

# **ZEXE:** Enabling Decentralized Private Computation

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Pratyush Mishra	UC Berkeley
Howard Wu	UC Berkeley

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[ia.cr/2018/962](https://ia.cr/2018/962)

[libzexe.org](https://libzexe.org)

# Computing on distributed ledgers

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
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
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


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






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





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





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



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







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
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





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
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

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
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



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
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

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
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- Permanently stored on the ledger

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[[BDJT17](#), [BBDJLZ17](#), [DGKLZBBJ19](#)]





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
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# The Zerocash Paradigm [BCGGMTV14]

Each transaction consumes old coins and creates new coins.  
The senders, receivers, and values are provably hidden.


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
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
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
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
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
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
**all created** coins  
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


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


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
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

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
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
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# Sketch of Zerocash


[BCGGMTV14]



Simplify: just say that proof proves four things: Existence of coins, unique spends, construction of new coins, and correct values.  
Reason: don't use it in the rest of the talk anyway.

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


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# Sketch of Zerocash

[BCGGMTV14]

set of all coin commitments    old coin serial numbers    new coin commitments    ZKP

**tx**

rt

$sn_i^{\text{old}}$

$cm_j^{\text{new}}$

$\pi$

$\Psi$   
 $cm_i^{\text{old}}$


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
$\Psi$   
 $cm_i^{old}$

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[BCGGMTV14]

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
A shaded rectangular area containing the Greek letter  $\Psi$  above the label  $cm_i^{old}$ . Two vertical arrows point upwards from the top of this shaded area to the  $sn_i^{old}$  and  $cm_j^{new}$  fields in the transaction box above.

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$\Psi$   
 $cm_i^{old}$

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$$\sum_i v_i^{old} = \sum_j v_j^{new}$$

ZeroCash achieves ideal  
anonymity for a single asset  
(on a single blockchain).




ZeroCash achieves ideal  
anonymity for a single asset  
(on a single blockchain).

How to achieve ideal privacy for  
multiple user-defined assets  
(on the same blockchain)?

# Private user-defined assets


set of all coin commitments    old coin serial numbers    new coin commitments    ZKP



\* For now we ignore how to mint an initial supply and generate a unique id.

# Private user-defined assets


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

**But:** assets are still isolated.

How to enable applications that interact with multiple assets?





# Custom access to user-defined assets

set of all coin commitments      old coin serial numbers      new coin commitments      ZKP




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


# Custom access to user-defined assets

set of all coin commitments      old coin serial numbers      new coin commitments      ZKP



**Transaction reveals no information about asset identifier, value, or predicate**



- $\forall id, id\text{-value is conserved}$
- $\forall i, \phi_i^{old}(\text{all coins}) = 1$


# Private atomic swaps

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Key primitive for constructing DEXs

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$c_1^{\text{old}}$

$pk_1^{\text{old}}$

$(id_1^{\text{old}}, v_1^{\text{old}}, aux_1^{\text{old}})$

$\phi_1^{\text{old}} = \phi_{\text{exch}}$

$c_2^{\text{old}}$

$pk_2^{\text{old}}$

$(id_2^{\text{old}}, v_2^{\text{old}}, aux_2^{\text{old}})$

$\phi_2^{\text{old}}$

$c_1^{\text{new}}$

$pk_1^{\text{new}}$

$(id_1^{\text{new}}, v_1^{\text{new}}, \perp)$

$\phi_1^{\text{new}}$

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$\mathbf{c}_2^{\text{old}}$

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$(\text{id}_2^{\text{old}}, v_2^{\text{old}}, \text{aux}_2^{\text{old}})$

$\phi_2^{\text{old}}$

$\phi_{\text{exch}}(\mathbf{c}_1^{\text{old}}, \mathbf{c}_2^{\text{old}}, \mathbf{c}_1^{\text{new}}, \mathbf{c}_2^{\text{new}})$  :

$\mathbf{c}_1^{\text{new}}$

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$(\text{id}_1^{\text{new}}, v_1^{\text{new}}, \perp)$

$\phi_1^{\text{new}}$

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
$(\text{id}_2^{\text{new}}, v_2^{\text{new}}, \perp)$

$\phi_2^{\text{new}}$



# Private atomic swaps

Key primitive for constructing DEXs




$\phi_{\text{exch}}(c_1^{\text{old}}, c_2^{\text{old}}, c_1^{\text{new}}, c_2^{\text{new}})$  :

Parse  $aux_1^{\text{old}}$  as  $(id^*, v^*, pk^*)$

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
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
Check that  $id_2^{\text{old}} = id^*$  and  $v_2^{\text{old}} = v^*$

Perform swap:

$$\begin{aligned} id_1^{\text{new}} &= id_2^{\text{old}}; & v_1^{\text{new}} &= v_2^{\text{old}} \\ id_2^{\text{new}} &= id_1^{\text{old}}; & v_2^{\text{new}} &= v_1^{\text{old}} \end{aligned}$$

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$\phi_{exch}(c_1^{old}, c_2^{old}, c_1^{new}, c_2^{new}) :$

Parse  $aux_1^{old}$  as  $(id^*, v^*, pk^*)$


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 $id_1^{new} = id_2^{old}; \quad v_1^{new} = v_2^{old}$   
 $id_2^{new} = id_1^{old}; \quad v_2^{new} = v_1^{old}$

Check addresses:  
 $pk_1^{new} = pk^*$   
 $pk_2^{new} = pk_2^{old}$


DEX

DEX



Atomic swap





# DEX Architectures



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Order-based:

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## Order-based:

- *Order book* maintains list of orders published by makers

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$(A, B, v_A, v_B, \dots)$

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# Intent-based DEX


Index

<b>Sell</b>	<b>Buy</b>	<b>Public key</b>
BAT	MKR	pk <sub>1</sub>
ZRX	OMG	pk <sub>2</sub>

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BAT	MKR	pk <sub>1</sub>
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


Maker

# Intent-based DEX

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<b>Sell</b>	<b>Buy</b>	<b>Public key</b>
BAT	MKR	pk <sub>1</sub>
ZRX	OMG	pk <sub>2</sub>
A	B	pk <sub>M</sub>




Maker


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Index

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


Taker

# Intent-based DEX

Index

Sell	Buy	Public key
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





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
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BAT	MKR	pk <sub>1</sub>
ZRX	OMG	pk <sub>2</sub>
A	B	pk <sub>M</sub>




# Intent-based DEX

Index


Sell	Buy	Public key
BAT	MKR	pk <sub>1</sub>
ZRX	OMG	pk <sub>2</sub>
A	B	pk <sub>M</sub>



# Privacy Leakage



# Privacy Leakage




“The addresses  
**addr<sub>M</sub>** and **addr<sub>T</sub>**  
are exchanging

**$v_A$  units of A**


for

**$v_B$  units of B”**


# Privacy Leakage



# Privacy Leakage




# Privacy Leakage



## Trade anonymity

No information about participants in the trade is revealed.

# Privacy Leakage



## Trade anonymity

No information about participants in the trade is revealed.

## Trade confidentiality

No information about the assets and values used in the trade is revealed.



# Private Intent-based DEX


Index

<b>Sell</b>	<b>Buy</b>	<b>Public key</b>
BAT	MKR	pk <sub>1</sub>
ZRX	OMG	pk <sub>2</sub>

# Private Intent-based DEX

Index

<b>Sell</b>	<b>Buy</b>	<b>Public key</b>
BAT	MKR	pk <sub>1</sub>
ZRX	OMG	pk <sub>2</sub>




Maker

# Private Intent-based DEX

Index

<b>Sell</b>	<b>Buy</b>	<b>Public key</b>
BAT	MKR	pk <sub>1</sub>
ZRX	OMG	pk <sub>2</sub>
A	B	pk <sub>M</sub>




Maker


# Private Intent-based DEX

Index

<b>Sell</b>	<b>Buy</b>	<b>Public key</b>
BAT	MKR	pk <sub>1</sub>
ZRX	OMG	pk <sub>2</sub>
A	B	pk <sub>M</sub>



Maker




Taker

# Private Intent-based DEX

Index


Sell	Buy	Public key
BAT	MKR	pk <sub>1</sub>
ZRX	OMG	pk <sub>2</sub>
A	B	pk <sub>M</sub>



# Private Intent-based DEX



## Index

Sell	Buy	Public key
BAT	MKR	pk <sub>1</sub>
ZRX	OMG	pk <sub>2</sub>
A	B	pk <sub>M</sub>



Maker


(A, v<sub>A</sub>) (B, v<sub>B</sub>)



Taker


(A, v<sub>A</sub>) (B, v<sub>B</sub>)

# Private Intent-based DEX




Maker

# Private Intent-based DEX




Maker

$c_1^{\text{old}}$







# Private Intent-based DEX




Maker



Taker





# Private Intent-based DEX




Maker

$c_1^{\text{old}}$




Taker


$c_2^{\text{old}}$




# Private Intent-based DEX




# Private Intent-based DEX



# Private Intent-based DEX



Maker



Taker

$c_1^{\text{old}}$

$pk_1^{\text{old}}$

$(A, v_A, aux_1^{\text{old}})$


$\phi_{\text{exch}}$

$(B, v_B)$


**Trade anonymity:**  
tx hides all information about Maker and Taker.

**Trade confidentiality:**  
tx hides all information about  $A$ ,  $B$ ,  $v_A$ , and  $v_B$ .

$r_2$



tx



Ledger



# Private user-defined assets

Private user-defined  
assets

Custom access to  
private user-defined  
assets



Private user-defined  
assets

Custom access to  
private user-defined  
assets

Private DEX



But what if you want a user-defined asset with a different (custom) policy?

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

**For example,**

simple ERC-20 tokens require only value-conservation.

other tokens, like stablecoins, need to also implement blacklists and whitelists.



# Birth predicates

set of all coin commitments      old coin serial numbers      new coin commitments      ZKP





# Birth predicates

set of all coin commitments      old coin serial numbers      new coin commitments      ZKP





# Birth predicates

set of all coin commitments      old coin serial numbers      new coin commitments      ZKP



# Supporting arbitrary data and computation



set of all coin commitments    old coin serial numbers    new coin commitments    ZKP





# Supporting arbitrary data and computation

set of all coin commitments    old coin serial numbers    new coin commitments    ZKP



ZEXE

# ZEXE

## **Modeling:** Records Nano-Kernel

minimalist shared execution environment that defines rules for computing on *records* (units of data)

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# ZEXE

## **Modeling:** Records Nano-Kernel

minimalist shared execution environment that defines rules for computing on *records* (units of data)



## **Theoretical crypto:** Decentralized Private Computation

crypto primitive that realizes a ledger-based RNK where txs reveal NO information about computations

# ZEXE

## **Modeling:** Records Nano-Kernel

minimalist shared execution environment that defines rules for computing on *records* (units of data)



## **Theoretical crypto:** Decentralized Private Computation

crypto primitive that realizes a ledger-based RNK where txs reveal NO information about computations



# ZEXE

## **Modeling:** Records Nano-Kernel

minimalist shared execution environment that defines rules for computing on *records* (units of data)



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crypto primitive that realizes a ledger-based RNK where txs reveal NO information about computations



## **Applied crypto:** ZEXE

leverage techniques from zkSNARKs, recursive composition, and efficient circuit design

# ZEXE


## **Modeling:** [Records Nano-Kernel](#)

minimalist shared execution environment that defines rules for computing on *records* (units of data)



## **Theoretical crypto:** [Decentralized Private Computation](#)

crypto primitive that realizes a ledger-based RNK where txs reveal NO information about computations



## **Applied crypto:** [ZEXE](#)

leverage techniques from zkSNARKs, recursive composition, and efficient circuit design

[libzexe.org](https://libzexe.org)



# Thanks!

[ia.cr/2018/962](https://ia.cr/2018/962)

[libzexe.org](https://libzexe.org)