



# *Ad Securitatem*

The best essays written by students at the  
Baltic Defence College during 2014/15



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# Foreword

Academic writing at the Baltic Defence College plays a central role in the Joint Command and General Staff Course (JCGSC), Higher Command Studies Course (HCSC) and Civil Servants Course (CSC). Throughout the 2014/15 academic year, Baltic Defence College students have engaged in research and writing in areas related to operations, leadership, political and strategic studies, and beyond.

The consistently impressive, engaging and insightful writings the students have produced is testament to their hard work, determination and inquisitive minds. *Ad Securitatem* contains some of the best essays produced by students during the 2014/15 academic year. The booklet could have been twice as long and would still not fully demonstrate the range of topics engaged with by our students. At its current length I hope it provides an introduction to the academic research and writing being undertaken by JCGSC, HCSC and CSC students at the Baltic Defence College.

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# **How is peace-building implemented most effectively?**

**LTC Goran Topalovic**

## **Introduction**

Peace-building is defined by ex UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali as 'action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid relapse into conflict' (Barnett, 2007, p 35). But, according to statistics 'nearly 50 percent of all countries receiving assistance slide back into conflict within five years, and 72 percent of peace-building operations leave in place authoritarian regimes' (Paul, 2003, p 233). Since the process is becoming less and less efficient, the question can be posed: What has gone wrong? Is the problem due to the concept, implementation, or due to misidentification of critical issues to be addressed in order to rebuild the peace on a solid foundation? This essay will assert that gender roles, if they are considered more seriously, can vastly contribute to the peace-building process. My main argument is that heeding gender roles could play a significant role in support of the peace-building process, raise the level of operational effectiveness in the field, improve situational awareness, and thus safety and security of our own forces. My second argument is that in order to achieve this, military personnel has to undergo appropriate training before deploying.

Before delving into discussion of we need to understand what is meant by peace-building. A crucial piece of information when one speaks about peace-building is that peace-building is an external intervention. In other words, peace-building is planned and conducted by someone who is not familiar, or not familiar enough, with the local culture, tradition, habits, conviction and beliefs. Peace-building is understood here as a process

which lasts after a conflict is over, until host nation institutions are able to take over full responsibilities of the wellbeing of their own citizens. Several officials and thinkers argue that peace-building is over as soon as a conflict is over. For example ex-USA President George W. Bush at the conclusion of Operation Iraqi freedom stated 'we don't do nation building' (George W. Bush, 2003). Yet, this approach is too narrow.

As argued above, peace-building should restore conditions for peace and stability and enhance people's ability to deal with crisis and rebuild society (Kristellys, 2010).

It is often discussed whether this should be a job for the military at all. However, it is often only the intervening militaries that could achieve such tasks in a volatile post-conflict situation. This brings us back to the gender roles, which, of late, gender roles have become a 'specific security concern' (BI-SCD, 2012, p 3), One of the major tasks of peacebuilding forces is to ensure protection of the most vulnerable in the society and learning about the gender roles in that society could greatly enhance our understanding of who needs protection.

In order to advance these arguments, the first part of this Essay will be dedicated to gender roles in general and why they matter. The second part will examine why peace-building is implemented more effectively if gender roles are considered, while the final part of this essay will pinpoint some bad examples and recommendations when we are talking about implementation of gender perspectives into military operations, paying special attention to education and training. In the second and third part of the essay the concerns of the critics of incorporation of gender dimension will be addressed, such as that gender roles are just a tool to easily gain political support and ethical justification for military operations and actions abroad in the Western society.

## Why gender matters

Since the very beginning of its adoption into official UN language, the word *gender*<sup>1</sup> has been misinterpreted. It is therefore important to explain this term before going into deeper discussion. First, we should distinguish between “gender” and “sex”. “Sex” refers to biological differences between a man and woman; whereas “gender” refers to socially constructed role among individuals divided by sex, age or some other characteristics and can thus vary from society to society.

There are thus many gender categories, and military personnel are expected to deal with at least those: man, woman, boys and girls. Gender roles are formed for each category depending on how each role is expected to behave (according to law, culture, tradition, beliefs, convictions, etc.) and how to behave (limitations, rights, obligations, duties, etc.). For example, woman in Slovakia and Pakistan have the same sex but perform gender roles differently. The issue can also be applied chronologically: an English woman born in the 17<sup>th</sup> century will have different gender roles from woman born in the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

As seen from these examples, gender roles change through time and space and are unique for each society. By understanding gender roles, one can be in a better position to interpret the conflict itself and better plan actions aimed at addressing the needs of real victims. As soon as we understand that our culture, tradition and beliefs build lenses through which we see the world around us, blinding us to some important issues, the sooner we will understand that same construction material is not used everywhere in the world. Our actions should be gender sensitive in order not to work against us or against someone that we should protect. Ultimately, gender roles must be considered in order to protect basic (fundamental) human rights and the protection of victims.

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<sup>1</sup> Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing, 1995

Gender roles are sometimes a question of life and death, freedom or slavery, humiliation or decent life. The most important issue is the fact that neglecting gender roles could cause more damage than good, both for us and for someone else. This can be better understood from the following example:

While operating in Afghanistan<sup>2</sup>, the British contingent Officer in Charge (OiC) decided that an equal amount of money should be reimbursed to the locals for every life lost as a consequence of combat operations conducted by British troops the area. Previously, larger amounts were allocated for adults than for children. Led by ethical reasoning (a life is a life) the OiC allocated the same amount for both categories. Suddenly, the OiC was faced with an increased number of female children being reported as collateral victims of combat operations between British troops and the Taliban. Girls were brought by family members, usually parents, in front of the main gate of the compound, with shots being fired in the back. Parents then claimed reimbursement for them. It was obvious that female children were more valuable dead than alive to them.

Consequently, gender roles must be analysed in order to better understand society as a whole, the root causes of the conflict, and to better identify which measures should be applied during the process of peace-building addressing particular gender category while having in mind that each of them are stricken by the conflict in different way. In other words, gender perspectives must be incorporated in all our plans, actions and tasks in order to be able to fulfil our missions.

Peter Lee named one of the chapters in his book "gendering war" while speaking about 'Afghanistan high authority intention to firstly sacrifice

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<sup>2</sup> This example was presented by chief of the British Stabilisation Unit in Afghanistan during the Building Integrity Course for Senior Officials at UK Defence Academy from 13 to 15 March 2013.

women's rights for sake of peace with Taliban' (Lee, 2014). This is an example of social interactions being influenced by gender roles and how important they are for local communities.

Even if it is obvious that, now when coalition troops are about to be withdrawn, peace with Taliban should be established, it should not be established at any price. I want to say that we have duty and requirement to interfere with the local culture if the aim is to protect basic human rights and values.

Incorporation of gender perspectives is important for us, for the affected population and it is easy to incorporate it if we want it. When we are about to build a school in Afghanistan and we think of gender perspectives in our plans, the only condition must be posed to the local community is that access to the school and education is granted to girls as well as boys.

### **Why peace-building is implemented most effectively if gender roles are considered**

As stated in the previous section, without an understanding of gender roles, we are not able to completely understand core values of particular societies and address the need of the victims properly. Women and children are particularly vulnerable, not because they are weak, but because their gender roles limit their access to the public domain. They usually remain "invisible", their wounds do not hurt much, they are just numbers and only when these numbers become drastic do we (the international community) decide to get involved. According to UN data, all conflicts that have been conducted from 1945 to 1998 have resulted in a total number of victims of about 80 million. In deeper analysis, more than 90 percent of the victims are civilians. Going further, a greater percentage



of the victims were women and children than soldiers. It seems that the safest place to be during war is in military.

According to UN data, 93,9% of Liberian women were victims of gender based violence<sup>3</sup> during the civil wars in that country. More than 70% of the 93,9% were raped, turned into sexual slaves or forced to become prostitutes. Sexually based violence has become a weapon of war, which is fortunately now recognized as a war crime and is listed under the Rome Statute's list of crimes for which the International Criminal Court has authority. It is, however, important to note that recognizing sex crimes as a war crime by international community started only after some cases of mass men's rape during the civil war in Bosnia and Hercegovina from 1991 to 1995.

These examples emphasize the importance to look at conflict from victim's perspective and understand their special needs. In that respect, the DDR<sup>4</sup> process is very important. This process is aimed to identify ex combatants, collect their weapons and help them to reintegrate into society. The identification process is followed by giving them some reimbursement for each weapon that they hand over. Additional training is offered to them as well. Majority of projects realised by peace-building mission are aimed to give them an alternative job from which they can earn a living. In other words, the task is to take from them one form of power (weapon) and give them another form of power (economic).

While this is important for stopping violence this process ignores the victims and their perspectives. Until recently, women did not qualify for this process unless they took a direct part in the hostilities. Eventually, this was also recognized as an issue and UN Resolution 1325 also

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<sup>3</sup> Gender based violence is all kind of violence based on differences among the gender categories. For example domestic violence and all kind of sexual based violence as well.

<sup>4</sup> Disarmament, Demobilisation, Repatriation, Reintegration and (or) Resettlement

addresses this problem. Women should be entitled to participate to this process, whether as dependants of ex-fighters or as women who were forced to join organized armed groups. This will allow women to be provided with an opportunity to acquire new skills and confidence. One cannot build peace successfully if they do not consider this issue seriously. Even more, they should aim their efforts of fighting discrimination that existed in the society prior to the conflict, because all bad things that happened during the conflict existed prior to it and only became more visible during the crisis. By neglecting this aspect one will just strengthen discrimination among the different gender categories and serves to perpetuate victimization. The best way to do this is to identify specific needs, address them and serve as a role model for promoting gender equality.

As previously stated this is extremely easy to do. I personally experienced this during my deployment to the Ivory Coast as a military observer. I was appointed at the team site *Man*, close to the Liberian border for almost seven months in 2009, when a female officer from Ethiopia came to serve with us. We performed a common patrol in one village which some of us had previously visited several times. As a part of preparation for the patrol, we read previous reports and realised that no security concerns were reported by the Chief of the village for the last couple of years. Upon reaching the village we looked for the Chief and started to fill questionnaire. Suddenly, some local women approached to us and spoke to my female colleague. Next moment I was able to speak to them and ask them the same questions that had been posed to the Chief previously. Contrary to Chief's answers, they reported some serious security concerns. Some of reports involved women that were killed when passing through certain areas, while some of them were raped. The problem was that the UN had built water pump in a remote place, requiring the women to walk three kilometres through a wooded area in order to get to the

water. This was not previously reported, as male members of society did not see it as a concern since they were not affected. Thanks to my female colleague I was able to identify this issue and address it to higher command who reacted promptly by building a new water pump next to the village. This is a simple example how promotion of gender equality can influence our effectiveness and why gender roles should be treated as specific security concerns.

But one need to have in mind another approach as well which claims that actualization of gender roles in the recent time in the Western society is just the way to justify something which cannot be based on national or international law. It can be said that there are enormous examples which could be used to prove this statement. One of the leaders in this field was ex-British Prime Minister, Tony Blair. Due to lack of more reliable arguments he frequently used gender based arguments in order to gain political points and public support for military operations. This was a significant part of his speeches wherever UK forces intervene abroad during his mandates. For example, after the NATO campaign was launched against ex-Federal Republic of Yugoslavia<sup>5</sup>, he stated on 24 April 1999: 'the full extent of the horrific repression by Serb forces in Kosovo is only emerging now. There has been organized systematic rape of women, usually in front of husbands and children' (Blair, 1999)<sup>6</sup>.

Of course, this statement was given without any evidence, but served as a justification for intervention since that campaign was conducted without UN Security Council Resolution. From such or similar cases could be seen how, so called "protagonists of gender equality" are trying to exploit population sensitivity to gender based violence. But this should not discourage us from future work on incorporation of gender perspective,

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<sup>5</sup> Air campaign was launched on 24 March 1999

<sup>6</sup><http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20040621031906/http://number10.gov.uk/page1300>

even more, this should be kept in mind in order to be prepared to react properly.

Another demand posed by incorporation of gender perspectives serves as an enabler for many other requirements that are supposed to be fulfilled and that is increasing number of women involved in peace-building operations. Besides serving as role models for local communities, they are able to identify specific needs of affected populations, particularly women, and how to resolve them. Positive effects of using Mixed Engagement Teams (MET)<sup>7</sup> in Afghanistan are clearly visible, simply because now teams in the field are able to speak with both local men and women. This significantly contributed to the situational awareness and security in the field for both local community and our troops.

Having in mind everything previously mentioned, peace-building will be much more successful if we tuned up our sensors more for this specific issue. Of course, there is always a question to what extent military should deal with this. There is no right answer for that, but definitely much more than we are dealing with now. We should realize that this would increase a level of our operational effectiveness in the field, allowing achieving easier our mission and forming better foundation for sustained and long lasting peace.

## **Implementation of gender perspectives – challenges and recommendations**

'The only thing harder than getting a new idea into the military mind is to get an old one out'<sup>8</sup> (Liddell-hart, 1944)

So far this Liddell-Hart's thought can be identified as the biggest challenge, but of course it is not the only one. Peace-building is always a

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<sup>7</sup> Small military unit composed of men and women

<sup>8</sup> Sir Basil H. Liddell-hart, Thoughts on War, 1944

multinational project and includes people with different educational, training and cultural background. A common language is difficult to find, even for most commonly used terms where very often the term peace-building itself is understood differently. This is why education and training becomes a key to success.

But, since training and education are national responsibilities, they depend on the sending nation and usually military personnel do not receive gender training before deploying. We are witnessing that while some nations have developed specialised centres to educate and train their personnel on gender issues, others have not included a single module in their training and education system. This is the main problem with having the training and education strictly under TCC and TCN<sup>9</sup> responsibilities.

There are a lot of bad examples of how implementation of gender perspectives should not be conducted. I will mention two which reflect the most commonly practised approach. There are a lot of states who are trying to reach “percentage” without quality. For example, India was the first country that sent all-women Formed Police Units (FPU) to one PSO<sup>10</sup>. However, this was performed for the sake of being first. In order to be first, India announced its intention for deployment of the all-women unit in September 2006, with deployment occurring in January 2007. The haste in deploying the team resulted in inadequate training, and team members were not properly selected to conduct tasks at the requisite level. This resulted in enhancing of prejudice among males toward women in uniform and contributed to misunderstanding of importance of this issue.

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<sup>9</sup> Troop Contributing Nations and Troop Contributing Countries

<sup>10</sup> UN Peace support Operation in Liberia - UNMIL, Liberia, 2007.

The second example displays the inability of a single unit or department to deal with such a complex issue. As a part of its core function, CIMIC<sup>11</sup> officers deliver Theatre Civil Assessment (TSA) to Joint Forces Commands. This is done through a CIMIC liaison architecture: CIMIC maintains liaison with local officials and organizations represented in the theatre (IO, GO, NGO). However, CIMIC liaison officers are not aware of civil society relationships and do not liaise with unofficial leaders (religious and tribal leaders for example) or particular groups within the larger population (women, children, elderly etc.). Given these shortcomings, it is no wonder that CIMIC was not aware at all what would happen in Kosovo in March 2004. They were not able to identify indicators of a pogrom<sup>12</sup>. In this "action" more than 50.000 Albanians were involved in well prepared and led attacks on Serbs and Serbian heritage in Kosovo. It happened in front of the eyes of more than 50.000 peacekeepers and international security forces. After this event, all CIMIC personnel and CIMIC structure were dismissed and new structure (with local liaison teams) was established. The problem was not the CIMIC officers, and my intention is not to pinpoint shortcomings of CIMIC, but to show how understanding of gender roles can contribute to mission accomplishment and mitigate misguided expectations. Without proper training, education and without addressing the right people, threats cannot be identified properly. In addition, this should not be the job just for CIMIC, Gender Advisers, Gender Field Advisers or Gender Focal points; this is a job for every soldier. Previously mentioned personnel are there just to facilitate the process. Having one liaison team and 10.000 troops on the ground in constant interaction with the population, it is obvious from which of them we could get more. Having them sensitive enough to be able to convey the message to the right people and take from them what is needed is of outmost importance.

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<sup>11</sup> Civil-Military Cooperation

<sup>12</sup> This violent riot, aimed at massacre of an ethnic group, happened in Kosovo on 21 Mart 2004. More than 150 churches and monastery were burnt, thousands of Serbian houses were destroyed, more than 4.000 people were forced to leave their homes, public buildings were destroyed... Aim was to cleanse Serbs from Kosovo at all.

This is why education and training is the key for success. Education is needed for every level, same in the military and the civilian domain. A recent statement by the Turkish president Tayyip Erdogan that 'women are not equal to men' (Erdogan, 2014) sends the wrong message and has huge consequences at the theatre level.

## **Conclusion**

Incorporation of gender perspectives is a task military forces are responsible for, requiring that education and training are keys to success. Military personnel must incorporate gender considerations into all actions for the sake of protection of basic human rights, operational effectiveness, situational awareness and security of troops and local populations. Peace-building, as one of the most complicated processes that must to be performed by military forces, will be more effective when socially constructed phenomena of affected population are taken into consideration. Gender roles play a more significant role than has been previously imagined. Judgment and critical thinking are needed when it comes to incorporation of gender perspectives as well. It is always good to have public opinion very sensitive about this issue, but at the same time the room for manipulation with it is opened. One should be aware of it, because this is the only way how one can incorporate a gender perspective properly. There is only one demand posed in front of us: to consider gender roles at least equally important as they are considered by enemies of all that we are standing for, and those are universal human values, liberty and equality. This can be done only by education.

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## **Which should be the main consideration for the Estonian naval policy: self-defence or 'plugging-the-gap' in the full spectrum of Allied maritime operations?**

**LCDR Mati Terve**

Because of limited resources, for a small state it has been and will be question of sustainability, how to build up state services, including military services. It is important to understand that state services are interrelated and complementary one to another. Acting as a joint force in military environment, state services under the framework of state policies should act to guarantee independence and sovereignty of the state and wellbeing of its citizens. State's naval policy as one of the abovementioned policies, to be sustainable, should honestly and rationally determine the course of actions in protecting state's sovereignty and international obligations taken by state. The principles of rationality and sustainability are leading to principles of capacity and capability. How capable one small state's Navy should be and what capacities it should have implementing his mission? One of important variables to consider would be the geopolitical situation a state has around him. Estonia is the centre of geopolitical intrigues forged by his eastward neighbour and to withstand to these intrigues indeed, full spectrum of naval capabilities might needed. However to build up such, full spectrum naval capability, would not be sustainable, as it absorbs all resources available to Estonia. Therefore to defend its sovereignty and to ensure the sustainability, the main consideration for Estonian naval policy will continue to be 'plugging-the-gap' in the full spectrum of Allied maritime operations; however, additional capabilities for coastal defence and in network centric warfare should be developed.

According to Mackubin Thomas Owens, professor at the US Naval War College, the force planner must answer two questions. 'First, what capabilities do we need to fulfil the requirements of our strategy, in light of the security environment? Second, what is the appropriate size of the force — in other words, how much is enough?' (2006). In 1997, an American political scientist, Zbigniew Brzezinski stated that Russia will have three geostrategic options. Firstly, pro-Western mature strategic partnership. Secondly, nationalistic and imperialist approach of the 'near abroad' policy to influence states by propaganda and economic means, and thirdly, Euroasianist approach designed to reduce the American preponderance in Eurasia (1997 p. 100). While first was more dominant in first years of Yeltsin's presidency, the second and third rise in mid-1990's and shaping currently Russia's foreign policy.

As up to 2015, Russia's has proved Brzezinski's statement. President Putin has clearly stated that the most important goal for Russian security policy is by prioritisation of investments in defence reforms to be strong (Kaljurand, et al., 2012 p. 14). While military spending in Western countries implicates decreasing trend, Russia with its \$81 billion in 2015 in comparison to \$72 billion in 2011 is on the rise (The Moscow Times, 2014).

Russia's revised military doctrine from 2014 names NATO as its principal threat. Russia has shown readiness to use variety of means in achieving his strategic goals and its security policy together with military build-up have threatened Russia's smaller neighbours (Vinayaraj, 2011 p. 265). Since 2008 Russia has demonstrated wide range of offensive tactics. However, the logic says that small state alone cannot build-up his defence to counter all possible threats posed by a major power and therefore should be partnered with allies, as recommended by the Commonwealth Consultative Group (Singh, 2007 p. 6). Indeed, despite released 30 years

ago, by addressing the importance of both internal and external cooperation while exercising soft and hard powers, they are still valid.

Partnership, particularly with NATO is base for an Estonian defence. Estonia deems essential that the Alliance has necessary military resources and is able to draw on these resources. Estonia is continuously preparing for national defence, and will defend itself in any circumstance and against an enemy of any superiority (The Parliament of Estonia, 2010). The statement to defend himself against any adversary is strong; however, this does not contribute sufficiently to the deterrence and thus certain capabilities for self-defence should be developed and maintained.

According to National Security Concept, Estonia participates in the development of NATO's multinational capabilities and Estonian defence forces are developed to achieve the full scale of capabilities needed for Estonia's initial defence; however, capabilities which are required for military defence and deterrence but which cannot be achieved by Estonia on its own will be ensured in co-operation with Allies in NATO (The Parliament of Estonia, 2010). This is honest and rationale statement, as country with GDP of 18.4 billion euros, cannot afford to have a full spectrum of capabilities of warfare.

A long term development of defence forces is formulated in the National Defence Development Plan, where development of mine warfare capability shall be continued with three mine countermeasure vessels to be modernized, as well as a diver group and one naval auxiliary vessel. Therefore one can assume that in the nearest future Estonian leaders do not plan development of other maritime capabilities than mine countermeasure. Thus Estonian Navy's main capability is in its specialisation into mine warfare, particularly mine countermeasure operations. Further, to gain understanding how navies are differencing from each other and where the Estonian Navy could be positioned in list of

navies, different theoretical approaches, mainly of Basil Germond, Geoffrey Till and Jacob Børresen will be examined.

In general, the Navy contributes to the avoidance of war through the performance of two essentially mutually supporting tasks: deterrence and the maintenance of sovereignty. The first task is performed by mounting a credible defence and second is to contribute to the removal of potential causes of conflict in territorial waters and exclusive economic zones (Børresen, 1994 p. 153). Basil Germond from Lancaster University, classifies navies into six ranks. Firstly, symbolic navies, these are navies that cannot fulfil any mission properly. Secondly navies who are able to conduct constabulary operations in territorial waters and sometimes in their Exclusive Economic Zone and to contribute into coastal defence, but unable participate in power projection operations. For this rank, repelling military attack requires a cooperative response. Partially this rank of navies describes the Estonian Navy in collaboration with fleets of the Estonian Police and Border Guard Board and Maritime Administration. Thirdly navies who are able to participate within coalition in limited projection operations. Fourthly navies being able to conduct limited projection operations autonomously and to participate, within coalition, in high intensity projection operations. Fifthly navies being able to participate in high intensity multinational power projection operations assuming the role of leading partner. And sixthly navies able to perform any type of missions, to operate on a sustained basis all over the world and without any outside help (2014 p. 43).

Germond has stated, that mainly rank 2 navies, such as for Estonia and Lithuania, specialisation is the only way to contribute to larger coalitions (2014 p. 48). Naming the Estonian Navy as rank 2 could be argued because of being active contributor to the Standing NATO Mine Countermeasures Group 1 (SNMCMG1), he is participating in limited



projection operations and therefore could be classified as rank 3 navy. However, capabilities inherent for rank 3 navy would contribute to the deterrence, but not too much into autonomous coastal defence (Germond, 2014 p. 43).

Norwegian naval researcher Børresen has emphasised the importance of a balanced navy as synergy of all its parts makes the total fighting power (1994 p. 158). Nonetheless some researchers have found a 'specialisation to be only way to contribute to coalitions' (Germond, 2014 p. 48). However, Børresen argues that opposite to the balanced navy is a function-specific navy, where emphasis is on one or more key elements, while other elements are left to the bluewater allies (1994 p. 158). Furthermore Geoffrey Till has asserted that modern navies prefer to maintain traditional naval fighting disciplines and a balanced, not a specialised, contributory fleet. They will not develop niche specialisations in the assumptions that some other navy will fill the gaps (Till, 2013 p. 17). In the light of an Estonian Navy, this will rise a question- do it needs to be with its mine countermeasures capabilities a gap filler for modern navy or will aspire to have a balanced fleet? Till also states that, the capabilities should be achieved and maintained in accordance with state's resources (2013 p. 73), therefore development of capabilities in military domain should not hamper democracy and wellbeing of people of the state. This leads to the question, which capabilities are needed and which navies are able to fulfil the full spectrum of maritime operations and therefore, Allied Joint Publication 3.1 maritime operations will be examined.

Firstly, the full spectrum of Allied maritime operations include surveillance and reconnaissance which involves locating, identifying and tracking of aircraft, surface vessels and submarines. Indeed, in order to have a situational awareness in designated areas, decision maker's primary need

is to have full operational picture and the ability to share this awareness among partners. Unfortunately Estonia, mainly because of administrative and institutional discords is lacking this capability as a vital part of the network centric warfare in maritime domain. Particularly the practise of ownership of the maritime surveillance system is different comparing to other states. As a best practice, maritime surveillance infrastructure is managed by defence structure (Finland, Denmark, Norway etc.), in Estonia the Ministry of Interior is responsible for this. Even more, despite maritime surveillance system being operational since 2005, an automatic delivery of the maritime surveillance information into computerized system of the Estonian Navy began only in 2013 and therefore maritime situational awareness has been hampered. The main reason for such late delivery has been and in some cases still is deficiency in the interagency cooperation.

Secondly coastal defence, which according to Till 'has tended to be of particular interest to weaker and smaller navies' (2013 p. 71), it encompasses those tasks related to protecting friendly ports and seaward approaches from adversary intrusion. Due to his limited geographical area, Estonia is vulnerable to adversary's military attacks from land, air and sea. Even more, significant amount of Estonia's military infrastructure is located near the borders, thus left exposed to enemy's strikes. Coastal facilities are under focus of the adversary and attacks on these usually conducted either to tie up or to divert enemy strength from the main sector effort or to conduct as a preliminary to an amphibious landing (Vego, 2003 p. 193). Børresen states that 'the development in weapons technology has made it possible to pack enough fire-power into even the smallest craft, so that small vessels or craft of minor navies may be in a position to threaten even the strongest naval units of the Naval Power' (1994 p. 149). Research by many navies confirms the importance of being effective in the littorals as they are the last line of maritime defence (van

Straten, et al., 2008 p. 66). Therefore capabilities to conduct operations in littorals including anti amphibious, plays important role in the defence operations. A potential adversary of the Baltic States, during his Zapad exercises has shown willingness and capabilities to conduct amphibious operations in his offensive military strategy.

Thirdly protection of shipping involving escorting, convoying and Naval Cooperation and Guidance for Shipping tasks. Alfred Thayer Mahan, an American naval officer and strategist has argued that in peacetime national power and security are dependent on the sea and in wartime, seapower resulting from naval supremacy and providing the means of attacking the enemy's trade and threatening 'his interests ashore whilst protecting your own' (Till, 2013 p. 52). Till argues that globalisation prospers when trade is mutually beneficial and takes place in conditions of so called 'good order at sea'. The maintenance of this order may be designated to the constabulary capability; however, being a crucial enabler for global security it should be under attentions of naval planners (2013 p. 10). In Estonia, Maritime Administration fleet and Police and Border Guard Board with its fleet constitutes such constabulary force. The cooperation in task and resource assignment between Navy, Maritime Administration and Police and Border Guard Board fleet has been under long criticism. To avoid duplication, a naval cooperation should be improved by using mutually shared resources or even merging these fleets into one. Several reorganizational attempts has been made since mid-1990s. The focus of these efforts has been on merging the port infrastructure, procurement and maintenance system or even all fleets, however, mainly because of political unwillingness and institutional resistance, have been unsuccessful. Despite this, attempts to reorganize Estonia's State fleet should not be stopped and further merging of resources is needed.

Fourthly Sea Control Operations, conducted using long-range surveillance and airborne weapon delivery systems over large areas of sea. As part of sea area, the littorals are important to exercise sea control as an enabling measure for maritime power projection, SLOCs protection, preventing hostile actions from a hostile coast or to support a maritime interdiction operation. Sea control is ambitious operation, will be contested and for small state almost impossible to achieve. Therefore to protect his SLOCs, every coastal state should be able to accomplish at least maritime sea denial operations (Till, 2013 p. 128), which is exercised when one party prevents by minefield, deploying submarine or by SSMS along the coast an adversary from controlling a maritime area (Ministry of Defence, UK, 2010 pp. 2-11). Present capabilities of Estonian Navy can be compared to the Singapore's Navy of 1980's, when limited funding allowed Navy to take part in limited operations and Navy's approach to defence was sea denial. However, from 1990s, Singapore Navy expanded its doctrine from sea denial to limited, defensive sea control with platforms of greater operational range and endurance (Koh, 2012 p. 79). Experience of Singapore Navy indicates how geostrategic circumstances can influence state's defence planning and his naval forces are moved from specialised to more balanced Navy and could be used as best practice for Estonia.

However, coming back to sea denial, importance of mines because of posing real obstacle for naval expeditionary operation, should be emphasised and navies have to pay attention to this obvious means of denying access (Till, 2013 p. 128). The importance of mines to deny adversary is illustrated by Utria landing in the Estonian War of Independence where minefields laid down by destroyer Lennuk in Gulf of Finland, protected Estonian landing forces in Utria from sortie of Bolshevik vessels from Kronstadt (Õun, et al., 2012 p. 96). Previously it was identified that Estonian Navy is specialised Navy rather than balanced. His

specialisation is characterized by his MCM skills and further development of this capability. However his mine warfare capability has only one 'leg', because while having an excellent mine clearing capability the minelaying means are absent. Thus making coastal defence even more vulnerable.

Fifthly Maritime Power Projection Operations which can be projected ashore by sea-based attack aircraft, submarine and surface-launched cruise missiles, naval fire support, amphibious forces, and SOF. These operations are common, depending being carried out autonomously or independently to navies of ranks from three to six (Germond, 2014 p. 43). Definitely Estonian Navy with its mine countermeasures ships is unable to project power to his potential adversary; however, being part of the SNMCMG1, in collaboration with other assets has significant ability to influence adversary's perception. This could be also called plugging a cap in NATO's capabilities, as only few navies are autonomously able to project power to the Russia's growing military strength. Consequently it leads to the maritime cooperation both internal and external as it plays important role in maintaining of a maritime consensus and commanding global commons.

Despite advantages in naval cooperation it could have also some drawbacks because of the policy restrictions upon information sharing and technical incompatibilities. Mitchell argues that in coalitions political influence because of the information security frequently trumps operational efficiency, thus different security policies prevent allies from operating at the same speed (2009 p. 134). Therefore tempo of the operations ultimately is measured by the tempo of the unit with the slowest information and OODA loop, putting so the operation with need for speed at risk. Some of mentioned drawbacks can be avoided with standardisation of procedures and interoperable technology; however,

mainly because of the different national policies they cannot be evaded and should be dealt by accepting these in start of the cooperation.

Indeed, contemporary examples of successful naval cooperation is Estonia's participation in NATO Naval groups, but as an historical example of successful naval cooperation, the assistance from the United Kingdom and Finland during the Estonian War of Independence could be drawn. Foreign naval units were able to achieve a sea control in Gulf of Finland, thus giving freedom of movement for Estonian Navy and success in joint operation, Landing of Utria. Even more, successful operations of Estonian and Royal Navy forced the Red Army's Chief of Army Staff, Major General Kostyaev write in January of 1919: 'Our assault operations in the Narva-Tallinn direction totally failed...Estonia attacked in overwhelming strength at sea' (Õun, et al., 2012 p. 102). Undoubtedly the military cooperation has been and is beneficial for a small state, therefore, Estonia's current participation in both NATO and EU military operations and civilian missions forms a vital part of its security policy and should be continued by contributing with all capabilities available to Estonia. Particularly for the Estonian Navy this means in collaboration with allies plugging-the-gap in the full spectrum of Allied maritime operations.

And finally, AJP-3.1 names Maritime Support to Joint Air Defence, where maritime forces contribute to joint air defence by providing ship-borne surveillance and warning, airborne early warning, electronic warfare, and C2 and weapons platforms. This maritime operation is tightly connected to the technology, networking, interoperability and connects all previously mentioned naval operations into network centric warfare with focus on combined actions of a collective fleet. However, knowing adversary's dislocation and strength does not creates superiority over them. To facilitate informational advantage, proper platforms and weapon system are needed. Till points out that to facilitate network

centric warfare 'there will be need to be substantial changes to existing maritime organisations, habits of thought, procedures and doctrines' (2013 p. 132). However, Paul T. Mitchell in connection to the network centric warfare, has expressed some degree of criticism towards allies and partners of the US because of lagging in technology and investment therein, also because absence of detailed plans, low technical standardisation and professionalism of personnel in these coalitions may be questioned (Mitchell, 2009 p. 129).

Despite the critics from Mitchell, he also highlights, that even small navies can generate additional combat power by optimising the efficiency of operations through information exchange, thus contributing to the speed at which operations are proceed and to the self-synchronisation between units. This speed and synchronisation conclusively incorporates the strategic recognised maritime picture with common operational and tactical pictures (2009 p. 130). Thus making obvious the importance of technology and connection between all maritime operations. Even more, it indicates how small navies could contribute to alliance with the capabilities in their possession and it applies to Estonian Navy, particularly sharing its maritime recognised picture to the maritime situational awareness of the Allies.

However, to improve the quality and speed of shared information provided by Estonian Navy and to improve its warfare fighting capabilities in littorals, further investments into maritime domain should be made. While development plan of 2009 clearly stated 'Among new development programs for the Navy is the procurement of multirole fast patrol boats to ensure defence of territorial waters and to improve maritime surveillance. The Navy's capabilities for command and control and shore-to-vessel communications will be improved' (Estonian Ministry of Defence, 2009), the new development plan approved in 2013 does not list these capability

developments anymore. Furthermore, Estonian Defence Forces are heavily land-centric (Kaljurand, et al., 2012 p. 38), because of this, investments into maritime component of defence forces are limited.

This essay tried to find the main consideration for Estonian naval policy, either self-defence or 'plugging-the-gap' in the full spectrum of Allied maritime operations. An Estonian security concept is build up on a NATO collective defence. The same concept declares that Estonian defence forces are developed to achieve the full scale of capabilities needed for Estonia's initial defence; however, it also states that capabilities which are required for military defence and deterrence but which cannot be achieved by Estonia on its own will be assured in co-operation with Allies in NATO. According to these statements Estonia has to be capable for initial self-defence including receiving of the NATO forces.

In maritime domain littorals are playing a vital role for initial self-defence and for receiving allied forces and therefore have to be protected. Neither Estonian Navy nor land forces have a capabilities for warfare, particularly sea denial, in littorals. As a consequence of that, Estonia is vulnerable to the seaborne attack of the adversary and could lead to the enveloping of the land force, further making deployment of NATO forces through seaports highly defenceless. So it is critical that future development of defence forces will bring back focus to the coastal defence including procurement of fast patrol boats with appropriate armaments, coastal missile system and sea mines.

This essay also found that small navies should not be modelled as navies of naval powers (Till, 2013 p. 73) and small states should be partnered with major powers (Singh, 2007 p. 6). Despite the desire towards balanced navy, for small navies specialisation is the only way to contribute to larger coalitions (Germond, 2014 p. 48). However, to fulfil expectations of other coalition partners, small state's navy has to have certain



capabilities to offer. Mine countermeasure capabilities and competencies of the Estonian Navy are known among partners. But to contribute to the initial self-defence and by specialisation into coalition, additional capabilities of the network centric warfare, particularly maritime situational awareness and information exchange have to be developed.

George Marshall, U.S. General and former Secretary of State has said: a readiness to cooperate is one of the great and hopeful factors of the world of today. Indeed, without cooperation there is no effective alliance and therefore the main consideration for Estonian naval policy will continue to be 'plugging-the-gap' in the full spectrum of Allied maritime operations, however, additional capabilities for coastal defence and in network centric warfare should be developed.

However, despite the findings of this essay, economic factors of additional capability development are unexplored and further research should be conducted.

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# **Are SOF only suited to be engaged against hybrid / unconventional threats?**

**MAJ Mindaugas Kazlauskas**

## **Introduction**

Admiral William McRaven, retiring commander of the U.S. Special Operations Com-mand, in his speech at the change of command ceremony pointed out that 'we are in the golden age of Special Operations' and it's 'a time when our unique talents as special operators are in the greatest demand' (Lamothe, 2014). With a rise of hybrid threats, importance of Special Operation Forces (SOF) has greatly increased. Today we are witnessing the conflicts, which differ from conventional wars of the 20th century and present new challenges for political and military leaders. Conflicts in Ukraine, Gaza, Iraq illustrate the changing shape of warfare – non-state actors, insurgents, usually indirectly backed by nation states, asymmetrical techniques, wide usage of media and information technology are common tendencies. Because of their flexibility, adaptability and versatility SOF have become a tool of choice for senior political and military leaders. It is a time of rapid SOF growth and modernization, and recent crises in Ukraine, Libya and Syria confirm the necessity of special operation forces.

SOF are particularly well adapted for unconventional warfare scenarios and their participation in modern conflicts have proved that they are the best suited component of existing forces for the new faces of war. As analytics claim (Davis Jr., 2013 p. 21), constantly evolving hybrid threats will be the main security dilemma of the near future and defeating them is the main challenge to the Army Profession. However, it would be a mistake to deny the possibility of large state to state conflicts as current

dominance of UW does not mean the end of conventional warfare. There is always an uncertainty about North Korea, Iran or Russia and war with these adversaries could result in conventional warfare (CW) scenarios. This raises a question about SOF role – are they only suited to be engaged against hybrid / unconventional threats?

This essay will argue that a large-scale state on state conflict will be focused on major combat operations and conventional or even nuclear warfare, and while SOF are particularly developed to conduct unconventional warfare, they also have a role to play in conventional warfare. In fact, as the methods of warfare are blurring, this role will be more decisive than traditional supportive one. In order to demonstrate that, the first part of the essay will briefly analyse SOF role and mission from theoretical perspective, as it is important to consider implications of evolving methods of war and ongoing debates on UW and hybrid warfare. In the second part, a case study and examples of SOF involvement in conventional / unconventional warfare scenarios in Operations Desert Storm / Desert Shield and Iraqi Freedom will be analysed. As the scope of this essay is limited, the detailed analysis of UW or conventional OPS is not possible; so only relevant to the topic theoretical material and cases will be presented. In the first part, theoretical perspectives of Frank G. Hoffman (2007) and David Maxwell (2013) will be referred to. The studies of William Johnson (1996,) and William Rosenau (2001) will be used in analysing Operations Desert Storm / Desert Shield. For further observations on Operation Iraqi Freedom, John D. Gresham (2013) and other authors will be cited.

## **SOF, core activities and implications for UW/CW: theoretical perspective**

First, to analyse the question of thesis, it will be accentuated, what core activities and roles of SOF are defined in NATO Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations (AJP-3.5), and how these definitions relate to SOF involvement in possible future CW scenarios. Doctrine acknowledges the importance of uncertain, complex and rapidly changing security environment and addresses SOF as offering 'an additional and unique capability to achieve objectives and perform tasks to create strategic-an/or operational-level effects that no other forces in NATO are able to conduct' (NATO Standardization Agency (NSA), 2013 pp. 2-1). It also distinguishes three principle tasks of SOF: military assistance (MA), special reconnaissance (SR) and direct action (DA) (pp. 2-1). These principal tasks are applied to support such activities as counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism, faction liaison; SOF capabilities in countering nuclear and biological threats are mentioned. As it is seen, doctrine acknowledges SOF as a widely capable tool to counter modern threats and conduct unconventional warfare, confirming the narrative of 'the golden age of SOF'. Their flexibility and competence are unmatched and essential for modern challenges, as these traits can offset the need of additional forces and minimise operational risk. However, doctrine also acknowledges limitations of SOF and clearly states, that 'SOF should not be employed as a substitute for conventional forces' (pp. 5-2). This brings us back to a question, whether SOF are suited to be engaged in conventional warfare. According to doctrine, special operations can complement conventional operations (pp. 1-2). However, having in mind, that SOF is a limited resource, it seems that their role is mainly associated with conducting and countering UW / hybrid threats, while large conventional operations are still left to the domain of conventional forces

(CF) and possible SOF activities in them remain unclear. This claim is reinforced by the fact that military technology, which may be more effective at destruction without exposing forces to as great a risk, is becoming widely adopted by CF (Spulak, 2007 p. 17). It means that CF will be able to employ strategies, previously used only by special operators and SOF participation might not be needed.

On the other hand, by putting these arguments into a larger context, one can turn them around and see that evolving war methods and rise of hybrid warfare are allowing SOF to apply their core activities in the case of large conventional war as well. Frank G. Hoffman and other analysts have constructed a hybrid war concept, which is characterized by convergence of different modes of war. 'It is not that just conventional warfare or interstate conflict is on the decline' – he writes in his study (2007 p. 7), 'there is a fusion of war forms emerging, one that blurs regular and irregular warfare'. Evolving character of modern conflicts means, that it will be hard to separate future wars into irregular or conventional categories. But it also does not mean that a state-based conflict is extinct, which makes a question of essay even more relevant. David Maxwell (2013) states that SOF will always have a role in conventional warfare, as in a case of major conflict with Iran or North Korea 'defeated enemy forces will rapidly transition to asymmetrical or hybrid threats'. This statement can be extended even further – a constantly evolving face of the conflict and blurring lines between modes of war suggest that in future conventional wars transition to UW in their different phases, regions or supported territories will be unavoidable and this 'foggy' element of CW will be ideal environment for SOF to act and use their spectrum of capabilities. SOF common attributes, as noted in AJP-3.5 (pp. 1-3), could prove essential in this type of environment of the CW. High tempo will be necessary in reacting to unexpected developments of the major conflict. Preemption by DA on critical targets can hinder forces of the adversary or

even prevent the conflict from developing. Capability of deception by imitating a larger force could allow CF to gain operational advantage.

Hybrid threats, converging phases and traditional modes of war will require cooperation and combined efforts of SOF and CF, which, having in mind their cultural and structural differences will not be an easy task. In AJP 3-05 the benefits of integration are recognized, as it 'not only creates unique capabilities, but may be necessary to achieve objectives not otherwise attainable' (pp. 3-7). The recognition of the importance of SOF and CF cooperation on the doctrinal level indicates that there could be a place for SOF application in conventional warfare scenario. Iraqi Freedom serves as a prime example of joint SOF and CF efforts. Successful SOF and CF working relations in the recent conflicts of Afghanistan and Iraq might have come out of necessity, but this is a foundation, on which SOF and CF integration in a case of large scale conventional war could rely. Mitchell D. Franks remarks (2013 p. 17) that 'human domain is simply too large and too complex for any approach other than one that ensures interdependence between conventional and special operations forces.' In fact, a necessity of integrated, multi-purpose force, capable to successfully blend conventional and unconventional capabilities and counter security challenges of hybrid warfare, is stated in some works (Ellison, et al., 2012 p. 61). This could be a logical step, as recent conflicts have shown that SOF do not only complement CF, but can make strategic contributions of their own. As Robert G. Spulak notes (2007 p. 21), 'the three qualities of SOF (elite warriors, creativity, and flexibility) create operational capabilities that allow SOF to have different limitations than conventional forces'. SOF do not win wars alone, and they are not magical 'panacea' against modern threats, but they are suited to be engaged not only against UW / hybrid threats. Thus, their capabilities should be used in possible conventional war scenarios of the future.

To summarize the first chapter of the essay: the activities and capabilities of SOF are mainly orientated towards their application in unconventional warfare in NATO doctrine. However, evolving war methods and rise of the hybrid warfare allow the potential application of these capabilities in the future conventional warfare campaigns. Recognition of the importance of SOF and CF integration on doctrinal and theoretical level gives a foundation, on which successful working relations could be based. In the next chapters, two historical cases will be analysed, which will support the theoretical perspective and give further arguments on how SOF are suited to be engaged not only against hybrid / unconventional threats.

### **A Case Study: SOF role in the Persian Gulf War**

In this chapter, the SOF role in the Persian Gulf War, codenamed as operations Desert Shield / Desert Storm, will be analysed. This particular conflict was chosen for the following reasons: first of all, it was the largest conventional operation since Vietnam war. Secondly, it marked the beginning of a major shift in warfare, as the superiority of coalition forces revealed, that it will be almost impossible to engage such force in symmetrical conflict in the future, and encouraged potential adversaries to use unconventional / asymmetrical methods.

Despite the difficulties SOF had to overcome, their contribution in all stages of the campaign was an important part of overall success in Desert Shield / Desert Storm operations. Their role in Gulf war can serve as an important example on how their capabilities could be applied in future conventional warfare scenarios. In Gulf war, SOF did not enjoy such level of trust and popularity, as they have today. In fact, General Schwarzkopf, commander of coalition forces, distrusted special operators and kept them under tight control – apparently he changed this opinion after the war, praising SOF contribution (Marquis, 1997 pp. 230-233). It is not surprising – USSOCOM, which elevated SOF to the new unified command level, was



created only three years before the Gulf war. SOF, still bearing the shadow of disastrous Operation Eagle Claw in 1980, where failure to free hostages resulted in damaged reputation of both of the Army and Special Forces, had a chance to prove their capabilities in a joint coalition effort.

The first mission performed by SOF in initial phase of the Gulf War belongs to one of their principle tasks in doctrine: that is, special reconnaissance (SR). It shows how SOF employment in early stages of the conventional operation can prove invaluable to overall campaign. SOF were tasked to perform border surveillance in combined effort along with Saudi forces. As General Schwarzkopf pointed out later, 'these detachments were the only eyes and ears on the ground for the entire coalition force' (Johnson, 1996, p. 45). SOF intelligence enabled coalition forces to reposition for offensive, while tracking Iraqi movement and reaction (p. 46). While the actual impact on the campaign's overall success could be hard to distinguish, the early SR performed by Special Forces in Operation Desert Shield reveals us the main benefits of SOF involvement in early phases of the conventional campaign. First of all, SOF can serve as a 'safeguard' to campaign plans, providing security through their tempo and flexibility. Secondly, their ability to operate and provide valuable intelligence (INTEL) in unfamiliar conditions gives an awareness and information, which can influence further phases of the campaign. For example, early intelligence in Desert Shield identified weaknesses of Iraqi troop morale, and these weaknesses became a key focus on PSYOP campaign, which followed later (Department of Defense, 1991 pp. 5-2). Leaflet drops and radio broadcasts were used with a great success and weakened morale of Iraqi troops, resulting in large-scale desertions and surrendering.

In the early border surveillance missions, working relations with coalition forces were established and that was a foundation of the following task, which was the most important task, performed by SOF in Gulf War – that

is, serving as a connecting link in coalition warfare. The capability of SOF to provide military assistance (MA) was critical in integration of Islamic coalition allies into defensive and offensive phases of the Gulf War operations and this attribute of SOF is one of the main arguments why SOF are suited not only to be engaged against unconventional / hybrid threats. SOF were deployed down to battalion level throughout the coalition forces and had to provide 'ground truth', ensuring coordination between Saudi, Egyptian, Syrian and other coalition troops. (Johnson, 1996, p. 51). SOF coalition support teams not only trained, but advised and assisted coalition forces, updated the commanding staff with status of the coalition units, also, provided liaison between ground units and air support, preventing friendly-fire incidents (Marquis, 1997 p. 233). In other words, SOF became a link, which encompassed all the activities of coalition forces, ensuring their coordination throughout the campaign.

In the light of this essay question, the following observation can be made: during the Gulf war, SOF versatility and capability to provide MA, support to coalition warfare throughout all the phases of the campaign, enabled the maximization of conventional forces abilities, and these attributes can be applied to any major operation, involving coalition of multicultural forces. In the multinational environment, which is the nature of the Alliance, SOF can be distinguished as having exceptional interpersonal skills. Cultural differences are often underestimated – a wrongly understood or misinterpreted order can result in a drop of morale, or, in worst case scenario, casualties or / and mission failure. In Gulf War, SOF have managed to form relations of mutual trust with their host units by 'eating their food, speaking their language, respecting their culture' (Johnson, 1996, p. 60). Actually, the lack of language efficient personnel and insufficient SOF language skills during the Desert Shield / Desert Storm were noted (Department of Defense, 1991 pp. 5-1), but that only proves the importance of SOF as a consolidating link in joint conventional

operation, because SOF are the only element able to provide this role. As the Secretary of Defense of U.S. Les Aspin summed up: 'SOF are particularly well suited to conventional coalition warfare' (Johnson, 1996, p. 51).

SOF performed a wide variety of missions during the conflict, most of them were Special Reconnaissance (SR) deep in enemy's territory. It is beyond the scope of this essay to analyse the overall impact of all of them, but so called 'Scud hunting' is worth mentioning. 'Scud hunting' missions prove a strategic value and flexibility of SOF, since, unlike conventional forces, they can be immediately redirected to counter unexpected threats. Hussein's launch of military-insignificant Scud missiles posed a major strategic threat – it was feared, that they will provoke Israelis military response and fracture the coalition (Rosenau, 2001 p. 30). Despite the technological superiority, coalition air force was unable to locate carefully hidden Scuds and SOF were the only option left. The operational success of Scud missions is debatable, as it is hard to evaluate their real impact, but the fact that British and American Special Forces were employed to this mission helped to hold the coalition together, thus, achieving an important strategic objective (Rosenau, 2001 p. 43).

Direct action missions (DA), performed by SOF were limited, and mostly concerned disruption of enemy's communications. However, SOF were also responsible for Combat Search and Rescue operations and played a key role in liberation of Kuwait city, entering it with Arab units, providing 'area clearance' and collecting evidence about possible violations of Geneva convention (Johnson, 1996, p. 76). As it is revealed, the MA capabilities of SOF were effectively used from the beginning to the final phase of the Gulf War. In fact, these capabilities exceeded the typical application of MA in many cases, as they involved not only training, advice

and support – SOF achieved all-encompassing level of cooperation with coalition forces, and performed combined SR tasks throughout the campaign. In conclusion, SOF with their efforts in SR and MA not only supported conventional forces manoeuvre and improved their overall effectiveness, they used their flexibility and interoperability skills to become the connecting link, which held the coalition forces together. Thus, the Gulf War case proves that SOF capabilities can be used not only countering unconventional / hybrid threats.

### **SOF and conventional forces in Operation Iraqi Freedom: further observations**

Since Desert Storm, SOF have been participating in variety of operations and, especially with the start of the War on Terrorism, proved themselves as being a tool of choice to counter insurgency and conduct unconventional warfare. SOF civil-affairs and psychological operation capabilities have been used in operations other than war. Furthermore, initial conventional phase of Iraq war revealed that SOF and CF cooperation in the battlefield can bring enormous success. SOF operations in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) became the key enabling factors of the war – unlike in Desert Storm, SOF were a part of the operational planning from the start and their capability to perform SR and DA on critical targets allowed conventional forces to complete major combat operations in just six weeks of fighting (Gresham, 2013). In fact, a degree of joint efforts and SOF-CF cooperation allowed adjusting combat techniques according to tactical situation, by combining air support with rapid manoeuvre / precision strikes and close combat techniques (Noonan, 2003).

To support the argument of the essay, SOF missions in 2nd Iraqi war revealed their effectiveness in Joint effort along conventional forces. In many occasions, it was more than traditional conduct of UW: for example,

Joint British Commandos, U.S. Marine and Polish SOF units took control of the port of Umm Qasr, near Basra. Heavy armed SOF performed direct support operations to the CF to identify enemy positions for bombing strikes, which was critical in campaign success (Gresham, 2013). During the conflict, SOF were not only performing supportive role, but often employed in a manner, traditionally suited to CF, even being able to occupy airfields and small towns by themselves. Later phase of the conflict involved SOF supporting conventional forces through SR and DA in a major battle against insurgents in Fallujah (Lohaus, 2014 p. 42).

Success of initial phase of OIF shows two important things: future conflicts will have to rely on joint effort, and combine multitude of capabilities of joint forces, including SOF, across the conflict spectrum. Secondly, this also applies to large scale conventional conflicts, as they will have tendency to shift into asymmetrical / hybrid threats in different phases and regions of the campaign. SR and DA missions, routinely performed by SOF in Operation Iraqi Freedom, can be used in similar nature by supporting conventional operations in potential large-scale military conflict. For example, in a case of military conflict with China SOF might be tasked to locate cruise and ballistic missile launcher hide sites and conduct DA against critical targets, that could not be safely neutralized by other means; also, perform rescue and extraction of the opposition leaders (Martinage, 2009 p. 9).

## **Conclusion and Implications**

A brief theoretic analysis, a case study of SOF involvement in Persian Gulf War, examples from 2nd Iraq war have shown, that SOF are suited to be engaged not only against hybrid/unconventional threats and have a role to play in conventional warfare. A core SOF capability to conduct SR was effectively used to support conventional forces manoeuvre in Persian Gulf War and Operation Iraqi Freedom. This gives an example how SOF can

serve as a 'safeguard' to conventional campaign plans, their ability to operate and provide valuable INTEL in unfamiliar conditions can influence further phases of the campaign. Furthermore, SOF, unlike CF, can be immediately redirected to counter unexpected threats.

Also, Persian Gulf War have proved, that SOF versatility and capability to provide MA, support to coalition warfare throughout all the phases of the campaign, enables the maximization of conventional forces abilities and these attributes can be applied to any major operation, involving coalition of multicultural forces.

Effective SOF and CF cooperation on operational level at Operation Iraqi Freedom, SOF ability to directly and indirectly support CF by performing DA on critical targets, gives a foundation, on which future joint operations, including large-scale conventional ones, should rely. It corresponds with evolving hybrid nature of the modern conflicts, when only interdependence and ability to utilise both SOF and CF strengths can allow Alliance to adapt to ever changing strategic and tactical situation. Furthermore, blurring lines between modes of war suggest that in future conventional wars transition to UW in their different phases, regions or supported territories will be unavoidable, and this 'foggy' element will be ideal environment for SOF to act and use their spectrum of capabilities.

In short, SOF were and will be effectively used in conventional wars. However, findings of this essay also allow making some important observations on the current SOF situation and its implications for the future. Increased reliance on SOF and so called narrative of 'SOF golden age' has some negative aspects. First of all, it gives an impression of all future threats being 'hybrid/unconventional', thus ignoring the possibility of conventional warfare scenarios. Secondly, defining SOF through 'unconventional' categories always widens a cultural gap, which historically always existed between SOF and CF. David Maxwell (2013)

notes that unconventional warfare does not solely belong to SOF. Author of paper would extend this notion by adding, that conventional operations also do not solely belong to CF. Instead of trying to agitate SOF (or CF) suitability in modern conflicts and making the same mistakes, we should look for the best ways to integrate SOF and CF in joint effort, as it is evident that security environment of the future will encompass a wide spectrum of threats. Interdependence, cooperation and multi-purpose force can be the key factors in adapting to them. As it was mentioned before, current doctrine acknowledges the importance of integration, but for being effective in countering future threats, it will need further adjustments and clarifications.

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# **Is MIA capable to fight new type of threat effectively without MOD support?**

**MAJ Tomas Matijošaitis**

## **Introduction**

In November 2013 public pro-European Union protests triggered the revolution in Ukraine, which was followed by Russian annexation of Crimea and pro-Russian separatist movement in the eastern part of the state. Due to this movement the government launched so called *anti-terrorist* operation to restore state's sovereignty. In fact the *anti-terrorist* operation means that there is an internal conflict. However, the current situation can also be assessed as internationalized military conflict between Ukraine and Russia using unconventional warfare methods. While denying any Russian involvement in eastern Ukraine, particularly in self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics, Russia's President Putin described this area using the historic name of Novorossiia, which became a part of Ukraine only in 1922 (Freedman, 2014, p. 13). US and NATO officials say that Russia stepped up its support to the separatists, 'deploying several thousand Russian troops to fight in Ukraine. Both the Russian troops and the separatists have been supplied with hundreds of tanks, armored personnel carriers, artillery, surface-to-air missiles, and other military equipment from Russia' (Woehrel, 2014, p. 4). On the other hand, Ukrainian long range artillery systems and armour is widely used in the conflict zone, being operated by Ukrainian army, military police (National Guard), National Security Service (SBU) and volunteers' battalions in this *anti-terrorist* operation (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2014, p. 15). Therefore, current events in the eastern part of Ukraine indicate the state of *undeclared war*, which is something in between peace and war conditions.

Consequently, events in Ukraine call to reassess the security strategy of Lithuania. It becomes difficult to distinguish the difference between the peace time unrests and the implementation of unconventional war methods. This ambiguity indicates the need to rethink traditional approaches to the war related actions. Moreover, wars are not officially declared anymore. It also leads to the question what kind of forces – internal security, military or both in cooperation have to face these non-linear unconventional war threats. Furthermore, whether these forces are competent enough, are they authorized to use the force from the legal perspective and do they have all the means and capabilities to perform such operations effectively. Two main structures of units, authorized to use force in Lithuania are Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA) and Ministry of Defence (MOD). MIA units are primary responsible for internal security during peace time, and MOD's – Lithuanian Armed Forces – during war. In the conflict where unconventional war techniques are applied the state of war may not be declared (e.g. now in Ukraine), but the necessity of both actors to be involved is vital. Hence, this essay will argue, that although according to liberal democracy principles only Lithuanian MIA units have to be authorized and tasked to establish security and stability before the state of war is declared, they have to be reinforced by MOD's units to be capable to fight unconventional warfare threats effectively.

Since the main question of the essay (Is MIA capable to fight new type of threat effectively without MOD support?) is to reason rationale of the employment of violent means of force during unconventional warfare, the essay will start with defining what unconventional warfare is and how it is embedded into Russia's new generation war strategy. Then, it will examine what are the *modus operandi*, pros and cons of employing internal security and military forces during public unrests. Another part will analyse the Lithuanian legal system in relation with crisis that has unconventional war features. Finally, the essay will argue whether MIA

units are capable to cope with threat alone or they need MOD support during initial *new-generation* war phases.

## **Unconventional Warfare**

Before the analysis of the theoretical approach to unconventional warfare, we need to go one century back, when the first Russian foundational doctrinal publication on unconventional war was published. In 1924 Alexander Verhorvsky authored *Red Army Manual – Regulations for Field War*. Then the primary task of the Red Army was to spread Communism from Russia to the rest of the world and first of all to the neighbouring countries. Vechorvsky outlined three phases that contained offensive political – military actions. The first phase is to destroy enemy morale and create 'political bases on hostile territory' (Baltic Defence College, 2014, p. 2) by propaganda campaign, terrorist acts and political provocations. Then, during the second phase, a large scale of insurrection follows to destroy communications and prevent effective mobilization of the enemy army. These events facilitate invasion of the Red Army to capture industrial centres. During the final phase the Red Army conducts conventional military operations against the enemy armed forces, whose morale is degraded, mobilization crippled and rear areas' security disrupted (Baltic Defence College, 2014, pp. 2-3).

Soviets implemented and tested these principles in the real operation in Estonia, organizing unsuccessful resurrection the same year when the book was published. After the propaganda campaign it was planned to take over governmental buildings, transport and communication hubs, neutralize Tallinn garrison, prevent arrival of relief forces, and arrest government and military leaders in Tallinn. The Soviet General Staff defined these main failures of the operation: 1) military strength was not sufficient to capture opponent's key military objects; 2) the prison was not

seized to increase number of fighters by prisoners; 3) propaganda was ineffective and insufficient (Baltic Defence College, 2014, pp. 3-6).

Despite the fact that later Soviets had not been using this tactic until the end of the Second World War, emphasising rather on building their conventional forces, the concept was constantly updated, expanded and used during the second half of the last century. As well, in 2013 Russian military thinkers Tchekinov and Bogdanov expanded new-generation war to eight major phases (Berzins, 2014, p. 6):

The *First phase* is described as non-military war, which focuses on informational, moral, ideological, diplomatic and economic domains with intention to create favourable political, economic and military situation. The *Second phase* could be described as intensive informational campaign, carried out by coordinated efforts in diplomatic, media and other channels by sending false data and messages. The aim is to influence targeted state's political and military leaders to take wrong decisions. The *Third phase* encompasses pressure, bribing and continuation of deceiving state's governmental officials and armed force commanders, seeking to resign them from their duties. The *Fourth phase* is characterized with high intensity destabilizing propaganda to disunite the population. During this phase Russian militants should arrive to enhance escalation of the situation. During the *fifth phase* no-fly zones over the country are established and private security companies could be used together with armed opposition units. Various types of blockades are imposed. The *Sixth phase* is the start of military action with large-scale reconnaissance and sabotage missions conducted by all types of forces and methods needed. The *Seventh phase* is described as intensive military campaign with forces on the ground and air force harassment, usage of high precision weapons or weapons, based on new physical principles (e.g. microwaves, radiation, non-lethal biological weapons). The *Eighth*

*phase* is the end of the campaign – seizing of remaining points of resistance and destroying survived enemy units using special operation forces and indirect fires, surrounding points of resistance and capturing them by ground forces.

In addition, the chief of Russia's general staff General Valery Gerasimov, stated that 'In the 21st century we have seen a tendency toward blurring the lines between the states of war and peace. Wars are no longer declared and, having begun, proceed according to an unfamiliar template' (2013, pp. 1-2). He also mentions that 'a completely well-off and stable country' could be converted into 'an arena of the most intense armed conflict in a matter of months or even days' (Freedman, 2014, p. 15). These postulates together with recent events in Ukraine lead to the deduction that the nature of war has changed from *total war* to *limited war*. This means that belligerents are not fighting in full capacity anymore. According to the limited war model the conflict neither gains in intensity nor expands in space and time. Freedman states, that belligerent accept 'natural limits imposed by resources and geography, and also from circumstances in which a strong state employs only limited forces to deal with opponents with inferior capabilities' (2014, p. 8). Complete victory against inferior adversary can still be achieved with limited effort, but to be a *limited war*, the limits must be accepted by both fighting parties (Freedman, 2014, p. 8).

Thus, to draw boundaries for this essay it should be mentioned, that Russian unconventional warfare approach has old traditions and has been developed over the last century. General Gerasimov's ideas on the character of armed conflict were successfully tested during annexation of Crimea and in the Eastern part of Ukraine showing that asymmetric and contactless warfare takeover the direct destruction approach. It proves that Russian Armed conflict vision has changed from total war to limited

war concept (at least during initial phases). This limited war concept will be used in the essay defining unconventional warfare threat. To analyse MIA and MOD responses and collaboration fighting unconventional warfare only first six Tchekinov and Bogdanov new-generation war phases will be considered. These phases could be assessed as very closely related to unconventional war conflict, conducted in state's peace time situation, where state of war has not been declared.

## **Internal Security Forces or Military Forces?**

Before arguing about police and military responsibilities dealing with the threat, it is important to define the status of contradiction. Since the essay focuses on the initial phases of the conflict, where neither official declaration of war is announced, nor opponents declared their juridical belonging to the other state, opposing party will be called terrorists. As it was mentioned in the previous chapter during phases one to six, terrorists may have intentions to destabilize the state to create favourable conditions for separation of particular regions or preparation for the annexation.

First of all, it is important to define theoretical approach to the problem: is such type of terrorism treated as a criminal act or a war? When it is seen as a war, repressive measures are to be implemented, terrorists are placed outside the law and they are classified as armed combatants. In this case there is a risk to grant terrorists as legitimate actors that are protected by Geneva Convention. When terrorism is seen as a criminal act, 'the response is limited to the methods standard law enforcement: infiltration, intelligence, arrest and detention' (Duyvesteyn, 2008, p. 331). In most cases these situations cannot be clearly predicted, therefore Duyvesteyn states, that state's counterterrorism policy is usually being adopted *ad hoc* (2008, p.31).

In fact, most of the states have both police and military forces available to deal with terrorist situations. Police and other internal security forces are the primary means to deal with the crisis. Military force can be used to assist them during the crisis. There are at least six ways in which military instrument can be used countering terrorism: assistance to civilian authorities in crisis, pre-empt terrorist attacks, deterrence, retaliation, and assassination of key leaders or fighting war with the state which supports terrorists (Duyvesteyn, 2008, pp. 333-334). Only the first approach will be analysed as it primarily contributes to the topic of this essay.

While assisting civil authorities exposed to terrorist violence military forces can be used in many situations: to restore law and order, conduct riot control, secure infrastructure, conduct hostage rescue operations, etc. However, the use of armed forces against criminal activities in the streets possesses high risks as it can be easily used by the terrorist propaganda. This is even more dangerous if heavy armament is involved in the operation. 'Terrorists aim to provoke the government into overreacting. By responding excessively, the government runs the risk of delegitimizing itself' (Duyvesteyn, 2008, p. 334). Therefore, employment of military force has to be carefully considered and controlled in order not to contribute to the further escalation of hostilities. Alternatively police should be considered as an appropriate instrument to fight terrorism, but in most cases they are not forceful enough to deal with terrorist activities, especially during the fifth and sixth Tchechinov's and Bogdano'v new-generation war phases. Police can conduct surveillance and patrolling, pay more attention to potential targets, increase security checks, but they usually are not capable of conducting effective offence or defence actions in several hot spots simultaneously (Duyvesteyn, 2008, p. 332). Therefore, unconventional war leads to transitional situation, where neither police, nor military force could act effectively. Table 1 illustrates general differences between police and military:



Variable	Military	Police
Prime role/function	War operations/peace keeping	Prevention and investigation of crime and disorder
Use of force	Coercive	Coercive
Skills	Specialized military	Interrelated policing and democratic
Use of Deadly Force	To complete an operation or to achieve political objective	Only if their or another's life is under direct threat
Organizational Focus	External/outward	Internal/internal (though this is changing with imposition of transitional crime)
Legality	Military law	Civil law
Arrest or deprivation of liberty	Conventions and treaties bind military	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Individual discretion</li> <li>• 'Office of constable'</li> </ul>
Organization structure	Centralized	Decentralized
Command	Orders	Directive/orders

Table 1. Differences between the military and police in majority of western democracies (Den Heyer, 2011, p. 464).

Due of this some countries have the force in-between police and military – *gendarmerie*, which is often defined as paramilitary police. They are recognized as constabulary force, but can perform both military and police roles. Den Heyer admits, despite the fact the *gendarmerie* has some police skills including basic investigation and is trained to use less-than-lethal force; it is still military organization rather than civilian police. It is structured according military principles into armed units 'that are capable of performing specialized law enforcement and public order functions, that require disciplined group actions' (Den Heyer, 2011, p. 468).

	Military	Gendarmerie	Police
Organization structure	Centralized	Centralized	Decentralized
Enhances democracy	No	Yes/No	Yes
Weapons/firearms	Heavy and light	Light	Light

Deployment	As group	As group	Individual/group
Level of policing	Law enforcement	Law enforcement	Full range of policing
Public perception	Military	Military	Civilian police
Legislation enforced	Military	Civil	Civil

Table 2 Comparison of forces (Den Heyer, 2011, p. 469)

The critical question fighting unconventional war threats against terrorist groups remains in proper selection of the forces that are to be employed. Table 2 depicts the main differences of the forces available. The right ratio of composition is primarily related to the situation. To secure democratic values of the country police remains the main actor in the initial phases; later *gendarmarie* units should be brought in and military force has to remain *ultima ratio regum*<sup>13</sup>.

## Legal Aspects to Use Force

Lithuanian legal aspects in case of conventional war are defined in the *Lithuanian Republic Martial Law*. This law clearly describes introduction and repelling of the martial law, actions, rights and place of armed forces in securing the state during armed attack (Lithuanian Parliament, 2000). As this essay is analysing the peace time situation when Martial law has not been declared, MIA is fully responsible for public security with means and capabilities it possess. Therefore, this chapter will explore laws that justify employment of police, Public Security Service under MIA and military force in low intensity conflict during the peace time.

Firstly, according to the *Law of Police* and the *Law of Public Security Service*<sup>14</sup> it should be mentioned that police and Public Security Service

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<sup>13</sup> (Latin): the final argument of kings (a resort to arms).

<sup>14</sup> Lithuanian Public security service is the agency under MIA. Due to the structure, tasks and tactic, techniques, procedures they possess, they can be called *gendarmarie*.

officers are authorized to use violent means during criminal acts and public unrests. Police officer is allowed to use violence in order to prevent law violations or to detain suspects or in other cases defending public and state's interests (Lithuanian Parliament, 2000). Likewise Public Security Service is authorised to restore public order during emergencies, reinforce police, border guard and other MIA units if necessary (Lithuanian Parliament, 2006).

Secondly, the *Law of National Defence System Organisation And Military Service* states that armed forces can be employed to support police in order to prevent anti-constitutional acts of violence during the state of emergency, detaining criminals or securing territories in extremis (Lithuanian Parliament. 1998). In these cases official request from MIA institutions has to be submitted.

Thirdly, the *Law of Civil Safety* defines emergency situation as the state, when due to emergency the health or life of individuals, property or environment can be endangered. Causes to declare emergency situation can emerge from nature (e.g. forest fires), technical (e.g. industrial disasters), ecological (e.g. environmental pollution) and social (e.g. public disorders and riots, blockades, terroristic acts and military actions in Lithuania or close neighbourhood) events. According to article 28, MIA units are responsible to restore public order in the flashpoint: police is controlling approaches and maintains public order, traffic control, organizes evacuation of casualties; Public Security Service supports police and prevents rough violations of public order; military units can be also employed if situation requires (Lithuanian Parliament, 1998).

Fourthly, *State of Emergency Law* defines special regime in the state or in the specified area, where some Constitutional rights of the person can be temporarily suspended. The state can be introduced if constitutional order or public order is endangered due to an emergency situation and there is

no other way to fight the consequences. An institution, which is assigned to steer the emergency, takes all the means necessary to meet the objectives assigned. It is also authorized to establish *Public order commandant parties* that are formed to cope with the emergencies (Lithuanian Parliament. 2002). Depending on the situation, the parties can consist of the State Security Department's, MIA's officers and civil servants; and MOD's soldiers and civilians (Lithuanian Government, 2003). Therefore, during the State of Emergency MIA remains the primary institution responsible for the maintaining the public order, still MOD capabilities can be invoked (e.g. by creation of *Public order commandant parties*).

### **MIA in new-generation war initial phases**

According to Tchekinov's and Bogdanov's theory there is a number of strategic activities to be completed that would shape the environment and create favourable conditions for conventional military actions. These preparations are taking six out of eight phases. The essay considers that the opposing side is not using military force at all or using it in under cover during these six phases. Therefore, MIA is to take the leading role handling unrests and other acts of violence.

In fact, the first, second and third phases do not have very high involvement of MIA resources due to the reason that soft power elements are used. During the first phase informational, diplomatic, ideological and economic measures are implemented. MIA does not have authority, tasks or capabilities to monitor or take any responsive measures as this is the Government's responsibility to react. The second and third phases are closely related and they could be described as informational operations to mislead political and military leaders, also conducting intimidation and bribery to make them abandon their duties. Countering this is also not directly connected with MIA competence.

Ultimately, in the fourth phase MIA importance highly increases. Destabilizing propaganda creates discontent among the population. At the same time arriving foreign militants escalate subversion and incite violence. Subsequently, it may lead to protests, riots and other violent acts. MIA agencies, such as police, public security service and border guard units, are the key institutions to prevent these acts of violence and restore the public order. Nevertheless, their capacity might be not sufficient. Therefore, employment of military units to secure critical infrastructure, conduct riot control or reinforce patrolling along the state border can be also required, depending on the scale of the unrests.

Furthermore, in the fifth phase the situation will continue to be escalated by employment of private security companies and military mercenaries to support armed opposition units. If such units take place in wide multiple areas, MIA may not be capable to fight back. Such circumstances may require announcing *Emergency Situation* or even declaring *State of Emergency* in these specific territories. Military units in this phase may be required not only for supportive and preventive tasks, but also to perform cordoning and detention of such illegal militants' bands, establishing military patrolling and curfew in specified areas.

Finally, during the last phase before a conventional war foreign military Special Forces will be deployed. Other military actions, mainly related to intelligence services, should also be started. This will require even higher involvement of the military units. Despite the fact that there is no declaration of the state of war, NATO states may be involved to provide military assistance fighting unconventional threat at least by providing intelligence assets. MIA will not have direct liaison with these military structures that is why the importance of MOD is also very high.

Altogether it can be assessed that MIA is the main actor fighting the threat in the initial phases of an unconventional war. Despite the fact that

MOD's role is low in the initial phases, its involvement gradually rises. At least at the end of the sixth phase armed forces must be ready take over the command of the antiterrorist operation and MIA should become the supporting asset.

## **Conclusions**

So, can MIA fight unconventional warfare threats alone or they have to be reinforced by military forces? According to Russian strategy unconventional war sets conditions for effective conventional military actions during initial phases of the conflict. This creates transitional situation, where neither police, nor military force could act effectively. Lithuania has four segregated force structures – three under MIA (Police, Public Security Service, Border guard) and one under MOD (Military forces). According to the Law, these structures can be employed in stand-alone mode or in combination between each other depending on the situation. Therefore, in Lithuania during the initial phases of the unconventional war MIA units (Police and Border Guard) act independently with support of Public Security Service, when necessary. However, MIA capacities are limited in place and scope. Thus, employment of the military units is indispensable if crisis becomes more intensive and widespread.

This suggests that MIA and MOD need to study recent examples of unconventional warfare strategy and tactic; identify existing gaps in bilateral cooperation and potential areas that could be exploited by opposing party. This would lead to the creation of the strategy to be used. Developed contingency plans and detailed instructions would reduce the risk of uncertainty if threat emerges. For this reason advanced interoperability fighting unconventional war threats has to be developed between MIA forces internally and externally with MOD forces. This can be achieved through interagency cooperation on the daily basis, integrated

planning and conduct of threat related exercises together. Equally important is involvement of other governmental agencies that indirectly support MIA and MOD in this issue (e.g. State Security Department).

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# **In light of the Iraq war, is the 'Blair Doctrine' still valid?**

**MAJ Fariz Fadzan**

## **Introduction**

In May 1997 Tony Blair stated: 'Mine is the first generation able to contemplate the possibility that we may live our entire lives without going to war or sending our children to war' (Hughes, 2013 p. 558). However, during first six years of Blair's premiership the UK military had been deployed to five operations: Kosovo, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan and twice in Iraq (Dorman, 2009 p. 9). These operations were justified as humanitarian interventions aiming to protect human rights (Abbott et al., 2004).

In June 2007, four years after the UK troops deployed to Iraq, Tony Blair resigned as the Prime Minister. While there are arguments that Blair's resignation was, to some degree, a result of the pressure from his Party rival and successor Gordon Brown (McAllister, 2006), it was the Iraq War that forced Blair to leave leading positions both in the Labour Party and in the UK Government. Blair's reputation was destroyed by his awkward attempts to justify the intervention in Iraq. According to the BBC, within ten years of his premiership Tony Blair had evolved from the most popular to 'one of the least popular' prime ministers in British history (BBC, 2007).

Explaining the rationale behind the NATO intervention in Kosovo, Blair publicized his criteria for humanitarian intervention which later became known as the 'Blair Doctrine' (Blair, 1999). The Doctrine triggered the United Nations (UN) to develop the concept of Responsibility to Protect (R2P). Furthermore, these doctrines and their application emphasized once more a tension between state sovereignty and need for international

action to protect human rights. That tension is a focal point of this essay. A few theoretical concepts and practical issues of contemporary international relations will be examined while answering the question whether the 'Blair Doctrine' is still valid in light of the Iraq war and this essay will argue the following thesis:

*While it contributed to development of the R2P, the Blair Doctrine is not valid since the Iraq War illustrated its ambiguous character and its possible use as a justification tool for coercive changes of regimes.*

The essay is structured in three parts. It will firstly describe the Blair Doctrine and touch upon the challenge it placed to the classic concept of sovereignty. Then the essay will outline the UN concept of R2P, touching upon similarities but focusing on differences between the R2P and the Blair Doctrine in order to highlight issues related to the latter. Thirdly, this essay will prove that the Iraq War invalidated the Blair Doctrine from the perspective of the Just War. The conclusion will summarize the research findings and offer a view ahead.

## **The Blair Doctrine: Just War, Liberal Internationalism and Realism**

In the speech he delivered to Chicago Economic Club in April 1999 Tony Blair characterized the ongoing NATO engagement in Kosovo as a humanitarian intervention and introduced his ideas of 'a new doctrine of international community' (Blair, 1999). This concept, which later became known as the Blair Doctrine, presents a specific mixture of liberal internationalism<sup>15</sup>, political realism<sup>16</sup> and the Just War theory<sup>17</sup>.

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<sup>15</sup> Liberal internationalism can be defined as 'A marriage between the pursuit of liberal purposes (security, free trade, human rights, rule of law, democracy promotion, etc.) and the use of institutionalist means to pursue them (multilateral institutions of various stripes - not only the UN, but NATO or the G-7 as well).' (Drezner, 2006)

Liberal internationalism had been Blair's primary political orientation since 1996. His policy had been based on principles of free market, democracy and human rights, as well as on the idea of a Western-led international community (Moses, 2010 p. 28). These ideas, accompanied by globalisation and interdependence, are the core of the Blair Doctrine. Blair claimed that the globalization had fundamentally changed the world and that nations were interdependent to the extent that events on one side of the globe would have direct implications on the other side. This interdependence is evident primarily in the economic sphere, but Blair understands it as a comprehensive phenomenon that also encompasses security and the political domain. Blair argues that the changes caused by globalization require new rules in international relations and 'new ways of organizing our international institutions.' Globalization and interdependence contributed to the necessity of protecting universal values of human rights, open society and liberty. (Blair, 1999). These ideas identify liberal internationalism as Blair's primary political discourse, place '...a serious empirical challenge to the realist belief in state autonomy' (Atkins, 2006), and indicate a need to revise the concept of sovereignty and non-interference.

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<sup>16</sup> Political realism can be defined as an approach to international relations that emphasizes a power struggle between states that are motivated solely by their self-interests in chaotic international relations. Main instruments of this power struggle are military and diplomacy. Political realists are sceptical about ethical norms and see power balance as a key to international stability (Korab-Kapowicz, 2013).

<sup>17</sup> Just War is an ethical theory that served as the basis for many rules of international law, from The Hague and Geneva Conventions to the Charter of the United Nations. It originates from work of Aristotle, Cicero and St Augustine. It consists of 3 parts: (1) *jus ad bellum*, (2) *jus in Bello* and (3) *jus post bellum* (Orend, 2005). These parts will be described later.

Acknowledging that values merge with interests, Blair combines liberal internationalism with elements of political realism. The Blair Doctrine recognizes that international actions 'are guided by a more subtle blend of mutual self-interest and moral purpose' and claims that 'The spread of our values makes us safer' (1999).

The central part of the Blair Doctrine is the five criteria for military intervention which are based on the Just War theory. Emphasizing that the international community is not able to intervene everywhere, Blair offered criteria to determine if a humanitarian military intervention is justified:

'First, are we sure of our case? [...] Second, have we exhausted all diplomatic options? [...] Third, on the basis of a practical assessment of the situation, are there military operations we can sensibly and prudently undertake? Fourth, are we prepared for the long term? [...] And finally, do we have national interests involved?' (Blair, 1999)

First question: 'are we sure of our case?' integrates three criteria of *Jus ad Bellum*<sup>18</sup>: just cause, right intention and proportionality. Blair described Kosovo intervention as a just war aiming to counter ethnic cleansing and to protect human rights (1999). This description corresponds to criteria of *just cause* and *right intention*. At the same time, while considering cost and benefits of humanitarian intervention in accordance with the Just War criterion of *proportionality*, Blair emphasizes that war is 'sometimes the only means of dealing with dictators' (1999) and gives a convincing argument to political realists: 'If we let an evil dictator range

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<sup>18</sup> *Jus ad bellum* prescribes six criteria which a state or a political organization must fulfil in order to initiate a 'just war' in accordance with the Just War theory. These criteria are: (1) *Just cause* - a war may be started only for a just cause. Examples are self-defence and protection of innocents; (2) *Right intention* - it must be to fulfil a just cause. Intentions such as territorial gains or hatred are unacceptable; (3) *Proper authority and public declaration* - a state may go to war if its legitimate authority has publicly declared it; (4) *Last resort* - war is justified only if all peaceful means to resolve a conflict have been exhausted; (5) *Probability of success* - a war should not be waged if it will be just a futile violence; (6) *Proportionality* - 'universal good' that is expected must be worth of 'universal evil' that will be caused by war (Orend, 2005).

unchallenged, we will have to spill infinitely more blood and treasure to stop him later.’ (1999).

Blair’s second question corresponds to Just War’s criterion of *last resort*, and third to *probability of success*. In his speech Blair brought up some results of ongoing Kosovo intervention and indicated that the intervention would be successful (1999).

The fourth question, ‘are we prepared for a long term?’ touches upon the just peace in accordance with *Jus post Bellum*<sup>19</sup>. Blair emphasized that ‘we cannot simply walk over once the fight is over’ and the intervention should be followed by a political framework for permanent stability (1999). Once more balancing with political realism, Blair also said it would be better to have a longer deployment of smaller military force to stabilize the situation, than to be compelled to commit a larger force again (Blair, 1999).

The final question brought allegations that the Blair Doctrine was an expression of political realism (Atkins, 2006). While there is no doubt that elements of realism are present in the Blair Doctrine, and very explicit in the last criterion which considers existence of national interest, it is still evident that the doctrine is a mix of liberalism and realism. Blair was trying to bridge a gap between liberals and realists, not because he was a realist disguised as a liberal but because he was trying to make the concept of humanitarian intervention justified and acceptable to those who did not share his political discourse. If Blair was a pure realist, what was

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<sup>19</sup> Jus post Bellum deals with the justice of ending wars and transition to peace. ‘There needs, in short, to be an *ethical* “exit strategy” from war, and it deserves at least as much thought and effort as the purely military exit strategy so much on the minds of policy planners and commanding officers.’ (Orend, 2005)

such an important British national interest in Kosovo that led him to advocate a military intervention?

## **The Blair Doctrine and the R2P**

The NATO intervention in Kosovo, performed in accordance with the Blair Doctrine, vigorously challenged the traditional view of sovereignty and non-intervention. While it was characterized as illegal, because it lacked a prior UN Security Council (UNSC) approval, the NATO intervention in Kosovo was seen as legitimate, because it ended violations of human rights. (The Independent International Commission on Kosovo, 2000 p. 4). As the credibility of the UN had already been damaged by its failures to protect civilians in Bosnia and Rwanda, and NATO intervention in Kosovo created a precedence of using military force without a prior UNSC approval, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan understood that lack of consensus in the UNSC on military intervention in similar cases in the future could lead to marginalization of the UN. The UNSC could simply be bypassed again in case of a new crisis similar to Kosovo (Chandler, 2005 p. 72). Striving to return the issue of humanitarian intervention to the legal framework of UN, and to maintain legitimacy of the UNSC, Annan strongly called for unity of the UN to protect human rights while respecting the sovereignty of states (Annan, 1999). The response to his appeal was development of the R2P and its unanimous acceptance by the UN General Assembly<sup>20</sup>.

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<sup>20</sup> Development of the Responsibility to Protect started with International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) which was established in September 2000 to examine 'legal, moral, operational and political' aspects of humanitarian intervention and state sovereignty and to provide report 'that would help the Secretary-General and everyone else find some new common ground' (International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 2001 p. VII). The ICISS final report was the cornerstone of the R2P. The R2P was *unanimously* adopted by the UN General Assembly at the World Summit 2005 (UN General Assembly, 2005) and 'reaffirmed in Council resolutions—including 1674 (2006) and 1894 (2009)—in reports of the UN Secretary General,<sup>4</sup> and in the establishment of a new joint office for R2P and the prevention of genocide' (Bellamy, et al., 2011). The Final Document of the 2005 World Summit writes:

As a concept aiming to regulate use of external military force for purpose of human rights protection in a sovereign state, the R2P is similar to the Blair Doctrine. It could be argued that the Blair Doctrine contributed to development of the R2P both formally and substantially: formally because its application initiated development of the R2P; substantially because the R2P, like the Blair Doctrine, finds its ethical base in the Just War theory<sup>21</sup> and endeavours to bridge a gap between liberal and realist views on the issues of human rights, state sovereignty and national interest. However, while the Blair Doctrine, as a result of his political orientation, is 'Western oriented', the R2P, as a result of a global compromise, is 'universally oriented'. Consequently, these two concepts have a few significant differences.

First of all, the R2P differs from the Blair Doctrine in understanding of state sovereignty and legitimacy of international military intervention. Consistently with his political discourse, Blair claims that state sovereignty is conditional not only on protection of human rights, but also on *legitimacy* of regime: 'When regimes are based on minority rule, they lose legitimacy...' (Blair, 1999). Consequently, only democratic states based on rule of majority are legitimate and sovereign. For Blair, *democracy is '...a marker of full state sovereignty*, laying a boundary between the "international community" and its Others, and undermining the principle of

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*'...Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary means. We accept that responsibility and will act in accordance with it. The international community should, as appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise this responsibility and support the United Nations in establishing an early warning capability. [...] In this context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.'* (UN General Assembly, 2005).

<sup>21</sup> The R2P offers six criteria for military intervention which are reiteration of *jus ad bellum*: (1) right authority, (2) just cause, (3) right intention, (4) last resort, (5) proportional means and (6) reasonable prospects (ICISS, 2001 p. 32).

non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states' (Moses, 2010 p. 40). Therefore, the '*international community*', as seen in the Blair Doctrine, is the *right authority* to decide on military interventions in states which are considered to be illegitimate. On the other hand, sovereignty in R2P is a universal quality of all states. Starting from the principle of non-intervention, the R2P develops a new dimension of state sovereignty, which implies principal responsibility of a state to protect its own citizens (ICISS, 2001 p. XI). The role of the international community is primarily to assist the state, and only if the state is failing to protect its citizens from genocide, ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity or war crimes, the international community has a responsibility to take a collective action through the UN mechanism. Specific measures are to be decided by the UNSC "on a case by case basis" and may include a military intervention (UN General Assembly, 2005 p. 30).

Secondly, while in the Blair Doctrine the *right authority* is the international community consisting of democratic states, for the R2P the *right authority* is the UNSC, as the only body that can legitimize a military intervention<sup>22</sup> (UN General Assembly, 2005 p. 30).

Thirdly, the R2P offers a broader approach to protection of human rights than the Blair Doctrine. While the Blair Doctrine in its essence merely presents a set of criteria to justify a military intervention and only touches upon the stability measures in the aftermath, the R2P concept includes three responsibilities of the sovereign state assisted by international community: *to prevent*, *to react* and *to rebuild* (ICISS, 2001 p. XI). While prevention is not mentioned in the Blair Doctrine, in the R2P prevention is seen as 'the single most important dimension'. Responsibility to react in

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<sup>22</sup> While the ICISS report leaves open a possibility that 'concerned states' might act without the Security Council authorisation if '...it fails to discharge its responsibility to protect in conscience-shocking situations crying out for action...' (ICISS, 2001 p. XIII), The 2005 World Summit Outcome Document does not discuss such a possibility and emphasizes a central role of the Security Council and actions in accordance with the UN Charter.



R2P includes a possibility of international military intervention only as a last resort and in extreme cases. Responsibility to rebuild includes 'full assistance with recovery, reconstruction and reconciliation, addressing the causes of the harm the intervention was designed to halt or avert.' (ICISS, 2001 p. XI).

Another important difference between the Blair Doctrine and the R2P is in motive and purpose of military intervention. The R2P accepts a limited scope of international military intervention with a clear and unambiguous purpose to stop or prevent human suffering (ICISS, 2001). This scope, accompanied by the UN decision making process, aims to eliminate a possibility of using the protection of human rights as an excuse for military intervention to another purpose. While an intervention in accordance with R2P could still result with a regime change, particularly if a country had an oppressive regime that violated basic human rights of its population, this outcome would be just a side-effect of such an intervention, as it was seen in Libya and Côte d'Ivoire (Bellamy, et al., 2011). For Blair on the other hand, the purpose of military intervention reaches beyond alleviation of human suffering, ultimately aiming to 'establish and spread the values' of Western democracy:

'Now our actions are guided by a more subtle blend of mutual self-interest and moral purpose in defending the values we cherish. In the end, values and interests merge. If we can establish and spread the values of liberty, the rule of law, human rights and an open society then that is in our national interests too.' (Blair, 1999).

Blair's views on state sovereignty and purpose of military intervention, seen in conjunction with his criterion of 'national interest', could be interpreted in a way which justifies military interventions aiming not only to prevent human rights violations, but to change any regime that the 'international community' of democratic states perceives as illegitimate. While this might not have been an original Blair's intention, a possibility of

such interpretations undermines the validity of his doctrine, as it was the case with the Iraq War.

## **The Blair Doctrine and the Iraq War**

In April 2009 Tony Blair spoke in Chicago again - this time as a former UK Prime Minister. Talking about wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and the oppressive nature of the Taliban and Saddam's regimes, he claimed that the Blair Doctrine remains as valid as it was in 1999 and 'what has really changed is the context in which the doctrine has to be applied' (Blair, 2009). However, while in 1999 it was widely accepted as legitimate because it was evidently applied to protect human rights, there are many arguments that the Blair Doctrine was invalidated in 2003 by attempts to use it as a justification for the Iraq War.

First of all, the Iraq War did not have a *just cause*. Attempts to characterize it as a humanitarian intervention to protect human rights seem unsubstantiated. Nigel Biggar claimed that the atrocities against civilians committed by Saddam Hussein's regime from 1988 to 2003 were the just cause for military intervention and that Iraq's alleged weapons of mass destruction (WMD) were of a secondary importance (Fisher, et al., 2011 p. 696). However, Biggar disregards the fact that, unlike in Kosovo, no mass atrocities were taking place in Iraq at the time when the military intervention was initiated so the just cause to protect the population was not present. Moreover, Biggar fails to notice that the official cause for the British government to intervene in Iraq were not atrocities against civilians, but Saddam's possession of WMD which were perceived as a threat to the region (Fisher, et al., 2011 p. 688).

Apart from the fact that the cause of the intervention was WMD which have never been found, the invasion of Iraq was not the last resort. Unlike Kosovo, where a military action was urgent due to the fact that Milosevic

was trying to finish the ethnic cleansing before accepting any peace agreement (Hosmer, 2001), such urgency did not exist in Iraq and diplomatic options were not exhausted. Iraqi government was complying with the UN Security Council Resolution 1441<sup>23</sup>, actively and continuously cooperating with UNMOVIC<sup>24</sup> inspectors for a few months before the invasion. From November 2002 to March 2003 UNMOVIC performed many inspections throughout Iraq but no WMD, production sites or storages of WMD were found. Iraqi government seemed to be willing to continue with cooperation and UNMOVIC needed just a few additional months to complete its work (Blix, 2003). However, the inspectors were withdrawn from Iraq on 18 March 2003 and military invasion began a day after (UN Security Council, 2003). The UN Secretary General characterized the intervention as 'an illegal act that contravened the UN Charter' (BBC News, 2004). Had a few more months been given to UNMOVIC and diplomacy, and there was no reason not to do so, it would have become obvious that Iraq had no WMD and Tony Blair would have lost his case in front of the British Parliament.

Even if the WMD was the real cause of war, requirements of *right intention* would have been satisfied if the aim of the war had been to eliminate that cause. In other words, the military intervention should have had a limited aim: to neutralize the Iraqi WMD capability. However, Blair's statements from 2009 indicated that the WMD was merely an excuse

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<sup>23</sup> UNSC Resolution 1441 of 9 November 2002 gave the Iraqi government the last opportunity to cooperate with the UNMOVIC and provide it with 'immediate, unimpeded, unconditional, and unrestricted access to any and all, including underground, areas, facilities, buildings, equipment, records, and means of transport which they wish to inspect, as well as immediate, unimpeded, unrestricted, and private access to all officials and other persons whom UNMOVIC or the IAEA wish to interview in the mode or location of UNMOVIC's or the IAEA's choice pursuant to any aspect of their mandates; further decides that UNMOVIC and the IAEA may at their discretion conduct interviews inside or outside of Iraq, may facilitate the travel of those interviewed and family members outside of Iraq, and that, at the sole discretion of UNMOVIC and the IAEA, such interviews may occur without the presence of observers from the Iraqi Government...' (United Nations Security Council, 2002).

<sup>24</sup> The United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) was created in December 1999, replacing the former UN Special Commission (UNSCOM). It was mandated to verify Iraq's compliance with its obligation to be rid of its WMD and missiles with a range of more than 150 km.

while the real aim of war was to change the regime in Iraq. Blair admitted that even without evidence of WMD 'he would still have thought it right to remove Saddam Hussein from power' and 'would have found a way to justify the war to parliament and the public' (Butt, et al., 2009). In terms of the Blair Doctrine the Iraq war could be legitimately described as follows: the international community, consisting of the United States and the United Kingdom, decided to change the illegitimate regime in Iraq. As Iraq was not a democratic state it did not have full sovereignty, so the intervention is justified. According to Toby Dodge, the removal of Saddam should have allowed 'democracy to flourish, with a liberated population and a vibrant free market to constrain the behaviour of any future government' (Dodge, 2010).

Instead of a free market and 'flourishing' democracy, the intervention in Iraq brought a disproportionate amount of harm. After Saddam's regime was changed, the Iraq War continued in form of a counterinsurgency campaign which ended with withdrawal of coalition troops in December 2011. While it could be argued that those nine years of Iraq campaign demonstrated preparedness of international community for a long term commitment in accordance with the Blair Doctrine to support building of democratic institutions, it should be borne in mind that the purpose of such a commitment should be to achieve a *just peace*. Three years after coalition withdrawal it seems like the just peace in Iraq is still to be achieved. The country is far from being 'sovereign, stable and self-reliant' as the President of the United States Barrack Obama described it (Obama, et al., 2011). In reality, Iraq is a failing state facing sectarian violence, frequent terrorist attacks and the threat from so called 'Islamic State' (Holmes, 2014). Iraq casualty statistics for the period between 2003 and 2014 vary from 126,370 (Armed Conflict Database, 2014) to 202,000 (Iraq Body Count, 2014), with almost 700,000 refugees and more than 2

million IDPs (Armed Conflict Database, 2014). As the violence continues, the dreadful statistics increase daily.

The War in Iraq clearly illustrated the ambiguous character of the Blair Doctrine and demonstrated how it can be used to justify coercive changes of regimes and political systems.

Coalition forces tried to build a mirror-image of Western democracy in Iraq, but once more it came out that democracy cannot be imposed from outside, and particularly not by military force. Democracy must come from inside a country and 'there are as many routes to democracy as there are countries' (Cooper, 2005 p. 32).

## **Conclusion**

Life, freedom and dignity are universal values of humankind and fighting to protect these values, to protect the innocents against the barbarians, is a chivalrous and inspiring idea. Since these values are violated in many countries, the question is whether and under which circumstances it is justified to use military force to protect human rights in another sovereign state. The Blair Doctrine and the R2P are two concepts aiming to answer that question, but from different perspectives.

The Blair Doctrine is Western-oriented, based on premise that the Cold War ended with global victory of democracy. For Blair, democracy sets the boundary between 'the international community' and 'others'. Full sovereignty belongs only to democratic states which are based on rule of majority. Consequently, the international community of democratic states is the *right authority* to decide when to use military force to protect human rights. To this end Blair offers five decision criteria based on his (re)interpretation of the Just War theory, and combined with elements of liberal internationalism and political realism.

The R2P is universally-oriented, based on traditional principles of sovereignty and non-intervention. Trying to avoid the conflict between right to sovereignty and right to intervention, the R2P conceptualizes a new dimension of sovereignty, which implies responsibility of a sovereign state to protect rights of its own citizens. Failing to fulfil this responsibility may lead to an international military intervention, but only in cases when genocide, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing or war crimes are taking place. The sole authority to decide on international actions to protect human rights, up to and including military intervention is the UNSC. The decision mechanism for an action in accordance with R2P is at the same time a strength and a weakness of the R2P concept: strength because the UNSC resolution will give undisputable legitimacy to such an action; weakness because any resolution must be a result of political consensus in the UNSC which is sometimes very difficult to achieve. A failure in the UNSC to implement the R2P could trigger another, arguably legitimate, unilateral military intervention to protect human rights.

The war in Iraq invalidated the Blair Doctrine as such as its aim was to change the Saddam's regime and establish a Western-type democracy. Alleged WMD and human rights violations were just excuses that Blair offered to the British Parliament and the public to gain their support for military action. The invasion was initiated despite of the fact that diplomatic and other options were still available and brought disproportionately high amount of damage. Eleven years later, and three years after the coalition's withdrawal, Iraq seems to be a larger threat to international peace and security than it was before the invasion.

An attempt to enforce a mirror-image of western democracy in Iraq proved that democracy cannot be imposed, but it must come from inside a society. It also demonstrated that the use of force, and the military force in particular, should be scrutinized very carefully in order to avoid creating more harm than good.

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# **Can the use of enhanced interrogation techniques ever be justified during counter insurgency operations?**

**MAJ Mike Dehner**

## **Introduction**

There are scenarios that justify the use of enhanced interrogation techniques (EIT) during counter insurgency operations. These techniques must be heavily regulated, monitored, and applied only when necessity requires such measures. Though there are opinions against such methods, the reality is that enhanced interrogation can be productive. Additionally, there is public support for it.

The character, Jack Bauer, in the Fox television series *24*, is a US government agent who has only twenty four hours to thwart a plot to attack the United States. This is the premise for all eight seasons. The antagonist takes the form of terrorists, corrupt government officials, rogue contractors, weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and even rogue Chinese agents. The series was extremely successful and garnered 73 Emmy award nominations and won Outstanding Drama Series in 2006. The lead actor, Keifer Sutherland, won the Emmy for Outstanding Lead Actor in a Drama Series (FOX, n.d.). Jack Bauer does whatever it takes to get the job done. With the clock ticking, Jack often resorts to EIT to rapidly acquire the information necessary to stop the impending attack. In fact, in the first five seasons of *24*, there were 67 enhanced interrogations (Miller, 2007). Though FOX has received some negative responses from organized groups such as Amnesty International, the fact remains that the public loved the series (Toomer, 2014).

In the movie *Taken*, Liam Neeson's character, Bryan, does what he has to do (enhanced interrogation) in order to recover his kidnapped daughter from evil perpetrators of the European sex slave trade. At one point, he shoots to wound the wife of his once friend who is withholding information that could help Bryan save his daughter. In another scene, Bryan secures a sex slave trader to a makeshift electric chair in order to extract critical information (Wolcott, 2013). The total domestic gross from this movie was over \$145 million (Box Office Mojo, n.d.). Despite any moral outcry against EIT, the movie has been successful enough to spawn two sequels.

The two examples previously discussed are fictional. However, the reaction to these entertainment products is generally favourable and thus accepting of the methods used by the hero. As long as the EIT is directed towards an acceptable villain, the method of information extraction may be tolerable to the moral thresholds of some as long as it is for a good cause. At most, one may ask him/herself if they would be capable of doing the same thing in order to save the ones they love or their way of life. It may also be much easier to answer yes to this question when one will never have to witness the ugliness of such methods. In reality, it is some person's job to do exactly that: extract critical information under extreme time compression in order to stop enemy actions against friendly assets (including innocent civilians).

There appears to be as many reports and opinions against EIT as there are supporting the need for it. It is not the intent of this essay to convince the reader that EIT should be legal. Nor is it the intent of the essay to convince readers that EIT is consequence free. This essay will argue that enhanced interrogation may be justified under certain conditions in order to extract critical, time sensitive information. In the process of making this argument, this essay will demonstrate that those opinions against

enhanced interrogation are idealistic, emotionally based, and constructed on false assumptions.

## **Categorizing/Framing Torture**

Article III of the Geneva Conventions provides guidance regarding the treatment of those who are not actively engaged in hostilities and in the control of others (civilians, Prisoners of War, detainees, etc.) (International Committee of the Red Cross, n.d.). This article was written from an absolutist position in an attempt to ensure that no government would be able to claim a loophole in the law and cause suffering via torture to a person in their control. The intent was to write the article so broadly, that no torture/mistreatment for any reason imaginable would be justified. In reality, the broad language and lack of agreed upon definitions provides room for manoeuvre regarding interpretation (Casey, et al., 2009).

The absolutist approach to torture does not coincide with the United States (and other nations) approach to suffering. Himma describes this hypocrisy as he compares torture to being confined in a maximum security prison for a long period of time. The incarceration is punishment and supposed to be unpleasant. The psychological/physical damage that can occur from long incarcerations may actually be greater than the psychological and physical damage caused by certain forms of EIT. Some, if given a choice, may prefer short term torture over a long term incarceration and exposure to the inherent danger of living with violent criminals. He also offers up the example that killing another human being is wrong except under certain conditions, yet no conditions are acceptable when it comes to torture (Himma, 2007, p.236-237).

There is a difference between terroristic torture and EIT. Terroristic torture is performed for the sake of cruelty itself. It may be performed to punish

political opponents, criminals, or generally intimidate a society/community into submission. EIT is performed in order to extract a confession or gain knowledge about the enemy (Fiala, 2006). Terroristic torture is morally indefensible by Western standards and, thus, has no circumstances that could justify the action. EIT, on the other hand, may be justified under certain totality of circumstances such as lethality of a future attack, time compression, or a captive's (confirmed beyond reasonable doubt) complicity in the planning/execution of a future attack.

## **Abandoning Acceptable Methods of Interrogation and Underestimating the Threat of the Non State Actor**

Joshua Dratel illustrates his opinion against the use of torture post 9/11. He contends that the United States abandoned its acceptable interrogation methods without any justification. Dratel also attacks the notion that the Al Qaeda threat required brutal interrogation techniques. He does this by minimizing Al Qaeda as compared to the threat of the Nazis and Japanese during World War II. Specifically, Joshua Dratel states that these global threats in the early 1940s were eliminated without abandoning the laws of war or international norms (Dratel, 2006, p.111-114). This is where the Dratel position unravels.

Heather MacDonald's opinion provides answers to Dratel's first contention mentioned above (abandonment of acceptable interrogation methods). MacDonald illustrates that the interrogators of Taliban fighters in Kandahar quickly realized that the prisoners were able to easily defeat the standard methods of leveraging personal pride, love of family, love of life, resentment of comrades, and cooperation leading to release. The Taliban prisoners did not fit the profile of the captives depicted in the US interrogator's previous training. The Taliban did not appear to care about their families, and certainly not about their physical lives on Earth. Thus,

the Taliban simply endured knowing the US interrogators could do nothing to them (MacDonald, 2006, p. 85-86). The methods in use at the time could not provide information at the rate required to support the desired tempo of military operations. This is why enhanced interrogation was required.

Dratel's assumption regarding the threat of Al Qaeda as compared to the Nazis and Japan during World War II illustrates his ignorance of all three actors. What should be the most glaring difference is that the Germans and Japanese military wore uniforms and were, thus, easy to identify. Al Qaeda operatives and Taliban insurgents, however, blend in with non-fighters as they wear clothing common to the environment in which they operate. The only law that the extremists follow regarding conduct is an extremist version of Islam. The motivation that drives these three actors is also quite different. Though some German military members may have certainly been committed members of the Nazi party, some were simply German Soldiers because they were Germans (or subject to Germany). Guy Sajer in his book, *The Forgotten Soldier*, portrays a feeling of national pride, not a hatred for others, and certainly ambivalent to the Nazi party. He, and others like him, were soldiers because that is what a young, able-bodied man did in the early 1940s. If one did not join, they were often conscripted anyway (Sajer, 1988). Japanese Soldiers were motivated by national pride and commitment to the Emperor of Japan. A primary aspect of their pride was the bushido code. This code instilled a fierce sense of honour and commitment to die before surrender or capture (Patterson, 2010). National pride and honour on the battlefield may motivate some Afghan fighters. However, Taliban and Al Qaeda force's motivation comes from what they believe to exist in an afterlife. Thus, as mentioned above, they do not care about what happens to them physically (MacDonald, 2006, p. 85). Further, Dratel does not appear to understand the level of threat regarding an invisible enemy such as exists in non-uniformed/ non-



state fighters and operatives. This is especially true in the modern day where an enemy can travel and communicate around the world much more efficiently than in the 1940s. The strength of the modern, non-state enemy is not in mass formations of conventional force, but the ability to travel, communicate, and blend into the environment.

Dratel's argument continues to wear thin as he describes the United States' willingness to abandon the Geneva Conventions, the Uniformed Code of Military Justice, and the US Constitution. He does not mention any specifics regarding any three of these documents (Dratel, 2006, p. 112). In regards to the Geneva Convention, Dratel is correct. Article III (known also as Common Article III) precludes the use of torture for those people not taking an active role in hostilities. Those persons in the custody of a High Contracting Party are included in this group (International Committee of the Red Cross, n.d.). The US Constitution and the Uniformed Code of Military Justice are meant for United States citizens and service members of the United States Armed Forces. It is difficult to understand how Dratel intended to apply these documents to detained al Qaeda and Taliban fighters that did not possess a legitimate US passport.

## **The Validity of Information Extracted via Enhanced Interrogation**

There appears to be evidence to support the premise that information gained via EIT is unreliable. The idea is that a person will say or do anything to make the pain stop. The person will confess to crimes or make up a story that the interrogator wants to hear. Some people who were questioned via EIT stated afterward that they mixed truth and fabrication in order to stop the pain and thwart the efforts of the interrogator (Costanzo, et al., 2009). It should be noted that there is a vast difference in decisions for a person (subjected to EIT) to confess to a past crime as

compared to providing information regarding a future event. Falsely confessing to a past crime under the pressure of pain/suffering may be a short leap. One only needs to connect the relationship between confessing and the pain stopping. This person may justify the false confession by coming to the logical conclusion that the consequences of confessing has to be better than enduring the current suffering. Also, the person may believe that the confession will buy him/her time to prove their innocence with legal help (Schwartz, 2010).

Information revealed from EIT regarding future events may also be unreliable if the technique is applied to people associated with an enemy. For example, applying EIT to a low ranking enlisted person in an attempt to uncover the details of a strategic plan has a high probability of producing useless information. A reasonable person would not believe that a Soldier with the rank of Private would have strategic level knowledge. This Private may say anything to appease the interrogator and make the pain stop. When EIT is applied in this manner, there may be a high risk of receiving false information. In contrast, if a detainee is believed to have critical information based on the totality of circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt, the probability of uncovering real and useful information through EIT increases (Himma, 2007, p. 239-241). An example of such a situation is that of the interrogation of Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (KSM). KSM was captured in 2003 and was known to be a key planner and the head of Al Qaeda's military committee. His capture was the result of enhanced interrogations of Abu Zabaydah and Ramzi Binalshibh (Thiessen, 2011). He was interrogated initially with direct questioning regarding the structure, finances, and most importantly, future operations. KSM's response was that his enemies would soon know what the future holds. Based on Al Qaeda's past performance, the interrogators did not take this statement lightly. KSM's interrogations escalated to EIT in order to extract the time sensitive information he held.

This resulted in securing information regarding attacks on the Brooklyn Bridge in New York City, poisoning drinking water systems, and anthrax attacks. Due to the secrecy of the interrogations, the veracity of these results regarding future attacks are disputed (Gewe, 2010). In the case of KSM, the authorities satisfied reasonable doubt precautions before escalating from direct questioning to EIT. Time and threat did not allow the interrogators and their supervisors the option to develop the relationship with the captive as may be considered the normal/ accepted path to extracting information.

The argument that EIT results are often fabrications is further contested by the WikiLeaks documents released in 2011 known as the *Gitmo Files*. These documents reveal the amount of information that was extracted by EIT and proven actionable. For example, Abu Faraj al-Libi was held by CIA interrogators in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Libi provided the information that painted the picture of bin Laden's courier system and use of a single individual for moving information from bin Laden to his Al Qaeda operatives and supporters. The courier was finally captured which lead to the raid that killed bin Laden in Abbottabad, Pakistan. As illustrated above, KSM's interrogations provided a great deal of information that was developed into actionable intelligence. Furthermore, the Gitmo Files revealed more post 9/11 attack plots that were thwarted due to the information from KSM. A detailed attack involving crashing planes into Heathrow Airport in London was detailed by KSM during the interrogations. This information led to the capture of the recruited martyrs which the CIA was previously unaware of (Thiessen, 2011).

## **Torture Causes Torture**

Some opponents of EIT believe that by torturing captives, the enemy will begin torturing friendly forces captured. Though this seems logical, it has not manifested in reality. This is not to say that the enemies of the United

States do not torture captives. They certainly have. However, it appears that the enemy historically tortures regardless of international law or the behaviour towards those captured by the US. Colin Powell has been an advocate that EIT causes torture. However, US service members and their fellow allies have been tortured by all enemies they have faced around the world such as Germany and Japan during WWII, North Vietnam, North Korea, and Iraq (International Committee of the Red Cross, n.d.) (Gewen, 2010) (Reynolds, 2002). Carolton Meyer is also one such opponent for this and other reasons. He states that not even Nazis tortured prisoners and adhered to Geneva Conventions (generally) (Meyer, 2004). On the contrary, torture was quite common regarding prisoners of the German government. Torture and death was the primary purpose in the concentration camps of Poland and Ukraine. At Auschwitz, cruel medical experiments were performed on prisoners by government doctors assigned to the extermination program. For example, Dr. Carl Clauberg experimented with a chemical placed in the vagina of Jewish women that would cause the reproductive organs to shut down. Many died from the treatment and others were killed for the sake of autopsy (American-Israeli Cooperative Enterprise, n.d.). To further demonstrate the Nazi's acceptance of torture, pedestrians walking passed what was known as the Columbia Haus in Berlin could hear human screaming coming from inside. This Gestapo prison utilized interrogation techniques such as near drowning in tubs of iced water, electric cables attached to extremities to include the genitals, and a special vice apparatus that was designed specifically for crushing human testicles (The History Place, 2001).

## **Conclusion**

The use of EIT is a slippery slope. It may result in an increasingly cruel application of pressure to one that is being questioned. The logic may develop that if waterboarding/electric shock is more effective than sleep

deprivation, loud music, and painful body positions, one should simply skip to the more extreme techniques and save a great deal of time and effort. Therefore, control measures must be in place with properly trained professionals at the helm. Future study is required to determine exactly what and how those control measures and training programs should be constructed. This is critical to minimize the probability that EIT drifts into terroristic torture. An example of what may occur without such controls is the events that took place at the Abu Ghraib detention facility. The investigation and subsequent report filed by Major General Taguba described an environment where untrained and ill supervised United States Soldiers and Officers abused Iraqi detainees under the directive to soften up the detainees for interrogation (NBC News, 2004). Oddly, this directive came from contractors of CACI Inc. and not from the U.S. Soldier's chain of command (Stempel, 2014). This further depicts the lack of control and engagement by military leaders and what the result can be when the proper professionals are not completely involved in EIT. Some may point to this series of events at Abu Ghraib and the fallout from it as why enhanced interrogation techniques are never justified. However, this is short sighted. The true failure of this event is an example of what can happen when proper controls, untrained personnel, and poor leadership converge. One of the products of this convergence was the abuse of captives.

Torture is against the law per the Geneva Conventions. It is not the purpose of this paper to contest this. Though enhanced interrogation techniques can produce information that can be transformed with existing information into intelligence, it will never become legal. It is difficult to conceive any national leadership that is a party to the Geneva Conventions willing to suggest an amendment to the laws to modify when enhanced interrogation is acceptable. Instead, nations will justify to themselves firstly that the only way to get the required information from a

captive is to escalate the manner of interrogation. Once complete (and the world discovers the infraction) the nation will work to publicly justify their actions to others. The justification becomes much easier when a foiled attack can be illustrated.

Enhanced interrogation is not pleasant. Unfortunately, it is sometimes a necessity. It is as dirty and brutish as the context (war/armed conflict) in which it is carried out. Emotional repulsion to such events are normal and magnified for those who do not understand the cruel nature and reality of war and all that goes with it at the tactical level. Many wars and armed conflicts have often included enhanced interrogation to some degree. If so much of the evidence and outrage points to the failure of enhanced interrogations, no logical entity would ever consider it as a viable means of extracting information. Yet, they still do. The unpleasant reality is that when properly applied, under satisfied circumstances/conditions, enhanced interrogation works and is justifiable.

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# **Compromising Freedom for Security: A Necessary Trade?**

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## **Introduction**

Terrorists use violence and intimidation as an instrument to instil fear, ultimately achieving a desired change in their audience's behaviour or opinion (Muhlhausen, 2011). While terrorists are generally quite successful at causing intimidation and fear they are frequently unsuccessful in achieving their stated political goals (Bakker, 2013). Ironically, Western states' reactions in the wake of the 11 September 2001 attacks (referred to as the 9/11 attacks) have resulted in broad-reaching changes to domestic policies that restrict civil liberties and inspire fear of minority groups often associated with terrorism. Terrorists are thus able to indirectly influence democratic states into imposing restrictions to the very freedoms and human rights that they mean to protect – in some cases enabling the achievement of terrorists' goals. This paper will compare and contrast selected domestic counterterrorism measures implemented by the US and Spain that have negatively impacted civil liberties in order to assess their gains versus compromise in improving domestic security.

The United States was selected due to its enactment of some of the most aggressive and broad-spectrum counterterrorism policies worldwide, subsequently having restricted several civil liberties. Spain was selected for comparison to the US due to its longer history of domestic terrorism and recent (as of 1975) emergence from under the authoritarian dictatorship of Francisco Franco. Having existed under police-state rule for

nearly 40 years, Spain has since developed a security posture more concerned with preventing human rights violations, despite having undergone its own '9/11' terrorist attack on 11 March 2004 (referred to as 11-M attack) (von Hippel, 2005, pg. 123). In comparison, US counterterrorism policies have allowed a much broader level of authorities than Spain, but have also resulted in greater infringements on civil rights. Yet has the US been more effective in fighting domestic terrorism than Spain? Have the US' compromises to civil liberties facilitated a higher level of domestic security? The purpose of this essay is to explore these questions.

First, major improvements to domestic counterterrorism that have impacted civil liberties in the US and Spain will be compared in order to establish the gains these measures have made to security and the compromises they have resulted in. Then, an overall assessment will be made for the effect on domestic terrorism from the measures implemented by the US and Spain in the wake of 9/11 attacks. Finally, analysis and conclusions will be made when comparing the gain and effectiveness versus cost of the US's more aggressive (but more human rights' restrictive) posture compared to Spain's more moderate (and less violating of human rights) counterterrorism approaches. The purpose is to provide insight and recommendations for more evenly balancing the measures needed for domestic security against the impacts they have on civil rights.

## **Counterterrorism Measures that Restrict Civil Liberties**

In the years following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, both the US and Spain have enacted several measures that have made major improvements to

domestic security and counterterrorism. Measures that while improving domestic security have also negatively impacted civil liberties are grouped below into the following categories: Increased Authorities for Telephone Surveillance and Records Monitoring; Electronic Data and Privacy Invasion; Privacy Invasion at Transportation Hubs; and Suspension of *Habeas Corpus* (the act of unlawful imprisonment).

## **Increased Authorities for Telephone Surveillance and Records Monitoring**

Immediately following the 9/11 attacks, the US made sweeping reforms to its counterterrorism policies with the release of the 2001 PATRIOT Act. The Act greatly expanded powers to gather intelligence domestically within the US, easing restrictions and making hasty requests for surveillance and tracking of suspects much easier to obtain. Under the new authorisations, cellular and telephone surveillance can be conducted on any device or location, without restriction of time period (Department of Justice, 2011). Previously, terrorists were able to avoid surveillance by utilizing several prepaid-use cell phones and disposing of them periodically (requiring a new court order to monitor each phone). Under the PATRIOT Act, continuous surveillance can now be maintained regardless of the device or time period being surveilled. Additionally, surveillance may be conducted covertly, based only on the requesting agency's certification that the information obtained will *likely* be relevant to the investigation (ACLU, 2009). The PATRIOT Act also allows US intelligence agencies the ability to demand information from banks, libraries and other public and private institutions without the need to provide reason for requesting the records. This may be conducted secretly and without requiring proof of a suspect's probable cause. Requests for records made to government and

private companies can additionally be made with stipulations that the provider remains silent about the inquiry – another move to avoid tipping off terrorists and allowing necessary evidence to be gathered (Doyle, 2002). As a result of the PATRIOT Act's expanded authorities, within one year after the 9/11 attacks there was a surge in records requested and surveillance conducted, which successfully resulted in a record number of domestic terrorism case prosecutions. However, since 2002 despite a continued high level of surveillance conducted and records being secretly requested, the number of domestic terrorism court cases in the US has shown a steady decline (TRAC, 2010; and ACLU, 2009). This indicates that (with exception of activities in 2002), the continued increased amount of domestic surveillance in the US is not resulting in a proportionate amount of gain to domestic security (TRAC, 2010).

In comparison to the US, Spain has continued to demonstrate a greater respect for personal privacy, constitutionally guaranteeing secrecy of communications for its citizens (Spanish Parliament, 1978). Although Spain's intelligence agencies have also developed wiretapping and electronic monitoring systems similar to US intelligence agencies, electronic surveillance may be conducted by court order only (Ortiz, 2011, pg. 20). Overall, there is a lack of public documentation that Spanish intelligence agencies have made the same level of personal privacy invasion as the US – further indicating either a much greater amount of respect for privacy rights, or simply not having been as publicised as the US (Clavell, 2014).

## **Electronic and Data Privacy Invasion**

When initially passed in 2001, the USA PATRIOT Act granted US intelligence agencies the authority to secretly gather vast amounts of information through the Internet using electronic data mining programs – without requiring consent from the citizens being monitored. Within two years of implementation, the data collected enabled US counterterrorism agencies to foil more than 50 terrorist plots (Dozier, 2013). Despite the successes, these broad authorities resulted in US intelligence agencies treating all persons collected on (innocent or criminal) as potential terrorists. In 2003 US Congress limited funding for data mining programs, restricting their use for intelligence collection and military activities conducted outside the US only (US Congress, 2003). However, despite the restrictions the US National Security Agency (NSA) continued covert internet data mining within the US using classified intelligence budgets – information that has only become public as a result of the 2013 Edward Snowden leaks (Hayes, 2013). The revelations from Edward Snowden and subsequent audits conducted on the NSA have discovered thousands of cases of privacy violations within the US (Gellman, 2013).

Spain's history under the Authoritarian-Franco government has resulted in general distrust of broad governmental powers (Clavell, 2014). In comparison to the US, stricter legal authorities have been allowed for conducting electronic surveillance, as well as a federally-funded Spanish Data Protection Agency (*Agencia Española de Protección de Datos*) dedicated to overseeing compliance for intelligence agencies collection of electronic data (Rodriguez-Ferrand, 2012). US intelligence agencies, in comparison, have a more complex system for reporting privacy compliance violations and do not consider all of the metadata collected to fall under the legal definitions they are constrained by. Further,

compliance reports submitted by agencies such as the NSA frequently include classified information, restricting the audience that can access it and thus making the information submitted more liable to be missed (Gellman, 2013). Although the NSA states their system to prevent privacy violations is 'multi-layered' and their reporting of violations is accounted for 'no matter how slight' (NSA, 2014), the continued number of violations indicates that a more efficient system is needed.

## **Privacy Invasion at Transportation Hubs**

Following the 9/11 attacks, US Congress approved the Transportation Security Act of 2001, transforming travel to avoid more terrorist attacks. Through a broad array of technology such as metal detectors, full-body scanners, pat downs, an army of more than 50,000 transportation security officers, and more than \$57 billion (USD) budget, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has ensured that no US airplane or train has been successfully attacked since 9/11 (Nussbaum, 2011). However, despite the efforts taken by TSA to improve transportation security, a 2012 US Congressional report stated that hundreds of millions of dollars were wasted through inefficient procurement and deployment of new and unproven equipment, and the administration lacked a comprehensive oversight program (US Congress, 2012). TSA's screening methods, besides resulting in increased delays and major inconveniences for passengers, have raised questions as to whether the physical searches equate to acts of sexual assault, and whether the digital imaging violates privacy and religious rights. (Electronic Privacy Information Center, 2014).

In retrospect, Spain, along with other European Union members, has voiced concern for violations to privacy rights from images produced by

body scanning equipment, calling for further studies to be conducted (Houlton, 2010). In comparison to the TSA, changes to security have not been as reaction-based for Spanish transportation agencies. For example, following an August 2014 warning of potential terrorist attacks, Spain chose *not* to implement 'exceptional' screening methods at Spanish airports, due to concern for the inconvenience to passengers and negative effect this may have had on the tourism industry (which accounts for 15.7% of the overall Spanish economy) (Precedo, 2014; and WTTC, 2014). The TSA, in comparison, implemented additional screening measures for passengers' hand-held electronic devices following a similar terrorism warning for a potential Al Qaida attack in July 2014 (Fox News, 2014). While US tourism makes up a smaller percentage of the economy than Spain (8.4% of the overall economy), the increase of security measures taken by the US had the same results as for Spain (no successful terrorist attacks occurred on aircraft in US or Spain in 2014) (WTTC, 2014). In this case, Spain's choice to not over-react to terrorism warnings resulted in its citizens maintaining a greater degree of personal privacy while failing to allow the threat of terrorism to negatively affect the country. In comparison, Al Qaida *even without taking action* successfully influenced the US – possibly encouraging the continuance of threats.

## **Suspension of *Habeas Corpus***

The PATRIOT Act and more recent US Military Commissions Act of 2009 have severely infringed on civil liberties by authorising the suspension of *habeas corpus* for both foreigners and US citizens determined to be 'unlawful enemy combatants'. This allows the arrest, indefinite detention, interrogation and prosecution of anyone suspected of terrorist activities – without any requirement to show proof of evidence (Kain, 2012). These



Acts have led to physical and mental coercion to cooperate and the use of Enhanced Interrogation Techniques on a number of detainees. Recent reviews of the interrogation techniques used have determined them to be harshly administered, poorly managed, and resulting in questionable intelligence (Collinson, 2014).


Spain, much like the US, has expanded the scope of criminal offense definitions and laws *effectively* allowing a limited suspension of *habeas corpus* for persons arrested on suspicion of terrorist-related activities. Suspects may be held in detention up to four years while the investigation takes place. An additional three years may be granted for trial to occur. Detained persons may also be initially held up to 13 days *incommunicado* if the judge reviewing the case deems that knowledge of the suspect's detention could hamper the investigation. During this period the police may interrogate the suspect, with only a court-appointed lawyer on hand to advise on procedure (not for private consultation). The suspect does not gain access to personally chosen legal council until after the *incommunicado* period has ended (FRIED, 2008).

Detention of terrorist suspects in both Spain and US has resulted in numerous convictions, as well as enabling counterterrorism agencies to gather intelligence. However, sacrificing civil liberties frequently increases resentment towards the government (for the detainee as well as their friends and family), sometimes turning moderates to extremism or resulting in support for terrorist causes. In this way, sacrifice of civil liberties can work against counterterrorism by creating new terrorists (Alexander, 2002, p. 173; and DNI, 2015).


## **Assessment of the Necessity for Sacrificing Civil Liberties in Order to Increase Domestic Security**

### **Overall Effectiveness of Counterterrorism Methods in the US and Spain**

Terrorist incidents worldwide have shown an increase since 2001 (see figure 1), although the US and Spain both show generally declining trends for domestic terrorist attacks since 2001 (see figure 2). This indicates that counterterrorist measures employed by the two countries have been overall effective, with some exceptions: Spain's domestic terrorist incident trend *peaks* in 2008, then begins a rapid decline - corresponding roughly to a major change in Spain's counterterrorist policy that moved from peace-seeking dialogues with its main domestic terrorist group, the *Euskadi Ta Askatasuna* (Basque Fatherland and Liberty, or ETA), prior to 2007 to active prosecution and financial asset freezes after 2008. The ETA's counter-response has been an increase in violent incidents (Celso, 2009). Thus a similar *tête-à-tête* interaction between Spain and the ETA has occurred as between the US and Al Qaeda following the 9/11 attacks (US troop deployment to Iraq and Afghanistan, and the subsequent counter-response of terrorist attacks by Al Qaeda and other extremist Islamic militant groups). Conclusions are that, while strong counterterrorism actions sometimes result in strong reactions, the careful application of police work and intelligence are effective in reducing terrorist activities over time (Jones, 2008). However, the nearly sinusoidal pattern seen for US domestic terrorist incidents after 2007 (figure 2) may indicate that current measures have reached their limit of effectiveness, and a change is needed.



**Figure 1: Terrorist Incidents since 2001 – Worldwide (Global Terrorism Database, 2014)**



**Figure 2: Domestic Terrorist Incidents since 2001 - Spain and US (Global Terrorism Database, 2014)**

## **Do Broader Authorities for Surveillance Equate to More Arrests?**

The PATRIOT Act has enabled US intelligence agencies to conduct covert surveillance without requiring proof of evidence of illegal activity. Since the year 2000, the number of Intelligence Surveillance Court Orders submitted has more than doubled, yet the number of successful

prosecutions from 2000-2007 (with the exception of 2002) declined to less than 50 per year (ACLU, 2009). This indicates that while the methods for surveillance have been eased, they are not producing a proportionate amount of results. This can be linked to a failure to integrate and understand the collected intelligence, as noted by US President Obama following the December 2009 US Army base terrorist attack (Best, Jr. 2011). Additionally, a 2009 US Senate report stated that a shortage of Arabic and other key language translators was still noted within the US intelligence community (Scarborough, 2009). Spain, in retrospect, does not allow the same broad-level authorities to its police or intelligence community, yet has shown a similar or lower number of terrorist incidents since 2009 (see figure 2). This indicates that despite broader intelligence collection authorisations, US counterterrorism agencies have failed to make the data actionable, therefore nullifying the usefulness. As a result, sacrifices to civil liberties have yielded little to no gain. Spain, using a lesser amount of intelligence collection and surveillance than the US, appears to be at least as successful as the US, based on terrorist incidents shown in figure 2 (although note that US intelligence collection received much greater reporting due Edward Snowden security leaks in 2013) (Gellman, 2013). Further study is required to conclude whether effective use of the vast quantity of intelligence collected by the US can be made actionable (and if so, would this make the sacrifices of privacy 'worth it?') – until then, it does not appear to be useful in proportion to the privacies it betrays.

## **Do More Intrusive Passenger Screening Processes Equate to Increased Security?**

Spain's reaction to increased terrorism levels has not resulted in the same intrusive measures as the US being taken for transportation security, instead seeing the invasions of privacy generated through body searches

and electronic scanners as not being justified (NBC News, 2010) and potentially affecting the national economy. Unlike the US, Spain has implemented an Immigration Advisory Program for screening and identifying high-risk travellers before they board aircraft. The program establishes international lines of communication to cross-reference and detect fraudulent travel documents, and has seen great successes in detecting and preventing potential terrorists from travelling (Department of Homeland Security, 2009). Spain has also adopted biometric security systems at several of its international airports, allowing rapid and unobtrusive screening for passport control without raising the same privacy issues that body scanners pose. By utilising the same biometric technologies as other EU partners Spain is able to access international biometric databases, easing the workload on airport screeners and National Police (FindBioMetrics, 2010).

There is clear evidence of a lack of oversight in the US TSA's administration of the domestic airport security program. Several court cases have already been filed on privacy violations from both pat downs and full body scans, and several reports have documented lack of accountability on effectiveness of some of the new equipment being used (Rotenberg, 2010). Continued funding misappropriations and inefficiency to both purchase and deploy new technology for domestic counterterrorism indicates that development of a better-organised oversight agency is warranted. However, despite the inefficiencies, the intrusive physical and electronic scans also make US airports inconvenient for terrorists, and have some deterrent effect by increasing fear of being caught through the more intrusive searching (Martonosi, 2006, p. 1).

It is difficult to assess whether the US' intrusive passenger screening methods work better or worse than Spain's more moderate measures due to a lack of successful terrorist attacks occurring on airplanes or trains since 11-M. However, the fact that Spain's methods *appear* to be just as successful indicate that the US' more intrusive screening measures may be unnecessary, and instead should seek to improve efficiency in intelligence (vice physical) when screening passengers – a conclusion also supported by mathematical modelling of airport screening measures (Martonosi, 2006, p. 1).

### **Suspension of *Habeas Corpus*: Necessary?**

A 2014 Senate Committee report on US Detention and Interrogation Programs has revealed brutal interrogation techniques being used, with a lack of accurate intelligence information or cooperation being generated (US Senate, 2014). The 'Enhanced Interrogation Techniques' employed by the US violate human rights, yet have been found to produce unreliable or unusable information (Collinson, 2014). Likewise, interrogation measures taken by Spain have facilitated the use of torture to obtain intelligence information (Alonso, 2005, p. 274). Looking beyond the interrogation measures used, both the US and Spain's detention programs have resulted in 21-40% of detainees being held without criminal sentencing, some for several years before being released (FRIED, 2008; and Collinson, 2014). Intelligence reports from both the US and Spain confirm that a significant percentage of released detainees result in return to extremist activities, as well as increased sympathy towards terrorist causes, establishing new network contacts and new recruits (DNI, 2015; and Alonso, 2005, p. 274). From this perspective, suspension of *Habeas Corpus* is only partially effective, and should either be stopped or more severely monitored to ensure speedy judicial processing and humane measures are maintained.

## **Conclusions and Recommendations**

Both the US and Spain have benefited from increases in counterterrorism manpower and resources, centralisation of efforts and inter-agency intelligence and database sharing. However, both countries have various areas of inefficiency (for example, the continued lack of Arabic translators employed by counterterrorism agencies in the US and Spain), and are still seeking technological improvements in identifying individual terrorists and their weapons within densely populated areas. The number of domestic terrorist incidents continuing to occur within the US indicates that despite broader powers and greater economic resources devoted for domestic counterterrorism (DHS' 2014 budget was approximately 10 times that of Spain's CNCA) the US is succeeding in (only) a similar level of protection as compared to Spain (see figure 1), while compromises made to civil liberties appear to be much greater (Gobierno de España, 2015, p. 119; and Medici, 2015). This balance between counterterrorism efforts and civil liberties sacrificed, when compared to Spain, does not appear to show a greater cost-benefit ratio.

In conclusion, the US should reduce sacrifices to civil liberties and concentrate on improving efficiencies with existing resources. While the broad authorities within the US for electronic surveillance, telephone and records monitoring has produced a tremendous amount of intelligence data for counterterrorism agencies to make use of, the inability to consistently produce actionable intelligence from the data makes its collection senseless. Spanish intelligence agencies have proven at least, if not more capable (supported by a comparison of the number of terrorist incidents in the US and Spain, shown in figure 2) events taking place of

detering or stopping terrorist incidents than the US, while showing a greater respect towards violations of civil liberties and privacy. Additionally, Spain's more moderate but smarter screening methods at airports appear to be just as effective as the US' more intrusive procedures – implying that the methods used by the US, which result in compromising privacy and increasing passenger frustration, are also being taken without cause and could stand to be curtailed. Further international coordination between counterterrorism agencies, including the sharing of intelligence and a common database could only benefit all countries: for example, had the US' 'no-fly' list been part of a greater international database connected with European intelligence agencies, perhaps the fleeing terrorist from the 2015 Paris attacks could have been apprehended in Madrid – or the attack may even have been prevented completely had the connection between US and French intelligence been made.

As for the suspension of *Habeas Corpus*, the potential for detained personnel to return to terrorist causes once released seems to nullify any advantage gained from repressing their liberties. Additionally, because evidence is not required prior to detention, innocent citizens may be subjected to intimidation and loss of their rights – especially when there is a lack of oversight in methods used (such as Enhanced Interrogation Techniques). By allowing the suspension of *Habeas Corpus*, States essentially fulfil terrorist goals of degrading government authority through loss of its citizens' confidence. A better outcome from detaining a suspected terrorist is to have evidence proving their complicity to commit harm and obtain a successful prosecution. In other words, the compromise of rights does appear to be beneficial to security and should therefore be reconsidered.



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# **“Russkiy Mir” Concept – Russia’s Strategic Centre of Gravity**

**Mr Algirdas Jurevičius**

## **Introduction**

On 1 July 2014 July, the President of Russia Federation Vladimir Putin addressed the Annual Conference of Russia’s Ambassadors. In his opening speech he gave a brief definition of “Ruskiy Mir” saying:

Our compatriots, Russian people, people of other ethnicities, their language, history, culture, their legitimate rights. When I say Russian people and Russian-speaking citizens, I mean people who sense that they are a part of the broad “Ruskiy Mir”, not necessarily of Russian ethnicity, but everyone who feels to be a Russian person (Vladimir Socor, 2014).

Therefore the term “Ruskiy Mir”<sup>25</sup> is quite often heard in current Russian policy. This term is widely used not only by politicians in foreign and domestic Russian policy, but also largely in mass media and in regard to the Russian Orthodox Church. Although the term *Ruskiy Mir* as such is not a new one, but it is worth to see how this concept is perceived in nowadays Russia by few important reasons.

Firstly, it is important because the concept of *Ruskiy Mir* currently serves as a justification for Russian aggression in Ukraine and remains the ultimate argument supporting Russia’s particular claims in regions which are under its intense pressure. The President of Russia Federation,

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<sup>25</sup> Russkiy Mir (*Русский мир*) refers to Russian world.

Vladimir Putin in the same annual July 2014 conference underlined the Russia's commitment to this concept saying

What reaction did our partners expect from us taking into account the recent events in Ukraine? I want everyone to understand that our state will protect the rights of Russians and our compatriots abroad in the future, and will use all the means in order to do so, from political and economic to humanitarian actions and the right to self-defence guaranteed by the international law (Lelizaveta Rekhtman, 2014).

Secondly, this concept is in principle a counterbalance to the Euro-Atlantic, democratic, Western, liberal system of values. Yuri Luzhkov a former Mayor of Moscow in his article "We and the West" noted that in order to stand against the West, Russia must to integrate the world around it, starting with the post-Soviet space and the "compatriot world" (Khlebnikov, 2006). It also implies that Russia is sort of a unique civilization in its own right with different path of development, different culture, traditions etc. The Head of "Russian World Foundation" Vyacheslav Nikonov said: 'Our immediate goal is to find a personal identity, to realize at last that we are a separate civilization that does not resemble any other' (Nikonov, 2008).

Thirdly, this concept promotes the reintegration of the post-Soviet space. This "vision" is mainly broadcasted by Russian Orthodox Church (ROC). In the Third Assembly of the Russian World head of ROC Patriarch Kirill argued that 'The independent states that exist on the territory of historical Rus and are aware of belonging to a common civilization might continue together to create the Russian world and regard it as their joint supranational project' (Kirill, 2011, p. 58).

On the one hand the Russia's stance could be fundamentally understood: only 25 years ago it lost its empire, and approximately 5 million ethnic Russian were forced to relocate to the newly founded Russian Federation. This migration was called the largest postcolonial migration in world history. The new born states on former Soviet territory are still home to approximately 9 million ethnic Russians, and there is almost 19 million who identifies themselves with Russian language as their native one. On the other hand this adoption of *Ruskiy Mir* concept already provoked an international conflict in Ukraine and potentially will provoke a chain reaction of international conflicts in the future.

As the importance of *Ruskiy Mir* concept is clearly visible for Russia's policy. The strategic significance of *Ruskiy Mir* to Russia's policy might be the Russia's strategic centre of gravity (COG).

### **Development of “Ruskiy Mir” concept**

The current chapter will outline the necessary theoretical orientation on development of this concept in Russia. It would give a broader understanding further when the main elements on Centre of Gravity analysis will be defined.

The idea of Russia as a “third Rome” was one of the first try to name Russia as one of political and civilization centres of the world with its messianic mission. Russian Monk Philotheus (Филофей) a hegumen of the Yelizarov Monastery in 16 century wrote ‘All Christian empires will perish and give way to the one kingdom of our ruler, in accord with the books of the prophet, which is the Russian empire. For two Romes have fallen, but the third stands, and there will never be a fourth’ (Bercken, 1999, p.

146). It is worth to note that "Rome" in Middle Ages always was a symbol of political centre of the world.

Anatoly Chubais, a Russian politician a former member of Boris Yeltsen government developed the doctrine of the "Liberal Empire". According him Russia has a mission to construct a "liberal empire" of its own and be a liberal reform achiever among the countries of the former Soviet Union. On the one hand Russia's main goal was to gain a dominant role in trade and business in countries of the former Soviet Union. On the other hand Russia had become a main guarantee of freedom and democracy in countries of the former Soviet Union. Mr. Chubais argued that 'only through liberal empire can Russia occupy its natural place alongside the United States, the European Union and Japan, the place designated for it by history' (Skidelsky Robert, 2007).

Vyacheslav Nikonov, the executive director of the *Russkiy Mir* Foundation also proposed another idea of Russkiy Mir. He argued that Russia is not only a centre of a great culture, but it also stands strong in defending such values as justice, honour and freedom. According to him

'The *Russkiy Mir* is not just a reminiscence of the past, it is rather a dream of the future of people belonging to a great culture who react strongly to injustice, who keep the ideas of honour and devotion close to their hearts, and who are consistently aspiring to freedom' (The School of Russian and Asian Studies, 2009).

Therefore Igor Zevelev a Russian political scientist argued that the roots of *Russkiy Mir* lie in Russian identity crises. He argued that the experience of empire (Russian Empire, later Soviet Union) gave Russians a fragile sense of nationhood. He argued that Russians were urged to identify

themselves with the empire as a whole, rather than develop a national solidarity among each other. In the Soviet Union situation was pretty the same to be "Soviet" indirectly meant being a Russian-speaker and acknowledging the "civilizing" mission of Russian culture and its extraterritorial nature throughout the entire Soviet Union. As well as the commonality of the linguistic, cultural and historical roots of Russia, Belarus and Ukraine and the lack of clear-cut boundaries between them played an important role in weakening of Russian nationalism (Igor Zevelev, 2009). Having this in mind the development of *Russkiy Mir* helps as integrating and consolidating factor.

Valery Tishkov, a Russian academic, went further with the *Russkiy Mir* concept. He argued that this is an ideological concept of Russian culture and its mission in global, not only a Russian diaspora. According him only a very few countries are able to form a "world": 'trans-national and transcontinental community, which united by belonging to some state and loyalty to its culture. Such a "worlds" has Spain, France, China and Great Britain' (Valery Tishkov, 2007).

Therefore the result of development of this concept lead to Putin era where *Russkiy Mir's* purpose become to unite the people who identify themselves as Russians under one political body. This supranational project so called a "civilizational space" rests on three main elements: Russian language, common historical memory, Russian Orthodox religion.

## **RUSSIAN LANGUAGE**

Although Soviet Union collapsed in 1990 the Russian language still plays a very important role in most of former Soviet Republics. As Deputy Director of the Institute of Philosophy at the Russian Academy of Sciences Peter Shchedrovitsky argues that those who speak Russian in their everyday life inevitably think Russian, and therefore act Russian (Andis Kudors, 2010 p. 3). It's one of the main elements which hold Russia and

Russian Diaspora together. Through political prism a common Russian language also implies a common destiny.

### **A COMMON HISTORICAL MEMORY**

A common historical memory is a second core element which helps to unite Russia and Russia's Diaspora under the same *Russkiy Mir* umbrella. Although it is possible to find a lot of elements of historical narrative which are crucial for Russia, such as the formation of the Russian Empire, Peter the Great's rule, Patriotic War I (the Anti-Napoleon war), Industrialization, Slavic Brotherhood, Revolutions of 1917, and the Soviet period etc. Narrative of the Second World War is definitely the strongest historical events in the Russia's common historical memory. As Colin Guillaume argues the common historical memory of the Second World War for Russians has to be understood from stand point of mobilization by identification (Colin Guillaume, 2004). It should be emphasized that this particular common memory is based not much on historical facts, but more on emotions, symbolisms and myths. It serves as huge identity myth which basically "proves" that only a united Russia was able to stand against powerful Fascism and later liberated a half of Europe. It has been stressed that Russians always should unite against external enemy and everybody who has a different attitude can be named an enemy of the people and be executed. Therefore terms like war against Fascism, enemy of the people and fifth column is so common in today's *Russkiy Mir* concept.

### **RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH**

The Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) serves as another unifying element for *Russkiy Mir* concept. The main role of the official ROC as a political and cultural consolidator of the Russians inside Russia and the pro-Russian masses outside Russia was rapidly strengthened after the collapse of the

Soviet Union. The ROC is positioning itself as a key player<sup>26</sup> in the discourse on Russian identity and its relations with neighbouring countries. It also plays a key role as a most important institution which preserves and maintains the unity of civilization space in *Russkiy Mir*. This ROC status is backed by the fact that ROC has its strong influence not only in Russia but also in Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova. ROC is also one of the most trustful institutions in Russia. And ultimately ROC is integrated in states policy and therefore has a very strong full support from it. It is worth to quote ROC Patriarch Kirill speech in the 3<sup>rd</sup> Russian World Assembly in 2009:

Historically, the "Russian world" has been a geographically single space, but nowadays, it is split across national borders of various countries. However, the people who live in the historical territory of *Rus* should have a sense of belonging to a single civilization and should see the "Russian world" as a trans-national project (Andis Kudors, 2014).

Therefore it's important to underline that Russian mass media unites all three elements of *Russkiy Mir* and rapidly strengthen its positions in the global arena. As Russian mass media is very popular in some of neighbouring states it serves as a useful tool for spreading influence. It also takes a very proactive role in domestic politics in the neighbourhoods and successfully shapes the way citizens interpret international events.

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<sup>26</sup> The ROC has built or restored about 25,000 churches in the past quarter-century, most of them in its traditional territory of the former Soviet Union. But it has also reclaimed churches in countries from France and Italy to Cuba and North Korea. With about 200 million members worldwide, the ROC is now the second-largest single church in Christianity after Roman Catholicism. (Gabriela Baczynska and Tom Heneghan 2014)

## CENTER OF GRAVITY CONCEPT

There are a lot of studies and different concepts which describe Centre of Gravity analysis. Very first on these analysis was famous Carl von Clausewitz, who stated, 'Out of the characteristics a certain centre of gravity develops, the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends. That is the point against which all our energies should be directed.' (Michael Howard and Peter Paret, 1989 p. 595) This concept was minor changes was used in the US Doctrine for Joint Planning Operations which also emphasized the critical role of COG analysis: 'the set of characteristics, capabilities, and sources of power from which a system derives its moral or physical strength, freedom of action, and will to act.' (Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations 2006, p. 132)

Although, Col. Dale C. Eikmeier argues that due to its enigmatic nature, the COG determination process has always been considered more of an art than a science he gave a clear picture of what COG analysis should consist (Dale C. Eikmeier, 2004 p. 2). According to him COG (a system's primary source of power to act) analysis should consist of:

- *Critical capabilities*: primary abilities which merit a centre of gravity to be identified in the context of a given situation.
- *Critical requirements*: vital conditions, resources, and means for a critical capability to be fully functional.
- *Critical vulnerabilities*: critical requirements which are either insufficient or exposed to neutralization in a way that achieves decisive results. (Dale C. Eikmeier 2004 p. 2)

Therefore the critical capabilities which empowers *Russkiy Mir* concept are Russian language, common historical memory and Russian Orthodox Church. As these key elements were already explored in previous chapter we will continue to elaborate on critical requirements.



As the 21<sup>st</sup> century is called a century of technology, the mass media plays a crucial role in it. Although media has a several tasks its necessary to concentrate on modern propaganda as one of most effective tool to shape people's opinions. Despite the fact that propaganda has been around for approximately a thousand years only the last hundred years with the progress of technologies which allow us to spread information to a masses has lead it to a scientific process which is capable to influence a whole nation of people<sup>27</sup>.

Michael Weiss and Peter Pomerantsev, specialists who explore Russian propaganda emphasize that domestically Russian state propaganda successfully annihilated the entity of investigative and independent political journalism, which leads to a lack of faith and trust in traditional media.(Michael Weiss, Peter Pomerantsev, 2014) It seems that the Russian government understands the importance of it and is ready to invest huge resources in it.

It is known that Russia's propaganda has the capacity to reach more than 600 million people in the world.<sup>28</sup> It is also clear that Russia despite economic crisis is ready significantly to increase spending on foreign propaganda. It includes a 41 percent increase for Russia Today - the state-supported television network which broadcasts around the globe in a number of different languages. Rossiya Segodnya which replaced a global news agency RIA Novosti, will get a threefold increase of a budget.

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<sup>27</sup> According to stratcom study a modern propaganda uses all the media available to spread its message, including: press, radio, television, film, computers, fax machines, posters, meetings, door-to-door canvassing, handbills, buttons, billboards, speeches, flags, street names, monuments, coins, stamps, books, plays, comic strips, poetry, music, sporting events, cultural events, company reports, libraries, and awards and prizes (Johnnie Manzarria,Jonathon Bruck 2014).

<sup>28</sup> Russia Today's English, Arabic and Spanish language programming is only one part of a bigger constellation of Russian government media assets that also include Rossiya Segodnya, as well as the Voice of Russia, TASS and Ruptly (RT's video news agency).

(Robert Orttung, Christopher Walker 2014)

<http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/russia-s-international-media-poisons-minds/508653.html>

(Robert Orttung, Christopher Walker, 2014). Therefore despite the criticism and warnings from the west the Russia's propaganda is one of the most powerful weapons which with much success is sending an influential message of *Russkiy Mir*.

Other backbone of critical requirement is the secret service. It is obvious that in order to unify the effort of a huge Russian state controlled media apparatus a very functional command and control (C2) measure is needed. Therefore the Federal Security Service (FSB) a successor of *KGB* finds its place. As a former *KGB* Gen. Aleksey Kondaurov emphasized that during Soviet times *KGB* status could be named as a state within a state. However in nowadays Russia FSB has almost unlimited resources to act and has become the state itself. (The economist, 2007) Although the main duty of secret services is to maintain order at homeland and impose a Russia's leadership will along its western border by conducting intelligence and counter-intelligence operations the C2 of media tools becomes more and more important. Currently there is an ongoing discussion in western media about the FSB involvement in social networks. The investigation by western media sources shows that there are the headquarters in Russia of so-called "troll army", where hundreds of paid bloggers work 24/7 in order to flood Russian internet forums, social networks and the comments sections of western publications with remarks praising the Russia's policy (Shaun Walker 2015). There are no official FSB budget and numbers on how many personnel the FSB employs, but the expert of security services Andrei Soldatov estimates the number of personnel is more than 200,000 (Shaun Walker 2013).

Main critical vulnerability is resources. Since Mr. Vladimir Putin rise to power in Russia he invested huge resources in modernization of two scopes: a potential of propaganda (prestige projects and state-controlled

media at homeland and globally) and the Russia's repressive apparatus (secret services and military). It was not a big challenge to invest huge resources in those elements until the Ukraine crisis as oil and as gas prices were at stable high. Russia is one of the world's largest oil producers with a non-diversified economy. Therefore its economy crucial depends on energy incomes, with oil and gas accounting for 70% of export revenues. It is estimated that from 2014 it was approximately 50 per cent decline in oil prices as a result Russia loses about \$2bn of incomes for every dollar fall in the oil price. (Tim Bowler, 2015) Not going to deeply it should be noted that Russia's economy also heavily suffers from EU and US economic sanctions.<sup>29</sup> It is sufficiently clear that the possible shortage of resources could affect all of the country at the same time, and the capabilities of propaganda machine which is a critical requirement for *Russkiy Mir*. However it is estimated that a shortage of resources could make a huge impact on Russia's repressive apparatus. The well-known US think tank - STRATFOR published an analysis about ongoing competition between the secret services in Russia. According it a main struggle is over control of the mechanisms that assess financial crimes and corruption. Such control has strong influence over how resources is appropriated and facilitated it also gives a control over budgeting decisions over state and local authorities on economic issues. It once was that whenever such interagency rivalry got out control Mr. Putin tended to intervene (Stratfor, 2014). It is foreseeable that the shortage of resources could have a critical effect on such interagency rivalries and could become a huge challenge to regulate it for Mr. Putin.

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<sup>29</sup> In November 2014, the Russian Ministry of Finance attempted to calculate the overall effects of the drop in oil prices, the rouble's depreciation, and Western sanctions on the country's economy. It estimated that \$130 to \$140 billion is being lost annually – \$40 billion of which is because of sanctions (Iana Dreyer, Nicu Popescu 2014).

[http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Brief\\_35\\_Russia\\_sanctions.pdf](http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Brief_35_Russia_sanctions.pdf)

## CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

- Although the *Russkiy Mir* concept isn't new in nowadays Russia it is a supranational project with purpose to unite the people who identify themselves as Russians under one political body. It rests on three main elements: Russian language, common historical memory, Russian Orthodox religion which are the critical capabilities of *Russkiy Mir*.
- Since Putin came to power Russia heavily invested in propaganda machine and the repressive apparatus. These instruments not only help to preserve power and control the population but also empower the ideas of *Russkiy Mir* and therefore are the critical requirements of it.
- Resources are the main critical vulnerability to *Russkiy Mir* concept. Economic crisis could not only affect the ability to spread the ideas of *Russkiy Mir* but also could inflict an interagency rivalry over those resources which could lead not only to disturbance of command and control over the concept but also could lead to overthrow of the regime itself.
- *Ruskiy Mir* concept already provoked an international conflict in Ukraine. The so called a duty to "protect" the interests of Russian speakers in sovereign countries by supporting their own quasi-referendums, or even intervening sovereign countries, could create a precedent and provoke a chain reaction of international conflicts.
- Baltic States in particular and West in general should consider the countermeasures in order to limit the influence of *Russkiy Mir* concept and to deter Russian aggression: Effective strategic communications for Russian speaking minorities, unified EU (economic pressure for Russia) and NATO (boots on ground in Baltic States) effort and strong political determination to allocate proper

resources to military defence budgets – are the key countermeasures for risk of *Russkiy Mir* concept.

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# **Can small- and medium-sized states have grand strategies?**

**Mr Martins Nilsons**

## **Introduction**

Great Latvian poet J.Rainis wrote "We are a small tribe, we will be as strong as our will..." (Rainis, 1980), expressing hopes of his nation for self-determination shortly before gaining independence at the beginning of the 20th century. But this will, although materialised in statehood, as appeared later in a history, was not producing enough strengths to withstand external aggression in 1940. Also today it sounds impossible for small state to substantially increase its relative strengths, taking into account, that in era of globalised World the power disparities between small and big states practically have increased (Wivel, Bailes, Archer, 2014; Vital, 1967). But the good news is that the widened concept of security has introduced new methods for state-craft, which could be of use also for small states to make the application of their will in more purposeful and strong manner, in particular as part of powerful alliances. Long term integrated grand strategic approach, using all elements of power, can mobilise small nations to achieve big strategic goals towards secure and more prosperous environment. This work will evaluate the conceptual bases of small states phenomenon vis-à-vis power, explore the purpose and framework of grand strategy and its applicability in case of small states and will highlight international structure's main factors influencing grand strategic choices of small nations. Finally, the essay will provide deliberations on the experience of the Baltic States in grand strategy.

## 1. Small states concept

The second half of the 20th century and post-Cold War era can be characterised as a period of proliferation and revival of small states, due to the process of World-wide decolonisation after World War II, as well as dissolution of Soviet Empire and Yugoslavia in the last decade of millennium. Despite this phenomenon and increased attention of the scholars to the topic of small states, there is reached no consensus on single criteria or definition, characterising the small state. The attempts have been made to adopt absolute and relative (quantitative versus qualitative) parameters distinguishing Global and European perspectives for small states (Riedel, 2013). The point of departure for defining the small states historically has been based on realism school emphasis on their limited, or even lack of, material power base *vis-à-vis* great powers, in absolute or relative sense, based on a proposed mix of four components to measure the size of the state – population, territory, gross domestic product and military expenditure (Wivel, Bailes, Archer, 2014, pp. 6-7; Thorhallsson, 2006, p. 1). D.Vital suggested following 'rough upper limits of the class of small states; a) a population of 10-15 million in the case of economically advanced countries; and b) a population of 20-30 million in the case of underdeveloped countries' (Vital 1967, p. 81). Prevailing view is that this upper limit in European context corresponds to the population size of Netherlands (16 million inhabitants). In addition the category of micro-states, whose capacity to maintain a minimum international presence in inter-state relations is problematic, with a threshold of less than 100000 inhabitants has been separated, although in some instances this threshold is proposed at 1 million or even 1.5 million level (Wivel, Bailes, Archer 2014, p. 8; Neumann, Gstöhl 2006, p. 6). The upper limit of GDP of small state by a group of scholars is suggested at €500 billion level. Part of scholars regard this method arbitrary in principle (Wivel, Bailes, Archer 2014, pp. 6-8) or view that four objective factors are too

limited to measure the absolute or relative size of the country, proposing that also the qualities of each state in exercising its sovereignty should be examined (Thorhallsson, 2006; Browning, 2006).

For many more proper seems the relational approach for defining the smallness of states in comparative or relative terms. Accordingly, small state is defined as a weaker party in asymmetric power relationships *vis-à-vis* larger state entities (Wivel, Bailes, Archer 2014, p. 9) and is 'unable to change the nature of this relationship on its own' (Wivel, 2009, p. 3). A number of authors add that not only comparative power, but also geopolitical position/environment is among most important factors, determining the size of the state (Molis, 2006, p. 82). In relational context, realist school proponents as one of the general characteristics of small state see influence and autonomy deficit, stemming from power shortage (Goetschel, 1998, p. 15) and resulting in 'smaller margin of time and error' (Jervis, 1978). But T.Rostoks in constructivism light tries to narrow down the smallness as a dependant on contextual situations, 'when actors find themselves in a position where smallness makes it more difficult for them to get what they want in comparison to other actors whose properties allow them to achieve their goals easier' (Rostoks, 2010). This proposition seems to capture more wisely the functionality of smallness, but also can be partly misleading. For instance, Ukraine is small in its relations to Russia, but due its impressive size it couldn't be regarded as small state. The influence and autonomy deficit should also be regarded in relative terms, as part of small states exercise active diplomacy through balancing regional power disparities, as well as by participation in wide network of international multilateral organisations. Actively supporting international peace efforts, developing countries and strengthening of the regime of international norms, small states generate their normative power/organizational influence (Lamoreaux and Galbreith, 2008, p. 2), as part of J.Nye proposed concept of 'soft power' – 'getting

others to want the outcomes that you want' through 'ability to shape the preferences of others' by co-opting them (Nye, 2004, pp. 4-11).

Therefore, it seems quite natural, that behavioural aspects, including the quality of performance regarding the application of policies in internal and external environment, have been emphasized in the context of measurement of small states. First of all, smallness could be a subjective perception of oneself or others. But smallness couldn't be automatically regarded as weakness (Neumann, Gstöhl, 2006, pp. 8-29), which is primarily qualitative not quantitative feature. To be able to better understand both quantity and behaviour quality aspects of state, Thorhallsson put forward expanded and more detailed framework of six categories: fixed size; sovereignty size (including ability to exercise sovereignty); political size (including military and administrative capability and cohesion of state); economic size (including development success); perceptual size and preference size. This method seems to better capture the capacity of the states, as Thorhallsson analyses includes additional elements on measuring strong and weak points, including vulnerabilities due to domestic and international weakness and consequent risks for subjugation, which in some examples even showing greater level of smallness of states (Thorhallsson 2006; Lamoreaux and Galbreth, 2008, pp. 2-4). But the ultimate distinction between weak and strong state is not based on material bases, but as B.Buzan and O.Wæver argue, is 'about the degree of socio-political cohesion between civil society and the institutions of government' – weak states, being internally divided and fragile, are also more exposed to the threats from outside, even risking with extreme weakness, which could lead to a state failure. The internal cohesion will be decisive factor for the security dynamics of the state (Buzan and Wæver, 2003, p. 22).

Despite variety of approaches how to measure the smallness of states, they do not render obsolete the very idea of small states

distinctness, which is rooted in history and seems to maintain its relevance also for the future. Taking into account that around two thirds of 193 UN Member States are regarded as small states, their features show complexity and diverse nature as 'small states themselves are just as diverse as any other constructed category in international society' (Wivel, Bailes, Archer 2014, p. 18). In previous two decades the size and quality of states' human resources and economy/GDP were emphasized, paying lesser attention to military potential. Many of small states in the West, being weak powers in military sense, are characterised as strong states in empirical terms, having efficient institutions, strong economic and societal basis. Taking into account all these aspects, we can conclude that the relative power of state comes into forefront, with strong emphasis on internal strengths/cohesion and increasing role of normative power or reputation. After Global Financial Crisis 2008 there is also a bigger accentuation of economic power, linked to both quality and quantity of population and ability of state to exercise effective policy at home and abroad. The power application has to be looked in geostrategic context of individual nation, linked to the overall structure of international system.

## **2. Grand strategy**

To better judge the feasibility of grand strategy for small states, we have to get understanding of grand strategy, as well as alternative approaches. Starting with grand strategy, we can see quite high degree of convergence on understanding this definition and its features, as well as awareness on the growing relevance of this instrument of statehood policy in contemporary environment of resource limitations and continuously evolving challenges. Although, the term "Grand strategy" has experienced significant evolution, since appearance in 19th century and continuously in 20th century its application was limited to coordination and contribution of

'whole of the resources of the nation', including military, economic, diplomatic, social and political capacities for war aims (Layton, 2012, pp. 2-3). As L.Simòn notes, Liddell Hart in 1967 expressed prevailing Cold War era view that grand strategy is about the support of 'non-military policies towards military power, both in peacetime and wartime' (Simòn, 2013, pp. 33-34). But after the end of the Cold War the meaning of grand strategy shifted away from the emphasis on military element, towards less hierarchical and more horizontal set-up (Simòn, 2013, p. 33). Grand strategy has been characterised in broad terms as a long term policy-making approach aiming to design and shape the future (Layton, 2012), as suggested by P.Kennedy, based on conceptually broad and integrated interpretation of the meaning of the power base of the state, besides the traditional military, economic, diplomatic, social and political elements (including their efficiency aspects) also emphasized the quality of the nation and its people (including also their beliefs, myths and illusions) (Simòn, 2013, p. 35).

Grand strategy currently is seen as overarching strategy of the state summarizing the national vision for development, applying, coordinating and sustaining all instruments of national power in integrative way to support long term interests/goals aiming to shape or even impose, in a certain sequence, a preferred state of order on the future. It provides 'the overarching design into which specific pieces of lower-level policy fit', balancing the political interests and objectives with available means and resources and tests the ability to avoid dis-balance in this relationship in most critical areas for the state (Layton, 2012; Murray, 2011). The elements of grand strategy are interdependent to such a high degree that changes in some elements or their relations triggers change across the system. That means that state strategies, including the military one, which is usually focusing on limited scope of instruments, derive from and are subordinated to grand strategy (Layton, 2012-2). The ambitious

nature of grand strategy puts very high requirements concerning its quality and systematic implementation, as miscalculations at strategic level bear very high costs. However, there has to be foreseen certain flexibility for the state to be able to adopt the policies to the real life constraints and uncertainties, maintaining the vision of desired future end-state (Murray 2011, pp. 3-5).

Altogether, grand strategic goals have to serve the overarching interests of a state aiming both to enhance the nation's strengths in positive sense and to withstand negative factors/threats (Strachan, 2011, pp. 1283-1284, Simòn, 2013, pp. 36-37). Therefore it sounds logical that the ultimate rationale of grand strategy is to promote the security of the country in a comprehensive fashion, far beyond a military dimension. As grand strategy is applied in a unique and constantly evolving environment, careful comprehension of the context, formed by both geopolitical location and internal features of the country, is a key for developing and using appropriate instruments for maximisation of state power (Simòn, 2013, p. 37). And here historical experience and culture leaves the peculiar constructive influence upon the subjective interpretation of this strategic context (Murray, 2011, p. 9). According to this constructivist notion, the success of the implementation of the grand strategy depends not only on material and geopolitical premises, but also on the moral perseverance of the government for legitimisation of chosen strategy by the internal and external audience, in order to get sustainable support for the mobilisation of national resources, the formation of international coalitions and marginalisation of opponents (Goddard and Krebs, 2015).

The concept of grand strategy is state centric, but there is a disagreement about ability of all states to exercise this feature. The prevailing view is that due to the access to all instruments of power, particularly in the context of their monopoly of use of force, the sovereign

nation states are regarded as the only subjects able to exercise grand strategy (Simòn, 2013, p. 36). But, part of the realist rhetoric, based on assumptions of the primacy of military power, the abilities of small states are undervalued. According to the judgement made by W.Murray 'Yet, grand strategy is a matter involving great states and great states alone. No small states and few medium-size states possess the possibility of crafting a grand strategy' due to the lack of room for manoeuvre both in domestic and external environment (Murray, 2011). This proposition is countered with counter-arguments that grand strategic approach of integrating elements of power and balancing available resources with goals is even more actual for small and medium size states (Layton, 2012). In this regard S.Goddard and R.Kerbseven add that even relatively small states have necessary military, economic and diplomatic means to create grand strategy to improve their national security situation (Goddard and Krebs, 2015, p. 8). In addition, A.Wivel views more benignly external environment, rendering traditional military power relationship less relevant, as a significant advantage for small states, giving them larger room for manoeuvre and chance for employing grand strategies, although through application of persuasive or normative power in international organisations (Wivel, 2009).

Coming to the point of alternatives to the grand strategy, opportunism and risk management are two broad approaches regarding the formulation of national security strategies, applicable if due to circumstances grand strategy happens to be not the right policy tool. As P.Layton suggests, both 'opportunism and risk management are means-centred, not ends-centred as grand strategy is' (Layton, 2012). Both models seem to be more flexible, but contain serious disadvantages. Accordingly, both the opportunism and risk management as a state policy evolve in reactive, not proactive fashion, as circumstances dictate, but risk management approach particularly aims at mitigation and management of



risks, loss control to the state security. Secondly, the prioritisation of the resources, as well as the judgement on efficiency of their application versus defined benchmarks on the way towards ends are problematic in both these approaches due to lesser certainty on these ends. Opportunism might have least resources requirements, if opportunistic state chooses minimalistic posture for engagement in influencing and exploiting the outcomes of processes driven by other players. The risk management, foreseeing investment in means to counter the possible threats, is resources intensive, but is not actively oriented towards shaping the environment to neutralise the causes of these threats. For better understanding Layton's used Foucault's 'ship of state' metaphor on the three alternatives of route programming – 'sailing to some port (grand strategy), sailing to take advantage of fair winds (opportunism) and sailing to avoid difficulties (risk management)', helps to capture the very essence of the differences between the grand strategy, opportunism and crises response approaches of states (Layton, 2012). There could be a temptation for states to enjoy good wind, as Japan and Australia have had under the US dominated environment. In Japanese case there is a broad interpretation of the concept of opportunism in Layton's observation being 'reactive to the forces shaping the modern system, referring to these as trends of the world and time or inevitable force of circumstances (Layton, 2012)'. Looking on these examples, opportunism seems more like a privilege for self-confident and very safely located nations, but risk management could be regarded as too short-sighted. In ideal set-up these two approaches could be regarded as complementing grand strategy, in case of unexpected circumstances.

Taking into account that the evolving concept of security has also broadly changed the perception of power dis-balance among states, as well as of subsequent availability of policy options for small states, we can recognise that small states couldn't be disqualified in principle from

application of one of the three strategic approaches, including grand strategy. Application of these choices has to be seen as part of states adaptability. And here we have to note that the understanding of the adaptability, in old times meaning more adjusting themselves to the will of large imperial powers in determined manner, has largely changed for the benefit of the small. Today, facing the threats, 'what seems to matter is less the common weaknesses of the small and more, the effectiveness of different strategies used to counter them' through adaptability and resilience. (Wivel, Bailes, Archer 2014, p. 11). The policy methods, chosen by the states could differ, depending on geopolitical context, remaining as a central point, and threat scope, level and perception. Practically all small states are exposed to economic, social, political, environmental threats or risks. As their internal coherence also differs, a number of them have cases of ethnic divisions and tensions. A number of small states, from the Baltic States through to Singapore, are coping with prominent or residual threats from bigger neighbours of dubious intent (Wivel, Bailes, Archer 2014, p. 19). Lesser than availability of resources, good governance and wisdom of leadership could be seen as main precondition of states, regardless of their size, for ability to mount and sustain grand strategy. And in turn, the application of grand strategy could generate better intra-governmental and cross-sectoral coordination and cooperation, leading to improved governance at all levels and the effects of 'maximising national strengths and leaving no cracks for hostile forces to exploit' (Wivel, Bailes, Archer 2014, p. 22). All in all, it sounds logical that larger threats or risks small state faces, the actuality for grand strategy rises. The ambition level for small states grand strategy could be much lower, primarily regionally focused on the close neighbourhood, in comparison with higher, or even global, ambitions of large states (Strachan, 2011, pp. 1283-1284).

### **3. International structure's context for small states security**

As geopolitical context is still regarded as most important one for evaluating the grand strategic options for states, the role of states interaction in close neighbourhood/regional level and the influence of global level power dynamics has to be clarified, also taking into account inter-state institutional level. Here we have to elaborate on realist global balance of power approach and constructivist suggested distinctiveness of regional security practices (Buzan and Wæver, 2003). As the Cold War international system, known as World order of bipolar rivalry, faded away, the idea of increased role and autonomy of regions, as geographic subsystems formed by inter-dependant actors, 'whose security problems cannot reasonably be analysed or resolved apart from one another', was proposed by constructivists in a form of Regional Security Complexes. However, the impact of the further dynamics of power balance between the only superpower (the US) and global powers, leaving more open the question about further stability of this balance, as well their influence upon regional balances through mechanisms of penetration of the regional affairs, which could be either conflictual or cooperative (forming security regimes or security communities), was recognised. On the other hand, realist school explicitly continue to see the security developments in the context of the distribution of global power, where security competition among the great powers still exist, therefore subordinating the regional level to this notion. As suggested by J.Mearsheimer, unbalanced multipolarity, as he saw the World in 2003, is exposed to harder power competition and possible conflict, seeing China and Russia as rivals of the US supremacy in a longer run (Meashmeier, 2003, pp. 360-402). Indeed, a decade after these deliberations, taking into account growing power and revisionist ambitions of China (Ratner, 2014), as well as Russia's confrontational posture

against the West and aggression in Ukraine (Kroenig, 2015), the context of regional security, particularly in Europe and East Asia, is increasingly regarded through the prism of global power competition, where hard power and geopolitics plays a greater role. That doesn't mean that the constructivists proposed concept of Regional Security Complexes is obsolete, as regional interaction and climate between states remain of utmost importance, particularly for small states.

Type of states - pre-modern, modern and post-modern located in the region will largely shape the security environment and character (cooperative or competitive) of the relations and policy options of states on regional level. Pre-modern states, characterised as weak states with low cohesion and underdeveloped governance would hardly be reliable partners. Modern states, although well developed and having strong government capacity, feature strong traditions of self-reliance and restrictive attitude towards openness. Postmodern states are characterised as strong, pluralist, democratic and having security community orientation, based on common values and institutions, in a win-win relationship and are primarily associated with members of European Union (Buzan and Wæver, 2003, pp. 22-26; Cooper, 2003, pp. 16-54).

The combinations of surroundings would be of particular importance for the small state for the strategic choice between neutrality, self-reliance or alliance, also depending on the need to balance asymmetry vis-à-vis big neighbouring powers, being either in the cycle of decline or growing strengths. Each of these options contain risks, as neutrality not always has been respected, to take World War II experience, and contained elements of bandwagoning towards the dominant power at the given moment of history, including the obligation to sustain defence to prevent capture of neutrals territory by rival to the dominant power (Karish, 1988; Øvriik, 2008). Self-reliance, as neutrality,

is increasingly costly (Wivel, 2013, p. 13), and vulnerable against great powers projected spheres of influence (Cooper and Shaw, 2009, p.3). On the other hand, in case of the alliance, including with great power, there are no absolute security guaranties (Handel, 1990) and risks for losing autonomy, entrapment ('getting involved into others' conflicts due to interests one does not fully share' (Honkanen, 2014, p. 115)) or abandonment for small states still exist. Since the end of the World War II, and particularly after the end of Cold War, following cost-benefit calculation in light of historic experience, small states increasingly have favoured to join alliances, or to switch from neutrality to the status of non-alignment, allowing a broad institutional cooperation both on soft and hard security. Taking into account the trends of increased participation of small states in international institutions, in such a way using alliances, as J.Lamoreaux notes, 'to punch above their weight', the concept of neutrality seems to be increasingly losing viability, despite of neutrality's original intent to have peaceful, friendly relations and commerce with all nations (Lamoreaux, 2014, p. 567-568). Moreover, the enhanced concept of alliances, aiming to overcome space limitations of states, particularly small ones, through integration with other spaces (Lewis, 2009, p. xiv), has become progressively attractive, and here NATO and EU can be regarded as pioneering and mutually reinforcing examples, covering full spectrum of security dimensions. Although, the geopolitical context can also constrain grand strategic options of small states, as in the case of Georgia and Moldova.

The liberal's optimism concerning growing role of international organisations and increasing influence of small nations is heavily contested by realists, arguing that great powers shape the institutions in a way as not to limit their dominance (Mearsheimer, 2003, p. 363-365). There is certain truth in argument that even in the institutions based on high common values, as EU and NATO

are, great powers have the dominant bargaining power to overcome small states by making direct deals among themselves, particularly in EU case of qualified-majority voting system favouring major states. But, on the other hand, the solidarity within NATO and EU, and the great powers' need for allies, particularly when their positions differ, gives the small states bigger chances to promote their interests, as Wivel suggests, usually in 'mutually overlapping 'concerts' in different issue areas' (Wivel, 2013). Both NATO and EU are important formats for coordinating overall strategies of member states, giving smaller states better situation awareness and sharing valuable experience on strategies crafting and feedback on their implementing, thus increasing also intellectual capabilities of small states. All in all, the international institutions, although with different level of credibility, involve active participation of small states aiming to promote their interests, also in regard to certainty in international environment.

#### **4. Experience of the Baltic States in grand strategy**

The success of the three Baltic States in internal transition and integration in NATO and EU after regaining the independence in 1991, resulting in substantial change of their geopolitical posture, previously more associated with buffer or 'insular' states (Buzan and Wæver, 2003), can be regarded as good example of successful grand strategy. It comprised mobilisation of all available internal resources, including the moral power, and external support for overcoming internal weaknesses, Russia's opposition and European conditionality (Lamoreaux and Galbreth, 2008) to achieve more favourable environment for further security and development. Subsequently, active membership in these organisations in a positive way reconfigure the action capacity and vulnerability of Baltic States, also increasing their international influence

through participation in joint decision making process at 28 state formats (Lamoreaux and Galbreth, 2008, p. 4). But it remains open, if all new opportunities were adequately used, as K.Paulauskas in 2006 noted a trend of 'lengthy list of national interests without clear priorities' and very limited resources to back up these ambitions (Paulauskas, 2006, pp. 15-41), largely characteristic in case of all three states. The actuality for better prioritisation of Baltic States interests within EU can be noted also in a study of D.Panke in 2010 on small states in EU, showing that this relates to a larger group of states to be able to punch above their weight (Panke, 2010). In the first decade of EU/NATO membership, taking into account NATO security guaranties, focus in the Baltic States was primarily on coping with non-military challenges. For example, M.Crandall, relatively recently, at the beginning of 2014, in the context of soft security of Estonia, stresses cyber security, energy security and national identity threats (Crandall, 2014), which are actual also in case of Latvia and Lithuania (Lithuania having lesser concerns about national identity). But due to Russia's launched hybrid warfare against Ukraine, propaganda campaign against the West and increased military force show near the Western borders, the hard security of the Baltic States is again in the forefront (Kroenig, 2015), being closely linked to the their internal stability and ability to resist possible provocations. These developments stimulated the Baltic States to critically reassess their priorities and strategically adapt to the new situation.

To consider the appropriateness of the strategies of the Baltic States, it might be a merit to look on strategic approaches of number of other small nations, particularly exposed to unstable neighbourhood. Here the experience of Nordic States activism on overcoming 'smallness' with 'smartness', enjoying greater international influence than their military and economic weight, could be studied, acting as 'norm entrepreneurs' in support for more benign international

environment; Finland's development of smart innovative model of the information society to generate competitive advantage in competence and resources; Finland's experience in turning its peripheral geographic location in EU into advantage in the context of Northern Dimension Initiative; enhanced model of societal security (Browning, 2006; Archer, 2014, pp. 66-79). Israel's case, being small according to geographic, economic and population criteria, but regarded as a regional power, able to exert considerable influence on larger states (Lamoreaux and Galbreth, 2008, p. 3), could make sense. Singapore's experience in developing successful statehood and extremely competitive economy, despite potential hostile neighbourhood (The Economist, 2015; Chong, 2015, pp. 65.-79), could also be attractive for study. However, a broad look on these country cases shows that there is no grand strategic alternative for the course of the Baltic States within the NATO and EU. Using Nordic experience on smart approaches for strengthening internal coherence and developing competitive advantages would be the right way, as there is still a long way for Baltic States to go to reach the level of economic development of Nordic countries to be able to act as bold sponsors of different international projects. In case of Israel and Singapore we could learn from success of developing internal strengths, but there is huge difference in geostrategic context, and Israel's military strategy has not led to successful transformation of its neighbourhood. We should also keep in mind that small states are not only partners, but also compete with each other for niches in global political-economic arena (Cooper and Shaw, 2009, p. 4). Baltic States, despite being competitors in economic field, could look on more integrated defence model, allowing more efficient military spending, which is planned to be increased, through joint procurement projects and getting better chances to use offset arrangements to promote local industrial and scientific base, in such a way mitigating the effect of growing defence burden on economy. Moreover,



the Baltic States, despite their shortfalls, can continuously act as strategy mentors for Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine for strengthening their capacities.

## **Conclusions**

The evolving concept of security has changed the understanding of overall security environment and of the structure and application of the power base of a state, putting small states in more favourable situation through the growing role of soft and smart power. Also the understanding of grand strategy has captured broader meaning of security and stress the quality of power exercise by state, not the size or qualitative criteria. The geopolitical context of states still remains the most important factor for defining grand strategic options of nations. As example of Baltic States show, small states even with limited resource base are able to generate and implement grand strategic goals to shape their environment, although the geopolitical context can also constrain grand strategic options, as in the case of Georgia and Moldova. Today, when hard power seems to become again a greater factor, due to militarisation of Russia and China, geopolitical factor plays even a greater role. There is a requirement for wisdom and self-discipline of the state for sustaining the grand strategy, redefining goals in new circumstances, when the initial goals are met. The joining of NATO/EU was a way, rather than end, to support national interests of the Baltic States, and there was a lack of agility to adapt grand strategy to this new situation.

The small states studies have been primarily devoted to foreign policy issues. It would be wise in future to turn greater attention to more comprehensive analyses of small state policy practices, corresponding to grand strategic level, usable at policy

level. Education on strategy should be promoted for policy makers, aiming for better strategies in the future.

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## **What capabilities might the Baltic states need to develop to deter against a 'hybrid', 'non-linear', 'limited' or 'ambiguous' attack?**

**COL Georgs Kerlins**

If to compare K.Clausewitz with his predecessor in time ancient Chinese strategist Sun-Tzu, it is possible to conclude that Clausewitz's theory of war generally is narrower and more primitive than Sun-Tzu's theory of war. In addition it should be noted that all attempts of Clausewitz's contemporaries and followers to create on this base "better" theory of war where making it more and more primitive.

British historian B. Liddell Hart looked at war as armed struggle and part of politics conducted in a framework of "grand strategy". He analysed hundreds of armed conflicts and wars of last twenty five centuries and concluded, that main and most effective strategy of war is strategy of indirect approach. His analysis of wars is most comprehensive and scientific, and conclusions made by British historian are fully relevant today (Vladimirov, 2013, part I, p.95).

Above quote is from monumental<sup>30</sup> monograph *Fundamentals of General Theory of War* by retired general of Russian army Alexander Vladimirov<sup>31</sup>. Besides interesting evaluation of Clausewitz, the quote highlights important aspect of contemporary Russian military and political thought – clear preference for indirect approach similar to that suggested by Sun-Tzu and Liddle Hart. It also indicates attention paid to what is considered to be Western approach to warfare in recent Russian publications.

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<sup>30</sup> Two volumes: 832 and 976 pages. Annotation claims it to be unparalleled comprehensive and innovative textbook on war theory, Russia's national strategy, politics and methods of governance.

<sup>31</sup> Besides army career, General A.Vladimirov has had key assignments in Russia's Ministry of Defence and Administration of President. Currently is chairman of Russia's military experts' board and member of Council of National Strategy.

This can be further exemplified by the speech of General Valery Gerasimov, Chief of General Staff of Russia addressing conference of scientists in 2013. In this speech he gave an estimate on key aspects of contemporary warfare. Examples referenced, where two US led operations in Iraq and NATO operation in Libya. Based on his interpretation of these examples, general Gersimov concluded that emphasis of contemporary warfare is moving from direct destruction annihilation of the opponent to its inner decay, and importance of indirect, covert and non-military means have increased significantly. It is worth to note, that so-called Colour Revolutions in Eastern Europe and Arab spring were also named as a new type of warfare (Gerasimov, 2013). The speech has acquired wider attention in the West since annexation of Crimea and conflict in Eastern Ukraine. A number of experts started to see many similarities between, what was claimed to be Western approach and tools Russia itself employed in Ukraine (for example: Berzins 2014, Galeoti 2014).

Developments in Ukraine alarmed many in Baltic States, despite NATO umbrella. Both politicians<sup>32</sup> and researchers tried to comprehend and term actions of Russia. Similar to other Western authors, their speeches and articles were filled with terms like 'hybrid', 'non-linear', 'limited', 'ambiguous', 'new generation', 'asymmetric', 'unconventional' and alike. All opinions, both in Baltic States and other Western countries, can broadly be summarised in three groups: 1) it is new type of warfare, 2) same, age-old ideas, 3) old ideas, capitalizing on new technologies and

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<sup>32</sup> Article of President of Estonia <http://www.interpretermag.com/estonian-president-toomas-hendrik-ilves-reflects-on-a-year-of-russian-aggression/>

advantages of autocratic regime in speed of decision making and coordinated action of key state institutions<sup>33</sup>.

In order to focus more on the capabilities Baltic States might need to develop against possible tools and methods used by Russia, this essay will abstain from the terminology debate<sup>34</sup>. The term 'hybrid warfare' will be used to describe comprehensive use of a state power to prevail over other state(s) defined by general Gerasimov as:

... widespread use of political, economic, informational, humanitarian, and other non-military measures — applied with involvement of the protest potential of the population. All this is supplemented by military means of a covert character, including conduct of informational struggle and the actions of special-operations forces. The overt use of force, often under the guise of peacekeeping and crisis management, is resorted to only at a certain stage, primarily for the achievement of final success in the conflict (Gerasimov, 2013).

It will be argued that, should Russia intensify its attempts to regain control over Baltic States, it is more than likely to adjust theoretical hybrid warfare model described above to exclude, limit or delay involvement of NATO in the conflict. Therefore, the Baltic States should: firstly, improve overall cohesion and resilience of their societies; and secondly, prioritise development of those own capabilities which contribute to early identification and prevention or exposure and swift defeat of any covertly

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<sup>33</sup> For instance - article by four researchers from all three Baltic States: [http://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/what-does-hybrid-warfare-mean-to-europe-four-experts-weigh-in\\_2034.html](http://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/what-does-hybrid-warfare-mean-to-europe-four-experts-weigh-in_2034.html)

<sup>34</sup> For example see article by Lukas Milevski on the use of term 'asymmetry': <http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/NewsArticleView/tabid/7849/Article/577565/jfq-75-asymmetry-is-strategy-strategy-is-asymmetry.aspx> ; or J.N.Nielsen on the use of term 'hybrid war': <https://geopoliticraticus.wordpress.com/tag/valery-gerasimov/>



created armed insurrection. Same capabilities and resilient society would also increase cost calculation for overt invasion, thus contribute to deterrence.

In what follows firstly those aspects of Russia's hybrid war are identified, which have most relevant implications for Baltic States. Then capabilities needed to deter Hybrid threat will be analysed and issue of NATO cohesiveness addressed.

## **Hybrid warfare by Russia**

Any insurgent with English language knowledge and internet access, interested in what the US and NATO publications say about counter-insurgency, can easily<sup>35</sup> find them. An outsider, even knowing Russian language, would certainly face difficulties to find a manual with detailed description of what is Russia's actual interpretation of contemporary (hybrid) warfare. However, it is possible to develop a number of credible assumptions, when official documents and country's leadership statements, publicly available academic debate, information about reforms in army and other state institutions is compared to its recent and historical behaviour in conflicts.

Idea of indirect approach, praised by general Vladimirov, could be a good starting point in an attempt to identify those instruments in Russia's tool box, which can be used to both coerce Baltic States and limit or prevent involvement of other NATO member states. Basil Liddell Hart argued that: 'In studying the physical aspect we must never lose sight of the psychological, and only when both are combined is the strategy truly an indirect approach, calculated to dislocate the opponent's balance' (Liddell

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<sup>35</sup> First three links after entry in google search

Hart, 1967, p.341). One can see clear correlation between Liddell Hart's thinking and general Gerasimov's estimate of contemporary warfare. So it follows, that the target is opponents will and understanding. Desired political aim and adversary's strength and weaknesses will determine the mix of instruments used.

## **Information measures**

Words - Russian propaganda and information war has been extensively used in Baltic States traditional and social media during last year as conflict in Ukraine developed. Consequently, almost universal perception has developed among Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians that this phrase means heavily biased or faked story on Russian TV or internet. As with many popular perceptions, this is oversimplification. To better understand Russia's current approach, it is worth to look at historical origins of its 'information measures'. Different researchers trace roots of attempts to influence popular attitudes back to variety of historical events and personalities. Some refer to French revolution, others to religious missionaries or older examples. In regard to Russia, arguably, key developments are linked to revolutionary movements prior and during World War I.

According to J.F.C. Fuller three main tasks of propaganda during World War I were: '... 1) to stimulate the mass-mind on the home front; 2) to win to one's support the mass-minds of neutral nations; and 3) to subvert the mass-mind on the enemy's inner front' (1961, 179). He then gives several examples of execution of these tasks during the war. Great Britain disseminated stories about German alleged atrocities in order to both consolidate own population and convince US to join the war. Economic blockade reinforced by extensive contributed to revolution in Germany and subsequent defeat. Since the World War I the idea of propaganda has evolved in the West through more sophisticated concepts of psychological

and information operations<sup>36</sup> into current concept of Strategic Communication<sup>37</sup> (StratCom).

Destabilisation tactics used by Germany during World War I included support to independence movements in Russia and Russian revolutionaries in exile. Eventually they also helped Lenin to return to Russia (Fuller, 1961, p.179-185). After so-called October Revolution in 1917, Lenin and *Bolsheviks*, while the Civil war was still ongoing within Russia, constructed world's most powerful radio station at the time to spread communists ideology and initiate 'world revolution'. Sophistication of Soviet propaganda methods was gradually growing and reached its peak during Cold War. Spread of TV technology was the final improvement during Soviet Union (Taylor, 2010, p.423).

Apparently Soviet achievements are not forgotten in contemporary Russia. Rather they are further developed to embrace opportunities offered by Satellite TV and Internet. For example, NATO Centre of Excellence for Strategic Communication (StratCom COE) has conducted research on Russia's information campaign in relation to annexation of Crimea. It concludes that information campaign was central in Russia's operation. State controlled TV and Internet were primary tools in framing opinions. Separate but coordinated narratives were used targeting Ukraine, the West and domestic population. Narratives were controlled and quickly adjusted from Presidents administration. Additional fake news and conspiracy theories were inserted as conflict developed with the aim to

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<sup>36</sup> For detailed description of these developments see Philip M. Taylor: From Psychological Warfare to Information Operations and Back Again.

<sup>37</sup> NATO definition - *The Coordinated and appropriate use of NATO communications activities and capabilities- Public Diplomacy, Public Affairs, Military Public Affairs, Information Operations (IO) and Psychological Operations as appropriate in support of alliance policies, operations and activities and in order to advance NATO's aims.* For recent discussion of the concept see Tatham, Le Page: NATO Strategic Communication: More to be done?

deceive, distract and overwhelm government of Ukraine and the West (StratCom COE, 2014)

So it follows, that Russia's *information measures/struggle* has similar origin and aim to the StratCom concept in Western countries. What differs is reluctance in the West to use some methods of the Cold War as opposed to Russia, which capitalises both from own historical experience and new developments in technology and theory. Scale and sophistication of information measures/struggle are likely to increase, based constant surge of the budget for state controlled media<sup>38</sup>.

## **The protest potential of the population:**

### **As exploited by Russia in Ukraine and Georgia**

Possibility to use defence of very wide category of 'compatriots'<sup>39</sup> as an excuse for intervention was clearly demonstrated by Russia during conflict in Crimea. Same narrative was used also in Georgia in 2008 (StratCom COE, 2014). The evidence of Russia's direct involvement in supporting so-called separatists in Eastern Ukraine is growing<sup>40</sup>, despite its persistent denial. The approach employed can be summarised as follows: 1) 'compatriots' are encouraged to seek independence; 2) covert support is

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<sup>38</sup> See: <http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/russia-s-international-media-poisons-minds/508653.html>

<sup>39</sup> Four categories: (1) persons born in a state, who live in it and are characterized by a common language, history, cultural heritage, tradition and customs, and their direct relatives; (2) citizens of the Russian Federation living permanently abroad; (3) those born in the Soviet Union who now live in states that used to be part of the Soviet Union, and who have obtained citizenship in their country of residence, as well as those without any citizenship; and (4) emigrants from the Russian Federation or the Soviet Union who have obtained citizenship in their country of residence, as well as those without any citizenship. (Winnerstig [ed.], 2014, p.22-23)

<sup>40</sup> For example see latest account from Russia's opposition: [http://rus.uk.itvnet.lv/attachment/20150512\\_160525\\_3145.pdf](http://rus.uk.itvnet.lv/attachment/20150512_160525_3145.pdf)

provided for ensuring success of separatists; 3) large conventional force is deployed to deter host country from decisive counter actions (Mastriano, 2014). Leadership of Russia reminds to Western countries, that it still possesses nuclear weapons. Information, intelligence and subversion measures are used both to prepare and fuel 'protest potential' throughout conflict. Cyber-attacks are increased and synchronised with other operational activities (StratCom COE, 2014 and Asmus, 2010, p.167). Covert support can range from intelligence and special forces operatives, to attack by conventional forces, with or without insignia. Recurring theme is the use of 'volunteers' and *Cossacks* as one more form of deniable support. Same groups were used by Russia during Georgian war and preceding conflicts as well (Asmus, 2010, p.22). Besides nuclear deterrence and information measures, diplomatic and financial leverages are used to prevent Western states from interfering or split their unity.

## **The protest potential of the population:**

### **Situation in the Baltic States**

'Protest potential' which can be exploited for the Hybrid War like scenarios in Baltic States usually is associated with Russian minority. Percentage of it is as follows: Latvia-26.9; Estonia-25.5 per cent and Lithuania - 5.4 per cent (Winnerstig [ed.], 2014, p.22-23). However, if one tries to apply Russia's 'compatriot' definition (see above), then numbers becomes indefinite due to broadness of the formulation. Arguably, later could have been the actual aim for such a wide description. Furthermore, as shown Therefore, it can be concluded, that 'protest potential' or compatriots to be protected are there, should Russia decide to do so. Noteworthy is also

a 6 percent Polish minority in Lithuania, which could be another target for Russia to be used to destabilize Lithuania<sup>41</sup>.

A study conducted by Swedish Defence Research Agency concluded that Russia is pursuing well financed and centrally governed soft power and non-military strategy in all three Baltic States. The aims of this strategy are: 1) to support 'compatriots' and their cultural, religious, business and political affiliations with Russia; 2) undermine self-confidence of Baltic States as independent countries. Strategy is executed by a number of governmental and seemingly non-governmental organisations. Overall coordination is done through Ministry of Foreign affairs. It was also concluded that Russia's interpretation of Soft power differs from Joseph Nye's original idea, and includes possibility to use financial and energy instruments for coercion (Winnerstig [ed.], 2014, p.4-25).

Complimentary, to Soft power (in Russia's interpretation) instruments, frequent military exercises are conducted in vicinity of Baltic States. Recently there have been some harassing activities, like kidnapping of Estonian security official and detention of Lithuanian ship (Winnerstig [ed.], 2014, p.14).

Based on situation described above, there are two potential options open for Russia: 1) continuous pursue of 'compatriots' policy primarily by 'soft' power means in order to keep Baltic States of balance and gain control over them through electoral process; 2) resort to adjusted Ukraine/Georgia type scenario. In later covert or overt use of force cannot be excluded.

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<sup>41</sup> For example see: [http://www.defence24.com/analysis\\_moscow-is-getting-ready-for-a-hybrid-war-with-lithuania-is-the-polish-minority-going-to-be-the-flashpoint](http://www.defence24.com/analysis_moscow-is-getting-ready-for-a-hybrid-war-with-lithuania-is-the-polish-minority-going-to-be-the-flashpoint)

## Implications for Baltic States

Defence Secretary of UK, Michael Fallon is reported saying that there is a possibility of Russia using undercover forces and cyber-attacks against Baltic States, therefore, NATO should be ready for Russian aggression whatever form it takes<sup>42</sup>. The President of Lithuania, Dalia Grybauskaite in TV interview claimed that first stage of conflict with Russia is already ongoing, and it is characterised by information war, propaganda and cyber-attacks against Lithuania. A conventional attack cannot be excluded as well (Grybauskaite, 2015). One can find similar statements also by politicians and experts of Estonia and Latvia. This indicates that many in Baltic States feel being under Russia's pressure already. However, only leadership of Russia can know, what are going to be exact next steps.

The Baltic States, especially after events in Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine recently, see Russia to be the belligerent side in current confrontation. Since, much of Russia's previous actions fit into indirect model suggested by Liddell Hart for offensive<sup>43</sup> side in the conflict, it is worth to look what were his suggestions for the side which perceives itself to be on defensive.

The conservative State can achieve its object by merely inducing the aggressor to drop his attempt at conquest – by convincing him that 'the game is not worth the candle'. [...] conservative State is to find the type of strategy that is suited to fulfil its inherently more limited object in the most strength-conserving way [...] At first glance, it might seem that pure defence would be the most economical method; but this implies static defence – and historical experience warns us that it is a dangerously brittle method on which to relay. Economy of force and deterrent effect are best combined in the defensive-offensive method, based on high mobility that carries the power of quick riposte (Liddle Hart, 1967, p.368).

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<sup>42</sup> BBC News, 2015: <http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-31530392>

<sup>43</sup> According to Liddle Hart offensive side in the conflict is 'acquisitive' as opposed to 'conservative', which is defensive (Liddle Hart, 1967, p.368).

As the last sentence of the quote indicates, Liddell Hart probably meant examples like posture of France against Germany in the beginning of World War II. Nevertheless, the same logic should apply to the defensive State in Hybrid war as well. If one feels uncomfortable with using term 'offensive', then 'proactive' could be more polite alternative. The other important notion to derive is a need to balance credible deterrence *versus* cost. Due to size of territory, population and economy Baltic States on their own are very unlikely to develop credible deterrence against Russia. On the other hand, NATO states (with the exception of the US) have been remarkably successful in 'strength-conserving' after the end of Cold War. Furthermore, NATO has demonstrated to Russia that it generally is not homogenous organisation, for example disagreements about operations in Iraq and Libya. Hence, in what follows - possibilities for Baltic States to increase own deterrence potential and cohesiveness of NATO will be analysed.

## **Improving deterrence capabilities of Baltic States**

One of the approaches for planning military capabilities is threat based model. It was used by NATO during Cold War to develop appropriate military capabilities to deter against Soviet Union. Later it was changed to capability based model which was used, primarily, to generate capabilities for expeditionary operations (Pfeiffer, 2008, p.118). Since the former is more precise and bounding it should be used also to generate capabilities against Hybrid War situations. Potential difficulty in applying both of these methods could be associated with involvement of *all* other (civilian) instruments of state power, if military are to remain the hub of such planning and control. Suggested solution, therefore, would be for threat based planning model to be firstly, adopted to Hybrid War scenarios, and then introduced into crisis management coordination body at national level.



Within limits of this study it is not possible to develop detailed and individual scenarios for each of the Baltic States, which are needed for precise identification of capabilities required. Therefore, only broad generic suggestions can be developed. A way to identify these capabilities is to match them to opposing Russia's options. Based on this approach, one can identify following capabilities:

Opposing option	Prioritised capabilities
<b>A.</b> Current status quo, with long term non-violent take-over through 'democratic' elections	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Resilient and cohesive society</li> <li>2. StratCom, Intelligence, Counter-intelligence, Law enforcement – with focus on identifying, preventing and exposing Russia's subversive and soft power activities.</li> <li>3. Education, Integration and Economic development – to improve resilience of society</li> <li>4. Own and NATO military capabilities to increase deterrence and prevent covert/overt attack</li> </ol>
<b>B.</b> Covert/overt attack	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. NATO capability on the ground, and fast reinforcement</li> <li>2. StratCom, Intelligence, counter-intelligence, Law enforcement, Military (takes lead in case of overt attack), , – with focus on identifying, preventing, exposing and defeating attempts to organise armed insurrection. Military in lead if insurgents get heavy arms or overt attack</li> <li>3. Cohesive and resilient society</li> </ol>

Table 1.

Since the capabilities needed for the covert/ overt attack scenario are more demanding, their development would be more costly and time consuming. Therefore, development of these capabilities should be prioritised.

What the table also clearly identifies is an obvious need for high degree of coordination and cooperation between different government agencies. This issue becomes even more crucial because, as announced by general Gerasimov, Russia has established special command centre to not only

coordinate, but also command and control *all* government agencies on their side of the struggle.

Russia is not unique in its desire to streamline contribution of different government agencies to a common purpose of an operation. During operations in Afghanistan and Iraq greater need of support from non-military government agencies in post-conflict stabilisation and reconstruction was recognised. As response different concepts of civil-military and interagency cooperation were tried, latest being the US developed 'Whole of Government' approach<sup>44</sup> (Dunlap, 2012 p. 185,). Critics, however, point also to difficulties associated with overcoming '...inherent barriers to interagency collaboration (LeCuyer, 2012, p.235)'.

This seems to be another example, how seemingly obvious and logic ideas turn to be difficult in execution. In theory, establishment of enhanced cooperation within Baltic States should be one of the few instances, when small size could be a benefit. According to the same logic, more developed cooperation among Baltic States should be also easier to develop. Persuading Russia to believe that all three states would reinforce each other would certainly add to cost calculation of any aggression.

### **Mini-case study**

As small but instructive illustration for need of such cooperation can serve the case of Vladimirs Lindermanis, who was jailed in Russia:

The Latvian prosecutor office asked for his extradition twice, since the first one was denied by Russia. A considerable diplomatic effort was made, and finally Russia agreed to extradite him to Latvia in March

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<sup>44</sup> NATO has developed similar concept - Comprehensive approach. For analysis of origins and current challenges see research of Philipp Rotmann. *Built on Shaky Ground : The Comprehensive Approach in Practice*, available at <http://www.natolibguides.info/comprehensiveapproach>

2008. In August of the same year he was free. This man, who Russia was not willing to extradite to Latvia, made huge efforts to organize the 2011 referendum about the Russian language's status in Latvia and in 2012 proposed a referendum for the region of Latgale to become autonomous (Berzins, 2014, p.9).

Story is continued by numerous claims of oppression of 'Russian speaking' minority by Lindermanis in local and foreign media. On 05 May 2015 Security services have submitted request to court to stop activity of political party established by Lindermanis in 2012<sup>45</sup>.

One can assume that all the initial diplomatic and current Security police effort could have been saved by somebody from foreign affairs people asking few questions to Security police. It would have also denied quite a few headlines for Russia's information measures. However, this would require from an anonymous diplomat both understanding of the need to look outside his job description and the will to cross *interagency barriers*.

The Lindermanis-case study should also bring the Table 1 back into the discussion. Although intentionally simplified from the beginning, it still highlights natural inclination for linear thinking. More developed threat scenarios and detailed capability lists would not guarantee breaking out of linear mental connections like: spy – counterintelligence; or suspected contributor to active measures – security police. Why not for tax office to check Mr. Linderman's financial books? Even if the bookkeeping is in order, maybe same laws need improvements to make it more difficult for him to get financial support from 'compatriots' support organisations? Main conclusion to be derived from this case is a requirement for creative and proactive thinking transcending agency borders and wider awareness among state officials and general population about the nature of hybrid threat and options to oppose it.

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<sup>45</sup> TVNET News: <http://www.tvnet.lv/zinas/latvija/558783-knab-ludzis-tiesai-apturet-partijas-par-dzimto-valodu-darbibu>

## Example of Finland

Later statement again qualifies to 'easy to understand – difficult to do' category. As a practical model to increase general awareness and interagency cooperation Baltic States could use example from Finland. Since 1961 Finland is conducting National Defence Courses for key civil and military officials and also leaders of major corporations and non-governmental organizations. The course is aimed at widening awareness about Finnish foreign, security and defence policy, and enhancing cooperation in society networking of the persons working in a field of Finland's security. Duration of the course is three and a half weeks. For graduates shorter, one to two days, refreshment seminars are organised later. Similar course series are organised also at regional level.<sup>46</sup>

Defence of Finland is widely associated with total defence concept<sup>47</sup> which has currently evolved into:

Comprehensive Defence Approach encompasses the whole of society by offering a possibility to use the resources of different sectors of society to maintain security. The idea is to coordinate the measures of the public and private sector as well as voluntary activities by citizens in order to maintain functional society under all circumstances. (MoD of Finland, online, undated<sup>48</sup>)

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<sup>46</sup> Finnish National Defence University/ Studies/ National Defence Courses: [http://www.puolustusvoimat.fi/en/National Defence University/Front Page/?uril%3Apath%3A/en puolustusvoimat.fi/Puolustusvoimat.fien/National Defence University/Front Page/](http://www.puolustusvoimat.fi/en/National_Defence_University/Front_Page/?uril%3Apath%3A/en_puolustusvoimat.fi/Puolustusvoimat.fien/National_Defence_University/Front_Page/)

<sup>47</sup> For the description of development of the Total Defence concept see Pertti Salminen: <http://www.osce.org/fsc/78104?download=true>

<sup>48</sup> See [http://www.defmin.fi/en/tasks\\_and\\_activities/comprehensive\\_defence\\_approach](http://www.defmin.fi/en/tasks_and_activities/comprehensive_defence_approach)

Apparent vulnerability of total or comprehensive defence concept is that there could be not enough time for mobilisation of reservists and material foreseen in defence plans, if situation develops with the speed and sophistication demonstrated by Russia during annexation of Crimea. Cohesiveness and increased resistance potential of society, on the other hand, is clear advantage and deterring capability in itself.

Finally, Finland does possess some conventional weapon systems which in case of aggression theoretically allow striking not only attacking units but also targets inside Russia<sup>49</sup>. This capability comes closer to credible 'power of quick riposte' Liddell Hart was referring to. It also provides retaliation possibility certainly adds to cost-benefit analysis of Russia's options against Finland. In the case of Baltic states, however, it also reminds dilemma of credible deterrence *versus* cost. Therefore, acquisition of such capability is advised if Baltic States see Russia's attack as imminent.

As a general conclusion, the Baltic States should critically study experience of Finland and adopt those elements of comprehensive defence, which would improve resilience of own societies. This would clearly increase deterrence effect and also improve ability for self-defence in case of both covert and overt attack. Therefore, cohesiveness and resilience of society by Baltic States should be treated as capability to be planned and developed. Ability to proactively use all state capabilities across interagency boundaries is equally important.

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<sup>49</sup> For example see: <http://www.army-technology.com/projects/mlrs/> or : <http://www.janes.com/article/44158/us-approves-jassm-sale-to-poland>

## **More cohesive and proactive NATO (another Kennan needed?)**

White Paper by US Special Forces Command *Counter-Unconventional Warfare*<sup>50</sup> argues that unconventional warfare<sup>51</sup> is preferred method in Hybrid Warfare<sup>52</sup> conducted by Russia and Iran. It recalls Cold War experience. Quotes George Kennan's *Policy Planning Memorandum* from 1948, and suggests for US to gain initiative and claims that '...a response capitalizing on America's own irregular<sup>53</sup> and unconventional warfare skills, as part of a whole-of-government and multinational strategy, can best counter actions of emergent adversaries to destabilize global security (2014, p. 3-14)'

Proposals from US Special Forces come close to defensive-offensive posture suggested by Liddell Hart. However, so far it is difficult to identify any signs that US or NATO would be gaining initiative and acting

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<sup>50</sup> US definition for *Counter-unconventional warfare* - A strategy encompassing a whole-of-government approach to synchronize the pillars of irregular warfare to integrate joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational partner efforts against adversary unconventional warfare activities (US SF, 2014, p.40)

<sup>51</sup> US definition for *Unconventional Warfare* - Activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area (US SF, 2014, p.41).

<sup>52</sup> US definition for *Hybrid Warfare* - Hybrid Warfare involves a state or state-like actor's use of all available diplomatic, informational, military, and economic means to destabilize an adversary (US SF, 2014, p.3).

<sup>53</sup> US definition for *Irregular warfare* - A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s). In IW, a less powerful adversary seeks to disrupt or negate the military capabilities and advantages of a more powerful military force, which usually serves that nation's established government (US SF, 2014, p.41).

proactively towards Russia. Widely accepted view about Cold War is, that it was existential threat, which forced NATO and wider West to be more cohesive. The Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact were feared because above huge military and nuclear capability they presented completely antagonistic ideology as well. Current, limited Western response to Russia's assertive behaviour clearly indicates that perception has changed. This could be linked to the fact, that Russia has adopted some sort of capitalism and claims practising their version of 'sovereign' democracy. This may have led some Western leaders to view recent Russia's actions as being temporary problem, or link them to personality and distorted ideas of president Putin alone.

However, it can be argued that there is a new, equally antagonistic to West, ideology spreading in Russia. Careful observers have noticed signs of it already some time ago. For example, James Sherr in January 2008 claimed that Russia is not seeking to join the West anymore. Ideas of 'distinctive' values, 'zones of interest' and geopolitics are disseminated. Its economic and military power is growing and it will use it for 'strict promotion' of interests, but '...military power takes back seat to economic power (Sherr, 2008, p.6)'. Events in Georgia later that year showed that military power can take front seat as well. Charles Clover in his article *In Moscow, A New Eurasianism* depicts how initial ideas of Mackinder and his followers were combined with imperial nationalism's 'traditional values' and adjusted for the use in contemporary Russia by Alexandr Dugin in his, in Russia frequently reprinted<sup>54</sup>, book *Basics of Geopolitics*. Clover also shows how key words from these ideas are quoted by Russia's top officials, including president Putin. Finally, he describes it:

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<sup>54</sup> Interesting to note, that as a 'scientific consultant' for the third, enlarged reprint is named general Klokotov, lecturer of Military Academy of General Staff of Russia (Dugin, 1999).

A shadow ideology is one that is not aimed at mass mobilization behind public slogans, as was the case in the Soviet period, but at consolidating an elite behind a set of understood if unspoken truths, deniably vague statements and opaque policies. It is not the subject of booming speeches, but one of whispered codes (Clover, 2014).

Although the full substance of 'Eurasianism' ideology might not be used for mass mobilisation, important aspects of it are. For example already quoted research on Russia's media before and during annexation of Crimea has frequently noticed reoccurring narratives of 'conspiring, encroaching West; distinctive, superior civilizational values and historical mission to preserve them (StratCom COE, 2014). One can compare them with some of the names of the chapters from Dugin's *Basics of Geopolitics*: 'Crusade against us; They will not stop; Liberalism – totalitarian ideology' (Dugin, 1999, p.920).

So it follows, that signs of new antagonistic ideology in Russia are visible for the West, if it chooses to see them. Therefore, one more proactive option for Baltic States is firstly, to research deeper both ideology and latest indirect/hybrid concepts this phenomenon in more details, and secondly, include well-grounded explanations in own StratCom narratives. This would provide possibility for domestic and wider audience to see some of Russia's statements and actions in a new light. Consequently, greater awareness should contribute to increased unity domestically, among Baltic States and within NATO. Maybe, eventually another Kennan would emerge to convince leadership of NATO countries for the need of proactive, hybrid actions?

Hence, previously identified crucial StratCom capability becomes even more important.

## **Summary**

As discussed in the essay, priority capabilities to be developed by the Baltic States in order to deter or defeat Hybrid threat are: StratCom,



Cohesive and resilient society, Intelligence/counterintelligence, Law enforcement, Military. Focus of development should be identifying, preventing, exposing and defeating attempts to organise armed insurrection. Ability to proactively cooperate between state agencies and among Baltic States is crucial. In this regard, example of Finland is to be studied carefully. Absolute priority is cohesion of NATO and presence in the Baltic States.

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