations from the cyber perspective; · Cooperation with local authorities and organizations, including systems protection. · Provision of support to restore systems functioning.

GEORGI KOKOŠINSKI, Maj

Battling the Russia's narratives on deterrence and assurance – Estonian example on Enhanced Forward Presence

'Narrative is power: it is a vehicle for manipulating individuals so that they are more inclined to do what you want, not because you have forced them to, but because you have convinced them that they want to do what you want them to.'
(Allenby, 2017)

Introduction

The beginning of the 21st century has brought uncertainty to Europe. Long lasted peace is about to fade, and emerging powers in Asia and Eurasia challenge liberal democracy, which had previously enjoyed prosperity. Russia is amongst those countries; it questions the flourished world order and seeks for ways to expand its influence. With the armed conflicts in Georgia and Ukraine, Russia has demonstrated that compared to previous wars, contemporary warfare with the addition of information and cyber domains is significantly more diverse.

Following the annexation of Crimea in 2014, the NATO eastern flank countries felt threatened by Russia's unpredictable behaviour. In its rhetoric, Russia has claimed that it has a sphere of influence over the former Soviet Union territory. In order to deter Russia's aggressive behaviour and reassure the Baltic states', the United States launched in 2014 an operation 'Atlantic Resolve' (U.S. Army Europe, 2018). The very same year the NATO decided to implement in different domains a set of assurance measures (NATO, 2017a). A few years later, in 2016, NATO decided to preposition in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland four multinational battlegroups. The establishment of Enhanced Forward Presence battlegroups has been accompanied by the constant flow of accusations by Russia, stating that allies have started the new arms race and that NATO is encircling Russia.

Countries are interpreting events and intents in a certain way, by giving them a meaning. Interpretation is made through stories or narratives. The word *narrative* is derived from Latin, where *narratus* means story or storytelling. Stories have played a vital role in history for humans in creating the world and providing the meaning of life. The German scholar Dr. Ansgar Nünning has been examining storytelling and

narratology for decades and concludes that compelling narratives and stories can themselves be weapons of mass destruction (Nünning, 2010, p. 195). Therefore, the narratives are playing an essential role in modern information warfare, and it is crucial to examine what Russia is saying and how the Alliance with its member states are withstanding in contemporary conflict.

Since the establishment of battlegroups, Russia has systematically attempted to undermine the unity of NATO, with its security strategy-driven narratives. The ultimate purpose of such information activity is to break the Alliance's cohesion and will. NATO, along with member state Estonia is putting much effort to withstand confrontation within the information domain.

This paper will argue that Russia's attempts to undermine the establishment of Enhanced Forward Presence battlegroups through spreading hostile narratives have not been successful in Estonia because of two aspects: the implementation of NATO's Strategic Communications (StratCom) and Estonia's StratCom centric activities to protect its society. The paper examines Russia's narratives firstly on deterrence and assurance, and their linkage to Russian policy, then focuses on NATO's policy and implementation of StratCom, and finally assesses Estonia's actions and practices in confronting these hostile narratives. This paper assesses narratives targeted towards Estonia as one of the NATO battlegroups host nations.

Chapter 1. Russia's utilization of narratives in the construction of NATO as a threat

1.1. Russia's objectives in countering the perceived threat

Russia has been acting vigorously in the world arena over the last decade. Russia's observers point out that the drivers of Russia's foreign policy have not changed much over time. According to a foreign-policy think tank, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Russia's behaviour in the contemporary world is a return to the three centuries-old approaches where the absence of natural protective barriers is compensated by geographic expansion and creation of strategic depth (Gurganus & Rumer, 2019). This point of view is shared as well by the British security expert Keir Giles, who argues that Russia has embraced the attitude of vulnerable land borders and the need to guarantee its security by establishing control over territories that

surrounding it. In order to mitigate the insecurity, Russia has unilaterally created zones of influence where the country demands itself the right to decide on security developments (Giles, 2019).

In this light, it is becoming understandable why Russia perceives the expansion of international organizations to the East as a challenge. The Kremlin has marked in its National Security Policy that the activities of NATO and its allies pose an immediate threat to Russia's national security (Russian president, 2015). As Russia's economy is most of all dependent on the export of natural resources, the country requires sea line communications. Losing the convenient access to the Baltic Sea and the rise of economically capable China in the East has made Russia anxious. The loss of buffer zones and immediate access to the world seas amplifies the uncertainty and calls the Baltic state's Eastern neighbour to more radical actions.

1.2. The role of information warfare in contemporary conflict

Expanding the zone of influence is Russia's main goal; the approach that had been chosen is multidimensional. Most of the methods and ways that Russia is implementing are not new but forgotten old from the Soviet era where the totalitarian state had through possession of mass army, propaganda, and censorship a rigid control over society. Today, the former superpower executes its foreign policy via the demonstration of military capacity, employment of cyberattacks, exploiting other's dependence on Russian natural resources, shaping the world with influence operations, and other nonconventional capabilities (Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service, 2019, p. 2).

Forecasting the essence of future conflicts, Russia acknowledges the importance of a non-traditional approach to security. General Valery Gerasimov points out that in the modern world where the clear distinction between peace and war is absent, require adaption of nonconventional capabilities. Top general emphasizes the significant role of information warfare. According to his analysis, the confrontation in information warfare provides a variety of asymmetrical momentums to degrade the enemy's fighting capability (Gerasimov, 2013, p. 3). The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation see the information war as a means to undermine the opposing state's political decision-making process, economic sustainability, and coherence of society.

Massive psychological manipulation is implemented to create effects that will lead to a destabilization of the country (Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, 2011).

The power of information was evident already for the Bolshevist government, which overthrew the Tsar at the beginning of the 20th century. They understood that the manipulation of information and propaganda is key to successful control of the population and masses (Gurganus & Rumer, 2019). The knowledge was maintained, and techniques were developed further during the Cold War when masses of Russians immigrated to the Baltic states. Today, roughly a million ethnic Russians are living in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Russia perceives them as its diaspora, and for that reason, the Baltic states' governments are always under accusation for not guaranteeing the minority human rights. In order to preserve the influence over the Russian-speaking population, Russia has since the millennium taken more focused measures. Among others, these measures involve compatriot's policy (Grigas, 2016, p. 65). The objective of compatriot policy is to create and maintain artificial ties between Russia and Russians living abroad. This serves the broader goal of Russia's foreign policy to prevent compatriots' integration into Western society. The development of the cross-border state-controlled media helps Kremlin to use its diaspora as useful influencers without direct evidence of interference (Mattiisen, et al., 2018, p. 9). NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence points out that with the implementation of contemporary information capabilities, Russia is creating its ideological world that exceeds the borders and aims to consolidate the compatriots living abroad (NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence, 2018, p. 7). Russia's world or its reality is crafted with the implementation of its own media channels and by the circulation of narratives that in core compete with the West. Consequently, Russia might be able to use its fellow citizens in Europe as force multipliers and voluntary messengers in pushing through Russia's national interests.

In some instances, in order to get the attention of non-domestic audiences, Russia employs the controlled media, social media accounts, and sources that look like media, but that is created for a specific purpose. These lastly mentioned and mostly web-based sources have an essential role in the justification of the Kremlin narratives. The Ukrainian academic and writer Anton Shekhovtsov brings to the table the terminology *narrative laundering*; he describes the process where narratives are circling in media.

With every next step, it is impossible to determine the author of the story (Shekhovtsov, 2018, p. 136). In such a case, the ultimate intention is to hide the real source and finally break into the West's information space.

1.3. Constructed narratives on NATO's actions on Eastern flank

As noted before, Russia is using a variety of channels to spread its messages. An American think-tank, the Atlantic Council, which is focused mainly on international affairs, has been monitoring Russia's narratives on deterrence and assurance since the prepositioning of the battlegroups. The foundation's initiative, called the Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab), is concentrating on disinformation and exposing falsehoods and fake news (Atlantic Council, 2019).

According to DFRLab's findings, the main narratives the Kremlin was spreading at the very first stage of the establishment of battlegroups, emphasized that Baltic states are paranoid and Russophobic. This narrative was followed by stories that negatively portrayed the collective defence. Most noted narratives stated that NATO is unwelcomed in Baltic states and the Alliance's troops are occupants, NATO cannot protect the Baltic states, and NATO's actions are provocative and aggressive (Digital Forensic Research Lab, 2017). Interestingly, two of the narratives mentioned above are contradicting in essence. On the one hand, Russia is trying to say that NATO's decision to send additional troops to its Eastern flank is a provocative move, and then on the other hand, it is attempting to undermine the strength of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, by saying that NATO cannot protect the Baltic states.

It is essential to notice that a year before the deployment in 2016, Russia disseminated stories that were hammering the immediate threat from NATO and, at the same time, ridiculing the idea of a Russian threat to allies (NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence, 2018).

The core narratives used towards the deployment of the allied troops have not broadly changed over time. After several rotations, the dominant narratives still refer to NATO's aggressive and provocative behavior, to the manifestation of Russophobia, and NATO's inability to protect its members because the organization is obsolete (Digital Forensic Research Lab, 2019).

For Russia, undermining NATO is a long-standing objective; this was a priority during the Cold War. The rapid evolution in the field of telecommunication has enhanced the states' perspective to project its influence. Russia has learned from it.

Chapter 2. The role of StratCom in NATO's collective defence

2.1. Defining StratCom

NATO acknowledged already in 2009 that an active presence and proactive approach in the information environment is vital for achieving the Alliance's political and military objectives. The observation and assessment of Russia's practices in dealing with its closest neighbors have not left a question of how vital part plays StratCom. NATO sees that Russia has integrated all information related aspects to serve its ultimate objectives. Therefore, information activities for Russia are not in a supportive role, but rather play a centric position in a palette of hybrid warfare capabilities (Laity, 2018, p. 68).

A decade ago, when StratCom was rather a new term and a relatively unknown field, the Alliance defined it as a coordinated and appropriate use of various communication capabilities in support of policies, operations, and activities in order to advance the organization's aims (NATO, 2009). With the development of StratCom, the Alliance adopted in 2017 in a military context a new definition, which emphasizes the integration of the communication capabilities:

> 'Strategic Communications in a military context is the integration of communication capabilities and information staff function with other military activities, in order to understand and shape the information environment, in support of NATO strategic aims and objectives' (NATO Standardization Office, 2018).

From this definition, it is observable that StratCom is continuously contributing to the aims and objectives of the Alliance. What has changed over time is that communication capabilities and StratCom as a staff function must be integrated with all other activities. The harmonization, synchronization, and a shared effort is the key to success. In that sense, the essence of StratCom is aligned with NATO's principles of operations, which emphasizes the requirement of unity of effort (NATO Standardization Office, 2017). A former military officer and an expert in the field of influence, Dr. Steve Tatham, argues in support of the unity of effort; he articulates that StratCom can be successful only if

words and actions match (Tatham, 2015, p. 8). The other core principles in implementing and developing the Alliance's communication capability are related to promotion of NATO values, empowering communication at all levels, building credibility, understanding of the information environment, perceiving communication as collective and integrated effort and approaching to StratCom as narrative-, policy-, and strategy-driven activity that is focused on achieving desired effects and outcomes (Laity, 2018, p. 71).

2.2. NATO's activities and practices in protecting its unity

The establishment of battlegroups on the Eastern border could be described as a manoeuvre of StratCom. It portrays an Alliance as a united and capable organization, which has not deviated away from its original purpose to protect the member states from the potential threat. The role of StratCom in creating deterrence is significant and should not be underestimated.

Another example of how the Alliance is countering Russian propaganda is the initiative where NATO publicly refutes on its website the claims that are presented mainly in Russian controlled channels (NATO, 2014). The portal serves as a source for confirmed information both for the general public as well as for media. The Alliance's initiative is contributing to the overarching aspiration to be transparent. NATO can only win the information game when it continues reporting the truth and right, confirmed information.

The creation of the StratCom Centre of Excellence (StratCom COE) in Riga is a clever move to withstand the contemporary information threats and enhance the Alliance and member states' knowledge about this rapidly developing domain. The StratCom COE primary task is to provide a comprehensive analysis, share its expertise on countering the hostile information activities, and organize topic-related conferences and courses (NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence, 2014).

One more example of how NATO is protecting its unity is a branded communication campaign that was launched in numerous member states. The slogan '#WeAreNATO' brings together visual narratives that tell the NATO story (NATO, 2017b). The officials of the NATO International Staff's Public Diplomacy Division have assessed that there is a need to remind the member states populations that the Alliance is an essential

guarantor of security for all its members. They have acknowledged that unity and thereby, the future of Alliance depends on the citizens' understanding of NATO's role in the contemporary security environment (Ildem, 2017).

In light of the recent developments, where NATO declared space as its next operational domain, the Alliance's StratCom community puzzles thoughts about the future of the informational domain. In 2016, NATO recognized cyberspace as a domain of operations in which the Alliance should be capable of defending itself (NATO, 2016). It is estimated that the acceptance of the informational environment still takes time. On the other hand, the Alliance has adopted in recent history a core document MC 0628 NATO Military Policy on StratCom that provides principles and tools to face the challenges of information warfare (Laity, 2018, p. 66).

All these described methods and measures are more or less reactive. There is no doubt that they have an impact on Russia's behavior, but in order to shape the environment based on Western values, NATO must be more proactive. So far, it has been a challenge because NATO is in a different position than Russia. The values and principles that form the foundation of the Alliances' reputation do not allow to use the same means and tactics as Kremlin does. NATO is based on decisions made on consensus; Russia's moves in the information domain are driven to a certain extent by one man's vision. Therefore, Kremlin will have an advantage in speed. This aspect is crucial in information warfare because the first narrative sets the scene and shapes the perception.

Chapter 3. Estonian response to Russia's effort in the information domain

3.1. Estonia's policy on StratCom

Estonia's approach to withstand Russia's attempts in undermining the NATO presence involves a variety of internal and outward-looking measures; the challenge remains the mood of the Russian speaking population. Estonia sees the value of StratCom through the prism of national security and defence. National Security Concept points out that StratCom is crucial for determining society's values and facilitating people's readiness to contribute to it. The main goal of StratCom is the resilience and more strong cohesion of society (Government of Republic of Estonia, 2017). By definition, Strategic Communication includes broad activities that serve the main goal:

> ‘Strategic communication means the planning of state activities, assembling these as a unified communicative whole, and forwarding this to the society’ (Government of Republic of Estonia, 2018).

StratCom involves the assessment of environment and risks, determination of stakeholders, construction of messages, planning of activities, prioritization of means, coordination inside and outside, and execution.

3.2. The influence of narratives on Estonian public perception

According to an annually conducted public opinion poll, ordered by the Estonian Ministry of Defence, the majority of Estonians (77%) believe that the presence of the battlegroup has made Estonia more secure. The difference is observable when compared to the attitude with non-Estonians who mainly speak Russian. Less than half of non-Estonians (45%) believed in the spring of 2019 that the NATO presence in the form of the battlegroup does not affect Estonian security (Turu-uuringute AS, 2019, p. 77).

In order to assess the impact of Russia’s information activities in shaping Russian-speaking population perception on NATO, it is essential to compare the results with previous mood measurement (see chart 1). Soon after the establishment of the battlegroup in Estonia, 78% of Estonians believed the country became more secure because of NATO’s actions. At the same time, 43% of non-Estonians thought that NATO’s presence does not play a significant role in the security of the country (Turu-uuringute AS, 2017, p. 56). Interestingly, the amount of those Russian-speakers who believe that the placement of battlegroup causes insecurity has degraded from 20% in 2017 to 17% in 2019 and the portion of these non-Estonian speakers who believe that NATO battlegroup presence makes Estonia more secure has risen from 21% in 2017 to 27% in 2019.



Chart 1. Estonian population public perception on prepositioning NATO battlegroup based on polls: Public Opinion and National Defence – Turu-uuringute AS (October 2017, May 2019). Source: Chart created by the author.

Broadly, the narratives and actions that Russia has undertaken to shape the Estonian inhabitants' perception towards the NATO troops on the ground have not remarkable effect on Estonians as well as on Russian-speaking minorities. There is even a slight positive change among the Russian-speaking minority attitude towards the NATO presence. Although, it should be mentioned that observable deviation in comparison of the conducted polls would fall within the margin of error. The notable difference between the ethnic groups' perception is visible on the question of security guarantees. Almost half of Russians living in Estonia ranks first the cooperation and good relations with Russia, on the other hand, the majority of Estonians believe that NATO membership will ensure the maximum security of the country (Turu-uuringute AS, 2019, p. 35). This remarkable difference is a significant challenge for a NATO border country. The reason for such different perceptions lies, in fact, in media consumption preference. The majority of Estonian Russian-speaking residents are primarily in the sphere of Russian controlled media, while ethnic Estonians are living in a relatively homogeneous media environment (Institute of Baltic Studies and Praxis Center for Policy Studies, 2017). Therefore, the polarization between different ethnic groups has not yet disappeared. This achieves Estonian StratCom's primary goal – resilience and stronger cohesion of the society a head breaking challenge for the country. Juulia

Barthel, who has case studied Russians living in Estonia, emphasizes that it should not be estimated that the Russian minority in Estonia is identical in perceptions (Barthel, 2018, p. 43); the studies are showing that integration into Estonian society has some positive progress (Institute of Baltic Studies and Praxis Center for Policy Studies, 2017). Nevertheless, this could be an effect of a more active StratCom activity effort from the Estonian side. As it is observable in the next chapter, Estonia has engaged with Russian-speaking contingent in the same timeframe with the establishment of the battlegroup in a country.

3.3. StratCom related activities

Estonia has recognized that the importance of StratCom is rising in time, and the threats coming from manipulation of information could create devastating consequences in a country where a quarter of its population is following more or fewer messages that are initiated by Kremlin. Starting from 2018, the Government of Estonia decided to increase the StratCom capability at the state level. Comparing to the previous situation where only two persons were dealing with StratCom on the governmental level, now it is enhanced to a coordination team of ten (Government Office of the Republic of Estonia, 2018). Putting in perspective that Estonia is with its population a small country, the resources that will be provided for the development of the communication field, are remarkable. The primary task of the StratCom unit is monitoring and assessing the information space, dissemination of messages, and resolving emerging crises more effectively. By 2017 Estonia spent on StratCom up to 60,000 euros per year, now after reform with the higher expectancy to the communication capability, the budget of the StratCom team has increased almost thirteen-fold (Kund, 2018).

Moreover, the team that is operating in the Government Office is not the only labour, which is contributing to the state's StratCom. The ministries and governmental institutions have created a network of communication specialists' positions, which will concentrate on the coordination of Russian language communication. The Ministry of Defence of Estonia and the Headquarters of the Estonian Defence Forces are amongst those institutions (Barthel, 2018, p. 45). The ultimate objective of such activity is to bring the Russian speaking population to the local information space.

For Estonia, it is a remarkable challenge to build an efficient strategy to protect its population from hostile information attacks aimed to spread and cultivate doubts and dissatisfaction. Thus, the limited resources of national power should be implemented in a wise, calculated way. The main path that Estonia has chosen is concentrating on the education of society. Rising media literacy is one of the ways to increase the populations' immunity to hostile media content. For example, in Estonia, the upper secondary school's eleventh-grade pupils undergo a media literacy course. The course aims to familiarize the younger generation with a contemporary media environment and introduce the techniques that are used to influence media texts and visuals (Sihtasutus Innove, 2016). An ability to evaluate the source and content of media is an essential skill in an era where modern telecommunication technology grants access to the world's information sources for 24 hours a day. The Government Offices' StratCom team highly welcomes the initiative to provide pupils a basic knowledge about the media functions and influence techniques. According to the former StratCom Adviser of the Government of Estonia Martin Jaško, dealing with disinformation is a reactive approach; the most efficient way to protect society is by enhancing media literacy (Jaško, 2017). Furthermore, not only are pupils undergoing subject-related training. The selected states' institutions are educating their personnel in order to become immune to hostile information activity.

As there is a significant contingent of those Russian-speaking people who do not consume Estonian language media, the Ministry of Defence of Estonia has launched in 2017 with the cooperation of local media company a project where inhabitants of North Eastern part of Estonia are receiving the news on defence and security issues in the Russian language. Once a month the newspaper *Северное Побережье Экстра* publishes a one-pager that contains the most recent news about the development of Estonian Defence Forces and Defence League, as well as cooperation with NATO and the activities of the battlegroup (Северное Побережье Экстра, 2019). The project is designed to provide for Russian-speaking older generation inhabitants an opportunity to get unbiased information on topics. This free print media run is 50,000 copies, and by that, it is the most read Russian language newspaper in the country (Eesti Meediaettevõtete Liit, 2019).

Another example of how the Ministry of Defence has attempted to reach the Russian-speaking population is the documentary series about the conscription. The twelve episodes documentary first broadcasted in the Russian language on TV channel ETV+. Mainly produced for the younger generation, the series gained up to 8,000 viewers per episode. With that performance, it was one of the most successful broadcasts of the channel. The episodes posted on YouTube gained the audience up to 1,500 viewers (Eesti Rahvusringhääling, 2018). Besides the media related efforts, the Estonian Defence Forces, Defence League, and NATO battlegroup are conducting the community relations activities and public engagement events in the regions where most of the population speaks Russian as their first language. Often, these face-to-face activities serve as the first point for local inhabitants to sense the presence of the Estonian Republic. Interacting with people and creating the first impression is intended to crack Russia's ideological dogmas that NATO forces are hostile. This communicative initiative was launched at the same time with the prepositioning of the battlegroup.

It should not be underestimated the will of people who voluntarily contribute to fighting hostile information. A group of volunteers, mainly from Defence League, run a blog Propastop that reveals the information manipulation cases and provides general information techniques on how to distinguish disinformation from an unbiased source. The blog is published in four languages – Estonian, Russian, English, and German (Propastop, 2019a). As part of the people's initiative, the same volunteers have called up the population to a collection of signatures to work out on the state level the principles and regulations on how to block the activity of hostile propaganda channels in Estonia. The petition that is currently waiting for citizen's signatures is focusing on Russian state-controlled channels Baltnews and Sputnik Estonia (Propastop, 2019b). The European Parliament has conceded the Russian way of world-making by the implementation of a variety of tools and instruments that demonstrate and represent itself as a steady and trustworthy source of information. In the resolution that was adopted in 2016, the European Parliament calls Sputnik, for example, a pseudo-news agency. The European community is acknowledging that Russia is investing a remarkable amount of financial means to shape the information environment in its neighbouring countries (European Parliament, 2016). By doing so, Europe has drawn attention to emerging and not always a visible threat from the East.

One of the practices that Estonian Government communication structure implements in dealing with Kremlin-controlled channels is an avoidance tactic and denying access to press orientated activities (Ruussaar, 2019). For example, in March 2018 Estonian Defence Forces revealed to the press the maligned intentions of Sputnik Estonia to cover a shooting incident involving soldiers. The channel intended to portray an incident as inter-ethnic violence between Estonian and Russian speaking conscripts of Estonian Defence Forces (Propastop, 2018). The reaction of Estonian media, which portrayed Sputnik's actions as an attempt to create tensions between the ethnic groups, forced the channel to search for justice from Estonian Press Council. The Kremlin-controlled news agency did not expect so cohesive and fast response from Estonian media (Estonian Press Council, 2018).

Broadcasting is one of the primary sources for information in Estonia; thereby, it plays a vital role in developing the values and opinions. The countries' information space is roughly divided into two language groups – Estonian and Russian (Eesti Konjunktuuriinstituut, 2018, pp. 4-4). Unlike Latvia and Lithuania, Estonia has not been restricting the broadcasting of Russian controlled TV channels. The Consumer Protection and Technical Regulatory Authority, which issues the licenses for communications services, has according to the European Union directives and national law and regulations right only to issue precept and temporarily suspend the broadcasting of radio and television channels. So far, there is no practice in the field. However, it is about to change because there might be a necessity to bring actions into line with European Union sanctions related to the subversion of Ukraine (Eesti Rahvusringhääling, 2019).

One of the practices that are contributing to the resilience of the Estonian society is the activity of non-governmental organizations (NGO-s). For example, NGO and non-profit organization Youth Academy of Ida-Viru are focusing on the promotion of national defence and security amongst Russian speaking youth living in the capital and North-Eastern parts of Estonia (Youth Academy of Ida-Viru, 2013). It is a challenge for a state because the majority of the countries' Russian speaking population is in the sphere of controlled media, and often, they do not have adequate information on Estonia. The Youth Academy of Ida-Viru and other NGO-s are providing to the Russian-speaking

youth the opportunity to get accustomed to the local circumstances. Such interaction, communication, and other voluntary activity help to develop the sense of the state and deepen the ties inside the society where different ethnic groups are co-existing.

Conclusion

This paper intended to examine which narratives Russia is implementing to undermine NATO's deterrence approach on its Eastern border, observe its linkage to Russia's policy, and assess NATO's and Estonia's StratCom policy and communicative activities to confront the hostile narratives. Russia's narratives in response to prepositioning the battlegroup in Estonia are policy-driven and contributing to its historically evolved approach where Russia requires surrounding buffer zones for the feel of security.

The narratives that Russia has been disseminating since the establishment of the battlegroup has not changed in time and do not vary in no small degree from country to country. The core narratives emphasize on NATO's aggressive and provocative behavior, on the manifestation of Russophobia, and NATO's inability to protect its members because the organization is obsolete.

NATO, on the other hand, has acknowledged the importance of StratCom's capability in the contemporary security environment and developing it in parallel with its member states. The success in the field of StratCom could be achieved only through a core principle - aligning words with actions. Following this principle helps the Alliance to create trust amongst the member states populations. Also, it is in line with the deterrence approach, which relies on transparency. NATO has carried out several StratCom related activities that all contribute to the unity of the organization.

Nevertheless, it should not be concluded that StratCom is the only enabler who creates effects in information warfare. Politics, diplomacy, international relations, economy, conventional military forces, and other factors play a crucial role in shaping the security environment. In sum, StratCom must be integrated at all levels and functions in order to create the desired effect.

Estonia's StratCom capability is in the phase of development. Still, the government has recognized the need for enhanced communication capability in the situation of polarization of the society and the ability to withstand the hostile information attacks. The countries' comprehensive national defence approach facilitates a variety of activities that are designed to protect society. As a small state, Estonia has chosen to educate its people instead of fighting with propaganda. From monitoring the public perception, it could be concluded that Russia's activities in the information domain have not negatively affected the Estonian population attitude towards NATO since the establishment of the battlegroup. The Alliance and its troops in the region are still perceived as the primary security guarantor.

Nevertheless, the lack of success in the Russian information operations in Estonia could have a different explanation. Perhaps Baltic states are not currently Russia's primary objectives. In this situation, the spreading of hostile narratives is not effective because of NATO's and Estonia's successful StratCom, but due to the lack of strategic interest.

However, Estonia should not forget that the difference in perception is observable among the Russian speaking population, which largely remains in the field of Russian media. Consequently, NATO and its member states should be more proactive in information warfare and plan their communication strategy ahead of Kremlin moves. There is a window of opportunity for NATO to engage even more actively with younger generation Russians living in NATO countries.

Driven from an argumentation above, it would be wise to examine further, how Russia is targeting the Enhanced Forward Presence contributing nations. What kind of narratives Kremlin uses to influence those who are sending troops to Baltic states. How these narratives differ from those that were observed in this research paper.

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‘A New Cold War between the West and Russia, or the Cold War Infinity’

Russia’s geopolitical actions, continued violations of arms treaties, and immense desire to rise to a global power indicates that the Cold War may have never ended.

Introduction

The Cold War began as two world powers competed in the post World War II multipolar climate and was a fight to balance power. Formally recognized from 1945 through 1991, there were many factors that led to increased friction in the Eastern and Western relationships. At the end of the war, the Soviet Union looked to expand its influence throughout Europe. The U.S., recognizing the power vacuum in Europe, focused on expanding democratic values in Europe. The expansion of democratic values centred on political reform and the creation and expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). This was the U.S. response to counter the expansion of Communism.

The Cold War was multifaceted with many aspects bringing severe tensions to international security. Nuclear development was another key factor that drove policy decisions. At one point it even put the two nations on the brink of a nuclear war. Not only were there political tensions between the West and Russia but even misperceptions were a driving factor at the end of World War II that pushed the nations toward conflict. One of the main security challenges during this time was the arms race which attributed to the escalation in tensions. The U.S. focus on defeating communism and establishing the liberal democratic order across Europe played a major role from the Russian point of view in increased tensions. In the current security environment, it is important to track and analyse geopolitical actions that can provide indications of a changing security environment. Russia’s geopolitical actions, continued violations of arms treaties, and immense desire to rise to a global power indicates that the Cold War may have never ended.

This research will focus on two areas of U.S. and Russian relations in order to argue that the Cold War never ended and remains an ongoing political rival; Russia’s geopolitical actions in Georgia and Ukraine and the ending of the Intermediate Range

Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty. First, the paper will analyse Russia's geopolitical actions in Georgia and Ukraine. One would argue that their geopolitical actions in what they call their "near abroad" demonstrate their willingness and to what lengths they will go to exert power and dominance. This paper will analyse the actions and counteractions of both the U.S., NATO, and Russian policymakers related to NATO expansion, the Georgian War, and the conflict in Ukraine and how it correlates to the ongoing Cold War.

Second, this paper will analyse previous arms control measures to include the INF Treaty and how the actions support that two countries remain in the Cold War. A key driving factor that started the Cold War was an arms race. From the start of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), to the INF Treaty, collectively attempted to end or limit the arms race between the two countries and deescalate the tensions experienced during the 1950s through the 1980s. In August 2019, the U.S. withdrew from the INF Treaty, which the U.S. and Russia signed in 1987 (Arms Control Association, 2019). The paper will describe and analyse the positions of the U.S. and Russia concerning the INF treaty and how this could indicate the potential for another arms race.

Russian Ambitions: Georgia and Ukraine

Russia's continuous actions in Georgia are an indication that the Cold War is still active. Many articles over the years have analysed and discussed the causes of the Georgian War in 2008, but that is not the focus of this research. This section will discuss a brief history of Georgia and analyse the geopolitical actions of both the U.S., NATO, and Russia indicating the continued Cold War mentality even after the fall of the Soviet Union.

The internal and external factors that affect Georgia date back to the early 20th century with the Russian revolution. Three new states formed at the conclusion of this revolution, the Georgian Democratic Republic, the Armenian Democratic Republic, and the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic (Karagiannis, 2013).

With the birth of the new states and the spread of socialism, conflicts broke out and ended with the invasion of the Red Army in 1922 and the establishment of the Georgia

Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR) under the Soviet Union. A key factor in this analysis is that the South Ossetians and the Abkhazians considered themselves a separate district and created the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast and the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia within the Georgian SSR respectively (Karagiannis, 2013). Issues continued in the region, however with the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, Georgia became an independent nation again. This did not settle the tensions in the region as South Ossetia and Abkhazia still wanted their own independence.

In 1992, a war ensued between Abkhazian forces and the newly formed Republic of Georgia where Abkhaz's fought for autonomy and ultimately full independence from Georgia. However, the Georgian government wanted to maintain full control of their territory (Human Rights Watch, 1995). The extent of this war is described as a brutal war with serious violations of human rights and the law of war on both sides of the conflict.

Russia was involved in the early stages of the war with humanitarian actions, but its support mostly benefited the Abkhaz side, according to the Human Rights Watch. During this conflict, Russia stated they had "special responsibility" in their near abroad and to maintain the peace and security which translated to an increase in support for Abkhazian forces (Human Rights Watch, 1995). Russia attempted to maintain their neutrality. Nevertheless, it was clear the military support they were providing to the Abkhaz forces continued to fuel the conflict. In a further display of attempting to maintain neutrality, Russia condemned the Abkhaz forces for their September 1993 breach of the cease-fire and attack on Sukumi and Ochamchira. Russia condemned the attacks, supported the United Nations (U.N.) Security Council resolutions, and criticized the Georgian government for refusing to negotiate (Human Rights Watch, 1995).

Similarly, a year earlier a conflict broke out in early 1991 in South Ossetia after a 1990 declaration as a Soviet republic and an election in South Ossetia. The Georgian government declared the election invalid and shortly after, the Georgian parliament abolished South Ossetian autonomy (Karagiannis, 2013). Both regions had ongoing issues occurring during the same time. During this time in the 1990s, Georgia was also receiving U.S. aid for economic development and the promotion of democracy (Stent,

2014). The U.S. saw this region as a strategic location and promotion of democratic values was key in this region following the collapse of the Soviet Union. On the other side, Russia saw this as a threat in their near abroad or region of special interest. After the attacks on September 2001, the U.S. began assisting with training the Georgian military in counterterrorism operations and its strategic location allowed access to Afghanistan through overflights (Stent, 2014). Georgia was also a participant in the War on Terror providing support in Iraq since 2005.

In 2004, Mikhail Saakashvili came to power after the Rose Revolution, the first of the colour revolutions, with a pro-Western view on foreign policy. Saakashvili brought forward a Peace Initiative for the South Ossetia conflict with support from the West and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) (Karagiannis, 2013). South Ossetian officials did not support this initiative and continued to support independence from the Georgian government. During 2006, Russia was extending its influence in the region by providing citizenship throughout South Ossetia. Russia continually felt threatened with the westward path that Georgia was on with their support from the U.S. Further perceived as a threat was the 2004 NATO decision to start a two year Individual Partnership Action Plan and a 2008 decision to support Georgia's Membership Action Plan (MAP) (Karagiannis, 2013).

Two conclusions about Russia are drawn from this conflict. First, their attempt to maintain neutrality while supporting the Abkhaz forces with weapons and supplies indicates their desire to fuel the conflict rather than stabilize the conflict. Acknowledging that the Human Rights Watch organization does not make any political judgements, their interviews identified Russian backed forces that called themselves "independent patriotic fighters" fighting against the Georgian Government (Human Rights Watch, 1995). Another supporting factor that Russia intended to fuel the instability was Russia's fulfilment of bilateral agreements in providing security assistance to the Georgian government, which they used during the conflict. The second conclusion is that after the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia was in disarray and could not effectively support a conflict of this nature. President Yeltsin stated his support for the territorial integrity of Georgia; however, the Parliament was likely supporting the Abkhazian forces (Azrael & Payin, 1995). Russia's tough separation from the Soviet Union and

the lack of a common view and consistency in the region, along with their view of seemingly supporting when they were to benefit was evident throughout.

To further frame this conflict, it is equally important to understand the U.S. position and foreign policy goals after the fall of the Soviet Union. The collapse of the Soviet Union created a unipolar world and U.S. interests aimed to prevent further conflicts in Europe by expanding the liberal democratic order. The liberal democratic order focused on expanding democratic principles, free trade, a market economy, and security cooperation. An additional benefit for the U.S. was its economic prosperity. The U.S. foreign policy interests in Georgia and the region began under President Bill Clinton, known as the Clinton Doctrine, which was focused on global foreign strategy (Zarifian, 2015). There were a few significant reasons the U.S. wanted to extend its influence in the region. This was a post Soviet State that was struggling post communism in political and economic reforms. The region is also a key area for the transport of Caspian and Central Asian resources to the western markets, removing Russian and Iranian influence (Zarifian, 2015). The expansion of U.S. interests in the region was aimed at assisting Georgia with reforms, helping to resolve the regional conflicts, security cooperation, and develop energy resources.

It is important to note that although denied by U.S. officials of direct involvement, there is evidence of indirect involvement of the U.S. in Georgian politics in supporting Mikhail Saakashvili in 2004 (Zarifian, 2015). This is important to note that the west sees this as an expansion of democratic values and political reform; one can argue how this is different than Russia's meddling in the conflicts in Georgia. From the western perspective, the promotion of democratic values is viewed in a positive note, but it makes it more difficult to criticize Russia's involvement. The U.S. never fully became involved in the conflicts in Georgia; however, they did not support the separation of the two regions from Georgia and supported a peaceful resolution to the issues.

Arguably directly related to the Cold War mentality, the interest in Georgia, both for Russia and the U.S. is an extension of the Cold War. If we accept that an objective during the Cold War era was the expansion of democratic values, the continuing issue of Russia's involvement signifies that these are Cold War actions, thus proving that the U.S. and Russian remain in the Cold War. No more than one year after the collapse of

the Soviet Union, they were involved in internal Georgian politics to prevent them from reforming and becoming part of the west. This continued through the late nineties in order to destabilize and maintain influence in the region and peaked with the war in 2008. Georgia was in a plan for NATO and EU membership and the war halted this from becoming a reality. This was a huge political gain for Russia by preventing NATO expansion in their near abroad and was their first major success since the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Ukraine has a unique and long history, which is quite different than Georgia's. Following the 1917 Revolution in Russia, Ukraine gained its independence in 1918. The Ukrainian People's Republic remained in power of the eastern part until 1921 when the Soviet Union occupied the territory (Stent, 2014). The Soviet occupation continued until 1941 when Germany took over the territory during World War II. This terror lasted until 1943 when the Soviet army pushed the Germans out of the Ukrainian capital city and would take control of the remaining parts of Ukraine with Germany's defeat in 1945. The Soviet Union modified its constitution in early 1945 recognizing Ukraine as an independent state (Internet Encyclopedia of Ukraine, 2001). Later that year, the Soviets would further annex the western part of Ukraine establishing the current borders as they are today. The final part, Crimea, was transferred from the Russian Federation in 1954 as a sign of eternal friendship between the two countries, but Serhii Plokhy notes that Crimea needed assistance from Ukraine to rebuild the economy since the area was geographically separated from the Soviet Union (Plokhy, 2015).

Ukraine largely remained under a Russian controlled government through the mid-1980s, however, there were attempts at liberalization in the government. Those attempts were typically dealt with by the Soviet Union removing those officials and replacing them with more pro-Soviet elites. The shift in political dynamics began during the period of *perestroika* starting in the mid-1980s (Internet Encyclopedia of Ukraine, 2001). Public discontent of the economy and how the leadership handled the Chernobyl disaster continued to rise. Throughout the end of the 1980s and the last few years of the Soviet Union continued to see the rise in public opinion in support of a sovereign state and after the coup attempt in August 1991, Ukraine proclaimed its independence and elected their first president later that year in December (Internet Encyclopedia of Ukraine, 2001). U.S. President Bush was initially not supportive of an

independent Ukraine due to fears of what would happen with the nuclear weapons in the region but ultimately stood behind the vote for an independent Ukraine.

During this same time, the contention over Crimea and the Donbas region emerged with Boris Yeltsin trying to lay claim to these regions (Plokhy, 2015). During the voting, the results showed that a majority wanted their independence, including the ethnic Russians in these regions. Shortly after, Ukraine began dealing with the Soviet military in its territory and began a program to create its own military from the ranks. The transformation was mostly successful except for the navy in the Sevastopol area, which remained under the control of Russia. The disagreement over the Russian troops in Crimea ended in 1997 with both countries signing an agreement allowing the continued presence of Russia's military in Sevastopol until 2017. These final territorial agreements paved the path for Ukraine to continue to look towards the West, Europe, the EU as well as NATO which began in the early 2000s (Plokhy, 2015). Through the years following independence, Ukraine experienced economic troubles and corruption in the government and oligarchs were beneficiaries while the population continued to struggle.

In 2004, a rigged presidential election led to the Orange Revolution and an increased support from European politicians. After the third election in two months, President Yushchenko won the popular vote and looked to the West to help with corruption and economic reform (Plokhy, 2015). Yushchenko's promises of reform never fully materialized by the end of his term and Ukraine again demanded reform in 2013 and closer ties with the European Union. Continuing with the path towards the EU, the agreement was ready for signatures in 2013. However, President Yanukovych changed course and refused to sign the agreement. This sparked more widespread protests which turned violent. Internal and international pressure forced Yanukovych to flee the country, and another successful revolution was won for the people of Ukraine.

During the years leading up to the signing of the agreement with the EU, Russia was set on trying to extend its influence on Ukraine and other previously Soviet controlled states under President Putin. Putin was against a westerly leaning Ukraine (Suslov, 2015). The pressure from Russia came in the form of trade wars and economic

incentives to keep Ukraine from the west but also in the form of Russian involvement in the counter protests (Plokhy, 2015). An investigation by a Ukrainian security service found that Russian snipers were part of the deadly protests. The largely Russian cause of internal Ukrainian unrest proved justification for Russia to take action to annex Crimea and the Donbas region and return it to Russian control. Putin also likely knew that territorial disputes would prevent Ukraine from continuing its path west.

After the fall of the Soviet Union and continuing throughout the 1990s, the dispute over Crimea displayed Russia's continued involvement in Ukrainian politics. Although it is not disputed that agreements had to be made, their extent to keep their influence in the region to counter any westerly paths shows that the Cold War never ended. Both the East and West influential involvement in the 2004 presidential election further supports the continuing Cold War. Lastly, the 2014 annexation of Crimea and war in Donbas are a continuation of the Cold War. Right after the fall of the Soviet Union, Russian leaders attempted to lay claim to Crimea and the Donbas regions, continuing the Cold War mentality. Russia was likely continuing to meddle in Ukrainian politics and wanted to maintain their influence and prevent Ukraine from joining the EU and NATO. As Ukraine was trying to focus its politics west with the EU and NATO, Russia successfully prevented this move with its geopolitical actions and direct military involvement. Russia's actions were against popular support in Ukraine and further displayed that the actions taken were in benefit only to Russia and prevent the aspirations of Ukraine to join the EU and NATO.

Arms Control and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty

The arms race began at the end of World War II with the U.S. using two nuclear weapons to effectively end the war in 1945. Within the U.S., there was much debate on the dependence and use of nuclear weapons in future warfare. It was not until the Soviet Union's test of their atomic bomb in 1949 that the U.S. adopted a nuclear weapon strategy (Wells, Jr. , 1979). There was still debate on whether nuclear weapons should be the focus for national defence or if other means such as a large ground force should be. During the post war years, the U.S. economy was recovering from a recession and in turn, funding was capped by President Truman fearing that more damage would occur to the economy with an increase in defence spending (Wells, Jr. , 1979). It wasn't until the Korean War that defence spending increased

drastically, however, a large part of the spending was focused on programs against the Soviet Union such as tactical nuclear weapons and a build-up of troops in Europe.

Just over 20 years after the end of World War II, the first arms control agreements began between the U.S. and Soviet Union with the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). SALT I, signed in 1972, limited the number of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) each country was allowed to maintain (Arms Control Association, 2019). SALT II followed and added limitations to nuclear weapons delivered by strategic bombers as well as deployed nuclear forces. This treaty was never formally in force, however the U.S. and Russia agreed to the terms of the agreement. Former U.S. President Jimmy Carter requested the Senate not consider this agreement after the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan at the end of 1979 (Arms Control Association, 2019). The significance of this agreement limiting ICBMs, SLBM, and nuclear bomber forces placed a cap on the total number of delivery vehicles allowed by each country, and it established equal numbers for both parties. In addition to the limits of delivery vehicles, the agreement also included a ban on a number of different warheads and was to remain in effect until 1985, but the agreement lasted until 1986 (U.S. Department of State, 1979).

U.S. President Reagan in an announcement stated that the limits of the SALT II agreement “no longer exist” (Hoffman, et al., 1986). This is an important point and the beginning of Regan’s surge in nuclear weapon development. It is also important to note that although the treaty was never formally ratified in the U.S. Senate, both parties agreed to its terms. Up until this point, the U.S. was just below the threshold of the SALT II limits. However, President Reagan was largely against SALT II despite keeping the terms of the agreement during the first five years of his administration. Reagan’s reasons for discarding SALT II were based on a suspicion that the Soviet Union had violated the treaty and Reagan’s belief that the U.S. should gain a first strike capability against the Soviet Union. During his presidency, he increased nuclear efforts to modernize the nuclear arsenal and create a missile defence system through the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) increasing spending by 39 percent compared to the previous eight year period, totalling $39.5 billion (Kimball, 2004).

The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty began under Reagan as well but both took several years to finally come to an agreement. Interestingly, Reagan's focus on a nuclear build up was occurring during the time of negotiations of weapons reduction treaties. The focus of the INF treaty was ground launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 kilometres and 5,500 kilometres (Arms Control Association, 2019). The treaty took effect in 1988 and the reductions were complete by mid-1991. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the INF treaty remained and applied to former Soviet states that possessed the weapons which fell within the INF guidelines. The INF was a success, at least for the U.S. as it eliminated several thousand missiles, mostly from Russia (Murray, 2019).

Trouble with the INF treaty began in 2013 when Russia began testing a cruise missile that the Obama administration said was in violation of the treaty. The claim became public a year later however Russia denied that they violated the terms in the treaty. Russia countered stating the U.S. was in violation of the treaty by a missile defence system in Europe that Russia claimed could also launch cruise missiles. Over the next several years the Obama and the Trump administrations discussed the issue over thirty times with no progress (Murray, 2019).

In January 2019, Russia tested a cruise missile in ranges that violated the INF treaty. This led the Trump administration to announce a six-month suspension of the treaty in February 2019. The U.S. continued to press Russia back into compliance. Russia continued to try and hide and provide false information to U.S. officials regarding the testing of the missile (U.S Department of State, 2019). It is also important to note that U.S. officials were concerned with similar weapons that China possessed. China was not part of the INF treaty and had no obligations to follow it. In August 2019, the U.S. formally withdrew from the treaty.

Similar to President Reagan halting the SALT I agreement, continuing arms control discussions while increasing the U.S. capability, the withdrawal from the INF treaty has the potential to lead to another arms race. This further displays an extension of the Cold War. The end of the INF treaty will bring uncertainty to European security. In addition to the INF treaty, the New START is set to expire in 2021 and with tensions

raised, there is a possibility of both parties fail to reach an agreement on its extension. Russia is not interested in another arms race, however their violations of the INF Treaty, as well as their recent development of a hypersonic glide vehicle, show their continued interest in developing new weapons, indicating a further continuation of the Cold War (Karaganov, 2018). Their economic troubles, enhanced by the significant sanctions, place them in a similar position (albeit worse) than the Soviet Union was in during the 1980s. The U.S. withdrawal from the INF was a necessary step, however unfortunate. It was not without significant effort on the part of the U.S. to maintain the integrity of the INF. Nevertheless, treaties are only valid if all parties involved remain in compliance.

Conclusion

The fall of the Soviet Union and the desire for Georgia and Ukraine to maintain their independence and strive towards economic and political reforms reflected negatively on Russia. Russia's involvement in both country's politics, even directly after the collapse of the Soviet Union displayed their continued desire to prevent western expansion in their near abroad. No doubt that negotiations with Ukraine were needed, but their unwillingness to accept Ukraine as an independent country who can make its own decisions is a clear indicator that the Cold War continued, even after the fall of the Soviet Union.

Leading up to 2008, Russia's economy was doing well and their ability to take advantage of the unrest, arguably fuelled by Russian involvement, attempted to show the world that Russia was still a world power. Russia's international voice during the Georgia conflict was that of a peace force attempting to act as a moderator, but in fact, they were fuelling the destabilization to extend their influence and prevent another NATO country next to its border. This was evident since their involvement in the early 1990s. Russia was against NATO expansion from the beginning and up until 2008, they had little impact in preventing states from joining.

Russia's employment of hybrid war in both Georgia and Ukraine allowed for some plausible deniability of their direct involvement. In Georgia, the use of hybrid tactics to fuel the instability allowed for their justification of involvement with military force. For Ukraine, the use of hybrid tactics in Donbas and Green Men in Crimea helped to fuel

the instability. Both situations display an emboldened Russia aimed at becoming a world power and recovering from the fall of the Soviet Union.

The termination of the INF Treaty has the potential to spark another arms race. The U.S. has already tested a weapon that falls under the guidelines of the previous INF treaty. The fact that there were issues with violations of the INF Treaty dating back to 2012 is a clear indicator that we have remained in a Cold War. There are no major benefits from another arms race for either the U.S. or Russia. However, Russia's newly released hypersonic missile could force an arms race. With the New START set to expire in 2021, a key indicator of an arms race will be the success or failure of extending this treaty.

An emboldened Russia after the Georgian War in 2008 and the 2014 conflict in Ukraine are clear indicators that the U.S., NATO, and Russia have remained in a continuous Cold War. Russia has demonstrated its ability and willingness to get as close as possible to a conflict then deescalate at the last minute. This is evident not only with Georgia and Ukraine but with the violations of the INF treaty. Likely since at least 2007, this is a demonstrated tactic of the continuous Cold War. The U.S. and NATO must be quick to recognize future Russian aggression against their interests and act quickly to counter. This does not mean with military force, but likely in the form of additional deterrence measures. Russia's geopolitical actions and their violations of the previous INF Treaty shows their desire to rise to a global power but threatens to keep themselves isolated and in a continuous Cold War with the U.S. and NATO.

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RIVO MEIMER, Maj

Reasons for failure of the Estonian communists' coup d'état of 1 December of 1924. A case study.

> 'That is the difference between the West and Russia. You are imperialists, you think all art is for you and we think we are all for art. We give, you take. That is why we can have Stalin and God together. We can fit everything inside us, Ukrainians and Georgians and Germans, Estonians and Lithuanians.' Alexei Weitz, leading member of Night Wolves (Pomerantsev, 2015, p. 186)

Introduction

Some of them had been operating in Estonia for years, systematically weakening and preparing to overthrow the government. Others, carrying weapons and explosives in the rucksacks, crossed the Russian – Estonian border illegally just a few nights before the planned *coup d'état*. They all had the single aim – merging the Republic of Estonia through violence and chaos with Russia. However, the events on the early morning of 1st December 1924 in Estonia ended with the communists` defeat. Had the aggressors succeeded, as they did in Georgia in 1921, the path of history for Estonia and potentially for the wider region would have been entirely different. Not only has this case a historical significance – many ways, ends and means described below, occurring 95-100 years ago, are being utilized by contemporary Russia and several parallels can be drawn between then and now.

The goal of this paper is to examine the conditions leading to *coup d'état* and the main factors contributing to the communists' failure. Both communists activities as well as domestic situation in Estonia, relevant from *coup d'état`s* perspective, will be described and analyzed.

It will be argued, that while Estonian military overwhelmed the adversary within hours, it was taken by surprise in the commencement of the *coup d'état* due to the overreliance on their threat assessments. It has been concluded, that the main reasons for the failure were poor planning and shortage of personnel. However, lack of rehearsals and common purpose were the main reasons for why they did not succeed. In addition, similarities between the past and present, regarding Russian *modus operandi*, will be highlighted.

For this research paper, *coup d'état* will be defined as

> `… an attempt to change the government by a sudden sharp attack against the actual machinery of administration. Under the proper conditions, a comparatively small number of determined men can capture the state at low cost. ` (Goodspeed, 1962, p. xi)

This study consists of three parts. The first part will give an overview of the events and situation leading to the *coup d'état*. Secondly, the analysis of planning, preparation and execution of *coup d'état* by communists through using six principles of special operations (McRaven, 1996) will be conducted. Finally, more relevant findings from the first and second part will be highlighted and in Annex 1, the similarities between Russian hostile activities towards Estonia prior the 1924 *coup d'état* attempt and after the 1991 re-independence will be presented.

1. Background

Estonia gained its independence in the War of Independence and signed the Tartu Peace Treaty with the Soviet Russia on February 2, 1920. Military defeat, however, did not make the Soviet Russia change its strategy of interstate insurrection. Soviets only changed the approach from direct confrontation to indirect – utilizing propaganda, disruption and sowing fear (Walter, 1999, p. 130). Appropriate organization to continue revolutionary activities in Estonia with other means was the Communist International (Comintern).

Comintern, created by the Russian communists in 1919, had according to Fisher following main characteristics:

- Comintern was a single, transnational communist party with national subdivisions in different countries[2]
- All national subdivisions were to follow the orders of the Comintern Executive Committee – consisting mostly of Russian communists
- The main purpose of the Comintern was to defeat the capitalist system by any means available to form a Soviet republic as a phase, before the eradication of a state as such (1955, p. 13)

[2] By 1922, Comintern had spread into 58 countries, Estonian Communist Party (ECP) joined in 1920 (Walter, 1999, pp. 130-131)

The ECP, Comintern`s subdivision in Estonia, was fully complying with the principles described above. The activities and the organization of the ECP in Estonia were, (1) legal and visible[3] as well as (2) illegal and covert (Traksmann, 1924, p. 13), (Zetterberg, 2009, pp. 410-411). It can be argued, that majority of activities conducted and funding had been directed to illegal and covert activities, since they brought faster results. Keeping the ECP visible in public had its merits as well – it allowed the ECP to be a part of legislative system and to gain insights of Estonian politics on different levels.

The activities of the ECP[4], both legal and illegal,[5] which directly or indirectly related to creating the environment suitable for the conduct of the *coup d'état* were:

- Purchasing and maintaining real estate to operate safe houses, warehouses and underground print houses, with the money received from the Comintern (Laaman, 1925, p. 24) (Rosenthal & Tamming, 2010, p. 471)
- Discrediting existing state order and organizing antigovernment demonstrations (Traksmann, 1924)
- Recruiting, training, maintaining and tasking underground communists spy networks (Rosenthal & Tamming, 2010, p. 515)
- Generating and spreading rumors to create tensions and confusion (Traksmann, 1924, p. 13)
- Conducting information operations to discredit Estonia and its government and praise the Soviet Russia through any means (Laaman, 1925, p. 18) (Rosenthal & Tamming, 2010, pp. 467-468)
- Establishing youth and sports organizations to train groups of youth in military tactics and shooting (Laaman, 1925, p. 30)
- Sowing hatred and intolerance towards all segments of population other than working class (Laaman, 1925, pp. 30-31)
- Organizing, equipping and maintaining irregular underground groups using small unit tactics (Traksmann, 1924, p. 12) (Anvelt, 1925, p. 8)

[3] Examples of legal and visible ECP activities in Estonia were ECP members belonging to Parliament and local government, as well as creating different organizations.
[4] The list is not exhaustive; the aim is to provide an overview of main activities.
[5] It was often hard, if not impossible to differentiate between legal and illegal activities – collecting intelligence could have been conducted by ECP MP, while dealing with legislation and related matters or it could have been done by illegal, underground member of ECP.

- Gathering intelligence, specifically political and military – every communist is a sensor (Traksmann, 1924, p. 13)
- Creating and maintaining the network of clandestine warehouses and caches for weapons, ammunition and explosives (Laaman, 1925, p. 35)

All the activities listed above clearly indicate the system of efforts, which had to be sufficiently funded and required extensive guidance, coordination and communications between ECP, its underground wing and Comintern leadership in Soviet Russia. Of all the spheres of interest for the ECP and Comintern, one of the most significant ones was Estonian military (Sunila, 1961, p. 115) and rightfully so.

Several experts have suggested, that the most important factor in regards of the outcome of a *coup d'état* is the status of the military. Preferably, military could be on the side of those trying to seize the power, but, at the minimum, military should stay nonaligned (Goodspeed, 1962, p. 211), (Johnson, 1982, p. 144). One of twenty-one categorical preconditions[6] required to join the Comintern was:

> `The obligation to spread Communist ideas includes the special obligation to carry on systematic and energetic propaganda in the Army. Where such agitation is prevented by emergency laws, it must be carried on illegally` (Nollau, 1961, p. 341).

The citation above clearly illustrates, how important influencing adversary`s military was in the eyes of the Comintern, and ECP was taking the regulation from Soviet Russia seriously. The main areas of interest and activities by the ECP, according to Traksmann, regarding Estonian military were:

- Observing soldiers` political views and changing them when possible against the Estonian state
- Spreading rumors, targeting senior military leadership, among military members, and portraying the leadership as fascists who are against the democracy
- Trying to contact soldiers and determine, which units are firm and which are not, special interest was towards more technical units
- Collecting information regarding weaponry and ammunition, also trying to buy ammunition and grenades
- Trying to convince soldiers to join illegal armed groups (1924, p. 13)

[6] Twenty-one conditions were created and issued in 1919, when the Comintern was founded; all joining had to comply with them unconditionally.

Not only were the preparations to destabilize Estonia taking place by the ECP, but also by Comintern and ECP members in Soviet Russia. Comintern established regionally focused international military schools. One of them, 3rd International Military School, established in 1921 in Petrograd, focused on training Estonian and Finnish communists and preparing them in leadership, small unit tactics and low intensity conflict related matters (Walter, 1999, p. 131). Majority of command element members for 1924 *coup d'état* in Estonia were the graduates of previously mentioned school (Walter, 1999, p. 131). In addition to communists` efforts both in Estonia and Soviet Russia, there were certain domestic conditions in Estonia, which could be considered as favorable for the planners of the *coup d'état.*

Experts have claimed, based on extreme bounds analysis, that *coup d'état* will have higher likelihood of taking place in states with fragile political system, frail commercial conditions and small populace (Gassebner, et al., 2016, p. 304). Estonia, having small population, was no stranger to two remaining factors increasing the likelihood of the *coup d'état* - weak economy and unstable political system. Fierce infighting between Estonian political parties in 1920s had negative effect on national unity and state security (Traksmann, 1924, p. 15). Average lifespan of the Estonian government was around ten months, which affected overall stability, created dissatisfaction among the population and resulted in loss of credibility of the government (Pajur, 2005, p. 72). Estonian economy, still recovering from the First World War and the War of Independence, was weak and unemployment rate was high in the beginning of 1920s, which allowed the ECP to gain support among working class through promising higher salaries, shorter workdays and increased quality of life (Pajur, 2005, p. 73) (Zetterberg, 2009, p. 410) (Valge, 2015, p. 62). ECP also claimed that Estonian economy, previously part of Imperialist Russian economy, would not be able to operate on its own (Valge, 2015, p. 31), (ECP, 1924, p. 3).

It is challenging to evaluate the effectiveness of ECP and Comintern activities listed above. It has been noted, that since ECP funding was coming from Comintern, then it was in the interest of ECP to show as many activities and results as possible to secure stable funding (Traksmann, 1924, p. 12). Therefore, it is logical to deduct, that more activities and achievements resulted also in elevated importance of the ECP leadership in the eyes of Comintern and Soviet Russia/Soviet Union leadership and increased

funding. Thus, it was not rare to see the differences in reports sent to Russia by the Russian Embassy in Estonia and ECP, latter often describing the situation in more optimistic tones, be the topic ECP successes or population`s willingness to support *coup d'état* (Valge, 2015, pp. 28, 65). Estonian Government, despite political infighting and other turbulences, was no blind to the ECP derived threat and appropriate law enforcement and security organizations were doing everything they could to contain and neutralize illegal communist threat.

Luttwak notes, that in a country facing the potential *coup d'état*, the most dangerous adversaries for the aggressor are most likely security services (1979, p. 99) and the situation was no different in Estonia. The main responsibility for fighting illegal unconstitutional activities in Estonia laid on Internal Security Service (ISS) and military intelligence (Rosenthal & Tamming, 2010, p. 482). One indicator of the ECP agents` activities and the effectiveness of ISS is the number of arrests – by 1920 there were almost two hundred arrested, by 1923 the number increased to more than three hundred and 1924 added extra two hundred fifty ECP related antigovernment activists (Walter, 1999, p. 133). While ISS in general had good grasp on ECP activities in Estonia, it has been noted, that the issue was that ISS activities countering ECP were shallow and reactive, not addressing the root causes of the spread of illegal ECP activities (Traksmann, 1924, p. 15). However, despite all the efforts, legal or illegal, ECP never received more than ten percent of votes during the elections – the best result received during the Parliament elections in 1923 (Zetterberg, 2009, p. 411). Receiving enough votes to be part of legislative system, but clearly not enough to become a majority could have been one of the incentives for the ECP to pursue more aggressively covert and unconstitutional means to gain power in Estonia.

In the beginning of 1924, it became known to Estonian government that ECP and Comintern are substantially planning and preparing to overthrow democratically elected government (Walter, 1999, p. 133) (Rosenthal & Tamming, 2010, p. 676). Next chapter will cover how *coup d'état* was planned, prepared and executed.

2. Analysis of conduct of *coup d'état*

The framework utilized for analyzing the *coup d'état* in this paper will be Special Operations (SO) theory (see Figure 1), created by admiral (retired) William H.

McRaven (1996). The SO theory focuses on direct action (DA) part of SO missions. DA missions, according to US Joint Publication (JP) 3-05 Special Operations, are:

> ' … short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensive actions conducted as SO in hostile, denied, or diplomatically sensitive environments, and which employ specialized military capabilities to seize, destroy, capture, exploit, recover, or damage designated targets (USSOCOM, 2011).'

In McRaven`s SO theory, relative superiority (RS) has a crucial role. RS can be explained as going against all odds, but well prepared – as when attacker, usually numerically lesser, engages with success against superior, often well defended opponent (McRaven, 1996, p. 4). RS is strongly related to six principles of SO – simplicity, security, repetition, surprise, speed and purpose (McRaven, 1996, pp. 8-23). RS in itself, nor positive implementation of SO principles do not guarantee the mission success, but eight case studies analyzed by McRaven indicate, that (1) RS is critical for achieving success and (2) all SO principles have to be effectively utilized to achieve RS.



Figure 1. The Special Operations model (McRaven, 1996, p. 11)

While the *coup d'état* conducted in Estonia in 1924 by the communists was not a SO *per se*, it shares more traits with SO DA operation than with any conventional forces operation, because it was conducted:

- By relatively small unit against superior, well defended adversary (McRaven, 1996, p. 4)
- In a politically sensitive and denied environment in a clandestine manner (USSOCOM, 2011, pp. I-1)

- Not only for military, but also diplomatic and informational purposes (USSOCOM, 2011, pp. I-1)
- With the acceptance of significant amount of both physical and political risk (USSOCOM, 2011, pp. I-2)
- To achieve strategic objective (USSOCOM, 2011, pp. I-4)
- With involving risky and complicated infiltration of men and equipment (USSOCOM, 2011, pp. I-2)

Thus, six SO principles will be utilized to analyze the planning, preparations and execution of 1924 *coup d'état* as most appropriate framework. Short definition of each SO principle will be provided prior describing the application.

Simplicity

Simplicity is most important, yet hardest element to accomplish, consisting of three elements: (1) restraining the amount of separate targets, (2) accurate intelligence and (3) novelty (McRaven, 1996, pp. 11-14).

(1) Restraining the amount of separate targets

Keeping the amount of moving parts minimal is complicated in the case of *coup d'état.* Requirement to attack several locations at the same time dictates the need for (1) relatively large amount of participants and (2) several objectives to be neutralized (Luttwak, 1979, p. 59), as was the case in Estonia in 1924. The plan, mainly compiled by the Red Army intelligence department (GRU) officer, Estonian origin brigade commander Tummeltau (Salo, 2009, p. 88) (Pajur, 2005, p. 74), included according to Saar following:

1) With the sudden strike take under control strategic locations[7], such as key transportation, communications and government facilities
2) Paralyze and disorient Estonian military forces, neutralize the lines of communication, free prisoners, mobilize additional participants (1925, p. 49)

Simultaneously with assembling additional partakers, it was planned to form the Soviet Estonian government to turn to the Red Army with the assistance request to be followed by the latter`s occupation of Estonia (Pajur, 2005, p. 74).

[7] The targets attacked were Toompea (the Parliament), Baltic railway station, Tallinn-Väike railway station, Main post and telegraph office, two police stations, the Flight Division (Lasnamäe), the 10th Infantry Regiment and the Signal Battalion staffs, the Ministry of War, Military Academy, the Transport-Tank Division and the Police Cavalry Reserve (Pajur, 2005, p. 75).

While the tactical plan involved moving parts, it was as minimalistic and simple, as it possibly could have been. The main factors contributing to it were professional planning, sufficient amount of time for planning and good intelligence.

(2) Accurate intelligence

According to Anvelt, ECP members had acquired excellent skills for operating clandestinely, including gathering intelligence since the Imperialist Russia`s rule, he exemplifies it with the instance of how in some cases the distance from conspirators` apartment to the objective was measured with steps and time required for movement were calculated (Anvelt, 1925, p. 8). Thorough scouting of all the objectives was conducted prior the *coup d'état* (Laaman, 1925, p. 46). The reconnaissance included topography around the objectives, force protection measures utilized, including the routes, tasks and routines of the security personnel, as well as the locations of weapons and potential weak spots (Sunila, 1961, p. 130).

While the ISS was generally aware of the preparations for the uprising, the ECP gathered intelligence on their targets with (1) gaining enough information to proceed with planning and (2) without alarming the ISS in regards of specific objects.

(3) Novelty

During the *coup d'état*, the ECP members used innovative tactics, such as attackers of the Ministry of War approached their objective as military escort delivering arrested civilians to the interrogation (Sunila, 1961, p. 205) as well as inventive equipment – military water bottle modified to carry and detonate explosives (Traksmann, 1924, p. 14). While the innovations utilized failed to change the course of actions, they can be viewed as attempts to channel extra effort to gain upper hand.

Several members of ECP estimated after the failure in their assessments, that planning itself was conducted properly and thoroughly (ECP, 1924, pp. 13, 15). Powell has stated, that *coup d'état* organizers will thoroughly estimate their chances of success, since ramifications in case of failure would be significant (2012, p. 1019). Anvelt and his coconspirators estimated the chances of success of 1924 *coup d'état* to be seventy five percent (Anvelt, 1925, p. 9).

While Walter assessed the plan of the *coup d'état* to be a disaster, partly due to only ten percent of participants showing up (1999, p. 133), it is hard to concur with this

assessment. According to Valge, three quarters of initially planned partakers were involved (2015, p. 65), which, considering the level of conspiracy and courier system, is a satisfying number.

Security

Since the SO DA missions` focus is on well defended adversary, it is the exact time of attack and the methods of getting to the objective to be obscured (McRaven, 1996, pp. 14-15).

In most cases, security experts, based on their intimate local knowledge, are aware of the upcoming *coup d'état* (Belkin & Schofer, 2003, p. 596), but it cannot be claimed in the case of Estonia in 1924. The ISS had documented proof of the ECP planned armed *coup d'état*, including potential targets (Rosenthal & Tamming, 2010, pp. 682 - 683), but despite the existing evidence, the *coup d'état* threat was not taken with required seriousness by Estonian authorities.

On one hand, the exact time of the *coup d'état,* 1st of December, was decided by the ECP leadership on 29th of November (Rosenthal & Tamming, 2010, p. 697) and therefore the time window for the authorities to find it out was short, especially considering that the level of conspiracy was good (Rosenthal & Tamming, 2010, p. 702). On the other hand, the main reason for the ISS and military intelligence failure could have been, that the way the events of the *coup d'état* occurred, did not fit the existing threat assessments and expected patterns.

Estonian intelligence community assessed, that should the *coup d'état* take place, it would happen so in parallel with a mass demonstration (Rosenthal & Tamming, 2010, p. 707). Interestingly, similar reverse reasoning has been highlighted by Anvelt, who stated that it would have been logical for the ECP to initiate the *coup d'état* with mass protests, but since it would have provided early warning for the government forces, the path of surprise attack was chosen (1925, pp. 6 - 7). In addition, the perception from the Estonian Government side was that should the hostilities by the ECP start, they would be first directed towards the warehouses (Traksmann, 1924, p. 20) to acquire weapons, ammunition and explosives.

To summarize – despite the authorities overall awareness of the direction of the events, the ECP was able to make preparation in secrecy and without compromise. The level of conspiracy was so high, that conducting the rehearsals by the ECP seemed unthinkable, which was one of their biggest errors leading to the failure.

Repetition

Under repetition, McRaven has meant rehearsing individual and collective skills and tasks related to the specific task (McRaven, 1996, pp. 15-16).

No overview, be it from the Estonian government or the ECP side, mentions rehearsals conducted by the participants of the *coup d'état*. One reason was the level of conspiracy – only very few senior participants were aware of the exact plans and timings until the last minute (ECP, 1924, p. 15). Another cause for not having the dry run could have been the lack of custom to conduct such activities prior the operations. Not only were there no mentions of rehearsals prior the event but also, the lack of physical preparations was not mentioned as a gap afterwards by the ECP – it might not have occurred to the ECP members, that rehearsals as such could have been organized.

While participants of the *coup d'état* were skilled in underground and clandestine activities, they lacked basic infantry skills. Main mistakes, as analyzed by Anvelt after the failure were:

1. Lack of skills and common tactics[8]
2. ISS informants in the ranks of the revolutionaries
3. A group commander`s inability to lead subordinates in a critical moment to free the prisoners
4. Forces spread too thin
5. Inability to create defensive perimeter after taking the objective (1925, pp. 7 - 8).

[8] Good example of the importance of the rehearsals and common tactics related details – in one case, attackers, instead of silently storming the guards house, threw grenades, which alerted all government forces present and thwarted the attack (Anvelt, 1925, p. 7), but also that the grenades were thrown inaccurately, bouncing back from windows and not detonating (ECP, 1924, p. 16).

From five reasons highlighted by Anvelt, every failure, except one – ISS informants among the ECP fighters – could have been either eliminated or greatly reduced through rehearsals.

Involving all participants to conduct practice prior the *coup d'état* in Estonia would have been unrealistic and counterproductive. However, conducting rehearsals in Soviet Union, with key leaders and participants, would have helped to identify and address the shortfalls and ways to deal with the contingencies.

Surprise

'In a special operation surprise is gained through deception, timing, and taking advantage of the enemy`s vulnerabilities' (McRaven, 1996, p. 17).

Gaining the surprise was the biggest success for the ECP –the attack came completely unexpected to the Estonian military (Traksmann, 1924, p. 20). Contributing factors for the surprise were timing and adversary`s weaknesses – the time of attack on all targets was 05:15 morning, which, among other consideration, was chosen as time of guard posts shifting to lesser, daily manning schedule, and due to early morning as typically with lower alert level then other times (Sunila, 1961, p. 156). Deception was gained by the ECP members wearing Estonian military uniforms and officers` insignia, when approaching the targets (Traksmann, 1924, p. 20). However, deception operations on a larger scale – faint attacks with minimum forces on irrelevant targets, to disorient and fragment the government forces, were not planned and executed by the ECP – a potential method to win time in a cost effective manner.

Speed

Speed in given context is defined as reaching your target as quickly as conceivable (McRaven, 1996, p. 19). In this particular case, the speed was directly related to surprise achieved while approaching the objectives and therefore, speed was achieved by attackers. In addition to the definition offered by McRaven, it is important to analyze the speed as urgency of actions on the objectives, due to the peculiarities of the *coup d'état.*

If in most military operations speed is frequently vital, then in case of the *coup d'état,* speed is an absolute must (Luttwak, 1979, p. 146). The attackers have to take control in no more than twenty four to forty eight hours, otherwise they are destined to failure (Galetovic & Sanhueza, 2000, p. 185).

According to Anvelt, it was crucial to hold positions for at least 5-6 hours, which would have allowed mobilizing additional forces (Anvelt, 1925, p. 7). Several arrested *coup d'état* participants admitted, that they were ordered to hold on for twenty-four hours for the external assistance to arrive (Laaman, 1925, p. 50).

While most Estonian government assessments after the *coup d'état* were not considering this failed event as anything substantially threatening, it is telling to consider the assessment of General Laidoner.[9] In 1928, Laidoner evaluated the ECP in 1924 *coup d'état* to be very close to success – if the revolutionaries would have:

1. Taken over the Ministry of War
2. Gained a control over the Main post and telegraph office
3. Remained in power for a few more hours,

then the outcome could have been devastating for the Estonian state (1928, p. 5).

This statement clearly highlights the importance of speed and time in case of the *coup d'état,* when the difference in outcome can be decided by seemingly minor aspects, such as few hours.

The operation started at 05:15 in the morning and by 07:00, it was clear, after the Ministry of War and the Main post and telegraph office were recaptured by the Estonian military, that the ECP had failed (Anvelt, 1925, p. 6). Laidoner and Anvelt, commanders of opposite sides, based on their statements, are unintentionally agreeing, that:

1. Time and speed are critical in case of the *coup d'état*
2. The ECP was much closer to gaining upper hand, then commonly assessed.

[9] General Laidoner was the Estonian War of Independence hero, who was reinstated as a Commander in Chief of Estonian armed forces immediately after the declaration of martial law in the beginning of the *coup d'état.*

Why then was the ECP defeated in such a short time and decisive manner by the initially surprised Estonian military? In addition to lack of rehearsals, another main contributor to the ECP failure was the absence of purpose.

Purpose

Purpose has been explained by McRaven as a two-fold criteria, (1) there has to be a clear end state as what needs to be achieved and (2) unit members` devotion to mission is essential (1996, pp. 21-22).

Ant has suggested, that in light of conducting the *coup d'état,* there was a consensus among the ECP, Comintern and Soviet Union leadership, regarding the end state – Soviet Republic of Estonia – but how to reach the goal, was unclear and undefined. This resulted in conflicting guidance from Comintern to ECP (2008, p. 16). Having strategic end state, but no clear and concise, mutually agreed operational level objectives, translated into confusion and lack of common purpose.

Further contributing to difficulty of achieving common purpose among the participants was the level of conspiracy – average accomplice found out about the exact plan, and his/her role in it just a few hours prior the beginning, clearly not sufficient time to think about the reasons for the fight. It has been accurately summarized by the ECP in their after action review, stating that the average member knew nothing about the overall situation – enemy or friendly forces – they only knew that it was required to go to fight, to win or die (1924, p. 15). While they went to fight, they did not win nor did they die – of approximately three hundred rebels, twelve ended up dead during the hostilities (Laaman, 1925, p. 92). This relatively small number of approximately four percent or revolutionaries killed in action, combined with the numerous cases of how the attack was discontinued or already conquered target was abandoned in case of Estonian military counteraction (Laaman, 1925), (Traksmann, 1924), provides sufficient evidence to conclude, that the ECP members were not committed enough to finish what they had started. As per the definition for the *coup d'état* provided in the beginning of this paper, ` small number of determined men` (Goodspeed, 1962, p. xi), the ECP revolutionaries were small in number, but determined they were not.

3. Summary

After the Estonian War of Independence, Soviet Russia instigated hostilities, with the end state of overthrowing the democratically elected Estonian government, never seized. Warfare only transformed from visible, conventional attempts, to underground, covert actions conducted by the ECP, with the Comintern and Soviet leadership guidance, full support and funding.

These activities, derived by numerous factors, such as ECP leadership ambitions and domestic situation in Estonia, led to the planning, preparation and execution of the *coup d'état* in 1924. It can be assessed, that the tactical plan was compiled professionally, with sufficient amount of time, intelligence and level of simplicity.

During the preparations, the level of security was held sufficiently tight for not to reveal exact plans and timings for the ISS, while sacrificing coordination and own members awareness. ISS failed to find out exact details, partly because of the ECP conspiracy measures, but also due to ISS firm belief in the ECP course of action and indicators, which were pursued. Despite the ISS analytical and intelligence failure and the ECP initial success in achieving tactical surprise, the ECP failed thoroughly and rapidly.

Two main reasons for the ECP failure were the lack of rehearsals during the preparations and the lack of purpose during the execution. Not conducting rehearsals led to catastrophic, yet relatively easily fixable mistakes, during the execution. ECP was proficient in clandestine operations, such as illegal cross border movement, moving people and weapons, conducting close target reconnaissance and infiltration, but critically lacked skills much easier to possess, such as squad level infantry tactics. Therefore, during the execution, participants were able to assemble, approach and assault the objectives with speed and surprise, but then lost the initiative. Advantage was lost not only due to the lack of rehearsals, but also because of collective and individual lack of purpose, mainly fault to the very minimum guidance and common understanding among the revolutionaries.

If the *coup d'état* would have been conducted by at least partly rehearsed key leaders and participants, with better explained purpose, then one cannot exclude the possibility of aggressors' success – the ability to fortify and defend some or all of overtaken

positions for long enough to declare the Soviet Estonian Republic and call for assistance from the Soviet Union. As concluded by both Laidoner and Anvelt, the chances of the ECP success were much higher, then commonly assessed.

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ANNEX 1. Comparison of measures[10] used by the Soviet Russia/Soviet Union against Estonia from 1920-1924 and by Russian Federation against Estonia from 1991 to present.

Then (RUS activities in Estonia 1920-1924)	Now (RUS activities in Estonia from 1991)
Russia originated and funded anti Estonian government activities had been taking place without any interruption since the end of War of Independence (Traksmann, 1924, p. 11).	Russia originated various forms of activities to weaken and disrupt normal pattern of life in Estonia started after its reindependence (Kamenik, 1999, pp. 26 - 27) (Praks, 2015, p. 3).
In 1920, Soviet Russia changed the approach towards Estonia from direct confrontation to indirect approach (Walter, 1999, p. 130).	Similar dynamics of choosing the strategy and tactics according to the capabilities by Russia can be observed today – Russia is arguably utilizing hybrid warfare due to economic and demographic difficulties (Chausovsky, 2019).
Discrediting existing state order and organizing antigovernment demonstrations (Traksmann, 1924)	Russian actions during the 2007 Bronze Soldier rioting and media campaign following the riots were directed to fuel the conflict (Praks, 2015, p. 5)
Establishing youth and sports organizations to train groups of youth in military tactics and shooting (Laaman, 1925, p. 30)	Involving Russian speaking Estonian students in GRU related military-sports youth camp conducted in Odessa[11] (Puusepp, 2014, p. 11)
Recruiting, training, maintaining and tasking underground communists spy networks (Rosenthal & Tamming, 2010, p. 515)	ISS announced that in addition to several already caught and sentenced FSB agents, the ISS arrested the GRU agent operating in Estonia (Puusepp, 2018, p. 13)
Gathering intelligence, specifically political and military (Traksmann, 1924, p. 13)	ISS has mentioned in practically all its annual reviews, how Russian security services are collecting information, regarding Estonian state and its security organizations (Puusepp, 2018, p. 13)

[10] While the measures in this paper collected and observed by Russia from 1919-1923 were important from the perspective of coup d'état, it is not the purpose of the comparison to suggest that there is currently existing coup d'état threat in Estonia.

[11] Mentioned event was conducted in then pro-Russian Ukraine, the organizers and program were from Russia, in previous years this occasion took place in Russia (Puusepp, 2014 p. 11).

Observing soldiers` political views, collecting information regarding weaponry and ammunition. (Traksmann, 1924, p. 13)	After 1991, individuals from Estonian security organizations, most notably several ISS officers, Herman Simm (MoD official in charge of handling classified NATO and other foreign documents) and Deniss Metsavas (working at the Estonian Defence Forces Headquarters) were providing sensitive information to different Russian intelligence services.
Purchasing and maintaining real estate to operate safe houses, warehouses and underground print houses, with the money received from the Comintern (Laaman, 1925, p. 24) (Rosenthal & Tamming, 2010, p. 471)	There is no information available to suggest that such or similar activities would have taken place in Estonia since 1991.
Organize, equip and maintain irregular underground groups capable of using small unit tactics (Traksmann, 1924, p. 12) (Anvelt, 1925, p. 8)	There is no information available to suggest that such or similar activities would have taken place in Estonia since 1991.
3rd International Military School, established in 1921 in Petrograd, focused on training Estonian and Finnish communists and preparing them in leadership, small unit tactics and low intensity conflict related matters (Walter, 1999, p. 131)	There is no information available to suggest that such or similar activities would have taken place in R since 1991.

The purpose of the comparison is to explore the parallels between the different measures used then and now, focusing on Estonia specific cases only. Only the measures used then are compared to measures now and not vice versa, therefore more contemporary methods such as cyberattacks are not covered.

This comparison, rather cursory than in-depth exploration, demonstrates many similarities between Russian activities in Estonia currently and hundred years ago. It can be concluded, that (1) prior the 1924 *coup d'état*, all the ways and means implemented were similarly to current situation, irregular and unconventional in nature and (2) the intensity of activities was much higher and their scope was wider then, when compared to the current level.

ANDRIUS STUKNYS, Maj

Small Power: The Role of Micro and Small UAVs in the Future

Introduction

The significant advantage of unmanned areal vehicles (UAVs) for military applications is in performance of “dull, dirty and dangerous” activities, commonly known as three Ds operations, which covers, target surveillance, identification, recognition and extermination (Gupta, et al., 2013). Nevertheless, such roles cannot be entirely fulfilled by all types of UAVs, which differ in their size, performance and capabilities. The most numerous UAVs in usage are micro and small ones, which are hand-launched and powered by electric engines (Gettinger, 2019). The proposition is that the typical flight endurance of such assets differs from 20 to 90 minutes, and the standard operating altitude is only hundreds of meters (Gettinger, 2019). The payload is quite limited, mostly consisting of sensors. This limitation appears due to strict mass and volume limits on these MSUAVs. Every gram of payload loaded onto the small UAVs negatively affects mission duration (Gettinger, 2019). Nevertheless, advances in technologies are swiftly increasing the capabilities of micro and small UAVs, allowing them to fulfil the missions comparable to the larger UAVs with less risk. Therefore it is necessary to identify the main potential applications, where these small assets could be utilized. Besides, new conceptions of operation, such as “*swarming,*” open access to various tasks, which were considered impossible for micro and small UAVs.

This paper argues that in the future, Micro and Small UAVs (MSUAVs) will be able to perform a broader spectrum of significant operations due to the implementation of advanced technologies. By given their intrinsic simplicity and expandability, MSUAVs will take an important place in military applications.

This research explores the current state of micro and small drones, helping to define the future, applying the existing strengths, recouping existing weaknesses, exploiting opportunities, and defending against threats. The first classification section consists of the categories, classes, employment, providing MSUAVs functionality and purposes. The strengths section highlights the modularity and swarming of MSUAVs by their military capabilities. The primary deficiencies: situational awareness, payload capacity,

autonomy and communication links are analysed in the weaknesses section. The main active growing research directions of technological progress in sensors, munition and advanced energy sources are described in the opportunities section. The threats section spotlights essential issue, such as survivability. Finally, we issue a set of conclusions and recommendations.

Classification

The lack of universal categorization for UAVs to a certain standard has been stepped up importantly over the last years. A variety of UAVs has been developed, demonstrating different capabilities and quality in performance, as they were produced in different airframe shapes and sizes, depending on desired functionality. Different countries and military forces have their particular classifications, which are based on the size, weight, operating range and by payload referring to carrying sensors, analysers, and munition of UAVs. Accordingly, it is necessary to classify UAVs to identify their capabilities and performances, as it was done in Table 1.

Group		Category	Class	Employment	MTOW	Normal altitude	Mission rdius	Primary Support Commander
Group I	0<w<20 lbs 0<w<9 kg <1200 ftAGL	Micro	Class I, w<150kg	Tactical Patrol Section	< 2kg	< 60mAGL < 200ftAGL	5km (LOS)	Platoon, Squad
Group I	0<w<20 lbs 0<w<9 kg <1200 ftAGL	Mini		Tactical Unit	2 - 20kg	< 900mAGL < 3000ftAGL	25km (LOS)	Company, Platoon, Squad
Group II	21<w<55 lbs 9<w<25 kg <3500 ftAGL							
Group II	21<w<55 lbs 9<w<25 kg <3500 ftAGL	Small		Tactical Unit	20 - 150kg	< 1500mAGL < 5000ftAGL	50km (LOS)	Battalion, Regiment
Group III	w<1320 lbs w<600 kg <18000 ftMSL							
Group III	w<1320 lbs w<600 kg <18000 ftMSL	Tactical	Class II, 150<w<600kg	Tactical Formation	150 - 600kg	< 3000mAGL < 10000ftAGL	200km (LOS)	Brigade
Group IV	w>1320 lbs w>600 kg <18000 ftMSL	Male	Class III, w>600kg	Operational.Theater	> 600kg	< 13,5kmAGL <45000ftMSL	Unlimited (BLOS)	JTF
Group V	w>1320 lbs w>600 kg >18000 ftMSL	Hale		Strategic/National	> 600kg	< 19,5kmAGL < 65000ftMSL	Unlimited (BLOS)	Theatre
		Strike/ Combat		Strategic/National	> 600kg	< 19,5kmAGL < 65000ftMSL	Unlimited (BLOS)	Theatre

Table 1. Classification of UAVs.

Source: (DoD, 2009)**,** (DoD, 2005)**,** (Szabolcsi, 2016)**,** (Maddalon, 2013) (DoD, 2009)**,** (DoD, 2005)**,** (Szabolcsi, 2016)**,** (Maddalon, 2013)**,** (NATO, 2009)**. Table created by the author.**

This research paper is describing the classification of UAVs analysing their groups, classes and main parameters. The final grouping of UAVs was defined according to the classification, which was structured in Unmanned Aircraft Systems Flight Plan

2009-2047 of the USA Air Force, and accordingly the training of drone operators from NATO Standardization Agreement 4670 (Table 1). This classification of UAVs is ranking three main classes, which mainly depend on the maximum take-off weight (MTW), flight altitude, mission radius and employment.

By the provided classification, Class III UAVs are classified as “Medium-Altitude Long-Endurance” (MALE) or “High-Altitude Long-Endurance” (HALE) assets, which are mostly used for operational and strategic needs (DoD, 2009). The assets in Class III can perform their missions up to 24 hours or even more, carrying over a hundred kilograms of payload (Gettinger, 2019). The highest speed reaches three hundred kilometres-per-hour and sometimes more. These drones can carry a different variety of weapons for strike/combat operations (Gettinger, 2019). While Class II UAVs sometimes are considered as “tactical” assets (Gettinger, 2019). The endurance of this class system can reach up to 10 hours, depending on the propulsion system and energy source. The payload capacity could be set up to 70 kilograms (Gettinger, 2019). The maximum flight range can be achieved up to several hundred kilometres, and the top speed reaches up to two hundred kilometres-per-hour depending on the load capacity. Class I has many different designs of UAVs, which varies from small handheld assets to larger systems. Endurance can reach 120 minutes, with a maximum range of 80 kilometres (Gettinger, 2019). The payload capacity mostly is limited to 10 kilograms, maintaining the flying speed of 100 kilometres-per-hour (Gettinger, 2019). These UAVs can carry different types of payloads, such as sensors, laser designators and lightweight ordnance (Gettinger, 2019). Typically, Class I assets usually are launched by hand. Loitering munition is also considered as Class I UAV, constructed with a particular explosive, which detonates on collision. Micro, mini, and small UAVs are scaled as Class I systems (Gettinger, 2019). Currently, various manufacturers produce different types of UAVs; therefore, it is essential to run through the classification and analyse to which class particular asset is assigned.

Micro and small UAVs (MSUAVs) have significant military advantages because they are hardly detectable, less expensive compared to the large ones, and easy expendable to the smaller units, groups or companies, providing ISR and combat possibilities (Chin, 2019). Currently, MSUAVs are taking the other path towards mission-effectiveness, because advances in miniaturisation continue reducing the

payload size. The performance of miniaturized sensors may not be as impressive; however, their small size, weight and excellent optical opportunities make them attractive for deployment on increasingly smaller areal vehicles for close-up surveillance. Next chapters mainly will focus on MSUAVs, providing their strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats.

Strengths

Despite being small, MSUAVs have had a significant impact on the battlefield, providing critical intelligence data to tactical units. The USA Air Force acknowledged these unique capabilities of MSUAVs not only in ISR operations but also in combat activities (USAF, 2014). Technology advancements in autonomy, modularity, and collective performance even maximize the effectiveness of MSUAVs, providing enhanced capabilities on the battlefield across payloads, control systems, and communication links. Thus, this paragraph analyses two main features: modularity and Smart Warfighting Array of Reconfigurable Modules (SWARM).

Modularity, in this case, is considered as the capacity to permutate the payload to satisfy given operation demands on the same asset (DoD, 2009). Furthermore, modularity will have a critical effect on MSUAVs missions` agility, adaptability, flexibility, capability, and mission effectiveness (DoD, 2009). Currently, MSUAVs primarily fulfil surveillance and reconnaissance functions for military purposes (Gettinger, 2019). The operational domain will continue to change, requiring advanced employment concepts of UAVs, which can help to overcome rising threats through their unique capabilities. The progress of sensors and munitions will enable to manage such drones for different new applications and services in the sector of unmanned military operations. Thus, modularity allows multi-payload and multi-mission flexibility by allocating particular payload capabilities across a formation of MSUAVs (DoD, 2009). These individual MSUAVs capabilities and possible payloads can be decided before mission requirements. The payloads on the MSUAVs can be rapidly changed by a simple “plug and play” operation. Modular payloads can be used to perform different mission types (Table 2). Therefore at least two common advantages can be identified through this technological progress. Firstly, modularity provides a way to modify MSUAVs for particular needs changing proper payload. Secondly, growing advances in electronics and artificial intelligence software will allow utilizing MSUAVs as a

collective strength (DoD, 2009). Thus, it opens the flexible opportunity to perform the following mission such as Suppression Enemy Air Defence (SEAD), Signal Intelligence (SI), Mine Detection (MD), Precision Target Location (PTL), Digital Mapping (DM), Destruction of Enemy Air Defence (DEAD), Electronic Attack (EA), and derivations of these themes (Davis, et al., 2014). Table 2 represents the prioritized ranking of these missions, which are executed currently and can be performed in the nearest future by Class I UAVs.

Missions	Operational Requirement	Ranking	Micro UAVs		Mini UAVs		Small UAVS	
			Currently	In Future	Currently	In Future	Currently	In Future
Reconnaissance	BA	1	√	√	√	√	√	√
Signals Intelligence	BA	10		√		√	√	√
Mine Detection/CM	FP	7				√		√
Precision Target Location and Designation	FA	2		√	√	√	√	√
Battle Management	C2	4				√		√
Chem/Bio Reconnaissance	BA	3				√		√
Counter Cam/Con/Deception	BA	8				√		√
Electronic Warfare	FP	14		√		√	√	√
Combat SAR	FA	6		√		√	√	√
Communications/Data Relay	C2	5		√		√		√
Information Warfare	FA	15		√		√	√	√
Digital Mapping	BA	11				√		√
Littoral Undersea Warfare	FA	17				√		√
SOF Team Resupply	FL	9				√		√
Weaponization/Strike	FA	16		√		√	√	√
GPS Psuedolite	C2	18						√
Covert Sensor Insertion	BA	12						√
Decoy/Pathfinder	FA	13						√
BA = Battlespace Awareness; FL = Focused Logistics; FP = Force Protection; C2 = Command and Control; FA = Force Application								
Current Representative Micro UAVs	Wasp III, TACMAV, RQ-14A/B, BUSTER, BATCAM, RQ-11B, FPASS, RQ-16A, Pointer, Aqua Terra, Puma							
Future Representative Micro UAVs	Magni Multi-Rotor Micro UAS, RQ-11C							
Current Representative Mini UAVs	Scan Eagle, Silver Fox, Aerosonde							
Future Representative Mini UAVs	Vehicle Craft Unmanned Aircraft System, Fulmar X							
Current Representative Small UAVs	RQ-7B, RQ-15, XPV-1, XPV-2							
Future Representative Small UAVs	STUAS, ThunderB							
Types of Class I UAVs	**Description/Concept**						**Examples**	
HTOL	The propulsion systems are installed at the rear of the fuselage						RQ-21A	
VTOL	Vertical propulsion system is instoled at the front of their fuselage						Quantix™	
Tilt-rotor	Rotors are vertical in vertical flight, but for cruise flight they tilt 90 °						TR-60	
Tilt-wing	The angle of the whole wing is changed in flight modes						QUX-02	
Helicopter	Types of drones which use a rotating wing as their blade						MQ-8	
Multirotor	Rotary wing drone have multi propeller-based systems						PC-1	
Multirotor types: Monocopter, Twincopter, Tricopter, Quadrotor, Pentacopter, Hexacopter, Octocopter, Decacopter, Dodecacopter								

Table 2. Current/Future missions ranking of MSUAVs.

Source: (DoD, 2009)**,** (DoD, 2005)**,** (USAF, 2014)**,** (Gettinger, 2019)**,** (Vergouw, et al., 2016)**. Table created by the author.**

Modularity will be an essential way to upgrade, improve or substitute technologies, which encourage innovation and low costs (DoD, 2009). Different types of the payload can be switched on the same platform, which provides various capabilities and mission performance. Table 2 shows current missions and future possibilities of micro, midi

and small UAVs. The importance of MSUAVs in the future may be considerably different from our days. Advances in technology, miniaturization, and new materials coupled with new operational concepts such as swarming, will give unbelievable capabilities soon (Davis, et al., 2014). However, some design improvements should be carried out to meet better endurance performance. The significant application areas of MSUAVs are briefly discussed in the next section.

The concept of using MSUAVs collectively to receive and process very high-resolution results is an emerging capability that deserves increased emphasis. There is a rising interest in the networking of MSUAVs to perform complex operations independently. The new coming contribution of MSUAVs collectively for Strike/SEAD/DEAD missions will add new options in the application of force. Close Air Support (CAS) is one example, where MSUAVs could be used to deliver missiles in very close proximity to friendly forces (Gettinger, 2019). At present, the United States Air Force (USAF) research laboratory is progressing in the operation of SWARMs of MSUAVs, which could be mass-deployed by a larger aircraft or by tactical units. This swarming is considered as a set of MSUAVs, which can be managed manually or by semi-autonomous and autonomous means. The primary and straightforward purpose of MSUAVs has been considered to extend surveillance missions (DoD, 2009). The most fundamental form of the swarm is the static configuration, in which particular MSUAVs are pre-sorted at the first mission stage (Akram, et al., 2017). In this static configuration, new assets can not be connected to the swarm because it is already fixed at the point of mission initiation. Figure 1 shows the fundamental configuration of the swarm, which can combine all Class I UAVs. The more advanced is a dynamic configuration, which is opened for the acceptance of new joining assets along with existing ones. This swarm configuration permits the MSUAV to leave or join during pre-mission or mission stages (Figure 2).



Figure 1. Fundamental/Static MSUAVs swarm with communication lines.
Source: (USAF, 2014), (Akram, et al., 2017), (Scharre, 2014). **Figure created by the author.**



Figure 2. Dynamic MSUAVs swarm with communication lines
Source: (USAF, 2014), (Akram, et al., 2017), (Scharre, 2014). **Figure created by the author.**

As it was mentioned, the swarm can perform a mission completely autonomously or be semi-operated, avoiding collisions with other MSUAVs. Figure 6 shows the possible swarm assembly process, which contains the main two phases: pre-mission and post-mission (Akram, et al., 2017). During the pre-mission phase, the swarm assembly

procedure starts with the statement of tasks for the given mission, setting the desired effects (Figure 6). The mission control center sets an operation playground, which contains the desired effects for the given task and baseline configuration and collaborative issues. Then this mission brief is transmitted to the Ground Flight Management System (GFMS), which finally assembles the MSUAVs in the swarm, to perform the given task (Akram, et al., 2017). This assembling process depends on the effects and the capabilities of MSUAVs. As soon as the MSUAVs are finally assembled, the GFMS uploads the operation requirements (Akram, et al., 2017). After the requirements are uploaded, the swarm generates protected communication among all assets in this swarm (Figure 3).

As soon as all MSUAVs are connected, GFMS permits to perform the mission (Raja Naeem Akram, 2017). Thus, artificial intelligence concepts and techniques are essential to the swarm, which might be utilized in the SEAD and DEAD missions. The most significant benefit is in the swarm, which can manoeuvre in full autonomy and radio silence modes, being undetectable in the operational environment with a particular configuration of the payload. This collaborative networking unlocks many opportunities for massive operations (Figure 4). In this case, the swarm provides a critical engagement capability with sophisticated Artificial Intelligence (AI) concepts and methods to overcome adversarial Air Defence (AD) capabilities. The swarm concept potentially unlocks such capabilities as overwhelming enemy AD either by electronic warfare attacks or by saturating detection systems. Weaponized swarms can even be utilized f by overcoming multiple potential targets. (Figure 4). In the swarming warfare, the MSUAVs are scattered widely, which creates specific difficulty level for the adversary to identify, target and defend itself (Akram, et al., 2017).

Swarm can organize its actions through the networks to fulfil uploaded activities (DoD, 2009). The utilization of intelligent swarms systems is already in development. With increased autonomy, MSUAVs would be able to make particular decisions by themselves, including usage of munitions, which are required to destroy a given target. DARPA's Collaborative Operations in Denied Environment (CODE) research is interested in the capability of MSUAVs to identify, analyze, and appropriately react to accidental threats and generate new decisions and re-tasking areas of interest (Scharre, 2014). In this case, the swarm modifies its course automatically depending

on the sensors and inputs from the external sources by interchanging information, planning and allocating new mission targets, making coordinated tactical decisions, and reacting in high-threat conditions. The threats can be detected through automatic imagery utilizing AI because target recognition technology generally depends on matching specific sensor information with predictive patterns of the planned target. The tactical advantage in speed should be reconsidered to the speed of information gathering and processing. The military force which can operate this information faster will gain a tactical advantage (DoD, 2009). MSUAVs are ideal platforms for such missions, which require to fly low and quietly to avoid detection and act unaided and precisely. Future technologies could be applied to reducing such systems' probability of detection (DoD, 2005).

A single operator would be to control numerous MSUAVs by utilizing complexed swarm technology, which manages various sensors and consolidates collected information. Technological achievements in artificial intelligence will enable swarm to solve and perform complex solutions required in this stage of autonomy. Shortly, autonomous targeting systems will be capable of self-learning and executing various spectrum of missions, however, humans will maintain the ability to change the level of autonomy, type or phase of the desired task (DoD, 2009). The capability of MSUAVs to operate in the area of operations autonomously could indicate a new age in military technology. Nevertheless, research in autonomy will remain an emphasis area in the near future. Autonomous capability is considered as an essential advantage for any military. It enables the system to respond to threats faster within the decision-making loop. As autonomy increases, the ability to control multiple MSUAVs would be more facilitated. The next chapter describes the additional challenges of MSUAVs.



Figure 3. The swarm assembly of the drones in different phases.

Source: (USAF, 2014), (Akram, et al., 2017), (Scharre, 2014). **Figure created by the author.**



Figure 4. MSUAVs swarm scenarios.

Source: (USAF, 2014), (Akram, et al., 2017), (Scharre, 2014), **http://www.seadswarm.eu/#. Figure created by the author.**

Weaknesses/Challenges

The most significant technical challenges arise due to real-time sensing, inter-MSUAVs communications, links to command and control, autonomy and payload. However, before MSUAVs can be used to improve effectiveness in the strike, EW, ISR, SEAD/DEAD missions, several challenges must be met, such as situational awareness, payload capacity, autonomy and datalink relay.

Current MSUAVs typically depend on sensors to provide overall battlefield situational awareness. Target identification, by utilizing Electro-Optical/Infrared (EO/IR) sensors, is essential to have positive target recognition before authorizing a lethal attack. As a consequence, during poor or reduced visibility, the speed operational accomplishment suffers. Deficiency of situational awareness of MSUAVs in military operations is often highlighted as an influencing disadvantage (DoD, 2005). The operators of MSUAVs do not have a clear field of vision and are dependent on multiple sensors. Additionally, these types of UAVs also perform worse off in terms of speed and manoeuvrability. Nevertheless, the problem of visual situational awareness could be solved by the utilization of a multitude of MSUAVs. Mostly, situational awareness should be assumed as the ability to detect possible threats even before the danger becomes impend through more advanced sensors and inter-communication capabilities. The advanced electronic systems on-board could increase manoeuvrability, speed, and endurance performance of MSUAVs in future (Wen, 2015).

The current MSUAVs payload capacity limits their ability to dispense firepower or carry bulky electronic warfare (EW) systems. In this case, the payload is the electronic equipment installed to perform this specific task. Furthermore, these EW systems require additional weight and volume allotment. However, other additional and essential payloads also require allocation in the design-based volume of MSUAVs. MSUAVs are disadvantaged in terms of payload capacity, which is mainly due to the limited size of MSUAVs design (Wen, 2015). The more significant disadvantage of the payload is the increment of capacity, which increases the proportion of the volume, affecting flying altitude and endurance time negatively. MSUAVs have to use smaller sensors, and so their effectiveness of surveillance will be less comparing to the larger ones (Wen, 2015). For weaponised MSUAV to gain their combat advantages, they will need lighter and smaller munitions, which are enough powerful and precise. This could be

achieved by the advanced warheads, which use plasma energy to effect destruction comparing. Thus, even with a small quantity of plasma warhead, the missiles will be able to “cut” through metal structures (Chin, 2019). Weaponised MSUAVs are anticipated to carry Directed Energy Weapons (DEWs, which emit high-powered energy spikes, destroying or disabling, transmitters in Command, Control, Communication (C3) stations, radars and electronics (Chin, 2019). Nevertheless, this strength capability is still limited for a smaller platform but could be solved by the implementation of the advanced power systems.

In general, UAVs could be classified by the autonomy level, which approaches to the ability of UAV to perform a given mission on its own, considering three dimensions: task, human-machine relationship and intelligence. In this case, “mission autonomy” is discussed as the result of mission complexity and the degree of autonomy. MSUAVs have already some autonomous functions on board, but this is still limited (Figure 5).



Figure 5. The autonomy of UAVs Dynamic.
Source: https://www.nap.edu/read/11379/chapter/5#59.

Nowadays, autonomy cannot replace operators entirely but for a longer time-frame, will quicken the OODA (observe, orient, decide, act) loop, providing crucial information to decision-makers in being significantly faster than humans (USAF, 2014). Incorporated autonomy can increase the overall effectiveness of MSUAS and decrease operator workload, which currently includes auto take-off, land and transit operations. The most desirable approach to MSUAVs would be autonomous management of ISR and combat missions in cooperation with other air vehicles in the operational environment. MSUAVs tend to have a limited level of autonomy; however, they will be more valuable in the future as levels of autonomy increase, providing benefits of reduced operational control. MSUAVs flexibility would be considerably enhanced by the capability of operating at different levels of autonomy to fulfil different mission needs. The swarm of MSUAVs can be taken as the solution by cooperative re-tasking each other, minimising target identification time and engaging these threats, which are detected by other assets in this swarm.

Research studies show that the operations, using MSUAVs widely through a quick datalink relay, is still quite demanding (DoD, 2009). Additionally, through the communications relay, MSUAVS are capable of performing Signal Intelligence (SIGINT), EW, Electronics Intelligence (ELINT), and Communications Intelligence (COMINT) more efficiently, nevertheless designing UAVs wireless communication links is much more demanding to meet the requirements for long-distance and frequency spectrum (Figure 6) (DoD, 2005). In this case, the radiofrequency spectrum is an essential enabling such MSUAVs missions. Reliable coordination in frequency managing is critical to safety and mission success. Usage of MSUAVs should be analysed through the frequency characteristics in the compatibility of the bandwidth requirements of the sensors, communications, and characteristics of data links. These essential characteristics will allow articulating radio frequency requirements for the frequency distribution (DoD, 2009). However, it is acknowledged that currently, it is quite challenging to manage radiofrequency bandwidth in the swarming, especially in the use of intensive intelligence data sharing applications (Chin, 2019). Next chapter highlights these particular opportunities, which enable to solve these fragile issues of MSUAVs.



Figure 6. A multi-level drones fleets.

Source: (USAF, 2014), (Akram, et al., 2017), (Scharre, 2014). **Figure created by the author.**

Opportunities

Technological equipment miniaturization is crucial to eliminate the deficiencies in capability between small and large UAVs. The most significant superiority occurred in the miniaturization of sensors and munition, and implementation of advanced energy sources. UAVs are expanding around the world in a range of operations, gaining acceptance in many forces; moreover, technological advantages are progressing to increase the requisition for UAVs (Gettinger, 2019).

The Class I UAVs mostly are utilized for tactical operations, such as ISR (DoD, 2005). Effective planning for the missions strongly depends and is directly related to ISR capabilities provided by these assets (DoD, 2009). Advanced sensors can increase ISR capabilities - drones see more, further and with higher resolution. All these mentioned characteristics make UAVs more potentially lethal, disruptive and challenging to defend (Lacher, 2019).

Model	D-STAMP-HD	U-STAMP	M-STAMP	T-STAMP-XR	T-STAMP-XD	iSky-20HD	iSky-30HD	iSky-50HD
Sensors	CMOS 1/3″ x9 / x20 Continuous Optical Zoom	Uncooled Infrared IR Single FOV Camera	Uncooled IR x4 Continuous Optical Zoom and CCD x10 Continuous Optical Zoom	Continuous Zoom Thermal Imaging and Continuous Zoom Colour HD Day Camera	Continuous Zoom Thermal Imaging and Continuous Zoom Colour HD Day Camera	Continuous Zoom Thermal Imaging and Continuous Zoom Colour HD Day Camera	37.5x Continuous Zoom Thermal Imaging and 50x Continuous Zoom Colour HD Day Camera	36x Continuous Zoom Thermal Imaging and Full HD Zoom Camera, and Full HD Daylight or SD SWIR Spotter Channel
Diameter	130mm	140mm	152mm	178mm	220mm	240mm	305mm	354mm
Weight	850g	1.25kg	1.3kg	3.5kg	5.7kg	10.7kg	21kg	29kg
Range	6km	2.7km	2.7km	12km	15km	15km	18km	32km
Operation	Day	Night	Day/Night	Day/Night	Day/Night	Day/Night	Day/Night	Day/Night

Table 3. Miniaturized sensors for MSUAVs.
Source: https://www.controp.com/. Table created by the author.

Miniaturized optical systems have been proven operationally for ISR and target acquisition, using sophisticated EO/IR sensors with integrated processing, integration, and management capabilities (Table 3). Such multi-sensor gyro-stabilized gimbals are equipped with Full-HD camera with up to 36x optical zoom and high-quality IR camera by multi-axis stabilization. They are completely sealed and can be operated in any weather conditions. The image processing unit allows such features as target tracking, coordinates lock and video stabilization without dead angle for observation with additional anti-vibration damping system to eliminates vibrations, even while using 30x

zoom. The modularity enables the utilization of a broad spectrum of different surveillance cameras, which can be preinstalled by various types of sensors.

USA Manufacturer Raytheon has already developed a smaller munition version for UAVs - the Pike 40mm precision laser-guided missile. Pike can be considered as a significant stage in further miniaturization of laser-guided rockets, particularly suited for MSUAVs. This missile is less expensive compared to the more massive munitions. Arming MSUAVs was quite restricted due to the limitation of existing lightweight smart weapons. To be carried on such assets and still maintain lethality, a missile should be light and still be precision-guided. Importantly, technological advances in lighter munitions opened the opportunity to MSUAVs to perform not only surveillance missions but also additional strike operations (Table 4).

	Raytheon Pike	Raytheon Pyros	NAVAIR Spike	MBDA SABER
Type	Guided missile	Bomb	Guided missile	Bomb
Mass	0.7 kg	5.9 kg	2.4 kg	4.5 kg
Length	43 cm	55 cm	64 cm	55 cm
Maximum firing range	2.000 m		3.2 km	

Table 4. Miniaturized munitions for MSUAVs.
Source: https://www.airforce-technology.com. Table created by the author.

The advantage of miniaturized guided munitions is their cost and size. They are notably cheaper comparing to larger ones. Small ammunition can provide better operational flexibility against light targets, while the utilization of more massive missiles can be used for hard targets.

The energy source strictly limits the endurance time and the flight radius of MSUAVs. Fuelled systems are inefficient, loud, and unreliable to MSUAVs. Traditional battery systems do not supply enough power due to the low energy density, especially where the additional energy-consuming payload is in use. The long and continuous battery re-charging is another hamper, which limits the electrically-driven UAVs. Therefore, it was raised as a significant demand to initiate a new development for long-endurance MSUAVs that rely on new beneficial energy sources, which provide high supply power

and energy densities, and rapid charging time (Sutopo, 2019). Hydrogen systems have already shown one of the ultimate solutions to increase flight endurance. Driving drones with hydrogen systems approach many advantages and are far more efficient compared to conventional powering systems. Hydrogen systems have better energy density and on-demand energy production than a regular battery of the same weight (Figure 7). There are already some implemented examples of hydrogen battery cells being used to military drones (DoD, 2005).



Figure 7. Mass specific power trends of different energy sources.
Source: (DoD, 2005)**. Figure created by the author.**

Hybrid electric-hydrogen systems in the future may improve high-speed or long-enduring, energy-intensive missions with the capability to operate more silently, which makes MSUAVs highly suitable for surveillance operations. The initial stage of using Hydrogen Fuel Cell (HFC) UAV solution provides longer duration flights and the benefits of fast fuelling. Expendable energy sources, such as hydrogen fuel cells, may be capable of prolonging endurance for MSUAVs even more. Alternative photovoltaics energy technology shows a potential advantage in the future.

MUAVs can carry a combination of different sensors, electronic receivers and transmitters, and offensive weaponry and can be operated or navigated autonomously. Using advanced sensors, building materials, battery systems, and efficient electric propulsion systems combined with useful airframe configurations, MSUAVs are rapidly improving in their performance criteria. They are smaller, fly faster and further, and can carry more load operating more quietly; nevertheless, they still have vulnerabilities, which are discussed in the next paragraph. The advantage of light precision weapons, autonomy and AI technologies will impel MSUAVs towards lethal assets with the independent ability in multi-missions. Currently, the miniaturized gyro-stabilized micro electro-optical gimbals provide the possibility to combine day-light camera and a un-cooled infrared camera with a laser range finder. The new advanced smaller gimbals on the market already have superior performance and functions, which could be found in larger systems.

Threats

MSUAVs are utilized at lower altitudes, so they may stay within the range of attack, comparing to the large-sized drones, which can perform their missions in higher ceiling altitude. Adversary's improved defence systems could easily disrupt or even destroy MSUAVs. It limits them to an environment with a relatively low threat level because they would be damaged quickly. Ensuring the survivability may be the most critical problem to overcome this threat, and MSUAVs still need protection. MSUAVs losses have been assigned to lethal risks, such as AD, small arms, and unspecified ground fire. Non-lethal threats are based on electronic warfare and information warfare manners. MSUAVs are prone to adverse actions against their electronic systems, communications data links, GPS systems, and their command and control data links (DoD, 2005).

EW environment and Global Positioning System (GPS) standstill still are vulnerable factors of MSUAV's. These unmanned vehicles can be braked by the unauthorised access to their video data if it is unencrypted. Other common threats to MSUAVs are GPS spoofing and jamming. Spoofing affects GPS receivers and counterfeiting GPS signals allows the enemy to take control over the MSUAVs. Jamming disrupts the GPS signals, which results in the loss of control. Ground control stations might be also sensitive to cyber-attacks due to software security vulnerabilities (Table 5). Therefore,

countermeasures such as anti-jamming devices, advanced encryption are being developed to reduce the probability of such attacks. It can be foreseen that counter-UAV technology developments will step in the future as the majority of military forces recognises the potential threats rising to MSUAVs (DoD, 2005). For this issue, the particular UAVs categories have been analyzed to identify threat environment effects on their survivability (Table 7). Currently, MSUAVs are used in various environments, but for future perspectives, these drones should be able to fulfil tasks more effectively, where the missions could confront different and unpredicted threats. In the broad context, next-generation UAVs must identify, analyze, or even counter recognized threats via more advanced means, to overcome a different range of threat.

Survivability Category	Ground Fire	Air Defense Artilery	Shoulder Launched Missiles	RF Missiles	Air to Air Missiles
Small	√				
Medium	√	√	√	√	
Large - Low Altitude	√	√	√	√	√
Large - High Altitude				√	√
	Jamming	Deception	Meaconing	Intrusion and Exploatation	
Small	√	√			
Medium	√	√	√	√	
Large - Low Altitude	√	√	√	√	
Large - High Altitude	√	√	√	√	

Table 5. Survivability classification to Lethal and Non-Lethal Threats.

Source: (DoD, 2005)**. Table created by the author**.

Therefore, MSUAVs have to be additionally re-enforced with advanced and adequate countermeasure systems safely share target or threat information with other assets. Survivability design specialities should be evaluated concerning the required mission and the potential threat environment. Survivability should be estimated in the systems engineering design process to develop the most effective UAV for the lowest life cycle cost (DoD, 2005).

Conclusion

The future role of MSUAVs is exacerbated by the rise of technology progression, covered in this report. Higher mission performance will be achieved through the advances in miniaturisation, modularity and artificial intelligence, making MSUAVs

more attractive. MSUAVs will take a significant part in defeating new targets, acting as decoys, jamming and disrupting enemy AD. The advanced power systems and miniaturized munition even more reliably affect mission performance, giving MSUAVs the ability to perform tasks such as EW, SEAD, and DEAD, including counter UAVs missions due to their massive expandability and sufficiently low cost. SWARM technology will enable multiple MSUAVs to dominate over lethal and non-lethal dangers, automatically identifying and overcoming threats using AI software and databases. Technological achievements in AI will enable swarm to solve and perform complex solutions autonomously.

Nevertheless, research in autonomy will remain an important issue. While this prognosis may sound optimistically, still there is a challenge that military technology may face implementation difficulties, because these technological solutions are being developed in the research centres, but have not been completely approved. Prototype solutions are now being demonstrated and tested only. Data links and coordination in frequency management is still critical to mission accomplishment due to complexity. MSUAVs operators should be very well informed of the frequency characteristics of current UAV, analysing maintaining the bandwidth dependency for sensors, communication relay output, and attributes for all installed links.

Recommendations

For a further comprehensive study and analysis by this suggested framework, the attention should be taken into these domains:

- Develop a detailed database of the currently existing UAVs, their challenges and risks related to emerging drone technologies. This can generate the silhouette of the existing drones, their capabilities and the trends associated with growing capacities.
- Explore the potentiality for swarming with the usage of a variety of different sensors and missiles. Additionally, loitering munitions could be used as the primary combat force in the swarm, while simple UAVs could be utilized as decoys.
- Investigate the potentiality of new advanced materials for enhancing UAVs reliability. High temperature and light-weight materials can reduce significant weight for the servos, flight control surfaces of existing designs.

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BEST ESSAY OF THE HIGHER COMMAND STUDIES COURSE (HCSC)

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Case study: Was the Klaipėda revolt (1923) Lithuania's hybrid operation?

'Unfortunately, there are germs that, if neglected, become harmful and can poison the organisms of higher animals.'
(French intelligence service's report, 22 January 1923
(Chandovoine, 2003))

Introduction

The interwar Lithuanian politicians and historians claimed that the Klaipėda revolt (10 - 15 January 1923) was mainly a local Prussian-Lithuanian expression of political will. It was an uprising to liberate from German and French oppression and to unite with Lithuania. Actually, more evidence appears that a young Lithuanian state challenged the Allies and arrangements of the Versailles Peace Treaty agreement with an aggressive action in the Klaipėda Region. The complex and covert operation designed to seize the French administrated former German territory was not an easy task to execute. May this combined operation serve as an example of hybrid warfare in the early XX century?

The theorists of the XXI century are trying to define hybrid warfare as a present and future form of warfare. Arthur F. Lykke Jr. proposed a strategic framework of ends, ways, and means (Eikmeier, 2007), and, while applying the hybrid warfare as a way, aggressors will employ and use any means necessary to achieve their ends. The classic state's means available are expressed as instruments of national power and include diplomacy/ politics, information/ intelligence, military and economy (DIME) (Farlin, 2014). Despite many definitions, NATO described hybrid threats as a 'combination of military and non-military as well as covert and overt means, including disinformation, cyber-attacks, economic pressure, and deployment of irregular armed groups and use of regular forces' (NATO, 2019). Additionally, the 'covert action' concept suggested by Kevin O'Brien, which encapsulates a wide variety of options, ranging from propaganda to economic pressure, covert political actions, or more aggressive para-military and military actions (Dylan, 2017) reviewed and assessed as similar to the NATO's hybrid threats definition. Therefore, hybrid warfare is not new or original. It is important to know the roots of the hybrid warfare and to study previous cases to be better prepared for future challenges.

Despite interwar official Lithuania's narrative about local roots of the Klaipėda revolt, the paper would dispute that Lithuania employed hybrid ways and means of that time to achieve its end: to annex the Klaipėda Region to get access to the Baltic Sea. This paper is a descriptive historic case study where the DIME framework and NATO hybrid threat definition were adopted to describe the Klaipėda revolt, except cyber-attacks, which were not the means of those times.

This case study is mostly supported by Lithuanian authors of the interwar (Šapoka, 1936) (Valsanokas, 1932) and after 1990' (Eidintas, et al., 1997) (Genienė Z., 2013) (Zikaras, 2013) periodic. In addition, the reflection of the French point of view is based on archives materials of France. (Chandovoine, 2003).

The case study structured as follows; after this introduction, the short regional background for orientation is introduced, followed by the description of DIME variables, and finally, aftermath of the revolt and conclusions.

Background

For centuries, the Lithuanians along with the Germans inhabited northern East Prussia (Lithuania Minor) of Germany, although the area had never been a part of Lithuania itself. The unification of Lithuania Minor with Lithuania emerged as a goal to consolidate all-ethnic Lithuanian lands in the one state (Eidintas, et al., 1997 p. 85). This vision of a future Lithuania also foresaw the acquisition of the Klaipėda seaport to gain access to the Baltic Sea.

Figure 1. The Klaipėda Region (*Memelland*) (Gloria, 2009)

On 28 June 1919, by the decision of the Paris Peace Conference, a new administrative formation emerged in the Northeast of Europe (Genienė Z., 2013). Although, the Lithuanian delegation at the Paris Peace Conference had little influence on its final decisions and the Allied powers did not yet take the new Lithuanian state seriously. The Versailles Peace Treaty did mention the Klaipėda Region

(*Memelland*): the Article 28 detached it from Germany, and the Article 99 put the territory at the provisional disposal of the Allies (ANON, 1919). Its territory of 2,7 thousand square kilometres on the North side of the river Nemunas (*Nemen/ Memel*) and more than 140 thousand inhabitants detached from Germany and felt under the French administration (Šapoka, 1936 p. 579). Despite German protests, the conference chairperson Georges Clemenceau declared that the Klaipėda Region had always been ethnically Lithuanian (Zikaras, 2013 p. 111). This statement was very significant and provided legal basis for Lithuania's claim to the Region.

After the German Army troops left the Region on 12 February 1920, control was assumed by the French 21st Alpine Rifle Battalion, led by Gen. Dominique Odry who became the military governor (Eidintas, 2017 p. 395). Later on, France appointed Commissar Gabriel Jean Petisne and together with the Regional Directorate, dominated by Germans, governed the Region (Zikaras, 2013 p. 111). Overall, Petisne exhibited an arrogant anti-Lithuanian attitude, causing friction between the Lithuanian government and the French administration (Eidintas, et al., 1997 p. 87).

Up to 1923, the Klaipėda Region evolved into a complicated crossroad of various interests. The main aim of France was to weaken Germany and separate the Soviet Union by creating 'a sanitary cordon' (Genienė Z., 2013 p. 14). On the other hand, Germany and the Soviet Union were eager to weaken the French - backed Poland influence (Genienė Z., 2013 p. 15). Poland wanted to re-establish Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth borders of 1772 and considered the Lithuanian desire for independence as a separatist movement. It also had own aspirations to take Klaipėda (Tomkus, 2018). Therefore, Poland fought Lithuania and finally in 1920 by a hybrid operation seized Vilnius forcing Lithuanian government to move to interim capital – Kaunas. Lithuania was still weak, not recognized *de jure*, isolated and recovering after the Independence wars but ambitious to re-seize Vilnius and to annex Klaipėda. The United Kingdom wanted to settle down all after war regional conflicts by maintaining the balance (Chandovoine, 2003 p. 30). Commissar Petisne and the pro-German Directorate, which sought to secure its powers, advocated the idea of Memel a free state (*Freistatdt*, similar of Danzig), which would remain under the French protectorate (Šapoka, 1936 p. 579). Germany and the Soviet Union had chosen to support the Lithuanian aspirations trying to expel French and decrease the influence of Poland in the Region (Čepėnas, 1992 p. 769).

The hard lesson that the Lithuanians learned in the first years of independence from the Poles, as well as the Allies, convicted them to rely more on their own. In addition, time was unfavourable to Lithuania as in 1922 it seemed ever more likely, that the Klaipėda Region would become a *Freistatdt* (Eidintas, et al., 1997 p. 88).

Diplomatic/ political means

The diplomatic and political (overt and covert) preparation was crucial for success of the revolt. Lithuanian diplomats participated in different conferences solving regional disputes, although, being not recognized *de jure* with limited rights. In the autumn of 1922, after *de jure* recognition, the Lithuanians decided that further delay was not possible. On November 20, 1922 at a secret cabinet session, which lasted through the night, the government concluded that any hopes to gain Klaipėda at the League of Nations or the Conference of Ambassadors would be ineffective. (Eidintas, et al., 1997 p. 90). The government, having considered various options, including a direct military intervention, and following the first President Antanas Smetona's suggestion that without *de facto* control there would be no control of *de jure*, decided to organize a revolt of the Klaipėda Region and the Prime Minister Ernestas Galvanauskas was assigned responsible. (Eidintas, et al., 1997 p. 91). He advised the General Staff to prepare a plan for the revolt and select its commanders (Genienė Z., 2013 p. 15).

The Prime Minister aided by Jonas Žilius, the Lithuanian consul of Klaipėda and Jonas Polavinskas, chief of counter intelligence of the Lithuanian General Staff, drafted a plan (Eidintas, et al., 1997 p. 91). They gave priority to devising a 'political cover' as deception for the government and prepared a diplomatic offensive (Eidintas, et al., 1997 p. 91). Galvanauskas intended his secret plan to work at several levels for the attainment of a common end, yet its separated elements were compartmentalized (Eidintas, et al., 1997 pp. 91-93). Only a very few individuals were aware of the real role of Galvanauskas and the Lithuanian government. The leadership of the Seimas (the Parliament) and a newly elected president were not informed at all, to avoid their objections, and neither were the Foreign Ministry and Lithuanian diplomats. (Čepėnas, 1992 p. 769). Galvanauskas efforts had the opposite of the intended effect; from the very start of the action, the Allies had no doubt who was actually behind the revolt (Chandovoine, 2003), but some of the action participants never fully understood their role, neither then, nor later (Eidintas, et al., 1997 p. 91).

Galvanauskas interacted overtly and diplomatically with London and Paris, but covertly looked at Berlin and, to a lesser extent, Moscow. Taking into account the history and demography of the Klaipėda Region, Germany's neutrality, if not a tacit approval, was crucial to Lithuania designs. By early 1922, the Germans initiated secret diplomatic contacts with the Lithuanians (Eidintas, et al., 1997 p. 93). The Germans covertly informed the Lithuanian ambassador in Berlin, that they would not oppose Lithuanian interests in Klaipėda, if the French exited from the Region (Čepėnas, 1992 p. 769). They clearly indicated, however, that this German position would never be official or public (Eidintas, et al., 1997 p. 92). In early December of 1923, Galvanauskas summoned the German representative in Kaunas, Franz Olshausen, and informed him on the Lithuanian government impatience with the Allies, its readiness to preclude any French plans for a takeover of Klaipėda (Eidintas, 2017 p. 139). He hoped that the German Government would not consider a Lithuanian march into Klaipeda as directed against Germany, and that it would urge local Germans not to get involved. Olshausen approved of the Lithuanian government position, and promised to restrain the Germans of Klaipėda. (Eidintas, 2017 p. 140). Anyway, the positive signals coming from Germany greatly influenced the Lithuanian government decisions to seize Klaipėda.

Furthermore, another element of Galvanauskas plan went into action to employ the Riflemen's Union as an additional 'political cover'. It should have acted as a patriotic but disobedient organization. In 1919, patriotic activists formed a sports-paramilitary organisation, and named it the Lithuanian Riflemen's Union (LRU) (Jokubauskas, 2014 p. 75). The leadership of this organization set out with great enthusiasm to carry out the government's urgings for concreate actions (Eidintas, et al., 1997 p. 93). At the first glance, it seemed that the government and the LRU were preparing parallel plans of action, but in reality it was but a part of the government plan. Prior the Klaipėda revolt, the LRU leaders met in Berlin with General Hans Seekt, the commander of German army (Čepėnas, 1992 p. 771). Seekt assured them, that not a single German would fire on the Lithuanians (Čepėnas, 1992 p. 771). The Germans kept their promise, before and during the action. The German consul in Klaipėda urged the local Germans not to hinder the Lithuanians (Eidintas, et al., 1997 p. 93). This surprised the Germans of Klaipėda but accurately reflected Berlin's view of events. The German

consul later wrote that the Germans of Klaipėda had been ‘sacrificed on the altar of German-Russian-Lithuanian friendship’ (Eidintas, et al., 1997 p. 93).

Seeking to counterbalance a possible Poland’s response to Lithuanian action in Klaipėda, the Lithuanian government turned to Moscow. The Soviets demonstrated a strong interest in the Klaipėda question and were free of any political obligations to the Allies (Eidintas, 2017 p. 134). The Soviet foreign minister Georgy Chicherin declared to Galvanauskas that Lithuanian annexation of Klaipėda would not be conflicting with the Soviet interests and even favoured such an action (Valsanokas, 1932 p. 85). He stopped briefly and met secretly with Galvanauskas in Kaunas during his travel to the West Europe on November 29, 1922, just a few days after the Lithuanian cabinet meeting (Vaičenonis, 2013 p. 383). Chicherin also declared that the Soviet Union would not remain a passive bystander in the event of Polish moves against Lithuania and promised a military show of force (Eidintas, 2017 p. 135). Actually, the Soviets started large-scale military exercises along Poland’s border to fix Polish forces in January 1923 (Chandovoine, 2003 p. 57).

Although everything seemed to be falling into place, the planned operation still presented a considerable risk for Lithuania. In the Europe of that time, any action in defiance of French interests was inherently dangerous (Eidintas, et al., 1997 p. 94). Berlin and Moscow had given a tacit support for the Lithuanian takeover of Klaipėda, but the Lithuanians could not be assured of their backing if Paris was determined to re-establish French authority in the Region (Eidintas, et al., 1997 p. 94). Of course, it was clear that France and Poland would oppose Lithuania action, but it was unclear what exact actions they would take to resist it.

On December 18, 1922, the Lithuanian government learned that a committee appointed by the Conference of Ambassadors and led by Jules Laroche, a French Foreign Ministry official, was to present a proposal for the status of the Region on January 10 (Vareikis, 2008 p. 194). The details of the proposal were not clear, but Lithuanians were convinced that Poland, not Lithuania would be favoured (Chandovoine, 2003 p. 63). Further delays were not possible- it was time to act.

The final preparations were completed in the first days of January 1923. Galvanauskas cautioned the revolt commanders that the Lithuanian government might have to dissociate itself from them (Eidintas, et al., 1997 p. 95). He ordered the soldiers to

avoid casualties if possible, and fire on French troops only as the last means of self-defence (Eidintas, et al., 1997 p. 95). Every French casualty could make any political solution much more difficult to achieve. Galvanauskas reminded them, that their 'goal is to take over Klaipėda, not to destroy enemy troops' (Eidintas, et al., 1997 p. 95). In January 1923, the Allies distracted by the war reparations dispute with Germany, and French forces occupied the Ruhr (Chandovoine, 2003 p. 63). The Lithuanians set their plan in a motion. On January 6 in Šilute (*Heydekrug*), with Lithuania's support formed a Supreme Committee for the Salvation of Lithuania Minor to represent political side of the revolt, which three days later appealed for help from Lithuania (Zikaras, 2013 p. 212). Martynas Jankus was elected its chairman and the Supreme Committee adopted the appeal to the people of the Klaipėda Region, which was published as a proclamation (Chandovoine, 2003 p. 63), which urged the forming of an organized force and the seeking of reunification with Lithuania. On 9 January 1923 the Supreme Council published the manifesto proclaiming that the rule of the Regional Directorate is terminated and that the Council takes all powers into its own hands (Zikaras, 2013 p. 212). Same day the military part of operation started, the seizure of Klaipėda region began, which Lithuania's government presented as an uprising of local Lithuanians, totally denying its involvement.

Information and Intelligence means

As the preparations for the covert military action moved forward, it was very important for Lithuania to maximize its influence in the Klaipėda Region and to attract as many supporters as possible for the idea of union with Lithuania. To this end, the Lithuanians utilized various means: they created and supported pro-Lithuania organizations, placed articles in the local press, organized rallies, workers' strikes, and spread rumours (Chandovoine, 2003 pp. 58-59).

The Lithuanians stressed propaganda by various means, sometimes through third parties; pro-Lithuanians acquired control of the most important segment of the local press. In 1922, the Lithuanian government paid out a monthly subsidy of 32,000 marks to the Prussian Lithuanian National Council, and, through the office of the Lithuania's consul Žilius, paid out another half million marks for propaganda (Čepėnas, 1992 p. 768). Lithuanian-American organizations and individuals also financed pro-Lithuanian activities (Čepėnas, 1992 p. 771). Because of these measures, Lithuania's influence

in the territory grew, and the Prussian Lithuanian organizations greatly increased their strength (Eidintas, et al., 1997 p. 91). In the weeks before the revolt, the Lithuanian and Klaipėda press had widely reported on alleged Polish intentions in Klaipėda (Vaičenonis, 2013 p. 387). The primary aim was to frighten not only the Klaipėda Region Lithuanian population, but also Germans, who detested the Poles and, given the choice, would favour the Lithuanians.

Lithuanian intelligence agents widely operated in the Klaipėda Region, among them Polovinskas and Matas Šalčius, a journalist and a representative of the LRU (Genienė Z., 2013 p. 11). Galvanauskas continuously was receiving intelligence reports on the situation in the Region, including the information that the majority of local population supported the free-state idea and expressed unwillingness to participate in any kind of armed revolt (Vareikis, 2008 p. 194). On 2-6 January, the Prime Minister discussed with Polovinskas, Žilius and Simonaitis, Prussian-Lithuanian and former representatives in the Klaipėda Regional Directorate, the final matters concerning the preparations for the military action (Vareikis, 2008 p. 197).

Kaunas also sought to exploit a strong anti-German sentiment in Europe by claiming that the insurgents were fighting against the territory's German Directorate, not the Allies. J. Gabrys-Paršaitis, who was sent on a special mission during the revolt, in Berlin worked hard to convince the Germans that the revolt was against the French, and in Paris to convince the French that it was against the Germans (Vaičenonis, 2013 p. 370).

Military means

After the decision to organize a revolt, a quick and successful military action was most important to present the Allies with the situation of *fait accompli*. In the beginning of 1922, Žilius was the first to suggest that Klaipėda should be taken by force, and that the LRU should be involved in the operation (Genienė Z., 2013 p. 15). On 16 November 1922, the Presidium of the LRU held a secret meeting, which approved the decision to organize the revolt in the Klaipėda Region (Čepėnas, 1992 p. 770). Shortly afterwards, the leaders of provincial riflemen units were summoned and received order to recruit volunteers, but only in person-to person talks, avoiding any written correspondence and promoting the utmost secrecy (Zikaras, 2013 p. 212).

Initially, The General Staff of the Lithuanian Army prepared a plan of revolt, issued directives to establish the Special Task Force (Zikaras, 2013 p. 212). Polovinskas, who took the operational nickname Budrys, was appointed as the Commander of the Special Task Force (Genienė Z., 2013 p. 15). This surname, typical for Lithuania Minor, stuck for the rest of his life. The headquarters of the revolt formed, Capt. P. Klimaitis, chief of staff of the LRU, who officially left to inspect subunits in province, became the deputy of Budrys. J. Tomkus, a General Staff officer, become Chief of Staff. All key personnel changed their surnames to the ones popular in the Klaipėda Region (Genienė Z., 2013 p. 15).

On January 5, the Chief Executive of the General Staff Maj. J. Gricius issued a secret notification to the division commanders warning them that the army was not going to watch Klaipėda events passively and that, if the necessity arose, it would take active participation (Zikaras, 2013 p. 212). The Army regular units were raised to higher alert status and stood-by throughout the operation (Vareikis, 2008 p. 198).

On 7 January 1923, the Special Task Force consisting of 1079 people deployed from Kaunas towards Klaipėda (Vareikis, 2008 p. 197). The formation included 40 regular army officers, and 585 soldiers from 8th and 11th Infantry Regiments, cadets of the Military and Military police schools, the rest were the LRU members from Vilkaviškis, Kaišiadorys and Panevėžys and civilian volunteers from Lithuania (Vareikis, 2008 p. 197). All of them were loaded on trains; militaries changed to civilian clothes and reached their points of debarkation along the Klaipėda Region borders (Genienė Z., 2013 p. 16). Weapons and ammunition distributed among the insurgents at the approach to the Klaipėda Region and their military gear and documents, indicating their Lithuania links collected in the railway stations of Kretinga and Tauragė (Genienė Z., 2013 p. 16). The Task Force was armed with machine guns, rifles and grenades; it had 4 cars, 4 motorcycles and 63 horses (Zikaras, 2013 p. 212).

On 8 January, Commander of the Special Task Force Budrys issued a secret operational order; the Force was broken into three groups for Klaipėda, Pagėgiai and Šilutė. On 10 January, the Lithuanian “insurgents” crossed the border of the Klaipėda Region. They wore green bandages on their left arms with inscription of ‘MLS’ (Mažosios Lietuvos Savanoris - Volunteer of the Lithuania Minor) for recognition (Zikaras, 2010). During the first day of the revolt, the Lithuanian Forces took over

control almost the entire Klaipėda Region (Zikaras, 2010). The next day the Lithuanian Forces surrounded the city of Klaipėda and the French troops deployed therein.

Figure 2. The March of Lithuanian insurgents to the Klaipėda Region (Zikaras, 2013 p. 213)

Budrys sent a letter to Commisar Petisne informing him that the Region had fallen under the control of the insurgents, the Regional Directorate had been dismissed, and that a new government had been formed (Vaičenonis, 2013 p. 388). He also informed that the local administration and police would continue to fulfil their duties and that the rebels were eager to remain neutral towards the French forces, because the Allies were not foes of theirs (Chandovoine, 2003 p. 65). However, Commissar Petisne refused to engage into talks with the Revolt commander (Zikaras, 2013 p. 213). The French troops started reinforcing their positions, digging trenches and building barbed wire fences (Zikaras, 2013 p. 213). On the night of 15 January, through a heavy blizzard, the Lithuanian forces launched an attack on the city (Eidintas, 2017 p. 396). At any rate, the small French garrison in Klaipėda was not willing and unprepared to

fight, and its resistance was only symbolic (Chandovoine, 2003 p. 66). On January 15, the insurgents took the town of Klaipėda, the last strong point at the prefecture raised a white flag, the French troops were interned, and rebels established control over the whole Region (Chandovoine, 2003 p. 16). Budrys signed with Commissar Petisne an act of armistice and Klaipėda was rendered to Lithuanians (Zikaras, 2013 p. 213).

Economic means

Lithuania had been applying economic pressure already from the early 1920' to show that the Klaipėda Region cannot survive without Lithuania. The economic pressure was designed to bend the inhabitants of the Region to Lithuania side and proved to be ineffective and too expensive and, at any rate, would hardly influence the Allies to decide in Lithuania's favour (Eidintas, et al., 1997 p. 92). After November 1922, Lithuania closed borders for exports and imposed food production embargo, these measures followed by inflation, price increase and workers layouts (Chandovoine, 2003 p. 58). Lithuania's economic pressure disappointed not only the Germans of the Region but also the Lithuanians (Chandovoine, 2003 p. 58). Lithuania resorted to restrictive trade regulations in an attempt to demonstrate the dependence of Region economic well-being on Lithuania.

Aftermath

After all, the attack on Klaipėda was short; it did claim several casualties, namely, 12 Lithuanians, 8 soldiers and 4 riflemen; 2 French soldiers and 1 German police officer (Zikaras, 2013 p. 213). 1 French officer, 7 soldiers and 15 German police officers taken as captives (Zikaras, 2013 p. 213). The Lithuanian Forces also seized three heavy machine guns and many rifles but later, all the arms returned to the French soldiers on oath that they would never be used against the Lithuanians (Zikaras, 2013 p. 213). Immediately after the revolt, Budrys gave orders to recruit local volunteers and the first week 300 of them joined The Klaipėda Region army, mostly for daily pay rather than for patriotic reasons (Vareikis, 2008 p. 199). Presence of locals in the ranks of insurgents was a strong propaganda tool to prove that Lithuania's volunteers were just helping the locals.

Although the role of the insurgents from Lithuania was obvious, the Lithuanian government, rebutting charges from Warsaw and Paris, claimed it had nothing to do

with the revolt (Eidintas, et al., 1997 p. 97). The French, however, spoke plainly, especially after the loss of several of their soldiers in Klaipėda (Eidintas, et al., 1997 p. 97). They wanted to crush “the insolent midget”, threatened to bombard Klaipėda and sweep Lithuanians into the sea, and Paris demanded that the Lithuanians immediately restored the *status quo ante* (Eidintas, et al., 1997 p. 97). The disobedient and tough insurgents, they played this role agreed before the revolt, took a hard stance. They even boldly bluffed and negotiated with the arrived Allied ships commanders, that lots of blood would be spilled if they risked to attack against 10.000 strength army (Chandovoine, 2003 p. 82). Britain also protested but refrained from direct threats (Eidintas, et al., 1997 p. 97). Poland’s attitude was therefore crucial. The Poles were constrained by threat of the Soviet or German invasion and weak Allied support limited themselves with strong protests (Eidintas, et al., 1997 p. 97). Germany’s relatively favourable view of the Lithuanian march on Klaipėda was obvious, in spite of official German protests (Chandovoine, 2003 p. 71). In the meantime, the Soviets denied their involvement in the action but continued a political pressure on Poland (Chandovoine, 2003 p. 72). Meanwhile, Kaunas was euphoric, and the success of the insurgents in Klaipėda inspired the Lithuanians, who had felt humiliated by the loss of Vilnius as well as by the Allies’ seemingly complete disregard of Lithuania and its interests (Eidintas, et al., 1997 p. 98).

On January 17, the Conference of Ambassadors sent a special commission to Klaipėda, which found no signs of disorder in the Region, but noted that Kaunas government is responsible for this *coup de force* (Chandovoine, 2003 p. 9). On January 19, the Supreme Committee for the Salvation of Lithuania Minor declared the attachment of the Klaipėda Region to Lithuania on an autonomous basis and asked the Lithuanian government for military and financial aid (Eidintas, 2017 p. 396). On January 24, the Lithuanian Seimas instructed the government to satisfy the aims of Lithuanians of Klaipėda. (Eidintas, 2017 p. 397).

In spite of these developments, on January 27 the Allied special commission ordered the insurgents to withdraw from Klaipėda (Eidintas, et al., 1997 p. 99). The insurgents refused, and the commission backed down (Chandovoine, 2003 p. 81). In contrast to the obstinate insurgents, the Lithuanian government sought to demonstrate a willingness to do everything to reach the agreement with the Allies (Chandovoine,

2003 pp. 86-91). According to the prepared scenario, the Lithuanian government acted as a mediator between the Allies and the “stubborn” insurgents.

On February 4, the Allies finally requested only that the transfer of the Klaipėda Region to Lithuania be orderly and not coerced (Eidintas, et al., 1997 p. 99). On February 11, Allied representatives even thanked the Lithuanian government for its help in finding a peaceful solution and ensuring that the authority of the Allies was not undermined (Eidintas, et al., 1997 p. 99). On February 17, 1923, the Conference of Ambassadors transferred sovereign rights over the Klaipėda Region to Lithuania, in essence legitimating the revolt (Eidintas, et al., 1997 p. 99). In the evening of the same day troops of the Lithuanian army officially marched into Klaipėda (Vareikis, 2008 p. 201). Two days later, the French 21st Alpine Rifle Battalion, the Extraordinary Commission of the Conference of Ambassadors and the former Commissar Petisne left Klaipėda on a ship (Vareikis, 2008 p. 201).

Negotiations to regulate the terms of the region’s incorporation into Lithuania dragged on for some time. In May 1924, the complicated diplomatic battle ended with the signing of Klaipėda Convention and Statute (Eidintas, et al., 1997 p. 99). The Lithuanians considered the result a major victory, Petras Klimas, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, later wrote, that the youthful diplomats defeated “the old foxes of diplomacy” (Eidintas, et al., 1997 p. 99). As American historian A.E. Senn stated, that ‘the revolt was boldest Lithuania’s foreign political step of the interwar period’ (Senn, 1966 p. 108).

In 1939, the Nazis took Klaipėda under German rule once again, but this fact does not reduce the importance of the revolt of 1923, because after World War II Klaipėda would have big chance to become a part of Kaliningrad district of Russia (Tomkus, 2018).

Conclusions

The Klaipėda revolt conducted in 1923 was a hybrid operation; planned, prepared and executed by Lithuania to annex the Klaipėda Region and to gain access to the Baltic Sea. Lithuania used military and non-military as well as covert and overt ways and means, including propaganda and disinformation, economic pressure, and deployment of irregular armed groups and kept stand by regular units to achieve its end. The occupation of the Klaipėda Region was one of the essential factors that

shaped a young country, although it violated international agreements. Lithuanians gained more confidence and many were inspired to march to liberate Vilnius.

The Lithuania's Prime Minister Galvanauskas was a political leader of the revolt, perhaps risky adventurists and opportunist, who boldly took decisions at proper time and executed an aggressive plan. His secret and multi-layered plan had never been disclosed during Lithuania's interwar independence period, but the cover up story, about revolted local Lithuanians with limited Lithuania's help, is a perfect example of disinformation. Involved Lithuanian diplomats showed high-level skills while balancing between interdicting interests of the regional actors in a rapidly changing situation. They managed to maintain a diplomatic attitude towards the Allies (France, the United Kingdom) during overt negotiations, ignored Poland's interests, and denied Lithuania's involvement in the revolt to avoid international condemning or direct confrontation. They granted covert tacit support of Germany and the Soviet Union, the countries who had own interests in the Klaipėda Region. Political success would not be possible without the involvement of local Lithuanian political activists in the Klaipėda Region, their activity in the Supreme Committee for the Salvation of Lithuania Minor, which helped to legitimize the occupation of Klaipėda.

Lithuania maintained good situational awareness due to intensive intelligence operations in the Klaipėda Region. The costly propaganda campaign gave results by increased locals' support of unifying the Klaipėda Region with Lithuania.

The fighters of the Klaipėda revolt were Lithuanian citizens. The Special Task Force, a non-regular unit, formed in Lithuania, consisted of civilian dressed regular soldiers, commanded by officers and supported by Lithuanian riflemen and civilian volunteers. After a successful military territory seizure operation, the insurgents performed their role as a tough force, which facilitated negotiations for the Lithuanian diplomats. Subsequently recruited local volunteers were used for propaganda purposes to promote story about revolted locals.

Economic pressure, closure of borders and denying of food supplies did not give the expected results to show the Klaipėda Region dependency on Lithuania, rather it served as a source of antipathy and dissatisfaction.

The Klaipėda revolt case is an interesting historical event showing an early employment of hybrid warfare. Certain elements of this operation may be used for the national and NATO exercises scenarios to reflect crafty and innovative opposing forces. For further researches, it is recommended to compare this case of the early XX century to the recent case, like the occupation of Ukrainian Crimea by the Russian Federation, to identify its similarities and differences.

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Impact of the Black Sea Region on the Security of NATO's Eastern Flank

Introduction

> *'NATO's Eastern Flank is the most vulnerable sector of the Alliance, one that is increasingly exposed to penetration, subversion, and military probing by a revisionist Russia'* (Hodges, et al., 2019).

Being one of the most complex regions of the world in many aspects, the Black Sea has always been an area of confrontation between great powers. Collapse of the Soviet Union made confrontations less intense. However, Russian invasion in Georgia and subsequent annexation of Crimea served as the ground for NATO to make relevant efforts for its increased presence in the region. NATO's initiative agreed at the Warsaw Summit regarding increase of presence was decisive and designed to maintain balance of force, improve deterrence capabilities and facilitate regional stability. NATO responded to annexation of Crimea with speed and decisiveness. NATO Summits in Wales, Warsaw, and Brussels allowed the Alliance to transit from assurance to deterrence along NATO's Eastern flank, from the Baltic to the Black Sea (Hodges, et al., 2019).

As Russia attempts to establish itself as the dominant actor in the Black Sea, understanding its objectives and taking adequate countermeasures is fundamental for ensuring stability of this region which, in turn, affects the entire Eastern flank to a great extent.

Speaking generally, annexation of the Crimean Peninsula shifted balance of power in the Black Sea region in Russia's favour. Active militarization and build-up of A2/AD (Anti-Access/Area-Denial) challenges NATO's power projection capabilities in the Black Sea, Eastern Mediterranean and beyond. Clear, robust and coherent plan for addressing vulnerabilities is required for NATO in order to avoid continued aggressive actions of Russia in the region (Hodges, et al., 2019). Since Crimean episode, the scope of Russian military presence in the Black Sea reaches the point where it can not be balanced with a sole country by itself.

Recent developments suggest a thesis that **currently, Black Sea region is the most vulnerable section of NATO's Eastern flank.**

This paper will argue that it is essential for NATO, and more specifically for the littoral NATO member and partner states of the region, to achieve common consensus on the utmost importance of regional coherence, which currently represents the weakest segment. Inadequate assessment of the importance of strengthening Black Sea security, combined with the lack of common threat perception and equal commitment by littoral states, will encourage the adversary to employ this soft spot to act even more rapidly and decisively than during 2008 and 2014 events. Moreover, failure to further gain and maintain superiority in the Black Sea will eventually affect the security of NATO's entire Eastern flank.

Thus, the aim of this paper is to analyse vulnerabilities and propose unified approach and common actions by NATO member and partner states towards ensuring shared security, using experience of Nordic-Baltic part of the Eastern flank.

Main interrelated research questions of the paper: why is Black Sea vital for Russia? What are main challenges faced by NATO in the region? Are existing means of deterrence enough?

This paper consists of the introductory part and three subsequent sections: the Introduction presents the subject, purpose and structure. First section reviews Russian interests, intentions, build-up and strategy in the Black Sea. Second section focuses on the importance of Baltic-Black sea coherence for NATO's Eastern flank security, adequacy of existing means of deterrence (EFP/TFP) and necessity of common threat perception and commitment. Last section provides conclusions as a summary of various sources.

Russia in the Black Sea: Importance, interests and build-up

Importance of the Black Sea for Russia

> *'In many respects, the wider Black Sea region is of even greater strategic value to Moscow than the Baltic region because the Kremlin has shown willingness to use force more readily there than anywhere else along NATO's Eastern Flank'* (Hodges, et al., 2019).

It has become a conventional knowledge that overall strategic goal of Russia in the Black Sea region is to preserve and increase influence at all costs and limit the presence of foreign countries / military alliances. Russia considers Black Sea as vital component of its security, political and economic interests. Restoring influence over Ukraine and Georgia and preventing them from integration with EU and NATO is the most important element of Russian strategy in the region. Military presence in the Black Sea and South Caucasus is a tool for Russia to achieve its broad strategic goals and limit access of NATO in the wider region. Various "soft power", economic and energy levers are used for influence.

Black Sea shall not be viewed as just another contested area between NATO and Russia. Since various geopolitical interests overlap here, it shall be deemed as a bridge between Europe, Asia and Middle East. With land and maritime domains, it is viewed in the wider context of interdependence between the Black, Caspian and Mediterranean basins, whereby making itself of utmost importance for Russia (Turkish Straits primarily, as the gateway to eastern Mediterranean and a tool to capture energy markets of South-East Europe) (Flanagan, et al., 2019).

Besides local geostrategic goals, Black Sea is considered by Russia to be an essential place of competition with the West, and US in the first place. Russia strives for domination in the region, as evidenced by multiple usage of military force since 2008. Russia gained strategic territorial advantages through annexation of Crimea, created a military bastion and significantly increased its exclusive economic zone – with the purpose of retaining *status quo* in the region against foreign countries (Flanagan, et al., 2019).

Russia gained an offshore gas-rich exclusive zone through Crimea’s annexation. As indicated in the Report by Ukraine’s Ministry of Energy, Ukraine lost 80% of its oil and gas deposits. Western energy companies were withdrawn. Romania is now *de facto* bordering Russia at sea (Joja, 2020).

As a general attitude, Russia asserts control over its near abroad and deters NATO from the region (Gvelesiani, et al., 2018). Maintaining control over post-soviet area is a part of Russia’s geostrategic ambitions through frozen conflicts, destabilizing of political, military, and economic situation in its neighborhood and creating security dilemmas easy to provoke and escalate into armed conflicts (Gvelesiani, et al., 2018).

As 2019 US DoD White Paper states, simultaneous employment of military and non-military means by Russia deters the Allies prior to hostilities. In more pessimistic view, Russia will never tolerate NATO at its southern border, as it made clear at several occasions, having experience of being forced to observe NATO's expansion into Baltic States (US DoD, 2019).

Russia views the Black Sea not only as a transit corridor for goods and energy resources, but as an access to Mediterranean, where its role has been growing significantly recently. For example, without logistic supply network operated from Black Sea fleet bases, Russia would not be able to conduct its military operations in Syria. NATO's eastern expansion and military exercises in the Black Sea is also viewed as a threat. Therefore, reaction through enhanced military force is another mandatory response by Russia to maintain strategic balance with NATO. Annexation of Crimea was a logical defensive step, and its possession further facilitated creation and modernization of an effective base for Russian fleet. Crimea ensures advance of Russian border and coverage of most of the Black Sea. Moreover, documentation related to naval policies/doctrines often mentions Black Sea as an area of strategic importance together with the Arctic, Caspian Sea and the Mediterranean. Russia's Naval Doctrine emphasises on the link between Black Sea and Mediterranean region. Enhancement of Black Sea Fleet capabilities and development of combined group of armed forces in Crimea is often referred to as a tool for prevention of conflicts and building strategic deterrence (Kuimova, et al., 2018).

Military build-up

In terms of A2/AD, as a tool to deny foreign forces freedom of movement, substantial deployment of new military equipment raises increased concerns over intentions of Russian build-up. First of six planned KILO-class upgraded submarines and first of six planned Admiral Grigorivich class frigates were supplied to Black Sea fleet in 2015-2016, as an addition to sophisticated A2/AD, with their long-range anti-ship missiles and long-range land-attack cruise missiles (Anastasov, 2018). Russian anti-ship cruise missiles can now cover the entire Black Sea, and defensive missile systems cover about 40–50 percent of the sea (Flanagan, et al., 2019). Land-based weapons deployed in Crimea are quite impressive and include Bal system with Kh-35U missiles (120 km range). In 2016, S-400 surface-to-air missile system was deployed in Crimea, followed by second in 2018. Through S-400 (400 km range), Russia covers most part

of the Black Sea from Crimea. Su-24 and Su-30SM combat aircrafts and Ka-27/29 helicopters have also been deployed (Kuimova, et al., 2018). Long-range land-based anti-air and anti-ship systems - S-400 SAM and Bastion-P coastal defence system are in place. After Kerch Strait incident, Russia added fifth battalion of S-400 (Dzhankoi) to the already existing four battalions. S-300 SAM and Pantsir-S1 point defence system compliments to the above. Survivability is ensured by mobility of the transporter erector launchers and other associated equipment (Petersen, 2019).
Modernization of the obsolete Black See fleet commenced shortly after 2014, as apparently driven by perception of threat from NATO, although naval presence in Mediterranean served as another reason for the Black See fleet's renewal, from which most modern vessels were later assigned to Mediterranean force. As of mid-2018, in addition to outdated (Soviet era) ships, the fleet included six new submarines, three new large frigates armed with Kalibr land-attack cruise missiles and one corvette armed with Kalibr missiles. More vessels are reported to be produced (3 frigates, 13 corvettes and 2 landing ships) (Kuimova, et al., 2018).

Enhanced military posture in the Black Sea region, military campaign in Syria, tense relationship with another littoral Black Sea state (Turkey) is a potential source of further instability in the wider region. As experts suggested at the 2019 Black Sea and Balkans Security Forum, we are in the new era of competition between great powers. Russia will attempt to force NATO into asymmetric game. Although, challenging Russia with military means only would mean to accept Russian rules of the game, lack a long-term political strategy and lead to escalation with a state which possesses most of the advantages. The West shall change the rules of the game and develop its own approach to hybrid war (Black Sea and Balcans Security Forum, 2019), as the increased military build-up around Black Sea by Russia, more military forces in Crimea and modernization of the Black Sea fleet, along with increased military presence in South Caucasus, is a clear indication of Russia's long-term plans (Melvin, 2018). Turkey can no longer be considered as dominant; Russian domination in the Black Sea is back (Petersen, 2019).

To summarize, with Crimean campaign and deployment of strong military force (ground, naval, and air components), Russia solved the task of becoming dominant naval force in Black Sea to some extent. Crimean episode clearly indicates the utmost importance of the region for Russia in many respects, and identifies its long-term plans

beyond. Therefore, the importance of power balance in the Black Sea for the Alliance, and even importance of unquestionable superiority as a deterrent, shall not be neglected and underestimated, with Russia repeatedly showing its will and readiness to enter into confrontations in this vulnerable region.

Baltic-Black sea coherence, common threat perceptions and commitments

Tailored Forward Presence

> *'By eliminating the distinction between EFP and TFP and also adopting a common regional threat assessment, NATO can further an approach of "one threat, one flank, one presence" to secure its Eastern Flank'* (Hodges, et al., 2019).

Bilateral and multilateral military cooperation of Baltic and Black Sea countries originated since 1990s. Geographical proximity and common threat created the basis for cooperation (Daborowski, et al., 2012). Insecurity in the Black Sea region can be compared to the situation in the Baltic Sea area, where common threat perception is shared by littoral, both NATO member and partner states, which nevertheless have active regional cooperation and manage to successfully address Russian military build-up in Kaliningrad. Russian military developments in the Baltics drives Western attention away from the Black Sea, where non-NATO states experience permanent threats and even invasions (Joja, 2019). Although challenges and opportunities in the Baltic and Black Sea regions differ, adequate coherence across them is needed for NATO in order to establish a well balanced united front of deterrence against possible Russian aggression. NATO's presence in the Black Sea is increased in order to deter Russia, assure Allies and assist partners, although some experts still believe that much more efforts shall still be taken to improve deterrence and defence capabilities to achieve more regional stability and ensure effective collective posture (Hodges, et al., 2019).

This section focuses mainly on the NATO's Tailored Forward Presence (tFP). However, a few aspects of Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP) should be highlighted: Fully deployed in June 2017, the EFP comprises multinational forces from framework nations and other contributing Allies on a voluntary, rotational basis. EFP comprises four battalion-size battlegroups, at all times presented in host countries. Battlegroups are under NATO command, through Multinational Corps Northeast Headquarters

(Szczecin, Poland), Poland. Multinational Division Northeast Headquarters (Elblag, Poland) coordinates training and preparation activities of battlegroups (NATO, 2019).

Although being a small presence, EFP's role is very significant and visible; strategic communication and proactive planning is required for possible need to strengthen EFP (e.g. to brigade level units) during crisis. It is necessary that EFP is backed by follow-on forces. It is also needed to ensure better coherence between EFP and other forms of Allied presence in the region (Stoicescu, et al., 2019).

As for TFP, it was established in the Black Sea region at NATO Warsaw summit. At land, TFP is built around Romanian-led multinational brigade (Craiova). Several Allies reinforced Romania's and Bulgaria's efforts to protect NATO airspace. Turkey is involved through maritime patrol aircraft flights and support to NATO Airborne Warning & Control System aircraft. TFP contributes to the NATO's deterrence and defence posture, situational awareness, interoperability and responsiveness. Also, NATO's rapid reinforcement strategy ensures that forward presence forces are reinforced by NATO's Very High Readiness Joint Task Force, the broader NATO Response Force, additional high readiness forces and NATO's heavier follow-on forces, as required (NATO, 2019). Besides, TFP represents a mean to monitor Russian A2/AD capabilities in and around the region (Day, 2018).

TFP is considered as a diplomatic success for Bucharest, pushing for NATO forces on its territory since around 4000 alliance troops were moved to Poland and Baltics. Besides, TFP serves as an attempt within Black Sea deterrence strategy to counter Russia's plans to create the so-called buffer zone in the region.

As TFP in the Black Sea region is apparently viewed by Russia as a weaker deterrent as compared to Enhanced Forward Presence in the Baltics. NATO's overall regional defence and deterrence posture should be reinforced evenly across entire eastern flank. (Hodges, et al., 2019).

More NATO capabilities and presence is needed in the Black Sea Region to counter A2/AD in Crimea. With regard to NATO focus, Black Sea has played second fiddle to the Baltic Sea recently, and this is slowly changing. NATO should not choose between the Baltic Sea and Black Sea and prioritize any of them, but rather focus on both. *'As*

a collective security alliance, NATO is obligated to defend Varna in the same way it does Vilnius' (Coffey, 2020).

Despite improvements, certain gaps still exist in some domains in terms of deterrence capabilities. Difference between EFP in Baltics/Poland and TFP in Black Sea can be presented as an example of a gap. Although at present TFP includes Multinational Brigade Southeast in Craiova, Multinational Division Southeast headquarters in Bucharest, and Multinational Corps Southeast headquarters in Sibiu, only a Polish company is deployed in Craiova and no other Allied troops are present. Sending troops in Craiova on a rotational base shall be considered by other Allies as well.

Russia's defensive posture is in fact aimed at supporting offensive aims. Baltic defence is boosted by European Reassurance Initiative (ERI) and NATO's Enhanced Forward Presence. Due to the lack of adequate force to repel an attack on their own, a hopeless position may occur without rapid rescue from heavier reinforcements (Dalsjö, et al., 2019).

Taking Crimean developments as a precedent, Moscow could formally annex the occupied territories to Russia and, from its perspective, bring them under Russia's nuclear umbrella at least nominally. Subsequent NATO counterattack (aimed at liberating Baltic states) could be translated into invasion of Russia and enable Moscow to initiate unpredictable escalatory dynamics (Shlapak & Johnson, 2016). NATO's tripwire deterrence is heavily depended on deployment of Alliance reinforcements from the center to periphery on short notice. Through effective use of A2/AD capabilities Russia can easily outmatch NATO forces by simply denying freedom of movement to and inside the area. Russia is in the process of forming variety of A2/AD systems in and around Baltic Sea region, Black Sea, Eastern Mediterranean and Barents Sea. After becoming operational, such systems can limit NATO's ability to reinforce allies by land, air and sea (Day, 2018).

In the very broad context, one can imagine three scenarios of conflict between Russia and NATO: total conflict, regional conflict in the Nordic-Baltic and/or Black Sea areas, and a limited incursion into NATO territory. EFP shall play vital role in the third scenario. The form of limited incursion and how it would look like is quite difficult to predict (probably an action with relatively restricted forces and goals), however the

basis of the deterrence shall be formed by the readiness of EFP and local forces (Stoicescu, et al., 2019).

To improve coherence, higher levels of readiness, capabilities and improvements will be required in several areas, e.g. mobility (higher than of the adversary), cyber defence; intelligence-sharing; interoperability, air and missile defence for the entire theatre; mission command capability in the Black Sea region, similar to the one offered by Germany in the Baltic Sea; common air and maritime picture; countering disinformation; continued diplomatic pressure; ways to improve maritime capabilities of Allies and Partners in Black and Baltic Sea regions. Coherence will require speed in recognition of Russian plans and actions, in decision-making at all levels on the basis of common definition of aggression, and in assembling to prevent/respond to crisis. Coherence shall mean a unified effort to deter aggression in all domains: land, air, maritime, cyber and information. Coherence shall be reflected e.g. in inter-governmental coordination, infrastructure improvements, intelligence-sharing.

Different Threat Perceptions and Interests

Although as declared at NATO Brussels Summit, NATO reaffirms its decisions towards Russia agreed at previous summits, continues to respond to weaker security environment through enhancing deterrence, including by forward presence in the Alliance's Eastern part (NATO, 2018), several challenges are caused by insufficient unity in perceiving and responding to Russia's policy, strategy and posture; in other words - different threat perceptions (Hodges, et al., 2019).

> *'Unable to agree that Russia is a shared threat, Black Sea countries neither cooperate nor attract outside support to deter Russian aggression. A common threat assessment of NATO members and partners is the key to a stable Black Sea. Only by exploring common ground and working towards shared deterrence can they enhance regional security'* (Joja, 2019).

Lack of common threat perception, similar to the one the Nordic-Baltic states share, is the main challenge to cooperation between Black Sea states. Different interests make it difficult to establish a unified strategy to counter Russian influence. For example: Romania is more concerned about developments in the north-east of Ukraine and Moldova; Bulgaria is focused on developments more to the south - Turkey, migration from Syria, radical Islamist threat. Both being members of NATO and EU, these

countries sometimes differ in their interests and goals. Apparently, Romania is actively blocking Russian influence in the region, while Bulgaria is often subjected to Russian pressure (Flanagan, et al., 2019).

Arguments exist that key EU and European NATO governments do not show adequate interest towards Black Sea regional security. Some argue that the UK, Germany and France are more worried and focused on ongoing crisis such as migration, Brexit, conflicts in Middle East and Africa and pay less interest to concerns of south Eastern European countries. Certain lack of common threat perception also results from different views of Western European countries towards Black Sea region, as to whether it is an integral part of Europe, or just EU's neighbourhood (Flanagan, et al., 2019).

Official Ankara has long preferred not to allow NATO getting involved into the Black Sea, but considering Russian-Turkish escalation, Turkey might insist for more NATO involvement in the Black Sea. Turkey views Black Sea as more of a national issue and not a NATO issue, therefore is often hesitant and cautious of major NATO initiatives in the Black Sea. In Bulgaria, certain political differences are in place regarding NATO's role in the Black Sea, although Bulgaria mostly supports NATO presence. *'Lack of common picture by NATO's Black Sea members makes it more difficult for the Alliance to develop a comprehensive strategy*' (Coffey, 2020);

Turkey's national interests and President Erdogan's personal political goals shall be considered as well. Crimea's annexation resulted in Turkey to step down from the position of dominant naval force in the Black Sea, supplemented by deployment of significant amount of Russian forces in Syria and Russia's ambitions to play dominant role in Syrian endgame. Deployment of the S-400 could also put Turkey on a path to further cooperation with Russia. Another concern is Turkey's growing dependence on Russian natural gas, making it more difficult to counterbalance Russian influence in the region (Flanagan, et al., 2019).

In the Black Sea, security policy is not fully agreed even between NATO members. Romania supported Black Sea "westernization", Bulgaria tended towards maintaining "peace and love" with Russia. Turkey and Bulgaria often side with Russia in some matters, despite being members of NATO (Joja, 2019). Overall picture is further affected by East-West divide in military capabilities. Dated equipment of former

Eastern Bloc states are far from those of Western NATO states. (Flanagan, et al., 2019).

Bulgaria's and Romania's cooperation in the Black See was primarily political rather than military. Their aim was to improve regional stability and create a platform for co-operation and communication between small/medium states (Romania, Bulgaria, Ukraine, Georgia) and dominant Black Sea states – Turkey and Russia. Romania views Russia as a threat over Moldova and potential problem-maker in the Black Sea through involvement in frozen conflicts in Transnistria and South Caucasus. Romania was calling for internationalization of the Black Sea region, more EU and US presence, whereby creating opportunity for the expansion of its own influence. This was the reason for Romania to support Georgia's and Ukraine's admission to NATO and Turkey's and Moldova's membership of EU. Another reason for such policy was Russia's withdrawal from the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.

If compared, Bulgaria's policy priority was to consolidate NATO and EU membership and support enlargement into Balkans and the Black Sea region (Daborowski, et al., 2012). However, Bulgaria did not support Romania's proposal to expand NATO naval exercises in the Black Sea. For its part, Turkey strives for maintaining *status quo* in the region as still being Russia's peer in naval power. Direct Russian threat is more severely perceived by two partner states Ukraine and Georgia and their policies are quite similar and more aligned than of NATO member Black Sea states - Turkey, Romania and Bulgaria (Flanagan, et al., 2019).

Another reason (although arguable) for challenges in crafting common strategy against Russian aggression is damaged perception of the West in certain states of the region, as chaotic international politics diminishes NATO/EU standing (Flanagan, et al., 2019).

A major "What if…" scenario emerges in the broader context: What if Russia occupied the seaport of Odessa and not only the seaports of Mariupol and Berdiansk? In this case, the scenario would be: Russia's occupation of Snake Island and deployment of Iskander Missile systems there, would constitute a *de facto* blockade of Odessa, also increase Romanian insecurity to a great extent. Russia would test NATO's willingness to deter threats against Romanian territorial integrity. Impact would include: NATO cohesion tested; slow economic death of Ukraine (followed by Moldova); further

escalation of conflict in Eastern Ukraine. No reaction from NATO would mean folding its flag in wider Black Sea region (Black Sea and Balcans Security Forum, 2019).

The process of strengthening NATO's eastern flank is far from over. A comprehensive strategy towards Russia based on unity, deterrence and resilience needs to be developed to complete the process. Unfinished business includes the still-existing problem of NATO member states being divided in their assessments of the Russian threat on the Eastern flank. Modest NATO deployments have questionable deterrence value. It is the perception of Southern member states that NATO's efforts towards their increased security is in contrast to its Eastern efforts, weakening sense of solidarity and cohesion (Dempsey, 2017). Besides, Disagreement between Alliance members over the scope and nature of the crisis may delay deployment of response forces (Cozad, 2018). NATO's efforts to strengthen its entire eastern flank will be successful only if current challenges in Black Sea (as in Baltics) are fully understood by all members, especially considering that the latter is more influenced by increased Russian activities since annexation of Crimea (Warsaw Institute, 2019).

By all accounts, annexation of Crimea - a strong forward defence point in the Black Sea - has affected regional balance of power dramatically. Russia is not bound by any agreements over limitation of its units deployed in Crimea and the planned expansion of force and capabilities in the peninsula makes future military balance even more unclear, therefore requiring immediate actions - increased focus on the entire region, projection of common strategy towards Russia, higher cooperation with partner states, more efforts towards improved coherence and unified deterrence.

Summary and Conclusions

General

2008 War in Georgia and 2014 annexation of Crimea clearly indicate that Russia's major ambition and a minimum precondition for achieving broader goals is to retain influence at least over North-East coast of the Black Sea through aggressive posture, at any cost. Russia aims to ensure its military, political, economic security by expanding "exclusive" sphere of influence, to eventually evolve from regional power into superpower and global influencer.

Therefore, it is vital for NATO to support definition of common goals and perceptions within member and partner Black Sea states and encourage collective goals in relation to Russia, to avoid gaps in deterrence. Russian aggression against its neighbours is the most imminent threat to peace and security in the Black Sea region and to NATO's effective deterrence. Taking into account the fragile regional security, Black Sea shall gain increased importance in the context of eastern flank security. It shall be the joint responsibility for littoral countries to acknowledge the importance of common threat perception and contribute to the overall stability with equal commitments, with same level of responsibility as North-East European countries share for Baltic Sea region.

There is a heated debate among security experts across the Euro-Atlantic area as to what credible deterrence and cohesion means in practice. It is obvious that Russia will decide to test NATO in Baltics or Black sea based on its assessment of the vulnerabilities in Eastern flank. It is not clear at this point if Russia sees more troops on the ground as a deterrent. However, the fact is that Russia follows its militarization plans and builds A2/AD in Kaliningrad, Crimea and Abkhazia to prevent quick Allied reinforcements in Eastern flank. It is hardly possible to predict Russia's plans with certainty. Thus, equal level of readiness for any possible contingency at any section of the flank shall be in place, without exceptions.

Suggestions

All Black Sea states shall be keen to contribute to NATO's efforts to enhance security and collective deterrence to counter Russia's military buildup and imminent threat of escalation. It is of critical importance for the Alliance to deliver unified countermeasures to Russia's actions in the Black Sea and its continuous attempts to undermine security.

Specific suggestions could include: increased number of regular joint military exercises and continued Allied presence on the ground, as an effective "show of will and force" and deterrent against existing and potential threats; Transition from assurance to deterrence and creation of reliable deterrent force-structure in the Black Sea; in this instance, deterrence may imply real war-fighting capability, together with the will to force the potential adversary to reconsider its policy; More integrated naval, land and areal assets and tailored approach for the Black and Baltic Seas, with integrated response forces and a more robust rotational presence; Creation of Theatre Command with relevant force structure to increase presence in the Black Sea;

Involvement of Ukraine and Georgia into Joint command, as a tool to re-establish credibility, capabilities and deterrence efforts in the Black Sea. In general, deterrence should be extended to Black Sea partner states by providing support through institutional arrangements and integration in overall deterrence architecture, while maintaining distinction between collective defence obligations and partnership; Establish Black Sea Maritime Patrol mission modelled based on Baltic Air Policing mission and NATO-certified Center of Excellence on Black Sea Security (although there is no precedent for such center in a non-member state, it could stress the importance of Black Sea for overall European security and provide opportunity for more dialogue and training).

Effective Black Sea strategy shall include more close cooperation and involvement of non-member states (Ukraine, Georgia) regularly suffering from direct Russian aggression. NATO shall find ways to overcome the challenge of existing restrictions over size, number and length of stay for non-Black Sea state ships, believed to be one of the major reasons for NATO's reduced presence.

To conclude, any further gap in cohesion and common threat perception would enable Russia to easily seek and employ weaknesses in the Black Sea region and act rapidly even more successfully, as compared to 2008 and 2014 events. The West should prioritize Black Sea as the primary area of possible confrontation and continue to support partner states' (Ukraine and Georgia) sovereignty, territorial integrity and membership aspirations, manage their expectations towards Alliance membership, while keeping them on realistic path. Meanwhile, try to prevent increased involvement of other actors, such as China, through offering infrastructure investment opportunities. Lastly, within NATO context, internal pressure shall be employed, as required, to prevent states from acting against collective interests and focusing more on personal goals.

As Secretary Stoltenberg stated during the Munich Security Conference 2020, *'Russia seeks to return to a world of spheres of influences; therefore, our joint answer must be more readiness, upholding sanctions and countering interferences in our democracies'* (Stoltenberg, 2020).

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